

Lonergan Workshop 1976 Q&A June 14-18

June 16 (TC 888 A and 888 B). The questions and some typed responses by Lonergan can be found at [www.bernardlonergan.com](http://www.bernardlonergan.com) file 27900DTE070.

**Question:** In *Insight* you make use of the depth psychologies of Freud and Jung; in *Method* and recent articles you speak of healing from above and refer to existential, humanistic, and Third Force therapies. Could you comment on the relationship between these two basic approaches to therapy, and how they relate to your method?

**Lonergan:** Well, under the better judgment of the several experts we have talking on depth psychology in this Workshop, I can only make a few suggestions. I would suggest that the differences in the two types of therapies are to be understood in terms of the depth of the trouble. Antoine Vergote has remarked that the Id speaks only through displacement and condensation. You find out about the Id not by what anyone tells you but by the lions you dream of without being afraid of them. The lions are covering up for something else: displacement; because if they were real lions you would be afraid of them too; the affect would go with the image. Condensation is more difficult. It is an accumulation of metaphors that don't fit together; it is the bizarre aspect of the symbolic as distinct from the artistic. The passage in Macbeth: 'And pity like a newborn babe, striding the blast' and so on: you get everything into it: 'till tears doth drown the wind.' It sounds wonderful, but don't try to analyze it. That is the Id talking, according to Vergote.

Connect this with the fact that infants are incapable of linguistic expression of their troubles; they are infants – they don't speak. They can have things to express, but they can't express them. So if you think of repression as lack of expression, then you have a lot of it in infancy. Again, there is the remark that children know what they cannot say; they are not as innocent but it is nothing that they can say. Again with Theodore Thass-Thienemann, *The Interpretation of Language*, two volumes, and he has two other volumes on something else: that language, specifically the unexplained relationship between disparate meanings of the same words – look up any dictionary, and you have a series of different meanings for the same words, and there is no logical connection between those different meanings. He says that language in this respect, more than dreams, is the high road to the unconscious, to the unconscious not of the individual but of the race.

What is the unconscious? My best idea of it is the experienced, and so conscious, needing correct understanding and expression. It is what is experienced without being expressed, in need of understanding and expression, distorted by misunderstanding and the cumulative complications of misunderstanding because one mistake leads to another, and healed by correct understanding and adequately felt expression. The remedy is similar to the disease. The disease is lack of expression, and the remedy is adequately felt expression, not just theoretic understanding. On this view, the deeper the trouble the more abstruse the remedy, and so you go to these queerer depth psychologies. On the other hand, the higher the trouble, the less the need for deep probing; but I'm not going to say that deep probing is never needed. Some people would claim that. Some people will say that if it rarely achieves results, why bother, if you can get it out the other way, and so on? Well, that is a question to be discussed among experts. I have no opinion on that, just general ideas.

**Question:** How important a role do you see either or both of these basic approaches to therapy playing in the realization of a religious conversion and/or of what might be called a psychic conversion?

**Lonergan:** Well, we are going to have a paper on this topic tomorrow, so I think we should leave it till after then. I haven't read the paper, but I've agreed with Fr Doran on what he's communicated earlier on the matter.

**Question:** Would you say something about how the doctrine of original sin might be expressed in contemporary theological terms? How do you see the relationship between this doctrine and various forms of authentic and inauthentic guilt?

**Lonergan:** Well, in theology one does what one can. It is a limitless field, and one doesn't know all about it, especially if there is something that one has never taught. Somebody asked a Cambridge Don if he had studied Scholastic philosophy, and he said he never even taught it! I've written not a little on the effects of original sin, in *Grace and Freedom*, on moral impotence, on the dialectic of sin in chapter 7 of *Insight*, moral impotence in chapter 18, and so on. But I never had the job of teaching that treatise. There is a treatise *De peccato originali, De gratia elevante*. I never taught it, and I'm not in a position to present an opinion as a theologian. A theologian can't express an opinion without having done his homework on that question. There are people who have done a lot of writing on original sin and especially on the question of Adam and Eve, and so on, everything up to the Council of Trent: Flick and Alszeghy at the Gregorian, for example, and many others. As a private layman I'm inclined to take seriously the opinions of those who regard the Garden of Eden as a highly instructive story, one of the stories that conveys very profound truths. I find Sebastian Moore's paper highly enlightening and helpful and original on generic guilt. But I'm not going to do a treatise off the top of my head on the present state of the question of original sin. There is no doubt at all about *peccatum originale originatum*, originated original sin. On the cause of it, well, that's a delicate question.

