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Lonergan Workshop 1976 Q&A June 14-18

June 14 (TC 885 A and 885 B). **Note: 885A is almost totally inaudible after the first few minutes. There is a transcription taken from some other source, and that is included here. An attempt will be made to discover the source. The transcription of the early portion has not been checked against an audio recording. The material that begins here on p. 8, with 'Questions from the Floor,' is somewhat more audible, though there is considerable background noise that could not be removed without losing the voices; that portion has been checked against the recording on 885 B. The questions and a copy of Lonergan's written responses can be found at www.bernardlonergan.com file 27880DTE070.**

Question: Would you agree that self-appropriation of the knower, to which *Insight* invites the reader, is an invitation to a fundamental form of praxis? Please explain.

Lonergan: Well, I won't explain the invitation as the same explanation for praxis. The book *Insight* asks people to discover themselves, to find out what goes on in the 'black box' that exists in between one's sensations and what one says. Terrific transformations go on in the 'black box,' and a lot of people have never taken the trouble to examine their 'black boxes.' Abraham Maslow, who has written on transforming personality and peak experiences, says the first thing you have to do in teaching people that sort of psychology is to get them to change themselves, to change from people who don't know what goes on in their 'black box' to being aware of it as going on in themselves. *Insight* is thought to be a difficult book, but its essence was given in a course at a school of adult education in the fall and winter of 1945 in Montreal. About the fourth night, a girl came in and whacked the table and said, 'I've got it!' She had discovered something in the 'black box.' That is the self-appropriation to which the reader is invited in *Insight*.

What has that got to do with praxis? Well, first of all, praxis is ambiguous. There is a fundamental ambiguity to praxis. There is praxis in the sense of Aristotelian faculty psychology, and there is praxis in the sense of a modern intentionality analysis psychology. Difficulty will be created by that ambiguity, especially if one's awareness of Aristotle is very dim. If it is very dim, one won't be able to uncover the confusions involved in the word 'praxis' in those two contexts. Faculty psychology is a corollary of Aristotle's hierarchy of the sciences, a hierarchy in which metaphysics, which studies being as being, as Heidegger loves to repeat, is the most general science and provides all other sciences with their basic terms. It is dictatorial. It denies autonomy to the other sciences. Since the basic terms of metaphysics are potency, form, and act, the most basic terms in the other sciences are also potency, form, and act. You will find them in Aristotle's physics, and you will find them in his psychology. So the psychology of plants, animals, and men can be a single science. Plants too have potency, form, and act, with regard to nutrition, growth, and reproduction. They are not conscious, but it is psychology in the Aristotelian sense. It is a different kind of act when you get to Aristotle's mechanical order. In like manner, intellect and will are potencies susceptible of forms named habits and of acts or operations. Intellect, further, is open to a distinction between the speculative and the practical, and operations with respect to the necessary are named speculative while operations with respect to the contingent are named practical. Then you get further refinements in Aquinas, i.e., the

mutual operations of will on intellect and intellect on will, on which Aquinas changed his mind a number of times. We needn't go into that. Now, one of the main blocks against modern science was precisely this intrusion of metaphysics into all fields. It implied that all other fields had to be denied the autonomy of discovery and determining their own basic terms. It followed that experimental method and the determination of basic correlations could not be the source of the basic terms in mechanics and other sciences; de facto the basic terms are space and time and functions and derivatives of functions, second derivatives of functions, mass, and so on. And none of those are metaphysical terms. The basic terms for Galileo were to be had from geometry, the mathematization of nature. Well, the mathematization of nature means eliminating the reality of nature. And so you have a war over that. Similarly, psychology had to operate with basic terms that did not refer to the data of consciousness. Intellect as potency is not a datum of consciousness. Habits are not directly data of consciousness. They are indirectly, insofar as the operations come more spontaneously, more easily. So you have indirect evidence for the habit but not a conscious datum. Intentionality analysis is a modern science that obtains its basic terms and relations from the data of consciousness. The terms name conscious acts. The relations name the dynamism that carries consciousness from one operation to the next in ordered series. So you have sciences built up from terms and relations, and you get them both out of consciousness in intentionality analysis.

