

Existenz & aggiornamento

Subject
World
Authenticity

1. To speak of Existenz, on being oneself, is to speak in public about what is utterly private, completely intimate, more intimate perhaps than one is aware of in oneself ^{for some even} has explicitly conceived.

psychological
sociological
historical

Such existential speaking cannot be tidily tucked away into a category: at once it is, philosophic theological religious ascetic mystical; but it is all of them because the person is all and involved in all.

At the same time, it is not personal in a merely individualist sense: it is not exhibitionism on the part of the speaker; it is not exhortation, a domestic exhortation in place of a lecture, for those that listen. It is what the Germans call a Besinnung, a becoming aware, a growth in self-consciousness, a heightening of one's self-appropriation, that is possible because our separate, unrevealed, hidden cores have a common point of reference, which is God, ta panta en pasin theos. ^{circle} ^{the human community, and an ultimate reference point}

I Subject - 5 main points

2. The first distinction is between substance and subject.

When one is sound asleep, one is actually a substance but only potentially a subject. To be a subject, one at least must dream. But the ~~dream~~ dreamer is only the minimal subject: one is more a subject when one is awake, still more when one is actively intelligent, still more when one actively is reasonable, still more in one's deliberations and decisions when one actively is responsible & free.

a saint or
a sinner.

Of the human substance it is true that human nature is always the same; a man is a man whether he is awake or asleep, young or old, sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron. From the viewpoint of substance, those differences are merely accidental. But they are not accidental to the subject, for the subject is not an abstraction; he is a concrete reality, all of it, a being in the luminousness of being.

Substance prescind from the difference between the opaque being that is merely substance and the luminous being that is conscious. Subject denotes ~~just~~ the luminous being.

3. The being of the subject is becoming. One becomes oneself.

When I was a child, I was a subject; but I had not yet reached the use of reason; I was not expected to be able to draw reasonably the elementary distinctions between right and wrong, true and false.

When I was a boy, I was a subject; but I was a minor; I had not reached law the degree of freedom and responsibility that would make me accountable before the law.

The self I am today is not numerically different from the self I was as a child or boy; yet it is qualitatively different. Were it not, you would not be listening to me. Were yourselves not, I would not be talking this way to you.

4. The subject has more and more to do with his own becoming. ^{+ tries to do for the child what the child can do for itself} When an adult underestimates a child's development, the child will resent the interference and exclaim: Let me do it.

Development is a matter of increasing the number of things that one does for oneself, that one decides for oneself, that one finds out for oneself. Parents and teachers and professors and superiors let people do more and more for themselves, decide more and more for themselves, find out more and more for themselves.

increasing

5. There is a critical point in the autonomy of the subject.

It is reached when the subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself.

At first sight doing for oneself, deciding for oneself, finding out for oneself, are busy with objects. But on reflection deeds, decisions, discoveries affect the subject more ~~deeply~~ deeply than they affect the objects with which they are concerned. They accumulate as dispositions and habits of the subject; they determine him; they make him what he is and what he is to be.

The self in a first period makes itself; but in a second period this making oneself is open-eyed, deliberate. Autonomy decides what autonomy is to be.

The opposite to this open-eyed deliberate self-control is drifting. The drifter has not yet found himself: he has not yet discovered his own deed and so is content to do what everyone else is doing; he has not yet discovered his own will and so he is content to choose what everyone else is choosing; he has not yet discovered a mind of his own and so he is content to think and say what everyone else is thinking and saying; and the others too are apt to be drifters, each of them doing and choosing and thinking and saying what the others happen to be doing choosing thinking saying.

I have spoken of an opposite to drifting, of autonomy disposing of itself, of open-eyed, deliberate self-control. But I must not misrepresent. We do not know ourselves very well; we cannot chart the future; we cannot control our environment completely or the influences that work on us; we cannot explore our unconscious and preconscious mechanisms. Our course is in the night; our control is only rough and approximate; we have to believe and trust, to risk and dare.

6. In this life the critical point is never transcended.

It is one thing to decide what one is to make of oneself: a Catholic, a religious, a Jesuit, a priest. It is another to execute the decision.

Today's resolutions do not predetermine the free choices of tomorrow, of next week, of next year, of ten years from now.

What has been achieved is always precarious: it can slip fall shatter

What is to be achieved can be ever expanding deepening: to meet one challenge is to effect a development that reveals a further and graver challenge.

II. One's world.

7. As the subject develops, his world changes.

Note the difference between "his world" and "the world": "the world" is what is there to be known and that is unchanged by its being known. But subject's world is correlative to the subject: it may be a world that is mostly fantasy; it may be the real world; but its differentia is that it is the world in which the subject actually lives and develops.