**Question:** Would you comment generally on your understanding of the process of healing and educating human feelings?

**Lonergan:** Well, my understanding of it is in that very brief passage in *Method*. However, if you want to know something about it, read Rosemary Haughton, a marvelous woman, the mother of nine children or something like that. She knows all the ins and outs of raising children, and how to go about it with extreme delicacy and high intelligence. Her book *The Transformation of Man*, subtitled 'A Study of Conversion and Community,' published in London by Chapman in 1967 and also published at Springfield, IL: Templegate, apparently the publishers also 1967. I found it so helpful that I have 17 single-spaced typed pages of notes from the book. Also Paulist Press in paperback.

**Question:** Does the Law of the Cross take on a new meaning when personally appropriated within interiority on the psychic level?

**Lonergan:** I would say that the ‘Law of the Cross’ is an attempt to put in words what already has been personally appropriated within interiority on the psychic level. The psychic appropriation comes first. It comes from reading and preaching and hearing on the passion and death of Christ and all the New Testament doctrine on the death and resurrection of Christ, that doctrine as ‘for us’ ‘for me’ involves a personal appropriation if you think about it at all and a psychic appropriation, because it is pretty terrific stuff. As St Paul says, one might die for a just man, but we’re not just. Without reading and hearing and meditating and affectively responding to the suffering and death and resurrection of Christ as for us, the ‘law of the cross’ is not a mystery but a mystification. It is a rather stiff doctrine, and you don’t accept it: the acceptance of suffering of evil as the solution to problems. I think that is the case where development comes up from the entry into the religious horizon of the Christ figure.

**Question:** Would you please briefly review for us your understanding of the relationship between religious studies and theology? Particularly, would you indicate which functional specialties are involved in each? If religious studies and theology are to come closer and closer together, will a change be required in the conception and practice of either or both, and if so, what kind of change?

**Lonergan:** Religious studies are not all of the same type. There is the positivist tendency in religious studies following the methods of natural science. Above that, there is the acceptance of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the German development that I spoke about last night. Fundamentally, originally, religious studies were the study of the history of religions, an offshoot of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the sciences of the spirit, the historical studies, the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of mankind. It was an empirical study trying to reconstruct what religious people were constructing. This movement, the German historical school, started off with the classics in people like Wolf, but with von Ranke, it was what we might call early European history, 14<sup>th</sup>- and 15<sup>th</sup>-century European history, but it was applying new methods in those fields. It gradually spread and took over; it’s the source of all our modern biblical studies. It was understanding all cultures and the ancient cultures of the Near East among them, and our Assyriologists and Sumeriology and all the rest of it is all part of that movement. As such it is going to be an empirical study understanding man, studying religion as an expression of the human spirit. There will also be the symbols, and so on, and the symbols can be admitted to be very significant. But in general religious studies does not attempt to answer the question raised by the two Anglicans who wrote the book entitled *Convictions*, in which their concern was to answer the question raised, perhaps not very explicitly by the people in the pews, whether there was any fire behind the smoke emanating from the altar. Was there some reality behind these symbols? That’s the question where the theologian comes in.

Now, that approach takes on a more serious turn with people like Friedrich Heiler, who has an article in the University of Chicago Divinity *History of Religions* volumes, on the history of religions as a preparation for the cooperation of religions. The history of religions is moving into praxis there. The history of religions is a preparation for the cooperation of religions. Again, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, formerly director of the Institute of World Religions at Harvard, whose specialty is Islam, has been reacting to the fact that the Muslims read our books, and so the representatives of the other great religions read the books written by the students of religions. The students of religions make the discovery that they have to write not simply for their Western

audience if they are going to be successful in their presentation of Islam or Buddhism or Hinduism and so on. They have to be accepted as really talking about those religions in the eyes of the members, the people who live those religions. In other words, there is an external test beyond that of the academic community, and that again gives a new dimension of seriousness to these religious studies and a brake upon them.

