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Wednesday, 30 June 1982

**Question:** In your lecture last night, you mentioned that Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* was an early work, and that in it he set excessively rigorous standards to which he did not revert in later works. Could you offer a couple of examples as to how Aristotle's later scientific works diverge from the requirements set forth in the *Posterior Analytics*?

**Lonergan:** Well, what I said about the *Posterior Analytics* is the opinion of Aristotelian scholars at the present time. In the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1, chapter 2, the apodeictic syllogism, the syllogism that demonstrates, is from necessary premises to necessary conclusions. And the premises are universal. In the *Physics*, the motions of the heavenly bodies are necessary, but all terrestrial events are contingent. In the *Metaphysics*, Book 7, Z, there is an ongoing disquisition on what is *ousia*. He settles it in a paragraph in the *Categories*, but he has 17 chapters in Book 7 of the *Metaphysics*. And he doesn't get a clear answer until the 17th. It gets to the point in chapter 17 when he asks what is meant by such questions as: What is *X*? *ti estin*? He has a first and then a second answer. The first answer is to reformulate the question. For example, What is an eclipse? can be reformulated as, Why is the moon darkened in this manner when an eclipse is occurring? That question is easily answered because the earth comes in between the moon and the sun. And he adds, either there or elsewhere, that if a man were on the moon during the eclipse, he'd be able to see the earth coming between the moon and the sun, and the consequent loss of light on the moon. The second answer completes the first. At times, he says, one does not easily find a reformulation. What is a man? What is a house? How do you reformulate that? In such cases, the question is asking for the formal cause. Why are this skin and these bones a man? Because of the *psyche*, the soul, the formal cause of the body. What is a house? Why are these bricks and timbers a house? Because of the design. What's it for? In general, his procedure is an ongoing exercise of intelligence. He will discuss the meanings of words and pick out or invent some quite precise meaning that suits his purpose, and he'll build on that. He will list opinions that have been proposed, discuss them, and come up with a better opinion of his own, and so on. It's an ongoing process, intelligently done and very thoroughly done.

**Question:** In your lecture last night, you stated that a purely scientific approach to theology would tend towards secularism. Could you make this more explicit? Is this tendency to be corrected by prayer?

**Lonergan:** The ordinary meaning of the word 'science' in English is 'natural science.' And the procedure of natural science is measurement, the correlation of measurements, curve-fitting, and other devices to arrive at a general rule, and the verification of the rule in various cases. That is science, and if you're not doing that, you're not doing science. Period. This question recurs in question 7. 'Would you distinguish between two notions that appeared in your talk last night? One is history as scholarship – the result of the development that began in 19th-century Germany. The other is history as science.' Well, the German word for science is *Wissenschaft*, and the *Wissenschaften* are divided into *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*, sciences of nature and sciences of the spirit. And sciences of the spirit are just as much science as sciences of nature. And they developed the sciences of the spirit: the historians, the exegetes, and

so on. They have rigorous methods; they follow them; and so on. They don't demonstrate anything, but it's an ongoing process, a cumulative process. They put out beautiful encyclopedias, endless information on endless topics. For them *Wissenschaft* is an inquiry performed in accord with a sound and accepted method. And a sound and accepted method is what's done. And if you want to change that, well, you have to work pretty hard. In Patrick Gardiner's *Theories of History*, the second half of a 500-and-some page book is devoted to recent theories of explanation in history. And there are all sorts of them. And you can read them at your pleasure. But there are many ways in which people talk about something being in science.

**Question:** Could you elaborate on the statement in your paper (note 9) that there is a knowledge of God by 'connaturality.'

**Loneragan:** In 1 John 4.16, God is love, *agapē estin ho theos*. Romans 5.5: God's love has flooded your inmost heart through the Holy Spirit given to you. St Thomas in the *Summa theologiae* holds that the supernatural grace of the act of charity is connatural to God. God is love, and that is love. It is that by which we become sons of God, children of God, partakers of the divine nature, and so on – the properties of sanctifying grace. You're arguing from something disparate from God but something that is a participation of divine nature. It's not infinite charity, but it is charity. That's what he means by it, anyway.

