

921 Fifth Discussion 921 A&B

Question 1: If the artist, in reflecting the psychological depths, goes beyond those depths, then what is the distinction between the artistic pattern of experience and various other patterns? What would this distinction imply in terms of art criticism? How does literary criticism mediate immediacy?

Loneragan: Distinctions emerge in the measure that consciousness is differentiated. When children play ‘Let’s pretend,’ ‘Let’s play house’ or whatever you please, eh? it’s artistic and everything else.

The artist produces works of art in drawings, colors, sounds, statues, architecture, words, epic, lyric, drama, and so on.

The dramatic pattern of experience makes the work of art one’s own life-style. The intellectual pattern of experience differentiates down the ages from Aristotle’s early philosophic thinkers – everything is water, everything is air, and so on – to contemporary distinctions of mathematicians, scientists, students of humanities, philosophers, and theologians. The Greek breakthrough was to separate the pursuit of the true from the pursuit of the good. In Hebrew the word ‘fidelity’ includes truth. Truth is telling the truth and keeping one’s promises. It isn’t the specialization that it becomes with the Greek philosophers. And modern development produces further differentiations. Science becomes natural science, human studies basically are hermeneutics and history, and philosophy retreats into interiority. You have a triple differentiation, where before it was all called philosophy and science, prior to the modern period.

Art criticism thematizes what the artist has achieved, attempted, intended. It talks about it just as a physicist thematizes what heat is. We all feel the heat and the cold but the physicist thematizes it in thermodynamics.

And how does literary criticism mediate immediacy? When Shakespeare presents Othello strangling Desdemona, literary criticism helps you witness the strangling in all its horror and background and overtone. (A man that finished a course in theology that I was teaching said, ‘Now I’ll get back to literature and watch Othello strangling Desdemona, really real!’)

Question 2: What is the connection between cognitive and affective development? How do these relate to one another as one moves toward cognitive, affective, moral, and religious conversion? How can education play a more positive role in this development and in the possibility of conversion?

Loneragan: The connection between cognitive and affective development: well, initially cognitive and affective development are undistinguished, simultaneous, ongoing, with the affective prior. How are these related? Well, Western education by its attention to reading, writing, and arithmetic and consequent arts and studies brings about a differentiation of cognitive activities; while its attention to value-free secular co-education leaves affective development to take care of itself. How can education play a more positive role? Well, my suggestion is to get the politicians out of the game, to get the merchants of hardware out of the game, to get educationalists out of the game, to get administrators out of the game, to let teachers teach. Dick Stevens did a doctorate at the Sorbonne. Paul Ricoeur was his director, and he asked Paul, What

must I do to get my doctorate? And Ricoeur said, 'Do what I tell you and pay no attention whatever to anyone else.' That is why the Sorbonne is a great university.

Question 3: To what extent does an aesthetic and/or affective undertow support fidelity to the intellectual pattern of experience? And to what extent does cognitive development mediate aesthetic and/or affective conversion?

Lonergan: Fidelity to the intellectual pattern of experience is basically a matter of seeing through the empty-headedness of people who think they know better and keep telling you what you really should be doing. That is the big problem. I met a young man who went to Cambridge to do a doctorate in history, and I asked him how he liked it; and he said it was wonderful, 'I don't have to spend my whole day defending the fact that I study.' And how did he find the seminars? 'It's wonderful to be at a seminar in which the person has been studying the book for two or three years before he starts talking about it.' If your seminar is a three-month thing and not an ongoing process, you have no obligation to attend that seminar. But you are better off if you do because you will know what professors are thinking.

Now, to brush aside all the nonsense of people who think they know better, to brush aside their nonsense and to stick to one's thing calls for self-confidence, self-reliance, and conviction. And of course, the aesthetic and affective undertow supports that. But the main thing is making up your mind.

Cognitive development is important inasmuch as it helps one brush aside the propaganda maintained incessantly by the cognitively undeveloped.

Question 4: If praxis is the art of living, a guide to the creation of the future, is psychic conversion a necessary constituent of authentic praxis?

Lonergan: Well, it is *phronesis*, practical wisdom, rather than praxis. Praxis is the result. Practical wisdom, *phronesis*, *prudentia*, is the art of living, the source of the art of living. Psychic conversion is essential in the measure that one is a kook. If one is not, then one need not bother about it, and if one is seriously in doubt then one had best investigate. Now, there are refinements and further comments on it that one can learn; people can be helped an awful lot. They won't get it otherwise.

