

**85400DTE060****Method in Theology****The Problem****External Factors**

## 1 The Shift in the Meaning of 'Science'

In the middle ages and subsequently theology was conceived as a science and, indeed, as the queen of the sciences.

But what then was meant by science was the Greek ideal, an ideal expounded in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and illustrated by the Aristotelian corpus, by the Greek mathematicians, astronomers, and students of medicine.

Recent centuries have brought forth not merely a vast array of facts, hypotheses, theories to effect almost a total transformation and an enormous extension of ancient science; they also have given birth to a systematic shift in the notion of science itself.

This change in the notion of science is of major importance for a contemporary scientific theology: it confronts the theologian with the alternative of the Greek ideal or the modern achievement as his model, as the basis from which he constructs his analogous notion of theology as science.

The nature of this shift may be indicated by a series of contrasts.

Greek science is concerned with the *necessary*: what is not necessary, in the measure it is not necessary, falls outside science properly so called. Modern science is concerned with *de facto intelligibility*: the law of falling bodies, or any other law, is not necessary; but it is intelligible and de facto it is true. Hence modern science is achieved by hypothesis and verification; it is named empirical (de facto) science (intelligibility). Necessity loses its central position and becomes peripheral, marginal.

Greek science is concerned with the *eternal*; with immobility; movement and change as such are not open to scientific determination because they are involved in the indeterminate; they are understood not in themselves but in their terms (*motus intelligitur ex termino*); cf. *TS* 8 (1947), 404 ss. Louvain Sympos. *Aristote et les problèmes de methode*, ed. S. Mansion (Louvain-Paris, 1961). (Margin: Parmenides & Ar. Physics) Modern science is concerned with the *temporal*: the indeterminacy of the continuum is mastered by the continuous function and the differential calculus; theory finds its object in genesis, evolution, development, dialectic, historical process.

Greek science is concerned with the *universal*: it acknowledges the facts of contingency and movement; but by abstraction it reaches necessity and eternity in

universals. Modern science is concerned with the *concrete universe*; science is about things that de facto exist, and it aims at knowing everything it can about them; it uses universals but through them it reaches toward particulars, e. g., through laws of movement, of growth, through studies of development, through theories of evolution, through the intelligibility reached in historical investigation.

Greek science is concerned with the *per se*; emphatically it denies the possibility of scientific interest in red-headed trombone players, in the *per accidens*. Modern science extends its interest to the *per accidens*, the *statistical*, the trends in statistical tables, the causes of changes in trends.

Greek science is defined by a *formal object*, by the *ratio sub qua* a scientific habit considers and attains its object. A modern science is defined by a *field*, by a region in the concrete universe, that it aims to master; and what can be mastered in the field is determined by a method, a group of basic operations.

Greek science is ruled by *logic*; modern science is ruled by *method*. For Greek science there is an ascent from particulars to definitions, postulates, axioms, principles, and then a logical deduction from definitions and principles to conclusions. In modern science method is a circular process of expansion: from data to insight, to hypothesis, to deduction, to checking, to unnoticed data, to fresh insight, to new hypothesis, etc. Logic functions mainly in the conception, elaboration, application of hypotheses.

Greek science is concerned to reach the *essence* of things, the one ultimate intrinsic ground of necessity, immobility, universality, per-se-ity, whence may be deduced all necessary properties. Modern science is confronted with a problem of *pluralism* and *perspectivism*: pluralism means that reality is perhaps too rich and manifold to be captured in single essences uniquely formulated; the reality of the ellipse comes to light, not from a single approach, but from a combination of different approaches (P Boutroux, *L idéal scientifique des mathématiciens*, Paris 1924 and 1950 circ.). Perspectivism is a mitigation of historical relativism: events become significant by subsequent history, and as subsequent history unfolds, the significance changes. K Mannheim.

Greek science is concerned with *causes*: *scientia est certa per causas rerum cognitio*; moreover the causes are four: end, agent, matter, form. Modern science aims at *complete explanation* of all phenomena, and the explanations express the de facto intelligibilities determined by hypothesis and verification.

Greek science is *certain*; to fall short of certitude is to fall short of science. Modern science is *probable*; it can with certainty exclude what it considers mistaken views; but its own positive account of things is just ‘the best available opinion’; certitude is a distant ideal towards which science moves by advancing through less to more probable views.

Greek science is *individualist and permanent*: it springs from individual achievement; it is stored in the great book; it becomes by study, learning, the acquisition of a habit, an individual possession. Modern science is *collectivist and in process*: it is not stored in the great books of the past but lies ahead in the ideal goal of scientific achievement; it has its great men but they could not arise without the continuous collaboration and accumulation of the scientific community and they could not be understood unless the scientific community existed and functioned; nor can it in its entirety, or even in the entirety of one of its main departments, be mastered by any single mind; it resides distributively in many minds and it is handed on not by great books but by enormous libraries with their floating populations of books in use.

I have set forth the differences by ten points of contrast; but these contrasts are not to be mistaken for radical antinomies. It is I believe possible to start from Aristotle and to move right into modern science. To say the same thing in another way, the differences can be made out to be radical antinomies on one reading of Aristotle, but they also can be considered to be no more than changes of emphasis, of perspective, of ideal goal and practicable procedure on another reading. I believe this second reading to be more correct.