Now, religious studies and theology are related. Theology differs insofar as the theologian will talk about God. He won't simply talk about man. If he isn't talking about God but just about man and how people feel and how good it is or how silly it is and so on, it is not theology. It can be religious studies of some school, some branch, and so on. The theologians, of course, differ. Theology, to my mind, mediates. Its function is to mediate between a religion and a culture, and consequently for every change in the culture you get a change in the theology. Otherwise, the mediation vanishes, and the theology loses a point; it is not fulfilling any function. The problem of contemporary Catholic theology is precisely understanding the changes that have come across Western culture because of modern natural science and modern human studies. There has been a constant undertow in theology during the 19th and 20th centuries because of these changes in the culture. I've been engaged in method in theology, and that's being engaged in the strategy of dealing with that transformation in your theology. It is for that reason, because I conceive the change is in the culture and consequently in theology as mediating between the religion and the culture, that I see the contemporary problem not as a problem of another faith or another church or another doctrine but of dealing with a cultural change, expressing the same religion to this new culture, this different culture. And that gives you all the complexity in the present theological situation, because not everyone sees it that way.

Now, there is an interdependence between the theologies and the religious studies. The theologians need the religious studies to be ecumenical. They have to know the other Christian religions. Again, you need religious studies if you're going to have your Secretariat on ecumenism. You need religious studies if you're going to have your Secretariat with regard to non-Christian religions; you have to have first-class knowledge of these non-Christian religions. And while you might say, Let the theologian do the study, OK, but they'll have to do the work that is done by the student of religions and not simply the work of a theologian. It's not a question of who does it, it's a question of what's done, and the theologian needs those other disciplines if he is to implement, to make significant these recent Secretariats on ecumenism and non-Christian religions and people who have no religion at all, reject all religion, the secularists. On the other hand, religious studies are incomplete without the theologian saying, Well, what is all the fuss about? Why is religion important? Does the empirical study of man as man answer the question, What is religion? Or does the question, What is religion? involve you in something more, and what is that something more? If you are raising that question, you are in theology. And the contention I presented in the paper last night is that in the measure that all methods listed or sketched are accepted and practiced, then theologies and religious studies will tend to cover cooperatively the whole field of religion, and there won't be conflicts between them that cannot be resolved, because the method of dialectic and dialogue envisages the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is to get within method the problem of diverging value judgments. You can get within method divergence about the interpretation of particular data and the ongoing development of that interpretation. You can get within factual control the development of historical knowledge, up to a point. But in both cases there are relevant value judgments of three types, regarding what is knowledge, what is morality, and what is religion, man's religions

conversion, and there the results are disparate, and the methods don't solve them, and one has to move into some kind of higher method called dialectic, and on a more personal level this becomes dialogue. You have to get into this personal approach simply because value judgments are personal judgments, and it is by bringing persons together that you get some sort of way of handling value judgments. It isn't the way of the crucial experiment, but it is something.

**Question:** Would you please review for us the central elements of your understanding of praxis? How is this understanding of praxis related to other significant uses of the word, for example in Aristotle, Marx, and Habermas?

**Lonergan:** Well, my idea of praxis is the second mode of development. There is development from below upwards, ever fuller attention to ever broader experience, ever better understanding and formulation of the understanding, ever fuller verification of these formulations, ever truer authenticity in one's commitment to intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, love. But there is also development from above downwards. It starts from the commitment. It formulates what the commitment means. It clarifies the formulation, and it transposes the clarified formulation to every audience – foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. This second type of development is praxis. It's a different thing, it's a complementary thing. The first type in human studies will use the past to enlighten the present. But the second will take the enlightenment of the present and use it as a guide for what you are going to do about it, now and in the future.

Comparison with others: well, comparison in general is a trap. People who want to do a doctoral dissertation comparing so and so with so and so, really are undertaking to do two doctoral dissertations, one on the first and one on the second, with an appendix comparing the results of the two investigations. So I won't move into it very seriously.

Aristotle: In Aristotle you distinguish *theoria*, *praxis*, and *poiēsis*. *Theoria* is speculative intellect, contemplation of the necessary, what necessarily is so: such is the movement of the heavens – that is necessary for Aristotle, perhaps not the planets but certainly the fixed stars. *Praxis* and *poiēsis* deal with the contingent. *Praxis* is conduct. It deals with the contingent. *Poiēsis* is producing, and it deals with the contingent. There are two ways of men dealing with the contingent: by their conduct dealing with persons, and by their production dealing with nature. So that analysis is a static analysis standing within the once-for-all achievement. The Greeks to inaugurate science had to oversell science, and in Plato and Aristotle you are going to have this oversell. Science arrives at truth, and the truth is necessarily so, and so on and so forth. The *Posterior Analytics* worked out all the implications of that view. We think we understand when we know the cause, know that it is the cause, and know that the effect cannot be other than it is. It is very modestly stated: we think we understand. How do you express this in the demonstrative syllogism? From then on, the talk is about the demonstrative syllogism. The weak point is, Where do the necessary premises come from? In Book II, chapter 19. he gives a very good account of the emergence of a hypothesis. It is like a rally and a rout. The line break: people were all running. But one man looked over his shoulder and saw that there was only one following him, so he turns and makes his stand, and somebody else comes along and joins him, and by this time the other side is all scattered all over, and these people come together and turn the tide. Similarly, in an investigation you have an endless mass of unconnected data, and then one little thing starts to click, and then another, and then another, and so on. But the trouble is

