GRATIA OPERANS:

A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of Aquin.

by

Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S. J.

Being a Thesis undertaken under the direction of the Reverend Charles Boyer, S. J., and submitted at the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, towards partial satisfaction of the conditions for the Doctorate in Sacred Theology.

".. trahuntur etiam a Filio, admirabili delectatione et amore veritatis, quae est ipse Filius Dei."

St. Thomas of Aquin.

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PREFACE.

Theologians have perhaps always been aware of the existence of a development in the theory of grace to be found in the writing of St.Thomas Aquinas. But to determine its precise character and significance was hardly possible until a number of related investigations had been undertaken. Among these, most notable are in the field of grace Dr. Artur Landgraf's researches in the whole earlier period,Dr. Johann Schupp's detailed study of Peter Lombard, Dr. Herbert Dom's presentation of the thought of St. Albert the Great. The theory of free will has been most patiently examined from St. Anselm to St.Thomas and an important discovery in the order of St. Thomas's works has been made by Dom Odon Lottin. Finally, though from a negative viewé point, an almost exhaustive study of St.Thomas's theory of motion has been conducted by Fr. Johann Stufler.

By an analysis of the idea of speculative development, the present work systematises the movement in the theory of grace from St. Augustine to St.Thomas, and with the aid of subsidiary investigations, arrives at the conclusion that the problem of the relations of grace and liberty occupied St. Thomas's attention from the De Veritate to the Prima Secundae, that his thought underwent a more or less continuous development, and that his ultimate position is a synthsis in which the Augustinian or psychological theory of the need of grace has an extremely significant role.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to R.P. Suermont, O.P., President of the Commission for the Leonine Edition of St. Thomas, who gave me exceptional information on the MSS. authority for a conjecture in the De Veritate, to Fr. Heinrich Lennerz, S.J., and Fr. Franz Pelster, S.J., both ever ready to answer auestions and give aid

and especially to Fr. Charles Boyer, S.J., who suggested the inquiry, directed me in it, and despite the pressure of many duties found time to read the manuscript.

INTRODUCTION.

A study of St. Thomas's thought on gratia operans offers a threefold interest. It reveals him working into synthesis the speculative theorems discovered by his predecessors. It brings to light the development of his own mind. It suggests an attitude and direction of thought distinct from the one resulting in the impasse of the controversy De Auxiliis.

It is necessary that the study move on the level of this interest, not merely incidentally, but systematically, not merely by way of a foot-note expressing a judgement with wich the reader may be expected to agree in view of the evidence adduced, but by way of a scientific conclusion in which the inductive process of the whole inquiry terminates. The grounds for this assertion are, perhaps, evident. Without the integral unity so postulated, an inquiry would presuppose that the unimportant issues can be settled scientifically while the important ones are merely matters of personal opinion. The effect of such a presupposition is only too well known. In the question treated in these passages it is notorious that for over three centuries theologians have been studying St. Thomas's thought on grace with Molinists uniformly concluding that the medieval doctor would have been a Molinist and Banezians with equal conviction arriving at the conclusion that he was a Banezian. Unless a writer can assign a method that of itself tends to greater objectivity than those hitherto employed, his undertaking may well be regarded as superfluous.

It remains that, though a method which solves the problem is

possible, its use makes extreme demands on a reader. It involves the exposition and use of a theory of the history of theological specula= tion. It rules out the arts of presentation which by emphasis and se= lection make reading easy and fallacy still easier. It postulates a capacity to see in several hundred pages which discuss a great varie= ty of points a single argument with a major premiss in the theory of development and a minor in a number of facts.

While apologising most sincerely for the use of so complicated a procedure, we would point out that we have no alternative. A study of St. Thomas's thought on gratia operans cannot but be historical. An historical study cannot but be inductive. An inductive conclusion, though it may be certain when negative, can for the most part be no more than probable when positive. If that probability is to be, not an opinion, but a scientific conclusion, no other method than the one we have adopted appears available.

Because the inquiry is historical, it does not open with the a priori scheme of current systematic theology with its point of view, its definitions, its interests, and its problems. That would be sim= ply to ask St.Thomas a series of questions which he did not explici= tly consider - had he done so, there would be no need to ask them to= day - and then work out the answers from a consideration of St.Tho= mas's answer to questions which we do not explicitly consider. Paten= tly such a procedure would be fallacious: it would be deducing an ex= trapolation from the thought of St.Thomas before taking the trouble to find out what St. Thomas was really thinking about.

On the other hand, though the inquiry is historical, there is no acceptance of the principles of positivism. To refute such principles lies outside the scope of this introduction. Suffice to say that even historians have intelligence and perform acts of understanding ; perfor= ming them, they necessarily approach questions from a given point of view ; and with equal necessity the limitations of that point of view predetermine the conclusions they reach. From this difficulty positi=

vism offers no escape, for as long as men have intelligence, the problem remains, and were they deprived of intelligence and became mere observers of fact like jelly-fish, then they would be truly positivists but their positivism would not be of any service to them.

It remains that history can follow a middle course, neither projecting into the past the categories of the present, nor pretending that historical inquiry is conducted without a use of human intelligence. That middle course consists in constructing an a priori scheme that is capable of synthetizing any possible set of historical data irrespective of their place and time, just as the science of mathematics constructs a generic scheme capable of synthetizing any possible set of quantitative phenomena. In the present work this generic scheme is attained by an analysis of the idea of a development in speculative theology.

The procedure provides a true middle course. On the one hand, it does not deny, as does positivism, the exigence of the human mind for some scheme or matrix within which data are assembled and given their initial correlation. On the other hand, it does not provide a scheme or matrix that prejudices the objectivity of the inquiry. The quantitative sciences are objective simply because they are given by mathematics an a priori scheme of such generality that there can be no tendency to do violence to the data for the sake of maintaining the scheme. But the same benefit is obtained for the history of speculative theology by an analysis of the idea of its development, for the analysis does yield a general scheme but it does so, not from a consideration of particular historical facts, but solely from a consideration of the nature of human speculation on a given subject.

To express more concretely the nature of this benefit, it will suffice to say that the argument will be able to proceed not from the twentieth century through the sixteenth to the thirteenth but from the fourth century through the twelfth to St. Thomas. So far from allowing the haunting figures of Dominicus Banez and Ludovicus Molina to domina=

te our investigation of St. Thomas's thought, we hope to make it continuously evident that these great theologians wrote three centuries after St. Thomas had ended his brilliant career.

Because the inquiry is historical, it cannot but be inductive. It is possible to construct a priori a general scheme of the historical process because the human mind is always the human mind, But there is no more a possibility of filling in the details of that scheme a priori than there is of predicting the future. Concretely, when commentators tell us that St. Thomas must mean this or that, either they are misusing the word must - which connotes necessity - or else they are claiming to demonstrate in a science that does not proceed by demonstration. It is possible to exclude any given interpretation with certitude, for then one merely has to produce evidence that St. Thomas contradicts it. But the only possible way to demonstrate an interpretation is to enumerate the entire list of speculative possibilities, demonstrate that the enumeration is complete (that is the difficult point), and then exclude all views except one.

For this reason we aim at certitude only in negative conclusions ; in positive ones we are content with probability.

The degree of probability attained will appear from the structure of the induction to be made.

In the first place, all guessing is excluded by the method. The argument does not consist in proposing and then verifying hypotheses. Instead of hypotheses there is used the a priori scheme of speculative development, which is not an hypothesis but a demonstrable conclusion. Consequently, instead of assembling the data and guessing at their significance, the argument employs what strategists term a "pincer" movement. It does so in five distinct stages.

First, it determines the general form of the speculative movement on the nature of grace from St. Augustine to St. Thomas. The analysis of such a movement has revealed that there are seven phases in the normal evolution of an explanation by a compound theorem. It happens that

the explanation of the necessity of grace in the Prima Secundae is a compound theorem and that each of the six earlier phases can easily be verified in earlier works. The procedure is essentially the same as when a mathematician works out an equation from general considerations and then a physicist evaluates the unknown coefficients by objective measurements. Just as the physicist obtains the formula for a natural law, so also by this means do we obtain the basic form of the development that extends from the fifth century to the thirteenth. Thus, without making any hypotheses on the nature of grace, we are able to correlate statements made by different people at different times merely in virtue of the assumption that the people in question were all men, all thinking, and historically inter-dependent in their thought.

Such is the first inductive movement. The second proceeds inversely from the particular to the general ; it consists in assembling the explicit statements on the nature of gratia operans to be found in the writings of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas.

The third and fourth movements are incidental. In simpler sciences than the history of speculative theology, the "pincer" process from both general to particular and from particular to general would suffice to yield the conclusion. But it happens that speculative theology is a very peculiar science. Its problems have to do with the relations between the natural and the supernatural orders. Inasmuch, then, as speculative theology conceives the supernatural on the analogy of the natural, it is necessary to make a special inquiry into St. Thomas's idea of operation. Inasmuch as there is a natural element within the field of the theological problem, it is necessary to make another special inquiry into St. Thomas's theory of the human will, its liberty, the limitations of its liberty, and the general way in which God operates upon it. Both of these inquiries are subsidiary, undertaken not for their own sakes but principally to eliminate misinterpretations of St. Thomas's position and to reveal that his mind is far more resource=

ful than is commonly supposed.

With this work accomplished, it is possible to return to the main problem : the idea of operative grace. As it is only in the Prima secundae that St. Thomas posits an operative grace that is not habitual but actual, and as none of his predecessors had thought things out with such finess and precision as to be able to enter= tain, explicitly and formally, that very complex idea, we are con= tent briefly to treat his position in the Sentences and the De Veri= tate - where operative grace is habitual grace - and concentrate our attention on the well-known 1a 2ae., q. 111, a.2.

Throughout the study of St. Thomas strict attention is paid to the chronological order of his work, and our conclusions are drawn mainly from the works whose sequence is known, namely, the Commentary on the Sentences, the De Veritate, the Contra Gentiles, the De Poten= tia, the Pars Prima, the Quodlibetum Primum, the De Malo and the Pri= ma Secundae. The Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and the Com= mentaries on Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Peri Hermeneias, form an extremely useful subsidiary source ; I do not make use of them in establishing the line of development of thought on particular questions, but as far as their content goes, they appear to be contem= porary with the Pars Prima. As is plain, the degree of importance to be attached to the chronological sequence varies in almost every question that is raised. It is paramount with respect to the theory of grace, which is well-known to have developed(1). The same is true with res=

(1) The existence of a development in St.Thomas's thought on grace is explicitly affirmed by Capreolus (2dist.28,q.1,a.3,$4, in fine) Did. Deza Hispalensis(2 dist.28,q.1,a.3,not.1,in fine),Cajetan (In 1m 2ae., q.109,a.6),Dominious Soto(De nat.et grat.,lib.2,cap.3.).The pertinent remarks they make are quoted by Lange,De Gratia,pp.91 (note 2),146 (note 1).

pect to the theory of free will. On the other hand, St. Thomas's theory of divine foreknowledge is always the same, his theory of pre= motion is always the same in itself, though naturally it varies with the variation in the theory of the will. Finally, with regard to opi= nions which St. Thomas never held, there is no need to bother at all about the sequence of his writings.

So much then for the nature of the inquiry before us. It may be well to add a statement of what we do not propose to do.

We are not engaged in proposing a theory in speculative theology. We are giving an account of someone else's theories. And in that task we are not concerned with the implications of his position, the ulte= rior development of his position, or even the defence of his position. We ask what he said, why he said it and what he meant in saying it.

Confined to the history of theological speculation, per se the inquiry is confined to the thought of a single writer. Discussion of anyone else's views or opinions is purely incidental. Thus, earlier writers are considered because of the influence they would exert on St. Thomas whether directly or indirectly. Later writers are considered inasmuch as their views provide a clear formulation either of what St. Thomas meant or of what he certainly did not mean. As the earlier wri= ters are helpful because of their influence on St. Thomas, so the la= ter writers must be considered because of their influence on the rea= der. For this reason it has seemed unnecessary to attempt any exposi= sion of later opinions: for if the reader has been influenced by them, he is already acquainted with them ; if he has not been influenced by them, then he will find it simpler to grasp St. Thomas's thought by direct study.

Concerned solely with an account of the thought of a single wri= ter, we are concerned solely with that thought as speculative. Dogmatic truths are one thing ; their speculative correlation and unification is quite another. A perfect expression of dogmatic truth, as when a child

repeats his catechism, or an eleventh century theologian recites the creed, is no evidence of a speculative position. On the other hand, speculative deficiency is no proof of heterodoxy. The two are really distinct, and this work presupposes that distinction. Moreover, the two are disparate, so that no specialised inquiry can possibly deal with both at the same time. Hence when we speak of speculative deve= lopment, we do not mean the development of dogma : as far as our argu= ment goes there need be no dogmatic development whatever from St.Paul to the Council of Trent ; and the reason why there is no such need, is that speculative development and dogmatic development are quite dif= ferent ; for instance, there can be speculative decline, as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ; but I do not believe one can speak of dogmatic decline within the Church.

This distinction is, of course, of primary importance. The rea= son why certain writers are able to "demonstrate" that St.Thomas in all his work held exactly their views on actual grace, when in point of fact St.Thomas himself did not hold the same viem in all his works, is that they argue from a dogmatic to a speculative continuity. Ex falso sequitur quodlibet.

Finally, confined to the history of the speculation of a single writer with other writers and other questions all exclusded, we are not aiming at writing a manual De Gratia or even De Gratia Operante. We do not propose to offer any systematic treatise or to show how a treatise might be developed from St.Thomas's thought. Thus, we are able to omit entirely the question of the entitative perfection of gratuitous dispositions prior to justification. In a systematic in= quiry on operative grace, that question could not be omitted.But in an historical inquiry one has to limit oneself to what appears to be, not in the forefront of modern speculation, but in the forefront of St.Thomas's thought.

The Form of the Development.

The fundamental problem of the present inquiry is to determine scientifically the unity and coherence of a vast body of historical data. Evidently, a study of St. Thomas's thought in its historical expansion and significance cannot be ojective if undertaken from the view-point of later ideas, problems, and theories. What is required is a point of vantage outside the temporal dislectic, a matrix or system of thought that at once is as pertinent and as indifferent to historical events as is the science of mathematics to quantitative phenomena. For unless such a view-point is attained and maintained, then of necessity the inquiry will reduce to a sterile compilation of uninterpreted facts or else a fallacious projection of current categories into a period in which they did not exist.

With the aim of solving this problem, the present chapter treats four points : the content of speculative theology ; the four elements in speculative theology ; the manner in which these elements combine to give the successive phases of a speculative development ; and, finally, the seven phases in the speculative development extending from St. Augustine to St. Thomas.

This "form" of the development automatically provides a scientific view-point for the rest of the investigation. It eliminates a host of impertinent questions which otherwise would spontaneously be introduced into the inquiry to give it a false bias and encourage a search-too often successful - to find in an author what the author never dreamt of. Apart from this essential negative benefit, it enables one

who lives in a later age to understand those whose thought belongs to almost a different world, and it does so,not by the slow and in= communicable apprehension that comes to the specialist after years of study, but logically through ideas that are defined,arguments that can be tested,and conclusions that need only be verified. Thus, the finer fruits of historical study are taken out of the realm of perso= nal opinion and made part of the common heritage of science.

§1.1. The Content of Speculative Theology.

Speculative theology does not exist in the pure state. The ordina= ry text-book, for instance,contains a variety of very different things. There are series of passages from scripture with here a longer and the= re a shorter exegesis. There are extract from the Fathers and, beside them, bibliographical notices and summaries of the results of patristic study.There are references to and quotations from councils and pontifical pronouncements.Lists and discussions of the opinions of theologians com= bine with an ubiquitous maze of technical terms and with sets of proofs of quite different natures.Finally,dominating and uniting all else is the formidable array of theses,each with its theological censure and its pla ce of importance anywhere between the summit of de <u>fide definita</u> and the the minimum of <u>probabilior</u>.Still,this multiplicity and variety is anything but confusion.The whole has an unity and cohesion more remarkable and less trivial then that of the multiplication table.And it is theological spe= culation,which is not confined to some part but penetrates the whole structure,that has brought to light and formulated this organicity in re= vealed truth.

It is necessary to insist that speculation is not confined to what are termed "proofs from reason" or <u>argumenta convenientiae</u>.

The unity of the treatise, the very idea of a treatise, the attempt to prove, to correlate, the array of these, the technical terms that are to be found in the enuntiation

of the thesis and still more in its definition and explanation, the distingtion of theological censures and of different kinds of argument, all is a fruit of speculation. But though speculation enters everywhere, it is also true that everywhere its role is very subordinate. It provides the technical terms with their definitions ; it does not provide the objects that are defined. It gives the arrangement and order of the subject ; it does not give what is arranged and put into order. It reveals the unity and cohesion ; but it neither creates nor discovers what has the unity and is shown to hang together. It is the work of the human intellect; but what it works upon is the Word of God.

Thus the content of speculative theology is the content of a pure form. It is not something by itself but the intelligible arrangement of something else. It is not systematic theology but the system in systematic theology. For the human mind to grasp truth and make it at once an effective spring and a higher form of action, there must be the process of assimilation : a process of distinguishing and correlating and organising ; of drawing out implications, of discovering their mutual coherence, and of constructing instances into groups and groups into species and species under genera till finally an ultimate unity is attained. The labour of this process is with difficulty repeated in the four years the seminarian has at his disposal. But that labour is negligible when compared with the vast effort that was needed in the first instance, when the men of Europe emerged from the chaos of a broken empire and the distress of barbaric invasion, and gave their leisure to the construction not only of cathedrals of stone but also of the more enduring cathedrals of the mind(2).

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(2) On the manner in which speculative theology was conceived in England in the first half of the thirteenth century and the unmitigated distrust of Books of Sentences some fifty years earlier, see Pelster, Die Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung für die theologische Spekulation des Mittelalters, Scholastik,2 (1927) 250.255

$1.2 Elements in Speculative Theology.

To define speculative theology with greater exactitude, its four elements are now considered; theorems, terms, dialectical positions, and technique.

A. Theorems.

The "theorem" may be defined as the difference between a common notion and a scientific concept.

For example, the common notion of "going faster" and the scientific concept of "acceleration" partly coincide and partly differ. They coincide inasmuch as both apprehend one and the same objective fact. They differ inasmuch as the common notion apprehends no more than the fact, while the scientific concept elaborates it by understanding it. First, "acceleration" generalises "going faster" to include "going more slowly." Second, it submits it to the subtle analysis of the calculus and enriches it with the endless implications of "$d^2 s/dt^2$." Third, it gives it a significant, indeed a fundamental, place in the general theory of natural phenomena.

Thus the "theorem" is the scientific elaboration of a common notion. It denotes, not the notion as elaborated, but simply the elaboration : not "going faster" nor even "going more slowly", but solely the generalisation, the analysis, the enrichment with implication and with significance for a system of thought.

To turn to an example from theology, the term "supernatural" in the writings of St. Thomas is clearly a scientific concept. It is a technical term, and it is used profusely ; it has an exact philosophic definition ; the implications of that definition are worked out and consistently faced ; finally, it has a significance for a system of thought, for in St. Thomas the "supernatural" is fundamental to his whole treatment of the order of grace.

Still, theology did not always posses this scientific concept(3). In Peter Lombard, the "supernatural" is simply a common notion. He does not use the term, though he has about twenty more or less equivalent expressions(4). He fails to note the disproportion between the order of nature and the order of grace, though he does state some related propositions(5). And that this implies a defect in speculative development would seem to be proved from his unsatisfactory solution of an elementary difficulty in connection with the nature of merit(6).

B. Terms.

Terms are an obvious product of speculation.

Words denote aspects of reality that are significant from a given point of view. The analytic processes of speculative thought necessarily, result in a complex transition from the latent to the evident, from the vague to the definite, from the implicit to the explicit, from the naked fact to its scientific elaboration. Parallel to this process and its necessary consequent, there is another process in which old words receive d/more precise meanings and new words are introduced.

To give two examples : "sacrament" is an old word that receidev a precise definition ; "actual grace" is a new term which does not occur even in St. Thomas ; he speaks of the auxilium divinum.

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(3) Cf. Landgraf, Studien zur Erkenntnis des Uebernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik, Scholastik 4 (1929) 1 - 37, 189 - 220, 352 - 389. Deneffe, Geschichte des Wortes "supernaturalis," Zeit. kath. Theol. 46 (1922) 337 - 360.
(4) Cf. Schupp, Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus, pp. 20, 21, Freiburg i. Br. 1932.
(5) ibid., p. 23. (6) ibid., p. 65.

The consequent problem for dogmatic thought is well known : the theologian must ever bear in mind the distinction between the language of dogmatic sources and the language of scientific thought. But it is less clear that historians have attended sufficiently to a similar problem of their own ; not only must they distinguish between the language of the sources and the scientific language of their own day ; they must also take into account the scientific language of the period they are treating.

C. The Dialectical Position.

Scientists have what may be called a "methodological position." They will maintain incompatible theories simultaneously : because of general phenomena, light has to be an undulation ; because of special problems, it is an emission of particles. The basis of this position is that at present the scientist is ignorant of the truth but in the future, as far removed as you please, he will possess the complete explanation of all phenomena.

The "dialectical position" of the theologian is at once more radical and more coherent.

On the one hand, it maintains that different truths of faith-or doctrines of faith and certain conclusions of the human reason - cannot be contradictory. Truth is one and God is truth. Hence, no matter how great the opposition may appear to be, it is always possible to attain the negative coherence of non-contradiction.

On the other hand, it maintains that at no point of time will the human understanding enjoy a full explanation of all doctrines of faith. For ultimately theology deals with mystery, with God in his transcendence. Speculation may construct the terms and theorems apt to correlate and unify dogmatic data ; but the unification it attains cannot

be explanatory in its entirety ; the mind attains a symmetry, but its apex, the ultimate moment and the basis of its intelligibility, stands beyond the human intellect.

Thus the "dialectical position" is the assertion of the negative coherence of non-contradiction but the simultaneous denial of the positive coherence of complete understanding.

D. Technique.

The necessity of a speculative "technique" is three-fold. The whole field of data must be envisaged, or thought is unbalanced. The natural element in problems must be accurately analysed, or thought is vague. Questions must be taken in their proper order, or the conclusion will be no more than the re-emergence of the initial problem in a more acute form.

Philosophia ancilla theologiae : it supplies the necessary breadth of view ; it is the accurate analysis of the natural element in theological problem ; its method is also a method for the systematic treatment of the question of theology(7).

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(7) It is not infrequently implied that theological speculation is a particularly odious vice peculiar to Catholics. What must be meant is not that Catholics speculate while non-Catholics refrain, but that Catholic speculation is systematic work and the result of centuries of collaboration, while the non-Catholic, as he is his own prophet and pope, thinks it a slight matter to be his own theologian as well. Anyone who reflects on religious doctrine enters the field of theological speculation : the question of the child, the difficulties of the adult, the flood of books and articles on the "religious problem", - all are essentially speculative. Reflection and speculation are irrepressible in man. Non-Catholics, so far from attempting to repress these natural tendencies, allow them the free play of tropical vegetation.

It is to be observed that technique not only gives the form but also influences the content of speculative thought. First of all, the philosophic analysis of the natural element in a theological problem (for instance, the analysis of free will in the problem of grace and liberty) obviously determines part of the solution of that problem. In the second place, there is influence by analogy. Nature is a theophany. So also, on a higher mode, is revelation and the economy of the supernatural order. It follows that an analogy exists between the field of philosophy and that of theology, and that philosophic analysis reveals distinctions and relations which may be transposed in some fashion into theological theorems.

This influence does a great deal to explain certain problems in the history of theology. But it will be preferable to consider here, not any actual instance, but a purely fictitious one ; for we wish simply to make an abstract point and so had best avoid the complexity of concrete instance. Let us suppose some speculator at a period prior to the elaboration of the scientific definition and divisions of grace ; let us also suppose that he derived his technique from Platonic thought, in particular, from the Liber de Causis, which may be by Al-farabi. For him, then, motion would be caused by Life, and life by the Absolute Life ; further, he would have some vague distinction between substantia and actio, but this would still be awaiting development into a distinction between substance and accident. Now not only is it most probable that our hypothetical thinker would be likely to conceive grace in terms of life or perhaps intelligence on the analogy of his system of philosophy. What is much more important is that it would not occur to him to ask whether or not grace is an accident in the soul, and, if an accident; whether there are graces entitatively distinct, and, if that is so, whether some of these are habitual gifts and others transient. The whole range of such questions lies entirely outside his field

of vision. Not aware of such distinctions in the natural order, he will not make his first discovery of them in the supernatural. He does not deny them, certainly not. The point is that he simply fails to think of them. A person who has never heard od De Moivre's theorem cannot be accused of the error of rejecting that theorem ; and no matter how exact and familiar his knowledge of Euclid, that is no proof that he would refuse to consider the employment of complex numbers. His position on the point is a pure "futurable:" what would take [redacted] circumstances that do not exist. Similarly with regard to the hypothetical disciple of Al-farabi [redacted] his speculation is defective. But the theological defect, provided it involves no rejection of what is explicit in the dogmatic sources, is the defect not of error but of ignorance or even of nescience(8).

§.1.3. Phases in the Development of Theological Speculation.

The next point is the correlation of the elements : theorems, terms, dialectical positions, technique. As these may be combined in different ways and as some combinations are naturally prior to others, the result of this correlation is a succession of different phases.

The term "phases" is used in an analogous sense. Phases in development are not functions of the variable "time," like the phases of the moon, but complex functions of two principal variables, "theorems" and "technique." Accordingly, what we hope to establish is not any a priori form of history but mere sets of abstract categories that have a special reference to the historical process.

It will be well at once to summarise what follows.

First is outlined the PRELIMINARY PHASE. It is collection and classification of dogmatic data relative to speculative problems. Such

(8) On the distinction, cp. De Malo, q.3, a.7.

collection and classification is found, relative to particular questions in the controversial writings of the Fathers, relative to all questions in a Book of Sentences.

Second are contrasted the INITIAL AND FINAL DIALECTICAL POSITIONS. Theological speculation never explains mysteries, but it does advance from an initial position, in which the mystery is not distinguished from adjacent merely philosophic problems and the connection between the different mysteries is not defined, towards a final position in which the pure element of mystery stands in isolation from all else.

Third are studied the INTERMEDIATE PHASES. These are of two kinds: either the speculative development arises from external influences or it arises from the attainment of internal coherence.

If development arises from external influences, it sets up INTERMEDIATE PHASES FROM DEVELOPING TECHNIQUE. Such developments are of three kinds : first developments in philosophy itself, such as the substitution of Aristotelian thought for Platonic ; second, philosophic clarification of the natural element in the dialectical positions, for instance, coherently maintaining a philosophic definition of human liberty and not defining liberty as the capacity to do good when one has grace ; third, the introduction of philosophic analogies into the theological field, for instance, affirming the grace of justification to be habitual.

If on the other hand development arises from the speculative attainment of internal coherence, it sets up INTERMEDIATE PHASES FROM DEVELOPING THEOREMS. Thus, in the simplest case of any complexity, namely the correlation of two theorems related as species and genus, there are no less than seven phases.

§. 1.31. The Preliminary Phase.

Since speculative theology is the systematic element in the presentation of dogmatic truths, its preliminary phase will consist in the first movements towards an explanatory unification of the data to be

found in the dogmatic sources.

Thus, a commentary on holy scripture is, of its nature, a pre-speculative work. Such were the commentaries written by the Fathers, the medieval Glossa(9), St. Thomas's Catena aurea. The same is true of St. Thomas's commentaries on St. Paul which rether make use of speculative knowledge than raise speculative questions.

On the other hand, the controversial works of the Fathers and the medieval Books of Sentences evidently constitute an initial phase in speculative thought. The Fathers collect numerous passages from scripture to bear on a single point : for instance, St. Augustine weaves together an array of texts on grace in vigourous polemic against the Pelagians. Similarly a Book of Sentenses collects and classifies dogmatic data in their relation to series of speculative questions In neither case is an explanatory unification of the data the deliberate object of the work. In both cases there is a manifest preparation for the pure speculative effort : for one cannot speculate without having something to speculate about.

This would seem to be the reason why innumerable speculative theologians wrote commentaries on the sentences of Peter Lombard.

In the first place his work was eminently suited to be the basis of speculative thought. He belonged to the reaction against the excesses of Peter Abaelard. He wrote to refute the heretical tendences of his day. But his refutation was not by argument but by appeal to authority : he proposed to present the teachings of the Fathers adding but little of his own, to oppose the heretical placitum, the satisfaction of the understanding, with the verum of dogmatic truth. And to this avowed posi=

(9) On the composition of the Glossa, see B.Smalley,Gilbertus Universalis, Bishop of London (1128-34), and the problem of the "Glossa Ordinaria." Rech. theol. anc. med.,7 (1935) 235-262 ; 8 (1936) 24 -60.

tive tendency he adds the advantage of a classified collection of data(9).

In an article already mentioned Fr. Pelster has drawn attention to this significance of Books of Sentences. So far from putting an end to the placita of speculation, Peter Lombard seems simply to have provided speculation with a solid basis : the scandalised Prior at Worcester attributes the evil spirit of his day to the similar Sentences of Peter of Poitiers ; later Richard Fishacre tells his pupils at Oxford that modern masters teach only moral theology directly from scripture; the discussion of dogmatic questions is based on a Book of Sentenses (10).

A final point in this connection is the loose relation between the Book of Sentenses and its later commentaries. Fr. Pelster generalises : Je weiter man sich von der Zeit des Lombarden entfernte, um so loser wurde die Verbindung zwischen seinem Text und der behandelten Frage. Immer aber bis zum 16. Jahrhundert blieb diese materielle Verbindung

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(9) On the general character of Peter Lombard's work, see Schupp, op. cit.,pp.289-298. On the purpose of his Sentences, see Peter's prologue. Noteworthy are the remarks : "sicubi parum vox nostra insonuit, non a paternis discessit limitibus" and "non debet hic labor... videri superfluus, cum multis... sit necessarius, brevi volumine complicans Patrum sententias, appositis eorum testimoniis, ut non sit necesse quaerenti librorum numerositatem evolvere, cui brevitas collecta quod quaeritur offert sine labore."

(10) See Pelster, Die Bedeutung der Sentenzenvorlesung, Schol. 2 (1927) 250 - 254. Note that Peter of Poitiers' Sentences are based on the Lombard's, ibid. p. 251. The passage from Richard Fishacre reads : Verumptamen tantum altera pars sc. de moribus instruendis a magistris modernis, cum leguntur sancti libri, docetur ; alia tamquam difficilior disputacioni reservatur. Hæc autem pars difficilior de canone sanctarum scripturarum excerpta in isto libro, qui sentenciarum dicitur, ponitur. ibid. p. 255.

zwischen Sentenzenvorlesung und theologischer Spekulation bestehen(11). The point that concerns us is the fact of development which imposes this ever looser connection between Sentences and Commentary. To take the example of operative grace, Peter Lombard makes it the fundamental and practically the sole topic of the 26th distinction of his second book ; St. Thomas has six articles on this distinction, but operative grace does not enter into consideration until the fifth article ; the development between Peter and St. Thomas had raised four prior questions that had to be settled before the operative character of grace could be considered.

§. 1.32 Initial and Final Dialectical Positions.

Theorems develop, terms change, technique increases, but the dialectical position always remains. Thus it is this position that is the constant element and, as it were, constitutes the identity of any particular development in speculative theology. None the less, there is a difference between the initial and the final dialectical position.

Initially there is simply the affirmation of two apparently opposed truths. Grace is necessary ; but the will is also free. Scripture asserts both ; scripture is the Word of God ; therefore, both are true.

On the other hand, the final dialectical position by the use of technique and the development of theorems has eliminated all but the essence of the mystery. It leaves to faith not human problems, nor the human element in religious problems, but the pure formulation of the point that cannot be encompassed by the human understanding. Before appealing to the dialectical position, it settles the prior questions. Grace is

(11) ibid., p. 252.

necessary : but what is grace, what are its divisions, what is the mode of its action, what is its efficacy, what is the difference between this efficacy and the certitude of divine providence, the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, the irresistibility of divine will ? And the will of man is free : but what is the will, what is its act, what are the conditions and the causes of that act, what precisely is freedom, what are the limitations of freedom, what is the connection between the limitations of human freedom and the necessity of grace ? If the problem is a mystery in the strictest sense of the term, as is the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, then, even after all these questions have been satisfatorily settled, it will still be necessary to frame the conclusion in the dialectical position. But there is a manifest difference between this final dialectical position and the initial position that simply asserts the compatibility of grace and free will.

§. 1.33. Intermediate Phases from Developing Technique.

One cause of the transition from the initial to the final dialectical position is philosophic development. It will have this influence partly because it provides the analogous basis for theorems and partly because it defines the natural element in the initial dialectical position. But before treating these two points, it will be well to say something on philosophic development itself.

A. The Development of Philosophy.

A distinction has to be drawn between the endless variety of philosophic shools that succeed one another in ever growing confusion and, on the other hand, the development of the philosophy that is the philosophia perennis.

Philosophy as philosophia perennis is man's apprehension of the eternal and immutable. Like all limited being, it is potentiality and achievement, dunamis and energeia, potency and act. Its potency is the

love of wisdom : it is detachment, orientation, inspiration. Its act is the triumph of the reason systematically revealing the light of the eternal in the light of common day. For all time the potency is represented by Plato, the act by Aristotle. And so from the nature of the case the development of the philosophia perennis is rectilinear ; it can embrace differences as wide as those that exist between the pagan from Stagira and the Christian saint of Aquino ; yet, however great such differences may appear outwardly, it remains that they emerge only to make more systematically certain and secure a position that is unique because it is central.

The existence of a philosophia perennis is not refuted but confirmed by the flux of the philosophies. For it is only too apparent that if philosophy's goal is the eternal, still philosophers are forever succumbing to the spirit of their age, becoming part of its limited culture, turning their thoughts to its crises and problems. This influence of the Platonic "unreal" is the supreme obstacle both to philosophic achievement and to the conservation of what has been achieved ; nor does the emergence of the perfect thinker suffice ; the environment also must ring true, and the time must be propitious. It needed an Athens that could boast in the tone of the Funeral Oration, if Socrates was to discuss instead of simply teaching as did Gautama, if Plato was to perpetuate a vision of an ideal polity instead of crystallizing a code of manners as did Confucius. On the other hand the shadow of infelicity hung too heavily over the Empire for thinkers to be balanced ; they were too much of the world and Epicureans, or too much against it and Stoics, or too eager to escape from it and Neo-Platonists. As for the febrile modern mind demanding perpetual change yet horrified by the monsters it begets, let Touchstone ask, "Shepherd, hast thou any philosophy ?".

S. 1.33.B.

B. Developing Technique and the Dialectical Position.

The essential moment in the transition from the initial to the final dialectical position is the emergence of a systematic distinction between reason and faith. It is to be observed, however, that this distinction must not only be enuntiated in general but also applied to each particular problem. The only way to make clear the difficulty of such an application is to give an example. We consider the definition of human liberty.

The condemnation of Peter Abaelard' proposition, Quod liberum arbitrium per se sufficit ad aliquod bonum (12), quite possibly led to the peculiar definition of liberty to be found in Peter Lombard(13):

Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis qua bonum, gratia assistente, eligitur, vel malum eadem desistente(14). Plainly this is to assert the dialectical position on the relation between grace and liberty at the very moment one defines liberty : it makes it impossible to find any opposition between grace and liberty as defined (15), though it leaves it very doubtful that the definition is correct (16).

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(12) D-B 373
(13) Dom Lottin has shown that this definition appeared for the first time after the Council of Sens (1140) in the Sententiae Divinitatis. See Rev. Neo-Schol.Phil.,28 (1926), Reprint pp. 3-10. Cp.Schupp,p.107 n.6.
(14) S.2,d. 24, c. 3.
(15) This device is the essence of the argument in St. Anselm's and St. Bernard's treatment of the problem. See PL 158, 491 ff. and 182, 1001 ff. Their dialectical definitions of liberty are at the root of the complexity, variation and unsatisfactoriness described by Dom Lottin, La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S.Anselm jusqu'à S. Thomas d'Aquin. The reader will find the complementary complexity, variation and unsatisfactoriness recounted by Prof. Landgraf, Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscholastik, Zschr. kath. Theol., 55 (1931) 177 - 238, 403 - 437, 562 - 591.
(16) It does not occur to Peter Lombard to exploit the possibilities of such a definition. His interests are not speculative enough for that. He affirms non posse non peccare (S. 2, d. 25, c. 6) and also et peccare et non peccare posse (S. 2, d. 28, fin.) His distinction between libertas a necessitate and libertas a peccato (S. 2, d. 25, c.7 ff.)is wholesome but purely dialectical.(See Schupp,op.cit., pp.105-115.)

In fact, when the Lombard wished to make clear the nature of liberty, he turned to the definition of Boethius(18) and wrote :

> (Liberum arbitrium) philosophi definientes dixerunt liberum de voluntate iudicium, quia potestas ipsa et habilitas voluntatis et rationis... libera est ad utrumlibet, quia libere potest moveri ad hoc vel ad illud(19).

The speculative defect of the position in the Sentences is that this definition cannot be consistently and coherently maintained.

On the other hand, speculative development will consist precisely in making possible the coherent use of a philosophic definition of liberty. The problem is not that we do not know what liberty is, or that we do not know what grace is ; what we do not know is how to reconcile the two. But this third question is not to be confused with the others.

To put the same point in different terms : science and truth are not formally identical. Science is knowledge of a thing in its causes, formal, material, efficient, final. Truth is simply the equation of judgement and the objective field. It follows that all truth is not science, that not any truth can be laid down as a first principle, and that least of all can a theological dialectical position be made the initial premiss of a speculative elaboration.

It is in these intricacies of the distinction between faith and reason, and not merely in the general enuntiation of the distinction, that theology prior to St. Thomas was involved(20).

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(18) III Super lib. Periherm., PL 64, 492.

(19) S. 2, d. 25, c. 1. The definition is developed by St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1.