**Question:** You have stated that Jesus Christ as Son of God is one subject of two subjectivities [Loneragan: *with* two subjectivities, I would say] – one of them a divine consciousness, the other a human consciousness. Are the following correct?

Jesus as subject: God qua Son of the Father.

Jesus as subjectivity (divine consciousness) – God as essence

God the Trinity – three subjects with one subjectivity, namely, divine consciousness.

**Loneragan:** Well, Jesus as subject and God qua Son of the Father: Jesus as divine subjectivity, Jesus as conscious of his divinity. Jesus as human subjectivity, Jesus as conscious of his humanity. The way to think of it is, if I were also a dog, I'd have a human life as a man and a dog's life as a dog. If people think of consciousness as taking a look at something, they get lost. That's the secret there.

**Question:** Would you repeat or expound (or both) the Trinitarian analogy, mentioned yesterday, according to which the Father is absolute loving, the Son is 'absolute approval,' and the Spirit is \_\_\_\_?

**Loneragan:** The Spirit is proceeding love, dependent love, love as gift, love as given from the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father and the Son.

**Question:** From time to time in recent years you have spoken of (unrestricted) love as a 'fifth level' of intentional consciousness. Since the levels of functional specialization are correlated with the levels of intentional consciousness, would this not imply the addition of two further, 'fifth-level' functional specialties? If so, what might they be or do?

**Lonergan:** Well, there are sensitive consciousness, intellectual consciousness, rational consciousness, moral consciousness, and religious consciousness. But if you have religious consciousness as well as moral, it takes over the moral. It's a perfection added to the moral, with a broader horizon. So we're back to four. However, it's a different four for different people. Religious consciousness has a fuller horizon than a purely moral consciousness, and the two are conjoined inasmuch as grace perfects nature, the supernatural perfects the natural.

7 [the seventh question] we've already said something about.

**Question:** Could you comment on the application or use of conscious intentionality to participation in Eucharistic sacrifice?

**Lonergan:** Well, not in the time at our disposal today. Either alone is enough, you know. There are three problems there: participation, intentional consciousness, and the Eucharistic sacrifice.

**Question:** In his recent book *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, Michael Novak argues that there is an intrinsic connection between political freedom and economic capitalism, such that most varieties of socialism verge on being inherently immoral. Novak cites your work on emergent probability in support of his claims [Lonergan: what support I have not gotten far enough into his book to know]. Do you think that his basic point here is correct?

**Lonergan:** Well, the case for socialism is current ignorance of how an economy might be run successfully and unwillingness to do that, whatever would be required. They want to keep on as they've been doing all along: maximization of profit, and all the rest of it. If you step on those toes, you're causing trouble. And if the thing can't work on that basis, well the only alternative will be something like socialism. And socialism will not be democratic, except if you want to call the Union of Soviet Republics democratic.

**Question:** In *Method* you distinguish between (a) the inner word of God's love flooding our hearts, and (b) the outer word by which God addresses a people in history. In the context of functional specialization, does not the inner word replace the outer word as the norm for theological reflection?

**Lonergan:** Well, the private norm, one's own conscience, is the inner word of God's grace. But there are also the outer words of the successors of the apostles, who have a commission to maintain the word that has been handed down in the sources of revelation. So there's still an outer word, and they both have a certain normative influence. 'Faith is by hearing.'

**Question:** On Tuesday evening, you said that more than dialectic is needed in order to resolve debates between disputing schools; there is also needed a conceptuality that penetrates beneath the two sides of the question and grasps them as a whole.

**Lonergan:** Well, the discovery of the necessity of a conceptuality in theology was the fruit of the impossibility in the twelfth century of answering coherently most questions in theology. There were all sorts of theories of grace, justifying, sanctifying grace, final ? Those were certainly graces. But they couldn't figure out why everything wasn't a free gift of God. And it went on ad

infinitum. And that was the basis of the *quaestiones*, the commentaries on the *Sentences*. And they worked and worked at this, and gradually certain things developed. Development of the notion of the supernatural was – A fourfold contradiction: grace is above nature; faith is above human intellect; the love of God is above merely human goodness; and merit before God is above the good opinion of your neighbors. Well what's the difference? How do you account for this? They developed the idea of the supernatural habit first of all, and that went on from even before Philip the Chancellor, who was the Chancellor at the University of Paris in 1230. At the start of the 1300s there were people who were moving in that direction. Actual grace, supernatural grace that's actual, begins with St Thomas. Working out a conceptuality is very traditional, Scholastic traditions that have come from the Middle Ages, not more or less at the present time. In my student days they were all still ? schools. No longer. And there's a need for a further conceptuality at the present time.