Question 5: Please comment on the effects of the constraints imposed by the American education system on the possibility for psychic, intellectual, and moral conversion.

Lonergan: Well, the same answer to that is the one to question 2, and we better not repeat that. You can add to the list the newspapers and the TV personalities; get them out of the game.

Question 6: Religious conversion is God's gift. In what way are moral and intellectual conversion gifts?

Lonergan: Well, moral and intellectual conversion are consequents of religious conversion, usually. Voegelin speaks of Plato and Aristotle as the mystical philosophers, and that is why he can relate them to the gospel. Love reveals values generally, and consequently God's gift of his

own love transforms our values, gives a transvaluation of values; love reveals values. It is the mother who can see the potentialities of her wastrel son and can make something of him because she loves him. Other people, who don't know him, only see the wastrel. To grasp an appreciation of values generally includes and leads to the grasp and appreciation of such values as truth – Plato and Aristotle; and understanding – modern science, human studies, philosophy: understanding as the gradual approach towards truth.

Question 7: Is it accurate to say that the Enlightenment (17th century) criterion of good theorizing, that the scientist or scholar be objective in the sense of being an impartial and value-free observer, is to be supplanted by theorizing whose criterion of objectivity is the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted scientist or scholar?

Lonergan: Well, if you read 'advancing understanding' rather than 'theorizing'; theorizing is the sort of thing that went on under the dominant influence of decadent Scholasticism. 'Value-free' is the name of a pretense and a lie. Any serious thinker is engaged in promoting values: he understands, appreciates, respects, for example, serious thought, if he is a serious thinker.

Question 8: To what extent must a person be operating in the third stage of meaning if he or she is to develop an adequate understanding of economics or psychology or the social sciences?

Lonergan: The third stage of meaning is where we are and where contemporary problems are. To carry on as though we were living in ancient Athens or medieval Paris is inept, fruitless, misleading. Ancient thought discovered the differentiation of the true from the good, Athens as distinct from Israel. Modern thought discovered the rule of understanding in moving towards the true. Aristotle and Plato knew about it, and so on, but they did not make it a specialty, differentiate it.

Question 9: In your view, do techniques of statistical inference have any significance or efficacy for correlating the contents of consciousness as objectified by anecdotal or verbal reports? If so, under what conditions?

Lonergan: It all depends on the degree of intelligence involved (1) in devising and (2) in employing the techniques in question. If the techniques express intelligence, represent intelligence, and if they are used intelligently to enormous further, to be determined conditions and you can determine them further if you know all about the relevance of verbal and anecdotal evidence to understanding a person's report. What does count is the intelligence with which hypotheses concerning the correlation are formulated and tested.

Question 10: One of the most liberating insights which I had while reading *Insight* was that which led me to discover that scientists have extra-scientific opinions; and that some of these opinions are not properly disengaged from those which are (intra)scientific; all of which can lead to lengthy journeys into territories from which we are eventually invited to retreat. I believe you use Galileo's opinion on the nature of science as an example. Insofar as in *Insight, Method*, etc., you are laying a foundation for science, could it be that your defense of free enterprise is extra-scientific? And a petition which is corollary to the spirit of the above question: can you comment

on our obligation to take up your work and ‘manfully,’ as you say in *Insight*, work to reverse whatever issues from inadvertent concessions to the counterpositions? (Addressing in your comment the fact that your work is being taken up by a community of which some members have had a chance to work with you closely while other members of that community gain access to your work through your writings and through dialoguing with those who have worked with you closely?)

Lonergan: Very definitely I should say that the issue of free enterprise is proximately scientific but ultimately existential. It is proximately scientific inasmuch as one has to refuse to mean by free enterprise what has been going on in the West for the past two hundred years. One has to take the word to mean what is revealed as possible by a functional analysis in macroeconomics. But the issue is ultimately existential, for one has to choose between praxis and technique. Planning is a technique by which a few people take upon themselves the office of deciding what vast numbers of other people are to do, whether they are to do it, and what will happen to them if they don’t. That is what planning means. And it is not anything particularly intelligent because it uses old ideas that everyone understands and knows are good. It is not a source of initiative. Free enterprise is a setup in which individuals are free to figure out what can be done, whether they will do it, and if they so decide they take upon themselves the risk of doing it. They are the people that pay for it if they are wrong. It is not merely a matter of getting bright ideas; it is a matter of putting them into effect at your own expense. The issue between planning and free enterprise is existential in two manners: it arises inasmuch as it is doubtful whether or not the people are totally corrupt. If people are totally corrupt, then planning is inevitable; they can’t help themselves. In the measure that they are not, you have some hope. But it is also existential inasmuch as one’s decision on the issue tells something about the kind of person one is. Our age is an age of technique; our behaviorists, positivists, newsmen, politicians know and think a great deal of technique and very little of praxis, and one can catch the virus. But deciding one way or the other is existential.