(20) A detailed discussion of the point cannot be undertaken here. But I believe the reader will find ample and convincing evidence in the works of Dom Lottin and Prof. Landgraf cited in note 15.

C.The Theorem and Developing Technique.

Not only does speculative theology derive from philosophy the cla= rification of the natural or human element in its problem.It also finds in the natural order,as philosophically analysed,the analogies necessary for the scientific conception of purely theological data(21).

We have already given an abstract and hypothetical illustration of the influence philosophy may exercise in this fashion(22).It will be well to consider here a concrete example.For the use of such analogies seems an extremely simple matter.In point of fact there is nothing more compli= cated and difficult than their first emergence.The great discoveries of men are not too numerous,and the greater they are,the more incredibly simple they appear.We are apt to be surprised,not that Columbus thought of sailing west to the Indies,but that no one else did it before him;not that Newton according to the legend,associated the falling apple with the falling moon,but that there could have been intelligent men before him who did not. It will serve then both to enforce a true historical perspec= tive and to introduce the subject of operative grace,if we outline the history of that view that grace is a donum habituale.

There is prima facie a difficulty to this position.Scripture attri= butes the forgiveness of sin and justification to conversion,faith and charity. These seem to be not habits.But infant baptism is immemorial and its reason recognised to be that it opens the gates of heaven.No great reflection or profound thought should seem necessary to arrive at the fol= lowing conclusion;the baptised infant is heir to the kingdom of heaven; the heir to the kingdom is justified; and ac=

(21) Cp.Conc.Vat.,Sess.III,cap.4,DB 1794.
(22) V.sup.,SS.1.2 D, pp.17 + 18

cordingly justification, in its essence, lies not in acts but in the habitual order. But in point of fact, the effect of infant beptism could not be satisfactorily determined by the early scholastics. Though hardly a canonist or a speculative writer failed to raise the question, it remained unsolved until the first half of the thirteenth century(24).

It would be a gross over-simplification to fancy that the whole difficulty was unfamiliarity with the Aristotelian concept of the habit. It is true that this is part of difficulty. But there were two different and far profounder difficulties.

In the first place a through-going scientific attitude was a prerequisite. Many authors were content simply to quote St. Augustine's remark : the baptized infant does not make an act of faith but it does receive the sacrament of faith(25). That, of course, is perfectly true. But redit quaestio, What precisely is it to receive the sacrament of faith ?

In the second place there was the distortion of the speculative field by what we later shall term the "third phase"(26). The idea of the supernatural became a scientifically elaborated concept with Philip the Chancellor. Speculators prior to this development, the key position to the whole theory of grace, were like men at sea without a compass. Lacking a metaphysical frame-work in terms of natura, they naturally tended to understand grace psychologically. Thus sin and especially original sin was conceived as a darkening of the understanding and a weakening of the will(27). Similarly, grace and justification were in the main conceived as the opposite states, the enlightened in=

(24) Landgraf, Busslehre, Zschr.Kath.Theol.,51 (1927) 170
(25) Cp. DB 410, 483. (25) Landgraf, Gnade,Scholastik,3(1928) 40.
(26) Vid. inf. § 1.4E. (27) Landgraf, Gnade, Schol.ibid.,p. 30.

telligence of faith and the comforted will of charity(28).

St. Anselm pushed this psychological interpretation of grace to the extreme limit by defining justice as rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata(29). More than this, he also gave the problem of infant baptism a solution, which,if brilliant and containing an essential element of the truth, none the less tended to postpone indefinitely the true solution. Briefly, his position was this : the infant cannot have justice, for it elicits no act of will ; but this incapacity is sinful before baptism because of Adam's sin ; on the other hand, because baptism removes the culpa, the infant's incapacity becomes excusable(30).

Combining with this false orientation of the issue was the lack of agreement on the nature of a virtue. Peter Lombard gives the two opinions : first, that the virtue is a habit and not an act ; second, that the virtue is not a habit but an internal as opposed to an external act(31). Though he obviously inclines to the former view, he does not venture to decide the question(32). In fact, there seem to

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(28) Landgraf, Gnade, pp. 31 - 38.
(29) Cp. De Veritate, c. 12, PL 158, 480 ss.; De Conceptu Virginali, c. 4, PL 158,436 ss. It is worth noting the parallel definition of free will : liberum arbitrium non esse aliud arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem, De Libero Arbitrio, c., 3, PL 158, 494.
(30) De Conceptu Virginali, c.29,PL 158, 462 ss. See for a fuller presentation together with an account of the influence of this position ; Landgraf, Der Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des hl. Anselm von Canterbury und seine Bedeutung für die Theologie der Frühscholastik, Div. Thom.(Freib) 5 (1927) 155 - 177.
(31) S. 2, d. 27.
(32) ibid.

have been a good number of theologians who assumed or maintained that a virtue which is not an act is inconceivable(33); and this perhaps, led to the explicit distinction between the remission of sins and the infusion of grace(34).

Finally it is to be observed that when obscurity was ended by the influence of the manifestly heretical demand of the Waldenses and Catharri for the re-baptism of adults baptised in infancy and, as well, by the Aristotelian concept of the habitual state(35), even then the solution did not consist in an immediate identification of grace with justification. Philip the Chancellor distinguished four elements in our participation of the life of Christ : vivificari which is grace and regards the soul itself ; illuminari which is faith and regards the intellect ; uniri which is charity and regards the will ; rectificari which is justice and regards the whole man(36). This influence of the psychological analysis of the nature of sin and grace is clearly to be found in St. Thomas's analysis of the process of justification(37).

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(33) Instances are Abaelard and Peter of Capua. See Landgraf, Gerechtigkeitsbegriff, loc.cit.,p.169;Busslehre,loc.cit.,p.186.

(34) Thus, Magister Martinus: Spiritus sanctus datur dupliciter: aut quantum ad peccati remissionem prout datur parvulis; aut quantum ad virtutum collationem prout datur adultis. Cited from Landgraf, Gnade, Scholastik, 3 (1928) 46. See the following pages.
It is to be noted that in the letter Maiores Ecclesiae causas, written at the end of 1201, Pope Innocent III in citing the solutions of the theologians to the problem of infant baptism gives in first place the view that distinguishes between grace and the remission of sin. The view that the virtues are infused quoad habitum non quoad usum appears in second place and is introduced with nonnullis vero dicentibus. See D - B 410.

(35) Landgraf; Gnade, Schol. 3 (1928) pp. 42, 64.

(36) Ibid., p. 61. Cp. pp. 56 - 62.

(37) e.g., 1a 2ae., q. 113.

To conclude we may cite the decision given in connection with the errors of Petrus Ioannes Olivi:

> Verum quia quantum ad effectum baptismi in parvulis reperi= untur doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias habuisse, quibusdam ex ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti sed gratiam non conferri, aliis econtra assentibus quod et culpa iisdem in baptismo remittitur, et vir= tutes et informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum etsi non pro il= lo tempore quoad usum : Nos autem attendentes generalem effica= ciam mortis Christi, quae per baptismum applicatur pariter omni= bus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in baptismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tamquam probabiliorem et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante conci= lio diximus eligendam(38).

§. 1.34. Intermediate Phases from Developing Theorems.

In the last section we considered the relations between philoso= phy and theological speculation. Here are to be considered the inter-relation of different theorems within the theological field itself. We begin with a few distinctions and then enumerate typical phases of a speculative development. With this the analysis of a speculative de= velopment will be complete.

A. The Set of Cognate Theorems.

One scientific concept is not a science. The analysis of motion, for instance, calls for the following : distance, time, velocity, ac= celeration, mass, momentum, energy. Together they may be said to con= stitute a set of cognate theorems. Similarly, any object of scienti= fic thought will require more than one theorem for a full account of

(38) DB 483. Cp. DB 410.

it. And, to give an example that we propose to use throughout the next section, the theory of the necessity of grace is based on two theorems: first, the theorem of the supernatural ; second, the theorem of the different states of man. One must have grace both because eternal life is a supernatural state and because fallen man cannot avoid sin without grace : no small part of the difficulties occasioned by Pelagianism arises from the fact that it is not one error but two ; it denies outright the necessity of grace and so denies both the supernatural character of eternal life and the effects of original sin.

B. The Relation of Cognate Theorems.

In the mathematical sciences the relation of different theorems is simply the difference of their elements : if distance is "s" and time "t" and mass "m", then velocity is "ds/dt", acceleration "d^2s/dt^2," momentum is "m.ds/dt," and energy $\int$m.v.dv, where "v" is "ds/dt."

In a purely rational science there is only the combination of genus and species. In the instance of the necessity of grace, the necessity from the supernatural end is generic, for it regards man simply as a creature ; on the other hand, the various states of man are specifically different initial positions with regard to the attainment of eternal life.

C. The Order of the Development of the Theorems.

The general law is perfectly simple. The mind begins from the particular and works to what is most general ; it then returns from the most general through the specific differences to the particular.

But that is just the general law. For what we are dealing with is not the discovery of some one theorem but the discovery of a set of cognate theorems.

Now each theorem in the set has four distinct elements : first, analysis ; second, generalisation ; third, unfolding of implication; fourth, systematic significance.

On the other hand, while analysis and generalisation regard the single theorems, systematic significance regards not each single theorem in itself but each one in its relations to all the others. Further, while the unfolding of implication logically follows from the analysis, in point of fact it is extremely difficult for the implications to be explicitly grasped before the systematic significance has been determined. The reason may be that implications are endless and only the systematic significance of the theorem will reveal which implications deserve attention.

So much for preliminaries. Let us now ask in what order theorems are discovered and what are the implications of that order.

From the general principle that the mind moves from the particular to the general, it follows that the specific theorem is discovered before the generic.

The implications of this order are as follows :

First, the specific theorem is adverted to and analysed : it is seen to explain something.

Second, the specific theorem is generalised : all parallel differences are considered and co-ordinated.

Third, its implications are worked out and there will be a tendency to give it the systematic significance of alone constituting the solution to the whole problem.

Fourth, the insufficiency of the specific theorem to account for the whole problem leads to the discovery of the generic theorem.

Fifth, the generic theorem is analysed, generalised, has its implications worked out.

Sixth, there is a tendency to make the generic theorem serve as the full solution of the problem. The reason for this is complex : on the one hand the "third phase" resulted in a distortion of the speculative field by attempting to explain everything in terms of the specific theorems ; on the other, the discovery of the generic theorem leads not only its generalisation and to the unfolding of its implications but also to the development of cognate theorems that had been obscured in the third phase.

Seventh, the insufficiency of the generic theorems is adverted to and there follows the re-discovery of the specific theorem in a new setting. This gives the synthesis of generic and specific theo= rems.

If it happens that there is one or more intermediate species, the course of the development is vastly complicated. The principles remain the same.

To illustrate the seven phases is too large a task to be carried on in a corner, and so the reader will find it in the next section. There it will be seen that the speculative movement from St. Augu= stine's De Correptione et Gratia to the Prima Secundae of St. Tho= mas is fundamentally a function of the generic and specific theorems on the necessity of grace.

§ .1.4. General Antecedents of St. Thomas's Doctrine on Operati= ve Grace.

At first sight it appears to the investigator of the thought of St. Thomas's predecessors that operative grace is just a name floa= ting aimlessly on the current of early medieval speculation and now given one meaning, now another entirely different. Closer scrutiny reveals that this would be a very superficial interpretation of the facts, for operative grace is not merely a name floating on the sur= face but also the very shape and inclination of the river-bed hidden beneath. The fundamental data of the necessity of grace and of the

liberty of the will, so unequivocally asserted by St. Augustine, are also the fundamental data of early speculation on the nature of grace, and it is the unresolved problem of their reconciliation that deeply and obscurely yet ever effectively sets the stage and drives forward the movement of thought.

To establish the point, we ask and then answer seven questions suggested by the analysis of a speculative development. St. Thomas explains the need of grace, generically by the theorem of the supernatural, specifically by fallen nature. How precisely was this explaination discovered ?

First, then, is the discovery of the specific theorem. Who first explained some aspect of the necessity of grace by distinguishing between the need of our first parents before the fall and, on the other hand, our need subsequent to the fall ?

Second, there is the generalisation of the specific theorem. Who formulated the doctrine of the different states of man, omitting consideration of natura pure ?

Third, there is the tendency to use the specific theorem as the sole explanation of the need of grace. What historical evidence is there for the existance of such a tendency ? Note that the question does not apply to thinkers such as Baius and Jansenius who explicitly rejected the theorem of the supernatural. It applies to thinkers who tended to positions resembling those of Jansenius, not because they rejected the idea of the supernatural but because they did not grasp its significance in a theory of grace.

Fourth, there is the discovery of the generic theorem. Who first formulated the theorem of the supernatural and for what reason ?

Fifth, there is the generalisation of the generic theorem. What are some instances of this generalisation ?

Sixth, there is the tendency to use the generic theorem alone in solving the whole problem. Who tended to deny a difference between

the different states of man, to everlook the fact of moral impotence?

Seventh, there is the synthesis of generic and specific theorems. Who made that synthesis for the first time ?

Such is our a priori scheme. It may be mistaken, but at least it is something tangible that can be refuted. It is not an intuition, analysed, unproved, asserted. It is not merely a habit of mind prejudicing the issue, but something above the issue that will lead to its solution. We now turn to the facts beginning with the primum quoad nos and working backwards.

A. The Seventh Phase.

The synthesis of the generic and specific theorems on the necessity of grace is to be found in the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas.

> .. sic igitur virtute gratuita, superaddita virtuti naturae, indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale ; sed in statu naturae corruptae quantum ad duo, scilicet, ut sanetur et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operatur, quod est meritorium ; ulterius autem in utroque statu indiget homo auxilio divino ut ab ipso moveatur ad bene agendum(39)

The synthesis could not be clearer or more explicit. But what is the point of mentioning the need of divine providence ?

B. The Sixth Phase.

Prior to the ultimate synthesis there is a tendency to make the generic theorem alone suffice. An article in the De Veritate, parallel to the article just cited, explain why St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae sharply distingushes between the need for grace and the need for providential assistence. For in the earlier article

(39) 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 2.

his thought clearly turns on two points alone : the supernatural and providential assistence. It is too long to cite in its entirety but the essential moment is the following :

> Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est supra naturam humanam, constat liberum arbitrium non posse sine gratia ; quia, cum per huiusmodi bonum homo vitam aeternam meretur, constat quod sine gratia homo mereri non potest. Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere.. Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest facere ea sine Deo...(40).

A clearer case of the tendencies to an excessive use of the generic theorem is to be found in the treatment of the problem of moral impotence. This problem has its definitive solution already in the De Veritate(41) but an earlier stage of thought is to be found in St. Thomas's and in St. Albert's commentaries on the Lombard. Both attempt to reduce the non posse non peccare to the sinners' inability to obtain the remission of his sins without grace(42).

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(40) De Ver., q. 24, a.14.It is to be noted that the problem of synthetizing the generic and specific theorems is here complicated by the absence of a clearly formulated category of actual grace. The formulation of the idea of habitual grace has already been described : the discovery that the definition of a habit meant a grace that did not completely satisfy requirements was not immediate ; further, to find the complement to the habit was not easy, for, as we shall see later, St. Thomas had to transform Aristotles's physical theory of motion into a metaphysical theory. Passages that clearly show an absence of the distinction between actual grace and general providence are : De Ver.,q.24,A.15. In 2 dist.28,q.1,a.1-4; in St. Albertus Magnus, Summa de Creaturis, 2a., q.70,a.5; also his Commentary In 2 dist.25,a.6.For St.Bonaventure, see Mitzka, Die Lehre des hl.Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade,Z'schr. kath. Theol., 54 (1930) 27-72, 220-252.
(41) De Ver.,q.24, a.12;cp.1a 2ae., q.109, a.8.
(42) For St. Thomas, see in 2 dist.28,q.1,a.2.St. Albert is similarly in difficulty in 2 dist.25,a.6,and in Summa de Creaturis 2a.,q.70, a.5. Where before the difficulty was complicated by the lack of a clear distinction between general providence and actual grace, here the difficulty is obviously the reconciliation of non posse non peccare

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C. The Fifth Phase.

This phase, the systematic generalisation of the generic theorem, lay in working out the application of the idea of the supernatural. Thus, Alexander of Hales used the idea to solve the otherwise insoluble problem of merit in our first parents(43). St. Albert the Great's development of the theory of sanctifying grace is known(44) and the systematic elaboration of St. Thomas familiar(45).

D. The Fourth Phase.

The discovery of the generic theorem is the emergence of the scientific concept of the supernatural.

Prof. Landgraf has shown that the discovery was the work of Philip the Chancellor and that it arose not from studying the idea of grace, nor from distinguishing the natural and the infused virtues, but from the distinction between natural and meritorious love of God. The existence of the problem had been denied by St. Bernard of Clairvaux and

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with liberty. In his early Summa (the later corrects, see Summa theol., 2a.,q.100,mem.2,3,4) St. Albert insists that the Lombard did not mean to deny libertas de necessitate. He derives his solution from an appeal to St. Augustine, who had said peccatum habendi dura necessitas; this he rightly interprets as regarding the remission of sin, but falsely supposes to cover the whole issue. St.Thomas simply repeats this position in his earliest work: taking it over from his master, he is at first much more downright about it; more brillant, he solves the point definitively in his next work. In this connection is has been pointed out to me by R.P. Bouillard, who is investigating the matter, that the medieval theologians do not seem to cite the second council of Orange. This makes the speculative defect less surprising than it appears at first sight. See also on the question, Lange, De Gratia, pp. 140-151, Herder 1929.

(43) Landgraf,Studien zur Erkenntnis des Ubernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik, Schol.,4 (1929) 1 -38,189-220, 352-389.See p.385.

(44) See for instance,Doms.Die Gnadenlehre des sel.Albertus Magnus, Breslau 1929.

(45) C.Gent.,3: 52, 147-163.

Hugh of St. Victor(46) but was re-established by William of Auxerre who affirmed a natural amor amicitiae erga Deum(47). Philip distiguished natural and rational appetite ; asserted the former to be self-regarding, the latter to tend absolutely to the honestum ; and them sub-distinguished two rational appetites, one following reason, another following faith ; the former of these is dilectio naturalis, the latter is charity(48).

Fore-runners were Praepositinus who had argued that the naturalia were in different category from the gratuita because reason was the highest thing in nature and faith was above reason(49) and Stephen Langton who had seen the connection between gratuitum, gratum faciens and meritum(50). Still neither attained to Philip's idea of an entitative disproportion between nature and grace(51).

E. The Third Phase.

The third phase was the inadequacy of the specific theorem alone: the modern theologian can well understand that speculation on grace without the basic theorem of the supernatural was in hopeless difficulties.. A few of the manifestations of the unsatisfactoriness of the third phase are :

First, the doctrine of merit hangs in mid air without any speculative support. This, of course, in no way interferes with the enun=

(46) Landgraf, loc. cit., p. 374. (47) ibid., p. 377.
(48) ibid., p. 381 – 384.

(49) Landgraf, loc.cit.,p.214. (50) ibid.
(51) ibid., p. 219.

tiation and affirmation of the doctrine ; but it does make the solution of difficulties impossible(52). It is of importance to remember always that the origin of the scientific concept of the supernatural was the problem of merit : this fact explains points in St. Thomas that might otherwise be obscure(53).

Second, there could be no satisfactory distinction between the naturalia and the gratuita : Radulfus Ardens is simply yielding to the logic of the third phase when he states that originally all the virtues were natural but that now they are gratuitous because they were lost by original sin(54). The effect of this specula= tive tendency was not to deny the gratuita but to deny the natura= lia : as late as the early thirteenth century one can find a wri= ter to maintain that without divine charity there are no virtues (55).

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(52) Thus, the Lombard accurately describes the need of grace in our first parents (S.2,d.24,c.1): creation was enough to ena= ble man to avoid sin, but not enough to merit eternal life ; for that another grace besides creation was needed. But he goes wrong when he tries to explain why the avoidance of sin by our first parents in the period prior to the infusion of grace would not be meritorious : he admits we merit when we merely avoid sin, but always that, that is because we have difficulty ; in the state of original innocence there was no difficulty and so no merit. In commenting this passage St. Al= bert cannot understand the Lombard's position ; he was not awa= re of the intervening development (see his In 2 dist.25,a.6). This provides a perfect illustration of misinterpretation due to ignorance of development. For a rich collection of twelfth century positions regarding our first parents,see Landgraf, Helfende Gnade,ZkTh.,55 (1931)403-422.

(53) See for example : 1a 2ae.,q.112,a.2,1m.

(54) Landgraf,Studien des Ubernatürlichen,loc.cit.,p.212.

(55) ibid.,p.191 .

In the same catggory falls Peter Abaelard's disjunction of charity and cupidity and St. Bernard of Clairvaux's assertion that nature in itself is crooked(56).

Third, it was impossible to have a satisfactory definition of grace. Here again this involved no obscuration of the dogmatic fact: universally it is asserted that grace is what is due to God's free gift and not due to man's desert(57). The difficulty was to find so= mething that was not grace in the strict sense of the term(58).

Fourth, we may recall the tendency to a purely psychological in= terpretation of the nature of grace that we illustrated above when treating the emergence of the idea of habitual grace(59).

Fifth, a further consequent of the purely psychological interpre= tation of the nature of grace was the difficulty in holding a clear theory on human liberty. This point has already been illustrated from Peter Lombard(60). But immediately a further point may be made ; be= cause the lack of the scientific concept of the supernatural made a scientific concept of liberty impossible, the emergence of the former concept would release speculation on liberty. Thus we find speculation on the nature of liberty beginning with Philip the Chancellor(61).

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(56) ibid.,p.195 and p.374.See whole section,pp.352-389.
(57) ibid., pp. 9-13.
(58) ibid.,pp. 14 - 28. Cardinal Laborans defined grace in the strict sense (veri nominis) as everything one has at birth or receives afterwards ; he admits then two narrower senses, first, every= thing the elect have at birth or receive afterwards, and second, the virtues of the elect. The exemple should provide a realisa= tion of the difficulty of defining grace in the third phase. It is to be found in Landgraf, ibid.,pp. 20 ff.
(59) Vid.sup.p. 27-61 (60) vid.sup.p.
(61) Cp. Lottin, La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S.Anselm jusqu'à S.Thomas d'Aquin, Saint Maximin 1929. Reprint from Rev.Thom.192 ff. A few citations will emphasize the point : "Le chancelier Philippe a le mérite d'avoir introduit les questions relatives à la nature du libre arbitre.... L'ordonnance de ces trois

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When it is grasped that the nature of liberty was for the first time undergoing systematic development simultaneously with the first extension of the scientific concept of the supernatural, it is not at all surprising that St. Albert and St. Thomas in their early writing find the doctrine of moral impotence too anomalous for assimilation(62). But the full explanation is only had when the formulation of the specific theorem in the second phase is taken into consideration.

F. The Second Phase.

The second phase is the systematic generalisation of the specific theorem: in the example under consideration, it is the systematic generalisation of the difference between our first parents and ourselves in the need for grace. According to Prof. Landgraf(63) Peter Lombard gives the final formulation of the distinction between the four

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questions est voilée dans l'exposé du chancelier. Mais Alexandre de Halès a su les distinguer soigneusement. Et ces mêmes questions seront reprises avec quelques variantes par Albert le Grant, Odon Rigaud et saint Bonaventure... "Alexandre de Halès... Odon Rigaud... s'efforcèent de scruter la raison foncière du libre arbitre, posant ainsi <u>les premiers fondements de la doctrine philosophique de la liberté.</u>"

In other words, speculation on the nature of liberty has its obscure beginning in Philip. The philosophiec basis of liberty is worked out by Alexander of Halès and Odon Rigaldi. After early attempts to harmonise the definition of Boetius, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, and the one attributed to St. Augustine by the Lombard, "saint Bonaventure trouvait, à juste titre, pareil travail assez stérile." The citations are from Lottin, Rev. Thom.,34 (1929) 268,9. The italics (underlined) are our own.

(62) Vid.sup. § 1.4B, note 42.

(63) Helfende Gnade, p. 425, cp. 422 - 437, 562 - 575

states of human liberty(64). That the need for grace is expressed in terms of human liberty is easily understood in a period prior to the theorem of the supernatural.

G. The First Phase.

Alone the first phase remains to be illustrated. It is the emergence of the specific theorem, the first apprehension of the significance of a difference, with regard to the need of grace, between Adam and ourselves. Clearly this should be attributed to St. Augustine. It is easy to select a series of phrases from his speculative De Correptione et Gratia that not only bear on the point but also fore-shadow future development(65). To suppose that this first essay in speculation con=

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(64) S.2,d.25,c. : Et possunt notari in homine quattuor status liberi arbitrii. Ante peccatum enim ad bonum nil imediebat, ad malum nil impellebat... Tunc sine errore ratio indicare et voluntas sine difficultate bonum appetere poterat. Post peccatum vero ante reparationem gratiae, premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur.. potest peccare et non potest non peccare etiam demnmbiliter. Post reparationem vero premitur a concupiscentia et non vincitur.. ut possit peccare propter libertatem et infirmitatem, et possit non peccare ad mortem propter libertatem et gratiam adiuvantem.. Post confirmationem vero.. new vinci poterit nec premi; et tunc habebit non posse peccare.

Two points are to be observed : first, the tendency to conceive grace psychologically, the illumination of the intellect and the strenghening of the will ; second, the fact that the need for grace was so explicitly conceived in terms of moral impotence naturally tended to eclipse the idea of moral impotence when the need for grace was seen to lie in the supernatural character of eternal life.

(65) Quapropter bina ista quid inter se different, diligenter et vigilanter intuendum est : posse non peccare et non posse peccare.. (c.12, § 33, PL 44,936). Primo itaque homini, qui in eo bono quo factus fuerat rectus acceperat posse non peccare...(ibid., § 34, p.937) praedestinatis non tale adiutorium datur, sed tale ut eis perseverantia ipsa donetur, non solum ut sine isto dono perseverantes esse non possint, verum etiam ut per hoc donum non nisi

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stitutes "all you know and all you need to know" on the nature of grace, perseverance, predestination and human liberty has been the source of not a few "vertical invasions" of the barbarian. The monumental work of Cornelius Jansen(66) is but the full flower of a far more universal tendency : to seek a speculative system, complete in all its parts and details, where no such system exists or, at most, exists only in embryonic form. To know and unequivocally to state the doctrine of grace is one thing ; it is quite another to ask what precisely is grace, whether it is one or many, if many, what are its parts and their correlation, what is its reconciliation with liberty, what is the na=

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perseverantes sint(ibid.). Maior quippe libertas est necessaria adversus tot et tantas tentationes quae in paradiso non fuerunt.. Illi (Adae) ergo sine peccato ullo data est, cum qua conditus est, voluntas libera, et eam fecit (Ada) servire peccato; horum vero (praedestinatorum) cum fuisset voluntas serva peccati, liberata est per illum qui dixit : Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis (Ioan., 8,36)... Huic peccato (impoenitentiae finalis) ultra non serviunt, non prima conditione, sicut ille liberi ; sed per secundum Adam Dei gratia liberati ; et ista liberatione haben= tes liberum arbitrium, quo serviunt Deo, non quo captiventur a diabolo. Liberati enim a peccato servi facti aunt iustitiae (Rom., 6, 18), in qua stabunt usque in finem (ibid., §35, p. 937, 8).

(66) For a close analysis of De Correptione et Gratia, see Boyer, Rech. sc. rel., 1930, 481 - 505; on Jansenism, see the article in Dict. théol. cath. A summary of the Augustinus is to be had in English, see Abercrombie, The Origins of Jansenism, pp. 126 - 133, Oxford, 1936. It is worth noting that in their third phase the medieval thinkers moved uneasily in the limited orbit of Baius and Jansenius's thought, but, as soon as they could, es= caped from it.

ture of its necessity. These speculative issues St. Augustine did not offer to treat, and it is a question without meaning to ask his position on them. To illustrate the point with the hardy perennial, the supernatural, it is easy to show that St. Augustine flatly denied grace to be nature. It is easy to understand that, when writing to the monks of Hadrumetum, he thought of comparig the elect in Christ with Adam but did not think of comparing both with the philosophic abstraction termed natura pura. But to ask whether or not the scientific concept of the supernatural is according to the mind of St. Augustine is like studying Euclid's elements to find out the truth about multidimensional geometries : in both you find the data that lead to the later conclusion ; in neither is the later theorem explicitly formulated.

H. Conclusion.

How, then, does this sketch show that gratia operans is the fundamental problem in the whole movement from St. Augustine to St. Thomas ?

To answer this one need only observe that the problem of gratia operans is the problem of good will : grace operates the goodness of good will.

Now in the period of the specific theorem, there is no explicit distinction between the two senses of this goodness : the goodness of moral action, and the goodness of supernatural elevation. There follows a two-fold consequence. First, since the aspect of moral goodness is the one explicitly understood, the theory of grace tends to a psychological form. Second, since the aspect of supernatural elevation is not explicitly grasped by theory, the whole weight of the doctrine of the necessity of grace presses down on liberty : this forces the dialectical position into the concept of liberty itself.

Next in the period of the generic theorem - about twenty years

elapsed between the death of Philip the Chancellor and the De Veritate of St. Thomas - there is intense speculative activity. The psychological concept of grace combines with the supernatural aspect to give the infused virtue: but the distinction between general divine assistence and actual grace is not immediately grasped(67). Similarly the supernatural seems to express the total reason for the necessity of grace(68).

But this defect has its compensation, for the idea of liberty is released and receives a purely speculative development. After some hesitation between the opposed views that liberty is a habit and liberty is a potency, the former view, which results from placing the dialectical position in the definition of liberty is eliminated, and a purely philosophic concept is accepted.

This indeed sets the problem of the necessity of grace despite the existence of liberty in all its acuteness. How St.Thomas meets this issue is the topic of the four chapters to follow.

§ 1.5. The Methodological Conclusion.

It has been shown that speculative theology consists in four elements, theorems, technique, terms, and a dialectical position. Of these the essential speculative element is the theorem.

Now it is plain from the distinction between the common notion and the theorem, that a common notion cannot be used to prove the

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(67) Thus, St. Albert, 2 dist. 25, a. 6: "auctoritates non probant neque dicunt quod sine gratia non potest aliquis resistere (tentationi) sed quod non potest sine Deo. Et hoc plane verum est, quia in Deo vivimus et movemur et sumus ; et nisi ipse continue contineat, et salvet, et moveat, nihil possumus esse et operari. Sed hoc non ponit gratiam specialem.

(68) ibid. Si tamen ponatur (homo) habere solum liberum arbitrium, videtur mihi quod adhuc potest resistere tentationi.

existence of a theorem. The latter is a reflective addition to the former, and it takes place only in conscious and deliberate reflection.

This fact has a most important methodological implication, namely, that the so called "implicit speculative position" is an impossibility. Either a speculative position exists explicitly or else one merely has common notions. Such notions have no doubt an exigence for speculative elaborations, but that exigence does not prove that any given thinker met the exigence.

Hence, throughout the argument to follow, "implicit speculative position" have to be disregarded. They can be nothing but a fiction, the projecting of the categories of later thought into the writings of an earlier period.

$2. The Data of The Inquiry.

The first inductive movement gave the form of the development extending from St. Augustine to St. Thomas. It lets us know what to expect. The second movement consists in assembling the data on gratia operans and cooperans : the explicit statements of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Peter Lombard, St. Albert, and St. Thomas are in turn presented. The inquiry is here purely factual, and no attempt is made to reach ultimate conclusions. Instead, attention is concentrated on grasping what exactly each author actually said, under what circumstances, and, in the case of St. Thomas who treats the issue differently on three occasions, with what reasons.

$2.1 St. Augustine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio.

Four points are considered : the occasion and character of the work ; the outline of its content ; the denotation of the term "grace ;" and the division of grace into operative and co-operative.

Immediately, however, two prior questions may be raised, Why begin from St. Augustine ? Why select one of his works for special study instead of giving a summary of his whole position ?

As to the first question, there is no doubt that an examination of the whole of St. Thomas's thought on grace would have to begin from the Greek Fathers. But our concern is not with grace as the elevation and divinisation of the soul ; it is with the relations between grace and liberty. Speculative thought on this issue begins with the emergence of the Pelagian heresy and the writings of St. Augustine.

Next, a summary of St. Augustine's thought is precisely what is not wanted, for a summary is always a presentation in terms of modern ways of thinking and conceiving. But the whole point in considering the historical antecedents to St. Thomas's position is to learn to conceive issues in the manner in which they were conceived before St.Thomas wrote. To achieve this end nothing but an accurate account of what was explicitly advanced by St. Thomas's predecessors is of any use. Since, we cannot examine all of St.Augustine's writings, we examine the one most pertinent to our inquiry.

The choice of the other three writers is on an obvious principle ; each is an outstanding thinker in a well-defined phase of early scholasticism ; in addition, Peter Lombard and St. Albert certainly exerted a direct influence on St. Thomas.

$.2.II The Occasion and Character of the Work.

The De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, presumably written about the year 426 or 427, was addressed Ad Valentinum et cum illo monachos. Apparently it was accompanied by the two letters Ad Valentinum(1). Of these the first defines the occasion :

> Venerunt ad nos duo iuvenes, Cresconius et Felix, de vestra congregatione se esse dicentes, qui nobis retulerunt monasterium vestrum nonnulla dissensione turbatum, eo quod quidam in vobis sic gratiam Dei praedicent, ut negent hominis esse liberum arbitrium; et, quod est gravius, dicant quod in die iudicii non sit redditurus Deus unicuique secundum opera eius(2).

(1) Letters 214, 215. PL 44, 875 - 879.
(2) Letter 214, $1, p. 875.

It further appears that St. Augustine was concerned over this trouble in the monastery of Hadrumetum. On discovering that the young men had very inadequate ideas on Pelagianism, he delayed their return until after the feast of Easter(3). In particular he feared that this imperfect grasp of the issue was at the root of all the trouble, and he asked to have the source of discored sent to him(4).

Thus the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio not only aims to show the necessity of grace, the freedom of the will, and the remotely gratuitous but proximately meritorious character of eternal life. There is also, throughout, a visible effort to profit by the occasion and explain, at least in part, the general nature of Pelagianism.

In its character the work clearly belongs to the preliminary phase. The effort of the human mind consists in a clear grasp of issues and a forceful presentation of Scriptural argument. The greatness of St. Augustine does not lie in any mastery of speculative technique, in the exactitude of explicit distinctions, the elaboration of theorems, the synthetic apprehension of multiple correlations. On the contrary his genius is precisely that, unaided by these devices of conscious reflection, he none the less is able to maintain a profoundly coherent position, not intermittently but through thousands of pages, not by over-simplification but by an intense and vital grasp of hundreds of passages from Scripture, not by abstract formulation but by relentlessly tracking down, confronting, and confuting each assertion and each evasion of Pelagian

(3) Cp. Letter 215, $$2,3; p.878.
(4) Letter, 214, $6; p.878.

thought.

To understand the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio one has to live fifteen hundred years ago. The questions raised are not the logical series of issues that would emerge from the application of a philosophic technique. They are the questions of Cresconius and Felix and only incidentally the questions of all time. The concepts used are the common notions with which they would familier. The arguments are simply passages from Holy Writ. The solution of difficulties is Scripture again. And distinctions are not formulated but only indicated by the juxtaposition of apparently opposed texts.

The work has a manifest presupposition : the Christian faith. It is not the opinion of St. Augustine but the doctrine of the Church that is at stake. It is not his thought but the testimony of Scripture that is to be accepted(5). And the one acceptance that is of real moment is the acceptance of faith. What the monks believe, they also do well to pray to understand ; for understanting depends on free will, and grace, here as elsewhere, is needed. But if they do not understand ! Ubi sentitis vos non intelligere, interim credite divinis eloquiis(6).

This presupposition of faith is of the greatest methodological importance. When a writer addresses himself to the assent of faith and tells his readers that if they pray they may understand, then manifestly an interpreter who offers a synthetic summary of the doctrine exposed presupposes the grace of understanding in himself and his readers. A scientific inquiry can make no such presupposition, and so must limit itself to an account of the doctrines to be accepted on faith. Princi-

(5) Satis me disputasse arbitror..et sic disputasse ut non magis ego quam divina ipsa Scripture vobiscum locuta sit evidentissimis testimoniis veritatis.Cap.20, §41,p.905, 6.
(6) Letter 214, §7,p.878.Cp.cap. 1,§1,p.881;cap.24,§46,p.912.

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(5) Satis me disputasse arbitror..et sic disputasse ut non magis ego quam divina ipsa Scriptura vobiscum locuta sit evidentissimis testimo= niis veritatis.Cap.20, $41,p.905, 6.
(6) Letter 214, $7,p.878.Cp.cap. 1,$1,p.881;cap.24,$46,p.912.

psally for this reason have we avoided all explanatory summaries of St.Augustine's thought.

$2.12 Outline of the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio.

If the work has not exactly a plan, at least attention successively focusses on different points. There is free will ($$2-5). Grace is necessary ($$6-40).God controls all wills ($$41-43).The judgements of God are just but inscrutable ($$44,45).

A. Free Will.

First, free will exists. Revelavit autem nobis per Scripturas suas sanctas, esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium(7). That is the point to be proved,that free will is a truth to be received on faith. The argument that follows is a mosaic of texts from the Old Testament and the New. There is no definition of freedom and no philosophic proof of freedom. What is a rigorous consequence, though not so obvious, is that there are no philosophiec difficulties about freedom. Such difficulties as do arise are solved not by distinctions but by a juxtaposition of the compensating and mutually limiting texts of Scripture which form the basis of theological distinctions and are the proof of their existence and legitimacy. "Watch and pray,"because you have free will. "Pray," because you need grace(8). In this antithetical presentation Augustine is a master. Gratia Dei sum id quod sum calls for

(7) cap. 2, $2, p. 882.
(8) cap. 4, $9 p. 887.

gratia eius in me vacua non fuit sed plus omnibus illis laboravi.(9). Fili, noli deficere a disciplina Domini is met with Ego rogavi pro te, Petre, ne deficiat fides tua(10).

