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1978 LW, Second Q&A, June 13 (includes 94000A0E070 and 94100A0E070)

Question 1: Could you state again the relationship, mentioned in Monday's question period, between the traditional categories 'essence' and 'existence' and *Insight*? Specifically, how are they correlated with 'potency,' 'form,' and 'act'? How is the approach to the philosophy of God in *Insight*, moving from the complete intelligibility of the real, related to the older approach, which begins from the distinction within finite being of 'essence' and 'existence'?

Lonergan: The required relationship is between the priority of metaphysics, being, the object, and on the other hand, the priority of cognitional theory over epistemology and the priority of cognitional theory and epistemology over metaphysics. With Aristotle, the object is first moving the subject, and he conceived metaphysics as the first science and all other sciences as fuller determinations of the general terms set forth in metaphysics. The necessity of this shift emerged in the Augustinian/Aristotelian controversy that emerged towards the end of the thirteenth century in such charming works as 'Correctorium Fratris Thomae' answered by 'Correctorium Correctorii Fratris Thomae' followed by 'Correctorium Correctorii Correctorii Fratris Thomae,' and so on to infinity. In this movement, the *odium theologicum* replaces the *odium hereticorum*.

Its immediate fruit was the skepticism and the decadence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, followed by the birth of rationalism in Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and that of empiricism in Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. There follow Kant's three Critiques, the absolute idealisms of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the return to the concrete subject with Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, the Historical School, Kierkegaard, Newman, Nietzsche, Blondel, and so on. To return to the *fons et origo* in the nineteenth century, the Catholic renaissance of mediaval thought, was to return to the priority of being, but we didn't reach any better agreement than they did in the Middle Ages, although we may have been more polite.

Medieval essence and existence are the objective answers intended by the distinct questions, *Quid sit* (essence) and *An sit* (whether the essence or something with that essence exists or not). But *Quid sit?* as a question presupposes data about which one asks, What is it, *Quid sit?* So we really have three distinct things: data, understanding, and affirmation. And it is three different parts of one being that we know, and if we want to give those three parts names, we can call the first part potency and the second part form and the third act, and we are right back with Aristotle's metaphysics, except that Aristotle wasn't too clear about the meaning of *An sit*. A French priest, Fr LeBlond, a rather heroic man who volunteered to go with the French workers conscripted to work in Germany during the Second World War to give them priestly assistance and encouragement, had published a thesis at the Sorbonne on 'Logic and Method in Aristotle,' and in it he talks about the ambiguity of whether Aristotle was a realist or a materialist. What does that question *An sit?* mean? Does it mean you take a good look at these taps here, or do you affirm the existence of what you call a tap? That is the ambiguity of materialism, or empiricism, and critical realism.

You find Aristotle's thought on this subject was mainly in discovering what form was. There are two books of the *Metaphysics*, books 7 and 8. He starts his investigation by asking what is meant by *ousia*, and his answer in book 7 is that *ousia* is form. 'What is it?' means 'Why is this a table?' It is form that makes the matter a man or a woman, and not merely the flesh of the corpse. He didn't get beyond that in his metaphysics. He didn't have existence as the third thing, although he does get act as something beyond, when he contrasts the form and its actions,

its operations, heat and heating, *calor* and *calefactio* (St Thomas). So there was considerable room for development after Aristotle, and you get it in Thomas when he distinguishes existence from essence and makes them really distinct. To make them really distinct you have to have something equivalent to an intellectual conversion, even if you don't know what is meant by an intellectual conversion.

I had the intellectual conversion myself when in doing theology I saw that you can't have one person in two natures in Christ unless there is a real distinction between the natures and something else that is one, the *unicum esse in Christo* of Aquinas. But that is the long way round. So the question *An sit?* is not answered by taking a good look at the data as empiricism takes for granted, but by finding in the data all the implications of the intelligibility proposed to the question *Quid sit?*, that is, by finding in the data the verification of the hypothesis proffered by an act of understanding. Modern science and Aristotelian/Thomist thought agree on that threefold operation in our knowing anything at all. Knowing is not merely knowing its name: what is this; a dog. But understanding it and verifying all the implications of your understanding. So observation, hypothesis, verification, potency, form, and act, in the same sense as is implicit in the thinking of Aristotle and Thomas. Aristotle and Aquinas knew of the questions, but modern science made it impossible to be ignorant of the nature of the answers. Kant conceived understanding, *Verstand*, as the faculty of judgment. He wasn't beyond the confusion of essence and existence. *Verstand*, understanding, is the faculty of forming hypotheses, and the hypotheses may be true or false. I once gave a talk to the psychiatrists at Halifax General Hospital on insight, and at the end of the talk one of the doctors said to me, 'Our patients have all kinds of insights. The trouble is they're wrong.' Well, that is the basis of the distinction between essence and existence. They have hold of an essence, but it isn't true.