Question 11: To what extent does investigation of the ‘black box’ into which go sensations and out of which comes talk require the appropriation of feelings, and in what manner does successful intellectual self-appropriation transform the task of appropriating one’s feelings?

Lonergan: Obviously, one cannot be suffering from anxiety neurosis and so be incapacitated, for serious and prolonged conversion. Anxiety can be very serious. One can be knocked out every second day by an anxiety neurosis. Successful intellectual self-appropriation transforms the task of appropriating one’s feelings in the measure that Bernard Tyrrell’s upper-level therapy facilitates lower-level therapy; but not in the sense that theoretical knowledge of any kind deals directly with lower-level problems. You have to live through and work through all the blind alleys you have been down. Just getting an insight into what’s wrong does not help; it has to be an insight with a terrific emotional resonance. That makes a difference.

Question 12: Could you describe the transposition of Voegelin’s *Plato and Aristotle* to the efforts of contemporary thinkers?

Lonergan: Well, Voegelin's *Plato and Aristotle* is the way people actually carry on their understanding, judging, and deciding; it is objectified not as ongoing process but only in its ultimate decisions. If you tell a man something, he will think it over and perhaps decide to do it, but he won't objectify his own process of thinking. He can't. You have to know the 'black box' very well before you can do that. So it is by raising questions and further questions and so on that one arrives at correct understanding and knows that it is correct and decides to act on it. It is the kind of account of human knowledge that one finds in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, totally incomprehensible to Henri Brémond, who wrote a book on it and had no idea of what he was talking about; he thought he was talking about logic. Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*, Gadamer's *Truth and Method*: Gadamer is concerned not to set up an epistemology but to know what happens when you pronounce a judgment on a work of art, when you arrive at a historical account of the past or an interpretation of the past. It is what's going on when you are knowing; that is the question of the 'black box.' And you can get people to move in on that or you can talk about their talking, and that is an entirely different thing. That's logic. My account of common sense is in *Insight* chapters 6 and 7, and judgment, chapter 10. It is common sense as distinct from maths and science and interpretation and history and philosophy. Common sense is distinct from all those.

Question 13: What are the consequences of your generalized empirical method and the tasks of the third plateau for departments of philosophy in particular and for other academic disciplines?

Lonergan: Well, the consequences are recovery from 700 years of mistaken presuppositions. The big moment of aberration was the Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy. It was agreed on all sides that Aristotle was a pagan, and it was also agreed that his logical works were OK, and there followed a neglect of the rest of Aristotle. Not a total neglect, but it wasn't tempering their logic. Medieval science developed into modern science, experimental method; and you have the same type of method in theology [?] up to that controversy. But after it, logic becomes dominant. A seminal work on the fourteenth century is Michalski, who published a series of articles on the fourteenth century, on the whole setup, not on particular authors, but showing that what we know of particular authors was commonly held at that time. He published a series of articles in learned Polish journals, and the articles were written in French in the 1920s and 1930s, and they have been made generally available by Kurt Flasch, Minerva, Frankfurt, 1969. The title includes *Six Études, Six Studies*, the title is something about fourteenth-century thought, and the title is in French.

Question 14: Could you give some indication of the manner in which your *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*, and your *De Constitutione Christi* might be transformed into the functional specialty systematics?

Lonergan: Well, a sample of it is a paper I read at Laval, Easter 1975, entitled 'Christology Today: Methodological Reflections.' It was a colloquium of about twenty or twenty-five people, and it has been published under the title *Le Christ Hier, Aujourd'hui et Demain*, published by Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Québec. And there are two articles in English, mine and Fr Fred Crowe's; the rest were in French. It is offset, the kind of thing you get in Scholars Press, but very nicely done.

