

1 Lonergan Workshop 1975 Q&A June 16-20

2  
3 June 19 (TC 852 A and 852 B)

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5 **Question:** The first topic for dialogue (I hope it isn't a monologue): The theology of hope (e.g.,  
6 Moltmann) has been accused of being too futuristic and not sufficiently grounded in the present.  
7 On the other hand, there is the obvious danger of being too little future-oriented. How do you  
8 conceive of a foundational approach to Christian eschatology? What is the role of Christian  
9 hope?

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11 **Lonergan:** If anyone wants a helpful book on Moltmann, there is Douglas Meeks's *Origins of*  
12 *the Theology of Hope*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974. It's about 180 pages, and it is very  
13 helpful. It liberates one from all the exaggerations in Moltmann's way of speech. The tendency  
14 in any 'theology of ...,' theology of death, theology of liberation, theology of woman, etc., is to  
15 be a bandwagon theology, written by people in a hurry. They have a big message, and they have  
16 to get it all done. They call attention to what has been overlooked. People spend an awful lot of  
17 time talking about faith and about love and about life, and so on, but why not hope? So call  
18 attention to what has been overlooked, develop its significance, its relevance to present issues  
19 especially: it's right on the ball, it's reading the signs of the times, it makes its splash, but it is  
20 somewhat one-sided. It brings about a correction, and it remains the landmark more or less  
21 significant, or model as the case may be. Now, if you study the origins, this fellow goes back to  
22 Moltmann's teachers and tells you what he got from each one of his teachers and how it comes  
23 into this, and all the extravagances that one can get, you know: God's future, and so on,  
24 gradually become melted down into ordinary plain water. I don't mean that they vanish, but it is  
25 much more easily assimilated than bald statements, especially summaries.

26 The kicking off point for Moltmann – something that he added to his teachers – was of  
27 course Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, who was a Marxist who lost his job at the University  
28 of Leipzig, talking about hope. After all, the philosophy of hope, they told him, is religion, and  
29 that has nothing to do with Marxism, so get out; and he got out. The defect in any of the  
30 theologies of hope is not that it is too much emphasis on this and there should be a little more  
31 emphasis on that; it is a lack of groundwork, and that is rather dull stuff, and it doesn't sell very  
32 well, and you don't get it published, and all the rest. But that is the fundamental problem. It isn't  
33 just that we should have more emphasis on the present and less on the future. You have to go  
34 into the foundations if you want to get anywhere, and when I say that you go to his teachers and  
35 so on, and find out what the teachers were thinking and why they thought that way and why they  
36 were different from their teachers, well, you get down to the roots of the thing and find out what  
37 it really is about. So the defect is not present, past, or future, or anything like that.

38 How do I conceive a foundational approach to Christian eschatology? Well, I'm not a  
39 specialist in eschatology. There are one or two questions I have spent some time on, and  
40 eschatology is not among them. I once did teach a course about 1941 on death, judgment,  
41 heaven, and hell. That's what it was in those days. The dress has shifted a certain amount. But  
42 the fundamental thing is an exploration of the literary genre 'apocalyptic,' the significance of  
43 apocalyptic in the fundamental category of 'being in the world.' After all, where are the souls of  
44 the dead? Are they above or below? How do you get there? Fill out the vision of the universe.  
45 Well, of course, you have to have someone tell you about that and reveal it, and that's where you

1 get your apocalypse. An apocalypse of what is going to come and remedy present evil, well, that  
 2 is a messianic kink thrown in: in other words, an exploration of that genre 'apocalyptic,' and its  
 3 twist towards eschatology. There is a terrific twist of eschatology to Marxism. As Christopher  
 4 Dawson points out, I think correctly, conflict of classes doesn't lead to the canonization of some  
 5 one class that becomes the model of all perfection, the center of all virtue, and so on. You may  
 6 have the feudal nobility in the Middle Ages and the bourgeoisie from the gradual development of  
 7 commercialism and banking, and the working man in another age. The people that deliver the  
 8 mail in Canada are getting seven or eight dollars an hour. They are out-classing all sorts of  
 9 people. Their supervisors don't get that much, as what they got out of the latest strike. So you  
 10 can say that it is the age of the working man at the present time, but the pendulum will keep on  
 11 swinging as far as any analysis of history based on conflict and classes, unless you introduce an  
 12 eschatological element that has nothing to do with the theory of history, and that's what Marx  
 13 did.