The operations occur on distinct levels, where the term 'level' denotes a sublation of a first set of operations, e.g., sensation, imagination, feeling, bodily movement, by a second set, i.e., inquiry, insight, formulation. Being intelligent doesn't interfere with your sensations. It makes your sensitive operations all the more accurate, all the more refined. My standard example is, if a bug walks across the table I knows it is a bug. But an entomologist can tell me a hundred things about it, and I won't know what he means, because it is all technical terms referring to specialized observations of the bug. His sensations are not interfered with. They are improved by the operations of inquiry, understanding, and formulation. They go beyond it. They give it a further goal, scientific knowledge. They expand its relevance enormously, and so on. That's sublation. They don't interfere with the senses.

Now, the second set is sublated in its turn by a third set, i.e., reflection, weighing the evidence, and judging. And the first three are sublated by a fourth set, i.e., deliberation, evaluation, decision, action. Now, on intentionality analysis every human act in the sense of those four levels, everything done freely and responsibly, is a matter of praxis. If it is done freely and responsibly, the fourth level is operating. What we have always thought of as the work of speculative intellect, intellect operating on the necessary, now is praxis in a differentiation of consciousness in which the good that is deliberately sought is the truth if you are in Aristotelian science, i.e., the sort of science thought out in the *Posterior Analytics*, or its goal is the best available understanding of the data at the present time. Modern science does not aim approximately at truth. It aims at understanding, at more adequate understanding, and truth is a limiting concept whose attainment is not foreseen in the proximate future.

So by the mere transition to intentionality analysis one gets a different meaning of praxis, in a very general sense. But by the time we get the third question, we will get to another more precise notion of praxis.

Question: How does the notion of praxis relate to your notion of a generalized empirical method?

Lonergan: Well, the basis of reference is intentionality analysis. Intentionality analysis brings the data of intentional consciousness to explicit formulation, recognition, acceptance. When what is in the 'black box' becomes something you know all about, you recognize it and accept it and formulate it. Such formulation, recognition, acceptance is constitutive of generalized empirical method. You are getting hold of the basic mechanism involved in any methodical procedure, and you have it recognized, formulated, accepted. It will be specialized, adapted differently to different fields, and so it will become by these adaptations special methods for special fields. All scientists are attentive to the data and inquire intelligently and come to understand them better and better and check their results against the data. Because they are all attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, they are employing a generalized empirical method, and that is what generalized empirical method means.

It is empirical because it is concerned with the data. It is method because you know what you are doing; it is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. That is true of all the operations of our knowing in any case, and so it is true in what is genuinely scientific.

Question: What would the main contributions of the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations in a methodologically transformed theology be to our understanding of the relation of theory and praxis?

Lonergan: This is where praxis in the stronger sense comes in. The functional specialties divide into two phases. A first, mediating phase, *in oratione obliqua*, in indirect speech – what did Isaiah mean or Paul or Luther or Augustine or whom have you? You are saying what somebody else thought. And there is a second, mediated phase, direct speech, where you are saying what you're up to, what you think or understand, *in oratione recta*.

The first phase is development. Both are developments. But the first phase is development from below upwards, if I'm permitted a spatial metaphor to denote the fact that the procedure is from data through understanding and judgment to decision. That's the first phase. It is from below upwards, and it is developing. You are learning what the original texts were in textual criticism. You are learning to understand what the meaning of the texts was in exegesis. You are placing the different texts each in its own period and so on in history. And you are clarifying the oppositions that aren't going to be eliminated by any further empirical work in dialectic.

The second phase is development from above downwards. From one's basic options, commitments, horizon, that's where foundations comes out. Dialectic moves to foundations insofar as you'll appeal to intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. That becomes the starting point. It is from that starting point that you can work out doctrines out of your interpretation and history, and go on to systematic determination of the meaning of the doctrines. What on earth could it mean? And finally to communications that preaches the gospel to every class in every culture. That's operating and developing, acquiring further knowledge and determination, moving from above downwards.

It is a type of development that modern thought is rather inclined to overlook. It has a very notable effect on the distinction between fundamental dogmatic and moral theology. Insofar as by fundamental theology you mean the old treatises on the true religion, on the divine legate,

on the church, on the inspiration of scripture, you're talking about doctrines, and they are determined in the same way as any other doctrine. They have no logical precedence, because your theology is no longer deductivist. You have moved out of the Aristotelian deductivism. It has become a quasi-empirical science, that is, a human science working with past history into the present to the illumination of the future.