The ambiguity, that in early medieval thought resides in the distinction between libertas a necessitate and libertas a peccato, has its origin in this procedure of St. Augustine's. From the liberty of free will to the liberation from sin, he passes with an ease that does not betray the slightest sense of inconsequence(11). But this is no explicit dialectical position, even though it does contain the whole mystery. Neither is it a theory of liberty, unless you take the liberty to develop his thought for him and then attribute your creation to his mind. But it is much more a dialectical position than a theory of liberty. For the method and procedure of setting one text of Scripture against another to justify an acceptance of all, is simply without meaning unless the faith is presupposed, and unless the acceptance of revealed truth without any scientific understanding is regarded as a matter of course. Such a preponderance of the dialectical position over vague and even over explicit theoretical tendencies is what constitutes the essential continuity of Catholic thought.

B. Grace and the Pelagians.

As free will is a dogmatic truth, so also is the necessity of grace. What St. Augustine means by grace will be considered in the next

(9) cap. 5, $11, p. 888. (10) cap. 4, $10, p. 887.
(11) An instance occurs, cap.15, $31, p.889: Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona. Aut enim a iustitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala: aut a peccato libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona. Such a passage simply puts in words of ordinary speech his familiar use of such texts as John 8, 36; Romans 6, 18; etc.

section. Here the aim is simply to make clear the ideas that direct and govern his exposition.

He is writing to monks, and so he draws his first argument from passages in Scripture that prove the necessity of a special grace for the life of the celibate. At the same time, opportunities are not lost to cite parallel texts that show free will to exist(12).

For reasons already indicated(13), he suspects that the monks need to be taught something about the exact nature of Pelagian error; the next thirty-one paragraphs are devoted largely to this end.

First is refuted the Pelagian view that grace is given according to our merits(14), and incidentally it is explained that though eternal life is a grace given according to our merits, still our merits exist only in virtue of graces, so that eternal life is absolutely a grace and only relatively a reward(15).

Second, the Pelagian evasions that grace is the law, knowledge of the law, nature, free will, or exclusively the remission of sins, are refuted(16).

Third, the more subtle evasion that grace is due to our initial good will is attacked. The Pelagian thesis is cited :

> Etsi non datur(gratia) secundum merita bonorum operum, quia per ipsam bene operamur ; tamen secundum merita bonae voluntatis datur, quia bona voluntas, inquiunt, praecedit orantis, quam praecessit credentis, ut secundum haec merita gratia sequatur exaudientis Dei(17).

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(12) cap. 4, $$6 - 9 ; pp. 885 - 887.
(13) Vid. sup., note 3.
(14) Cap. 5 - 10, $$10 - 22, pp. 887 - 894.
(15) Cap. 8, 9, $$19 - 21, pp.
(16) Cap. 11 - 13, $$23 - 26, pp. 895 - 897.
(17) Cap. 14, $27, p. 897.

St. Augustine's answer is to show that the good will involved in faith and prayer is as much due to grace as the good will of actual performance. It is in this section of the work that the distinction between operative and co-operative grace arises(18). What is to be grasped is that it arises in answer to a Pelagian distinction.

C. Divine Mastery.

After the existence of both grace and free will is established, the argument turns to a point speculatively related to grace as the cause of good will.

> .. Scriptura divina, si diligenter inspiciatur, ostendit non solum bonas hominum voluntates, quas ipse facit ex malis et a se factas bonas in actus bonos et in aeternam dirigit vitam, verum etiam illas quae conservant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in Dei potestate, ut eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, faciat inclinanari, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, vel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat, occultissimo quidem iudicio sed, sine ulla dubitatione, iustissimo(19)

Such are the hardening of the heart of Pharaoh, the flight of Israel from the men of Hai, the resistence in Palestine to Josue, the cursing of David by the son of Gemini, the treason of Judas and the hatred of the Jews in crucifying Christ(20)

D. The Mystery.

Finally, St. Augustine exposes his explicit dialectical position. O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei ! quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius, et investigabiles viae eius. The trouble is that men suppose human good to precede divine favour. Let them consider the

(18) The section runs from cap.14-19,$$27-40,pp.897-905.
(19) Cap.20,$41,p.906. (20) The argument runs from $41-$43.

baptism of infants. They wail and struggle when receiving the sacrament; what a crime if they were free in their actions. And what merit of theirs precedes, if, now and then, pagan children are baptised while those born in the faith die before christening. The Lord has concluded all in infirmity that he might have mercy on all. But this is not, Do evil that good may come. Rather, it is, We have done evil, and good has come. Do not attribute folly or injustice to the fount of all wisdom and justice. Grasp that the judgements of the Lord are inscrutable, that if the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, this does not exclude nor prevent Pharaoh from hardening his own heart(21). Be assured that the labour of your life is not in vain, and that if grace is not given according to your merits, eternal life is according to your works(22).

$ 2.13. The Meaning of the Term, "Grace"

The connotation of the term is known : the gratuitous, what is not due. What is important is the denotation. For St. Augustine uses any text that suits his point, nor does he confine his attention to those that refer exclusively to what we would term actual grace.

Grace then is the gift of God. But omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursem est, descendens a Patre luminum(23). Thus it is the gift of a vocation to the monastic life(24) or the most efficacious vocation

(21) .. et Deus indurevit per iustum iudicium, et ipse Pharao per liberum arbitrium, Cap. 23, $45, p.911.
(22) This section embraces Cap.22,23,$$44 - 45, pp. 909 - 911.
(23) Cap. 6,$15,p.890. (24) Cap. 4, $7, p. 886.

of St. Paul(25). It is salvation given per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus sancti, quem ditissime effudit super nos, per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum, ut iustificati ipsius gratia, haeredes efficiamur secundum spem vitae aeternae(26). It is the justification of the unjust(27). It is faith working through charity(28). It is being a child of God and moved by the Spirit of God(29). It is creation in Christ Jesus in whom all things are made new(30). It is his aid without whom nothing can be done(31). It is not the law, nor knowledge of the law, nor nature(32). It is not simply the remission of sins but also power to avoid them in the future(33). It is preceded neither by the desert of our good works nor by the welcome of our good will. What precede are evil deserts and bad will(34). Above all, grace is charity(35).

Such is the global apprehension of grace in the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. Distinctions between sanctifying grace and the infused virtues between habitual grace and actual, are, of course, in no way denied. Neither are they affirmed.

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(25) Cap. 5, $12, p. 889.
(26) Cap. 5, $12, p.889.
(27) Cap. 6, $13, p.889; $14, p.890; Cap. 12, $24,p.895.
(28) Cap. 7, $18, p. 892.
(29) Cap. 11, $23, p. 895.
(30) Cap. 8, $19, p. 892.
(31) Cap. 5, $10, p. 888; Cap.6, $13, p.890.
(32) Cap. 11 - 13, $$23 - 25, pp. 894, 895.
(33) Cap. 13, $26, pp. 896, 897.
(34) Cap. V, $12, p.889; cap. 14, $29, p. 898.
(35).. unde est in hominibus charitas Dei et proximi, nisi ex ipso Deo ? Nam si non ex Deo sed ex hominibus, vicerunt Pelagiani. Si autem ex Deo, vicimus Pelagianos. Cap. 13, $37, p. 903. Considerable space is devoted to charity, $$34 - 40, pp. 902 - 905.

$2.14 Operative and Co-operative Grace.

The origin of the distinction is St. Augustine's rejection of the Pelagian assertion that, though grace may be needed for good works, it is given according to the merit of the good will that believes and prays. His refutation is on the following lines.

Faith is itself the fruit of grace. Misericordiam consecutus sum ut fidelis essem(36).

As evil deserts precede the grace that leads to meritorious action (37), so evil will precedes the good will which God by his grace pro= duces.

> Et dabo eis, inquit, cor aliud et spiritum novum dabo eis. Et evellam cor lapideum de carne corum, et dabo eis cor carneum, ut in praeceptis meis ambulent, et iustificationes meas observent, et faciant eas; et erunt mihi in populum, et ego ero eis in Deum, dicit Dominus(38).

What could be more absurd than to speak of good will preceding grace when the effect of grace is to remove a heart of stone and give a heart of flesh ? But let us not argue. In the same passage the prophet tells why God produces this change. Not because of deserts, but because of his Holy Name, the Name that Israel's sin has dishonoured(39). Yet even in the divine victory over obduracy of heart, it is not to be supposed that free will does nothing. Else why the command, Nolite obdurare corda vestra ? Why does even Ezechiel say,

> Proicite a vobis omnes impietates vestras.. facite vobis cor novum et spiritum novum, et facite omnia mandata mea. Utquid mo= riemini domus Israel, dicit Dominus ? quia nolo mortem morientis, dicit Adonai Dominus,(sed)convertimini et vivetis(vivite)(40).

But how is it that he who says Facite vobis also says Dabo vobis ?

(36) Cap. 14,$28,p.897. (37) Cp.cap.5,$12,p.889.
(38) Cap.14,$29,p.898;Ezech.11,19 and 20.
(39) ibid.,$30,pp.898,899;Ezech.36, 22-27.
(40) Cap.15,$31,p.899;Ezech.18,31 and 32.

Why does he commend, if he is the giver ? Why does he give, if man is the doer ? Our will is always free, but it is not always good ; for it is either free from justice, and then it is evil ; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good. But grace is always good, and it both makes an evil will into a good will, and advances incipient good will to perfection(41).

The Pelagians thought they had a good point when they argued, God does not command what man cannot perform. Who does not know that ? But still God does command some things we cannot perform that we may know what graces to pray for and so perform. The Psalmist commands, Cohibe linguam tuam a malo. But he also prays, Pone, Domine, custodiam ori meo (42)

After establishing separately that grace is responsible both for good will and for good performance, he now repeats both points simultaneously. This gives the basic passages on operative and co-operative grace. There is no need of commentary: we copy them out indicating in the margin "op(erans)" and "coop(erans)."

coop. Certum est enim nos mandata servare si volumus: sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus.

op. Certum est nos velle cum volumus : sed ille facit ut velimus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui, Praeparatur voluntas a Domino, de quo dictum est, A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius volet, de quo dictum est, Deus est qui operatur in vobis et velle.

coop. Certum est nos facere cum facimus : sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati, qui dixit, Faciam ut in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea observetis et faciatis.

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(41) Cap. 15, $31, p.899. (42) Cap. 16, $32,p.900.

op. Cum dicit faciam ut faciatis quid aliud dicit nisi auferam a vobis cor lapideum unde non faciebatis et dabo vobis cor carneum unde faciatis ? Et quid hoc nisi, Auferam cor durum, unde non faciebatis, et dabo cor obediens unde faciatis.

coop. Ille facit ut faciamus, cui dicit homo, Pone,Domine, custodiam ori meo. Hoc est enim dicere,Fac ut ponam custodiam ori meo. Quod beneficium Dei iam fuerat consecutus, qui dixit, Posui custodiam ori meo.

op. Qui ergo vult facere Dei mandata et non potest, iam quidem habet voluntatem bonam, sed adhuc parvam et invalidam:

coop. poterit autem cum magnam habuerit et robustam. Quando enim martyres magna illa mandata fecerunt, magna utique voluntate, hoc est, magna charitate, fecerunt : de qua charitate ipse Dominus ait, Maiorem hac charitatem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis...
Ipsam charitatem apostolus Petrus nondum habuit, quando timore Dominum ter negavit...

op. et tamen quamvis parva et imperfecta, non deerat, quando dicebat Domino,Animam meam pro te ponam. Putabat enim se posse quod se velle sentiebat. Et quis istam etsi parvam dare coeperat charitatem, nisi ille qui praeparat voluntatem,

both et cooperando perficit, quod operando incipit. Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. Propter quod ait Apostolus, Certus sum quoniam qui operatur in vobis opus bonum, perficiet usque in diem Christi Iesu. Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur ; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur : tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus. De operante illo ut velimus, dictum est,Deus enim est qui operatur in vobis et velle. De cooperante autem cum iam volumus et volendo facimus, Scimus inquit quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.

coop. Quid est omnia nisi et ipsas terribiles saevasque passiones? Sarcina quippe illa Christi, quae infirmitati gravis est, levis efficitur charitati. Talibus enim Dominus dixit esse sarcinam suam levem, qualis Petrus fuit quando passus est pro Christo, non qualis fuit quando negavit Christum(43).

To conclude, St. Augustine does not distinguish between operative and co-operative grace, but between God operating on an evil will to

(43) Cap.16,17,§§32,33,pp.900,901.There follow the four columns in praise of charity,which si non ex Deo sed ex hominibus,vicerunt Pelagiani.

make it incipiently good, and co-operating with a good but weak will to make it strong. Even in the former case the will acts freely, as we have seen(44). And the distinction consists in an appeal to Scripture in answer to an evasion attempted by the Pelagians.

$2.2 St. Anselm.

Two points are briefly treated : the character of his thought ; his position on prevenient and subsequent grace(45).

A. The Character of his Thought.

St. Augustine's problem was to confront a living heresy and define the content of Holy Writ on a complex issue, not by a technique of abstract thought, but by a masterly series of juxtaposed texts. When St. Anselm wrote, the faith was accepted and secure, but the problems of the mind appeared insoluble(46). His task was the highly speculative work of establishing the abstract possibility of solutions.

He grasped the need of philosophic thought and composed treatises on the will, free choice, truth. But writing in the form of the dialoque he naturally failed to separate philosophy and theology. Both suffer.

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(44) Vid. sup. p. ~~66~~. 58

(45) A distinction between operans-cooperans and praeveniens-subsecuens does not appear before the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas, q.111, a. 2, a.3.

(46) He expresses this difference : .. fuerunt quidam superbi, qui totam virtutum efficaciam in sola libertate arbitrii consistere sunt arbitrati ; et sunt nostro tempore multi, qui liberum arbitrium esse aliquid penitus desperant. Concordia, cap. 11, PL 158,522.

As we have seen, he has no distinction between habitual and actual grace(47). His idea of liberty is simply a deduction from the problem of the relations between grace and liberty(48). Accordingly, his theory of liberty is nothing but the unconscious formulation of a dialectical position(49).

Within the limitations of his time, St.Anselm is a genius. His thought on the reconciliation of grace and liberty blocks out in bold but exact lines the only course of a possible solution. In the Tractatus de Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis nec non Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, seven chapters are devoted to divine fore-knowledge (50), three to predestination(51), fourteen to grace(52). The way he puts the questions reveals at once a master in speculative thought. He does not ask, How does one explain God's fore-knowledge of a free act ? He asks, Is fore-knowledge of a free act a contradiction ? He shows that it is not, and having shown that, he leaves to future thinkers nothing more to do than fill in the details. As we shall see, St.Thomas prolongs his thought to almost the ultimate stage of refinement(53).

His thought on grace proceeds from his definition of liberty : libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem. The fundamental theorem is that a right act of willing presupposes the rightness of the will. Granted this rightness, the will can keep it by acting rightly. If the rightness is lost by wrong

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(47) Vid.sup.p.30,$1.33C. (48) See,Dialogus de Libero Arbitrio,PL 158, 489 - 506.
(49) This statement follows immediately from the preceding.
(50) PL 158,507-519 (51) ibid.,520,521. (52) ibid.,521-540.
(53) I do not say absolutely but almost the ultimate stage of refinement for St. Thomas did not make his position unmistakable to every reader.

action, the will cannot act rightly (servitus peccati) since right action presupposes rightness of will. But though it cannot act rightly, it retains liberty wich, by definition, is the capacity to retain rightness(54).

B. St. Anselm on Prevenient and Subsequent Grace.

The connection between grace and liberty appears as soon as St. Anselm identifies the rightness of the will with justice.

> Quicumque autem ex his salvantur, per iustitiam salvari dubium non est. Iustis enim promittitur vita aeterna: quia iusti in perpetuum vivent et apud Dominum est merces eorum(55). Quod autem iustitia sit rectitudo voluntatis, sacra saepe monstrat auctoritas...(56).

His next step is to demonstrate that this rightness or justice can be had only through grace. The argument runs :

> Considerémus nunc utrum aliquis hanc rectitudinem non habens, eam aliquo modo a se habere possit. Utique a se illam habere nequit, nisi aut volendo aut non volendo. Volendo quidem nullus valet eam per se adipisci : quia nequit illam velle nisi illam habeat(57). Quod autem aliquis non habens rectitudinem voluntatis, illam valeat per se non volendo assequi, mens nullius accipit. Nullo igitur modo potest eam habere creatura a se. Sed neque ab alia creatura. Sicut namque creatura nequit creaturam salvare ; ita non potest illi dare per quod debeat salvari. Sequitur itaque quia nulla creatura rectitudinem habet quam dixi voluntatis, nisi per gratiam(58)

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(54) De lib.Arb., PL 158,492 - 494, 503; cap. 3 and 11 especially. This may seem elaborate trifling. I cannot here digress to show that it is not. But despite its technical deficiencies, it would seem to grasp in global fashion the ultimate issue.
(55) Wisdom 5, 16. (56) Concordia, cap. 12, PL 158,522.
(57) Because "voluntas non est recta quia recte vult, sed recte vult quoniam est recta." Concordia, cap. 13, p. 523.
(58) ibid. and p. 524.

From this position, St. Anselm has no difficulty in solving all points connected with grace and freedom. There can be no merit before the gift of rectitude; free will can merit afterwards by retaining its rectitude, but this merit is due to the rectitude given.

Accordingly, the grace that gives the will rightness and enables it to will rightly is termed praeveniens; what appears to be the same grace, inasmuch as it maintains this rightness of will, is termed subsequens :

> Quibus autem modis post eamdem rectitudinem acceptam, liberum arbitrium gratia adiuvet ut servet quod accepit : quamvis non omnes valeam enumerare, multifariam enim hoc facit : tamen non erit inutile aliquid inde dicere. Nemo certe servat rectitudinem hanc acceptam nisi volendo ; velle autem illam aliquis nequit, nisi habendo ; habere vero illam nullatenus valet, nisi per gratiam. Sicut ergo illam nullus accipit, nisi gratia praeveniente ; ita nullus eam servat nisi eadem gratia subsequente. Nempe, quamvis illa servetur per liberum arbitrium, non tamen est tantum imputandum libero arbitrio, quantum gratiae, cum haec rectitudo servatur ; quoniam illam liberum arbitrium nonnisi per gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem habet et servat(59).

As is stands, the passage leaves a good deal open to question. It would be well to know exactly whether and to what extent praeveniens and subsequnes are technical terms, whether the eadem gratia is simply literary or, to some extent, metaphysical. But on these points we cannot pause, and, did we, it probably would only be to attempt to determine what in itself is undetermined.

Grace, for St. Anselm in his speculation, is what gives and maintains the rectitude of the will. That rectitude as willed is the justice which wins eternal life.

Grace is prevenient in giving the will its rectitude ; it is subsequent in maintaining - more than the will itself - the same rectitude.

(59) De Concordia, cap.14, PL 158, 524, 525.

§2.3. Peter Lombard.

Three points are treated : the period ; the context of gratia operans ; the doctrine on the subject.

A. The Period.

First we must draw on the mine of information : Prof. Langraf. Discussing the terminology of early scholasticism, he has written :

> In the whole of early scholasticism the term gratia actualis does not occur. This need cause no surprise to anypne who reflets that at that time the psychological interpretation of grace was dominant, and that a grace before justification was mentioned only tentatively and with distinctions. The root of this was the origin of speculation in the Pauline epistles, which, almost exclusively, speak of grace and its necessity only in connection with justification. Thus early thought envisaged, for the most part, only the grace of justification, which because of its connection with faith presented at the same time the permanence of a virtue and the causation of activity.
>
> The dominance of Augustinian thought in the early period makes perfectly natural the frequency of such terms as gratia operans(60), cooperans, gratia adiutrix, gratia adiuvans, gratia ausiliatrix, gratia praeveniens, gratia praeveniens and subsequens, gratia praeventrix, gratia aspirans, gratia suscitans. There are such combinations as gratia praeveniens, comitans, cooperans ; or benedictio praeveniens, adiuvans, consummans(61) ; gratia conservatrix, operans, cooperans ; or gratia incipiens, et perseverans et salvans ; also gratia praeveniens et cooperans. There are expressions such as gratia excitat, gratia operans compungit mentem et excitat ; gratia praevenit, adiuvat, suscipit. After Peter Lombard the dominant terms are gratia operans and cooperans. Still Peter of Capua, for instance, explains, when speaking of gratia operans and cooperans : Hoc idem est quod alibi dicitur preveniens subsequens. A similar rematk is to be found in Philip the Chancellor's Summa de Bono.
>
> In the twelfth century all these expressions referred exclusively to the grace of justification. In the beginning of the thirteenth century Geurricus de S. Quintino uses the term gratia praeparans - with an antithetical cooperans - to refer to a grace prior to justification. Also denoting a grace distinct from justification is the gratia excitans - as opposed to informans - be found in Langton, in his pupil Gaufrid of Poitiers, in the clearly dependent William of Auxerre and John of Treviso, and finally in the unidentified Collection of Questions, Cod. British Museum Harley 3521 Q(62).

(60) The elenchus of his references I cannot copy out. See loc. cit. infra.

(61) Cp. Schupp on the Lombard's use of the term misericordia instead of gratia, Gnadenlehre des Ptrus Lombardus, p.26.

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The fore-going provides a clear picture of the situation. The language of St. Augustine gradually crystallises into a terminology. The later eminence of gratia operans and cooperans is due to Peter Lombard. And what first attracts attention in the field of grace is the grace of justification.

B. The Context.

To carry on the brilliant speculation of St. Anselm was an impossible task. There was needed a broader dogmatic basis to clarify theological thought, a closer philosophic analysis to define nature and provide the analogies for the supernatural, and above all, an explicit and systematic distinction between philosophic and theological speculation. The notable confusions of Gilbert de la Porrée and Peter Abaelard on the latter point provoked a reaction that turned interest to a study of the dogmatic sources. Such, we have already indicated, is the general definition of the Lombard's position(63).

The twenty-sixth distinction of his second book begins with a demonstrative pronoun : Haec est gratia operans et cooperans. Accordingly we must turn back to distinction twenty-five. The last paragraph reads :

> Libertas ergo a peccato et a miseria per gratiam est ; libertas vero a necessitate per naturam. Utramque libertatem, naturae scilicet et gratiae, notat Apostolus cum ex persona hominis non redempti sit : Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio (Rom. 7, 18) ; ac si diceret : Habeo libertatem naturae, sed non habeo libertatem gratiae ; ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis quam naturaliter habet non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adiuvetur:

(62) Landgraf, Die Erkenntnis der helfenden Gnade in der Frühscolastik, Zschr kath. Theol., 55 (1931) 179 - 181.
(63) Vid. sup. p.

liberetur quidem ut velit ; et adiuvetur ut perficiat. Quia, ut ait Apostolus (Rom.9,16), non est volentis velle, neque currentis currere, id est operari, sed miserentis Dei... qui operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum (Phil. 2, 13). Cuius (Dei) gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praevenit praeparando ut velit bonum ; et praeparatam adiuvat ut perficiat(64).

This is the end of the twenty-fifth distinction on which immediately follows : Haec est gratia operans et cooperans.

In the foregoing citation we may note an advance over St.Anselm inasmuch as the Lombard has, in this passage, moral impotence reduced to an incapacity of efficacious willing(65), and explicitly asserts that nature has freedom from necessity. Also to be observed is the tendency to conceive grace psychologically.

C. The Doctrine on Gratia Operans.

The twenty-sixth distinction of the second book is a long series of citations from St. Augustine. Omitting them, we may give the Lombard"s position in his own words.

Haec est gratia operans et cooperans. Operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem, ut velit bonum ; gratia cooperans adiuvat ne frustra velit. Unde Augustinus...

Operans enim est quae praevenit voluntatem bonam : ea enim liberatur et praeparatur hominis voluntas, ut sit bona, bonumque efficaciter velit. Cooperans vero gratia voluntatem iam bonam sequitur adiuvando. Unde Augustinus...

His testimoniis aperte insinuatur quia voluntas hominis gratia Dei praevenitur atque praeparatur, ut fiat bona, non ut fiat voluntas. Quia et ante voluntas erat, sed non erat bona et recta voluntas...

Ecce hic expresse habes quod gratia praevenit bonae voluntatis meritum, et ipsa bona voluntas pedissequa est gratiae, non praevia.

Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi monstratur quae sit ipsa gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione. Ideoque Augustinus...

Hic aperte ostenditur quod fides est causa iustificationis, et ipsa est gratia et beneficium quo hominis praevenitur voluntas et praeparatur. Unde Augustinus...

(64) S.2, d. 25. (65) St. Anselm's liberty - a capacity to retain rectitude - is, in the absence of rectitude,similar to the capacity to see an object that is absent when you are in the dark and blindfold.De Lib.Arb.,cap.4,PL 158,495.

Such is the thesis. Gratia operans prevents and prepares the will ; it makes it will the good ; it liberates it from sin and the non posse non peccare of the unregenerate. It is fides quae per dilectionem operatur. Next come the difficulties.

> 1. Non est tamen ignorandum quod alibi Augustinus aliter significare videtur, quod ex voluntate sit fides...
>
> Ad quod respondentes dicimus... haec ideo dicta sunt, quia non est fides nisi in eo qui vult credere : cuius bonam voluntatem praevenit fides, non tempore, sed causa et natura.
>
> 2. Caeterum hanc quaestionem magis acuunt et urgent verba Augustini... Hic videtur insinuare quod bona cogitatio praecedit fidem, et ita bona voluntas praeveniat fidem, non praeveniatur ; quod praedictis adversari videtur.
>
> Ad hoc autem dicimus quod aliquando cogitatio bona sive voluntas praevenit fidem ; sed non est illa bona voluntas vel cogitatio qua recte vivitur. Illa enim sine fide et charitate non est. Nam ut ait Augustinus...
>
> Qui verba Augustini praemissa secundum hanc distinctionem considerat, nullam ibi repugnantiam fore animadvertit, non ignorans etiam ante gratiam praevenientem et operantem, qua voluntas bona praeparatur in homine, praecedere quaedam bona ex gratia Dei et libero arbitrio, quaedam etiam ex solo libero arbitrio quibus tamen vitam non meretur nec gratiam qua iustificatur.

The second difficulty shows that the psychological concept of grace is no more than a tendency which is deserted the moment a real difficulty arises. In that passage the Lombard is obviously feeling for something more adequate : he places graces previous to prevenient grace. One may note that the good deeds that precede faith and charity are the familiar agros colere et domos aedificare.

The final point in the twenty-sixth distinction is the relation between gratia operans and cooperans.

> Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit per gratiam operantem et praevenientem voluntatem hominis liberari ac praeparari ut bonum velit, et per gratiam cooperantem et subsequentem adiuvari ne frustra velit : utrum una et eadem sit gratia, id est unum munus gratis datum, quod operetur et cooperetur ; an diversa, alterum operans, et alterum cooperans.
>
> Quibusdam non irrationabiliter videtur quod una et eadem sit gratia, idem donum, eadem virtus, quae operatur et cooperatur ; sed propter diversos eius effectus dicitur operans et cooperans. Operans enim dicitur in quantum liberat et praeparat voluntatem hominis ut bonum velit ; cooperans inquantum eamdem adiuvat ne frustra velit, scilicet ut opus faciat bonum. Ipsa enim gratia

non est otiosa, sed meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici.

This identification of gratis operans and cooperans is quite to to be expected when the grace in question is, in its content, fides quae per dilectionem operatur. As we have already pointed out, the Lombard does not attempt to decide whether a virtue is a habit as opposed to an act, or an internal act as opposed to an external act. But he manifestly inclines to the former view, and in the next distinction metaphorically describes a virtue in this fashion:

> Propterea quidam non inerudite tradunt virtutem esse bonam mentis qualitatem sive formam quae animam informat, et ipsa non est motus vel affectus animi, sed ea liberum arbitrium iuvatur, ut ad bonum moveatur et erigatur ; et ita ex virtute et libero arbitrio nascitur bonus motus vel affectus animi ; et exinde bonus motus procedit exterius. Sicut pluvia rigatur terra, ut germinet et fructum faciat, nec pluvia est terra nec germen nec fructus, nec terra germen vel fructus, nec germen fructus ; ita gratis terrae mentis nostrae, id est arbitrio voluntatis, infunditur pluvia divinae benedictionis, id est inspiratur gratia, quod solus Deus facit, non homo cum eo : quia rigatur voluntas hominis, ut germinet et fructificet, id est, sanatur et praeparatur ut bonum velit, secundum quod dicitur operans ; et iuvatur ut bonum faciat, secundum quod dicitur cooperans et illa gratia virtus non incongrue nominatur, quia voluntatem hominis infirmam sanat et adiuvat(69).

These passages, I think, will suffice to provide, not indeed a detailed knowledge of the Lombard's thought, but a sufficient introduction to St. Thomas, For though the former's influence on the latter is notable, still it is due to such explicit thought as has been cited and not to the details that modern research can collect and classify. It will be well, then, to conclude with a summary.

First, the Lombard admits the existence of graces prior to justification, but he does not term them prevenient or operative.

Second, he affirms good acts without any grace, such as the building of houses and the cultivation of the land.

(69) S. 2, dist. 27.

Third, he inclines to the view that gratia operans and cooperans are one and the same grace ; that they receive different names because of their different effects.

Fourth, the effect of gratia operans is the liberation of the will from moral impotence, non posse non peccare ; positively it is an efficacious will of the good, ut bonum velit, ut efficaciter velit.

Fifth, though this psychological conception of grace is the most common form of expression, still when the Lombard is faced with the difficulty of the bona cogitatio that precedes faith, he immediately asserts that such good thoughts or good will do not merit eternal life.

Sixth, gratia operans is fides quae per dilectionem operatur ; it is a virtue and more probably a habit.

Seventh, gratia cooperans has for its effect the performance of good deeds corresponding to good will.

§2.4. St Albert the Great.

Three points are treated : his historical position, his terminology on grace, his doctrine on gratia operans.

A. The Historical Position.

Like Alexander of Hales, St. Albert takes over the theory of supernatural from Philip the Chancellor(79). Like him, he also devotes a great deal of thought to the elaboration of a theory of liberty(80). This twofold labour results in a speculative tendency that is anti=

(79) Vid.sup.p.45. See Doms, Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus,capp. 1 - 9.
(80) See Lottin, La théorie du libre arbitre...

thetical to the tendency of Peter Lombard. The point is illustrated by two examples.

Peter Lombard posited an intermediate stage of original innocence between the creation of Adam and the infusion of grace. In this period he rightly held that Adam neither suffered from moral impotence when confronted with temptation, nor, on the other hand, could merit for merit presupposes grace. But, not having a firm grasp of the idea of the supernatural, he was at a loss to explain why Adam could not merit when he resisted temptation, and this led to his assertion that resistance was not meritorious unless it was difficult(81).

Commenting on this passage, St. Albert finds it unintelligible. The idea of the supernatural is so familiar to him that he fancies the Lombard must be distinguishing between grace and virtue, for virtue presupposes difficulty, or, again, that the resistance which is not meritorious is resistance to a sin which one does not even consider(82).

On the other hand, Peter Lombard places the idea of moral impotence in the fore-ground of his thought on grace. Without grace, man suffers non posse non peccare etiam damnabiliter. By grace, man is liberated from this onus of evil and enabled efficaciously to will the good(83). But St. Albert, because of his effort to work out a coherent theory of human liberty, at first tries to evade non posse non peccare (84) and in his later Summa Theologica admits it without offering more than a metaphorical explanation(85).

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(81) S. 2, d. 24, c.

(82) In 2 dist. 24, a.4.

(83) S. 2, d. 25, 26.

(84) Summa de Creaturis, 2a., q. 70, a. 5; Commentary, In 2 dist.25, a.6.

(85) Summa theol., 2a., q.100,m.2,3,4.

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(81) S. 2, d. 24, a. (82) In 2 dist. 24, a.4.
(83) S. 2, d. 25, 26. (84) Summa de Creaturis, 2a., q. 70,a.5;
(85) Summa theologica, 2a, q.100, m. 2,3,4

B. Terminology with regard to Grace.

The Lombard distinguished between gratia gratis dans which is God himself and gratis data which is the infused virtue, faith operating through charity; gratia operans(86).

St. Albert's fundamental distinction is between gratia gratum faciens which gives the forma meriti and gratia gratis data which does not. The former is highly elaborate concept backed by a whole philosophy. The latter is little more than a vague gesture. Dr. Herbert Doms lists seven distinct meanings: 1. Natura rationalis cum potentiis suis. 2. The natural moral goodness of the will. 3. Such praeternatural gifts as Adam possessed before the fall. 4. Such supernatural aids as the unformed habits of faith and hope, servile fear, imperfect movements to salvation. 5. Inspiration, miracles, and the like. 6. The assistance of the angels. 7. The indelible character. Combining with each of these, and differing according to their differences, is in the eighth place the divine activity which not merely conserves in being and moves to action, but conserves in goodness and moves to good action(87).

In this connection it is well to note the conspicious absence in St. Albert's writings of an account of the preparation for grace. There is no lack of possible explanations of this defect, for St. Albert's interest in all fields of knowledge, the long years he spent on Ari=

(86) S. 2, d. 27, c. (88)Doms, op. cit., p. 167, 8.

See citation from Landgraf above p 65
also p 87

Landgraf Die Vorbereitung auf die Heilsgnade

stotle, his special attention to the ideas of merit and liberty, can readily combine to account for his neglect of a contemporary development. None the less, the contemporary development does exist, especially in William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventura(89), and St. Thomas. Perhaps a comparative study of these authors, from the view-point of their main lines of thought and especially their interest in Aristotelianism, might throw further light upon the issue.

C. St. Albert on Gratia Operans.

By gratia operans St. Albert understands the forma supernaturalitatis in the will; by gratia cooperans the forma meriti in the good act. Such is his explicit doctrine. But he also has an implication of the habit as a virtue controlling good action. Thus, with the usual identification of praeveniens and operans, he writes :

> ... gratia praeveniens est quae omne nostrum meritum praevenit, et haec est quae operatur bonum esse in voluntate per informationem voluntatis ; oportet enim voluntatem habitualem esse informatam gratia, antequam bonus actus meritorius eliciatur ex illa.
>
> Subsequens autem invenitur primo in ea (voluntate ?) quae meretur, quia habitum immediate sequitur actus : et ideo dicitur cooperans quia libero arbitrio (liberum arbitrium ?) in merito ministrat materiam actus, sed formam per quam est efficacia meriti dat gratia quae est in anima et libero arbitrio. Et ideo dicit Magister in sequenti distinctione quod usus virtutis et gratia partim est a libero arbitrio sicut a causa(90).

That St. Albert here thinks of grace exclusively as a formal cause is confirmed by the manner in which he meets the following difficulty in the next article :

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(89) See Doms, op. cit., pp. 163 - 166. Ludyng above p.65
(90) In 2 dist. 26, a. 6.

a. Cum enim dicitur gratia operans, aut intelligitur operari se, aut voluntatem, aut se in voluntata.
Si se: hoc non potest esse, quia nihil operatur se vel facit. Si voluntatem intelligitur facere : hoc iterum nihil est, quia voluntas ante hoc fuit.
Si autem se in voluntate : hoc iterum nihil est, quia nihil facit se ipsum nec in se nec in alio.
Ergo, male intelligitur gratia operans.

b. Si dicas quod facit bonam voluntatem, quaeritur quid supponit ly bonam ? Constat autem quod non voluntatem secundum se sed (secundum quod est) gratia informatam. Ergo, idem est facere bonam voluntatem quod se facere in voluntate. Et sic redit primum.

He answers :

Dicendum ad primum quod operans dicitur quia operatur esse bonum in voluntate, et dicitur operari sicut forma facit esse, non sicut efficiens.
Hoc autem facere quod est formae, non est nisi diffusio sui in formato. Et ideo bene concedo quod forma absoluta accepta, acta formae non efficientis, facit se in formato. Nihil facit se secundum eamdem considerationem acceptum : sed quia forma non proprie facit sed dat, et suum dare est diffusio sui et informatio, ideo forma dat esse quod est actus illius formae, et operatur, et hoc (quod operatur) est esse suum in formato.
Primae autem obiectiones procedebant quasi gratia esset operans per modum efficientis et non formae(91).

However though the solution of these two objections consists in affirming that grace operates as a formal cause and not as an efficient cause, it remains that when St. Albert comes to explaining how grace is the principal and free will the subordinate cause, he makes use of the idea of the habit or virtue as effecting the free act.

Si dicas quod gratia movet et excitat liberum arbitrium ad agendum, et ideo est principalior : tunc quaeritur, utrum moveat naturaliter vel violenter ?...
Ad aliud quod quaeritur, utrum moveat naturaliter vel violenter ?
Dicendum quod nulla est divisio, quia voluntarius motus nec

(91) In 2 dist. 26, a. 7. Cp. St. Thomas, la 2ae., q.111, a 2, ad lm.

naturalis nec violentus est(92) et ipsa(gratia) movet ut perfectio naturae.

Sed verum est quia movet in modum naturae, sicut dicit etiam Tullius de virtute. Tamen est habitus voluntarius : et ideo in talibus nati sumus suscipere (perfectionem ?); et perfectio est ab assuetudine in virtute civili ; sed in gratia perfectio est ab infusore gratiae.

Et ideo illae quaestiones ridiculosae sunt(93).

This comparison of the habit to a natural form - to what we should term a natural spontaneity - appears still more clearly in the following :

.. et bene concedo quod liberum arbitrium est secundarium in illo opere tribus de causis :

quarum una est, quia gratia est primum movens, sicut habitus movet in modum inclinantis naturae ad impetum actus alicuius, ut grave declinat deorsum ;

Secunda est, quia ipsa non dat proprietatem sive accidentalem formam, sed formam substantialem meriti, a qua est tota efficacia meriti, ita ut actus sine forma illa non est meritorius nec valeret vitam aeternam ;

tertia causa est quam tangit Augustinus, quia regit liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium est ut iumentum obediens(94).