In knowing any material thing you observe, you understand, and you verify. Observation brings you an element in your knowledge that, when you take out the intelligible part of it, is just matter. Two successive Fords came rolling off the assembly line. All the intelligibility you will find in the first you will find in the second. They are built according to the same specifications, the same principles of mechanics and combustion engines, and so on. The difference is more matter, more potency, different potencies. They differ numerically, not intelligibly. You can have a picture of a Ford or an account of all the specifications, and it isn't a Ford. That Ford doesn't exist, it is just a picture. So potency, form, and act are what correspond ultimately to what you know by experiencing, understanding, and judging. You don't know any material thing without knowing those three things and getting them done rightly.

Question 1, continued: How is the approach to the philosophy of God in *Insight*, moving from the complete intelligibility of the real, related to the older approach which begins from the distinction within finite being of 'essence' and 'existence.'

Lonergan: Well, there is a recent book on *Christ and Consciousness*, and it says that Christians got their idea of reality from the resurrection of Christ. If Christ rose from the dead, there isn't just this world. It was the concrete understanding of what is meant by existence. It is what St Thomas meant by the third degree of abstraction, which isn't an abstraction at all, but a separation: the separation between the material and the immaterial, and the real divides into the two. In other words, that is the way the Christians got hold of the Christian idea of spirituality.

Voegelin speaks of the intracosmic gods, and he speaks of the Egyptians, who had a god beyond the gods, a god unknown to the cosmic gods: the gods of the Greeks, the gods of the

Ethiopians, the gods of the Thracians, etc. The gods of the Greeks were made of marble, and the gods of the Ethiopians had snub noses and thick lips, and the gods of the Thracians had blue eyes and fair hair, and so on. If horses and lions and oxen could paint and carve, well, the gods of the horses would be horses, and the gods of the lions would be lions, and the gods of the oxen would be oxen. The god unknown to the many gods and to the many nations, the god beyond their knowledge, the unknown god to whom there was an altar in Athens, as Paul noticed in the Areopagus – this notion of the unknown god begins in the eleventh century before Christ with the Egyptians.

Now, insofar as they reach the notion of an unknown god – you have the unknown god in Plato and in Aristotle – insofar as they reached the unknown god they were already within the horizon of being, of being that is immaterial beyond all human knowledge. You have the long-winded approach in *Insight* because people today do not know about the unknown god. You have to open up their minds, let them find out what their own minds are, before they can begin to be open to thinking of anything beyond this world. That is the difference in the approach. It is apologetics. It is simpler to start with the finite being and the infinite being if you can think about an infinite being. But the trouble with the modern world is that people can't think of that. If it is infinite, it doesn't exist.

Any questions on that?

Question from the floor: Could you expand on your own intellectual conversion?

Lonergan: Well, that's when I accepted the distinction between essence and existence and saw the necessity of it. But seeing the necessity of it was a matter of accepting Catholic dogma, and enabling people to accept that dogma was dealt with in a prior stage in *Insight*. We go through all this rigmarole of science, common sense, and all the rest of it, to help people find out what they have underneath their skulls – only it isn't underneath! Anything else?

Question 2: Fr Sebastian Moore's paper, in its concentration on Jesus, would appear to be connected with what are called in *Method* 'inner word' and 'outer word' – that is, with God's love as personal gift and as entering history. In *Method* what takes theology beyond philosophy of God is revelation. Although that is a specifically theological, not methodological, issue, can you suggest how Christian theologians might begin to define revelation or the connection of 'inner' and 'outer word' or 'the importance of Jesus'?