Next, I do not believe the theologian can hesitate between the Greek and the modern notions of science. God in himself is eternal and necessary, but our knowledge of God is mediated by a contingent universe and by a gratuitous divine revelation transmitted by the historical movement contained in the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Christian tradition. Indeed, I believe, the die has already been cast: contemporary theology is too deeply involved in the positive study of scripture, the Fathers, the middle ages and subsequent thought, and it is too alienated from ‘speculative abstractions,’ for a resurgence of the Greek ideal to be possible.

The real issue is a coherent and thorough acknowledgement of a *fait accompli* (Congar, p. ? [no page number is given; elsewhere L says Congar in his article ‘Théologie’ was still leaning to the classical ideal of science]).

## 2 Historical consciousness

By historical consciousness I shall mean what I believe to be the nucleus, the core, the key to what is meant by ‘modernity,’ ‘modern man,’ ‘the modern world.’ No less than modern science, the modern world cannot be overlooked by contemporary theology; if modernism was condemned by Pius X, *aggiornamento* was demanded by John XXIII.

Classicism is the antithesis to historical consciousness: it has a view of man that suits Greek science; it considers man as a child of nature; his living is governed by necessary and immutable laws; the vagaries of fashion are superficial; 'antiquated' and 'up-to-date' are not significant categories; the rule is, Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose – you can't change human nature.

For historical consciousness man is not just a child of nature; besides man's nature, besides what is common to Julius Caesar and a drunk, to Thomas Aquinas and a lunatic, to Einstein and a baby, there are meanings; meanings vary with the individual's experience, his understanding, his judgments, his choices and commitments; meanings are constitutive of man's actual living and of his potentialities; meanings are constitutive of human communication and human community. The human world is a world mediated and constituted by meaning, and the constituent meanings change in time, they develop and they go astray. So man is a child not only of nature but also of history.

Evidently historical consciousness is a matter of major import for theology: divine revelation primarily is the entry of God, not into the world of nature, but into the world of meaning and history. Intention = conscious finality. Meaning = comprehensive – determinable – determinate intention. [The material from 'Intention' to 'intention' is added by hand.]

(1) Meaning is not to be taken as found only in concepts; it must be extended over the whole intentional field; and to be clear about this extension, let us enumerate.

*Unformulated meaning*: intersubjectivity, symbol, incarnate meaning, artistic expression.

Intersubjective meaning occurs in encounter; it is what acting adds to the text of the play.

The encounter itself already has a meaning, the meaning of his or her coming to me, my going to him or to her; the fact of encounter recalls, releases, sets in motion the dynamism evoked, developed, modified by past encounters; continued mutual presence is a mutual recognition, a tacit acknowledgement of the past, an implicit agreement to continue or to change it.

Human communication is not the work of a soul hidden in some unlocated recess of the body and emitting signals in some Morse code; soul and body are co-principles of a single thing; the bodily presence of the other is also the presence of the incarnate spirit of the other; and that incarnate spirit reveals itself to me by every shift of eyes, countenance, colour, lips, voice, tone, fingers, hands, arms, stance; that revelation of the other is not an object to be apprehended but rather works immediately on my own subjectivity to make me share the other's seriousness, vivacity, ease, embarrassment, joy, sorrow; and similarly my response

affects his subjectivity, leads him on to say more, or quietly rebuffs him, holds him off, closes the door.

E. g., a smile has a meaning: we do not go about smiling at everyone; we should be misunderstood; but smiling can be misunderstood only because it has a meaning. What has a meaning is highly perceptible: we can walk along a crowded thoroughfare and hear, not the thudding of trucks, the clatter of machines, the noises of the street, but only the relatively low tones of the person with whom we are conversing. Smiling is an *Urphänomen*: we learn to talk, to walk, to swim; but we do not learn to smile; we do not learn the different meanings of different ways of smiling the way we learn the meanings of words; nor can the meaning of a smile be translated into words; it is on the prior level of unformulated, literally ineffable meaning.

Where conceptual meaning tends to univocity, the meaning of a smile may be recognition, welcome, friendliness, love, joy, delight, contentment, satisfaction, amusement, irony, resignation; smiles may be sardonic, enigmatic, sad, weary.

Where conceptual meaning may be true or false, smiles may be only honest or deceitful.

Conceptual meaning distinguishes what we feel, desire, fear, think, know, wish, command, intend; but the smile is a total meaning; it expresses what one person means to another; and that meaning is the meaning of a fact that exists, not of a proposition to be considered.

Max Scheler, *Die Formen der Sympathie*

F.J.J: Buytendiik, *Phénoménologie de la rencontre*, Desclée 1952; *La femme*, Desclée 1954.

Symbolic meaning is the affect-laden image or percept: it evokes the affect and, inversely, the affect finds expression, form, resonance in the image.

Freudian: family relationships crystallized from cycle of Seven against Thebes.

Jung: symbols of transformation, conversion, death and resurrection.

The psyche as the born cooperator with man's spirit; it pre-forms and anticipates man's spiritual destiny; interpretation and critique, M. Eliade, *Myths, Dreams, Mysteries*, New York Harper 1960, Paris Gallimard 1957 (Preface to Original edition); also *Forgerons et Alchimistes*, Paris Flammarion 1956; *The Forge and the Crucible*. Note on Jung [handwritten].

Elementary symbolic meanings: Gilbert Durand, *Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire*, Introduction à l'archétypologie générale, Grenoble 1960.