The meaning seems to be that there is a double causality of grace with regard to the free act. First, there is the formal causality that regards the <u>modum actus</u> : this supplies the second reason for the superiority of grace to the will, for this <u>modus</u> in what makes the difference between an act that is meritorius and one that is not. Second, there is the causality of the <u>habitus</u>, which is in <u>modum naturae</u> and gives the will a spontaneity in right action such as that of a

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(92) Cp. Scotus's idea of free action. (93) In 2 dist, 27, a. 7.
(94) In 2 dist. 26, a. 7.

stone in gravitation. In two ways this gives rise to a priority of grace in causation ; first, such a perfection of nature is a first mover ; second, such a perfection confine the will to right action, regit liberum arbitrium, et liberum arbitrium est ut iumentum obediens.

So great has been the influence of Scotus that it is hard for us to conceive the habit as a principle of limitation of free acts. Scotus, because of his antithesis between natural and free activity, cannot admit the habit to exercise any such influence on the will(95). Accordingly, when he treats St. Augustine's charitas se habet ad liberum arbitrium sicut sessor ad equum, he distinguishes between the substantia actus and the ratio meriti (modus actus), and asserts that with regard to the latter charity is the principal cause and the faculty is the subordinate cause, but with regard to the substantia actus the potency is the principal cause eliciting the act and using the habit, while the habit is the subordinate cause inclining the potency to the act(96).

All that we would observe is that this is in no way the position of St. Albert who made grace the principal cause from both points of view.

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(95) Thus, he writes ;.. habitus est causa naturalis ; igitur si ipsa sit causa principalis movens potentiam, moveret eam per modum naturae ; et per consequens, quoniam potentia agit eo modo quo movetur, ageret per modum naturae ; atque ita actio omnis potentiae habituatae foret naturalis, et nulla libera ; quod est maximum inconveniens. Oxon., 1 dist.17, q. 2, n. 18; cp. q. 3, n. 6. In q. 3, n. 8, he points out that the opposite view is equally if not more probable, but his theory of operative grace follows the other position.

(96) Cp. Oxon., 1 dist. 17, q. 3, n. 24 ff.

§2.5. St Thomas's Position in His Commentary on the Sentences.

In his first work St. Thomas follows and slightly ddvelops the position of his master, St. Albert.

In commenting on the twenty-sixth distinction of the second book - a distinction which the Lombard ddvoted entirely to his doctrine of operative grace - St. Thomas first asks four prior questions :

1. Utrum gratia sit aliquid creatum in anima.
2. Utrum gratia sit accidens.
3. Utrum gratia sit in potentia vel anima sicut in subiecto.
4. Utrum gratia sit virtus.

His answers are well known. Grace is a creature, an accident, in the essence of the soul, and not a virtue but the ontological basis of the virtues. Accordingly, we turn at once to the fifth question, Utrum gratia dividatur convenienter in gratiam operantem et cooperantem.

In the response he begins by considering prevenient and subsequent grace. First, he draws up a scheme of abstract sequences. Second, he turns to St. Augustine to verify his sequences.

He draws up a scheme of abstract sequences :

> Respondeo dicendum quod gratia habet in nobis diversos effectus ordinatos. Primum enim quod facit est hoc dat esse quoddam divinum. Secundus autem effectus est opus meritorium quod sine gratia esse non potest. Tertius effectus est praemium meriti, scilicet ipsa vita beata ad quam per gratiam pervenitur.
> In actibus etiam est quidam ordo : primum est opus interius voluntatis ; secundum est opus exterius quo voluntas completur.

These give three pairs of terms : merit and eternal life ; the internal act and the external ; grace and merit. All are found in St. Augustine.

> Et secundum hoc quandoque Augustinus diversimode videtur accipere gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem :
> quia considerato ordine meriti ad praemium quod sequitur, nominat gratiam praevenientem quae principium est merendi ; gratiam vero subsequentem, ipsum habitum gloriae, qui in nobis beatam vi=

vitam efficit, ut patet in auctoritate(97).

Secundum vero ordinem actus interioris ad exteriorem, ponit gratiam praevenientem quae causat motum bonae voluntatis, gratiam vero subsequentem quae onus exterius complet ; unde dicit quod praevenit voluntatem ut bonum velit, subsequitur ut compleat sive perficiat ; et sic in Littera quasi per totum videtur accipere praevenientem et subsequentem(98).

Secundum vero ordinem esse quod dat ad actum qui est operatio, sic ponit gratiam praevenientem quae animae quoddam esse salubre confert, et gratiam subsequentem quae opus meritorium causat ; unde dicit quod praevenit ut sapemur et subsequitur ut senati negotiemur(99).

He now turns to consider operative and co-operative grace, and, observing that in this sense grace has no reference to the state of the blessed in heaven, infers that in the other two senses prevenient and subsequent grace may also be operative and co-operative. He writes :

Sed distinctio gratiae operantis et cooperantis proprie accipitur tantum prout pertinet ad statum vitae praesentis : unde dupliciter distingui potest.

Uno modo ut per gratiam operantem significetur ipsa gratia, prout esse divinum in anima operatur, secundum quod gratum facit habentem ; et per gratiam cooperantem significetur ipsa gratia secundum quod opus meritorium causat, prout opus hominis gratum reddit.

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(97) Presumably "gratia praevenit ut pie vivamus et subsequitur ut semper cum illo vivamus ; et nunc praevenit ut vocemur et tunc subsequitur ut glorificemur!" Cp. ob. 5a. and ad 5m.

(98) St. Thomas has obviously made a careful study of the citations from St. Augustine in Peter Lombard, and has noticed the tendency to a psychological concept of grace.

(99) Contrast the esse divinum of his own schematic sequence with the esse salubre that he finds in St. Augustine.
Above all, note his method : first a general analysis determining the abstract possibilities of preceding and subsequent graces and then the empirical examination of what St. Augustine actually says.

Alio modo secundum quod gratia operans dicitur, prout causat voluntatis actum ; et cooperans secundum quod causat exteriorem actum in quo voluntas completur, vel (per) perseverantiam in illo.
Et utroque modo cooperans et operans dicit idem quod praeveniens et subsequens.

Now while the meaning is reasonably clear, it will be well to exclude all possibility of doubt by considering the objections.

The first objection is that grace is radicated in the soul and not in the potency and so has no bearing on action.

Ad primam ergo dicendum quod quamvis non immediate gratia ad opus referatur, tamen est per se causa operis meritorii, licet mediante virtute ; et ideo non est inconveniens si per operantem et cooperantem distinguatur.

The second objection is the one already met in St. Albert. If grace is operative, it causes either itself or something else. Neither position is tenable.

Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia operans secundum unam acceptionem dicitur operari in anima, non effective, sed formaliter secundum quod quaelibet forma facit esse aliquod in subiecto, sicut albedo facit esse album ; unde per hunc modum gratia dicitur operans quia formaliter hominem Deo gratum facit(100). Secundum vero aliam acceptionem dicitur operans effective, secundum quod habitus effective causat opus ; ita enim gratia motum meritorium voluntatis operatur eliciendo ipsum, licet mediante virtue, propter quod operans dicitur(101)

The third objection is that no deed is so much the work of grace that it is not also the work of free will. Accordingly, if grace is cooperative because it co-operates with will, then all grace is cooperative.

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(100) This is certainly sanctifying grace.
(101) &(102) In both these cases what is dealt with is grace operating the internal act. From ad 2m we have that it is mediante virtute, and that the operation is not formal but efficient. From ad 3m we have that free will acts as a subordinate cause, that grace acts after the fashion of the forma gravitatis. It follows that in the second sense, gratia operans is the influence of the infused virtue on the internal act of will.

Ad tertium dicendum quod si accipiatur gratia operans secundum primam acceptionem, tunc planum est quod effectus quos operatur formaliter, ipsa sola operatur ; sicut enim sola albedo facit album parietem, ita sola gratia formaliter gratum facit. Sed secundum aliam acceptionem verum est quod ipse motus voluntatis non est a gratia sine libero arbitrio ; et tamen quia se habet gratia ut principale, quia inclinat ad talem actum per modum cuiusdam naturae, ideo ipsa sola talem actum dicitur operari, non quod sine libero arbitrio operatur, sed quia est principalior causa, sicut gravitas dicitur operari motum deorsum(102).

To co-operate, according to the fourth objection, is to be a subordinate agent. But grace is always the principal agent. Therefore grace is not co-operative.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod si dicatur gratia cooperans secundum quod causat quemcumque motum vel extrinsecum vel intrinsecum(103), sic dicitur cooperans non quia non sit principalis causa in agendo, sed quia liberum arbitrium ministrat substatiam actus, et a gratia est forma per quam meritorius est(104); unde illud quod gratia ministrat est sicut ultimum complementum ; et propter hoc dicitur cooperans, quasi complens illud quod per liberum arbitrium ut praeiacens exhibetur.

Si autem accipiatur cooperans prout respicit actum exteriorem tantum, sic dicitur cooperans non propter principalitatem liberi arbitrii ad gratiam, sed propter principalitatem actus ad actum; actus enim interiores in moralibus potiores sunt exterioribus, ut in X Ethic., cap. XII, Philosophus dicit ; unde convenienter gratia secundum quod causat principalem actum dicitur operans; et secundum

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(102) In both these cases what is dealt with is grace operating the internal act. From ad 2m we have that it is mediante virtute, and that the operation is not formal but efficient. From ad 3m we have that free will acts as a subordinate cause, that grace acts after the fashion of the forma gravitatis. It follows that in the second sense, gratia operans is the influence of the infused virtue on the internal act of will.

(103) From the context this refers to sanctifying grace.

(104) Sanctifying grace is the formal cause of the meritoriousness of both the internal and external acts : in both cases the substantia actus is from the free will, but the forma meriti is from sanctifying grace. Cp. In 2 dist.26, q.1, a.1, ad 5m. De Ver, q.27, a. 5, ad 4m.

quod causat secundarium dicitur cooperans(105).

The fifth objection is against the identification of prevenient with operative, subsequent with co-operative grace. St.Thomas admits that eternal life cannot be termed a co-operative grace, but maintains that otherwise the two distinctions are objectively identical. This position is apparently deserted in the Summa theologica(106)

It will be well to conclude by drawing up a scheme of the division.

informans :	hominem : operans.	
	opus : cooperans.	
Gratia :		
inclinans :	ad actum interiorem : operans.	
	ad actum exteriorem : cooperans.	

In confirmation of the distinct interpretation just given, namely, that the four distinctions all refer to different aspects of habitual grace, we may cite the answer to the second objection in the following article(107).

> Ad secundum dicendum quod quocumque modo distinguatur(gratia) maxime quantum ad duas distinctionis, operans et cooperans, praeveniens et subsequens, non differunt essentia sed ratione tantum. Una enim est forma quae dat esse et quae est principium operis ; unus etiam est habitus qui elicit actum intrinsecum et extrinsecum ; unde eadem gratia est operans et cooperans. Nec dicitur praeveniens et subsequens propter ordinem gratiae ad gratiam sed propter ordinem effectus ad effectum.

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(105) In the second sense, operative and co-operative do not mean a difference between the way grace acts, for in both cases grace co-operates with free will ; cp.ad 3m. They signify a different type of act with which grace, mediante virtute, co-operates.In other words, the co-operation of grace in the internal act is termed gratia operans, but in the external act gratia cooperans, because the internal act is cause of the external : propter principalitatem actus ad actum. To this excess of subtlety, St. Thomas does not return.

(106) 1a 2ae., q.111, a. 2 and a. 3.

(107) Utrum gratia sit multiplex in anima. The answer is negative. In 2 dist. 26, q. 1, a. 6 and ad 2m.

In his next work St.Thomas modifies his view that there is only one grace in each individual and consequently modifies his division of grace into operative and co-operative.

The matter is treated under four headings : antecedents ; the change ; the cause of the change ; the effect of the change on gratia operans et cooperans.

A. Antecedents.

In Peter Lombard gratia gratis data denoted the grace of justification, faith operating through charity(108). Perhaps it was Stephen Langton that gave currency to the term gratia gratum faciens(109). In St. Albert gratia gratum faciens denotes habitual grace while gratia gratis data tends to be used to cover all the gifts of God(110). With regard to St.Thomas we may omit consideration of his Commentary on the Sentences, where his position is clearly the same as St. Albert's(111), and turn immediately to the De Veritate.

In the De Veritate, q. 24,a.14, the question is, Utrum liberum arbitrium possit in bonum sine gratia. It will be well to begin from the final remark in the response which seems to define current terminology:

> Sed communiter loquentes utuntur nomine gratiae pro aliquo dono habituali iustificante.

Ordinary usage restricts the term "grace" to denoting an habitual gift

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(108) S.2,d.27,c. On the twelfth century difficulty in defining grace vid.sup.p. ;Landgraf, Erkenntnis des Übernatürlichen, Scholastik 4 (1929) 9 - 38.
(109) Vid. sup. p. ; Landgraf, ibid., p. 214.
(110) Vid. sup. p. ; cp. "..aut est gratia gratis data aut gratia gratum faciens. Si gratia gratis data, de hoc non quaeritur : quia et potentiae animae et virtutes et caetera omnia quae a Deo habentur sunt gratiae gratis datae. In 2 dist.26,a.11,sed contra...
(111) See, for example, In 2 dist. 28, q.1, a.1 - 4.

that constitutes justification. From this meaning of the term grace it would follow that man can do good without grace. But such a conclusion, without qualification, would be unacceptable. Accordingly, St. Thomas expresses himself as follows :

> Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est supra naturam humanam, constat liberum arbitrium non posse sine gratia... Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere... potest agros colere, domos aedificare, et alia plura bona facere sine gratia operante. Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo ; cum nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina, quia causa secunda non agit nisi virtute causae primae, ut dicitur in lib. de Causis... Unde si gratiam Dei velimus dicere non aliquod habituale donum, sed ipsam misericordiam Dei, per quam interius motum mentis operatur, et exteriora ordinat ad hominis salutem ; sic nec ullum bonum potest homo facere sine gratia Dei. Sed communiter loquentes utuntur nomine gratiae pro aliquo dono habituali iustificante.

Two points call for observation. First, what is needed to do good seems to be simply concursus generalis : it is needed for any good deed whatever, even digging and building ; it is needed for operatio naturalis ; to dispense with it would be to act sine Deo Second, this divine assistance appears to be contrasted with gratia gratum faciens, which regards acting above the proportion of nature : on the one hand there is sine gratia gratum faciente, on the other sine Deo.

B. The Change.

If now we turn to De Veritate, q. 27,a.5; we find gratia gratum faciens extending its denotation and limiting the field of sine Deo.

The question is, Utrum in uno homine sit una tantum gratia gratum faciens. The same question, in a far less precise form(112), had already been put in the Commentary on the Sentences. Now it is answered in a different manner .

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(112) Utrum gratia sit multiplex in anima, In 2 dist.26,q.1,a.6.

The first step is to set aside gratia gratis data, giving it the precise signification, however, of prophecy and the working of miracles(113).

The second is to distinguish two senses of gratia gratum faciens:

> Gratia gratum faciens... dupliciter accipitur : uno modo pro ipsa divina acceptatione, quae est gratuita Dei voluntas ; alio modo pro dono quodam creato, quod formaliter perficit hominem, et facit eum dignum vita aeterna.

The third step is to demonstrate that in the second sense - grace as a gift that makes an individual formally acceptable to God and worthy of eternal life - there is only one grace in each man.

The fourth step is to make a distinction with regard to the gratuita voluntas divina, the first sense of gratia gratum faciens. For the divine will may be considered either in itself or in its effects: in the former case grace again is one ; but in the latter it is many. The former does not interest us, the latter does :

> .. ex parte autem effectuum divinorum potest esse multiplex; ut dicamus omnem effectum quem Deus facit in nobis ex gratuita sua voluntate, qua nos in suum regnum acceptat, pertinere ad gratiam gratum facientem ; sicut quod immittat nobis bonas cogitationes et sanctas affectiones.

Thus, any effect of the divine acceptation unto eternal life is termed a gratia gratum faciens, and the example is good thoughts and holy desires.

There is, it seems to me, a marked difference between this and q. 24, a. 14 which was examined in the preceding section. Points of contact do exist. In the earlier article divine mercy providentially arranging external events and internally cooperating with the soul unto its salvation is termed a grace, but not gratia gratum faciens. In the

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(113) Cp. De Ver., q. 27, a. 1. This, I think, is the first time in St. Thomas that gratia gratis data is given so precise a meaning.

In the present article, it is not divine mercy but the gratuitous will of God accepting unto his kingdom, nor is it the general expression -interius motum mentis operatur - but something more specific - immittat bonas cogitationes et sanctas affectiones.

C. The Cause of the Change.

What was most striking in De Veritate, q.24,a.14, was the absence of the specific theorem on the necessity of grace. It was flatly asserted that grace, in the broad sense of that article, was necessary for any good deed, even for digging and building. But in the parallel article, 1a 2ae., q. 109; a. 2, we are explicitly told that even fallen nature can of itself do some good acts, such as digging and building.

There is then an antecedent probability that the reason why St. Thomas enlarged his concept of gratia gratum faciens was that he adverted to the specific theorem on the necessity of grace.

Now it happens that the specific theorem does come to light in De Veritate, q. 27, a.5, ad 3m. The third objection to the view that there is only one gratia gratum faciens in each individual is as follows :

> Praeterea, nullus habet necesse petere id quod iam habet. Sed habens gratiam praevenientem, necesse habet petere subsequentem, secundum Augustinum. Ergo non est una gratia praeveniens et subsequens.

In the answer, the position of the Commentary on the Sentences, that gratia praeveniens and subsequens differ only notionally(114), is no longer maintained. Instead we hear the specific theorem, not applied to different states of liberty as in Peter Lombard, but to different needs of divine grace :

(114) In 2 dist. 26,q. 1,a.6, ad 2m.

> Ad tertium dicendum, quod quantumcumque homo habeat habitum gratiae, semper tamen indiget divina operatione, qua in nobis operatur modis praedictis ; et hoc propter infirmitatem nostrae naturae et multitudinem impedimentorum, quae quidem non erant in statu naturae conditae(115). Unde magis tunc poterat homo stare per se ipsum quam nunc possint habentes gratiam : non quidem propter defectum gratiae sed propter infirmitatem naturae ; quamvis etiam tunc indigerent divina providentia eos dirigente et adiuvante. Et ideo habens gratiam necesse habet petere divinum auxilium, quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet.

The position is not altogether clear in its details : what is certain is that a fundamental idea has come to light to be worked out with greater precision and clarity in the Prima Secundae. What concerns us immediately is that the habitual gift is no longer considered alone sufficient ; a divinum auxilium is also needed, not because of a defect in the habit, but because of the infirmity of our fallen nature and the great number of obstacles to a good and holy life.

D. The Division of Grace into Operative and Co-operative.

The first objection to the thesis of De Veritate, q. 27, a.5, is to the effect that gratia gratum faciens is divided into operative and co-operative. But nothing by itself is both operative and co-operative. Therefore, there is not merely one gratia gratum faciens in each individual.

The second paragraph of the Sed contra rejects the principle of this objection :

> .. relatio non multiplicat essentiam rei. Sed gratia cooperans supra operantem non nisi relationem addit. Ergo eadem est gratia per essentiam operans et cooperans.

However, the answer to the first objection treats the issue not merely

(115) Cp. St. Augustine, De Correptione et Gratia, cap. 12,§35,PL 44,937-8.

in principle but also in detail. It distinguishes between the donum habituale and the effectus gratuitae divinae voluntatis. In the former case the same grace is both operative and co-operative. In the latter, operative grace is the grace of justification ; co-operative includes the other effects of divine favour ; hence, in this respect, the two are really different. The answer reads :

> Ad primum dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans potest distingui et ex parte ipsius gratuitae Dei voluntatis, et ex parte doni nobis collati. Operans enim dicitur gratia respectu (illius effectus quem sola efficit ; cooperans autem dicitur respectu) illius effectus quem sola non efficit sed cum libero arbitrio cooperante(116).
>
> Ex parte vero gratuitae Dei voluntatis, gratia operans dicetur ipsa iustificatio impii, quae fit ipsius doni gratuiti infusione; hoc enim donum sola gratuita divina voluntas causat in nobis, nec aliquo modo eius causa est liberum arbitrium(117) nisi per modum dispositionis sufficientis.
>
> Ex parte vero eiusdem (gratuitae Dei voluntatis) gratia cooperans dicetur secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur, motum eius causando, et exterioris actus exsecutionem expediendo, et perseverantiam praebendo, in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium(118).
>
> Et sic constat quod aliud est gratia operans et cooperans.
>
> Ex parte vero doni gratuiti eadem gratia per essentiam dicetur operans et cooperans : operans quidem secundum quod informat animam : ut operans formaliter intelligatur per modum loquendi quo dicimus quod albedo facit album parietem ; hoc enim nullo modo est actus liberi arbitri(119); cooperans vero dicetur secundum quod inclinat ad actum intrinsecum et extrinsecum, et secundum quod praestat facultatem perseverandi usque in finem.

The general scheme of the division is clear. The effects of divine favour are manifold : operative grace is the grace of justification, the infusion of habitual grace; co-operative grace is the divinum auxi=

(116) From the context I conjectured the line in brackets.R.P. Suermont, President of the Commission for the Leonine Edition, very kindly informed me that this is to be found, with slight variations,in Cod.Vat.Ottob.,204,208,214,187;Urb.,134; it is missing in Cod. Vat.Lat.,781,785,786; Reg.,1883. It is to be noted that the excep= tional critical value of Cod.Vat.Lat.,781,ends with De Ver.,q.22,a.1

(117) Because free will does not operate,grace is operative.

(118) Because free will does operate,grace is co-operative.

(119) Because free will does not operate,grace is operative.

lium that supplements habitual grace because of the infirmity of fallen human nature(120). But habitual grace is essentially one thing : inasmuch then as it acts formally, it is operative grace ; but inasmuch as it acts efficiently, it is co-operative(121).

As a whole, the division is clearly unbalanced. The grace of justi= fication appears in both members. It is operative grace in the first member. It is both operative and co-operative in the second member.

To be noted is that the second member here corresponds to the basic division in the Commentary on the Sentences. The change has obvious advantages. First it eliminates the excessive subtlety of grace co-ope= rating as a formal cause by causing the meritoriousness (forma meriti, modus actus) of the free act. Second it eliminates the unsatisfactory oddity of grace being termed operative when it co-operates with free will in the internal act, co-operative when it co-operates with free will in the external act. But these eliminations also eliminate a really impor= tant point made in the Sentences. There it was observed that quasi per totum in Littera St. Augustine had made the distinction between opera= tive and co-operative correspond to the distinction between the internal and external act, between good will and good performance. But in the De Veritate both members of the division have co-operative grace referring to both internal and external acts.

This unsatisfactoriness will lead to a new treatment of the subject in the Prima Secundae.

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(120) Cp...divinum auxilium quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet, ibid., ad 3m.

(121) To be noted is the difference between praestat facultatem perseve= randi, attributed to habitual grace, and perseverantiam praebendo, attributed to the divinum auxilium. This would seem to correspond to the distinction between the possibility of perseverance and actual perseverance which is made in De Ver., q.24, a.13.

§2.7 From the De Veritate to the Prima Secundae.

Though gratia operans is not explicitly treated during this interval, there occurs a very relevant development in St.Thomas's thought. Five points are treated : the definition of Pelagianism ; the prima gratia ; the preparation for habitual grace ; the Quodlibetum Primum and the significance of Romans 9, 16.

A. The Definition of Pelagianism.

It is a simple matter to define Pelagianism after studying St. Thomas's articles in question 109 of the Prima Secundae. But St. Thomas could not employ this simple method before writing the Prima Secundae. To orientate the reader, we give specimens of his successive statements with regard to Pelagianism.

In 2 dist. 28,q.1,a. 1: Utrum homo possit facere aliquod bonum sine gratia. Pelagiani, facultatem liberi arbitrii ampliantes, dicunt.. quod.. homo per liberum arbitrium in quodlibet bonum opus potest sine gratia aliqua superaddita, etiam in opus meritorium..

ibid., a. 2 : Utrum homo sine gratia possit vitare peccatum...in hoc errabat Pelagius, aestimans hominem propriis operibus sine gratia posse se a peccatis praeteritis absolvere satisfaciendo.

ibid., a. 3 : Utrum homo possit implere praecepta Dei sine gratia. .. et ideo erravit Pelagius, qui simpliciter(122) impleri praecepta legis posse sine gratia posuit.

ibid., a. 4 : Utrum homo possit se praeparare ad gratiam sine aliqua gratia Pelagius does not seem to be mentioned.

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(122) "simpliciter implere" in the context means "cum charitate."

De Veritate, q.14, a. 12 : Utrum liberum arbitrium sine gratia in statu mortalis peccati vitare peccatum possit. Pelagius.. dicens absque Dei gratia hominem peccatum evitare(123).

De Veritate,q.24,a.14: Utrum liberum arbitrium possit in bonum sine gratia. Pelagius does not seem to be mentioned(124).

De Veritate, q. 24, a. 15 : Utrum homo sine gratia possit se ad gratiam praeparare. Pelagius does not seem to be mentioned(125).

Contra Gentiles 3 : 147, Quod homo indiget divino auxilio ad beatitudinem consequendam... Pelagianorum qui dixerunt per solum liberum arbitrium homo poterat Dei gloriam promereri.

Contra Gentiles 3, 149; Quod praedictum auxilium homo promereri non potest. .. Pelagianorum qui dicebant huiusmodi auxilium propter merita nobis dari, et quod iustificationis nostrae initium ex nobis sit, consummatio autem a Deo.

Contra Gentiles 3: 152. Quod divina gratia causat in nobis fidem. .. Pelagianorum qui dicebant quod initium fidei in nobis non erat a Deo sed a nobis.

From the foregoing it appears that in the Sentences the explicit concept of Pelagianism is that it denies the supernatural character of merit. In the De Veritate the assertion that one in the state of mortal

(123) Cp.In 2 dist.28,q.1,a.2;C.Gent.,3,160;1a 2ae.,q.109,a.8.
(124)Cp. In 2 dist.28,q.1,a.1;1a 2ae.,q.109,a.2.
(125) Cp. In 2 dist. 28,q.1,a.4; Quodl.,1,7;1a 2ae.,109,a.6.

sin can avoid further mortal sins is affirmed to be Pelagian. In the Contra Gentiles it is argued that to attribute justification to merits in the beginning of faith to man is also Pelagian(126).

B. The Prima Gratia in the De Veritate and the Contra Gentiles.

In his Grundlagen für ein Verständnis der Busslehre der Scholastik. Prof. Artur Landgraf investigating medieval thought of faith as the prima gratia asserted that until the middle of the thirteenth century the term prima gratia without exception denoted the grace of justification(127). In the two works here under consideration it would seem that St. Thomas did not immediately improve on his predecessors(128).

In the De Veritate in answering an objection on prevenient and subsequent grace, he wrote :

> Ad sextum dicendum quod gratia praeveniens et subsequens dicitur secundum ordinem eorum quae in esse gratuito inveniuntur : quorum quidem primum est subiecti informatio, sive impii iustificatio, quod idem est...(129).

It is to be noted that this occurs in the very article in which we have already observed the introduction of a divinum auxilium subsequent to justification and distinct from it(130).

The treatment of grace in the Contra Gentiles is highly speculative. First, it is established that the beatific vision lies beyond the natural capacity of any creature(131). Then in turn are deduced the necessity of grace(132), the necessity of habits(133), and that grace causes in

(126) The development of St. Thomas's thought in the field of grace has been common knowledge at least since the XVIth.century: cp.Caietanus,In 1a 2ae.,q.109,a.6; Dom.Soto, De nat. et grat.,lib.2,cap.3; Lange, De gratia,pp.140-152.
(127) Cp. op.cit.,Zschr.kath.Theol.,51(1927)181.Note that the statement refers to the term prima gratia.
(128) The statement refers to an explicit speculative development.
(129) De Ver.,q.27,a.5,ad 6m. (130)Vid.sup.p.87.
(131) C.Gent.,3:52. (132)ibid.,3:147. (133)ibid.,3: 150.

us charity(134), faith(135) and hope(136). In its principles, the whole of St.Thomas's theory of grace is complete. It remains that all the details do not seem as yet established.

Thus the recognition that it is Pelagian to attribute justification to our merits(137) or the beginning of faith to our good will(138) does not immediately lead to the affirmation of a divinum auxilium prior to the grace of justification. There is nothing to show that the faith, hope and charity that are caused by grace(139) are not the infused virtues that accompany justification. It is true that St.Thomas speaks of a movement, but the movement in question is the movement from the state of nature to the beatific vision, not explicitly a movement of intellect and will prior to justification. There is a scheme into which such movements could be fitted, but the possibility of a later idea is not proof of its prior existence.

Indeed, so far from adding a divinum auxilium prior to justification, the Contra Gentiles attributes the divinum auxilium that is subsequent to justification to the external action of divine providence(140)

C. The Preparation for Grace in the Sentences and the De Veritate.

It has already been noted that in these works St.Thomas does not seem to speak of the Pelagians in connection with the initium fidei.

In the Commentary on the Sentences a distinction is drawn between divine providence and habitual grace. To prepare for the latter provi=

(134) ibid.,3: 151. (135) ibid.,3: 152. (136) ibid.,3,153.
(137) C.Gent.,3,150. (138) ibid.,3,152. (139) 3: 151,152,153.
(140) ibid.,3,155.There is no allusion to fallen nature as in De Ver., q. 27,a.5, ad 3m.Cp.De Ver.,24, a.13; 1a 2ae.,q.109, a.9; the former lacks, the latter has the "specific theorem".

dential assistance is needed. But this divine aid may take any form. Thus :

> .. gratia dupliciter potest accipi : vel ipsa divina providentia.. vel aliquod donum habituale.. Si ergo primo modo accipitur gratia, nulli dubium est quod homo sine gratia Dei non potest se praeparare ad habendum gratiam gratum facientem.. omne enim motum necesse est ab alio moveri. Nec differt quidquid sit illud quod huiusmodi variationis occasionem praebeat, quasi voluntatem excitando, sive sit admonitio hominis, vel aegritudo corporis, vel aliquid huiusmodi ; quae omnia constat divinae providentiae esse subiecta(141).

In the De Veritate the position is not essentially changed. Divine mercy is spoken of as well as divine providence. An internal movement is offered as an alternative to external influence, or else in combination with it. But there is not an affirmation of the necessity of internal change of heart produced by God.

.. Si autem per gratiam gratis datam intelligant divinam providentiam, qua misericorditer homo ad bonum dirigitur, sic verum est quod sine gratia homo non potest se praeparare... oportet quod ad hoc inducatur aliquibus exterioribus actionibus, aut corporali aegritudine, aut aliquo huiusmodi ; vel aliquo interiori instinctu... vel etiam utroque modo... (142).

It is to be observed that in both cases the theory of motion underlying these explanations of the preparation for grace is derived from the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics.

D. Quodlibetum I, a. 7.

In this article there appears an explicit recognition of the necessity of an internal change of heart prior to justification. This position is derived from a further consideration of Pelagian thought; it

(141) In 2 dist.28,q.1,a.4. (142) De Ver.,q. 24,a.15.

resolves the problem of the prima gratia and the preparation for grace; and, what concerns us, it will supply a divinum auxilium that is a gratia operans.

The question reads, Utrum homo absque gratia per solam naturalem arbitrii libertatem possit se ad gratiam praeparare(143).

The response begins with an account of Pelagian thought :

> Respondeo dicendum quod in hac quaestione cavendus est error Pelagii, qui posuit quod per liberum arbitrium homo poterat legem implere et vitam aeternam mereri ; nec indigebat divino auxilio nisi quantum ad hoc quod sciret quid facere deberet, secundum illud Ps. 142,9: Doce me facere voluntatem tuam.

It will be recalled that the foregoing was the idea of Pelagianism that ST. Thomas had in the Commentary on the Sentences. He continues :

> Sed quia hoc nimis parum videbatur ut solam scientiam haberemus a Deo, caritatem autem qua praecepta legis implentur, haberemus a nobis, postmodum Pelagiani poserunt quod initium boni operis est homini ex se ipso dum consentit fidei per liberum arbitrium sed consummatio est homini a Deo.

This aspect of Pelagianism is the central issue in St.Augustine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. It was recognised to be Pelagian by St.Thomas in the Contra Gentiles. But though one can find there an abstract scheme for a fully developed theory of conversion, one does not find an explicit application of the point to the preparation for grace(144). Such an explicit application is here made immediately :

> Praeparatio autem ad initium boni operis pertinet. Unde ad errorem Pelagianum pertinet dicere quod homo possit se ad gratiam praeparare absque auxilio divinae gratiae : et est contra Apostolum qui dicit ad Phil.1,6: Qui coepit in vobis opus bonum ipse perficiet.Dicendum est ergo quod homo indiget auxilio gratiae non solum ad merendum sed etiam ad hoc quod se ad gratiam praeparet : aliter tamen et aliter. Nam meretur homo per actum virtutis, cum

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(143) The chronological sequence: Sentences, De Veritate,Contra Gentiles Pars Prima, Quodlibetum I, De Malo,Prima Secundae,seems securely established by Dom Lottin.Cp.Rev.hist.eccl.,24(1928)373-384; Rev. theol. anc.med., 7 (1935) 52-69; 156-173.

(144) Read C.Gent.,3: 149,158.

non solum bonum agit sed bene ; ad quod requiritur habitus, ut dicitur in II Ethic., et ideo ad merendum requiritur habitualiter gratia.

There follows an explicit rejection of the sufficiency of external influences, that is, of the position of the Commentary on the Sentences and the De Veritate :

Sed ad hoc quod homo praeparat se ad habitum consequendum non indiget alio habitu quia sic esset procedere in infinitum. Indiget autem auxilio divino non solum quantum ad exteriora moventia, prout scillicet ex divina providentia procurantur homini occasiones salutis, puta praedicationes, exempla, et, interdum, aegritudines et flagella ; sed etiam quantum ad interiorem motum, prout Deus cor hominis interius movet secundum illud, Prov. 21, Cor regis in manu Dei ; quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. Et quod hoc necessarium sit, probat Philosophus in quodam cap. de Bono fortunae.

On the excerpt from the Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics, that, in the middle ages, went under the title, Liber de Bono Fortunae, more will be said later. All that need be noted for the present is that the preparation grace is no longer conceived in terms of the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics(145).

E. The Significance of Romans 9,16.

The text, Igitur non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, is an important clue to the thought of St.Thomas on operative grace. It is cited by Peter Lombard at the end of S.2,d.25 with the comment,

Cuius gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praevenit, praeparando ut velit bonum ; et praeparatam adiuvat ut perficiat.

It is also cited by St.Thomas in the third objection to la 2ae.,q.111, a. 2, where the Lombard's answer is put in terms of St. Thomas's distinction between the will of the end and the will of the means.

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(145) The first reference to the Liber de Bono Fortunae occurs in C.Gent.,3,89.The verse,2 Cor.3,5,which is here cited in the Sed Contra, is explained in St.Thomas's Commentary on St.Paul on the same principle (In 2 Cor.,cap.3,lect.1).The Commentary on Romans (cap.9,lect.3)has the same idea,though there subordinated to a point from Aristotle's Metaphysics. ./.

Since one cannot will the means without first willing the end, the similarity of that distinction to St. Anselm's affirmation that only the recta voluntas can will rectitudo, is apparent. But what is most interesting is that in Contra Gentiles, 3 149 the text is interpreted in terms of St.Thomas's theorem of universal instrumentality : the same idea appears in 1a.,q. 83, a.1, ad 2m. In the De Malo, q.6,a.1,ad1m., the text is again interpreted : here to the idea of instrumentality is added the fact that God is the first principle of the act of will. Thus, we apparently have to deal with a synthesis of the metaphysical theorem of universal instrumentality, the psychological analysis of the will and of the process of the free act, and the view that God is the first mover of the self-moving will.

The Commentary on the Romans connects such a synthesis with dogmatic truth by the following argument : if grace is simply a cause or condition of good action, then, since the same is true of free will, it would be possible to invert St. Paul's affirmation and say, Non est miserentis Dei sed volentis et currentis. Such an inversion is preposterous. Therefore, grace must be the principal cause and free will the instrumental cause.

The texts here referred to will be quoted in the fifth chapter. The third and fourth chapters are devoted to clearing up obscurities in St. Thomas's theory of instrumentality, of the will, of its motion and of its liberty.

§2.8. Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae., q. 111, a. 2.

The treatment of operative grace is here, as in the Commentary on the Sentences, explicit ; the title reads, Utrum gratia convenienter dividatur per operantem et cooperantem.

The central thought in St.Augustine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio is presented in the Sed contra and again in the response. It is interesting to note in the former a syllogism :

> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in libro de Gratia et libero Arbitrio(cap. 17): cooperando in nobis Deus perficit quod operando incepit ; quia ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. Sed operationes Dei, quibus movet nos ad bonum, ad gratiam pertinent. Ergo convenienter gratia dividitur per operantem et cooperantem.

The response begins by recalling the more fundamental division of grace into actual and habitual : a step that has seemed more and more superfluous to successive generations of Thomists yet, I think, would have appeared as notable to St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Peter Lombard and St. Albert as the law of inverse squares to Aristotle.

> Respondeo dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est (q.110,a. 2) gratia dupliciter potest intelligi : uno modo divinum auxilium, quod nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum ; alio modo habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum.

This passage raises three questions. Two of these are to be investigated later. One to be dismissed immediately.

The first question is this : if we dutifully turn back to q.110, a. 2, we find a reference to the theory of motion in Aristotle's Physics. But this is not, as in the Sentences and the De Veritate, to the eight book but to the third book. Why the change ?

The second question arises from the words, quod nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum. The reader will recall the citation already made from the Quodlibetum Primum in which the distinction between bene agere and bonum agere was made. Does then the use of bene here imply that St. Thomas is confining operative grace to justification and the period subsequent to justification ? Cajetan thinks this the more probable view(146) and on this basis constructs a far-fetched interpretation.