Lonergan: You will find the answer to that question in a paper delivered by Eric Voegelin, 'The Gospel and Culture,' in *Jesus and Man's Hope*, ed. D.G. Miller and D.Y. Hadidian (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971). The book is a mine of wealth, and Voegelin's paper is tops. In it he distinguishes between information and revelation. Why did our Lord tell the apostles to 'tell no man that I am the Christ'? Because merely telling them is just at most information. Why did he say to Peter, 'Blessed are you, Simon, Son of Jonah, for flesh and blood has not revealed this to you but my Father who is in heaven?' Because it takes an action of the Father as well as the information to give you revelation. And so I quote from my paper, 'Theology and Praxis,' delivered at the Catholic Theological Society of America, *Proceedings of the XXXII annual convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America* June 15-18, 1977. In St John 12.32, 'And I shall draw all men to myself, when I am lifted up,' That is the manifestation of the 'outer word.' That's what touches the hearts of men, the external sign, that

manifestation of God's love. 'God sent his only Son into the world that men might be saved.' But the power of the Crucified to draw man to himself is conditioned by the prior drawing by the Father. John 6.44: 'No man can come to me unless he is drawn by the Father who sent me.' There is God's grace that causes your being drawn by the crucified, that makes that a revelation of God. And that prior drawing is a listening and learning. 'Everyone who has listened to the Father and learned from him comes to me.' John 6.45. And you have in Matthew the same thing at Caesarea Philippi when Jesus asked the disciples, 'Who do men say that I am?' And they give him the various answers, and then he asks, 'Who do you say that I am?' And Peter answers that he is the Son of God. And Jesus answered, 'Simon, son of Jonah, you are favored indeed! You did not learn that from man.' That would be merely information. 'It was revealed to you by my heavenly Father.' Voegelin comments:

The Matthean Jesus thus agrees with the Johannine (John 6.44) that nobody can recognize the movement of the divine presence in the Son unless he is prepared for such recognition by the presence of the divine Father in himself. The divine Sonship is not revealed through information tendered by Jesus but through a man's response to the full presence in Jesus of the same Unknown God by whose presence he is inchoately moved in his own existence ... In order to draw the distinction between revelation and information, as well as to avoid the derailment from one to the other, the episode closes with the charge of Jesus to the disciples 'to tell no one that he is the Christ.' (Matthew 16.20)

That is the distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer word' and the distinction is God's gift of his grace. So that is the connection between the inner and the outer word. You have to have the outer word. You need the information for something to be revealed. But you need God's inner word, God's grace, to recognize in the outer word that it is divine. The importance of Jesus, again, is precisely that. He is one sent by the Father in the fullness of time to save mankind, to provide the outer word as well as the inner word. We can go from this to answer further questions regarding other religions, and so on, but these are the central points. Anything further on that?

Question from the floor: The outer word is necessary to make the inner word effective. Was that your formulation?

Lonergan: Well, the inner word is necessary to make the outer word not mere information.

Question: How is the inner word effective apart from the preaching of Christ in bringing the grace of God in non-Christian religions?

Lonergan: In the non-Christian religions you have the inner word. William Johnston studied Zen very carefully. He made his retreats in Zen monasteries under the direction of Zen masters, and so on. And he says that the Zen monks all know what's going on in the other fellow whether Christian or not. But there is a difference in the outer word. In other words, it is what Rahner calls the anonymous Christian. The outer word is not a necessity, but it is a terrific revelation that God is love, and that is an idea of God that is pretty well absent in many non-Christian religions. Johnston's most recent book to be published this fall by Harper & Row in New York, *The Inner eye of Love*, had to argue that these people know about love and the meaning of God's love but

he has to argue against them and from things that they say to their implications. They haven't got it out in the same explicit form as you do get in Christianity and its predecessor Judaism. 'You shall love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole mind, and with all thy strength' occurs not only in Mark but also in Deuteronomy.

Question: It seems that what Sebastian Moore is talking about isn't operative outside of Christian preaching, and therefore I still have problems with how the inner word can become effective apart from that proclamation of God's word.

Lonergan: It doesn't become effective in the same way. It doesn't become explicit in the same way.

Question: It remains anonymous. Do they concretize it in other symbols?

Lonergan: Well, on the cover of Johnston's book you have a cross and Japanese symbols around it symbolizing nothing. That's the way they think of God. And why do they think of God that way? Because they haven't got the idea of being that comes through the resurrection of Christ. Certainly the mystic's experience is not of anything in this world. You can conceive it as something outside, beyond this world, something transcendent. However real it is to you, you have to call it 'nothing' if you are going to use words.

Question: There is a recent paper on transcendental Thomism and Buddhist scholasticism.

Lonergan: I've seen it, but I haven't read it.

Question: It was published in the *Downside Review*, and I think that author finds quite a divergence between the transcendental Thomist understanding of God ultimately as the ground of intelligibility and what Buddhists would have to say.

Lonergan: I have no difficulties with that.

Question: So I'm wondering if there may not be some deep departures.