14 The object of Christian hope is *bonum futurum arduum*, something good. It is not a  
 15 present or a past good, it is something in the future, *futurum*, and it is *arduum*, hard to get. You  
 16 don't get there just by sitting down and keeping your hands folded. What is its function? Well, it  
 17 enables you to overcome present difficulties. One speaks of psychological, economic, and social  
 18 determinisms of all sorts, and they become really deterministic when people give up. Hope helps  
 19 people not to give up too soon; it keeps people at it, either in the attainment of eternal life or in  
 20 getting things done in this life. Browning in one of his poems says, I think, 'God is in his heaven,  
 21 and all is right with the world.' The attitude today seems to be, Well, all is not right with the  
 22 world, therefore God is not in his heaven. The function of hope is to put God back in his heaven,  
 23 to realize that he is still there and that things are not really as bad as they might be. If the present  
 24 is miserable, well, hope makes you think of something else and not merely say what a terrible  
 25 time I am having. Or the old maxim, You're lucky to be alive: tell him that.

26  
 27 **Question:** Recently you have spoken of a fifth level of human intentional consciousness,  
 28 whereby a plurality of self-transcending individuals achieve a higher integration in a community  
 29 of love. Please expand on this.

30  
 31 **Lonergan:** There is very little to expand on this. Everyone knows what it means. Getting there is  
 32 another thing. But the constitution of the subject is a matter of self-transcendence. You are  
 33 unconscious when you are in a coma or a deep sleep, a dreamless sleep. When you start to  
 34 dream, consciousness emerges, but it is fragmentary; it is symbolic. You wake up, and you are in  
 35 the real world. But if you are merely gaping and understanding nothing, you are not very far in.  
 36 And so you have another level of asking questions and coming to understand. There is the  
 37 understanding that people can have from myth and magic and so on, but arriving at the truth is a  
 38 further step of being reasonable, liberating oneself from astrology, alchemy, legend, and so on  
 39 and so forth. And responsible. And this is all a matter of immanent development of the subject.  
 40 But even before you're born you are not all by yourself, and all during your life. Robinson  
 41 Crusoe is a real abstraction. And if he really is all alone, his history does not go beyond himself.  
 42 There is living with others and being with others. The whole development of humanity is in  
 43 terms of common meaning. Not just my meaning, attention to my experience, development of  
 44 my understanding, and so on. Common meaning is the fruit of a common field of experience,  
 45 and if you are not in that common field you get out of touch. There's common understanding,

1 and if you have not got that common understanding, well, you are a stranger, or worse a  
 2 foreigner, you have a different style of common sense, and so on. Common judgments, what one  
 3 man thinks is true another man thinks is false, well, they are not going to be able to do very much  
 4 about anything, insofar as those judgments are relevant to what they do. Common values,  
 5 common projects, and you can have a common enterprise, and if you don't [have common  
 6 values], you will be working at cross-purposes. The highest form of this is love as opposed to  
 7 hate. It is a hard saying, 'Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, love them that  
 8 persecute you,' and so on. There are all kinds of things in the New Testament expanding on this.

9  
 10 **Question:** In what sense could intellectual conversion sublate moral conversion?

11  
 12 **Lonergan:** Not in a proper sense. In the proper sense, sublation refers to the constitution of the  
 13 subject. Conversion is concerned with the development of the subject. The constitution of the  
 14 subject is a process from below upwards, if I may use a spatial metaphor which is eliminated by  
 15 talking about sublation. What is sublation? When you distinguish operations of different kinds  
 16 and certain operations with respect to others. You introduce a new principle, and because there is  
 17 a new principle there is a new end. And they complete the previous set of operations that are  
 18 sublated, and sublating operations complete the sublated operations and perfect them and go  
 19 beyond them and give them a new, fuller finality and preserve them as opposed to destroying,  
 20 cramping them, or interfering with them.