You can have a fundamental theology insofar as you are doing dialectic and foundations, but that is what fundamental theology on this concept of method is.

Question: What positive and negative contributions would your *Method in Theology* and your present interest in economics make to political theology and liberations theologies?

Lonergan: Well, to political theology: history not just as first-phase inquiry but as second-phase and practical. In *Insight* there is developed an account of progress, decline, and recovery, redemption. Our fundamental moral thinking in the twentieth century has to be a stance of the same dimensions as the liberal doctrine of progress, the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism. It has to be able to restore progress and diffuse Marxism, and provide us with a dynamic. The modern world was governed during the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century by the liberal doctrine of progress. A great part of the world, i.e., Eastern Europe, Russia, China is governed by Marxism, and it is influencing in all sorts of ways, including so-called struggles between the right and left and so on that are all very happily geared to further ends, if you know anything about the plans for world revolution. We have to be doing our moral thinking fundamentally on that level, on the dynamics of our time. That moral thinking is the dynamics of our time, and until we are able to move on that level and think on that level and operate on that level, we are going to be eliminated just as easily as the Red Indians were eliminated by the whiles when they came to America. We will be behind the age; we won't be living in our own times. So that to my mind is the point to political theology. It isn't politics in any sense in which we think of politics, but it is very much politics in the sense of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Marxism.

As far as the relation to liberation theology is concerned, it would endeavor to include technical competence in economics. And by technical competence in economics, I mean first of all that the economics becomes instrumental. In general, economic science at the present time aims at being predictive at telling the government what will happen if you do this, and so on. You don't have to consult the masses, and they don't have to be consulted; and as long as economics retains that notion that science is predictive, it's just a spin-off from the notion of James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, who thought that political economy in his day was more or less in the same situation as astronomy was in the time of Newton. It was a predictive science just like Newtonian mechanics. It wasn't quite there yet, but it was moving towards it. That idea of economics as predictive is not going to be an economics that fits in with these ideas at all. It has to become an instrument, something that enables free and responsible people, that reveals to them how to attain their freely and responsibly chosen goals. You get that idea expressed in Adolph Lowe's *On Economic Knowledge*. He teaches at the New School of Social Research. It's published in a Harper Torchbooks. (It usually takes about twelve months to get a Harper Torchbook!)

So, liberation apropos of that. There's a book by a Fr Duquoc on theology of secularization, or the ambiguities of a theology of secularization. It is in print. In it he comments

on the great breakthrough of the social encyclicals that occurred with John XXIII. Up to John XXIII, the social encyclicals were concerned with an agrarian society, with the result that the family, property, and work were the fundamental concepts. John XXIII has moved beyond that into an industrial society. However, he also states – now, I'm not taking full responsibility for these statements, which are interesting, I think – that while *Gaudium et Spes* is really concerned with the problems of an industrial society, still its attitude is one of a moralizer, and there is no technical competence coming in to say what is to be done.

Question: Please comment generally on the importance of 'theology as public discourse,' particularly within the framework of the functional specialties.

Lonergan: Well, within the functional specialties theology is not public discourse in any vulgar sense. However, modern mathematics, quantum physics, biophysics, biochemistry are public discourse in every reasonable sense. Anyone that has the time and so on can learn them and come to understand them. There is a beautiful book on Fourier's theory. Is it public discourse or is it not? It certainly is public discourse, in that you can't publicly dispute it without making a fool of yourself. So there is a sense in which public discourse is completely intelligible, but only to a highly specialized audience. Theology as a modern academic discipline is highly specialized. Either you go into that strict specialization or you are an amateur. You have to have experts on scripture, on the Old Testament, on the several parts of the Old Testament, and the sub sub parts; and the same for the New. No one takes the whole of Paul for his field. He does well if he does something brilliant on a section of a letter, and so on. All this research, interpretation, history, and so on, is highly specialized. Dialectic is still more specialized. It means you are quite at home with the 'black box,' and you have a 'black box' that is operating well.