Lonergan: Oh, there are differences, no doubt. But as Panikkar says – or at least his idea of a universal fundamental theology is to get together the mystics of the various religions and even if they can't sign a common formula, they will recognize a common existence. They may not be able to find the words 'common existence,' referring to what they're talking about. But that's a hope.

Question: On his part.

Lonergan: Well, his father was a Hindu, and his mother was a Spanish Catholic.

Question: How did they get along?

Lonergan: Well, he came along!

Question 3: Wittgenstein once observed, ‘The malaise of an epoch is cured by a change in peoples’ mode of life, and the malaise of philosophical problems could be cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not by a therapy invented by any individual.’ Please comment in regard to the contrast between your views and ‘liberation theology.’

Lonergan: Well, the contrast is not so much between my views and liberation theology but views people hold about liberation theology and what a first-class liberation theologian holds. At a Notre Dame meeting, Towards Vatican III, which included the editors of *Concilium* in the various languages and their publishers and members of the Catholic Theological Society of America, the format was: the first hour and a quarter in the morning and in the afternoon was a panel discussion. Someone would present a paper and a topic, and the members of the panel would raise questions about it, and he would answer the questions, and the audience would ask their questions, and no one answered them, they were left till the next meeting, which was of small groups and went on for another hour and a quarter. The whole thing was three hours morning and afternoon for three days. And the group I was in included Gustavo Gutierrez, the rather left-wing liberation theologian from Peru. During one of the sessions he informed us that the weakness of liberation theology in South America was that its proponents did not know any economics. Now, of course, you have the same weakness among the Catholics in North America and in Europe and Asia: they don’t know much about economics. As a matter of fact they have to invent an economics. It is a serious defect. There is no use calling for justice unless one can go beyond defining justice as ‘give each man or woman his or her due.’ You need a whole system of economics to define what that ‘due’ is and means. Plato in the *Republic*: why did he discuss the republic, because he knew that there is no use talking about justice in the individual if what you have in the same city are a group of thugs. Well, everyone has to be a thug to survive. To have good people, you have to have a good state, and so the discourse on the *Republic* is to reveal what justice is by saying what the good state it. And justice in economics is knowing what correct economic doctrine is. The modern problem of justice in economic affairs is the non-existence of an intelligent, reasonable, and responsible account of economics. The fundamental influence in political theory as in economic theory is Machiavelli. There is no use giving people pious platitudes; nothing happens. You have to be effective, and one of the most effective means for the prince to get things done is a few assassinations. In modern economics, the great principle is the profit motive. That’s what gets things done. As long as your economics is the work of minds that can’t conceive any other way of having things done than the profit motive, then you will have the Gulag Archipelago as a substitute. But the problem is to understand what makes things click in intelligent, reasonable, responsible economics, and that requires intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Our great economists have not been noteworthy for any of the three, and that includes our Catholic economists.

The big problem is intellectual conversion. The Catholic Church moved into intellectual conversion with the Council of Nicea, after three centuries of Christianity; and with great difficulty, because there were fifty years of controversy after Nicea before things quieted down. Jerome remarked after the Council of Rimini, ‘The whole world was amazed to wake up and discover it was Arian.’ The Western bishops didn’t know what Nicea was about, and the Eastern bishops took a good thirty-five years to find out. Intellectual conversion doesn’t come easily, even to Catholics, even to bishops. Until Catholics have the diligence needed to understand economics, until they have the reasonableness to defend a correct understanding of economics,

until they have shouldered the responsibility of presenting to other Catholics and to the whole world a correct account of economics, their talk on the subject is just sounding brass and tinkling cymbal. We have had no lack of that.

This, of course, is only part of the malaise of our epoch, but it is the part that is relevant to liberation theology. It calls for a profound transformation of the mental habits of our contemporaries, Catholic and non-Catholic, so on this point at least I agree entirely with Wittgenstein, who also seemed to have been a mystic. He spent his later years as an orderly in a hospital.

Questions from the Floor:

Question: Along the same lines of a well-conceived state and economic system, the Church in speaking on social justice issues is also facing the criticism that its own ecclesiastical institutions do not mirror justice. There is a lot of argumentation being advanced that ordination of women is a right, that justice is being violated if the option isn't there. The 'Call to Action' conference in the United States put forth a lot of resolutions calling for public accountability and consultation as a required part of the political process in the Church. This shift to the analysis of Church institutions in the light of justice: do you have any reflections on that?