**Question continued:** I believe that serious ecumenical statements of agreement between Christian churches – e.g., the final report of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission – rightly conducted, achieve such a conceptuality. Many fear or distrust such ecumenical discussions because they fail to recognize the possibility of achieving such a conceptuality. Would you comment, and expand, your notion of a conceptuality?

**Lonergan:** All I can do is give instances of it. That's the simplest way to do it. The chemists – their first big discovery was between things with fixed properties and mere mixtures. The things with fixed properties – they started breaking them up into parts. And they finally got to atoms. There wasn't anything smaller than an atom for a long time. And then they made the discovery that you can put these atoms in a periodic table. And Mendeleev predicted three further atoms that at that time were not known. And the three were discovered within sixteen years. So you had a factual element connected with the periodic table. They could predict things that could be discovered and hadn't been discovered yet. And then Niels Bohr in our century, studying the four variables of the electron, proved the table had to be periodic. (I don't know what the proof is, but I've been told.) Well anyway, that's working out the conceptuality of chemistry. The attainment of such a conceptuality is as simple as the periodic table in chemistry. It is a matter of creative thinking. Discussion groups are not likely to welcome creative thinking. They're afraid that that will be a roadblock on their getting any unity resulting from the discussion, because it's very hard to communicate an understanding to people that do not understand it yet. Everyone understands the things he already understands. To change what they have and put in something else usually takes a lot of time, and it's a matter of – who's the man who wrote on the scientific revolutions? Kuhn – a new paradigm. It's a thing that you may have one or two people saying, 'This is rather good,' and the rest all think it's nonsense. And gradually the opinion changes. He thought it was more or less a sociological process by which unanimity is attained. And the Hungarian who since has died, Lakatos, showed that what really settled the issue was the research programs: research programs based on one paradigm, and research programs based on the other. The one that was based on the correct theory would show up in the research program because of the success they had. So there was empirical evidence for the choice of a new paradigm. And it would take time, of course, for that to develop.

Now, reaching an ecumenical statement of agreement between different Christian bodies, different churches, is determining what is to be believed, what is to be understood. It's not providing an understanding of it. It's an entirely different dimension. It's the difference between

doctrines and systematics. Fr Dhanis, who is a very rigid theologian, used to say, Catholic theologians agree because the dogmas are defined ‘of faith,’ and on the rest they disagree. It isn’t the explanations that make people agree, and that’s what a conceptuality makes possible. St Thomas was always St Thomas, but the Thomists weren’t everybody. So, I’m not saying it’s impossible, but a conceptuality is a far more complicated thing. Aristotle worked out a conceptuality that was influential up to the days of Newton. Newton’s *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*. Still, he called it ‘philosophia naturalis.’ He wasn’t on to the distinction between philosophy and science. He did a great deal to promote that distinction, but he didn’t make it. He was still in the Aristotelian way of thinking. Discoveries in modern science were being made from 1400 on, but the people who were making the discoveries were all Aristotelians. And the old hands at Aristotelian doctrine were able to refute them hands down, the contradictions in their positions. It was only when a sufficiently large body of scientific doctrine was made that could stand on its own feet against Aristotle’s conceptuality that they were able to raise their heads above ground. So that’s the size of this problem of a conceptuality. I’m not saying the thing’s impossible, but it is not a simply thing at all. When they go on for centuries differing on all sorts of points, the conceptuality isn’t too well established. The need for a critical philosophy is precisely that – the difficulty of getting a conceptuality that will deal with the problems that everyone knows about today.