21 I see a bug walking across the table, and for me it is just a bug. There is nothing wrong  
 22 with my eyes, but for me it is just a bug. An entomologist looks at it and can tell you a hundred  
 23 things about it, and he will have names for each of the hundred things. I will have to get out a  
 24 dictionary and find out what the names mean. The intellectual development, even if it is just a  
 25 matter of elementary classification, enables you to see what otherwise you don't see. If you  
 26 haven't got words for it, you don't see it. It's not merely that your language depends upon your  
 27 seeing, but your seeing also depends upon your language. And different languages emphasize  
 28 different aspects of things. It is a very interesting study of words: people who know different  
 29 languages will tell you how the English see this and the French see that and the Italians see that,  
 30 and so on, and their words are all built on it. Now that is the process of sublation. Understanding,  
 31 so far from interfering with sense, perfects it. And judgment, so far from interfering with  
 32 understanding, prunes off the overgrowth of myth and magic and astrology and alchemy, and  
 33 God knows what. Deliberation and evaluation and decision take you out of the ivory tower, have  
 34 you doing something, and so on. Each successive level sublates previous levels. And when you  
 35 say, What do you mean by level, and higher and lower levels? I mean what is defined by  
 36 sublation, the set of words I use in sublation.

37 Now, in the perfection of the subject ordinarily religious conversion precedes moral  
 38 conversion, and moral conversion precedes intellectual conversion. The Christian religion got on  
 39 to intellectual conversion – well, it only started to get on to it – after the Council of Nicea, and it  
 40 took them fifty years of scwabbling, merely to begin to digest that, without particularly grasping  
 41 what it meant. And it is still a bone in the throat for a lot of people today. Intellectual conversion  
 42 can come rather late, if at all. People can be religious without their morality having developed  
 43 very far yet. They developed their morality starting off from their religion and under religious  
 44 impulses, and their morality refines due to religions influence. And once they become religious

1 and moral, they have a chance of getting on to intellectual conversion, or a need for it, insofar as  
2 a religion moves into differentiated consciousness.

3 So if you speak of sublation in terms of the development of the subject, the perfection of  
4 the subject, you are using it in a looser sense than when you are using it properly, a sense in  
5 which it can be defined not simply as completing something, perfecting something, but the  
6 constitution of a subject which is the fundamental sense in which I use the word 'sublation.'  
7 Hegel's *Aufhebung* is another question into which I could not venture to go.

8  
9 **Question:** Please comment on the suggestion that concretely the self-appropriation of one's  
10 possible immortality is a condition that must be fulfilled if one is to be intellectually converted.

11  
12 **Lonergan:** Well, first of all, be very skeptical when someone says 'must' or 'can't.' That goes  
13 back to the good old days when people thought they were knowing something when they had  
14 concepts. Because the agent intellect took the thing and imprinted it on the intellect, and from  
15 that you got a concept, and you had concepts that way. There was no possibility of your  
16 knowledge ever developing; you were right, right from the start. People might get mixed up  
17 about their concepts and so on, and there would be a lot of arguing about who has the right  
18 concept. But the idea that concepts weren't the basis of eternal truths right from the start had not  
19 occurred. That is a notion that has been destroyed by the history of ideas. So drop that 'must.'

20 You know something is possible if it is a fact. *Ab esse ad posse valet illatio*: you can infer  
21 possibilities from matters of fact. If I'm sitting here, then it is possible for me to be sitting here,  
22 and so on. It isn't saying much when one says what is possible, when you know what possible  
23 means. The impossible, well, if you know all possible facts – if you don't, well, you are really  
24 hard up to prove that something is impossible. And necessity is pretty well the same thing, not  
25 quite.