A first world is the world of immediacy: it is the world of the infant, the world of what is felt, touched, ~~manipulated~~ grasped, soaked, seen, heard -- it is the world to which the adult returns when with an empty head he lies in the sun -- it is the world of immediate experience, of the given as given, *in a perfect* without any intrusion from insight or concept, reflection or judgement, deliberation or choice. -- *it is the world of pleasure & pain, hunger & thirst, food & drink, surrender sex and sleep.*

A second world is the world mediated by meaning, and it has two forms.

Initially it is an extension of the world of immediacy, a revelation of a larger world than the nursery that comes through pictures, speech, stories, that is of incredible extent and variety.

But initiation into the world ~~of immediacy~~ mediated by meaning gradually leads to the discovery of the difference between fact and fiction, between what is just a story and what really and truly is *so*. *See Henry James*

The necessity of that distinction reveals that the world mediated by meaning is not just the sum of all world's of immediacy: the world of grown-ups, the world of literature and science, philosophy and history, religion and theology, is not a world apprehended by infantile procedures. It is a universe of being, that is known not just by experience but by the conjunction of experience and judgement.

The difference between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by *immediacy* meaning is the source of the critical problem of philosophers. *Philosophy is mediated by meaning*

For naive realists the real world is the world of immediacy, for idealists the world of immediacy is not the world mediated by meaning, and so the world mediated by meaning is not real but merely ideal. Both are mistaken.

A third world is not only mediated but also constituted by meaning.

Language is constituted by meaning: it is not just articulated sound; it has to have meaning; and the meaning can be incorporated in print no less than in sound.

But not only language is constituted by meaning. Human acts have meaning in their constitution: they include acts of will; will is rational appetite, appetite that follows intellect; and what intellect knows, it knows by meaning, by asking and answering questions.

Human acts occur in socio-cultural contexts: there is not only the action but also the human set-up, the family and mores, the state and religion, the economy and technology, the law and education. None of these are mere products of nature: they have a determination from meaning; to change the meaning is to change the concrete set-up.

Hence there is a radical difference between the data of natural science and the data of human science. The physicist chemist biologist verifies his hypotheses in what is given just as it is given. The human scientist can verify only in data that besides being given have a meaning. Law-court.

8. We have spoken of the self-constituting subject and his world.

The two are correlative, not only by definition inasmuch as we have distinguished the world and his world, but also because the free and responsible self-constituting subject can exist only in a freely constituted world.

The world of experience is not freely constituted; the world mediated by meaning is not freely constituted; but the world constituted by meaning, the properly human world, the world of community is the product of freely self-constituting subjects. *To exclude freedom is to exclude Existence. SA XXIV (middle)*
is constitutive of human nature

For what is community? It is not just a number of men within a geographical frontier. It is an achievement of common meaning: (kinds and degrees of) *achievement*

Common meaning is potential when there is a common field of experience, and to withdraw from that common field is to get out of touch

Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding, and one withdraws from that common understanding by misunderstanding, by incomprehension, by mutual incomprehension. *C.P. Burns Two Worlds*

Common meaning is actual inasmuch as there are common judgments, areas on which all affirm and deny in the same manner; and one withdraws from that common agreement when one disagrees, when one considers true what others hold to false and false what they think true. *especially*

Common meaning is realized by will, by permanent dedication, in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states, in the faith that makes religions

Community coheres or divides, begins and ends, just where the common field of experience, common understanding, common judgment, common commitments begin and end.

The common meanings constitutive of communities are not the work of isolated individuals nor even of single generations. Common meanings have histories: they originate in single minds; they become common only through successful and widespread communication; they are transmitted to successive generations only through training and education. Slowly and gradually they are clarified, expressed, formulated, defined, only to be enriched and deepened and transformed, and no less often to be impoverished, emptied out, deformed.

As it is only within communities that men are conceived and born and reared, so too it is only with respect to the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes himself. The choice of roles between which he can choose in electing what to make himself is no larger than the accepted meanings of the community admit; his capacities for effective initiative is limited to the potentialities of the community for rejuvenation, renewal, reform, development. At any time in any place what a given self can make of himself is some function of the heritage or sediment of common meanings that comes to him from the authentic or inauthentic living of his predecessors and his contemporaries.

III. Authenticity of the Subject and his World

9. The question of authenticity is twofold: there is the minor authenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him; there is the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself.

The first passes a human judgement on subjects; the second is the judgement of history and ultimately the judgement of divine providence upon traditions.