Basis: dominant reflexes; daytime, ascensional, St George and dragon; night, descent, Jonah and great fish; compound, Tree Serpent Tao Swastika

L. Binswanger, *Traum and Existenz*, Desclée 1954 (cf Rollo May)  
 Paul Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté* Aubier I 1950 II 1961; dialectic of  
 OT symbols of guilt [Information on Ricoeur is added by hand]  
 Incarnate meaning is the meaning incarnate in a person, either in his totality,  
 or in his characteristic moment, his most significant deed, his outstanding  
 achievement.  
 National heroes (Washington Lincoln) national objects of loathing (Benedict  
 Arnold, Simon Legree)  
 The drama of the passion and death of Christ  
 G. Morel, *Le sens de l'existence chez saint Jean de la Croix*, Paris Aubier 3  
 vols 1960 1961.

Artistic meaning: art is the expression of a pure experiential pattern; the  
 release of sensibility and feeling from the intellectual or practical concerns that  
 instrumentalize it; the emergence of human vitality in a spontaneous native pattern.

S. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, New York Scribners 1953

R. Huyghe, *L'art et l'âme*, Paris 19

Linguistic meaning: Every-day, Technical, Literary Language.

Three dimensions: expressive (first person, optative mood), impressive  
 (second person, imperative mood) propositional (third person, indicative mood).

Everyday language is the language of the home, of friends, acquaintances,  
 colleagues, of the school and playground, of commerce and industry, of press and  
 radio, of politics and of prayer.

It combines expressive impressive propositional components; it is modeled  
 on the human situation (person, number, tense, mood); it develops from an  
 oppressive concreteness and particularity (E Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic  
 Forms*, I. Speech); its significance for human existence is illustrated dramatically  
 by the story of the day when Helen Keller first discovered the meaning of a word,  
 water; by the veneration of the word, the name, in ancient cultures. It would seem  
 that the human psyche floats with the weightlessness of images on the caprices of  
 affectivity and aggressivity until it can pin things down in words.

Technical meaning. Only primitives get along without any technical  
 meanings; and as civilization develops, technical meanings increase and multiply;  
 hence the history of technical meaning is solidary with the history of human  
 development.

E. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Essay on Man*.

K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung and Ziel der Geschichte*, München 1949

Henri Frankfort et al., *Before Philosophy*, Chicago UP 1946; Pelican

1949 ss.

E. Voegelin, *Order and History*, 3 vols, Louisiana State UP<sup>2</sup> 1958

R. Redfield, *The Primitive World*, Cornell 1953

S. Malinowski, *Magic, Science, and Religion ?* Anchor

While the ancient high civilizations (Egypt Babylon Crete, valleys of Indus and Hoang-ho, Incas, Mayas, Toltecs) developed the mechanical arts (irrigation architecture tools) and the organizational arts (book-keeping state armies navies), at the summit they were locked in myth: the King was the Son of God, the source of order in the cosmos, and also the ruler of the state.

The break-down of the ACH was the break-down of the myth; it forced on man a self-reliance and an individualism unknown to primitives and to ACH; the myth was replaced in Israel by revelation, in Greece by Logos.

Technical meaning aims at being impersonal (3rd person) and purely indicative. It omits all feeling, all intersubjectivity, all free play of imagination and affect, all verbal flourishes and magic. It is dry-as-dust. It has a precise point which it states as clearly, as exactly, as fully as it can, without any irrelevant expression of me or impression on you.

Technical meaning is at a second remove, a second power, when it is concerned with the clarification and control of meaning. Such are the study of grammar, languages, linguistics, logic, mathematics, and, on a more fundamental level, of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics.

Plato's early dialogues ask what is temperance, justice, virtue, knowledge; the Athenians knew perfectly what they meant but they could not give universally valid definitions; when Aristotle worked out the answers he found he had to develop a special vocabulary: a virtue is a *habitus operativus bonus*.

Phenomenology attempts to formulate the unformulated meanings (intersubjective, symbolic, incarnate) of human living: vécu and thématique, exercite et signate, existenziell and existential; it is a matter of insight into data and expression of the insight; it is insufficiently aware of the development of insights (dime a dozen) and the need of judgment. H. Fries *Die katholische Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*, Heidelberg (Kerle) 1949, pp. 140-142. Imaginative insight includes delirium. [The last sentence is handwritten.]

Literary meaning is mediate and permanent (everyday is immediate and transient); it is contained in a work, a poiêma; unlike technical meaning (the treatise), it attempts self-expression and communication; unlike everyday language, it lacks the complement of intersubjectivity, symbol, incarnate meaning, and for this it compensates by departing from everyday language and becoming artistic.

Hence literary meaning floats between an upper level of logical discourse and a lower level where the laws of imagination and affect hold sway.

This floating is found in a displacement (Langer *Feeling & Form* p 243)

from concept of a class to representative figure - First, Second Adam

from univocal concept to multiple meanings - death, life in NT

from excluded middle to over-determination, ambivalence - love & hatred

from negation to overcoming (imagination does not merely deny) -

Swinburne

from proof to repetition enumeration variation contrast climax

from single theme to condensation of several themes - Shakespeare

Then star nor sun shall waken,  
 Nor any change of light;  
 Nor sound of waters shaken,  
 Nor any sound or sight:  
 Nor wintry leaves nor vernal;  
 Nor day nor things diurnal;  
 Only the sleep eternal  
 In an eternal night.

And Pity, like a naked newborn babe,  
 Striding the blast, or Heaven's Cherubin, hors'd  
 Upon the sightless couriers of the air,  
 Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye  
 Till tears shall drown the wind.

(2) Meaning evolves. It is a classicist illusion to think of all meaning in terms of conceptual meaning and coherent logical discourse; to postulate in the mind of the speaker or writer a plain literal meaning which is known and made more effective by the addition of the figures of speech.