26 What is intellectual conversion, and what has immortality to do with it? Well, intellectual  
27 conversion is the terrific discovery that it is very important for me to get into my head, right in  
28 between the ears, that the really real is not exhaustively indicated by the six directions: right and  
29 left; front and behind; above and below. That is the basis of the whole of mythic consciousness.  
30 Thomas speaks of the three degrees of abstraction, and the third is *separatio*. What is *separatio*?  
31 It is the division of being into material and immaterial, and until you get that division you are  
32 still in mythic consciousness, or as Voegelin calls it, compact consciousness. As Tertullian said,  
33 'If it isn't a body, it isn't real.' Secondly, that knowing is not essentially a matter of taking a  
34 good look, and the meaning of objectivity is not seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing  
35 what is not there. Intellectual conversion is to move out of that set of assumptions, which follow  
36 inevitably from one's whole development in the first six months of one's life, or up to the time  
37 when one begins to talk, to talk about things that aren't present. There is a shift gradually starting  
38 when one starts to talk. Insensibly he or she is using an entirely different set of criteria than in  
39 that earlier stage, and using them perfectly, without any difficulty. Difficulties start from the time  
40 when someone puts the philosophic question, What do you mean by reality? Then you have  
41 infantile regression. So that is what intellectual conversion is. And the relevance of a grasp of the  
42 fact that I'm immortal, if you mean the immortality of the soul as distinct from the resurrection  
43 of the body, is identifying your own reality with something outside this universe of reality  
44 divided by right and left, up and down, front and behind. It includes another realm in which my  
45 immortal soul would be real.

**Question:** How is the liberation of understanding *from* imagination related to the liberation of understanding *by* imagination?

**Lonergan:** There are two stages in the development of understanding. The liberation *by* imagination is liberation from the here and now. If your understanding is limited to what is present to you at any given time and place, you are not going to understand an awful lot, because understanding constructs a universe, a world. Man's being is being in the world, and he has to construct his world. The fundamental problem in underdeveloped cultures is, How do you form an apprehension of the world? Cassirer narrates from anthropologists who discovered a tribe that felt sure that such exalted beings as lions and tigers and elephants certainly would have enough sense to live in villages the way they did; they had never seen a village of lions and tigers, but they knew that these beings far superior to them must live in villages too; they would have enough sense to do that. Man constructs his world by completing what is given here and now, by serializing, by generalizing, by putting things together. That is all liberation by imagination; you imagine much more than you see.

Liberation *from* imagination is when you move on to systematic knowledge. The elements of a system are not imaginable because the elements are reached as terms in empirically established relations, which relate things not to our senses but to one another. The description of hydrogen is something in terms of a colorless, imperceptible gas, all its sensible qualities or lack of them. But its definition is in terms of the periodic table, and you have to understand the periodic table to understand what is meant by hydrogen; and the periodic table is a set of relations, things defined by their relations, and so on for all systematic knowledge. Socrates puzzled the Athenians over definitions of the various virtues: courage, fortitude, temperance, and so on. And Aristotle defined them. Why could Aristotle do what none of the contemporaries of Socrates could do? Because he introduced a system. The notion of habit: he gave all the meanings of the word 'habit' in Greek, and picked out the meaning he wanted. Then he distinguished between the entitative and the operative habit, the entitative habit like health and beauty and grace and so on, and the operative habit, that by which you get something done, and then the good and bad operative habits, and the good ones are virtues and the bad ones are vices. And the differences between the virtues and the vices – well, the virtue is in the mean; and then the different cases that grew into a book full of virtues and for a long time the development in the moral life was the matter of acquiring all these habits which were virtuous and getting rid of the habits that were vices, It isn't thought at the moment to be too good psychologically at least as a program. But anyway, liberation from imagination is movement to an apprehension of reality in terms of terms and relations that are not imaginable. You can start off forming a notion of masses by trying to lift or move things that are heavy, but you discover that mass is not the same as weight. Weight is  $MG$  and mass is just the  $M$ ; and there are a lot of other things that have an  $M$  in with other terms, and what is mass, well, it is just the  $M$ . Can you imagine it? No, but you can use it in a number of equations, and make sense; and because, of course, with systematic knowledge or serialized knowledge, explanatory knowledge, its elements are not imaginable, people will say 'This is too philosophic, too scientific, or as you say, it is too abstract,' and to say that it is too philosophic or too scientific is OK, if you mean 'I haven't worked at that yet, and I don't intend to get down to it,' but to say that it is abstract is just a mistake. Anything that anyone says contains a certain amount of the indeterminate, and all that's true about the abstract

is that it contains a certain amount of the indeterminate. People are always talking about the concrete. People are never talking about abstractions, no matter how scientific or philosophic they are. They are talking with a certain degree of indeterminacy, and when they are scientific or philosophic they know about it. And if they are neither, they don't know about it, but the indeterminacy is there in either case.