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(146) See Cajetan, In hunc art., $$3,5.

Fr. De San, in his polemic against Didacus Alvarez, enthusiastically follows him(147). Are they right ?

The third question is connected with the second, though hardly with St.Thomas. Susequent to Fr. Stufler's earnest study of St. Thomas there has arisen a learned debate, Does St. Thomas consider grace prior to justification to be entitative supernaturale ? The difficulty with this debate is that the question is badly put. Modern theologians divide grace into entitative supernaturale, such as sanctifying grace, and supernaturale quoad modum, such as a miracle or a prophecy. The student of St. Thomas, if he would ask intelligent questions about St. Thomas's thought, must base his divisions of the supernatural in St. Thomas's thought. It is not sufficient to have some sort of an approximation. Now it seems to me that St. Thomas's thought calls for a distinction within the later category of the entitative supernaturale. However to prove this point would call for another thesis, and so, in the present work, we propose to doubt the legitimacy of this recent debate and so to prescind from it entirely.

St. Thomas proceeds to argue that both habitual and actual grace are divided into operative and cooperative.

> Utroque autem modo gratia dicta convenienter dividitur per operantem et cooperantem. Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili sed moventi ; in illo ergo effectu in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur ; et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans ; in illo autem effectu, in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum Deo attribuitur sed etiam animae ; et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans.

This would seem to define the difference between operative and co-operative grace. First it is pointed out that what counts is the number of agents. If there is only one cause; then there is operation. If there

(147) De San, De Deo Uno, I, 702-710.

are two or more causes, there is co-operation. Second, the application is made, An effect, in the order of grace, that is produced by God alone, is attributed to operative grace. An effect that is produced both by God and by man is attributed to co-operative grace. It may be noted that the term mens is simply the Augustinian equivalent, common enough in early scholasticism, for the more philosophic anima : in the passage cited, the two are evidently interchangeable.

The next step is the application of the definition to the two cases of gratia operans et cooperans.

> Est autem in nobis duplex actus. Primus quidem interior voluntatis : et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle, quae prius malum volebat ; et ideo secundum quod Deus nos movet ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia operans.
> Alius autem actus est exterior, qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est (q.17,a. 9), consequens est quod ad hunc actum operatio attribuitur voluntati ; et quia ad hunc actum etiam Deus nos adiuvat, et interius confirmando voluntatem ut ad actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo, respectu huiusmodi actus, dicitur gratia cooperans.
> Unde post praemissa verba subdit Augustinus (ibid.) : Ut autem velimus, operatur ; cum autem volumus, ut perficiamus, nobis cooperatur.
> Sic igitur si gratia accipiatur pro gratuita Dei motione, qua movet nos ad bonum meritorium, convenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.

This passage raises a number of interesting questions.

The most obvious question is, What is the actus interior ? Is it simply the initium consiliandi, as perhaps the context suggests ? Or is it the election, according to the usual meaning of actus interior? For that matter, what is the actus exterior ? Does it regard the merely corporal movement ? Or does it refer to the actus humanus, and so include the election ?

Again, according to the ad 4m, gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia ; sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus, ut ex supra

dictis patet (in corp. art.).

Are we to restrict the reference of this response, which is as general as the objection it answers, to the sole case of habitual grace ? If so, on what grounds ? If not, then the whole point of St. Augustine's distinction between an initial grace giving good will and a further grace giving good performance disappears. How is that to be accounted for?

In addition to the above questions, which arise from the text itself, there are the questions that arise from later controversy. Does voluntas mota et non movens mean praemota ? Is this passive movement of the will free ? Is such freedom intelligible ?

Finally, due to the differences between St. Thomas and later thought, which is lost in metaphysical theories of motion and concursus, there arises the question, What precisely is the psychological mechanism of ut bonum velit ? Is it more closely related to the thought of the sixteenth century or to the thought of Peter Lombard ?

Having indicated the questions to be answered, not always with certitude, we pass on to the division of habitual grace.

> Si vero accipiatur gratia pro habituali dono, sic est duplex gratiae effectus, sicut et cuiuslibet alterius formae, quorum primus est esse, secundus est operatio ; sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum et exterior calefactio. Sic igitur habitualis gratia, inquantum animam sanat vel iustificat sive gratum Deo facit, dicitur gratia operans ; inquantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans.

This, by now, is relatively familiar ground. It is the thought of St. Albert, and of St. Thomas in the Sentences and, more proximately, in the De Veritate. None the less, a few questions arise.

Here, as before, the habit is conceived not merely as the possibility of supernatural action but also as the cause of good acts. This is particularly evident from parallel passages in q.113 on justifica-

tion. Does this function of the habit throw any light on the, ut bonum velit of the other operative grace ?

Second, the parallel passages in q.113 give great attention to the axiom, motio moventis praecedit motum mobilis. But the reference to Aristotle's Physics in q. 110, a.2 presents us with another axiom, motio moventis est motus mobilis. How did St. Thomas manage to hold both of these views at the same time ?

Such are some of the questions presented by the notoriously obscure(148) article of the Summa Theologica on operative grade. Summary answers are easy but are not helpful. The purpose of the following chapters will be to investigate changes in St. Thomas's thought parallel and related to the changes in his conception of operative grace. This procedure may help eliminate a few mistaken interpretations.

$2.9 Summary.

It will be well to pass in review the whole movement that has been studied.

First, there is the Semi-Pelagian admission that grace is necessary for good deeds though not always necessary for initial good will.

St. Augustine asserts that grace is needed for initial good will, though even here the will is free, and a still greater grace is needed for actual performance.

St. Anselm, aiming at giving some account of free will, defined justice as rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata. Since this justice leads to salvation, it can come only from God. Since the will cannot act rightly unless it is in itself right, it is argued that the will is always free but it can be good only when grace is given.

(148) Fr.N.del Prado has observed that not even all strict Thomists are agreed on the interpretation. See his De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio I, pp. 194, 236 note.

Peter Lombard conceives gratia operans as the grace of justifica= tion, gratia cooperans as the same grace in its vital productivity.

St. Albert explicitly conceives gratia operans as the forma su= pernaturalitatis in the will, gratia cooperans as the forma meriti in good deeds. Implicitly there is present in his thought the idea that the infused virtue has all the influence and power of natural sponta= neity. This is illustrated by the gravitation of bodies.

In his Commentary on the Sentences St.Thomas, under the influence of the citations from St. Augustine in Peter Lombard, articulates both elements in St. Albert's thought. As a formal cause, grace is operative in sanctifying man, co-operative in making his works meritorious. As an efficient cause, grace is operative in co-operating with free will for the production of the internal act, co-operative in co-operating with free will for the production of the external act. The grace referred to is one, and all the distinctions are notional ; it consists in sancti= fying grace and the infused virtues.

In the De Veritate the fundamental cause of differences appears to be St. Augustine's real distinction between prevenient and subsequent grace : after receiving prevenient, one has still to pray for subsequent grace. This clearly accounts for the enlargement of the concept of gratia gratum faciens to include a divinum auxilium that is a gratia cooperans subsequent to justification. It would also account for the extrinsic theory of the grace of perseverance to be found in the Contra Gentiles : the incorporation of Augustine's point would not lead imme= diately to a grasp of the insufficiency of the theory of motion in the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics. Other changes are incidental. The

anomaly in the Sentences - operative grace as an efficient cause co-operates with free will - is eliminated. The excessive subtlety of co-operative grace producing the forma meriti in the free act is also omitted. And these changes are at the expense of the real gain in the Sentences : there operative grace referred to the internal act, co-operative grace to the external act ; now co-operative grace refers equally to both.

In the Quodlibetum Primum there emerges the synthesis of a number of previous tendencies : the increasing clarity and fullness of the idea of Pelagianism ; the significance of the Liber de Bono Fortunae as contracted with the eight book of the Physics; the problem of preparation for grace. The resultant is a divinum auxilium producing a change of heart prior to justification.

In the Prima Secundae the distinction between donum habituale and divinum auxilium is clearly established : but the theory of motion on which the latter is based is not, it would seem, from the Liber de Bono Fortunae nor from the eight, but from the third book of Aristotle's Physics. The division of habitual grace into operative and co-operative is the same as in the De Veritate. The divinum auxilium is operative when the will is moved but not moving, and this is in the internal act; it is co-operative when the will both moves and is moved, and this is in the external act. The meaning of these statements is not too clear.

§3. The First Subsidiary Investigation : The Theory of Operation.

The necessity of this subsidiary inquiry arises from the nature of speculative theology : it constructs its theorems with respect to the supernatural order by appealing to the analogy of nature.

Alone that fact does not account for the lenght of the present chapter. Conspiring to impose such a need are a number of factors.There is the speculative difficulty connected with the precise nature of causality or operation, to which must be added the difficulty of convincing others that St.Thomas solved this problem in a definite manner. There is the historical difficulty, for the theory of operation appears in connection with the theory of grace in quite different forms : plainly the most exact knowledge of the general idea is necessary, if we are to understand the significance of St.Thomas's successive appeals to the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics, then to the Eudemian Ethics, and finally to the third book of the Physics.Further, though we believe that in its ultimate form St.Thomas's gratia operans is an extremely simple idea, it remains that the simple idea derives a great deal of its significance from its metaphysical and cosmic background in such theorems as the affirmation of universal instrumentality and the efficacy of divine will ; in any case, it will be necessary to determine just what is the relation between the general world-view of Deus operans and the particular theory of gratia operans. Finally, there are the well-known controversies which have brought issues to a very fine point indeed : to ignore them in a treatment of operative grace is not altogether possible.

The chapter treats in turn six points : the distinction between posse agere and actu agere ; the idea of premotion, of application, of instrumental participation, and of immediatio virtutis ; it concludes with a study of the idea of co-operation.

Throughout, a purely historical view-pont is maintained. What precisely did St. Thomas say and what did he mean ?

$3.1. Posse agere, Actu agere.

The question, though familiar, is not too easy to define(1). Posse agere means that a given agent is able to act yet not actually acting. Actu agere means that the agent is not merely able to act but actually acting.

Now it is evident that the two propositions, potest agere, actu agit cannot both be true with respect to the same agent and the same activity at the same time. The two, as defined, are contradictory : the first means that he is not acting ; the second that he is acting.

It is also evident that there must be a real difference between the real situation in which potest agere is verified and, on the other hand, the real situation in which actu agit is verified. For contradictory proposition cannot be verified in identical situations.

But, while everyone must admit the necessity of a real difference in the objective situations, the point in dispute is whether or not there is per se and necessarily a real difference in the agent qua agent. For when the agent is actually acting, the real difference in the objective situation is supplied very obviously by the effect of his activity; and it makes no difference whether this effect be immanent or transient.

(1) If the terminology of actus primus, actus secundus, is used, then great care must be taken in interpreting St.Thomas. He has three senses for this pair of terms. First, the substance is actus primus, the accident is actus secundus (e.g., 1a., q.76, a.5, Sed contra). Second, the habit is actus primus and the operation is actus secundus. Third, in metaphysical potencies such as the intellect of the the angel, the potency as such is really distinct from its act(1a., q.54 a.3) note that this distinction is never applied to the virtutes elementares which are accidental forms and always in act(fire is

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But not only is there no *a priori* reason for asserting a real difference in the agent *qua* agent ; there is no possibility of such an *a priori* reason existing. For if there were, then the conclusion would be universal. If it were universal, then *omne movens movetur*. If *omne movens movetur*, ther can be no *motor immobilis*. If no *motor immobilis*, there can be no motion. If no motion, then no action.

Still, though not universal and not following from nature of the agent as such, it might be that in the creature there is a real difference between *posse agere* and *actu agere*. That defines the question of this section. Does St.Thomas make any distinction between creator and creature in this respect ? It is known that he does hold that the creator acts in virtue of a substantial act while the creature acts in virtue of an accidental act, and that is certainly where he places the essential difference(see 1a.,q.54,a 1-3,which demonstrate the proposition). But the question is whether in addition to this he also places in the creature a real distinction between a *posse agere* and *actu agere*.

No evidence has ever been produced that he holds such a view, and the purpose of this section is simply to relate the vicissitudes of St. Thomas's thought on *actio*. In an early period he disagreed with Aristotle ($3.11) ; in a later period he agreed with Aristotle but retained his own earlier terminology ($3.12) ; and at all times there are a variety of meanings which he attributes to the term *actio*($3.13). The one very clear point is that, if he made a real distinction between *posse agere* and *actu agere*, then he did so only in his mind and never in his writing(2).

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always hot, water is always wet,hence,*forma quaedam habens esse firmum et ratum in natura*).Obviously,the distinction between *posse agere* and *actu agere* is identical with none of these:neither created substance, nor angelic potency(*potentia passiva*),nor habit are a full *posse agere*. Hence,a fourth sense must be ascribed to *actus primus et secundus*. Some writers appear confused on this point.

(2) On later opinions,see $3.13E.

§3.11. Actio in the Early Period .

It will be well to begin with an explicit rejection of Aristotle's doctrine :

> Videtur quod possit esse eadem actio bona et mala. Quia, ut in 3 Phys., text. 22 dicitur : idem est motus qui in agente est actio et in patiente passio, secundum substantiam, ratione differens ; sicut eadem est via ab Athenis ad Thebas, et de Thebis ad Athenas. Sed contingit actionem esse malam, passionem bonam : unde dicitur, Actio displicuit scilicet Iudaerum, Passio grata fuit scilicet Christi. Ergo contingit eundem actum esse bonum et malum.

The objection is a valid argument. According to Aristotle, actio and passio are one and the same reality. According to common doctrine, the action of the Jews was wicked, the passion of our Lord was good. Therefore one and the same reality can be both good and bad.

The answer is a flat rejection of Aristotle's position. This rejection is supported by an appeal to Avicenna.

> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum actio sit in agente et passio in patiente, non potest esse idem numero accidens quod est actio et quod est passio, cum unum accidens non potest esse in diversis subiectis ; unde etiam Avicenna dicit quod non est eadem numero aequalitas in duobus aequalibus sed specie tantum.(3) Sed quia eorum differentia non est nisi penes terminos, scilicet agens et patiens, et motus abstrahit ab utroque termino ; ideo motus significatur ut sine ista differentia, et propter hoc dicitur quod motus est unus...(4).

Here then actio and passio are two different accidents in two different subjects; it is simply impossible for the two to be one and the same thing. Avicenna is the man to follow.

But, to show at once that there are two periods in St.Thomas's thought, the treatment of the same objection in the Prima Secundae may be cited ; here the answer is that what physically is one, may

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(3) If A and B are equal, the equality of A to B is a different entity from the equality of B to A.
(4) In 2 dist.40, q.1,a.4 ad 1m. The latter part of the answer refers to Aristotle's argument. Cp. 3 Phys.,lect.5.

morally be manifold. In the response the distinction is drawn :

> ... Si ergo accipiatur unus actus, prout est in genere moris, impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali; si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest esse bonus et malus(5).

And so to the same objection as that cited above :

> Ad secundum dicendum quod actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris inquantum habent rationem voluntarii ; et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter ; et potest esse una parte inesse bonum et ex alia malum(6).

The difference between the two answers is manifest. In the Sentences Aristotle is rejected and Avicenna cited. In the Summa an answer is found that leaves Aristotle's position untouched.

It has been shown that in the Sentences actio is in the agent. The next question is, What precisely is the actio that is in the agent?

The answer to this is a distinction.

Some of the predicaments denote an inherent reality, such as quality and quantity. Others involve a relativity, in which one must distinguish between their principle, which is some inherent form, and their ratio formalis, which is not. The obious example of this is actio.

> .. secundum diversam naturam generis diversus est modus denominationis. Quaedam enim genera secundum rationem suam significant ut inhaerens, sicut qualitas et quantitas et huiusmodi ; et in talibus non fit denominatio nisi per formam inhaerentem, quae est principium secundum aliquod esse substantiale vel accidentale(7). Quaedam autem significant secundum rationem suam ut ab alio ens et non inhaerens, sicut praecipue patet in actione.
> Actio enim, secundum quod est actio, significatur ut ab agente; et quod sit ab agente, hoc accidit ei inquantum est accidens(8).

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(5) Ia 2ae., q. 20, a. 6. (6) ibid., ad 2m.

(7) The truth of the assertion, The goose is white and weighs ten pounds, posits in the goose two entitative determinations : a quality, whiteness ; a quantity, ten pounds weight.

(8) One might have expected quod sit in agente hoc accidit ei inquantum est accidens. Then there would be the parallel to esse in and esse ad. The question treated pertains to the theory of the Blessed Trinity.

> Unde in genere actionis denominatur accidens per id quod ab eo est, et non per id quod principium eius est, sicut dicitur actione agens; nec tamen actio est principium agentis, sed e converso(9). Et si per impossible poneretur esse aliquam actionem, quae non esset accidens, non esset inhaerens, et tamen denominaret agentem ; et tunc agens denominaretur per id quod ab eo est, et in eo non est ut inhaerens. Sed cuiuslibet actionis principium est aliqua forma inhaerens, ideo aliquid potest dici agens duobus modis : vel ipsa actione quae denominat agentem et non est principium eius ; vel forma quae est principium actionis in agente...(10).

The foregoing is not extremely clear. Still certain points are certain: action is not predicated in the same way as quality and quantity. There is the principle of action, which is a form inhering in the agent. There is also a ratio formalis that is termed ut ab agente and that seems to be asserted in virtue of the effect resulting from the principle. In brief, though the passage is not conclusively against the real distinction between posse agere and actu agere, none the less it would embarrass anyone who maintained that distinction.

However, the same point comes up in the De Potentia and here the parallel between action and the esse in and esse ad of relations is quite manifest. Further, the point at issue is settled quite definitely : actio ceases to be without any change in its subject. It would be a little difficult to maintain that something real ceases to be without any change being involved. After the nature of relation is exposed, the argument turns to actio :

> .. Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens, licet non ex hoc ipso quod sit relatio ; sicut et actio ex hoc quod est actio, consideratur ut ab agente ; in quantum vero est accidens, consideratur ut

(9) In other words, the predication, Peter acts, denominates Peter as acting. But the denomination is based not on the principle of Peter's acting but on what comes from that principle.
(10) In 1 dist. 32, q. 1, a. 1.

> in subiecto agente. Et ideo nihil prohibet quod esse desinat huius=modi accidens sine mutatione eius in quo est : quia sua ratio non perficitur prout est in ipso subiecto, sed prout transit in aliud ; quo sublato, ratio huius accidentis tollitur quidem quantum ad actum, sed manet quantum ad causam ; sicut et subtracta materia, tollitur calefactio, licet maneat calefactionis causa(11).

This would seem to be clear. Calefactio is actu agere ; calefactionis causa is posse agere. Still the transition from the one to the other is an illustration of the removal of actio without any change occurring in its subject. Yet note that actio is in the subject.

It might be too much to expect that St.Thomas should also very conveniently assert that the converse transition from posse agere to actu agere is without any real change in its subject ; yet the following is sufficiently clear to be really convincing :

> .. relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate ; quia quanti=tas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boethius dicit, ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud; unde et Porretani dixerunt relationes non esse inhaerentes sed assistentes, quod ali=qualiter verum est ut posterius ostendetur. Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam probat Philophus in 5 Phys. quod ad aliquid non potest esse motus ; quia sine ulla mutatione eius quod ad aliud refetur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius ;sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie ; si=cut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus ; quod non esset si re=latio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens(12).

Here, apparently out of deference to Boethius, manens is used where pre=viously there has been inhaerens. Here again, unlike quantity and qua=lity, relation and action cease to exist without any change in their sub-jects. But in addition there is the negation of a real distinction between agent and action : quod autem attribuitur alicui "ut ab eo in

(11) De Pot., q. 7, a. 10, ad 7m. (12) De Pot., q. 7, a. 8.

aliud procedens" non facit compositionem cum eo. Finally, metaphors apart, there is no motus secundum actionem, no real difference involved in the transition from the otium of posse agere to the actus of actu agere.

Briefly, one might in three different ways assert a real difference between posse agere and actu agere. First, one might say that the emergence of the predicament actio involved a real change. Second, one might say that the presence of the predicament actio involved a composition. Third, one might say that the disappearence of the predicament actio involved a real change. Again, the same view might be denied in three ways. One might deny that the emergence of the predicament actio involved a real change : such a denial St.Thomas makes when he asserts that there is no motus secundum actionem except metaphorically and improperly. Again, one might deny that the presence of the predicament actio involved a real composition : such a denial is to be found in St.Thomas's assertion non facit compositionem cum eo. In the third place, one might deny that the disappearance of the predicament actio involved a real change : and such a denial is explicit in the repeated sine mutatione eius in quo est.

Since then St. Thomas makes use of all possible means to deny a real distinction between posse agere and actu agere, one cannot but conclude that perhaps he means what he says.

However, to preclude the more facile type of tergiversation, it will be well to add a few observations.

First, the statements quoted are perfectly general. They are of the utmost generality possible. They are made with regard to the predicament actio as such. Such statements admit no exceptions.

Second, the statements quoted are from passages that deal with

the theory of the Blessed Trinity and the theory of divine immutability. It might be suggested that though St.Thomas speaks generally, really he is envisaging a very special case. To put the objection bluntly, St.Tho= mas says one thing and means another.

This position is untenable for three reasons. First, the assumption that St.Thomas says one thing and means another necessarily eliminates St. Thomas entirely : for if what St.Thomas says is not the sole crite= rion of what he means, then the sole criterion is what any Tom,Dick or Harry fancies him to mean. That is absurd.

The second reason is that St.Thomas is a coherent thinker.He will not hold a view simply to solve difficulties in speculating about the divine Persons or the divine attributes, and then turn around to adopt another theory when he comes to an analysis of the facts of experience.

The third reason is that, as a matter of fact, St.Thomas is not exclusively envisaging a very special case. He explicitly applies his theoritical position to one of the four elements, fire ; he distingui= shes between calefactio and calefactionis causa : and the distinction between the two is such that the calefactio can cease sine mutatione eius in quo est.

$3.12. The Aristotelian Position.

It has been shown that up to the De Potentia St. Thomas considered actio to be in the agent, that he explicitly rejected Aristotle's view which identifies actio with passio, that in the Prima Secundae he solves the difficulty of the Sentences without rejecting Aristotle. In his Commentaries on the Metaphysics, the Physics and the De Anima, the Aristotelian position is exposed,accepted and defended.

The fundamental exposition is in the third book in the Physics(13) in which Aristotle works out the nature of motion.

Seven terms are used : motivum, movens, mobile, motum, motus, actio, passio. Their definitions are as follows :

Motivum est id quod potest movere.

Movens est id quod movet.

Mobile est id quod potest moveri.

Motum est id quod movetur.

Motus est actus exsistentis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi.

Actio est motus ut ab hoc, ut ab agente.

Passio est motus ut in hoc, ut in patiente.

The doctrine is concerned with the objective content of these terms. It may summarily be expressed as follows :

First, there is no real distinction between motivum and movens.

Second, there is an adequate real distinction between movens and motus, between movens and mobile, between mobile and motus.

Third, there is a real but inadequate distinction between mobile and motum, motus and motum.

Fourth, the reality of motus is common to both actio and passio. In other words, there is one entity, motus, which from its relation to its origin is termed actio, which from its relation to its subject is termed passio.

Fifth, both the active potency of the motivum and the passive potency of the mobile have a transition from potency to act. But the two transitions do not involve two acts. There is only one act for both po-

(13) 3 phys., lect. 4, 5.

tencies. This one act pertaining to both is the motus. The motus is in the mobile but from the movens. And, inasmuch as it is in the mobile, it is passio ; inasmuch as it is from the movens, it is actio.

Sixth, the foregoing does not involve a denial of the distinction between actio and passio. Going from Thebes to Athens is not going from Athens to Thebes. But the road from Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to Thebes. Similarly, though the reality of actio and passio is basically the single entity, motus ; still this one reality in the relativity of its dynamism has two terms, an origin and a subject ; inasmuch as it is from the origin, it is actio ; inasmuch as it is in the subject, it is passio.

So much for an exposition of the doctrine ; St. Thomas's commentary may now be considered. This falls into two parts. In the first he simply presents Aristotle's position. In the second he raises the general question of the nature of predication. With regard to the former it might be maintained that St. Thomas was merely telling what Aristotle meant without taking any responsibility for it. But such an interpretation cannot be placed on the second part where he deals with a large issue that goes quite beyond the text of Aristotle.

First with regard to the mover one has to distinguish between its being moved as a mover and its happening to be moved when moving :

> .. quamvis movens moveatur, motus tamen non est actus moventis sed mobilis secundum quod est mobile. Et hoc consequenter manifestat (Aristotles) per hoc quod moveri accidit moventi, et non per se si ei competit..(14).

Second the question arises whether motion is in the mover or in the moved :

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(14) 3 Phys., lect. 4, $6.

> Solet enim esse dubium apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente aut in mobili. Sed hoc dubium declaratur ex praemissis(15). Manifestum est enim quod actus cuiuslibet est in eo cuius est actus ; et sic manifestum est quod actus motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis, causatus tamen in eo a movente(16).

Third, it is shown that the motivum must have some act ;

> Quidquid enim dicitur secundum potentiam et actum, habet aliquem actum sibi competentem. Sed sicut in eo quod movetur dicitur mobile secundum potentiam in quantum potest moveri, motum autem secundum actum in quantum actu movetur ; ita ex parte moventis motivum dicitur secundum potentiam, in quantum scilicet potest movere, motus autem in ipso agere, id est, in quantum actu agit. Oportet igitur utrique, scilicet moventi et mobili, competere quemdam actum(17).

Here, then, the distinction between posse agere and actu agere is clearly drawn, and the question is put, What constitutes the reality of actu agit ? One need only read the next paragraph to see what St. Thomas considers Aristotle's view on the matter :

> ... ostendit (Aristoteles) quod idem sit actus moventis et moti. Movens enim dicitur inquantum aliquid agit, motum autem inquantum patitur ; sed idem est quod movens agendo causat, et quod motum patiendo recipit. Et hoc est quod dicit quod movens est "activum mobilis" id est, actum mobilis causat. Quare oportet unum actum esse utriusque, scilicet moventis et moti : idem enim est quod est a movente ut a causa agente, et quod est in moto ut in patiente et recipiente(18).

There is, then, one and the same actus actuating both the active potency of the mover and the passive potency of the moved ; and this one and the same actus is not in the mover but from the mover and in the moved.

Aristotle has a full realisation of the paradox of his position and accordingly proceeds to draw a list of the objections that may be

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(15) I.e., the definition of motion. (16) ibid., §7.
(17) ibid., §9. (18) ibid., §9.

raised against it by considering the terms actio and passio. He begins by taking it for granted that actio is a motion and passio a motion ; he then asks whether there are one or two motions. On the supposition that there are two, it would follow that either the motion actio is in the agent the motion passio is in the recipient, or that both motions are in the agent, or that both are in the recipient. He excludes the view that any motion is in the agent on the following grounds :

> .. Si enim aliquis dicat quod actio est in agente et passio in patiente; actio autem est motus quidam, ut dictum est ; sequitur quod motus sit in movente... In quocumque autem est motus, illud movetur ; quare sequitur, vel quod omne movens moveatur, vel quod aliquid habeat motum et non moveatur. Quorum utrumque videtur inconveniens(19).

In the present passage St. Thomas leaves it to the intelligence of his reader to see the inconvenience. To put motus in the mover without the mover being moved is not a contradiction. On the other hand, to assert that omne movens movetur is to eliminate the possibility of a motor immobilis ; and as a motor immobilis is required if there is any motion at all, omne movens movetur eliminates all motion. Parmenides would have won.

But while the whole argument of the Physics cannot be anticipated in the third book, in the De Anima St. Thomas explicitly notes that omne movens movetur is not a necessary truth because actio est in passo. His occasion is Aristotle's assertion that sound and hearing are one and the same objective reality :

> Manifestum est autem quod auditus patitur a sono ; unde necesse est quod tam sonus secundum actum qui dicitur sonatio, quam auditus secundum actum qui dicitur auditio, sit in eo quod est secundum potentiam, scilicet, in organo auditus.
> Et hoc ideo, actus activi et motivi fit in patiente et non in agente et movente. Et ista est ratio quare non est necessarium

(19) 3 Phys., lect. 5, $4.

> quod omne movens moveatur. In quocumque enim est motus, illud movetur. Unde si motus, et actio quae est quidam motus, esset in movente, sequeretur quod movens moveretur(20).

The following remark reveals St.Thomas's personal view. To posit a real distinction between posse agere and actu agere in the agent implies omne movens movetur. That clearly denies any motor immobilis and so the possibility of any motion. So far then from this distinction being the very stuff and fibre of St. Thomas's thought, it is considered by him to be a fundamental error, an error of the type he characterises exactly and truly in the De Malo, q.6,a.1,corp.

It has been shown that Aristotle, St.Thomas independently of Aristotle, and St. Thomas commenting Aristotle all agree in denying that there is in the cause qua cause, any real difference between posse agere and actu agere. But as soon as St. Thomas finishes his exposition of Aristotle in 3 Phys.,lect.5, he raises the general question of the nature of the predicaments and of predication. A few quotations will be well worth the space :

> .. sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud ; unde et decem generaa entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta.

In other words, there is the logico-metaphysical parallel, but all predication is not of the same nature. The ten predicaments are not univocally but analogically entia. To continue,

> Tripliciter enim fit omnis praedicatio.
> Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico Socrates est homo vel homo est animal ; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum substantiae.

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(20) 3 De Anima, lect. 2.

> Alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum quantitatis... aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis...
>
> Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum praedicatur de aliquo per modum alicuius denominationis... Sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente. Secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est...(21).

The foregoing is extremely pertinent, for it attacks the very root of the error we are combatting. Why is a real distinction between posse agere and actu agere so easily foisted on St. Thomas ? Because Peter can act but is not acting and Peter is actually acting are contradictory propositions. Therefore, there must be an objective real difference involved by the transition from the truth of one proposition to the truth of the other. That is perfectly true. What is overlooked is that the emergence of the effect does supply such a real difference in the objective field. And the reason why it is overlooked is that it is assumed that all predication is of exactly the same nature, that ens divides univocally into the ten predicaments the way a genus divides into its species. Such a blunder cannot be attributed to St. Thomas.

There is no need to give the data from the Commentary on the Metaphysics. The doctrine is identical. The exposition of the doctrine is identical. Notably enough, there is the same spontaneous introduction of an explanation of the analogy of predication. The one difference is that the treatment is much briefer(22).

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(21) 3 Phys., lect. 5, $15.
(22) 11 Metaphys., lect. 9, $$2308 - 13.

§3.13 Terminology.

Objections that may be raised against the foregoing are of two kinds. It may be said that the argument applies only to transient action: suppose that it does, that does not show that St.Thomas ever affirmed the contradictory with respect to immanent action ; but in point of fact the argument is perfectly general, it appeals to general principles, and, particularly in the De Potentia, what is treated is the idea of actio as such.

More serious difficulty may arise from innumerable passages in St.Thomas, for he uses the term actio in a variety of senses. To forestall such objections, the present section is devoted to an account of the use of the term actio.Four points are treated. First, the acceptance of Aristotle's theorem involves no change in terminology. Second, the term actio is frequently equivalent to the Greek energeia,actus : in this sense actio is immanent or transient. Third, confusions arise from the superposition of the above complications on those of the terms operatio, motus. Fourth, the meaning of actio media is examined. This is not a complete list of all the difficulties but merely an indication of the principal causes of confusion.

A. Actio qua actio.

By actio qua actio is meant the predicament as such, the pure difference between posse agere and actu agere.

In this respect St. Thomas's terminology is almost always the same. One might have thought there would be a radical change after his

first-hand contact with Aristotle. In fact, he accepts Aristotle's position but keeps his own terminology.

A striking illustration can be had in the Commentary on the Physics In 3 Phys., lect. 5 $13 he is exposing Aristotle's thought and has motus ut ab hoc as actio and motus ut in hoc as passio. But in $15, in his discussion of predication, actio is actus ab agente in aliud, while passio, so far from being motus ut in hoc, is an extrinsic denomination from the agent.

The actus ab agente in aliud recalls the ut ab eo in aliud procedens of De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8, and that seems little more than an expansion of ut ab agente of In 1 dist. 32, q. 1, a. 1.

Hence it is not surprising to find in the Pars prima, after a reference to Aristotle in 3 Phys.,

> ..licet actio sit idem motui, similiter et passio, non tamen sequitur, quod actio et passio sint idem ; quia in actione importatur respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili in passione vero ut qui est ab alio(22).

This is simply Aristotle's theorem but St. Thomas's terminology.

A more striking example is to be found in the theory of creation. In the Pars Prima St.Thomas argues that since actio is motus ut ab hoc and in creation there is no motion, it follows that creatio is simply the relation. But though Aristotle's theorem is the basis of the whole

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(22) 1a., q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m. Note that Aristotle's Physics are here applied to the immanent processions of the Blessed Trinity. Cp. the somewhat parallel, De Pot., q. 8, a. 2, ad 7m. The point made is fully explained, 3 Phys., lect. 5, $13.

argument here, Aristotle's terminology is no more used than in the earlier treatment in the De Potentia(23).

A study of the passages referred to will, I think, convince the reader that in the De Potentia St. Thomas has not yet accepted Aristotle's theorem, while in the Pars Prima he has. On the other hand, he refuses to alter the terminology previously worked out in his theory of the divine processions and of creation(24).

B. Actio, energeia.

In Aristotle the predicaments of action and passion are poiesis and pathesis. On the other hand, potency and act are dunamis and energeia; further, act as perfection, attainment, is entelekheia.

In the eighth book of the Metaphysics(25) he is proving that act is prior to potency : this is the equivalent of the theorem, unumquoque agit secundum quod est actu. Incidentally, he distinguishes between two kinds of energeia : one immanent, such as seeing ; the other transient, such as building.

Now, if energia is translated not by actus but by actio, there will follow a distinction between immanent and transient action instead of immanent and transient act. If, at the same time, it is assumed that actio is in the agent and passio in the recipient(26), the result will be a marvellously confused terminology.

(23) Subtracto autem motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio. 1a., q.45, a.3, corp? Cp. ibid., ad 1m. and a.2, ad 2m. Turn then to De Pot., q.3, a. 2, 3.
(24) Whether this is inadvertently or deliberately I cannot say.
(25) 8 Metaphys., cap.8, §§8,9; i.e., 9 Metaphys., lect.8.
(26) Recall that Aristotle identifies actio and passio with the motus.

But in the Sentences St. Thomas held actio to be in the agent, passio in the recipient, and he apparently had a text that translated energeia by actio. The result is the following :

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, ut Philosophus tradit in 9 Metaphys., text.16, actionum quaedam transeunt in exteriorem materiam circa quam aliquem effectum operantur, ut patet in actionibus naturalibus, sicut ignis calefacit lignum, et in artificialibus, sicut aedificator fadit domum ex materia ; et in talibus actio (i.e., energeia) est recepta in eo quod fit per modum passionis secundum quod motus est in moto ut in subiecto ; et ideo in talibus est invenire actionem (i.e., St.Thomas's predicament) in re agente et passionem in re patiente(27).

It would seem that actio has two different meaning here, for it is both recepta in eo quod fit per modum passionis and at the same time it is in re agente(28).

Unless actio is taken as a translation of energeia, such a passage as the following is unintelligible :

> quando praeter actum (A) ipsum potentiae, qui est actio (A'), sit aliquod operatum, actio (B") talium potentiarum est in facto et actus facti, ut aedificatio in aedificato.. Et hoc ideo quia quando praeter actionem (A,) potentiae constituitur aliquod operatum, illa actio (B") perficit operatum et non operantem. Unde est in operato sicut actio (B") et perfectio eius, non autem in operante. Sed quando non est aliquod operatum praeter actionem(A) potentiae, tunc actio (B") existit in agente ut perfectio eius et non transit in aliquid exterius perficiendum, sicut visio in vidente...(29).

Here actio regularly means energeia. The one exception is in the incidental phrase qui est actio.Even there, the reference is not to the ratio formalis of the predicament, for that is at least notionally

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(27) In 1 dist.40,q.1,a.1,ad 1m.
(28) Is this the origin of the extremely obscure distinction, actio divina est formaliter immanens et virtualiter transiens ?
(29) 9 Metaphys., lect.8,Cath.$$1864,5.
A means causal actus, B the actus that is effected.
A' is the causal actus as actus, A" is the causal actus as causal.
B' is the immanent effect, B" is the transient effect.

distinct from actum ipsum potentiae, but to its esse in which is identical with actum ipsum potentiae.

For another instance in which it is particularly evident that actio is energeia, see 1a., q. 54, a.1. where actio, actus and actualitas appear to be interchangeable terms.

C. Actio, operatio, motus.

Though St. Thomas does make sporadic efforts to stabilise a terminology, he seems to have been too occupied with real issues to be successful in fixing the meaning of all the words he uses. Thus, while operatio tends to denote the immanent act, it does so in two different senses : it is both the production of the immanent act, and the immanent act that is producet. Thus,

> .. duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ab agente in rem exteriorem quam transmutat ; et haec est sicut illuminare, quae etiam proprie actio nominatur. Alia vero actio est, quae non procedit in rem exteriorem, sed stat in ipso agente ut perfectio ipsius; et haec proprie dicitur operatio(30).

Here the ambiguity of actio as the predicament and actio as the energeia effected by the activity is evident. In the first sentence actio transmutat rem exteriorem : it is the predicament. In the second sentence the actio is the perfectio that is immanently produced : it is the energeia that is effected.

One may not infer from the foregoing that actio will be restricted to transient activity, for in the Contra Gentiles we have in an introductory explanation,

(30) De Ver., q. 8, a. 6.

> .. Prima igitur dictarum operationum, tamquam simplex operantis perfectio, operationis sibi vindicat nomen vel etiam actionis ; secunda verò, eò quòd sit perfectio facti, factionis nomen sibi assumit(31).