In fact, the precision and coherence of the treatise is an ideal; it was not perfectly attained by Euclid and, without an outrageous elaboratedness, it is not attained by anyone. Cf. symbolic logic.

Nor do minds attain such precision and coherence in some inner fashion which they fail to manifest in their expression. The primitive begins from a small dose of common sense and a large dose of common nonsense (*Insight* 6 & 7); the common nonsense gradually is reduced; with the Greek victory of logos over mythos, the techniques of control of meaning began to be developed, but the development suffered from the classicist bias which rationalism grossly exaggerated and reinforced: (M. Eliade, *Images et Symboles*), rationalism did not



destroy myth but drove it underground, degraded it from Paradise Lost to South Pacific, from Aphrodite to the pin-up girl.

As meaning evolves, subjects become differentiated. [Handwritten]

Evolution, development, is a process from the undifferentiated through differentiation and specialization and separation to an integration of the differentiated.

The evolution of meaning necessitates a parallel differentiation and new integration in the subject that means. Unless the subject himself develops, he finds that the meanings are 'all Greek to me'; he raises his hands in dismay as soon as another becomes 'technical.'

In undifferentiated consciousness the whole man functions for an immediate human end, represented by imagination, embraced by affect, with intelligence ordering the steps towards its attainment, and choice following intelligence. In differentiated consciousness man becomes specialized, concentrated on some partial human end, biological, aesthetic, mystical, intellectual, intersubjective (cf. patterns of experience, Insight 6), and the rest of him is held in abeyance.

Differentiated consciousness (intellectually) gives rise to  
 a different subject (Thales and milkmaid; Newton)  
 a different world (Eddington's two tables; giraffe)  
 a different language (physics, chemistry, biology, depth psychology, etc.)  
 a different society (the specialist at work and at home)  
 a different method of inquiry and investigation  
 a different mode of understanding (things for us; things in relation to one another)

from what we both understand to definition (you ought to understand)  
 from proverbs (rules as in grammar) to laws and principles that either are always valid or are worthless  
 from seeing the point to hypothesis, rigorous deduction, detailed verification

The foregoing illustrate the transition from undifferentiated consciousness to the intellectual pattern of experience; modern man is ready to move into any pattern of experience, to recreate if he can in himself the patterns of experience of the past, of the primitive, of the ACH, of the Hebrews or Greeks, of the Hindus or Chinese or Muslims or Russians.

The classicist was a standardized man; his culture was Culture; his education was *the* right education that effected the line between educated and uneducated; his reason was Reason.

Modern man in his historical consciousness regards the classicist as a particular anthropological species that had many excellences and many marked

limitations. He regards romanticism as the revolutionary explosion that shattered the ordered living and world of classicism. He finds himself in his liberation confronted with the problem of human existence, of making himself and constructing his own world, clear-headedly, responsibly, freely, well.

(3) Meaning is constitutive of human reality.

It is not the sole constitutive: a man in a coma is a man. It begins to be constitutive when in sleep we begin to dream; its role increases when we awake, when we inquire, understand, think, when we reflect, weigh the evidence, judge, when we deliberate, weigh the pro's and con's, choose, commit ourselves, when we act, are engaged, live in the full sense of being alive.

With the emergence of meaning, of intentionality, whether unformulated or linguistic, there emerges the subject (the man as present to himself) and the object (what is present to the subject) and the intentional act (apprehensive or appetitive, sensitive or intellectual).

Without the emergence of meaning one is an infant, or sound asleep, or in a coma; one is still outside the region or field or realm in which exist sense and nonsense, truth and error, right and wrong, good and evil, actual grace and actual sin, saving one's soul or being damned.

Meaning is constitutive of our symbols, expressive of our affectivity and aggressivity, our existential psyche (walking, swallowing, mating), our deepest drive for transformation and integration.

It is constitutive of our intersubjectivity, our living-with, our loving loyalty allegiance fidelity faith, our choices deliberations decisions commitments.

It is constitutive of our projects, our plans and counter-plans, our tactics and strategy, our aims goals ideals intentions, our yet to be realized achievements, of the fidelity by which we remain in ourselves for others what we have undertaken to be. [from 'of the fidelity' is handwritten, not sure of order]

It is constitutive of our endless questions, our perplexity and our understanding, our explorations of possibility in mathematics, in hypotheses, in fiction and poetry, of our doubts our affirmations and negations, our beliefs and opinions, our convictions and certitudes.

We have spoken of the evolution of meaning, of the differentiation and integration of consciousness. Meaning is the potentiality for that differentiation, for human development, and also for one-sidedness, for classicism, romanticism, scientism (positivism), and the beatniks.

Meaning is constitutive of human communication and human community.

Communication is of meaning and it gives rise to common meaning.

Common meaning is constitutive of community.

Potential community: a common field of experience (lives in a different world).

The community of understanding: each can understand any of the others. Strangers are strange: they speak differently, think differently, judge differently, have different values and tastes and ways of doing things.

The community of knowledge: not only understand but also agree: a common common sense, Common doctrine, religion, philosophy, specialty.

The community of commitment: absolute; the family (love), the state (loyalty), the church (faith); limited; friendship, partner, professional obligation, code, contract.

As common meaning is constitutive of community, so the disruption of common meaning is crisis, breakdown, disintegration of community.

Without the common field of experience, we become out of touch.

Without a common understanding (common in broad features, complementary in details), we become mutually incomprehensible.