Moreover, as a modern academic discipline and one that is developing from above downwards, that is praxis in the strong sense, it doesn't differ from any of the other modern sciences, because the modern sciences are group performances. Thomas Kuhn in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* says in his postscript to the second edition that if he were rewriting the book it would be about the scientific community. What counts for Aristotle as science is the habit of a man's mind, and of course the set of syllogisms constitutive of an Aristotelian science could easily become an individual's in time. But there is no modern science that is known by any one man. No one man knows the whole of mathematics and the whole of physics and the whole of chemistry and the whole of biology, and so there is no theologian today that knows the whole of theology, or that tries to. We talk about ongoing collaboration, and that again is a matter of a community. Communities have their required momentum and all the rest of it. They have their options and commitments, as well as their theoretical determinations, and that is what this problem is. Kuhn is often described as an irrationalist, because a community will take time to change its mind. And the changing of its mind is a matter, to no small extent, of the old-timers gradually retiring from their chairs and the new theory being propagated by the new arrivals. But it doesn't prevent physics and so on from being public discourse. One might think of public discourse as something like Descartes's *Cogito, ergo sum*, or something like that. It isn't science in that sense. Science in that sense doesn't exist. Gadamer's *Truth and Method* is against the method of Descartes.

Question: More specifically, would you say something about systematic theology speaking to the three publics Fr Tracy mentioned this morning: the academy, one's specific Church tradition, and cultural/political movements?

Lonergan: Well, not just systematic theology, but the whole of theology. I'll talk about that. It speaks to the academy by being methodical in a rigorous fashion. A modern subject at the present time is academic, an academic discipline, insofar as it has and follows a method. The last court of appeal is the method. The method can develop, but it will develop along the lines, perhaps not explicit, of generalized empirical method. But the key think, the basic criterion, is the method. The principles and laws of any science are open to revision, and they will be open to revision insofar as the method is such as to call for a revision in the light of what has been recently discovered or determined. Method is the ultimate thing, and you speak to the academy insofar as you are methodical.

It speaks for one's own specific Church position in the light of its options, commitments, horizon. One can go further and say that it formulates tentatively but very influentially the expression of that position. In the sense in which Lord Keynes remarked that politicians usually are presenting the ideas of some defunct economist, well, the same thing happens within theology and papal announcements, and so on. They are talking somebody's theology; maybe he died a few centuries ago; but that's where it comes from. I was talking once to John Courtney Murray, and he said that there are very few bishops in the United States that have time to do any more than attend to the business that comes across their desk every morning. Well, they're not being the theology of the future, then.

But besides speaking for one's specific Church, it speaks in an age of ecumenism. It can recognize God's universal salvific will. It can recognize religious conversions in other communions, in other religions, and so on.

With regard to cultural and political movements, there is the general thing I've said on history already. In general, it can diffuse nonsense, and there is an awful lot of it. Common sense is always mixed with common nonsense, and the common nonsense is a great variable that needs constant refuting, and the proposing of alternatives, thinking creatively.

Question: Would you please comment on Fr Tracy's statement that the analogical imagination is *the* distinguishing characteristic of most Catholic theology?

Lonergan: Well, I haven't got Fr Tracy's familiarity with other theologies. He is in the midst of it seven years now. But on the subject of analogy, I think of it in terms of heuristic structure. I think of it in terms of questions, notions. I have not only to think of the concept of being and knowledge of being, which are things that are formulated, but also inquiry, wonder, which contains the notion of the intelligible. There is something to be understood. What is it? I don't know. It is X, what you are aiming at, and what you are talking about is something you don't know. It is the heuristic structure, and it is never completely filled. We talk about the concrete, but we never know the concrete, because to know the concrete is to know everything that is to be known about something; unless you want to use the word 'concrete' in a quite different sense, i.e., the sensible. But the concrete is reality in all its aspects, and we know nothing that way, so that our knowledge of anything is analogous in that sense. There is an unknown component. The analogous concept – as when thinking of God, it is like going to the mathematical limit. It is a

process from what you have a hold on to something that is related to it in a transcending way. The analogical imagination, if it means the open mind because the open mind is the basis of the heuristic structure: that's all I've to say on that.

Question: The idea of 'the classic' was related this morning to your understanding of the concrete and universal aspects of insight. Would you please say something further about their relationship?

Lonergan: The trouble with a logical approach is that the only relation between the concept and the particular is going from the universal to the particular. It is an instance, one thing that comes under the general heading of 'man' or 'spider' or what you please. But there is another way from the concept to the data, and that is through understanding, through insight, and that is something quite different. Insofar as you understand something, you are entering into it, you are mastering it, you are knowing something about it, and you can learn a lot more; you keep on developing.