Here it might seem that operatio and actio are used to translate the general term energeia, while factio is derived from Aristotle's predicament. As in the De Veritate cited above, operatio does not mean producing an immanent act but having one : for the reference is to God whose immanent acts are not produced.

At this point the different senses of actio superpose on the different senses of motus. Motus is any of three or perhaps four things:

First, St. Thomas's metaphysical idea of transitus de potentia in actum.

Second, Aristotle's physical idea, actus exsistentis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi : this can occur only in divisible and corporeal beings, as is demonstrated in 6 Phys., lect. 5.

Third, Aristotle's loose sense of motion, seeing, understanding, loving ; it is to be remembered that these are not immanent transitions from potency to act but immanent acts, actus exsistentis in actu. This is identical with the Platonic sense of motion, according to which God moves(32).

Fourth, St. Thomas's references to Aristotle's loose sense as a titulus coloratus for his metaphysical idea, for example, 1a 2ae., q. 109, a.1.

It is to be observed that the ambiguity of this last is identical

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(31) C. Gent., 2, 1.
(32) 3 de Anima, lect.28 ; C. Gent., 1, 13; etc.

with the ambiguity noted above on operatio. There results such a passa= ge as the following :

> ..duplex est actio. Una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare. Alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire, et velle, quarum haec est differentia. Quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis, quod movet, sed ipsius moti. Secunda autem est perfectio agentis. Unde quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda actio inquantum est actus operantis dicitur motus eius, ex hac similitudine quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi actio est actus agentis (licet motus sit actus imper= fecti, scilicet existentis in potentia ; huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti, id est exsistentis in actu, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima, text.28)... Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet se ipsum...(33).

$3.13 D.

D. Actio Media.

The fourth cause of obscure terminology is the actio media of Avicenna and the Liber de Causis.

It is either intrinsic, an accidental form inhering in the agent as the additio super esse of the De Causis ; or extrinsic, as Avicenna's Virtus motiva efficiens, St. Albert's virtus divina creata, and more obviously, the radiation of light or heat(34).

Neither actio media is to be attributed to God :

> .. Deus.. non agit aliqua operatione media vel intrinseca vel extrinseca, quae non sit sua essentia ; quia suum velle est suum facere, et suum velle est suum esse(35).

But in the created will there is an actio media which is not the essence of the will :

> .. Aliud est agens per voluntatem, et in hoc distinguendum est Quod quoddam agit actione media quae non est essentia ipsius operantis, et in talibus non potest sequi effectus novus sine nova actione...Quoddam vero sine actione media vel instrumento,

(33) 1a., q. 18, a. 3, ad 1m.
(34) Vide inf. $3.5.C. (35) In 2 dist.15,q.3,a.1, ad 3m.

et tale agens est Deus...(36).

Here, the actio media appears to refer simply to the accidental act produced in the will, when it makes its election. It is the actio media intrinseca. On the other hand, when an actio media is denied to the intellect, the context requires reference to the actio media extrinseca. What is denied is that knowledge is a transient activity of the knower on the known(37).

The reader may be inclined to suspect that the image of light proceeding from the sun to the earth, or warmth proceeding from the fire through the room, may lie at the root of St. Thomas's clinging to his old formula for predicamental action, namely, ut ab agente in aliud transiens, instead of taking over Aristotle's far simpler terminology. Such a view would, however, be a gross simplification of a very complex issue.

In the first place, St. Thomas, irrespective of his own desires in the matter, has to be write so as to be understood by his contemporaries ; he has to answer their objections as they would formulate them; finally, he would only discredit his position if, by an excess of zeal, he seemed to reject what was true in cruder views.

In the second place, the Aristotelian terminology overlooks what to St. Thomas was an essential point in the analysis of action, namely, that it sets up a twofold relation. He does not use Aristotle's motus ut ab hoc and motus ut in hoc because the theory of the divine proces-

(36) In 2 dist, 1, q.1, a. 5, ad 11m., 1a series.
(37) Cp. De Ver., q. 8, a.6, ad 11m., and 1a., q. 54, a. 1, ad 3m.

sions requires an ut a quo and a qui ab alio.

In the third place, though he denies actio media in the intel= lectual act, he quite emphatically affirms the double relativity of the dynamism in intellection(38).

In the fourth place, though he denies both intrinsic and extrinsic actio media in the case of God, still he is quite willing to say ideo etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam(39)

Thus, though the actio media may have been both a useful image and a useful mode of speech, it in no way clouds thought.

It is on that point that this account of St.Thomas's use of the term actio must end. Though the confusions of interpreters of St. Tho= mas on this matter are numerous, grave, and distressing, there is no confusion of any moment in the thought of St.Thomas. He is above words.

E. Historical Note.

The subsequent history of the term actio is rather rich in anomalies The following may be mentioned.

a) The Platonist view that actio is a relation in the cause(1), which was developed and followed by St. Thomas, is subsequently regarded as an opinion peculiar to the Scotist school. On the other hand the Aristotelian analysis which St. Thomas simply presents in commenting the Physics and the Metaphysics is commonly considered Thomist(2).

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(38) E.g.,1a., q.28, a.1, ad 4m. (39) 1a., q.45,a. 3, ad 2m.
(1) See Liber de Causis, lect.20,31. (2) Suarez affirms this and naturally follows what he considers the Thomist view. See disp. Metaphys.,48,sect.4,where references are given to Hervaeus (Quod.4,q.4), Capreolus(2 dist.1,q.2,a.3; 4 dist.49,q.1,a.3), Soto(3 Phys.,q.1,conc.5),Ferrariensis (In c.Gent.,2,1;2,9;3,149), Soncinas, (5 Metaphys.,37).

b) Probably owing to the difficulty of grasping that in immanent action there is a cause and an effect - a difficulty possibly increased by the anomalies in St. Thomas's terminology - only a relatively small number of writers raise the question of the analysis of actio when the effect is immanent(3). Though they employ the same argument as did Aristotle - namely, that omne movens movetur results in an infinite sries - there does not seen to be any recognition that Aristotle had faced and solved the problem in precisely their fashion.

c) Cajetan observing that St. Thomas normally considered actio to be in the agent(4) seems to have been the first to desert what had previously and has since been termed the Thomist view.

d) He is followed by Joannes a S.Thoma who attempts a reconciliation of the two positions by the compromise of puting the actio half in the cause and half in the effect(5). In this manner he succeeds in contradicting Aristotle, St. Thomas's independent discovery, and St. Thomas's agreement with Aristotle. He also derives an excellent argument in favour of the Banezian theory of physical premotion-(6), and his singular view seems to be implied by Fr. N.del Prado(7).

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(3) See Agostino Trape, Il concorso divino nel pensiero di Egidio Romano, Unpublished Thesis 615, Greg.Univ., Rome 1938. Santo Santoro, Valenzianismo o Delfinismo ? Estratto della Miscellanea Francescana, v. 38, f. 1, 2, Roma 1938. Wilhelm Hentrich, Gregor von Valencia und der Molinismus, Innsbruck 1928. L. de San, De Deo Uno, 1, 181 ff., Lonvain 1894.

(4) In lm., q. 25, a.1.

(5) Phil. Nat., la., q. 14, a. 4, ed. Reiser, 1, 309 ff.

(6) ibid., q. 25, a. 2; Reiser, 1, 493 ff.

(7) De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 2, 252.

e) The common expression actio divina ad extra est formaliter immanens et virtualiter transiens would be a use of the Platonist - St. Thomas - Scotist manner of speech. On the other hand, the view that makes divine action formally transient would be Aristotelian.

f) The common difficulty of reconciling divine immutability with divine liberty would seem to have a triple source : confused ideas on the nature of actio ; a failure to grasp that premotion is required only in the agens in tempore ; a curious analysis of free will which places freedom in the immanent effect and not in the immanent cause. The first two imply that God could not cause without changing. The third implies that God could not cause freely without producing in himself a contin= gent effect. Adding the three confusions together divine liberty becomes what is sometimes termed a metaphysical clarum-obscurum.

g) Dominicus Banez, unable to solve the problem of divine liberty(8), concludes that human liberty cannot be more perfect than the divine(9). As the only liberty he can ascribe to God is a judgement on an objectively indifferent object of choice, he thinks the same is quite enough to make man free. Accordingly he profits by the occasion to point out that no matter what God foreknows, intends, or does with respect to the will, the act of will cannot but be free provided divine activity does not interfere with the judgement on the object of choice(10).

h) The Banezian theory of physical premotion(not to be confused with

(8) In Im., q. 19, a. 10 ;p. 376 E, 380 C D,Rome 1594.
(9) ibid., 381 F - 382 D.
(10) ibid. In the next chapter($4.1) it will be necessary to determine whether this is an instance of St. Thomas's intellectualism or an an instance of the logical dictum ex falso sequitur quodlibet.

that of St.Thomas and of Aristotle which is briefly presented in the next section) does not seem to arise from any explicit theory of actio but rather from a neglect of such theory. Thus Didacus Alvarez, when discussing sufficient grace appeals to Cajetan, Medina and the Ferrariensis as favouring his distinction between posse agere and actu agere. Not only is the appeal worthless, for the authors in question are discussing perseverance and so may mean no more than that there is a real difference between the possibility of an effect and the effect itself, but had Fr. Alvarez taken the trouble to consult the Ferrariensis just six chapters earlier he would have found a very forceful refutation of his opinion(11). Billuart goes so far as to affirm that a real distinction between actio and potentis agendi is one of the pillars of St. Thomas's thought(12).

$3.2 Physical Premotion.

Though St. Thomas does not posit a real difference between posse agere and actu agere, none the less he always maintains the well - known Aristotelian doctrine of physical premotion. In the present section the nature of that doctrine is presented.

In proving the eternity of the world, Aristotle points out that the existence of mover and moved is not sufficient to account for the actuality of a motion. If mover and moved exist, motion is merely

(11) De Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae, 8n disp. 79. The relevant passages in the Ferrariensis are In c. Gent., 3, 155 and 3, 149.
(12) De Gratia, Diss. 5, art. 2, $2; v. 3, p. 130 ; ed. Paris 1872.

possible. For actual motion it is further necessary that they be in such a situation, mutual relation or disposition, that the one can act on the other. Thus, let the heat of the equator be the mover and the cold of an iceberg be the moved : does the existence of the heat and of the cold suffice to account for the melting of the iceberg? The answer is that the existence accounts merely for the possibility of that motion or change. For actual motion the two must be brought together. Bringing them together is the premotion. And the premotion may consist either in a change of the mover (shifting the equator up to the pole) or in a change of the moved (the southward drift or the iceberg.)

From the nature and necessity of premotion it follows that no motion can be the first in time, that is, that motion is eternal. For any motion that is not eternal was at some time non-existent ; therefore, there was a premotion to make it actual ; and there was a premotion to that premotion ; and so on to infinity. St. Thomas presents the argument as follows ;

> .. oportebit dicere quod sit alia mutatio prius facta in movente vel mobili.. quod sic patet. Quies enim est privatio motus ; privatio autem non inest susceptivo habitus et formae nisi propter aliquem causam ; erat ergo aliqua causa vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis, quare quies erat ; ergo, ea durante, semper quies remanebat. Si ergo aliquando movens incipiat movere, oportet quod illa causa quietis removeatur. Sed non potest removeri nisi per aliquem motum vel mutationem ; ergo sequitur quod ante illam mutationem, quae dicebatur esse prima, sit alia mutatio prior, qua removetur causa quietis(1).

The point to be observed is that it makes no difference whether the premotion changes the mover or the moved : this squares with Fr. Stufler's discovery of the distinction between essential and accidental

(1) Phys., lect 2, $6.

potency ; if premotion is required in the mover, then it is in essential potency ; if it is required in the moved, then the mover is in accidental potency(2). But it also squares with metaphorical transition from potency to act of De Potentia, q.7, a. 8 ; for if the mover changes from potency to act simply in virtue of a change in the moved, then the changes in the mover is metaphorice et improprie.

Next, observe that the doctrine of physical premotion is universal. It will be well to copy out St. Thomas at lenght on this point, for he has suffered some neglect.

> Dicit ergo (Aristotles) quod ex quo ita est, quod simili modo se habet in iis quae agunt secundum naturam et secundum intellectum, possumus universaliter de omnibus loquentes dicere, quod quaecumque sunt possibilia facere aut pati, aut movere vel moveri, non penitus possibilia sunt, idest non possunt movere aut moveri in quacumque dispositione se habeant, sed prout se habent in aliqua determinata habitudine et propinquitate ad invicem(3). Et hoc concludit ex praemissis ; quia iam dictum est quod tam in agentibus secundum naturam quam in agentibus secundum voluntatem, non est aliquid causa diversorum nisi in aliqua alia habitudine se habens(4). Et sic oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem movens et motum convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum moveat et aliud moveatur, necesse sit hoc moveri et aliud movere(5) Si ergo non semper erat motus, manifestum est quod non se habebant in ista habitudine ut tunc unum moveret et aliud moveretur : sed se habebant sicut non possibilia tunc movere et moveri. Postmodum autem se habent in ista habitudine ut unum moveat et aliud moveatur. Ergo necesse est quod aliud eorum mutetur.

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(2) See 8 Phys., lect. 8; De Ver., q.11, a.1, ad 12m.; Stufler, Gott, der erste Beweger, p. 5, ff.

(3) On such a disposition in the will, see 1a 2ae., q. 10, a. 1, ad 2m.; contrast the essential potency of the will, ibid., q. 9, a. 3, ad 2m., a. 4. On the cosmic aspect of such a dispositio see the treatment of fate, 1a., q. 116, a.2. Vide inf., §3.4 C.

(4) St. Thomas makes an exception in the case of God; the reason is obvious, for God is not in time, and so the argument, which presupposes time, does not apply (see 8 Phys., lect. 2, §197.

(5) On the necessity of motion once the habitudo is attained, see the parallel passage in 9 Matphys., lect.4, Cath. §§1818 ss.

> Hoc autem videmus accidere in omnibus quae dicuntur ad aliquid, quod numquam venit nova habitudo, nisi mutationem utriusque vel alterius ; sicut si aliquid, cum prius non esset duplum, nunc factum est duplum, etsi non mutetur utrumque extremorum, saltem oportet quod alterum mutetur. Et sic de novo advenisat habitudo per quam aliquid moveat et aliud moventur, oportet vel utrumque vel alterum moveri prius(6).

Clearly, there is no opposition between the theory of actio held by Aristotle or that held by St. Thomas and, on the other hand, the theory of physical premotion which both of them hold. But perhaps St. Thomas also held another and more metaphysical theory of physical premotion such as that of Banez. Perhaps he did. But the onus probandi is on those who make the assertion. So far they have never attempted to show that there are two distinct theories of physical premotion in St. Thomas.

$3.3 Application.

St. Thomas affirms a number of times(1) that Deus omnia applicat. His meaning is the same as when he affirms that God moves all things to their appointed ends by his intellect(2). This is proved as follows. First, application can mean physical premotion, for in the parallel passage in the Metaphysics it is so used. Second, application does mean physical premotion, for the assertion that God applies all things is deduced from the fact that God is an Aristotelian first mover. Thirds, the significance of the affirmation of universal divine application is to be found in the divergence between Aristotle and St. Thomas : St. Thomas's first mover is an intellectual agent, while

(6) 8 Phys., lect. 2, $8.
(1) C. Gent.,3,87;ibid.,3,70;De Pot.,q.3,a.7;1a.,q.105,a.5.
(2) De Subst. Separ., c. 13 (Mandonnet 1, p.121).

Aristotle's is merely a final cause.

A. From the parallel passage in the Metaphysics it is evident that application can mean physical premotion. The two passages are as follows

9 Metaphys., lect. 4, §1818.	8 Phys., lect 2, §8.
..quando passivum appropinquat activo in illa dispositione qua passivum potest pati et activum potest agere, necesse est quod unum patiatur et alterum agat : ut patet quando combustile <u>applicatur</u> igni.	.. oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem movens et motum convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum movet et aliud moveatur necesse sit hoc moveri et aliud movere.

Since in the Metaphysics the physical premotion of a <u>combustibile</u> to sufficient proximity to a fire is termed an application, it follows that application can mean an Aristotelian physical premotion.

B. Since God is said to apply all things because he is first mover (in the Aristotelian sense), therefore application cannot be anything but physical premotion (in the Aristotelian sense).

The major is evident. The Aristotelian first mover is posited to account for the existence of the infinite series of terrestrial motions, in which each prior motion is a physical premotion to each subsequent motion (3). Therefore, the first mover (in the Aristotelian sense) is the cause

(3) The eight book of Aristotle's Physics demonstrates a cosmic scheme: there is an immovable first mover; there is an eternal and uninterrupted first motion (that of the heavly speres); there is the the eternal series of <u>generabilia</u> and <u>corruptibilia</u> which sometimes move and sometimes do not. The argument is as follows; lect.1, motion has to be accounted for; lect. 2-4, motion is eternal; lect.5,6, some things sometimes move and sometimes do not move; lect.7-13, there must be a <u>primum se movens</u>, one part moving and the other moved, to account for the continuity and perpetuity of the terrestrial series as a series(see especially, lect.12); lect.14-20, the first motion must be perpetual and uniform circular local motion; lect.21-23, the first mover must be spiritual.

Aristotle's fundamental idea is that the first mover cannot be the cause of the terrestrial <u>quandoque moventia</u>, because then he would

of all motion and premotion (in the Aristotelian sense).

The minor is proved, first from St. Thomas's general acceptance of the Aristotelian cosmic scheme, second from the manner in which he proves that God moves and applies all nature[1] and voluntary agents.

a) St. Thomas accepts the Aristotelian cosmic scheme.

Though there are differences, these are not pertinent to the issue before us. Thus, there are a number of Avicenna's Platonist tendencies in St. Thomas(4) and there is the denial that the intermediate beings create(5). But though God is the sole cause of esse, creatures are the cause of fieri(6). Hence the execution of providence is mediated(7) : to be observed is the fact that the execution of providence is a motion (8) and that there are no motions except those intended by providence (9); hence did God not control the wills of angels and of men there could be no execution whatever of providence in either the spiritual or mate=

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have to act differently at different times and so himself need physical premotion; on the other hand, the primum mobile or corpus caeleste is constantly changing and so can cause the quandoque moventia. See 8 Phys.,lect.13,$$8,9; 12 Metaphys.,lect.6,$$2510 ff. a.2 de Generatione, text.56.Hence the corpus caeleste is the primum alterans or the alterans non alteratum: because it is moved locally it can cause alteration(8Phys.,lect.14,$3).

(4) Avicenna deduces the Aristotelian hierarchy beginning from the first principle and proceeding along the lines of Plotinian emanations: this gives the cosmic structure a great measure of rigidity not to be found in Aristotle. Contrast De Pot.,q.5,a.8 with 2 de Caelo, lect. 4,$13.

(5) 1a., q. 45, a.5,et passim. (6) 1 dist.37, q.1,a.1;1a., q.104,a.1.

(7) 2 dist.15,q.1,a. 2; De Ver.,q.5,a. 8,9; C.Gent.,3: 77-79,82,91, 92; 1a.,22,3;103,6;110,1;115,3;et passim.

(8) 1a.,q.103,a.5,ad 2m. (9) 1a 2ae.,q.109,a. 1; C.Gent.,3,94 1a.,q.19,a.6;q.103,a.7.

rial world(10). In particular, the essential feature of the Aristotelian scheme, the function of the heavenly spheres, is repeatedly affirmed(11).

b) Not only does St. Thomas accept the Aristotelian cosmic scheme, but in De Pot., q.3, a.7 he deduces from that scheme his conclusion that God moves and applies all things. His argument is as follows,

> Et quia inferior agens non agit nisi mota(12), eo quod huiusmodi corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata(13); caelum autem est alterans non alteratum(14) et tamen non est movens nisi motum(15, et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum(16); <u>sequitur de necessitate</u> quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum(17).

Has anyone tried to show that the Banezian theory of physical premotion follows with necessity from the Aristotelian hierarchy ? When anyone begins to make the attempt, it will be time to think of refuting the view. Meanwhile, <u>quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur</u>.

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(10) C.Gent.,3,90.
(11) 2 dist.15,q. 1, a. 3; De Ver., q. 5, a. 9; De Pot.,q.5,a. 7-10; q. 3,a. 7; C.Gent.,3: 82,86; 1a., q. 115,a.3; et passim.
(12) The terrestrial agent is <u>quandoque movens</u> (8 Phys.,lect.5,6) and so needs premotion (8 Phys.,lect.2,$$6-8).
(13) Motion is necessarily either change of place, of sensible quality, or of corporeal magnitude(5Phys.,lect.2-4;11 Metaphys.,lect.12). Alteration is change in sensible quality(7 Phys.,lect.4,5).There must be a <u>causa per se</u> for the series of terrestrial motions,and that cause must be outside the terrestrial series(8 Phys.,lect.12). According to Aristotle, it cannot be the first mover and must be the <u>primum mobile</u>(8 Phys.,lect.13,$$8,9;12 Metaphys.,lect.14-20). St. Thomas expresses the same need for the <u>primum mobile</u>,1a.,q.115,a. 3; C.Gent.,3,91.
(14) The heavenly spheres are <u>non alteratum</u>, because change of place is not entitative (3 Phys.,lect.5.$15).But they cause alteration,for they change their position:that the cause change its <u>locus</u> is necessary if it alters(8 Phys.,lect.14,$3).See 12 Metaphys.,lect.6;8 phys., lect.13,$$8,9;2 de Gener.,text.56.
(15) On the motor caeli, see 1a,q.70,a.3.
(16) On angelic administration,see De Ver.,q.5,a.8;C.Gent.,3,78; 1a., q.110,a.1.
(17) The <u>virtus rei naturalis</u> is not to be confused with the <u>virtus operativa</u> of the angel in 1a.,q.54,a.3. The latter is a metaphysical potency limiting act. The former is an Aristotelian accidental form <u>forma quaedam habens esse firmum et ratum in natura</u>. Water is always wet, fire is always hot, nor is there any question of a transition from potency to act, as is evident from <u>De Potentia</u>,q.5,a.8,<u>ad omnia</u>.

c) The proof that God applies all things in C.Gent.,3, 67, offers no ground for reasonable doubt that St. Thomas understands by application a physical premotion in the Aristotelian sense.

> Quidquid applicat virtutem activam(18) ad agendum dicitur esse causa illius actionis; artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis(19). Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est primo et principaliter(20) a Deo; applicantur enim virtutes operativae(21) ad propria operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis vel animae(22); primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus ; est enim primum movens omnino immobile, ut supra (lib.1.c.13) ostensum est(23); et similiter omnis motus voluntatis, quo applicatur aliquae virtutes ad operandum(24), reducitur in Deum sicut in primum appetibile(25) et primum volentem(26).

It is clear that the cook applies the meat to the fire by a physical premotion in the Aristotelian sense. St. Thomas says that God is the first cause of this and every other application, for God is the motor immobilis.

d) In C.Gent., 3,70 God is again said to be the cause of all application, and the proof is the hierarchy of virtutes. In 1a., q. 105, a. 5, one reads that God not merely applies but also conserves in being all forms.

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(18) On the virtutes activae, 1a., q. 115, a.3, ad 2m. (19) The fire cooks because it is hot; the cook cooks because he sets the meat on the fire.

(20) That is, as head of the hierarchy of movers: the first mover moves more than any lower mover, 8 Phys., lect.11, $11. (21) The virtus operativa may be active, as is the heat of fire; or it may be passive as the angelic intellect of 1a., q. 54, a. 3.

(22) The promotion or application of the virtus is effected by some corporeal or spiritual movement, not by a transition of the virtus from posse agere to actu agere.

(23) It is not possible and there has never been any attempt to deduce the Ba,ezian theory from C.Gent.,1,13.

(25) God uses the will to apply virtutes operativae because he is the final cause of the will's activity. This is incompatible with the Banezian theory.

(26) On this see the next section, $3.3C.

e) To conclude, if the followers of the Banezian view to argue from St.Thomas's applicatio to their praemotio physica, they have first of all to explain how St. Thomas can deduce the applicatio in their sense from the cosmic hierarchy. Until they do so, they have no claim to pose as interpreters of St. Thomas. Meanwhile, there is a convincing cumulation of evidence in favour of the view that by application St. Thomas means physical premotion in his sense and Aristotle's sense, namely, that the transition of a situation from a state of rest to a state of activity presupposes a previous motion of some kind or other.

C. The significance of the affirmation of universal divine application lies in the fundamental divergence between Aristotle and St. Thomas.

Aristotle's problem of motion was to find a sufficient cause for the perpetuity and continuity of the terrestrial process as a process. Motion A presupposes motion B, motion B presupposes motion C, and so to infinity. But none of the movers within the process accounts for the process as a whole ; nor do all of them together, for they are not together. Therefore there has to be a mover outside the process to account for the process as such(27).

Now while Aristotle's wheeling heavens do necessitate continuous change on earth(28), it remains that they do not account for anything more than the continuity of that change. They make it necessary that something keeps happening ; they do not determine precisely what is to happen(29). And much less does the first mover do so, for he acts

(27) 8 Phys., lect. 12 ; 12 Metaphys., lect.5. (28) 8 Phys., lect.13, $$8,9; 12 Metaphys., lect. 6.
(29) C.Gent., 3, 86; 1a., q.115,a.6; 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $$10-17.

simply as final cause(30). Thus the idea of divino design and control= ling providence is simply absent from Aristotle's cosmic scheme ; he compares the world to a household : the heavenly bodies, like the sons of the family, have their conduct mapped out for them ; the terrestrial agents, like slaves and domestic animals, move a good deal at random(31). Nor could Aristotle have conceived things differently, once he had made the radical mistake of thinking that the first mover could not cause anything but one perpetued and unavarying motion(32).

Now St. Thomas's solution to Aristotle's fundamental error is the affirmation that God acts by his intellect(33). The inference from the affirmation of the intellectual character of divine action is that God is the causa per se of every coincidence of mover and moved; every conjunction of cause, every combination of effects(34).

(30) 12 Matphys.,lect.7. (31) 12 Metaphys., lect. 12, $2633.
(32) See 12 Phys., lect. 13, $$8,9.
(33) The Contra Gentiles is to a great extent simply the philosophy of the Gentiles made into a Christian philosophy by means of the principle : Deus agit per intellectum. 1; 63-96 deal with divine intellect and will; 2 : 1 - 45 treat of the emergence of creatures ; 2 : 64 - 97 deal with providence; 2: 111 - 146 deal with divine government by law. The central issue is the possibility of the world not being eternal (2: 31 - 38); this contradicts Aristotle on a fundamental point (8 Phys., lect. 2 - 4); and what precedes is the preparation, what follows is but a consequence of this closely reasoned affirmation of the intellectual character of divine activity.
(34) De Ver., q. 6, a. 3 is somewhat Aristotelian. This is corrected in C.Gent., 3, 94 ; la., q. 19, a. 6 ; q. 103, a. 7. Here the starting - point of the line of thought is the objection from Aristotle in C.Gent., 3, 94 : hence 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; la., q. 116, a. 1; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $$10 - 17, are also parallel. For the Aristotelian idea of the per accidens see, in addition, 5 Metaphys., lect. 9 ; 6 Metaphys., lect. 2 ; 11 Metaphys., lect. 8. All coincidence, conjunction, combination simply reduces to the general category of the per accidens.

Hence when St. Thomas affirms that God applies all agents to their activities, he is indeed thinking of God as the cause of all motion. But the significance of his affirmation goes far beyond that. God is the cause of each particular motion inasmuch as his mind plans and his will intends the endless premotions that make up the dynamic pattern of the universe and provide the real guarantee against entropy. It is not enough that things be kept moving by the moving heavens; the order of the universe has to be maintained and that is due not to the heavens but to divine providence(35). Thus, the basic significance of Deus omnia applicat is this,

> Non est autem alicuius causa Deus nisi sit intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere... Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae. Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnis movet ad proprios fines, Hoc autem providere est(36).

and so this,

> ..praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente(37); quam quidem causa necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem... cum igitur Deus sit universalis causa non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis(38).

Because God is an intellectual agent, he is not merely the first cause of all physical premotions; he is the cause of the premotione as intended premotions. An intended premotion is an application.

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(35) De Ver., q. 5, a. 2; C.Gent., 2, 64; 1a., q. 22, a. 2.
(36) De Subst. Separ., c. 13 (Mand., 10, p.121).
(37) On the causa impediens see C.Gent., 3, 94; 6 Metaphys., lect.3; 1a., q. 115, a. 6; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $$10 - 17.
(38) 1a., q. 103, a. 7. Cp. 1a., q. 19, a. 6; q. 22,a.2, ad 1m.; and the passages cited in note 37.

§3.4 Virtus instrumentalis.

There remains the mysterious intentio of De Potentia, q. 3.a.7, ad 7m. Since for centuries this has provided Banezians with their most formidable argument in favour of praemotio physica, it is necessary to investigate St. Thomas's meaning.

Three points are to be settled : the nature of instrumental causality; the ground for the assertion of universal instrumentality; the nature of the intentio in De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m.

A. The Nature of Instrumental Causality.

There are two aspects to the cause as a cause. First, it must be something in act: omne ens agit quatenus est actu. Second, the something that it is must be proportionate to the effect intended: omne agens agit sibi simile.

Next, there are four ways in which a cause may possess proportion to an effect. First, in virtue of a natural form: thus, fire has the form or virtus of heat and it causes heat in other things. Second, in virtue of a more eminent form: thus the corpus caeleste is neither hot nor cold, wet nor dry, yet, as primum alterans it is the principal cause of all emergence of heat, cold, humidity and dryness; it does all this in virtue of a more eminent form. Third, in virtue of an idea in the mind: thus, a master-builder is not a cathedral, nor something more eminent than a cathedral, and yet he is proportionate to the production of cathedrals because he has an idea of a cathedral in his head. Fourth, in virtue of an idea that is on its way from the mind to the effect: thus, the idea of the master-builder guides the masons and carpenters and these guide the motions of their bodies and of their tools ; because the idea is somehow immanent in the motions, it is

eventually realised in the effect. Such is the presentation in De Veritate, q. 27, a. 7.

However, St. Thomas expresses the idea of different kinds of propor= tion in another manner. In defining motion Aristotle explained that it is not "something" but a process "towards something." It is not included in any of the ten genera entis, but it is the process towards three of them; it is "towards being in a place." "towards being of a certain kind" "towards being of a certain size"(1). This intermediate between not being and being, the process towards being something, a motion, is termed an esse incompletum.

Reverting now to the examples just given from De Veritate, q.27, a. 7, one can say that the fire is proportionate to its effect per modum naturae completae ; that the sun is proportionate to its multiple effects, for it is a causa aequivoca(2), per modum naturae completae et eminentioris ; that the mater-builder is proportionate to his effect, not indeed per modum naturae for he is not a cathedral, but per formam apprehensam for he is an intellectual agent ; finally, that the instrument is proportionate to its effect not per modum naturae completae, nor per formam apprehensam, but per modum naturae incompletae, per quoddam esse incompletum. The theory is that just as a motion is the esse incompletum of its term, for instance, "becoming white" is an incomplete "being white" so also the proportion of the instrument is an incomplete realisation of

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(1) 3 Phys., lect. 3, §6; 4 dist.1, q.1, a.4, qc.2, ad 1m.; De Ver., q. 27, a. 4, ad 5m.; 3a., q.62, a.4, ad 2m.
(2) The causa univoca directly follows the rule omne agens agit sibi simile; the causa aequivoca is proportionate eminentiori modo.

the proportion of the principal cause(3).

It is now possible to define the instrument : an instrument in the broad sense is any movens motum(4); an instrument in the strict sense is a cause that is proportionate to its effect per modum naturae incompletae. Thus, the moon illuminates the earth in virtue of the light it receives from the sun : it is a movens motum but it is not an instrument in the strict sense, for the moon is bright per modum formae completae. On the other hand, in the generation of animals the seed is an instrument in the strict sense, for it is not an animal nor something more eminent than an animal and yet it is the cause of an animal(5).

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(3).. entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere, nisi per reductionem, sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur in illud genus in quo sunt termini motus... Unde et virtus haec quae est in sacramentis reducitur ad id genus in quo est virtus completa principalis agentis.. 4 dist.1,q. 1,a.4, qc. 2, ad 1m.

(4) See 8 Phys.,lect.9,$5, for an example of this usage.

(5) This is the doctrine of De Veritate, q.27,a.4. The generation of animals appears to be the source for the theory of instrumental causality. See Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium,1,c.21-2,c.5; St. Albert, 2 de Creaturis, q. 17,a.3 (Borgnet,35,154 ss.); St. Thomas, 2 dist. 18,q. 2,a.3; De Pot., q. 3, a. 11, 12; 7 Metaphys., lect. 6-8; 1a.,q. 118,a.1. The instrument in the Summa is far more Aristotelian than that in the Sentences.

The fundamental idea of the whole analysis would seem to be the Aristotelian parallel ~~parallel~~ between nature and art in 7 Metaphys., lect. 6-8.

From that parallel comes St. Thomas's analogy: sicut artifex est est ad artificiata, ita Deus ad naturalia. This does not seem to occur in the Contra Gentiles. It is fundamental and synthetic in the Summa: see 1a.,q. 16, a. 1 (objective truth); q.17,a.1 (objective falsity); q. 14,a.8 (scientia Dei causa rerum); q. 21,a. 2 (truth and justice); q. 22, a. 2 (providence); 1a 2ae;, q. 93,a.1 (lex aeterna; cp.ibid.,a.3,4).

But besides this equivalence between ideas and essences or forms, there is also the theory of cognition based on the view that knowledge arises from the immateriality of a form(1a., q. 14, a.1): now just as the idea, species intentionalis, in the mind of the artisan is his proportion to his work of art, so also the esse incompletum of the species, the pattern of instrumental movements, is the proportion of the instrument. (1a, 87, 1, 3m: intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu, etc.)

B. The Hierarchic Ground for Universal Instrumentality.

St. Thomas systematizes the Aristotelian hierarchy on somewhat Platonist lines. God as primum movens, and the corpus caeleste as primum alterans are affirmed to be universal causes. Just as the Platonic idea cannot but be the cause of every participation of the idea(5), so there cannot be an ens that is not produced by ipsum esse nor a res naturalis that is not produced by the causa speciei(6).

5) Con'd.

Now the favourite illustration of the esse incompletum of a form or an idea appears to be color in aere. Heat is not merely in the fire and in the object heated : it is also in the intervening space per modum naturae completae ; the air is really heated. But a colour is in the object, and it is in the eye or sense of vision, but the intervening air is not coloured ; hence the species coloris in aere is per modum naturae incompletae, it is sola intentio, that is, the specification of knowledge but not an act of knowing ; it is an esse spirituale but it is not an esse completum like the soul or a spiritual faculty or a spiritual act ; it has merely esse spirituale incompletum.

Hence on the natura of light and colour, see St.Albert, 2 de Creaturis, q. 21, a. 5(Boregnet, 35, 205 ss.); St. Thomas, 2 dist. 13, q. 1, a.3; 2 dist. 19, q.1, a. 3, ad 1m.; De Pot., q. 5, a. 8 ; 1a., q. 67, a. 4; 2 de Anima, lect.14. Note that the intentio by itself cannot cause anything but a sensation, a perception ; to produce a physical effect it must be immanent in a motion ; compare the gramophone record which has the intentio, the virtus artis, permanently, but renders the work of art only inasmuch as it is moved. Further observe that in later works the term intentio is replaced by esse spirituale : in 3a., q. 64, a. 8, ad 1m., as H.D. Simonin has noted (Rev. sc. phil. theol., 19 (1930) 445 - 463), it is denied that there is an intentio in the instrument.

On the limitations of instrumental causality, see 1a., q. 45, a. 5; 1a., q. 118, a. 2. On the theory of the sacraments, see Cajetan in 3a., q. 62, a. 4; q. 78, a. 4. On the instrumentality of the heavenly spheres, 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2; 1a., q. 70, a. 3, ad 3m., 4m., 5m. ; De Occultis Operationibus Naturae; De Pot., q. 5, a. 7-10. On the instrumentality of accidents, 1a., q. 115, a. 1, ad 5m.; cp. q. 118, a.1.

(5) .. si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. 1a., q. 115, a. 1, corp.

(6) For a statement of the hierarchy as such, see 6 Metaphys., lect.3, §§1207 - 1209. For the causa speciei and the Platonist tinge in this conception, see De subst.Separ., c. 8 (Mand., 1, 107); 1a.q. 115, a. 3, ad 2m.; cp. 1a., q. 104, a. 1, 2. The basic principle of

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C. The Intentio of De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m.

Ad septimum dicendum quod virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis ut quaedam forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura(7). Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agat(8), est ut intentio sola(9), habens esse quoddam incompletum(10), per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in istrumento artificis(11). Sicut ergo secu=

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(6) cont. the systematisation, quanto virtus alicuius causae est perfectior tanto ad plura se extendit, is attributed to Proclus in the Commentary on the Liber de Causis (prop.1, Mand., 1, 198) ; it is repeated in De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7; 2 Phys., lect. 6, $3 ; De Subst. Separ., c.8 (Mand., pp. 105,106). For Platonism in the concept of God, ipsum esse separatum, ipsum intelligere separatum, see De Subst. Separ., c. 12 (Mand.,1. 112).

That God is universal cause of being can, of course, be proved without an appeal to the Platonist analogy: the proportion of a cause is determined by its nature; only the divine nature or essence is being; therefore, God alone is the proportionate cause of being. It follows immediately that any creature causes being only instrumentally.

Though ST.Thomas in the Sentences and the De Substantiis Separatis uses the principle that God is the universal cause of being to prove that God alone can create it does not follow, as Fr.Stufler seems to assume(Gott, der erste Beweger, pp. 67-83), that the principle has no further implications.

Finally, note that Aristotle implies the primum mobile to be an universal cause: "first" means "presupposed" by all other motion.