Lonergan: Well, I never taught 'De ecclesia.' Really, one has to learn to think historically, and historical reality is a fundamental problem of the treatise on the Church. The possibility of thinking historically is something that emerged in the course of the nineteenth century and gradually seeped into Catholic mentality during the course of the twentieth. There had been good Catholic historians, but they didn't have the historical point of view, the historical mentality. That came out of the reaction of German historians against Hegel's a priori account of history. I have two chapters on it in *Method*. To move into that historical mentality is what's needed to have a good treatise and account of the Church.

Question: In your economic analysis there is a notable lack of sources. Could you say something about the influence on you of the thought of Wicksell, Marshall, and Keynes?

Lonergan: Mostly Wicksell. Wicksell was the man who introduced me to what is called general equilibrium theory. It is the same sort of thing that you have in Walras, who preceded Wicksell. And it is a beautiful deduction. It realizes the dream of James Mill, who felt that in his day – he was the father of John Stuart Mill – economics was de facto in the same position as astronomy in the days of Newton. The truth was there, and any intelligent person knew it. Only the wrong-headed people rejected it, but they hadn't the courage to take the truth, and that truth was – Newton thought he was deducing, and he wasn't. Euclidean geometry had to be rewritten and has been rewritten by Hilbert, and you don't recognize it as Euclidean geometry just by reading it, but it is Euclidean geometry made logical. Newton thought he was deducing: 'I don't fabricate hypotheses,' he said. Universal gravitation is just a hypothesis. The idea that human knowledge is deductive is a blunder. You get it in the second chapter of the first book of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. The implicit direction of the blunder occurs in the nineteenth chapter of the second book. He asks where we get these first principles, and he says when a rout turns into a rally, you get an idea of what discovering a first principle is like. A rout turns into a rally when

there are fewer following than being chased, and those being chased make a stand and others will come and join them.

The second side picks up with Lonergan saying: I taught future bishops for twelve years in Rome, but I don't attempt to teach ...

Question: There are implications to the positions that you're taking.

Lonergan: Yes, what about them?

Question: I'm interested in any reflections you have on those implications, in terms of what the Church as an institution ought to mirror in order with integrity to approach ...

Lonergan: Well, I don't expect anything to be possible before the end of another century. People learn very, very slowly. People are transformed more by being kicked around than by being talked to. As I said yesterday, give people a cause, and they'll do anything; but if you merely give them a book, heavens above! That's all an individual can do is give them a book, and he is lucky if he is able to get the book written.

Question (Lonergan realizes there are more questions that had been submitted): Would you explain the relationship between moral and intellectual conversion? Do you think that one genuinely occurs without the other? On your view, is there a dynamism in human nature towards the occurrence of the three conversions? Please explain.

Lonergan: Well, there are three questions there at least. What is the relationship between moral and intellectual conversion? Well, we have moral conversion in the Church from the days of St Peter, when he preached to the multitude and they came up with the question, What must we do to be saved? But you don't get intellectual conversion until they were able to swallow the 'homousion' at Nicea, and most swallow it by simply saying that it is a mystery. Saying it is a mystery doesn't call too much for intellectual conversion.

Do you think that one genuinely occurs without the other? Certainly. Moral conversion occurs regularly without intellectual conversion. Intellectual conversion is rare. There is the well-known saying, *Quot homines, tot sententiae*: There are as many opinions as there are men. Very rarely do you really get people to agree about anything, really knowing what the other fellow is saying.

Is there a dynamism in human nature towards the occurrence of three conversions? Yes, there is a dynamism in human nature that isn't explicit but spontaneous, unthematized. It is the asking of further questions. You try to understand and come up with a bright idea. How do you know that it is not merely a bright idea? Because all sorts of further questions also arise, and you have to answer the whole lot of them before you can know that it is something better than a mere bright idea. You may write an 800-page book before you are finished. Similarly, with regard to judgment: you consult, and another person will say, but what about this, what about that? You ask someone else, and he'll say there are further things that you hadn't thought about, and your judgments get pushed around. And you make a moral decision, and have an uneasy conscience. What about this, and what about that? To illustrate this, I can give the example of a boy who lived in a parish in England where I was helping out, and I was preaching in the evening, and I

want for a walk with him afterwards, and he said in the course of the walk that my sermon had hit him right between the eyes. He told me what it was, and it had nothing to do with anything I had preached. But if you get people in a church and they are not talking to anybody else, and someone is droning away, and their uneasy conscience starts worrying them, and they think, what a wonderful preacher he is! That's the way it works. So there is a native dynamism to the three conversions.