Edward Levy, your Attorney General, has a little book on legal reasoning. And what is legal reasoning? It is a matter of taking the decisions of previous judges, saying how much that decision is relevant to the present case, where the present case differs, understanding the difference, and making a decision in the light of that understanding. It is developing understanding of the law and a growing understanding and a transforming understanding, and it can be very good, and it can be very bad, but that's what it is, and it isn't static.

Napoleon drew up a code of laws, and so did Justinian, and the trouble with them – Hegel, of course, praised Napoleon to the skies for his code of laws – but the Catholics are somewhat disenchanted with their code of canon law after fifty years, and part of it is that you have not got that elasticity that was developed primarily in the medieval canonists, and so on, because the code only came out in 1918. So when you are relating your concepts to the data through understanding, you understand the data up to an extent. It's not just an instance, and this comes under it, and there bang, I know all about it. You can see that you have still a lot more to learn and you can keep on learning, as in successive things made law.

Question: More generally on 'the classic,' would you say something about its *liberating* potentialities in both personal and communal development?

Lonergan: Well, we are going to have a whole lecture on that, on the use of literature in ethics, and it is an extremely important thing. In other words, morality – there is the old saying, Let me write a nation's songs, and I care not who writes its laws – the artistic presentation is an understanding of the potentialities of human living. It reveals, formulates for men and women, ways, possible ways of living, just as mathematics formulates possible ways of understanding nature. It doesn't tell you which one is the right one. It leaves it up to the empirical scientists to determine which mathematical formula will best fit the data in our present knowledge. Well, literature is that reflection on human living, presentation of different ways in which people can live and think and act and so on. It helps people to objectify their own living and become not merely conscious in the general sense but explicitly aware of how they are living and what they are doing, and so on. There's Gadamer's *Wirkungsgeschichte*, effective history. The classic forms the culture of the people that interprets the classic. Feedback: the classic forms people that

are taught through the study of the classics. That study influences the people who interpret the classics.

Question: Would you please comment on the general issue of an exclusivist versus an inclusivist Christology?

Lonergan: Well, the expression can have all sorts of meanings. The meaning taken this morning was that you had an inclusivist Christology if you believed in universal salvific will. I certainly have no objection to that. It is what Rahner would call the anonymous Christian. He doesn't know he is a Christian, but he has God's grace. Exclusivist Christology, I suppose, is denial in some way or other. When I was a student, the great trick was the salvation of the infidels. When you were studying divine providence, you were told that that would be handled in the treatise on grace, and in grace that it would be handled in the treatise on baptism, and in baptism well, of course, you've already seen this in the treatise on providence or the treatise on grace. But the universal salvific will nonetheless was taught, even though people didn't see how it worked.

Questions from the Floor (885 B begins here)

Question: I've got a question on the notion of conversion as it operates in the functional specialty of foundations. In trying to implement the method, I ran into a problem there. I wasn't sure on rereading the chapter whether conversion meant the simple sheer experience or whether it meant the experience that was at least basically interpreted by the tradition in which one was. For myself, that's the Catholic tradition, in which you have Christ, the church, magisterium, and all sorts of things surrounding me. Further, it would seem that if you say there is simply the sheer experience, the religious transformation that happens to the Catholic or the Buddhist or whatever, then I find it difficult to see how one is going to decide on the next stage, which doctrines we are going to select.

Lonergan: There are three conversions: intellectual, moral, and religious. The big divisions in the religions are – well, there is a paper by Fr Panikkar in a volume of *Concilium* about 1962, I'm not certain, I think it was volume 48 or 46, in which he wants a fundamental theology that consists in getting together the mystics of the various religions and not expecting them to arrive at any common formulation but understanding one another. That in a sense has been achieved in Tokyo by William Johnston, for example, where Christians and Catholics make their annual retreat in a Zen monastery and talk with the Zen monks afterwards. As far as the religious experience goes, they are all talking about the same thing, but as far as the formulation goes, they are worlds apart, and understanding this being worlds apart is a matter of understanding the development in Western culture within which Christianity has developed and these different Eastern cultures, and so on. It was once said that the Japanese could not win a naval battle because their language did not allow for the possibility of making an unambiguous command. The editor of the *Saturday Review*, I once had dinner with him, and he was talking about Japan. So I asked him what he thought of that statement, and he said, Well, I've never been in the Japanese navy, but I've been in their TV studios, and that seems to me to hit it off pretty well.