Without common agreements, what is truth for some is error for others; the field of common knowledge narrows; the basis for wholehearted common commitments becomes restricted – knowledge of what is good and what evil, of what is right and what is wrong, depends on knowledge of what is.

Without common commitments, we become indifferent; the way is open for rivalry, for suspicion, for contention, for quarrels, for defensive measures, for war.

Newman's theorem: to omit a part is (1) to be ignorant of that part, (2) to mutilate the whole, (3) to distort the remainder.

As community breaks up, each faction omits different parts of whole and so is partly ignorant but of different parts, mutilates the whole but in different ways, distorts the remainder but with a different bias.

C.P. Snow's Two Cultures.

Common meaning does not exist without communities; and communities arrive at their common meanings in time; meaning is historical.

(4) The World: of immediacy; mediated by meaning; constituted by meaning.

World = a totality of objects

The world of immediacy: the totality of objects seen, heard, smelt, tasted, eaten, reached, touched, felt, grasped, handled, used – basically it is the world of the baby.

The world of immediacy is enlarged through the mediation of meaning: imagination; language; learning about things and people – the child.

Indefinite enlargement made possible by mediating the mediator, by studying meaning: language, art, literature, logic, mathematics – basic education, general education.

World mediated by meaning is world of common sense, literature, religion, of natural and human science, philosophy, history, theology.

It is not a summation of all worlds of immediacy, an integration of what there is to be known by all infantile minds; it is a universe of being, of all that is to be known through experience insight judgment.

Critical problem: two meanings of real (immediacy, being); two meanings of knowing (looking and affirming); two meanings of objectivity (out there, true judgment). In between: Kant, idealism, relativism.

Nature\* [in margin: \* distinguish scholastic usage] is the part of the world mediated but not constituted by meaning: as meaning develops, the apprehension develops, but what is to be apprehended has been there all along.

Spirit\* is the part of the world that is both mediated and constituted by meaning: it is the strictly human world, the world that exists in so far as not all men are infants, asleep, or in a coma.

Change what people understand the family to be, and you change the kind of families that exist; change what people understand by the state and you move from feudalism to monarchy to parliaments to dictators; change the understanding of the economy and you move from mercantilism, to the gold standard, to managed money; change what people understand by religion and you move from catholicism to protestantism to deism to indifferentism to militant atheism. [In margin of this and preceding paragraph: History/Intentional order/Subject/acts/objects]

Neither the convert nor the apostate has put off human nature; but he has become a different man; the whole meaning of life has changed for him, and the world has become a different place for him.

Johann: When one moves from nature to history, the world becomes unstuck.

(5) Historical consciousness.

The world constituted by meaning varies with the development of meaning, with the aberrations of meaning, with the redemption of meaning.

Man's world has always been constituted by meaning and has always – now slowly, now rapidly – varied in time. But man attains historical consciousness when he becomes aware of that massive fact of human existence.

Modern man is acutely aware of that fact (1) because he has made his own modern world, (2) because he has investigated the very different worlds of other places and times, (3) because he is confronting the problems of his own conscious historicity.

(i) Modern man has made his modern world: from mediaeval beginnings of commerce and finance, through periods of exploration, conquest, colonization, to applied science, industry, technology, with population ever on the increase; from mediaeval Latin through the development of modern languages to the creation of modern literatures with the ever decreasing importance and significance of the ancient models;

the emergence of the Western nations and their long and sustained political development, their own histories, their own accumulation of political experience; the development of modern mathematics, modern natural science, modern human science, modern philosophies, modern religious and historical thought.

(ii) Modern man has investigated the 'worlds' of other places and times: voyages of discovery, new lands, peoples, languages, religions, cultures; archeology, ethnology, anthropology.

For the classicist ancient Greece and Rome were islands of light in a vast sea of darkness; for modern man the whole of human history stands in an evolutionary perspective that takes its stand on astronomical geological biological foundations and expands and develops through countless psychological social cultural historical studies.

(iii) Modern man confronts the problem of his historicity: as freedom is constitutive of individual Existenz, so also freedom, the contingency of free choices, is a factor in the common meanings constitutive of community; to confront the problem of historicity is (1) to know the fact of that freedom and (2) to exercise it responsibly. [In the margin here: (3 [iii?]) has discovered his historicity; (4 [iv?]) confronts the problem of his historicity / Teilhard]

Hence (1) tradition, what used to be done, has ceased to be a decisive argument – the wisdom and folly of our ancestors have made the world what it is; we have the responsibility of deciding to maintain that wisdom and folly, to let things drift, to undertake a continuous reassessment and reappraisal of the course of things.

(2) for the classicist out-of-date and up-to-date, antiquated and timely, could refer only to tastes, fashions, fancies, fads; for historical consciousness those categories are basic – one has to live and to operate in the world that exists with an exact apprehension of just what it is, just what its possibilities and its limitations are – otherwise one will act blindly and achieve only what chance bestows – to be out-of-date is to try to live in a world that does not exist – to be up-to-date, timely,

is to know and deal with things as they are. [The marginal mention of 'Teilhard' may be with regard to this paragraph.]

(3) '-isms' may be discoveries made by historians, but they also may name contemporary movements that have come to consciousness and to a more or less explicit formulation.

In the latter case they denote collective attempts to deal with man's collective destiny.

political: feudalism, monarchy, parliaments, dictatorship

economic: mercantilism, laissez-faire, socialism, free enterprise

literary: classicism, romanticism, realism, flow-of-consciousness

religious: catholicism Protestantism deism rationalism agnosticism

indifferentism, atheism and militant atheism

philosophic: rationalist and empiricist; Kantian and idealist; relativist and existentialist; positivist, historicist

each 'ism' tends to organize the universe

### 3. Modern Philosophy

Repeatedly have referred to the difference between a Greek or mediaeval type of philosophy and a modern type. I must say what I mean.