**Question:** Please talk about alienation.

**Lonergan:** There is a book on alienation in Marx by Olleman (I'm not sure of the spelling). The light I got from it was – or at least the dialectic as expounded by this man is a matter of trying to talk about insight without knowing you're doing so. By insight you can define point and line by saying that a straight line is defined by two points, points are that two of which will fix a straight line, and that is known as an implicit definition of point and line. But if you go on from that insight or implicit definition and say that, well, a point is a line, well, you are moving into dialectic.

Alienation is connected with a whole series of different meanings. Objectivation: your percept is an objectivation of your sensation. You can draw something and see either of two things. I can draw a series of lines on the board, and you can see it either looking down at a stairway or looking up at a stairway; it is exactly the same drawing. What you are objectifying is the stairway from above or from below, and what you see is something prior to both and indifferent to both; it can be either. There is objectification of understanding in thought, in language, in formulation, and without that objectification you have bright ideas. And what was your bright idea? I don't know, I forget, it slipped me, it came and it went, just like that. There is objectification of evidence in judgment, what is and what is not so, of value in decisions. All this matter of objectification is the objectification of the subject that objectifies, of his experience, of his understanding, his judgment and responsibility, his freedom. Through that objectification he arrives at a self-appropriation which a Hegelian would call a mediated immediacy. You arrive at yourself and know yourself ever so much better through the objectifications of yourself, in your percepts and formulations and judgments and decisions. You can glide from that into *Entäusserung*, exteriorization. The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the glory of the Father is the Son in all his perfection, and so on. Hegel: The Son is also somebody else which the Father gradually discovers, and the Son too. He can't become himself without discovering that, and you have a case where *Entäusserung* not only becomes exteriorization, but also opposition, alienation. And so we move on to another word, *Entfremdung*, which is closer to our English for alienation, alienating a wife's affection, taking someone away from someone and to somebody else. Or alienation of Church property; you have to get permission from the Holy See, handing over to somebody else. Or the opposite to that alienation in terms of *Entfremdung* is reconciliation, when you move into a Christian context, and so you do speculative systematic theology within philosophy, and you have reconciliation in that sense in Hegelian thinking.

Radical alienation, in French *aliéné*, means somebody out of his mind; he has not all his wits about him. A less radical form of alienation is being unauthentic, not attending to what one experiences, not being intelligent when one is dealing with it, not being reasonable in one's interpretation, and not being responsible in one's decisions, and not being loving in one's dealings with others. There are all these forms of feeling inauthenticity; they are alienating from being authentic man. And so one moves on to bias as a radical form of alienation. If alienation is

not really being a man, then it is being unauthentic. I spoke on existentialism at Boston College in 1957, and at the time an example of the existential was Eisenhower's remark; someone had asked him, Wasn't it risky sending the sixth fleet into the eastern part of the Mediterranean? And Eisenhower said, 'We have to be men.' Well, they all had birth certificates, but there is something more to it than existing in that birth certificate sense, and it is a matter of being authentic, an authentic human being. That's what he meant. Whether he was right is a further question but that meaning exists, and the newsmen all understood it; there was no problem about that. And so if you take bias as a fundamental form of alienation and don't try to take this whole series of different meanings from Hegel and Marx, but something that means the same thing all through and you have different cases of it in scotosis, in individual egoism, in group egoism, and in general bias, as is developed at length in chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight*, and there are further notes on moral impotence in chapter 18, and still more in chapter 20 on the problem of evil.

**Question:** What are some of the main steps that would have to be taken if one is to move from an inadequate notion of efficiency in economics to a more adequate one?