When I was teaching theology in Toronto, there was a Hungarian scholastic who had done his three years teaching prior to theology in Tokyo. He had a story about a missionary in a

small village in Japan who spent six years convincing the bonze of the place of the principle of contradiction. The bonze's view about religion was that there were several ways of ascending the mountain Fuyihama, and they'll all get you there, and he applied that to the differences of religion and the argument about the principle of contradiction was thought not to hold for religion, that the analogy was imperfect. You had to introduce that principle; it was not something in the tradition. In the West we are under the influence of the development of logic by the Greeks and the further pushing of logic in the medieval period, with the result – for example, French is a language dominated by logic in an incredible fashion. It's dominated by the influence of the medieval universities, of Cartesian philosophy, of the *grand siècle*, the classical period of Molière and Racine, Corneille, of the Academie Française, and the exam of literary composition and knowledge, the entrance to the university.

I once did an article for a French periodical about the Catholic university, and translating it was a man to whom I had taught theology for three years who knew my stuff, a literateur from the Revue. It took him three weeks to translate it, and in that time I had to rethink the whole article to get it into French, because in French you do not allude, you say exactly what you mean, no more and no less. You do not think like a machine gun, like you can in English. You have to have everything connected. Each sentence has to be related to the preceding sentence and the sentence that follows, and that relation has to be explicit, and the same goes for the paragraphs and so on. It's dominated by the logical mind. With the result that I felt always that Blondel would have had no problems with theologians if he had written in English instead of French, because, while his thought was fluid, still French is not a language that accepts that, and you will be interpreted differently.

Now, I've been talking about differences of cultures and so on, and that is why I say in Communications that you have to be able to talk to every class and every culture. The ability of your talking to these people in different cultures is understanding these different cultures and saying as well as can be said in that culture what you mean, and so on. That is the point to our historical studies in theology, because Christ spoke to simple folk in Palestine. There was no doctrine of the hypostatic union prior to Nicea, and so on. Christianity can be taught to less developed cultures. The problem in the past, as I see it, has been the Western classicist view that culture was spelt with a capital C. A man was cultured when he knew the perennial philosophy and the immortal works of art and the wisdom and prudence of mankind enshrined in our customs and laws, and that was just one thing. People in other cultures were given the benefit not only of our Christian faith but also of our one true culture, with the result that our one true faith did not get communicated. So by conversion I do mean that religious conversion, but it's just with respect to blocks in, selecting blocks in, the historical interpretation, the interpretation of texts and so on, in the first phase. It becomes relevant insofar as in that first phase you find antagonisms that further data are not going to eliminate. The sort of thing that is not going to be eliminated by further data is the absence of religious conversion, or the explicit rejection of it, militant atheism, and you can have people who are militant atheists in the sense that they don't know what it means. They can have the conversion and be unable to formulate it. People can be religiously converted, and yet that peak experience that is informing their lives de facto is something that they are not aware of. If you talk to them about the love of God, they won't know what you are talking about. They have been occupied with their sins and their faults and their hopelessness about getting any better than they have been, and so on, but they have what really is religious conversion.

Now, its application there: I'll admit that all I'm doing is providing a formula, and the work is yet to be done according to the method. It is a big task, and an awful lot will depend on the problem selected, and so on.

Question: Could I press the question a little bit further? In doctrines you say that the doctrines may be chosen in light of the position in foundations. Now, what you have been stressing in your answer is the detachability of any one particular formulation from the basic experience itself. So if a set of doctrines is so detachable from the experience itself, how, when you get to doctrines, are you going to be able to discriminate for one set of doctrines as against another?