Question 15: Would you find in many dehumanizing applications of technique in modern societies (e.g., *Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* on physical mobility versus neighborhood community and other social planning) consequences of a massive perceptualism and conceptualism in modern cultures?

Lonergan: I think so. The logical binge came out of the Augustinian/Aristotelian controversy, and it is still going strong.

Question 16: Could you relate the inner light and the ‘pull’ in history that you spoke of last night to your discussion of the four graces in *De Deo Trino*?

Lonergan: Well, I’d relate it to my book on *Grace and Freedom*, Augustine and Thomas on operative and cooperative grace. God’s gift of his love is an unrestricted love; operative grace is the pull, and it becomes cooperative when you respond. And as grace is absolute, unrestricted, with my whole heart and whole soul and all my mind and all my strength, and when that grace becomes cooperative, you have transforming union. The four graces in *De Deo Trino* has to do with four real relations in the Trinity and their relation to the analysis of grace. John Courtney Murray pressed me to develop it further, but by that time I had come to the conclusion that what I had to say in *De Deo Trino* on the subject was a rather metaphysical conceit, and I was more interested in personalism at the time, and I never wanted to do it. And so I’m not too interested in it now, either.

Question 17: What in your experience and thinking has led you to emphasize dialogue as well as dialectic? What is the relation between them?

Lonergan: Dialectic objectifies opposed positions. Everyone will have a different account of which positions are the right ones and which are the wrong ones, because otherwise you wouldn’t need any dialectic. It reveals and pulls out the question of judgments of value and reveals their consequences. It sets out objectively – it will give you different accounts of what is an objective presentation, but the mere fact that you keep getting different accounts also reveals objectified judgments of value. The point to it is (1) that theology cannot keep out value judgments (really, human science can’t but theology least of all). And unless you have some way of dealing with value judgments, you are not being methodical. Dialectic is an attempt to introduce some element of methodical control over value judgments. And the first thing is to reveal that they exist. Where do they come in? They come in on issues that further research, further interpretation, further historical writing does not affect. If you have different value judgments, you are going to get different research, different interpretation, different history. They influence, but they do it as an undertow, and you have to bring them out into the light.

Now, the difference between dialectic and dialogue is that everyone has his own little self-starter of asking further questions: on the intellectual, the judgmental, and the decision levels. And if you bring that self-starter into the picture, actually operating, you get dialogue, not merely dialectic but dialogue. The difference between dialogue and dialectic is that you have as many sources, principles of direction, of elimination of bad value judgments, operative in the discussion as there are persons there, or at least as there are genuine persons there. So if people

are bull-headed about it, then dialogue doesn't help much, but otherwise it brings in something new, namely, the personal element.

Questions from the audience

Question: In answer to question 11, you commented that it was only the insight into one's personal problems that was emotion-laden that was effective in keeping pure your feelings, and I wonder if you could comment a little further on how one set of insights into one's problems can be without emotion and another insight have it. How does that happen?

Lonergan: Well, a theorist: you can go ahead and study depth psychology, and that won't help you because your studying will suffer from the same blocks that you are already suffering from. I think I told you Harry Stack Sullivan's account of a man he was helping. The man was constantly talking about his father, who apparently was a terrible person, and he had a dream of a Dutch windmill, beautiful green sward, a magnificent wall, terrific veins moving around grandiosely, and then the scene shifted, and he was inside the windmill, and it was full of cobwebs and rust and dust, and Harry said, 'What does that remind you of?' And he said, 'Oh, my God! My mother!' He had an emotional insight. He connected it with his living. He had always seen his mother as a person of terrific devotion who helped him to do everything, doing everything she possibly could, but she had emptied herself out. At least that was the account Sullivan gave. And up to that point he had not said a word about his mother. From then on he started thinking of things in a different way, and it was all the thinking of things in a different way that would be the cure.

Question: Fr Crowe presented a paper this morning that he gave at convocation, and he spoke of two mindsets; and different adult education programs have come out with ways of classifying contemporary Catholics. There is the traditional Catholic, the pre-Vatican Catholic, and the post-Vatican Catholic, and I think they call those different mindsets. From your intentionality analysis, what do you think of that kind of classification? Have you any thoughts on that or any handle on that?

Lonergan: Well, they are Greek ways of talking about differentiations of consciousness and aberrations of consciousness. Everyone you know who was enthusiastic about Vatican II doesn't mean that he has achieved great differentiation of consciousness. It probably means that he dislikes what went on before.