**Lonergan:** I think the fundamental step is the problem of the demand function. Marx, I believe, remarked that Riccardo thought it was going a little too far afield to think about human nature; he was content to think about the shopkeeper. If you think just about the shopkeeper, you arrive at the demand function in a perfectly general sense. The shopkeeper does not buy what he doesn't think he is going to sell, and consequently he has no demand for it. And he isn't going to sell unless other people have a demand for it, and you have a very neat little idea of demand there. It is always individual demand, what the shopkeeper demands and what the people who buy from him demand. Well, they are not buying cookies for somebody else; they are buying them for themselves. But that is not the only type of demand. We have tax bills that keep growing bigger and bigger and bigger and provide more and more lucrative posts for more and more people and an ever larger part of the population is working for the government at all levels, local, regional, state, federal, international, and in all sorts of fields, medical, educational, and so on; and this is all something that everyone is demanding. After all, paying your taxes is a good thing from a certain viewpoint; it is part of non-individual demand, group demand. And if you found an efficient way of handling group demand, without the detours through taxes and politicians and all the people they hire and made it something as efficient as going into a shop and paying your money and take what you choose, you would have an efficient type of economics. According to one of the best statisticians of the time, Colin Clark, the fundamental problem of the contemporary economy is welfare conceived as taking care of everybody instead of taking care of people who simply can't take care of themselves. Cut it out, and our economies would run ever so much better, he feels. And he would not say that unless he was pretty sure of it; he is a highly respected person.

That is one way of moving from an inadequate or unsatisfactory notion of efficiency to a good one. How do you do it? Well, that is another question. I will have a little more to say on that tonight.

**Question:** In your view, how has the expansion of multinational corporations rendered obsolete some of the basic presuppositions of Keynesian economics? **Change of tape to 852B**

**Lonergan:** ... is the ... people engaged in banking, industry, and commerce. The problem is, how do you keep them afloat, how do you keep them members in good standing of the affluent community, despite the fact that they are inefficient? The simple answer is to have more money in circulation than is justified by the Gross National Product, and if there is more to go around, then fewer people are going to go under, even though they are not entitled to it, but there is money going around which no one is entitled to have, balance their books with. One way of doing this is the favorable balance of trade, which started with mercantilism. If you are selling more to other countries than you are buying from them, then you have more and more money in your own country, and there is more gravy to be divided up among the inefficient, and this keeps them from going bankrupt. That isn't the whole story with regard to that, but it is part of the story.

And Keynes's big discovery was, of course, deficit spending. The government picks up so many billions in taxes, and it spends all of them and so many more billions, by way of having a deficit. There are all sorts of different ways of doing that, but the answer in all cases is that the books don't balance. And, of course, doing that sort of thing before Keynes was looked upon as really bad; that's bad government, and running a deficit was a way of being put out of business as far as the government was concerned. But Keynes changed all that, and it smoothed over the problems of the recession of the thirties, and people felt that they finally got the solution to the boom-slump business in the economy. Whenever there is a slump, then we have deficit spending, and that fills up the valley with loose cash, and it works till things start up again, and perhaps then we will pay off some of it, and if not, well, it will just increase the national debt. You can increase that to the point where the total interest payment on the national debt means that everyone has an income, just live off a coupon clipping, and no one will have to do any work, and then things won't work anymore.

Now, this business of deficit spending when you have several, if you had only one country that idea would be all right, but when you have several countries and different countries doing a different amount of deficit spending, and so on, well you get complications arising. The way to avoid those complications is for each government to be able to control its internal finances, the import and export of money. And so you get the *Währungsabkommen* introduced by Brüning before the advent of Hitler, but enforced by Hitler especially with regard to more notable characters who were not obeying prior to Hitler's advent to power. But also in other countries. All during the thirties you couldn't take out of it much worse bring them it. There was very much curtailment of the import and export of currency to enable the government to do this deficit spending. And particularly with the Fascist governments (something inaudible about communist governments). You have to be able to control the import and export of money from a country if you are going to have this deficit spending to work and especially if more than one country is doing it.

Now, the multinational corporation is in several countries at the same time, and its single processes extend over different countries. I believe TV sets are no longer made in the United States, they are made in Taiwan and Hong Kong, etc. It is cheaper to do it there because people will work for a cheaper hourly rate, and they can assemble the little pieces just as well as anybody else, and they do it for far less. Consequently, the multinational corporations will have them made there. I have a small RCA radio that was made in Hong Kong, and it has a far better tone than others of the same price. Riccardo explained years ago that it was to the advantage of England not to try and make wine but to buy their wine from Portugal. It was to the advantage of



the Portuguese not to try to do sheep farming but to buy their wool from England, to the advantage of both countries. And any multinational corporation is on both ends and has both advantages because they buy and sell to themselves, across frontiers. And the buying and selling is just bookwork. All money at the present time is just bookwork, but when you are a multinational corporation, then the bookwork is your own private books. It is not done in public books or in books at a bank. And they buy and sell at whatever prices they please. Since they can buy or sell at as high a price or as low a price as they please, they can transport money without anyone noticing it from one country to another, and if you can transport money from one country to another without anyone noticing it, then no government can control the amount of money that it has or it has not got within the country. And if you can't control then that presupposition of Keynes in economics is lost. And I think that is the answer to your question, Q.E.D.