that the hypothesis is only hypothesis, and it doesn't supply Aristotle with his necessary premises.

Marx's reaction against Hegel, which was also his reaction against the Prussian Christian state, which was not the same – it's the Lutheran Christian state: it's against bourgeois politics, the bourgeois state as conceived by Hobbes, the survival of the citizens, Locke and Adam Smith, the protection of property. It's an egoistic, individualistic notion of the state, or it's the religious notion of the state. Because of this all along the line reaction it is praxis as a theory of revolution, and the three stages of preparing the revolution: that is all Marx could do. The dictatorship of the proletariat, once you got hold of state power, and then the emergence of true communism, which is utopia. As Hegel, Marx is dynamic, but his dynamism is not of *Begriffe*, of concepts, but of the mode and the relations of production. There were his more general theory and tactics. His more general theory envisaged the revolution coming much more quickly; he was expecting it when he wrote the Communist Manifesto, very shortly. The revolution broke out in Paris at the same time as the Manifesto, but the revolution didn't work. From then on Marx's work moved to tactics.

With regard to Habermas, I think you'd better ask Fr Lamb about that.

**Question:** At the beginning of the chapter on dialectic you give the following division of differences: 'Not all opposition is dialectical. There are differences that will be eliminated by uncovering fresh data. There are the differences we have named perspectival, and they merely witness to the complexity of historical reality. But beyond these there are fundamental conflicts,' the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

**Lonergan:** Now, this dialectical opposition in chapter 10 regards opposition among theologians doing history of the same events, doing exegesis of the same texts, doing research on the same material. It is not a complete list of differences. It is the differences in investigations and among investigators. Cultural differences regard differences in the events, the texts, the materials. Or the history of exegesis, the history of historiography, the history of research: they are in the object – cultural differences. The differences in the interpretation can be reduced to cultural differences, but then you transpose. It comes up in *Method* on 'The Ongoing Context.' You have the context of Nicea and the fuller context that arises in Ephesus out of the context of Nicea and the fuller context of Chalcedon and the fuller context of Constantinople III. The context is constantly changing and becoming more precise in unfolding the same fundamental idea. Similarly, you have the medieval context and consequent development. The medieval context is canonized in the council of Trent to a large extent. The theology that was developed in the medieval period was affirmed, on the sacraments and on justification, in the Council of Trent.

Now, these cultural differences aren't differences in history or in space and time, not specifically different.

The question continues: If so, finally, doesn't there seem to be here a growing range of mid-level differences which can be handled neither by further factual investigation, nor by dialectical techniques, but only by mutually respectful discussion?

'Only': I don't think it is because of cultural differences, and I wouldn't take the mutually respectful discussion as mid-level when you are getting close to a solution, the dialogue. Factual investigations handle differences that do not arise from the presence or absence of conversion. Dialectic deals with subjects as objects; you talk about Aristotle and Marx and

Hegel, and so on and so forth. But in dialogue, it is the people that differ talking to one another and respecting one another, and there you are getting much closer to the issue.

**Question:** Some of your comments on faculty psychology seem to be very critical, almost derogatory. Yet one of your very significant contributions has been to show us how to throw a bridge between the new intentionality categories and the older metaphysical ones: for example, in the expression of Trinitarian and Christological doctrines in terms of consciousness. Faculty psychology is, of course, in the metaphysical context, and is justly supplanted by the context of intentionality analysis. But is it wise to burn the bridges back to the metaphysical context? Or has that been your intention?

**Lonergan:** In a world in which empirical science, developing science, exists, you have to start from the data, and in psychology from the data of consciousness, and consequently intentionality analysis is the thing. It is quite true that I can go from the work I did in *Insight* to the metaphysical categories of potency, form, and act, central and conjugate forms, and so on. Taking that step to metaphysics seems to me not relevant as far as human psychology goes. You want to know just what you are talking about, and there is no need to introduce these further things, except perhaps as schematic helpers (?). My principal use of it would be as a schematic image of the potencies. You could draw a diagram representing the potencies and the habits and the forms and the operations and the relations between the operations, and so on. That idea is in the back of my head when I am talking about this other stuff, this intentionality analysis, because I worked first at the thing through the metaphysical presentation.