(7) Fire is always hot, water is always wet, etc.
(8) Cp. 8 Phys., lect. 2, $8. The existence of mover and moved does not suffice for more than the possibility of motion; for actual motion they must be in the right situation, disposition, relation. See above,$3.2.
(9) Sola,presumably not an act of knowledge but merely its specification.
(10). Were the intentio an act of knowledge, it would have esse completum.
(11). Heat heats the intermediate air, colour does not colour the intermediate air (hence, natura incompleta). Art is an idea in the mind; an instrument qua instrument has not a mind, nor fully realised ideas, but some participation of an idea, namely, the pattern of instrumental movements. The gramophone record preserves such a pattern permanently.

ri per artem dari potuit acumen ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedem forma permanens nisi haberet intellectum(12), ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria ut forma in ipsa permanens non autem vis qua agit ad esse ut instrumentum primae causae nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium. Nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret se ipsam(13), nec ut conservaret se in esse. Unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit ut operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina(14).

The question is, What is the intentio, esse incompletum, virtus artis, vis artis, motus artis, which God as universal cause of all being confers on creatures to enable them actually to produce being?

One has only to examine the parallel passages. God is the divine artist, artisan, architect. The design of providence, ratio gubernationis divinae, works through creatures towards the achievement of the gloria Dei externa. Obviously, just as there is a participation, a virtus, in the tools of the artisan, so also there is a participation, a virtus artis divinae, in the whole created universe. This view is not peculiar to the De Potentia; it gradually develops from the Sentences to the Pars Prima.

Thus, in the Sentences divine knowledge is a cause just as the knowledge of an artist is a cause,

> ... scientia secundum rationem scientiae non dicit aliquam causalitatem, alias omnis scientia causa esset; sed inquantum est scientia artificis operantis res, sic habet rationem causae respectu rei operatae per artem. Unde sicut est causalitas artificis per artem suam, ita est consideranda causalitas scientiae divinae(15).

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(12) Vis has apparently no muscular connotation: the vis artis cannot exist permanently in the instrument because the instrument has no intellect. Apparently, St. Thomas did not foresee the gramophone.

(13) Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur. (14) This conclusion corresponds to the conclusion of the objection.

(15) 1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1.

Further, the conception, plan, design of the divine artist has a two-fold existence : first and essentially in the mind of God; second and derivatively in creatures. In the former case it is termed providence, in the later, fate :

> .. providencia et fatum differunt per essentiam : sicut enim forma domus est aliud per essentiam secundum quod est in mente artificis, ubi nomen artis habet, et secundum quod est in lapidibus et lignis, ubi artificiatum dicitur : ita etiam ratio gubernationis rerum aliud esse habet in mente divina, ubi providentia dicitur, et aliud in causis secundis, quarum officio gubernatio divina expletur, ex quibus fatum dicitur(16).

Here, plainly, providence is affirmed to be really different from fate; further, fate is something for it has aliud esse; again, it is in secondary causes, and, indeed, inasmuch as these causes execute divine government. It can hardly be denied that the fundamental elements of De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. are to be found in the very first book of the Sentences.

In the De Veritate a distinction is drawn between the forms of creatures, which are participations of divine ideas, and on the other hand, fate, which is a participation of divine providence ;

> ...sicut se habet idea ad speciem rei, its se habet providentia ad fatum(17).

The fundamental distinction between providence and fate reappears in the Contra Gentiles.

> ...ipsa ordinatio, secundum quod in mente divina est, nondum rebus impressa, providentia est ; secundum vero quod iam est explicata in rebus fatum nominatur(18).

(16) 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5m.
(17) De Ver., q. 5, a. 2, ad 1m. (18) C.Gent., 3, 92.

At this point the passage in the De Potentia was written : if the reader will refer back to it, he will observe how natural it is for St. Thomas to appeal to the virtus artis divinae which is fate when the operation of God in secondary causes is denied.

This connection of fate with the activity of secondary causes is clearly expressed in the Pars Prima:

> ... divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exsequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum quod est in ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio ef= fectuum vocatur providentia. Secundum vero quod praedicta ordi= natio consideratur in mediis causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet rationem fati...(19).

No closer parallel to the passage in the De Potentia could be desired than:

> ... fatum est in ipsis causis secundis sacundum quod sunt ordina= tae ad aliquos effectus producendos(20).

For, in the first place, divine providence is like the conception of an artist, while fate is the same conception according to another mode of existence ; in the second place, fate is in the secoundary causes ; in the third place, fate is in these causes qua ordained by God to produce given effects. As nothing can act without the participation of the divine art, so with this participation nothing can fail to act. This is stated explicitly.

> ... et ideo dicendum est quod fatum secundum consideration em cau= sarum secunderum mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae ne= cessitatis sed conditionatae, secundum quod dicimus hanc condi= tionalem esse verem vel necessariam, Si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit(21).

(19) 1a., q. 116, a.2.
(20) 1a., q. 116, a. 2, corp. (21) ibid., a.3, corp.

Thus, St. Thomas connects his idea of fate with his brilliant theorem on divine transcendence and the efficacy of divine will(22)

Further, this affirmation of a fate is in no way opposed to the repeated assertion that the sola intentio by itself cannot produce any effect except a perception. For,

> ... in tantum habet rationem causae, in quantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur(23).

Nor is it opposed to his repeated assertion that the execution of divine providence is not immediate but mediated : whether one uses one instrument or one million instruments, they are all instruments, and the virtus artis is automatically transmitted through the series, for it is simply the seriation, the arrangement, the pattern of the instruments in their movements.

> ...causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas potest dici fatum; essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.
> ... fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideratur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus ; et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideratur per relationem ad effectus vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit,Te tua fata trahunt(24).

This dispositio may very naturally be identified in single instances with the dispositio or habitudo that must exist between mover and moved if the one is to move the other : thus, we have the idea of physical premotion which is necessary quo actualiter agat. Next, if this dispositio is considered in,its relations to all other secondary

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(22) On divine transcendence, see $4.2. (23) ibid., a. 2, ad 2m.
(24) 1a.q. 116, a. 2, ad 1m ., 3m. Cp.. vis principalis agentis instrumentaliter invenitur in omnibus instrumentis ordinatis ad effectum, prout sunt quodam ordine unum 3a., q. 62, a. 4, ad 4m.

causes, then there is the intentio, the participation of divine art in the secondary cause. Again, if the dispositio is taken in conjunction with the divine will, it is the term of the applicatio, for, as has been shown, application is premotion as intended. Finally, all of these dispositiones taken together give fate.

Admittedly St. Thomas's thought on the issue is rather complex. But if he ever dreamt of a Banezian praemotio physica, he simply could not have asserted that fate is merely the arrangement of secondary causes. For the praemotio physica is far too obviously fatal, not to be mentioned by its originator when fate itself is under discussion.

$3.5. The Degrees of Causality.

It has been shown that the theory of application and of instrumental participation are nothing but speculative elaborations of the Aristotelian cosmic system. Three theorems on the degrees of causality represent speculative elaborations from a different viewpoint, namely, the relative importance of the different hierarchic movers. They are considered in turn.

A. Magis movet.

In proving that metaphysic is the truest of the sciences Aristotle enuntiated his theorem on degrees of being :

> Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur, ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce praedicatum de eis. Sicut ignis est causa caloris in elementatis; unde cum calor univoce dicatur de igne et de elementatis corporibus, sequitur quod ignis est caldissimus(1).

(1) 2 Metaphys., lect. 2, Cath. $292.

Accordingly, since metaphysic deals with first principles which are the basis and presupposition of all other truth, it follows that metaphysic is the truest of the sciences. Again, if A by moving B causes B to move C, then, because A is the cause of B's moving C, it follows that C is more moved by A than by B.

> Omne enim quod movetur, magis movetur a superiore movente quam ab inferiori; et per consequens, multo magis a primo movente(2).

This theorem is perfectly simple and straightforward.

B. Vehementius imprimit.

This is from the first proposition of the Liber de Causis. Its basic principle St. Thomas enuntiates in these terms:

> ...si albedo esset separata, ipsa albedo simplex esset causa omnium alborum in quantum sunt alba.. Secundum hoc ergo Platonici ponebant quod id quod est ipsum esse est causa exsistendi omnibus ; id autem quod est ipsa vita est causa vivendi omnibus ; id autem quod est ipsa intelligentia est causa intelligendi omnibus(3).

Now in the first proposition an effect, esse vivum humanum, is examined. On the ground that the cause of humanum can cease acting without destroying the vivum; that the cause of the vivum can cease acting without destroying the esse ; that, on the other hand, were the cause of vivum to cease acting, then the humanum is eliminated ; and that, were the cause of esse to cease acting, then both vivum and humanum are eliminated: it is argued that the higher cause prius intrat, vehementius imprimit et tardius recedit(4).

(2) 8 Phys., lect.11,§11. The principle is used by Aristotle to show that the first mover cannot be moved in any of the species of motion in which the lower mobilia are moved. Since the first is the ultimate cause of all these motions and more a cause than the intermediate movers, it follows that they cannot be effected in him.
(3) Liber de Causis, prop. 3a., Mand.1,209. Cp. De Ver., q.5, a.9 ad 7m.
(4) ibid., prop. 1a., Mand.1, 193 - 200.

Since St. Thomas conceives his hierarchy as a hierarchy of universal causes with God as the universale principium essendi and the heavenly spheres as causa speciei, he is quite justified in using this theorem to express the degrees of causality in his own hierarchy.

All that is to be observed is that the conclusion means no more than the premisses justify. One is not to interpret vehementius imprimit with the imagination. Like prius intrat and tardius recedit, these expressions mean nothing more than this : the activity of the higher cause is a presupposition of the activity of the lower.

C. Immediatio virtutis.

While the foregoing theorems are very simple, the present one is notabily complex. It is a reaction against Avicenna, a use of the Liber de Causis, and an appeal to Aristotle.

Avicenna in his analysis of animal motion distinguished between virtus motiva imperans and virtus motiva efficiens. The former is immanent in the pars irascibilis and concupiscibilis. The latter is the principle of their transient action. It is described by St.Albert, who follows Avicenna in this matter, as:

> .. infusa in nervis et musculis, contrahens chordas et ligamenta coniuncta membris, aut relaxans et extendens(5).

Not content to follow Avicenna, St. Albert uses this doctrine as the analogy for his explanation of divine activity. Accordingly he distinguishes in God between an immanent virtus divina increata and a transient virtus divina creata(6).

(5) 2 de Creaturis, q.68;Borgnet 35,560. (6) See Sauer, Die theologische Lehre der materiellen Welt beim heiligen Albert dem Grossen, pp. 133 ss. Würzburg, 1935.

On the other hand, the twentieth proposition of the Liber de Causis meets the Epicurean view that the gods cannot be distracted from Elysian pleasures and mixed up in the affairs of this world. The solution is the assertion that God acts by his essence. Other agents have between them and their effects a habitudo, continuator, res aliqua media, additio super esse, actio(7): for instance, perhaps, the light of the sun as in the sun and in the medium, the heat of the fire as in the fire and in the atmosphere between the fire and the object heated. It follows that such agents are "mixed up" in the things they effect. But God acts by his essence; one and the same thing is the prima bonitas, the primum esse and the virtus virtutum(8).

Now in St. Thomas we find a trace of Avicenna, a good deal of the Liber de Causis, and a new idea out of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. This last must now be explained.

For Aristotle the explanatory syllogism with the middle term the cause of the predicate(9) is the ideal and the goal of science. Naturally he raises the question occasioned by the plurality of middle terms, asking whether inquiry is to begin from the most gene= ral of these or from the lowest. His answer is that one should begin from the nearest and least general - for confusion lurks in generali= ties - and then by successive steps advance to the most general which will be the immediate cause of the predicate. Here "immediate" has its etymological sense of "non-mediated," "logical first." Thus, Socrates is mortal, because he is a man; a man is mortal, because he

(7) Prop. 20, 31; Mand., 1, 279 ff, 307 ff.
(8) See prop. 20, 6, and 9;Mand.,1,pp.279,225,239 respectively.
(9) To be observed is the assumption of the parallel between the logical and real orders. It is fundamental to both St. Thomas and Aristotle. Cp.. sicut est dispositio rerum in esse, it's etiam in veritate. G.Gent., 1,62.The locus classicus is 2 Metaphys., lect. 2.

is an animal; an animal is mortal, because its material cause is composed of contraries. The three middle terms are "man" "animal" "with material cause composed of contraries." The first of these is the least general. The last is the real cause of mortality: not only does it make "animal" "man" and "Socrates" mortal; it also is the cause of "animal" making "man" mortal, and of "man" making "Socrates" mortal. The gist of the thought is presented by St. Thomas as follows:

> ...oportet semper media accipere quae sunt propinquiora subiecto, in quo quaeritur causa illius communis causati; et sic oportet procedere quousque perveniatur ad id quod est immediatum communi causato. Et huius rationem assignat, quia illud quod est ex parte eius quod continetur sub aliquo communi, est ei causa quod sit sub illo communi(10): sicut si D est sub B, et si C est causa D quod B insit ei; et ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod C sit causa quod A insit D; et quod A insit C, B est causa. Ipsi autem B inest A per se ipsum et immediate(11).

Here we are clearly in the pure regions of the logico-metaphysical parallel. We have now to observe the way these extremely diverse elements influence St. Thomas, combine in his thought, and there are purified. This observation will help to eliminate misinterpretation.

First, though he uses Avicenna's distinction of <u>virtus motiva imperans</u> and <u>virtus motiva efficiens</u> at least once in the Sentences (12), he refuses to follow St. Albert in applying it to God(13).

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(10) I.e., the middle term is the cause of the predicate in the subject; this is the idea of the explanatory syllogism. See 1 Post. Anal., lect. 4, 23; Joseph, Principles of Logic, is very good on the subject.

(11) 2 Post. Anal., lect. 19, $6. The meaning of the symbols may be had by any four terms of descending generality: A. material; B, animal; C man; D, Socrates. Thus, if Socrates is an animal, and if this is because Socrates is a man; if, further, Socrates is material because he is a man; and if man is material because he is an animal; then <u>per se et immediate</u> an animal is material.

(12) In 2 dist.18, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1m.

(13) .. Deus.. non agit aliqua operatione media vel intrinseca vel extrinseca quae non sit sua essentia: quia suum velle est suum facere, et suum velle est suum esse. In 2 dist.15, q.3,a.1, ad 3m. This is not merely the position but also the reason to be found in the <u>Liber de Causis</u>.

Second, he makes common use of the concept of the res media:

> Operatio reducitur in principium sicut in duo: in ipsum agentem et in virtutem agentis qua mediante exit operatio ab agente(14).
> In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem qua agit, sicut ignis calefacit per calorem(15).

Third, since God does not act by a res media but by his essence (16) and since an agent must be present in the respect in which it acts, it is inferred that the divine essence is present where it acts(17).

Fourth, coupled with the theorem on divine presence in the Sentences and in the De Potentia though not in the Contra Gentiles(18), is Aristotle's theorem on the immediacy of first principles. The universal causes of the hierarchy permit this transposition just as much as the use of the Platonist vehementius imprimit. The argument is as follows :

> Sint A,B,C, tres causae ordinatae ita quod C sit ultima quae exercet operationem. Constat tunc quod C exercet operationem per virtutem suam; et quod per virtutem suam hoc possit, hoc est per virtutem B et ulterius per virtutem A. Unde si quaeritur, Quare C operatur ? Respondetur, Per virtutem suam. Et quare per virtutem suam ? Per virtutem B. Et sic quousque reducatur in virtutem primae causae, in quam docet Philosophus quaestiones resolvere in Post. Anal., 2, text. 22 et in 2 Phys text. 38. Et ita patet quod cum Deus sit prima causa omnium, sua virtus est immediatissima omnibus(19).

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(14) In 1 dist. 37, q. 1,a. 1, ad 4m. (15) C.Gent., 3, 70.
(16) V sup. note 13. (17) De Pot., q. 3,a.7. (18) See notes 14,15,17.
(19) In 1 dist. 37, q. 1, a.1, ad 4m. The reference to text 22 in Post. Anal. is to a connected subject, but there the question is definition and not immediate first principles. In 2 Phys., lect. 6, $10, there is the same idea, though without any elaboration, as in 2 Post. Anal., lect. 19, $6.

Plainly, this theorem is simply an exploitation of the parallel between the logical and the real orders.

There is, finally, another aspect of the same point. Just as the higher middle term is the cause of the lower causing the predicate in the subject, so, inversely, one may say that the higher middle term conjoins the lower to the predicate. Mediation and conjunction are equivalent. "Animal" makes "man" make Socrates material. What makes "Socrates" material ? "Man." What makes "man" make Socrates material ? "Animal". Similarly in the order of efficient causes, the provost can do things because he does them in the name of the king ; the virtus of royal authority mediates between the provost and what he would effect, it conjoins the virtus of the provost to the effect (20)

Perhaps these theorems belong to the exuberance of St. Thomas's youth(21). In any case they in no way justify a Banezian interpretation.

$3.6. The Theory of Co-operation.

One of the most startling features of the celebrated dispute on concursus divinus is the somewhat ingenuous assumption that everyone knows precisely what it is to "cause" "operate" "co-operate". Our long investigation of St. Thomas's thought on actio, supported as it is by the study of premotion, application, instrumental participation and the degrees of causality, provides a safe starting-point for the present inquiry :

(20) In 1 dist. 12, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4m. Cp. De Pot., q. 3,a. 7.
(21) The theorem of "immediatio virtutis" is not used to prove divine presence in C. Gent., 3,70; it is not mentioned even in the article on divine presence in 1a., q.8,a.1, nor in the article on God's operation in the operation of creatures,1a.,q.105, a.5.

it also suggests that past discussion may have suffered from a neglect of more fundamental ideas.

A. The Issue Defined.

Co-operation in general means that two or more causes combine for the production of a single effect. Each cause has its own actio, and the question is, What are the relations between the different actiones. Presumably, it makes no difference whether one uses the Aristotelian idea of action, namely, the relation of the effect to the cause, or the Thomist ratio formalis, namely, ut ab agente, in aliud procedens.

Different instances of co-operation must be distinguished.

First, there is co-ordinate co-operation: two men pull a boat. Each cause exerts its actio. The two actiones are distinct, and their combination is according to vectorial addition. Such co-operation would seem to presuppose space as an intrinsic condition. With it we are not concerned.

Second, there is accidental co-operation: Abraham begat Isaac, Issac begat Jacob. Here again there are two actiones, and the two are distinct. With this we are not concerned.

Third, there is serial co-operation: Peter kills Paul with a sword. This is the object of our discussion.

The essential feature of serial co-operation is that it involves not two but three actiones. Peter moves his sword according to the precepts of the art of killing; the sword so moved kills Paul; and, in the third place, Peter kills Paul.

The assertion that there are three actiones (1) does not mean that there are three products : if there were three products, then there would be no-operation. The third actio is the co-operation; it is the operation of the higher cause in the operation of the lower.

Hence, a twofold error is to be avoided.

First, one must not deny the third actio. That would eliminate the difference between accidental and serial co-operation. Peter kills Paul but Abraham does not beget Jacob. Isaac could beget Jacob, even though Abraham were dead ; but the sword cannot kill Paul, unless it is moved by Peter.

Second, one must not assert a third product. It is true that Peter not merely moves the sword but also kills Paul. But this truth in no way implies that Peter not morally runs through with the sword but also strangled Paul, there would be a third product. There is a third actio, even when he does not strangle Paul.

Now, these two errors correspond to the two positions between which St. Thomas steers a middle course. He does not deny a third actio, and so differs from Durandus who is reputed to have held that God merely creates and conserves. He does not affirm a third product, and so he differs from Banez who posits a praemotio physics and from Molina who posits a concursus simultaneus.

The point to be grasped is that to deny the position of Banez or of Molina is not to affirm the position of Durandus.

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(1) There are three actiones according to Aristotle's terminology. St.Thomas normally speaks as though there were two actiones of which the second is in virtue of the first. His idea seems to be derived from the Liber de Causis. See De Ver., q. 29, a.14, corp.

B. Deus operatur in omni operante .

St. Thomas does not merely affirm that God alone creates, that he conserves all things in being, that he is the first mover and so the cause of all physical premotion(1), that he acts by his intellect and so all premotions are intended by him and therefore applications, that the design of providence is the dynamic pattern of an instrumental universe just as the idea of the artist is the pattern of the movemnts of his tools. That is just so much scaffolding. It is no more than a list of reasons for affirming the central theorem, namely, Deus operatur in omni operante.

The created cause cannot have an operation, unless in that operation is the operation of God. The created agent cannot have an actio without there being an attribution of the same actio to God. From the created principle there cannot proceed an ut ab agente in aliud without this procession proceeding still more from God qui vehementius imprimit, qui immediatius agit.

Further, since this affirmation of divine operation in all otther operation is the affirmation of a theorem, of a conclusion, and since there cannot be a conclusion without a premiss, the argument can be reversed. One may not only say that if God moves all things, then he operates in all operation. One may also say that unless God moves, then the creature cannot operate.

Thus, there are two points to be established: first, God operates in all operation; second, unless God moves, then the creature cannot operate.

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(1) The reader will recall that the continued existence of mover and moved is not sufficient for actual motion; there is such a thing as entropy.

a) The Direct Statement: God operates in all operation.

The point may be illustrated from the De Veritate, the Contra Gentiles, the De Potentia and the Summa.

In the De Veritate one reads that God operates in the will as he operates in nature :

> Potest autem Deus voluntatem immutare ex hoc quod ipse in voluntate operatur sicut in natura: unde, sicut omnis actio naturalis est a Deo, ita omnis actio voluntatis in quantum est actio, non solum est a voluntate ut immediate agente, sed a Deo ut primo agente, qui vehementius imprimit(2).

The meaning is not obscure: the actio voluntatis in quantum est actio would seem to be the ut ab agente in aliud procedens, the ratio formalis of actio. This is asserted to be not merely a procession from the will but much more a procession from God. The Platonist theorem of the degrees of causality is mentioned. And one also learns that God's operation in nature is the same as this operation in the operation of the will.

In the Contra Gentiles there is a chapter entitled Quod Deus est Causa operandi omnibus operantibus. The title is immediately repeated in the first paragraph: Deus est causa omnibus operantibus ut operarentur. The second paragraph shows that the creature is a cause of being inasmuch as it ~~note~~ acts virtute divina: in other words, the virtus divina is required for its actio. The third paragraph argues that since God is the cause of the virtus from which proceeds the creature's operatio, therefore he is the cause of the operatio. The fourth paragraph argues that since God's conservation of the virtus is necessary if the virtus is to have an actio, therefore God is the cause of the actio: the idea is not that attributed to Durandus, namely, that God conserves and the virtus acts on its own, a comparison is made with the appearance of colours ;

(2) De Ver., q. 22, a. 8.

just as colours cannot show themselves unless the sun maintains its light, so a created virtus cannot have an operatio unless God maintains his influence. The fifth paragraph argues that since God primo et principaliter applies all agents, therefore God is the cause of their actio. The sixth paragraph argues that all lower agents act in virtue of the higher agents ; since, then, causa actionis magis est id cuius virtute agitur quam etiam illud quod agit, God is more the cause of any actio than any subordinate agent. The seventh paragraph(3) argues that since God ordains all things to their ends, therefore every agent acts virtute divina, and so God is the cause of all actio(4).

For six different reasons St. Thomas affirms God to be the cause of the actio of the creature. We conclude that divine operation in the operation of the creature is St. Thomas's central theorem and that the manner in which he arrives at this theorem is of minor importance.

Three chapters later the same question is treated from a different view-point. It would seem that one actio cannot proceed from two causes; if it proceeds from one, then it does not proceed from the other if one is sufficient, the other is superfluous; if one produces the effect, then there is nothing for the other to produce. Omitting the subordinate arguments, the objection is :

> Quibusdam autem difficile videtur ad intelligendum quod effectus naturales attribuantur Deo et naturali agenti.
> Nam una actio a duobus agentibus non videtur progredi posse. Si igitur actio per quam naturalis effectus producitur procedit a corpore naturali, non procedit a Deo(5).

The actio in question is the ut ab agente in aliud: it proceeds from the

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(3) In this paragraph the term operatio is used in the Aristotelian sense and so denotes the effect.
(4) C.Gent., 3, 67. (5) ibid., 3, 70.

cause and it produces the effect. The difficulty is the obvious one, How can two causes do one "producing?"

The solution is that the lower agent acts, has an actio, in virtue of the higher agents:

> Oportet igitur quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per virtutum omnium superiorum agentium(6).

The theorem on the degree of causality, derived from the Posterior Analytics, is introduced(7). Finally, it is affirmed that the effect is not partly from one cause and partly from the other, but the whole is from each cause though in different manners(8).

In De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7. the thought is manifestly identical. The title is, Utrum Deus operetur in operatione naturae. The sedulously neglected Sed contra introduces four considerations, namely,

> .. sicut ars praesupponit naturam, ita natura praesupponit Deum. Sed in operatione artis operatur natura.. Ergo et Deus in operatione naturae operatur.
> ... secundum Philosophum, homo generat hominem et sol. Sed sicut operatio hominis in generatione dependet ab actione solis, ita et multo amplius actio naturae dependet ab actione Dei. Ergo quidquid operatur natura, etiam Deus operatur.
> .. nihil potest operari nisi sit ens. Sed natura non potest esse nisi Deo operante... Ergo natura non potest agere nisi Deo agente.
> .. virtus Dei est in qualibet re naturali, quia Deus in omnibus rebus esse dicitur per essentiam, et potentiam, et praesentiam. Sed non est dicendum quod virtus divina secundum quod est in rebus sit otiosa. Ergo secundum quod est in natura operatur. Nec potest dici quod aliud quam ipsa natura operatur, cum non appareat ibi nisi una operatio. Ergo in qualibet naturae operatione Deus operatur.

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(6) ibid.
(7) .. virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi casus immediata, sicut patet in principiis demonstrationum, quorum primum est immediatum.
(8) The difference between St. Thomas's concursus and that of Molina is not great : St. Thomas would be willing to identify the actio with the effect as does Aristotle. Thus the main difference is that Molina has the effect partly from the first cause, partly from the secondary cause. There is, of course, a notable difference in the way each proves his conclusions.

The last remark, non appareat ibi nisi una operatio, seems significant: it is equivalent to a denial of a third product. After proving the existence of the first mover from the movements of experience, St.Thomas does not infer the existence of unexperienced motions from the existence of the first mover. Such a procedure would be illegitimate. What he does is establish theorems with respect to the movement of experience(9).

The corpus of De Potentia, q.3,a.7 has already received sufficient attention; it is a selection from the arguments of Contra Gentiles, 3,67; the conclusion is the same as before(10).

In the Pars Prima(11) the argument undergoes a notable simplification. There are three forms of active causality; final, efficient, formal. In each respect it is to be affirmed that Deus operatur in omni operante. The first is most interesting: the final cause is really a cause, for it is the cause of the activity of the efficient cause; therefore any effect is causally related to the final cause ; but any

(9) An argument may prove either an existence or a theorem: for instanc one may prove the existence of another continent, or another planet or another element; but one may also prove simply a theorem, the law of falling bodies, the principle of work, the circulation of the blood. In the former case one knows a new thing; in the latter one understands better a thing already known. The followers of Banez suppose St. Thomas to be proving a new existence when plainly he is simply establishing in a variety of ways a new theorem.

(10) Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum applicat actioni, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit. The fourth reason, as stated, may appear identical with the conclusion; really it is distinct, for inasmuch as it is a premiss, it refers to the instrumentality of the creature's operation.
Note that here, as in 1 dist. 37,q.1,a.1, ad 4m., immediatio virtutis is used to prove divine presence in the operation. God is the principle of causality.

(11) 1a., q. 105, a. 5.

casual relation is an actio of some sort, and so, even on the ground of finality, God operates in all operation.

So much for the direct statement of the theorem.

b) The Indirect Statement: Unless God moves, the creature cannot act.

The Platonist systematization of the Aristotelian hierarchy(12) results in a notable rigidity. It is extremely doubtful that Aristotle would maintain that a stack of dry hay enveloped by fire would not burn without the help of the corpus caeleste. St. Thomas does so, most emphatically in the De Potentia, but with less assurance in the De Caelo(13).

The difficulties against the necessity of the corpus caeleste in such a case are manifest: there is nothing for it to do. The fire is hot and determined to act(14); the material is to hand(15); the two are in contact(16). Then, why will the hay not burn? Because fire can have an actio only in virtue of the action of the corpus caeleste. Unless one supposes that the situation has been produced by the corpus caeleste, and so that the fire is its instrument, action is impossible (17).

A better known instance of the indirect statement is in 1a 2ae., q. 109, a.1.

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(12) See above, $3.4B. (13) De Pot., q.5, a.8; 2 De Caelo, lect.4, $13.
(14) De Pot., q.5, a.8, ad 1m. (15) ibid., ad 2m. (16) ibid., ad 6m.
(17).. ignis est proprium calefacere, supposito quod habeat aliquam actionem; sed eius actio dependet ab alio, ut dictum est. ibid.., ad 5m. This is the point that recurs throughout the corpus and the solutions to objections. It is not a matter of a new motion being required, but a necessity of dependence, of instrumentality.

> ... usus autem quilibet quemdam motum importat... Videmus autem in corporalibus quod ad motum non solum requiritur ipsa forma, quae est principium motus vel actionis, sed etiam requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine corporalium est corpus caeleste, unde quantumcumque ignis habeat calorem perfectum non alteraret nisi per motionem corporis caelestis. Manifestum est autem quod sicut omnes motus corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum movens corporale, ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum movens simpliciter, quod est Deus : et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta. non potest in actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo; quae quidem motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem, non secundum necessitatem naturae sicut motio corporis caelestis.

The Banezian theory of praemotio physica cannot be considered an interpretation of this passage: if the perfect agent needs to be reduced from posse agere to actu agere, then is it God or is it the corpus caeleste that causes this transition in the perfectly hot fire ? If God effects this change, then what is it that the corpus caeleste does ? If the corpus caeleste effects the actu agere, then what does God do ?

It should seem that the passage is parallel to De Potentia, q.5, a. 8. The fundamental idea is the Aristotelian theorem of physical premotion, namely, the existence of the agent is insufficient for actio unless the agent acts eternally. But this basic idea is placed in the context of a cosmic scheme in which God and the corpus caeleste are universal causes. Because the latter is the primum alterans, there can be no alteration except by its instruments. Because the former is the primum movens, there can be no motion except in its instruments. If motio is an actio in St. Thomas's sense, then the passage simply asserts the dependence of the lower actio on the higher. If the motio is an actio in Aristotle's sense, motio moventis est motus mobilis, this is not to make the already perfect agent still more perfect, but a prerequisite of its being in a situation in which it can act.

The precise nature of St. Thomas's thought may best be seen by comparing De Veritate, q. 24, a.14 with 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 9.

In the former passage divine operation in the operation of the creature is based on creation and conservation.

> ... nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina, quia causa secunda non agit nisi per virtutem causae primae, ut dicitur in libro dx Causis(prop.1)... Operationis enim naturalis Deus est causa, in quantum dat et conservat id quod est principium naturalis operationis in re, ex quo de necessitate determinata operatio sequitur; sicut dum conservat gravitatem in terra, quae est principium motus deorsum.

Now in the Prima Secundae it is still true that God operates in the operation of the creature because he conserves, but a new factor has entered into consideration. The created cause cannot act merely because it is conserved; it is an agens in tempore and needs premotion before it can begin actually to act; and as God is the first mover, moving all things by his intellect, the cause of all the coincidences and combinations that constitute premotions, it follows that no matter how perfect a thing is and how much it is conserved, still without premotion or application, it cannot act. Accordingly, though it is true that things do act virtute conservationis, it is necessary, as well, that they act virtute motionis divinae. Hence,

> .. indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet moveatur ad recte agendum; et hoc propter duo: primo quidem ratione generali propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est (art.1, huius q.), nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinae..

The motion here is clearly the premotion in the Aristotelian sense.

c) Conclusion.

St. Thomas's theory of concursus, of divine co-operation in all other operation, is a theorem.

The theorem is proved from a variety of principles: in the Sentences one reason is given(18); in Contra Gentiles, 3, 67 there are six reasons; in Contra Gentiles, 3, 70, there are three reasons; in De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7 there are four reasons ; in 1a., q. 105, a. 5 it would seem that St. Thomas tired of enumerating reasons and simply gave categories of reasons, namely, final causality, efficient causality, formal causality.

The theorem is distinct from the affirmation of divine presence: in the Sed contra of the article in De Potentia divine presence is a premise and the theorem is a conclusion ; in the corpus of the same article the theorem is a premiss and divine presence is a conclusion.

The theorem is simply a theorem. As our examination of the ideas of physical premotion, application, and virtus instrumentalis established, there is no evidence for the Banezian view that St.Thomas is proving the existence of additional motions. He proves the existence of the first mover and then a theorem with respect to the operation of creatures. On the other hand, the negation of additional motions is not equivalent to the position attributed to Durandus : on that position God is no more a cause of the operation of a creature than Abraham is the father,of Jacob(19). The three positions are well illustrated by t the example, Peter runs Paul through with his sword: according to St. Thomas, Peter kills Paul; according to Durandus, Peter merely moves a sword ; according to the later theory of concursus, Peter not merely moves his sword but also with his own hands strangles Paul.

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(18)1 dist., 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4m.
(19)Note that Abraham is not the father of Jacob. Isaac is the father of Jacob.

C. Grace as Co-operative.

The purpose here is to treat the idea of co-operation in the context of grace.

Since an operation is a notional relation in what operates, it follows that co-operation is simply an additional notional relation.

> Relatio non multiplicat essentiam rei. Sed gratia cooperans supra operantem non nisi relationem addit. Ergo eadem est gratia per essentiam operans et cooperans(20).

Again, since the relations which are denoted by operation and co-operation are notional relations, it follows that the distinction between operative and co-operative grace derives from the effects produced.

> Divisio debet dari per opposita: sed operari et cooperari non sunt opposita; idem enim potest operari et cooperari. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur gratia per operantem et cooperantem.
> Ad quartum dicendum quod gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia : sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus..(21).

Finally, as the higher cause operates the operation of the lower, there can be no distinction between what is produced by the one and what is produced by the other.

> .. isti videtur distinxisse inter id quod est ex gratia et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse idem ex utroque.. Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio et ex praedestinatione, sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda et causa prima. Divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum secundarum.. Unde id quod est per liberum arbitrium est ex praedestinatione(23).

$3.7 Summary and Conclusions of the First Subsidiary Investigation.

a) The analogy of creator and creature in the field of action is not that in the latter there is, while in the former there is not, a real difference in the agent qua agent between posse agere and actu agere.

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(21) De Ver., q. 27,a.5,Sed contra.. (22) 1a 2ae.,q.111,a.2,ad 4m.
(23) 1a.,q. 23,a. 5,corp. Cp. C.Gent., 3, 70.

b) The analogy is that the creator acts in virtue of his substance, eternally, without presupposition or conditions, while the creature acts in virtue of an accidental perfection(1a.,q.54,a. 1 - 3), presupposes an object with respect to which it acts(1a.,q. 45,a.5), and requires a premotion or application to act with respect to that object (8 Phys., lect. 2, §§6,8); since there is no such thing as chance (Metaphys., 6, lect. 3 ; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14 ; 1a., q. 116, a.1), God cannot but control all created activity (C.Gent.,3, 94; 1a., q. 103, a. 7), a control that is exercised according to the designs of divine providence(1a 2ae.,q. 109,a. 1) and that is immanent in the dynamic cosmos as a fate (1a.,q. 116,a. 2,3) and as the art of a craftsman in his tools (De Potentia, q.3,a.7, ad 7m.); it follows that the operation of the creature is in virtue of the operation of the creator, and that, were it not, the creature could not act, for God alone is proportionate to the production of being.

c) The general theory of motion is a theory of providence and a subtle elaboration of the idea and conditions of cosmic order. It provides a background and a context for a theory of <u>gratia operans</u>, for it shows God to be operating in all things and it reveals all creatures, as agents, to be instrumental. But it is not itself a theory of grace, for grace is a divine intervention over and above the nature of things and not a purely speculative conclusion following with metaphysical necessity from the conditions of nature.

d) The theory of the preparation for grace in 2 dist.28,q.1,a.4 would seem to be an attempt to make general providence serve as a grace ; on the other hand the appeal to the <u>Eudemian Ethics</u> appears as an indication of the way in which a divine intervention might be introduced ; finally, the use of the pure analysis of action from 3 Phys., lect. 5 that is to be found in 1a 2ae., q. 110, a. 2 would seem to be a systematization

of this special divine intervention. The study of the exact nature of this intervention will occur in the next chapter.

e) While our conclusion do not exactly coincide with those of other interpreters, they may derive confirmation from all/ Thus, we agree with the Banezian synthesis of premotion, application, instrumental participation, and fate, but we think the explanation of the transition from rest to activity found in 8 Phys., lect.2 to be more germane to St. Thomas than their distinction between posse agere and actu agere. In general we have no difficulty in accepting the conclusions of Fr. Stufler, though on a number of points there is a measure of disagreement. Finally, we are inclined to believe that did Fr. Sertillanges, O.P. work out in detail the general position he has indicated, he would be in entire agreement with the views here advanced.

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§4. THE SECOND SUBSIDIARY INVESTIGATION: DIVINE OPERATION IN THE WILL.

A number of parallel movements, which may be united under the heading "Divine Operation in the Will," accompanied the development of St. Thomas's thought on gratia operans.

Most notable among these is the acceptance of the Augustinian or psychological theory of the necessity of grace. This adds to the general affirmation of the need of habits a law of psychological continuity to account for the impotence of the sinner. On combining this law with the other limitations of human liberty (there is free choice neither with respect to the end nor with respect to the series of free choices), one sees that the instrumental character of human freedom(1) is verified not merely by a metaphysical position but also by a psychological analysis.

Solidary with this main movement, which is treated in §§4.3 -4.5, there is a gradual development from the Aristotelian appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum to the affirmation of both general and special premotion internal to the will (§4.6). Most significant is the remark that the special premotion is a grace.