Lonergan: Insofar as the maxim behind what you consider a misinterpretation of history, I think you would not attribute to a religious motive, or rather to the contradictory of the religious stance or the moral stance or the intellectual stance. It can be an extremely rigorous requirement because we are all sinners. Like the questionable elements, you know. Take Cyril of Alexandria getting Nestorius imprisoned; well, they were both imprisoned, but Cyril got out. There were all sorts of things like this that make this a very delicate tool, but it is on the other hand an effort to recognize the existence of development from above because that is what the theologian in the second phase is doing. Just as the horizon can block correct interpretation, block correct historical interpretation, so it can found a correct development, and that is the point I'm making. How it is going to work out will become clearer only in time. My own practical knowledge of this dialectic was more recently the first 100 pages or so of the first volume in my *De Deo trino*, which is due to come out in English within a year, *The Way to Nicea*. Conn O'Donovan in Dublin is translating it. Prior to that there is the development of the doctrine of grace. I did my doctoral dissertation on operative grace. I studied the whole development; well, I had very good people who had been over the ground ahead of me, from Augustine to Thomas, and the way that development went forward was in a sense dialectical.

Question: In the strong sense of praxis as coming from above downwards or either in the more generalized sense of praxis, would it be true to say then that in the turn toward method and intentionality analysis that praxis sublates theory. Or is there always a way in which somehow the subject as object or the objectifications of the subject are never fully sublated in the subject as subject?

Lonergan: The sublations are not of the subject into the object. The sublations are of operations on one level with respect to operations on the previous level, and that succession of sublations gives you development from below upwards, and in learning those procedures, going from above downwards is praxis in the strong sense. You have praxis in the strong sense in Marx insofar as he says that the critique of religion is the basis of the critique of politics and economics; it is a religious stance. He never had any religious problems, and he could see that the religion of the Prussian state was interfering with what he thought was the good, and so on, and so he found religion evil. But it is praxis on that stance. And it is the way people operate, you know, even though they are not saying so. The methodologist, the person that works methodically, has to be fully aware of what he is doing, of his presuppositions and so on. Otherwise he is just pulling the wool over not others' eyes but over his own.

Question: Could I go back to an earlier question? If I recall this morning, Fr Tracy brought up the notion of the analogical imagination of Catholic theologians vis-à-vis the dialectical imagination of what he considered Protestant theologians. In that context what it brought back to me was the statement from Vatican I about the three ways of doing theology, in terms of analogy, and relating the mysteries among themselves, and finally relating them to man's last end. In terms of that question, while in the previous question, you spoke not just of systematic theology but of the whole of theology, it seems that one of the problems of a lot of Catholic theology has been that fundamental theology was done with that analogical imagination, and in the process I think it canonized a lot of analogies instead of getting down to the real fundamental question, the fundamental dialectic that would be involved in, say, fundamental theology. (Lonergan: What is this fundamental dialectic?) Well, on the level of foundations, we are trying to come up with what the dialectic is as proposed to us through the data of research, interpretation, and so on, and trying to resolve that in some sense of coming up with a doctrine. This is my understanding of what fundamental theology does. And then systematic theology would be the next step from that. And it seemed to me that in just reflecting on my own theological education, a lot of the people that are doing the so-called fundamental theology are really using analogy, which I got the impression this morning Fr Tracy was saying belonged to systematics rather than foundations.

Lonergan: Yes. The fundamental theology as it existed when I was a student in theology was a set of treatises. It presupposed that you had done philosophy beforehand, and so on, and was prior to doing work that was praxis in the strong sense, in which you were appealing to the authority of scripture, the authority of the church and of tradition, and so on. Now, to my mind, that is a byproduct of medieval thought that became decadent, and insufficient corrections were brought in. The point to dialectic and foundations as I conceive them arises in a situation that did not exist in that whole development of Catholic theology, namely, what do you do about value judgments? It is a big block in modern science, value judgments. Is it scientific if value judgments are operative? You have a whole group that holds that science has to be value-free, and there is a sense in which that is true. But you can't do theology on that basis, and how are you going to control the value judgments that do influence research, interpretation, and history, if these are determinative of your theology, to get some sort of control over value judgments which will conflict? We find the roots of division, in oppositions in the writing of history, in oppositions in exegesis and the research behind it coming from value judgments, conflicting value judgments, and that is what dialectic does. It pinpoints the conflicting value judgments that are behind the oppositions in history, exegesis, and research. That handling of value judgments is the methodical point to the dialectic. How does it first solve the issue? It solves it in the only way in which it can be, namely, dialogue. The conflicting people come to recognize that their value judgments do differ. Well, it can be dialectic in the sense that you set up the opposition. But it heads to a solution insofar as people who are intellectually, morally, and religiously converted can recognize one another and where their value judgments go.