However, the place where you must not burn the bridges to the metaphysics is if you want to talk about the angels and God. Very few people want to talk about the angels anymore. But if you are going to talk about God, you are going to need the capacity to move out of the human area and to speak objectively of intelligence in God and love in God and so on. And that is where a metaphysical analysis or structure becomes much more appropriate.

It is not my intention to burn any bridges back, but what I am opposed to is saying that metaphysics comes first and they lay down their metaphysics and they use their metaphysics to give you a false account of knowledge. You can't dislodge them because the metaphysics has been laid down; that comes first. And if you are talking about anything, you are talking about being, reality, and therefore you must begin by talking about reality. Well, that would be fine if there was no original sin.

**Question:** Yesterday you made reference to natural law in terms of the transcendental precepts. If I am correct, another interpretation of natural law would speak in terms of the givenness of the teleology of one's faculties; for example, lying is a frustration of the purpose of speech, homosexuality is a frustration of the purpose of sexual faculties. Can or should this notion of the intrinsic teleology of man's faculties be incorporated into your understanding of natural law?

**Lonergan:** The natural law: there are two apprehensions of man, man as the rational animal, something that is true of every man whether he is awake or asleep, dreaming or in a coma or dreamless sleep, sane or crazy, drunk or sober, and so on all along the line; and there is the knowledge of man through the interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit. It is knowledge of man as a historical being, man as a self-completing animal. Man as a

self-completing animal completes himself by his morality and knowledge and religion. But that self-completing proceeds fundamentally from his capacity to ask questions for intelligence, questions for reflection – Is that so? – and questions for deliberation – Is it worthwhile? There is where the whole process of self-completing occurs. Now, that is the entrance of modern empirical and historical science into anthropology. And with that entrance you are setting aside the earlier anthropology in terms of the rational animal and making room for the symbolic animal, the self-completing animal, and so on, that one deals with historically and one communicates with in civilized society.

So, insofar as people have made that transition and have that apprehension of man, to start talking to them about faculties and their intrinsic finality and so on is not a starting point, a basis for discussion. It can be a consideration in solving particular questions, but raising the questions and solving them is a matter of being intelligent, reasonable, responsible, in love, and don't think you're Adam.

'Can or should this notion of the intrinsic teleology of man's faculties be incorporated into your understanding of the natural law?' As a particular type of argument in solving particular questions, fine, for what it's worth, though there seem to be questions. But the fundamental issue, the foundations, lie elsewhere.

**Question:** This morning Sebastian Moore spoke of the discovery of the self carrying the discovery of self-transcendence within it. In reference to descriptions of your work as being too heady, too cognitive, lacking a literary and poetic expression, could you please say something further along the lines of your discussion on religious knowledge and specifically on self-transcendence as first of all coming from our flesh and blood and through nerves and brain have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meaning and to carry our symbolic demands?

**Loneragan:** Well, development is from below upwards. Piaget has two books on his three children from the ages of zero to twenty-four months, and their development during that time. You see how the development begins when they start learning to speak, and so on. The human infant is born with a terrific plasticity. They say it takes a kitten nine days to get its eyes open, but it is able to crawl around in no time, and so on. When a calf is born it is already walking around. The human infant takes a long time to learn to walk. But that very plasticity of the human infant means that it can develop in all kinds of incredible ways. The dexterity of the concert pianist or even of the typist, the violinist, the acrobat, the athlete all doing incredible feats; and it is under symbolic control. The whole of man's body is something to be directed by signs and symbols, and wants it. My nephew during the Second World War – my brother was in war industries, and this boy was about 4 or 5, and was living in a French part of the city of Montreal – ran into another boy and said something, and the other boy just looked at him. And my nephew said, 'What's wrong? Are you stupid? Can't you talk?' Children are asking endless questions all the time and just love moving into this world mediated by meaning, and inventing their own worlds mediated by meaning in their games. They play house and doctor and God knows what. It is the spontaneous movement of the human animal into a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values. It goes right up. Christopher Dawson: you can give men everything that they could want and they will be dissatisfied and complain; but give them a cause, and they will sleep in ditches and starve, suffer and die, and that is the ability of the



human animal gladly to pursue a cause, to work for a cause. That is what I'm talking about, without a literary or poetic expression.