### Questions from the Floor

**Question:** Yesterday you talked about feelings. I wonder if you would elaborate a bit on the notion. Are feelings in your view basically sensitive, or is there a spiritual dimension of feelings?

**Lonergan:** They are on all levels. A most helpful work is Collingwood's *Principles of Art*, on aesthetic emotions, aesthetic feelings, and the aesthetic feeling is getting things right. The painter is sketching something, and he draws a line and rubs it out and draws another line; he tries a color and is not satisfied, and so he tries another color, and so on, till he gets it right. The mathematician does exactly the same thing, an elegant proof.

**Question:** So then, feelings in that sense are what ...

**Lonergan:** ... phenomenon on the act (?). But that whole dynamism connected with it. That is just one aspect of it, eh? But it illustrates the point that feelings are not just sensitive. Like the old statement when you were introducing people to poetry and appreciation of poetry, 'You must have all your taste in your mouth.'

**Question:** Feelings in that characteristic sense then ground the judgment of value.

**Lonergan:** The apprehension of values. There is an apprehension of values constituted by feelings. There is such a thing as getting people excited. Recently, there was a profile in the *New Yorker* on someone who was a painter and also ran galleries. Someone asked her, why? And she said, 'I find this terribly exciting.'

**Question:** Would you draw a relationship between insight into phantasm and the relationship of evaluation into feelings? Is there a similarity there in the psychic quasi-operator?

**Lonergan:** In a book like *Insight* you start off from mathematics and then you go on to science, and then you go on to common sense, and that approach is a prescinding from feeling, and feeling comes back into the picture in *Method in Theology*. It really comes back into the picture when you have given an account of the cognitional process – experience, understanding, and judging – and when you go on to the level of deciding, you are integrating all your feelings that

1 you have not been paying attention to up to then; you need to take them into account. They  
 2 provide the apprehension. But they are not the full apprehension of value; the full apprehension  
 3 of value comes with your value judgment. Your deliberation: Is it worth while? Your evaluation  
 4 is coming to an act with regard to values that is only potency on the level of feelings. And that  
 5 act is what makes you *you*, it is what gives you a soul that can be saved or damned, and it is at  
 6 that point that history runs its own experiments, just as the individual runs his own experiment of  
 7 what he is to be.

8  
 9 **Question:** So then there is a way in which values don't find their source within feelings.

10  
 11 **Lonergan:** They are revealed in feelings; they get their push from feelings. I said that  
 12 experiencing, understanding, and judging are paper thin if you forget about the feelings. There is  
 13 such a thing as talking about the bloodless ballet of the categories. That is when the feelings are  
 14 not there. But there is something rational about evaluation, responsible and free. It is a higher  
 15 type of rationality, rationality that is personal, a personal dimension to rationality, putting the  
 16 person on the line, putting yourself on the line.

17  
 18 **Question:** In reference to the question when you were clarifying between intellectual conversion  
 19 and moral conversion, I may not have heard correctly, but it seemed to me that you said in the  
 20 normal course of events the religious conversion normally comes first, then the moral, and then  
 21 the intellectual. Are you implying in any sense that these may be necessarily not sufficient for  
 22 the religious and moral conversion for the intellectual conversion?

23  
 24 **Lonergan:** Well, necessary and sufficient, eh? You aren't religious without some use of an  
 25 intellect. However, you can be highly religious although you have not got intellectual  
 26 conversion. Like the whole of Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane*, of a religious man is prior to  
 27 any intellectual conversion because it is all mythical consciousness or compact consciousness.  
 28 But very definitely it is a religious outlook on life, very religious.

29  
 30 **Question:** Can one be intellectually converted prior to religious and moral conversion?

31  
 32 **Lonergan:** Can, Yes. As far as I know; I don't see why not. Is it likely? That is another question.  
 33 How often does it happen? Well it's very rare that it happens at all.