I do not mean some set of contrasting characteristics derived from diligent positive study of ancient, mediaeval, modern philosophies. There is nothing to prevent a contemporary philosophy from repeating earlier stages: Heidegger admires the pre-Socratics; linguistic analysis seems to be a rebirth of the Greek Logos. There is nothing to prevent an earlier philosophy anticipating what becomes more explicit and refined in later thought.

By a philosophy of the Greek type I mean one that draws a sharp distinction, acknowledges a discontinuity, between necessity and contingency, theory and practice, wisdom and prudence. Wisdom guides theory to a contemplation of the necessities of the universe; prudence guides practice in dealing with its contingencies. The solid substance of philosophy lies in the realm of wisdom, theory, necessity. A great deal of attention, analysis, praise is bestowed on the prudent man; but all of it does not add up to scientific knowledge; on the contrary, prudence takes care of the contingencies that science, theory, cannot be expected to deal with.

By a philosophy of the modern type I mean a philosophy of the type that has or would develop in conjunction with the development of modern science and historical consciousness.

E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Berlin I & II 1922; less relevant are III Berlin 1920, IV Yale 1950.

Re phil & Hist: see above p 5: Richardson, Gardiner

W H Walsh, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, London, Hutchinson 1951 <sup>5</sup>1958 bibl 172 f.

Hans Meyerhoff, *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, Doubleday Anchor, New York 1959. bibl 346-50.

It is a philosophy that is principally concerned with the realm of contingency, practice, prudence [to speak with the Greeks]; in its own language it is concerned with critical and comprehensive foundations for modern science, for historical consciousness, and for philosophy itself.

(a) The Shrinking of the Realm of Necessity.

Euclid, Russell-Whitehead, Hilbert, Gödel

J. Ladrière, *Les limitations internes des formalismes*, Louvain 1957

M.L. Roure, *Logique et Métalogique*, Lyon Vitte 1957

S. Breton, 'Crise de la raison et philosophie contemporaine,' in *La crise de la raison dans la pensée contemporaine*, pp 117-206, Desclée de Brouwer, 1960.

Newtonian mechanics to Relativity; Determinism to Quantum mechanics.

Pure reason (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff); Kant's Critique; Gilson's critique, essentialism.

Hegel, a new logic of necessity, the dialectic: but philosophy of nature commonly considered indefensible; philosophy of history led to 'presuppositionless' history of Ranke and *Historismus*.

Xtian: the created world is contingent; man's world adds the further contingency of free acts; the redemption adds a third contingency.

(b) The Penetration of Theory into Practice

Where theory is not limited to necessity, where it deals with the de facto intelligibility of the concrete universe, there is not discontinuity in principle between theory and practice.

There remain the distinctions between *quoad se* and *quoad nos*, between things in relation to one another and things in relation to us, between the different patterns of experience. Indeed, modern theory is more elaborate, more refined, more rigorous, more difficult than Gk and MA predecessors. Besides it is practical.

One transposes from pure to applied science, to engineering, to technology; one develops computers that not only perform routine tasks but also threaten to take over management decisions. The theory of natural science is man's power over nature. Theory in human science and history can become the illumination of man's individual and collective decisions. Theology the illuminations of his self-constitution before God.

## (c') The Breakdown of Naive Realism

[On the reverse of the preceding page (10) Lonergan has:

## (c') The Breakdown of Naive Realism

Descartes, Kant, Hegel

Relativity, Quantum Theory

Psychology, Piaget

History: Dilthey, Troeltsch, Carl Becker, Charles Beard, Heussi, Aron, Marrou, Richardson (cf Meyerhoff)

Primitive Thought, Categories, Explanation: E. Cassirer PSF II

## (c'') From Logic through Method to the Subject.

Logic deals with objects in general in their possible and necessary relations. Method shifts from objects to operations; it includes the operations performed by the logician; it adds the operations of observation, investigation, description, forming hypotheses, drawing inferences, devising and performing experiments, confronting actual with anticipated results, etc.

But the performance of the operations supposes the development of the subject; the development of subjects includes climactic moments of conversion; upon differences in development and the presence or absence of conversion depend the differences in the worlds mediated or mediated and constituted by meaning.

## (d) From the per se, de iure, subject to the self-constituting subject.

From a classicist, deductivist viewpoint there is no problem of the subject: per se and de iure one cannot help apprehending self-evident principles, necessary truths; per se and de iure one cannot help drawing necessary and mediately evident conclusions; per accidens and de facto there exist idiots imbeciles low IQ's fools and sinners, but per se and de iure there cannot be a critical problem.

But as historical consciousness distinguishes worlds of immediacy, worlds mediated by meaning, and worlds mediated and constituted by meaning, so a modern philosophy distinguishes the subject of a world of immediacy, the subject in a world mediated by meaning, the subject in a world mediated and constituted by meaning. There are many worlds and many subjects: they may be confused; one world may be mistakenly identified with another; a subject may employ the right procedures in the wrong world.

There exists a basic problem of orientation: of distinguishing the sense of reality and the image of knowledge one developed before reaching the age of reason and, on the other hand, the criterion of reality and the analysis of knowledge one can attain in one's maturity.