### **888B: Questions from the floor.**

**Question:** Writers like Paul Hazard or Robert Nisbet or Leo Strauss seem to situate the beginning of something like the long-term decline around Machiavelli somewhere around the late Renaissance period. Would you situate the long-term decline around the same time, or do you think it's longer?

**Lonergan:** There it's political: Machiavelli. It's mixed. You have the breakdown of civilization. Dawson describes the Dark Ages between 600 and 800, and it is described by a contemporary, 'when men devoured one another as fishes in the sea.' It was the church that supplied concrete examples of restoring architecture and agriculture through the monks and providing a general skeleton of government, a universal government, and so on. In that period the church exercised terrific political power, as a super-polity, as it were, and carried on all sorts of offices. It was the literate part of the population. 'Clerk' meant a person who could read a book. Well, as the civilization of the West developed, there had to be a withdrawal on the part of the church, and the emergence of others, and it didn't occur easily; the church had to be pushed a bit, and theories had to be thought out for doing the pushing, and so on. That's why you get the idea that it started there. Well, it was a bit of oversell on the part of the people who were doing the pushing. That's my idea on that. But in general, one hasn't got pure decline or pure development or complete recovery.

**Question:** A question about what Lonergan said about giving people 'causes,' a link to Becker's suspicion of immortality projects, etc.

**Lonergan** acknowledges that 'causes' can lead to aberrations, false causes.

**Question:** Are there authentic causes rather than just authentic subjects?

**Lonergan:** I think so, but they can be corrupted. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

**Question:** You identified the unconscious with experience that hadn't been expressed, and then you had the notion of consciousness as awareness.

**Lonergan:** It is the presupposition of questions and insights and verification. My meaning of the unconscious I don't find in Freud but in Stekel, Horney, and Jung. In Jung the conscious is what is explicit, explicitly related to the ego. In Horney there is the difference between registering and knowing. Things register without your being able to say them. Stekel: 'They know but they won't say it.' Now, when you go back to the infant, what was known then was just experience without the possibility of saying. Freud is a lot at that level, and what you get there is conscious experience wanting some sort of expression and incapable of having it. So the point to that analysis, you get it in Fingarette, *The Self in Transformation*, that neurosis is misinterpreted experience. The point to it is that the cure is the expression. The first case Freud worked on – she

spoke of it as the talking cure. What she tried to express by her hysteria was something she could state within the analysis, the analytic situation, and had the talking cure. So, if the talking is the cure, well, the lack of talking is the difficulty, at least the lack of intelligent talk.

**Question:** What about the whole area of dream analysis, which tries to get at an area of the psyche that isn't available in other ways?

**Lonergan:** The Id according to Vergote expresses itself only through displacement. It throws a monkey in the wrench, that's all. You dream of lions, but you are not afraid of them. Well, you are not dreaming of lions, Freud says.

**Question:** You mentioned the necessity for the psychic appropriation of the Law of the Cross, and working out the Law of the Cross in *De Verbo Incarnato* as in a certain sense the intelligibility of historical process, as a higher viewpoint. I wondered if you could comment on that relative to what you said last night about how the experiment, the crucial experiment, the experiment occurs in terms of praxis in the strong sense in the whole process of history. In setting up the correlation between bias and how that affects in terms of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility, one has progress, and if not there is decline. How do you relate those two, the Law of the Cross on the one hand, and then this notion of the experiment of historical progress?

**Lonergan:** The experiment is simply the decline. The proof that you've been on the wrong track is the decline. How to get back on to the right track is the question of redemption. It's the fact that, if rationalization is the root trouble, then reasoning isn't going to clear the thing up. Why isn't that more rationalization. If you call it rationalization, then people will say, well, you're rationalizing too, probably more than I am if you can find reasons for it. You have to go to faith. And how do you deal with the determinisms, economic, psychological, through the media and so on, all these determinisms? Well, there's no use making promises. It is hope beyond hope, religious hope, that will break them. People will be strong enough to resist. Retributive justice will just duplicate the evils. If it's an eye for an eye, there won't be many eyes left; what we need is self-sacrificing love. And that's the law of the cross.

**Question:** Well, then you would see theology mediating the Law of the Cross to our contemporary culture in decline.

**Lonergan:** Yes, but also putting in a bit of light too.