Question: It sounds like what you are saying is that it is not even a differentiation of consciousness sometimes; it is just a description of a set of attitudes.

Lonergan: Yes. It can be. But the problem is that not everyone has to achieve differentiation of consciousness. You can save your soul without that. As I say in *Method*, no one is obliged to have a differentiation of consciousness because of his faith, and no one is prevented from having a differentiation of consciousness because of his faith. But if you are a professional theologian, well, you need a certain amount of differentiation of consciousness, and you can be in the first stage of meaning, an anachronist, or in the second stage of meaning, a logician, or in the third

stage of meaning and in method. And method is the contemporary position. Method is not in terms of the eternal verities; it is in terms of increasing understanding; that is what method is concerned with. If you already know all about it, then you don't need a method.

Question: Last year a book came out, *The Owl of Minerva*, in which the editors tried to collect the opinions of contemporary philosophers on their idea of what the task of philosophy is: from Karl Popper to Fr Copleston. And I was wondering, if you had contributed, would you have included, say, a transposition of your eight functional specialties into the realm of philosophy, or what would be your general outline of the task of the philosopher?

Lonergan: I would say, fundamentally cognitional theory, what goes on in the 'black box.'

Question: If I understood you correctly, earlier this week you criticized the notion of value-free knowledge. I'm a little perplexed by (sound not clear, but basically about Lonergan's position on value judgments in social science).

Lonergan: Well, you can understand social sciences as simply further instances of natural science. Behaviorists, in principle, deny scientific validity to any account of human behavior that cannot be reproduced in a robot or in a rat. Animal psychology is all you need to deal with human beings, and if you go beyond that you are introducing value judgments. Now, insofar as human science is done that way, obviously it has to be value-free. You have to be able to reproduce it in a robot or a rat, but that isn't the whole of human science, and an awful lot, the social sciences and the psychological sciences, go way beyond that; clinical psychology goes way beyond that; sociology such as Parsonian sociology, G. Wright Mills, and especially the New School of Social Research, which is influenced by the phenomenological movement, go way beyond it. Now, when you go beyond limitation, then you have a problem of value judgments. Max Weber thought out a very complicated scheme in which your value judgments were excluded but you considered the value judgments of the people you were studying, but you considered them simply as objective fact. He wrote on Calvinism and the rise of capitalism, and he gave you an account of the value judgments of Calvinists, but he didn't make his own value judgment about those value judgments. He studied historically what came out of them. And a lot of people may well disagree with it. Leo Strauss in *Natural Right and History* violently attacked Weber. He said a rational man will make these value judgments. The question of value judgments exists. And I have the specialties Dialectic and Foundations in my *Method in Theology* to bring the question of value judgments out into the open. The first three functional specialties can be performed by anyone. Anyone can do the research, anyone can do the interpretation, anyone can do the history, but none of the three are definitive, because any of the three can be influenced by the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. So what is the dialectic doing? It brings out into the open these differences, things that are not going to be changed by further research, interpretation, and history. because you can get a different history according to your presence or absence of the different conversions.

Question: Is there a devil, or are there angels?

Lonergan: Anything else?

Question: Perhaps Sebastian's question could be rephrased in terms of the correspondences you saw between what Voegelin was doing and what Harvey Egan was discussing in terms of the *Spiritual Exercises*.

Lonergan: Harvey Egan, his book on, well the fundamental chapters are on consolation without a previous cause. It is on a diagnostic of when it is a pull and when it is a counter pull. Take *Sacramentum Mundi*, the second volume, an article by ... on the discernment of spirits. It is a traditional practice. It goes back to the monks in the desert, on pull and counterpull as these things emerge in the spiritual life, and the diagnostic, the one time at which you can be certain, according to St Ignatius in his *Spiritual Exercises*, that it is a pull is when you have a consolation without a previous cause. And the book by Egan is determining exactly what a previous cause could be and when is there a consolation without a previous cause. He works the thing out. But the general literature on the subject, articles in the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité ascétique et mystique*, a whole series of articles and volumes. There are pages and pages on the history of these topics, and it is the occurrence within the Christian ascetical and mystical tradition of precisely what Voegelin is calling pull and counterpull. One of the articles starts off with Socrates. Harvey Egan's book is published by the Institute for Jesuit Sources in St Louis, a paperback.