The proper subject in a world constituted by meaning is a self-orientating, self-constituting subject: else the world constituted by meaning would be a dream-world, a nightmare for which we had no responsibility; individually we are responsible for the lives we lead, and collectively we are responsible for the world in which we live them.

There are *drifters* who with a minimum of reflection move from the infant's world of immediacy to boy's world mediated by meaning and to the adult's world constituted by meaning. Their self-orientation happens because they think what others think, judge what others judge, say what others say, and do what others do.

There are the *confused* who think themselves genuine Christians or Muslims or Buddhists, Platonists or Aristotelians, Augustinians or Thomists, Kantians or Hegelians, Western secularists or communists – who have no other language in which they can interpret themselves or express themselves – but in their real selves are something else, who devalue, misinterpret, unconsciously but systematically distort the way of thought or of life they claim to represent and realize.

There are the *rationalizers* who make mistakes and stick to them through thick and thin; their position is coherent; but they are not coherent – they are involved in counterpositions, in radical conflicts between their saying and what they say, their performance and the content of their performance.

There are *relativists* fully aware of the differences of philosophies, the pluralism in cultures and civilizations, who have found no way to acknowledge or locate absolute truth or absolute value. For them Western man is just another anthropological species; his ways, his science, his philosophy, his religion is not the way, the science, the philosophy, the religion; were they born in India or Africa not only is there no doubt that they would be different from who they are but also there is no reason why they should try to be different from what they are.

There finally is the difficult way of authenticity, of discovering in oneself the exigences of one's own intelligence, rationality, responsibility, and of working out and accepting and living the consequences.

Such authenticity is not automatic, not to be assumed, presupposed, taken for granted; it is something to be discovered, struggled for, conquered, won, achieved, maintained.

A modern type of philosophy acknowledges a basic critical problem: as it is concerned, not with reality insofar as, abstractly considered. it contains elements of necessity, but with the concrete universe, so it is concerned with the subject, not as per se or de iure he may be classically supposed to be, but as de facto he is, as de facto he makes himself what he is, as de facto he can be helped (though not dictated to) in making himself what he is to be.

(e) Such a philosophy provides itself, modern science, and historical consciousness with critical foundations and a consequent determination of the legitimate range and the limitations of each.

It provides foundations: everyone can find out for himself in his own immediate experience what it is to experience, to understand, to grasp evidence as sufficient for a judgment, to be responsible in his choices; on such operations all philosophy, all science, all historical consciousness rest. The philosopher, scientist, historian ignorant of those operations does not know what he is doing; the one that attends to them, understands their network of relationships, that discovers that such relationships are not just objects but the normative reality of his own intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, has reached what is at once immediate and ultimate. Immediate, because that normative reality is his own being in its intellectual, rational, moral luminousness; ultimate, because that reality is already presupposed by any intelligent, reasonable, or responsible attempt to go beyond it.

It provides critical foundations: one can be intelligent but one does not have to be intelligent; not understanding is usually easier than making the effort to understand, going through the process of learning, submitting to the humiliation of being taught. One can be reasonable, but one does not have to be reasonable; one has the alternative of rationalization, of sticking to one's ignorance, one's blind spot, one's error, of building up a case for the defense, of proceeding to taking the offensive, of denouncing the people that dare to be reasonable where I am accustomed to being unreasonable. One can be responsible, but one does not have to be responsible; one can be irresponsible; one can sin; in fact, in this world, without God's grace, one cannot help sinning.

Such critical foundations meet the issue:

They regard operations immediately and objects mediately; they ground both method (immediately) and logic (mediately); they are just as relevant to contingent as to necessary objects, to concrete, de fact, moving objects as to abstract, per se, immobile objects; they hold in the spontaneous activities of common sense and the thematic activities of the scientist, philosopher, theologian.

They regard subjects in their operations, development, their openness, their conversion, their broadening horizons, their ever precarious achievement of authenticity.

They ground everything that classicist thought rightly holds to be self-evident and demonstrable; but the assigned grounds are deeper, more far-reaching, more supple; and so there is eliminated the classicist tendency to canonize and eternalize a particular culture or epoch and to set up tensions between 'truth' and, on the other hand, life, freedom, growth.

They are historical. The self-appropriation of the subject is also his self-mediation; and his self-mediation occurs within the historical matrix of mutual

self-mediation. [this paragraph is probably meant to be crossed out in favor of the next]

They are historical and personal: the self-appropriation of the subject, his self-mediation, is also his response to a tradition, his personal touch added to the tradition's further communication; again, the self-appropriation of the subject occurs along with the self-appropriation of other subjects in a mutual self-mediation.

(f) I have said that these critical foundations ground everything that the classicist rightly claims to be self-evident and demonstrable. But the grounding involves a shift of grounds; one has to go behind the self-evident proposition to the subject in his rational utterance and the basis of the rationality of the utterance; one has to go behind the demonstration, the 'objective' evidence, to the 'formal' being evident of reflective understanding in its grasp of the unconditioned.

Such a shift can take place in a classicist mind only by conversion; he has to learn to stand where he never stood before; and in the process of learning he will often have the feeling that he has nowhere to stand, that he is sacrificing his roots, becoming uprooted, and slipping into the abyss.

The classicist can refuse the invitation to conversion; his refusal will take the form of rationalizations; he will say he is being invited not to conversion but to apostasy, to idealism, to relativism, to subjectivism, to nihilism; he will attempt to substantiate his charges by arguing that unless classicism is true, idealism must be true, relativism must be true, subjectivism must be true, nihilism can have no alternative. The answer to all such arguments is the same: classicism is true with regard to the self-evident, demonstrable, necessary; but the self-evident demonstrable necessary is not the whole of truth; and to reach the whole of truth one needs broader foundations than classicism provides.