Questions: Are there affective components in the process of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, or do you see merit to speaking in terms of an affective conversion? You would you distinguish conversion in a strict sense from differentiations of consciousness? Do you envision a limited number of conversions?

Lonergan: Yes. I used to believe there were three, but my friend from Marquette, Robert Doran, has convinced me there is a fourth. It is the conversion of one's affectivity. One's affectivity can have things go wrong with it, and they go wrong with it before you even know what affectivity is, and it keeps getting worse and worse. There is an affective conversion, and there is an affective liberation. That is the meaning of Progoff's book, *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology*. First he treats Freud, then Adler, then Jung, and fourthly Rank. Rank spent about 25 years of his life as an assistant to Freud and published posthumously a book entitled *Beyond Psychology*. Psychiatry is not enough in rounding off the human person, and that is what Progoff is concerned with.

These conversions involve a difference in consciousness, but they are something distinct from differentiations of consciousness, because they are primordial. Differentiations of consciousness presuppose a certain measure of conversion, but you needn't be converted to be able to pass an exam in Euclidean geometry or any exam for that matter.

Are there affective components in the process? There are affective components in everything. The thing is, don't let your affects get mixed up with your thinking. If you are a hot thinker, a devotee, well, you can draw a good cartoon, but you don't think straight usually. But experience, understanding, judging, and deciding are just paper-thin without the affectivity which is the mass and momentum of our lives, and that is why falling in love involves the transformation of the person. My example of a person in love is a girl in Scotland whose mother didn't want her to marry a Protestant and asked me to speak with her. But anything I would say she would answer, well, I'll ask him: she was in love. There was someone else in her life besides herself.

With regard to differentiations of consciousness, first of all the first differentiation of consciousness is common sense, and that consists mainly in knowing the names of persons, places, and things. You move on from common sense to science when you get strict definitions that hold in every case, and you get these strict definitions insofar as you forget about your commonsense language and develop another one, a technical language, and talk about velocity and acceleration and mass, protons and electrons, and so on. And you have a third differentiation of consciousness when you move into human studies, because in human studies your basic terms come out of your own experience, your own experience of yourself. You can get into history insofar as you can reconstruct the ways of thought, the deciding and acting, of another place and time. Philology was defined by Friedrich Wolf as the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of mankind. What are the constructions of mankind? The way they live. Every people have their own lifestyle with individual variations within the common core. To

reconstruct these constructions of mankind is the work of philology, of hermeneutics and history, in their later differentiations. That is a third differentiation of consciousness, reconstructing another people's way of life from the available data and not a priori the way Hegel went about it, e.g., one man rules, a few men rule, everyone rules, that view of history. There is the study of interiority; you have to figure out how you do your own thinking before you are able to figure out how other people think. Beyond the differentiation of interiority, there is the differentiation of religion, being at home with God, being at one with God: at-one-ment, atonement. These are all differentiations of consciousness; they are different ways in which you use your faculties for different ends. But the conversions are what are necessary to be able to move through this series of different ways: the presuppositions, the underpinnings.

Do you envisage a limited number of conversions? Yes, four: intellectual, moral, religious, and aesthetic, or psychic, or whatever you want to call it.

Question: Does intellectual conversion imply correct explicit articulation of what it means to know? Certainly, there have been people in the past who were 'on position' (e.g., Augustine, who realized that the spiritual is real). But your usage (unlike for moral and religious conversion) sometimes suggests that intellectual conversion means accepting the epistemological position you have articulated in *Insight*.

Lonergan: Well, intellectual conversion means different things at different times. Before science of any kind, there is no problem of intellectual conversion. It is just a matter of growing up and learning to talk. When people start looking for proof and getting into philosophy and arguing that Achilles can't catch up with the tortoise and you can't refute him, then you get moved into a different world. And at first you have no distinction between interiority and human science, human studies, and natural science. It is just one big blob [?]. You get the separation of science from philosophy with Descartes; of theology from philosophy with the introduction of the notion of the supernatural in the Middle Ages, in the thirteenth century. It gradually evolved. These distinctions come slowly. At the present time, there are a lot of people who don't see any difference between history and natural science. They want to do everything by the computer. James Reston had a column on Solzhenitsyn's speech at Harvard, for which he consulted the computer. So it depends on the age in which you live for the number of conversions that you have to have or you would be better off if you did have. Is there a nuance of difference between the converted subject and the authentic subject? The authentic subject is the upright person.