As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Xtian, so divers men can ask themselves whether or not they are genuine Catholics or Protestants, Moslems or Buddhists, Platonists or Aristotelians, Kantians or Hegelians, artists or scientists, etc.

They may answer that they are, and be correct in their answers. But they can also answer affirmatively and still be mistaken. In that case there will exist a series of points in which what they are coincides with what the ideals of the tradition demand, but there will be another series in which there is a greater or less divergence. These points of divergence are overlooked: whether from a selective inattention or a failure to understand or an undetected rationalization, what I am is one thing, what a genuine Buddhist is happens to be another, and I am unaware of the difference. My unawareness is unexpressed; I have no language to express what I really am, so I use the language of the tradition I unauthentically appropriate, and thereby I devaluate, distort, water down, corrupt that language.

Such devaluation distortion corruption may occur only in scattered individuals. But it may occur on a more massive scale, and then the words are repeated but the meaning is gone. The chair is still the chair of Moses but it is occupied by scribes and Pharisees. The theology is still scholastic, but the scholasticism is decadent. The religious order still reads out the rule and studies the constitutions, but one doubts whether the home fires are still burning. The sacred name of science is still invoked, but one can ask with Edmund Husserl whether any significant scientific ideal remains, whether it has not been replaced by the conventions of a clique.

Then the inauthenticity of individuals generates the inauthenticity of traditions. Then if the subject takes the tradition, as it exists, ~~as~~ for his standard, he can do no more than authentically realize inauthenticity.

The word, ^{minted} aggnamento, coined by John XXIII, retained by Pius VI, is not entirely outside the range of our present reflections.

For the problem set the Church by the modern world is at once massive and profound.

The modern world is in advance of its predecessors in its mathematics, its natural science, its technology, its history, its human sciences, its method of philosophy, and the ~~wealth~~ variety penetration of its literary potentialities. It holds within its grasp what lay beyond the horizon, the comprehension, the capacity ~~for~~ for expression of Hebrew and Greek, Hellenistic and Mediaeval, Renaissance and Reformation, ~~and~~ Counter-reformation and Enlightenment ~~man~~.

From that enormous development the Church has held off: it could praise the ends; it could not accept the means; and so it could not authentically participate in the process that ended the standardized man of classicist thought and ushered in the historical consciousness of today.

Modern man has created his states and his sciences, his philosophies and his histories, his ~~own~~ cultures and his literatures, on the basis of absolute autonomy. There is human intelligence, human reasonableness, human responsibility, and that is all there is. To speak of God is at best irrelevant; to turn to God is to sacrifice the good we know and by ~~our~~ our own resources we can attain. (except by way of political gesture or emotional outlet)

diminished

are responsible for the world in which they live them.

of modernity

or perhaps Nietzsche,

Karl Jaspers repeats from Kierkegaard, *I think*, that unless I sinned, I could not be myself. The sin in question is not any sin of frailty, any transient lapse, any lack of advertence or consent. It is the fully deliberate and permanently intended determination to be myself, ~~human~~ to attain the perfection proper to a man, and to liberate humanity from the heavy hand of ecclesiastical tradition, ecclesiastical interference, ecclesiastical refusal to allow human beings to grow and be themselves.

rather weakly

or seems to open

aggiornamento

The word, aggiornamento, has electrified the world, Catholic and non-Catholic, because it implies a rejection of classicism, a rejection of the view that human nature is always the same, a rejection of the view that any change is only an incidental modification introduced to meet a merely accidental difference in circumstances. It opens the door to historical consciousness to the awareness that men individually are responsible for their lives & collectively

10. It would be a long and very complex task to list all the ways in which change is possible and permissible and desirable and all the other ways in which it is not. To do so would be beyond the scope of the present discussion.

The present question rather is what kind of men we have to be if we are to implement the aggiornamento that the council decrees, if we are to discuss what future decrees are to be desired, if we are to do so without doing more harm than good, without projecting into the Catholic community and the world any inauthenticity we have imbibed ~~from~~ from others or created on our own.

In brief, we have to ask what it is for a Catholic, a religious, a priest to be himself, today. There is the modern secular world with all its values and all its potentialities. There is the possibility of rejecting the system. But that possibility will not be realized unless Catholic religious priests exist & exist with authority but not inauthentically.

10. Being oneself is being, and by being is not meant the abstract but the concrete. It is not the universal concept 'not nothing' of Scotus and Hegel but the concrete goal intended in all inquiry and reflection.

It is substance and subject: our opaque being that rises to consciousness and our conscious being by which we save or damn our souls.

That conscious being is not an object, not part of the spectacle we contemplate, but the presence to himself of the spectator, the contemplator.