**Question:** The Eastern and Western traditions of Christianity differ notoriously on questions pertaining to the Trinity. The Eastern churches emphasize the monarchy of the Father, and the procession of the spirit from the Father alone; whereas the Western churches understand the procession of the Spirit as being from the Father and the Son.

In *Verbum* you have clarified Thomas’s analysis of the relations of the Trinity in terms of *dicere* (the act of conceiving [Lonergan: the act of saying, of uttering a word]), *verbum* (the inner word) and *iudicare* (value judgment). In other contexts you have employed the notions of falling in love, judgment of value, and decision to love in order to illuminate Trinitarian belief.

What light can these analogies shed on the divergence of Eastern and Western traditions?

**Lonergan:** Well, again it’s the same thing. You can have analogies that will understand the Eastern tradition, and you can have analogies that will understand the Western tradition. But you don’t get analogies that understand both, because they’re contradictory. The contradiction came out about 1054.

**Question:** In chapter 14 (7.4) of *Insight* you thematize the emergence into consciousness of an ‘ideal self.’ What is this ideal self? Would you give an example of what you mean? In what sense would it be proximate and possible?

**Lonergan:** Well, one has an ideal insofar as one knows what one wants to be or wants to become. It’s an ideal self, what one wants oneself to become. I don’t know what I mean in *Insight* because there’s no chapter 14 that has a subdivision 7.4. There’s a chapter 15 that has a division 7.4, and that division runs over ten pages, and I had only ten minutes to come up with an answer to these questions. It would be much more helpful, of course, if you gave the page and even the line if you want me to explain a book I wrote 30 years ago.

**Question:** Does your differentiation of a fourth (and perhaps a fifth) level of consciousness in post-*Insight* work force a modification of the triadic metaphysical structure of proportionate being which, in *Insight*, is isomorphic with the subject whose conscious operations take place at three levels of intentionality?

**Lonergan:** The triadic metaphysical structure of *Insight* corresponds to the triadic *cognitional* structure of *Insight*. Metaphysics is dealing with reality, and that by which you know proportionate reality is this threefold structure. The fourfold structure in *Method* corresponds to the fourfold structure of religious consciousness, and you could have a fourfold structure without religious consciousness if you had a moral consciousness, which is included in the religious.

**Question:** At the end of your talk on Tuesday, you said that religious conversion is an ongoing process. Could you make this more explicit? This ongoing process, you said, is a ground of theology. How?

**Lonergan:** Religious conversion is an ongoing process in the individual. There's a traditional division of stages in the spiritual life: the purgative way, you're getting rid of your sins, your bad habits; the illuminative way, you're beginning to see what the spiritual life is really all about; and the unitive way, you're getting there. That doesn't mean that you haven't got unitive moments at any time except when you're in the third stage, and so on. Predominantly purgative, predominantly illuminative, predominantly unitive. That's an ongoing process, and it's much easier not to make much progress than to keep at it day after day.

Now, the ongoing development of individual believers over the ages is a ground for the emergence and advance of theology. Theology is studying the whole of Catholic faith. And in studying the whole of the Catholic faith, the first sample is John Damascene, in the eighth century. The Fathers handled particular questions according to the controversies of the day: Christological, and the things on grace, some things on the sacraments. The full-blown systematic study, methodical study, of theology emerged in the thirteenth century and disappeared at the end of the thirteenth century. The Thomists didn't know this word *Begrifflichkeit*, conceptuality. They couldn't explain why they were using Aristotle, why they were citing him the way they cited the Fathers. What's the difference? He's a pagan. Scotus said, We'll accept the Organon; the rest is written by a pagan. Of course, Voegelin would disagree with that verdict on Aristotle. He holds that Socrates and Plato and Aristotle were mystics.

**Question:** In a recent Thomas More Institute publication, you state that at the age of 22 you asked permission from your superiors to do major studies in General Methodology. What experiences, insights at this early age led you to make such a request?

**Lonergan:** Well, by methodology I understood knowing precisely what you're trying to do and how to do it. And that seemed to me than to be something highly desirable in philosophy, which I was studying at the time. It wasn't too clear what it was all about or how anything was being achieved, and so on. What's the difference between scientific philosophy and ordinary common sense, which most of the students were content with?