

uses the verbum as its instrument through which it regards intelligible reality.²⁶⁵ The last, ~~sentence~~ last-named, contemplative act of understanding also seems to stand within the connotation of the "intellectus ut terminus rationis."

There is another approach to the critical act of understanding: for it would seem to be the second act to which the intellectual virtues of prudence and especially wisdom are first act. These virtues regard judging as an active resolutio in principia and not judgment as the ^{passive} reception of a verbum. One might say that there is a virtue of intellectual honesty, of submitting readily to what one sees must be so; such a virtue would regard not the act whence judgment ~~proceeds~~ ^{act that is} proceeds but the reception of the ^{passive} judgment itself; but most probably its subject would be not the intellect but the will, since its concern would be to prevent ~~the~~ undue interference from ~~with~~ the will. Again, one might be able to argue that the virtue of faith regards the passive rather than the active side of judgment-assent. But prudence and wisdom are concerned with marshalling and weighing the evidence: prudence is a sort of counsel in contingent matters;²⁶⁶ while wisdom conducts the resolutio to ultimate causes.²⁶⁷ Further, by their closer relation to judgment, prudence and wisdom are distinct from understanding in the basic sense of insight,²⁶⁸ and from the logical consequent of insight which is science.²⁶⁹

Hence, just as the mathematician at work actuates the insights he possesses habitually, so the critical act of understanding is an actuation of the virtues of prudence and wisdom that one may possess. Further, the only difference