It is not an object of introspection, but the prior presence that makes introspection possible by constituting its object.

It is conscious but that does not mean that properly it is known; it will be known only if we introspect, understand, reflect and judge. It is one thing to feel blue and another to advert to the fact that you are feeling blue. It is one thing to be in love and another to discover that what has happened to you is that you have fallen in love. Being oneself is prior to knowing oneself. St Ignatius said that love shows itself more in deeds than in words; but being in love is neither deeds nor words; it is the prior conscious reality that words and, more securely, deeds reveal.

That prior opaque and luminous being is not static fixed determinate once-for-all; it is precarious; and its being precarious is the possibility not only of a fall but also of fuller development.

That development is open: the dynamism constitutive of our consciousness may be expressed in the imperatives, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible; and the imperatives are unrestricted -- they regard every inquiry, every judgement, every decision and choice.

Nor is the relevance of the imperatives restricted to the world of human experience, to the mundus aspectabilis; we are open to God. Implicit in human inquiry is a natural desire to know God by his essence; implicit in human judgement about contingent things there is the formally unconditioned that is God; implicit in human choice of values is the absolute good that is God.

11. In Christ Jesus we are not only referred to God, as to some omega point, but we are on our way to God. The fount of our living is not eros but agape, not desire of an end that uses means but love, an end that overflows.

As God did not create the world to obtain something for himself, but rather overflowed from love of the infinite to loving even the finite

II II, 132, 1, 1m: non quaerit Deus gloriam suam propter se sed propter nos -- the glory of the Father is the excellence of the Son, and the excellence of the adoptive sons.

as Christ in His humanity did not will merely to reach an end, but possessed the end, the vision of God, and overflowed in love to loving us,

so too those in Christ participate in the charity of Christ: they love God super omnia and so can love their neighbours as themselves.

they participate in that charity because they are temples of Christ's Spirit, members of His Body, adopted children of the Father whom Christ could name the Risen Lord, the Kurios of things invisible and visible, has bought them at a great price; he possesses them; qui Spiritu dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei

But this being in Xto Iesu may be the being of substance or of subject substance

Inasmuch as it is just the being of subject, it is known only through faith, through affirming true propositions, meditating on them, concluding from them, making resolutions on the basis of them, winning over our psyche's, our sensitive souls, to carrying out the resolutions through the cultivation of pious imagination and pious affects, multiplying individual effort, thru liturgical

Inasmuch as it is just the being of substance, it is being in love with God without awareness of being in love. Without any experience of how or why, one is in the state of grace or one recovers it, one leaves all things to follow Xt, one binds oneself by vows of poverty chastity obedience, one gets through one's daily heavy dose of prayer, one longs for the priesthood and later lives by it.

Quietly imperceptibly there goes forward the transformation operated by the Kurios, but the delicacy, the gentleness, the deftness of his continual operation in us hides the operation from us.

But inasmuch as being in Christ Jesus is the being of subject, the hand of the Lord ceases to be hidden. In ways you all have experienced, in ways some have experienced more frequently or more intensely than others, in ways you still have to experience, and in ways none of us in this life will ever experience, the substance in Xt Jesus becomes the subject in Xt Jesus. For the love of God, being in love with God, can be as full and as dominant an experience as human love. , as overwhelming and as lasting,

12. Being in Xt Jesus is not tied down to place or time, culture or epoch. It is catholic with the catholicity of the Spirit of the Lord.

Neither is it an abstraction that dwells apart from every place and time, every culture and epoch. It is identical with personal living, and personal living is always here and now, in a contemporary world of immediacy, a contemporary world mediated by meaning, a contemporary world not only mediated but also constituted by meaning.

In personal living the questions, abstractly asked about the relations between nature and grace, emerge concretely in one's concern, one's interests, one's hopes, one's plans, one's daring and timidity, one's taking risks and playing safe. And as they emerge concretely, so too they are solved concretely. Such concrete solutions, divided from the viewpoint, the challenge to which Pope John initiated a response, may be solutions thought out in Xt Jesus for a world that no longer exists; they may be solutions thought out for the modern world but not thought out in Christ Jesus; they may be for the modern world and in Xt Jesus

for an archaic world that no longer exists or for a futurist world that never will exist; they may be thought for the world that is now but not thought out in Xt Jesus; they may be for the world that is now and thought out in Xt Jesus.

Our time is a time for profound and far reaching creativity. The Lord has

Run's
At the Father's heart
Love me, I have
Love you
Love one another
I have Love you

Strength

whether living a life
or witnessing a
personal love

not

A M O G, and, as I have said, God's own glory, in part, is given.

as all