(g) There is a broader objection against critical foundations in the subject's empirical, intelligent, rational, responsible consciousness.

The ultimate criterion lies in the 'for interior,' in the immediacy and ultimacy of *das Sein in seiner Gelichtetheit*, in the realm, in the utterly private realm in which man saves his soul or loses it.

Extrinsicism demands something else, something open to public view, something that anyone can test, not in the privacy of his own mind, but by some sort of external criteria, commonly acknowledged and commonly accepted procedures or views.

Extrinsicism wants truths that are 'out there' [*fides scientifica*]; or it wants everything settled by common meaning and common consent; or everything settled by sensible data, by observation and experiment; or it wants absolute evidence and

consequent demonstration; or it settles for intellectual coherence plus voluntarist will.

None of these are more than attempts to escape the basic fact: the human subject is self-constituting; his self-constituting is free and so is contingent; but it also is responsible, not prior, but subsequent to the development of his intelligence and the maturation of his judgment; and it is not, in this world, once-for-all; we become what we are; with some development of intelligence and some maturation of judgment we have become what we now are; with further development and fuller maturity we can become more that we now are; and by sin, by a spreading, thickening, solidifying growth of sinfulness, we can destroy all that we have achieved.

(h) The turn of modern philosophy to the subject is also its return to theology.

The 13th century distinguished natural and supernatural orders, reason and faith, philosophy and theology. But philosophy was worked out by theologians, within a theological context, for theological purposes. Since then seminary philosophy has tended to be an extract from theology, studied as a propaedeutic to the study of theology and, within theology, functioning as an *ancilla*.

In Cartesian and subsequent thought, theology and philosophy became not only distinct but also separate; philosophy was busy finding its own proper foundations; and its search went on in conjunction with the development of science and scientific method.

With Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, philosophy become not only separate but also hostile to theology: monism, agnosticism, and the sublation of religion (picture-thinking) within philosophy.

Though Newton named his major work *Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis*, in fact he showed the way to distinguish and separate science from philosophy. With positivism, the negation of any comprehensive ultimate science, philosophy was dethroned as theology had been. But positivism is self-refuting: to restrict valid knowledge to the particular sciences is to deny the validity of any assertion not made in any particular science; and no particular science establishes anything that lies outside its own field, such as the complete list of valid sciences.

In contrast, a philosophy that rejects extrinsicism, that begins from the self-appropriation of the subject = his self-mediation with respect to a tradition = mutual self-mediation within a tradition, begins with man as he concretely is, as a member of a community, as a receiver and transmitter of a tradition, as in need of conversion.

Such a starting point is isomorphic with the starting point of one that inquires into Christian claims.

While there are two formally distinct starting points, there is only one full solution: when one deals with man in the concrete, one is dealing with man under original sin, in need of grace, receiving it, and either accepting or rejecting it – one is in a theological context.

Handwritten pages:

On the reverse side of three pages in this item, there are handwritten notes. The reverse side of p. 10 contains notes relevant to 'The Breakdown of Naive Realism. These are given here on p. 16. The other two are:

On the reverse side of p. 1:

Catholic Theology and Classicism

(1) Dogmas are certain – but the certitude is neither self-evidence or demonstration; semi-rationalism

(2) Dogmas and necessity: the Trinity is necessary quoad se but not quoad nos; creation sin, redemption, whole order of salvation is not necessary

(3) Theological system and explanation – transcendental element necessary in root not in form?

essential element – analogous and imperfect understanding – probable classicist method either attempts to demonstrate the undemonstrable or falls back on atomistic negation of explanation or resorts to voluntarism, skepticism re whole theological enterprise

(4) Positive studies: not confined to world of classicist 'properly so called' concepts of.

not confined to level of mode of thought of treatise scripture, Fathers, post-theological mythical tendencies – undifferentiated cs.

(5) Reduction of dogmas to sources: nobilissimum munus 'Humani generis' from differentiated to undifferentiated consciousness

Classicism → voluntarism / Lutheran blind faith & successors / rationalist thesis that eternal verities cannot depend on contingent historical facts / semirationalist

demonstration of mysteries / controversy demonstrating undemonstrable –  
rejection of theology as vain, useless, speculation, pride

On the reverse side of p. 2:

Historical consciousness is man's realization that individually he is responsible for the life he heads and collectively he is responsible for the world in which he lives it.

But the most emphatic and most common case of self-constitution is fully deliberate, whole-hearted, permanently intended mortal sin. Man decides, not merely to be no longer a child, but to be his own master and his only master – to be fully intelligent, fully reasonable, fully responsible, and fully free – he is the court and the only court of last appeal- God is dead.

The most conspicuous and most conscious instance in which man has undertaken to be the ground of the world in which he lives is modern secularist culture, society, civilization.

It has reinterpreted the past, written its own literature, history, philosophies, devised its own forms of government, promulgated its own laws, imposed its own education, built up its science in opposition to the Catholic Church.

My contention is not for individual sin and collective apostasy.

Beyond the self-constitution of the sinner, there is the self-constitution of the saint. Beyond the apostasy of the modern world, there is its conversion to Christ. Apart from these alternatives there is only the conception of the Church as a ghetto for children.

Historical consciousness – not knowing, cognitional theory, epistemology, method of historical inquiry, but anthropology, ontology, metaphysics – there is a highly important realm/domain of being/reality constituted by common meaning and common commitment.