The first two section of this chapter (§§4.1, 4-2), though far from unconnected with the subject of our inquiry, none the less regard more particularly the questions raised by later speculation. In the first St.Thomas's theory of liberty is examined. In the second an attempt is made to determine his position on divine foreknowledge, on the efficacy of divine will, and on the reconciliation of human instrumentality with divine sanctity.

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(1) Recall (§2.7 E) that human instrumentality is inferred from Rom., 9, 16.

§4.1 The Idea of Liberty.

Though in his earlier works St. Thomas speaks of liberty as the negation of coercion, and does so not merely incidentally but systematically(1), he is not to be thought a Jansenist. In the De Malo this opinion is rejected with all possible vehemence(2) and, to my knowledge, does not recur(3). But not even are St. Thomas's earlier works ti be considered infected with error : though the denunciation in the De Malo necessitates a modification of earlier forms of expression, no position need be changed(4).

(1) There is an incidental identification of Liberty with non-coercion in 2 dist. 25,q.1,a. 2. This becomes systematic especially in the De Veritate.Five distinct acts are said to be necessary yet free: A.God's will of his own goodness(De Ver., q.23,a.4).B. The procession of the Holy Ghost(De Pot.,q.10,a.2,ad 5m.).C.The natural appetite for hapiness(De Ver.,q.22,a.5,corp.& 4a.4m.1ae.ser.& 3a.3m. 2ae.ser.;ibid.,q.24,a.1,ad 20m.;1a.,q.82,a.1,ad 1m.). D. the immutable will of the demons(De Ver.,q.24,a.10,5a.5m.). E.The impotent will of the sinner(De Ver.,q.24,a.12,ad 10m.2ae.ser.) The use of "non est cogens" in De Pot.,q.3,a.7,ad 14m.is incidental.

(2) Five charges constitute the attack on the identification of liberty with the absence of coercion.First,it is heretical.Second,it destroys the concept of merit and demerit.Third,it is subversive of the very principles of morality.Fourth,it is alien to all philosophic and scientific thought.Fifth,it is the sort of opinion that is proposed either through impishness or because the incompetent are confronted with fallacies they cannot see through.De Malo,q.6,a. 1, corp.init.

(3) Use of St.Augustine's remark in De Civitate Dei, bk.5,chap.10, recurs in the Sed contra of 1a 2ae.,q.6,a.4.However, the passage is there used to deny the coercion of the will, not to justify a compatibility between freedom and necessity.

(4) The point may be proved by enumeration.First,God's will of his own goodness, the procession of the Holy Spirit, and man's natural appetite for beatitude, are henceforth to be said necessary and free: this change has no ulterior implications. Second, the immutable will of the demons is absolutely free in causa, for they freely chose to rebel; it is now free in the choice of this or that evil act,but necessitated in the choice of some evil. That is the position of De Malo,q.16,a.5.No more than that was asserted, really, in De Ver; q.22,a.10.Third, the impotent will of the sinner is absolutely free in causa; it is free to sin or not in any particular act; it will necessarily commit some mortal sin. That is the position of 1a 2ae;, q.109,a.8; that is precisely what is asserted in C.Gent.,3,160.; fin.; and no more is asserted in De Ver.,q.24,a.12.

The genesis of the idea in St. Thomas would seem to be as follows ./.

A similar historical process seems to have provided Dominicus Banez with some ground for asserting that the freedom of the will arises esclusively from the indifference of the object presented by the intellect(5). The refutation of this view is best attained by following development of St. Thomas's thought.

The initial achievement was the rejection of St. Albert's view that the libertum arbitrium was a third potency distinct from intellect and will(6).

But, though the liberum arbitrium is no longer a distinct entity, St. Thomas continues ti write about it and the will in separate question(7). Not only does he write about the two in separate questions, but he treats freedom principally when he treats liberum arbitrium, and then he speaks not of the liberty of the will but of the liberty of man. It is worth following this evolution of thought.

.... The genesis of the idea in St.Thomas would seem to be as follows. In the Sentences he took over the current and popular notion that freedom was the absence of coercion: 2 dist.25,q.1,a.2 proves that the will is not forced with the same reason that 1a 2ae., q.10,a.2 proves that the will is not determined by its object.In the De Veritate,as we shall see(inf.,§4.52C), he took over the psychological theory of the necessity of grace, that is, the Augustinian tradition on libertas a coactione, a peccato, a miseria. In this enormous movement of thought, the idea of liberty as non-coercion slipped into his thought, was used systematically, but in no way falsified his position. When in writing the De Malo he adverted to the use to which this idea could be put, he rejected it with the utmost vigour.

(5) See In 1m.,q.19,a.10;pp.381 E-382 D,ed?Rom.1584.

(6) 2 dist.24,q.1,a.3.For St. Albert,see Lottin,La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S.Anselme jusqu'à S.Thomas D'Aquin.

(7) De Ver., q. 22 is on the will, q.24 is on liberum arbitrium. 1a., q. 82 is on the will,q. 83 is on liberum arbitrium. But in the Prima Secundae qq. 6 - 17 are on the will, yet the liberum arbitrium does not figure in the title of any article.

The fundamental thesis from the Sentences to the Pars Prima inclusively in that the free agent is the cause of its own determination The determination in question is not the determination of the will but the determination of action generally. Such determination comes from the intellect, and intellectual beings are free, not because they move from an intrinsic (as the gravis and levia), not because they move themselves (as do plants and animals), not because they judge (for the lamb judges the wolf dangerous), but because they are the masters and makers of their judgement, they construct the form on their own activity(8).

But does the judgement necessitate the act of will? Must the bonum apprehensum move the appetite? This is consistently denied, but in the Sentences in the treatment of the liberum arbitrium(9), in the De Veeitate and the Pars Prima in the treatment of the will(10), in the Peri Hermensias and the De Malo incidentally(11).

(8) This position isa already implicit in 2 dist.25,q.1 ,a.1. It is elaborately presented in De Ver.,q.24,a.1; an elaboration prepared with the greatest skill in De Ver.,q.22,a.1-5. It is repeated summarily, but in a variety of ways in C.Gent., 2,48. It makes its final appearance in 1a.,q. 83,a.1.
In the last passage cited, an important change may be noted. In the De Veritate and the Contra Gentiles the question of liberum arbitrium is considered settled by liber est qui est cause sui: it was enough to show that man himself caused the form of his activity; his judgement is reflective and not mere instinct. But in 1a.,q. 83,a.1 the issue is examined more profondly, and it is shown that there is no necessity in man's making the judgement that he does make. Not only does man judge his judgement, but the judgement he makes is contingent.
For the idea of contingence as non-syllogistic inference, see the general theorem of the parallel of the logical and the real in 2 Metaphys., lect.2 and its application to necessity in 2 Phys., lect.15; 1 Post.Anal., lect. 42; cp. C.Gent., 2, 28-30.
(9) 2 dist.25,q.1,a.2. (10) De Ver.,q.22,a.6; 1a.,q.82,a.2.
(11) Peri Herm., bk. 1, lect. 14; De Malo, q. 3, a. 3.

How is it that the will need not be determinated, need not be moved and yet, on the other hand, can be determined and moved by the object on which reason decides ? That is a question that is not explained in the earlier works. It took the great controversy in Paris over the passivity of the will(12) to break down the inertia of the distinction of will and liberum arbitrium in the mind of St.Thomas, and bring him to explain how the will is active and how precisely the will can act or not act no matter what the object presented may be(13). With that explanation all are familiar; the will is in act with respect to an end so moves itself from potency to act with respect to the means to the end(14). Nor is this contrary to the principle, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur; for the will is not both in act and in potency in the

(12) See Lottin, Liberté humaine et motion divine, Rech. théol. anc.méd. 7 (1935) 52 - 69; 156 - 173. It would be inexact to think that St. Thomas held a purely passive or a determinist theort of the will at any time. I think the accurate statement is that in the earlier works he does not attempt to explain how it is that the will causes and determines its own acts.

(13) Observe that both in the De Malo and in the Prima Secundae St. Thomas's distinguishes between the exercise of the act of will and its determination or specification. In the latter respect, liberty is limited: reason cannot but select the infinite good, In the former respect, liberty is unlimited: the will may act or it may refuse to think of the object proposed. See De Malo, q. 6,a. 1; 1a 2ae., q. 10, a. 2, corp. init.

same respect(15).

Thus, there are four reasons why the will is said to be free. First, because the means to end is not a necessary but an optional means. Second, beacause the pratical judgement is contingent. Third, because the bonum apprehensum does not efficacio sly move the will. Fourth, because the will may or may not move itself to its free act. Because an historical accident prevented St. Thomas from attending to these four points at once is not a reason for saying that he means what he says when he asserts this one but not when he asserts that one: he asserts all four. Much less is an interpreter entitled to reject St. Thomas's assertion that the will is a causa ad utrumque that determines itself by its own intellect(16), assert that it is a causa ad utrumque determined by a non-Aristotelian and non-Thomist præmotio physica, and then claim it is nevertheless free because St. Thomas places the basis of freedom in the indifference of the practical judgment or of the object of choice. Yet that is what Dominicus Banez has done(17).

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(15) See 9 Metaphys., lect. 1, Cath.$1776. For Scotus's position see his 9 Metaphys.,q. 15.For a comparison, see Auer,Die menschliche Willensfreiheit im Lehrsystem des Thomas von Aquin und Johannes Duns Scotys, pp. 285 ff. ,München 1938. The divergence is not, of couse, that one affirms and the other denies self-motion to the will; both admit that. But while Scotus holds that the faculty of the will is an actus virtualis(that is, a causal act, not formally similar to the effect, but proportionate modo eminentiori) capable of producing the act of will with respect to the good in general, St. Thomas denies such a possibility. His reason is that the will as a potency is an inclinatio universalis which can be caused by no participation of the absolute but only by the bonum universale, just as materia prima can be caused by God alone; next, that since the will can be caused by God alone, so its operation can be caused by God alone, for only the cause of a nature can produce a natural motion in that nature; any other motion must be violent.Thus, the only actus virtualis that can cause the motion of the will to the end is the actus purus(1a 2ae.,q.9,a.6;cp.1a.,q.54,a.2). This position spontaneously integrates with the argument from the impossibility of a prior infinite series of motions in the will quoad exercitium actus(1a 2ae.,q.9,a.4),and so clarifies what had been the hitherto obscure instinctus divinus derived from the Liber de Bona Fortuna.On this see below,$4.6E.

If, however, one should ask which of the four reasons for freedom is the essential reason, it should seem that the last is at once necessary and sufficient. The first three are causae cognoscendi, and they may be present as in the case of the demons with respect to the choice between good and evil without the will being, here and now, free(18). But the last, the will's ability to move or not move itself, is the causa essendi: it is the primum quoad se from which the other three can be deduced as conditions(19); it solves the ultimate problem in the via inventionis(20) and so is the first proposition in the via doctrinae; it defines, not the liberum arbitrium which is the global

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(16) 2 dist.25,q. 1,a. 1. Cp. De Ver., q. 24,a. 1; C.Gent.,2, 48; 1a.,q. 83, a.1, De Malo q.3,a. 3, ad 5m. See above, note 8.

(17) Habemus itaque necessarium esse ad libertatem actus voluntatis quod indifferentia medii eligendi iudicetur per intellectum, et simul iudicetur tale medium determinandum ad finem... Quotiescumque actus voluntatis oritur ex praedicta radice iudicii, semper erit liber. Unde rursus colligo. Quidquid antecesserit, vel comitabitur, vel supervenerit ad actum voluntatis, si non tollat iudicium illud circa medium respectu finis, non destruet libertatem operationis. Haec consequentia evidens est. Quia stante definitione actus liberi, necesse est actum esse liberum.Dom.Banez,in 1m.,q. 19,a.10; pp.381 F - 382 B, ed.Rom. 1584.

(18) De Malo,q. 16,a. 5,ad 11m. compares the responsability of the demons to that of a drunkard.

(19) Unless, of course, one so interprets 1a 2ae.,q.10,a.2,as to assert that the will is free quoad exercitium actus even with respect to the infinite good. If such an interpretation - it is the literal interpretation of the passage - is preferred, then there is no debate on the question. Ability to act or not act is the sole criterion of liberty.

(20) It explains how it is that the will does accept or not accept a given object; without an explanation of that point, there is no complete theory of even liberum arbitrium.

difference between rational and irrational creatures, but free will, which is the central faculty in the process of free self-determination.

Since, then, the dominium sui actus, the ability to produce or not produce tyis act, is the essence of freedom, it follows that a pure passivity cannot be free(21).

§4.2 The Possibility of Liberty.

If St.Thomas held that the essence of freedom lay in the will's capacity either to act or not act, it would seem that he must have a solution to the trite objection: The will cannot act without God, therefore liberty cannot be the will's capacity either to act or not act.

Indeed, in St.Thomas God infallibly knows what the will is to do, he efficaciously decress what the will is to do, he irresistibly brings it about that the will do what he foreknows and decress. Under such circumstances, to say that the will do this or that according to its good pleasure is, it mays seem, preposterous.

But this is not all. Granted the will freely chooses and executes what God infallibly foreknows, decrees and effects, it remains that God is principal cause, universal cause, eternal cause, while the will is instrumental, particular, temporal. If then God is for these reasons more a

(21) Observe that the dominium sui actus pertains not to the act that is dominated, namely the act freely produced in the will with respect to the means, but to the act that dominates, that causes, that freely produces the will of the means. Thus, freedom is a quality in an actio, and an actio is a ratio formalis or notional relation. This point eliminates considerable confusion that exists in the reconciliation of divine liberty with divine immutability.

cause of the good that the will does than is the will itself, it would seem that he is also more a cause of the evil; and if the will is sinful because its works are evil, then how evade the conclusion that God is still more sinful.

These are the sixteenth century problems that block the view and obstruit the passage from our minds to St. Thomas's thought on operative grace. It is necessary to eliminate them, for otherwise no matter how numerous the textes we adduce and how cogent their evidence, the intel= lect of the reader will necessarily remain in doubt.

The section falls into two parts: divine foreknowledge and human liberty is treated in the first place ; next, the idea of divine transcendence is studied.

$4. 21. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Liberty.

The fundamental difficulty in the problem is, according to St. Thomas, the imagination(2). First, then this difficulty is surmounted; second, St. Thomas's solution is given; third, the sixteenth century question is raised in its most general form, Is their any difference between God's knowledge of good and his knowledge of evil acts of will?

A. The Elimination of Anthropomorphism.

The first anthropomorphic difficulty arises from fancying that God knows what the will does before the will does it. God does not know any

(2) He explicitly affirms of an eternal vision to counteract the anthro= pomorphic image: see 1 dist.38,q.1,a.5;C.Gent.,66,67;1a.,q.14,a.13; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $19.

11 q3 a3
12 q3 a3

event before or simultaneously or afterwards. To know in such a manner, one must know in time, God knows eternally(3).

Hence, the object of God's knowledge cannot be "what was" or "what will be," for relative to God's knowledge there is neither past nor future. No more can the object be "What is," if the "is" retains its temporal connotation and is opposed to either "was" or "will be", for God's knowledge is not simultaneous with anything else. God knoww "what is" where the "is" has the timelessness of logician's copula.

But how then does God know time ? He knows time because he knows all that is ; among all the things that are, there are motion and the measure of motion and the motion as measured : knowing motions as measured is knowing time(4).

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(3),Einstein's position would not have been surptising to St. Thomas; he held that if there were more then one world, there would not be a common simultaneity(1 dist.37,q.4 a. 3); that if all motions were not caused by the primum mobile (and they are not),then there would be as many times as motion (4 Phys., lect.17,$$3,4). Time is a measure of motion: without motion and a measure for it, such as space, there could be no time (4 Phys., lect.17,$$7,10). "Before time" is a figment of the imagination (2 dist.1,q.1,a. 5, ad 13m.; 12 Metaphys.,lect.5, $2478 and so the question,Why did God not create sooner ? is meaningless. God created time,acts eternally(C.Gent.,2,31-38;cp.8 Phys.,lect.2 $19). The nunc of a temporal being changes inasmuch as the being changes; the nunc of an immutable being cannot change; such a nunc is eternity (4 Phys., lect.18, $$4,5.).

(4) If I see a man crossing the street, I see the space he traverses but not the time. The time of his motion in crossing equates with the time of my motion in seeng. Consequently, I do not see time as an object like space but experience it as I experience an emotion. But an angel or God not merely apprehends the space as an object but also the time as an object. For in neither case is the apprehension a sensible perception, with space in the percept and time in the perceiving, but the intuition of a four-dimensional object that cannot be imagined though it may be expressed by algebraic symbols.

The second anthropomorphic difficulty is to fancy that because one can add to the finite, therefore one can add to the infinite. To the infinite no addition can be made. God is entitatively the same whether he creates or does not create ; his knowledge is the same ; his will is the same ; his activity is the same. For all of these are infinite and really identical with each other and with the infinity of substance that is ipsum esse.

But while this is as certain as is the simplicity and immutability of God, it does contain a problem. For if God creates, then he knows, wills and does something that otherwise he does not know, will or do. What constitutes the objective difference ?

The objective difference is constituted by three actiones, an actio of knowing, an actio of willing, an actio of performing. But an actio according to its ratio formalis is a notional relation, according to its principle or foundation is some reality. Therefore, to say that God knows, wills, does, adds three notional relations ; but it adds only one additional reality, namely, what is known, willed done. It cannot put a new "knowing" in God nor a new "willing" in God nor a new "doing" in God, for God already is infinite, ipsum esse, ipsum intelligere, ipsum amare, and actus purus. Finally, to bring this analysis to an ultimate degree of refinement, note that the notional relation of the knowing or willing is predicated eteenally, while the notional relation of the doing is predicated ex tempore(5).

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(5)...operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante. Et ideo nomina, quae significant relationes consequentes actionem intellectus et voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero consequuntur actiones procedentes secundum modum intelligendi ad exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi. Ia., q.13, a. 7.
The passage is not without the complications of the different senses of the term, actio. God neither knows nor acts in time: from that point of view both predications are eternal. On the other hand, the energeia of knowing is eternal, but the energeia of the creature ./.

B. The Reconciliation of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Liberty.

From the foregoing it will be apparent that any consideration of the issue that is not strictly logical cannot but be both illusory and futile. It is not surprising, then, that St. Thomas conceives the issue in an abstract and dialectical fashion. Treating predestination in the Commentary on the Sentences he refers back to his earlier treat= ment of providence in the following terms :

> Praedestinatio enim includit in suo intellectu praescientiam et providentiam.. Praescientia.. non imponit necessitatem rebus, nec in quantum est causa... nec ratione adaequationis ad rem scitam quae ad rationem veritatis et certitudinis scientiae exi= gitur, quia adaequatio ista attenditur scientiae Dei ad rem non secundum quod (res) est in causis suis in quibus est ut possibile futurum tantum, sed ad ipsam rem secundum quod habet esse determi= natum prout est praesens et non futurum..(6).

The passage is worth detailed study.

Two manners in which foreknowledge might necessitate events are distinguished : inasmuch as the knowledge is a cause of the event, and that does not here concern us ; inasmuch as the truth or the knowledge makes the actuality of the event necessary, and that is the present question.

...is temporal : from that point of view the former predication is timeless, the latter temporal. In the article, the different view-points seem to superpose ; compare Contra Gentiles, 2, 31 - 38 on creation ab aeterno.

Observe that the passage stands well beyond the level of the com= mon difficulty that suppose a "time" when there are no temporal objects. St. Thomas does not argue that crea ion cannot be predica= ted ab aeterno because there is a "time" when there are no creatutu= res : such a view he explicitly rejects as sheer imagination (2 dist. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 13m.; 12 Metaphys., lect. 5, $2478 ; 8 Phys., lect. 2, $19 ; Gent., loc. cit.).

(6) 1 dist.40, q. 3, a. 1.

Next, with regard to the truth of the knowledge, two adaequationes veritatis, equations between knowledge and reality, are distinguished. There is the adaequatio of divine knowledge to the event as something future and now existing only in causa. There is the adaequatio of divine knowldge to the event as something present and so existing in se ipso.

The third, and last, element in the statement is that the adaequatio to be considered is not that between the knowledge and the event as future, but that between the knowledge and the event as present. In the latter case the event is not necessitated ratione adaequationis.

But two questions arise.

First, why should one consider the adaequatio of divine knowledge not to the event as future but to the event as present. Because the former is false and the latter is true. All things are eternally present to God. Hence St. Thomas insists on this point in each successive treatment of the issue : see 1 d. 38,q. 1, a. 5 ; C. Gent., 3 ; 66,67; la., q. 14, a. 13; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $19.

Second, why does this adaequatio, which relates and equates divine knowledge not to the event in causis but to the event in se ipso eliminate the problem of necessity from divine foreknowledge ? Because once the event is, it can no longer be necessitated ; any necessity then is necessarily hypothetical necessity ; and that is compatible with contingence. Omne enim quod est dum est necesse est esse. And this is the other essential and constantly repeated point in St. Thomas's solution. See the same passage as those listed above.

Turning now to the objection from which this discussion began,

let us ask St. Thomas for his solution. It was said that the essence of freedom cannot lie in the will's capacity either to act or not act ; for God knows precisely what it will do ; therefore it is impossible for it to do otherwise.

After considering a number of solutions to abjections of this type, St. Thomas gives his own as follows :

> Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod antecedens(God's knowledge) est necessarium absolute, tum ex immobilitate actus (God's immutability) tum etiam ex ordine ad scitum (the relatio rationis is ex aeterno); quia ista res non ponitur subiacere scientiae divinae nisi dum est in actu secundum quod determinationem et certitudinem habet. Ipsum enim necesse est esse dum est ; et ideo similis necessitas inserenda est in consequente, ut scilicet accipiantur ipsum quod est Socratem currere secundum quod est in actu ; et sic terminationem et necessitatem habet. Unde patet quod si sumatur Socratem currere secundum hoc quod ex antecedente sequitur, necessitatem habet ; non enim sequitur ex antecedente nisi secundum quod substat divinae scientiae, cui subicitur prout consideratur praesentialiter in suo esse actuali; unde etiam sic sumendum est consequens, quomodo patet quod consequens necessarium est : necesse est enim Socratem currere dum currit(7).

First this solution may be summarised. Second that an application may be made to the definition of liberty.

If God knows this, this must be. If the antecedent is absolutely necessary, then the consequent is necessary. The antecedent is absolutely necessary. Therefore the consequent is necessary.

St Thomas concedes the minor but distinguishes major and conclusion. For though the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent may be necessary either absolutely or hypothetically. If the necessity of the consequent is hypothetical, then the consequent may still be continguent : for hypothetical necessity is compatible with contingence.

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(7) 1 dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m.

Next, to show that the necessity of the consequent is not absolute but hypothetical, he argues as follows.

If God knows this, this must be. The "this" or the consequent must be in all respects identical with the "this" of the antecedent. But the "this" of the antecedent is actually existing, for God's knowledge is eternal. Therefore the "this" of the consequent is actually existing.

But the necessity of existence in what actually exists is hypothetical. Therefore the necessity of the consequent,"this must be," is hypothetical.

Take, now, the objection against the definition of liberty : If God knows the act of will, then the act of will must be and so cannot either be or not be. Plainly the answer is that the conclusion follows if God's knowledge bears on the act of will <u>in causis suis</u> but not if it bears on the act <u>in se ipso</u>. But the latter is true and the former false. Therefore the objection against the definition of liberty is a fallacy.

C. The Difference between Divine Foreknowledge of Good and of Evil. B+M

Cfr. S q1 a2 scientia Dei tres [illegible]

Under the influence of the Scotist tradition(8), both Banez and Molina attempt to explain how God foreknows, and accordingly posit their <u>decreta praedeterminantia</u> and <u>scientia media</u>.Both positions palpably differ from the pure metaphysics of St. Thomas(9), but the question

(8) See the passages collected from Scotus by Fr. H. de Montefortino relative to Ia.,q. 14,a.13 (vol. 1, pp.374-383): it is precisely in the Scotist field of a mistaken concept of eternity and of prior and posterior <u>signa</u>, that the whole of both Banezian and Molinist thbught moves.

(9) Banez implicitly admits the difference when in his commentary on Ia., q. 14; a.13; after giving his own conclusions in terms of predetermination, he asks why St.Thomas is so preoccupied with time and hypothetical necessity, points which in no way figure in his explanation. His quite unsatisfactory answer is that St.Thomas is anxious to give all possible solutions to the problem (St. Thomas gives only one); that St. Thomas wishes to give God intuiti=

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Such an exigence for development must arise either from the fore= knowledge as knowledge or from the foreknowledge as knowledge of such an event.

On the former account there neither is nor can be any such exigence God is self-explanatory and not to be explained in terms of anything different; God is his knowledge; therefore divine knowledge neither is to be explained nor can be explained.

If, however, divine foreknowledge is considered from the view= point of the object known, then a need of future explanation is evi= dent. Scientia Dei est causa rerum(10). God is not the cause of sin.

.. ve knowledge of the future contingent events(St.Thomas does not mean that God knows by looking at things: what then is this intui= tive knowledge ?). See Banez, p.314 B, ed. Rom. 1584.

The Molinist scientia media can explain the contingence of only future acts of free will: but St. Thomas's explainadion covers the contingentia in maiori et minori parte as well. According to Molina, God's foreknowledge makes the falling of a stone necessary ; accor= ding to St. Thomas God's foreknowledge leaves the falling of a sto= ne contingent, See 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $$14 - 19.

(10) The phrase simply means that other knowledge arises from the action of the object on the knower; in God the action is the other way about. It is not an explanation of knowledge in God. St. Tho= mas clearly affirms the absolute charcter of God's knowledge when treating the futura contingentia in the Peri Hermeneias : ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscible cadat sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate, sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa..(lib. 1, lect. 14, $16.) It is only because God necessarily has infallible knowledge with respect to everything knowable that foreknowledge constitutes a problem.

Banez's solution to this problem is well known(11). God knows what is by causing it; God knows what is not by not causing it ; sin is not a reality ; therefore God Knows sin inasmuch as he is not the cause of the opposite Good.

But, while according to Banez there are only two categories, namely, what God causes and what God does not cause, there are according to St. Thomas three distinct categories, namely, positive truth, negative truth and objective falsity. Positive truth correspond to what God causes ; negative truth correspond to what God does not cause; objective falsity is a third category that contains one element, malum culpae(12).

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(11)... alia futura contingentia cognoscit Deus in suis causis, prout sunt determinata a prima causa: malum vero culpae futurum cognoscit in sua causa, quantenus non est determinata a prima causaa ad bene operandum. In 1m., q. 14, a. 13; p. 314 D, ed Rom. 1584.

(12) This would seem to be the proper inference from 1a., q. 17; a.1, Utrum falsitas sit in rebus. Et. Thomas conceives veritas simpliciter as conformity to the divine intellect, falsitas as nonconformity. He writes: in rebus dependentibus a Deo falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit ex ordinatione divine intellectus procedat nisi forte in voluntariis agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus, in quo malum culpae consistit, secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in Scripturis, secundum illud Ps. 4: Ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium ? sicut per oppositum operatio virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini intellectus, sicut dicitur Ioan. 3: Qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem.

The positive truth that the sun shines is something that is positively and conforms to the divine design. The negative truth that the sun does not shine on us, is something that is not positively and yet conforms to the divine design. But the objective falsity of malum culpae is something that is not positively and further does not conform to the ordinatio divini intellectus.

It is obviously impossible for Banez to speak of anything as withdrawing itself from the ordination of the divine intellect. St. Thomas not only speaks of it but cites Scripture as his ground for doing so.

Similarly, there are three categories with regard to the divine will; there is what God wills to take place ; there is what God wills not to take place ; and, in the third place, there is what God permits to take place(14).

Finally, with regard to execution there are three categories: first, there is the good that God effects ; second, there is the good that God does not effect ; and third, there is the sin for which the sinner is alone responsible(15).

Thus, St. Thomas's divine artifex is not at all anthropomorphic. He is not restricted to two categories: what he conceives and what he does not conceive ; what he wills and what he does not will ; what he effects and what he does not effect. That is Banezian doctrine.

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(14) Unde malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult; sed malum naturalis defectus vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum cui coniungitur tale malum. Sicut volendo iustitiam vult poenam, et volendo ordinem naturae servari vult quaedam naturaliter corrumpi(1a.,q. 19,a. 9 cp. the argument in 1a 2az., q. 79, a. 1). Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri neque vult mala non fieri sed vult permittere mala fieri et hoc est bonum(1a., q. 19, a. 9, ad 3m.; for the reason why it is good in God to permit sin, see 1a., q. 23, a. 5, ad 3m).

(15) .. in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus (1a., q. 17, a. 1)...dicuntur aliqui cogitare vel loqui vel agere contra Deum non quia totaliter renitentur ordini divinae gubernationis (quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum) sed quia contra itentur cuidam determinato bono quod est eis conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum(1a., q. 103, a. 8, ad 1m.)...
Deus sic est causa actus (peccati) quod nullo modo est causa defectus concomitantis actum; et ideo non est causa peccati (1a 2ae., q. 79, a. 2 ad 2m.; cp. a. 1, ad 3m.) ... sicut creatura decideret in nihilum nisi per divinam potentiam contineretur, ita etiam deficeret in non bonum si non contineretur a Deo. Non tamen sequitur quod nisi contineretur a Deo per gratiam, rueret in peccatum; nisi solum de natura corrupta quae de se habet inclinationem in malum (De Malo, q. 16, a. 4, ad 22m.).

In St. Thomas, thougg there is in this as in so many other respects no fully developed theory, still there are sufficient indication of three categories: there is objectively positive truth and negative truth and absolute falsity ; there is what God wills to take place, what God wills not to take place, and what God permits ; there is what God effects, and there is not what God does not effect, but there is also what God neither effects nor does not effect.

A few deducations with respect to the nature of St. Thomas's transcendent artifex may not be of place. It will be simplest to proceed from the idea of falsitas objectiva.

First, then falsitas objectiva is not false in the sense that it is false to say that the sinner sins. That the sinner sins, is true. This truth is what constitutes the objectivity of objective falsity.

Second, the falsity of objective falsity is nonconformity to the divine intellect, non-participation of divine intelligibility, just as the truth of objective trhth is conformity to the divine intellect and participation of divine intelligibility (see 1a., q. 16, a. 1; q; 17, a. 1).

Third, just as objective truth is the object of intelligence and understanding, just as the presence of objective truth is the possibility of understanding and explanation, so also objective falsity is the negation of an object of intelligence and understanding, and the presence of objective falsity is the negation of the possibility of understanding or explanation. This is self-evident to anyone who has reflected on the critical problem: the possibility of our understanding objects is their objective intelligibility, their participation of the absolute intelligibility of God. Note that understanding, explaining,

is not the same as knowing : one can know without understanding or explaining, for instance, one can know the facts to be understood or explained. Thus, the difference between the fact of sin and other facts is that the latter are not merely to be known as facts but also are to be understood and explained (positivism to the contrary), while the fact of sin is simply to be known and cannot be understood or explained. Again, though other facts may happen not to be explained or understood, still they could be, for they participate divine intelligibimity ; but the fact of sin, the objectivity of objective falsity, not merely happens not to be understood or explained from a subjective defect on our part, but cannot be understood or explained from its own objective defect. This may be summed up by saying that sin is a fact but not a problem: it is a fact, for it is objective; it is not a problem, for there is no objective intelligibility to be known.

Fourth, just as the mathematician can treat simultaneously both ordinary numbers and complex numbers (such as root minus one) on condition that he equates ordinary numbers to ordinary numbers and complex numbers to complex numbers but does not equate ordinary numbers to complex numbers; so also the philosopher or theologian can think and reason about God and man and sin, predestination, reprobation, efficacious and sufficient grace, only on condition that he relates what is intelligible to what is intelligible, and what is unintelligible to what is unintelligible, but does not explanatorily relate the unintelligible to the intelligible.

The grounds for this canon are as follows.

First, the intelligible can be related to the intelligible : that is the nature of all understanding and explanation such as it

exists in a finite mind; whenever we understand, we understand something ; only God's understanding is absolute, ipsum intelligere, and so simple, absolute, one, and without relation.

Second, the unintelligible cannot be related to the intelligible: this is self-evident for the relation in question is explanatory relation, so that to relate the unintelligible to the intelligible would be to explain the unintelligible. But the unintelligible is what cannot be explained.

Third, the unintelligible can be related to the unintelligible: there is a certain explanation of sin in terms of other prior sin, but the reason for this is not any intelligibility in sin; it is simply due to the fact that sin is also evil, a privation of the good; one privation leads to another, not because a privation does anything but because a deficient cause produce a defective effect.

Now to apply this analysis of falsitas objectiva to the three problem of the controversary, De Auxiliis: first, what is God's knowledge of sin; second, is the difference between efficacious and sufficient grace; third, why does not divine reprobation make God responsible for the sinner's damnation ?

With regard to divine foreknowledge of sin, first, it is plain that God knows eternally and in particulari all sins. The fact of sin is objective and knowable: ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadit sub eius cognition. But God does not understand sin, for sin has no intelligibility to be understood: unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est for any other knowledge would be error. And therefore sin is not part of God's ordo divini intellectus, ordinatio divinae gubernationis (1a., q. 17, a. 1; q. 103, a. 8, ad 1m.): for that ordo and ordinatio is intelligible.

With regard to the difference between efficacious and sufficient grace, there is no difference entitatively. Both ab intrinseco are proportionate causes of changes of will: but in the one case the changed will because changed consents to the change, and this follows from the nature of the case; in the other case the changed will though changed does not consent to the change but reverts to evil, and, like all other sin, this is unintelligible, a fact but not a problem.

With regard to God's innocence of the fate of the reprobate, observe that reprobation is both antecedend and infallible(1a., q. 23, a. 3; Rom. 9, lect. 2) as also is predestination. But the latter is a cause of merits and of glory. The former is a permission to sin but not a cause of sin (Perditio tua ex te Israel). Now why can the one be a cause yet not the other ? Because there are not two categories but three. How can reprobation be antecedent and not a cause ? It is antecedent because it is a divine act. It is not a cause because sin has no cause, but is unintelligible, inexplicable and not to be related explanatorily to the intelligible. But if it is antcedent yet not a cause, and if there are three categories and not two, then how can it be infallible. The answer to that lies in the theory of divine transcendence: God's knowledge is infallible.

The reader may now expect a synthesis, a presentation of the successive signa rationis, so that he can take in at a glace the whole theory. Such a synthsis is impossible: the unintelligible cannot be worked into a synthesis, for then it would be related to the intelligible. But it would seem that the blessed in heaven who participate the intellect of the transcendent artifex are most enthralled with the vision of divine sanctity, and so they exclaim perpetually, Holy! Holy! Holy!

§4.22. Divine Transcendence and Human Liberty.

The argument has followed out the implications of St. Thomas's position because that position has to be placed in the environment of the De Auxiliis if that controversy is to be set aside and the study of St. Thomas himself be made possible. Now we return from the implications of St. Thomas's position to that position in itself. Three points have yet to be considered: his theory of divine transcendence, his meaning in the phrase ad modum libertatis, and his solution to the objection Deus causa peccati.

A. Divine Transcendence.

The basic point in the theory of divine transcendence is the generalisation of the solution to the problem of foreknowledge and liberty. It has been shown that in the proposition, If God knows this, this must be, the consequent this must be is not absolutely but hypothetically necessary. Now divine knowledge, divine will and divine operation are really identical. Therefore, what holds with regard to divine knowledge, necessarily holds with regard to divine will and divine operation. Accordingly, to the proposition, If God wills this, this must be, or to the proposition, If God does this, this must be, the same answer is available. This must be with hypothetical necessity, I grant, with absolute necessity, I deny.

This generalisation can be found in any of St. Thomas's works. Thus, in the Sentences,

> .. quamvis voluntas Dei sit immutabilis et invincibilis, non tamen sequitur quod omnis effectus eius sit necessarius necessitate absoluta, quam habet res a causa sua proxima, sed solum necessitate conditionata, sicut et de praescientia

dictum est(16).

In the Pars Prima,

> ...fatum secundum considerationem secundarum causarum mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, Si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit(17).

And in the Pars Tertia,

> ...aliquid potest dici possibile vel impossibile dupliciter: uno modo, simpliciter et absolute; alio modo, ex suppositione. Simpliciter igitur et absolute loquendo, possibile fuit Deo alio modo hominem liberare quam per passionem Christi: quia non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum, ut dicitur Luc.1. Sed ex aliqua suppositione facta, fuit impossibile: quia enim impossibile est Dei praescientiam falli, et eius voluntatem seu dispositionem cassari, supposita praescientia et praeordinatione Dei de passione Christi non erat simul possibile Christum non pati, vel hominem alio modo quam per eius passionem liberari. Et est eadem ratio de omnibus his quae sunt praeordinata a Deo, ut in prima parte habitum est(18).

Plainly, divine will and divine operation are assimilated to divine foreknowledge. The same solution of hypothetical and absolute necessity is valid in each case and in all three together(19).

(16) 1 dist. 47,q.1, a.1, ad 2m. (17) 1a., q. 116, a.3.
(18) 3a., q. 46, a.2.
(19) Two reasons may be assigned for the generalisation. First, what is true of foreknowledge must also be true of will and operation, for the three are really the same. Second, the predication, God wills this or God does this, is of the same nature as the predication, God knows this. In each case is added a relatio rationis to the actus purus and the term of the relation is not a possibility (God might will this, God might do this) but an actuality (God wills this, does this). Finally, there is the same basic difficulty in all three cases, namely, the idea of time: just as God does not know in time, neither does he will in time, nor act in time. On the eternity of divine action, see C.Gent., 2, 31 - 38; on God's will of what is not yet, ibid.,1, 79. In the latter passage St. Thomas does not endeavour to rise the reader to the level of the concept of eternity.

Because this is so, there arises a special prerogative of God as agent: he stands outside the other of all other causes and his effects are necessary or contingent at his choice, yet the contingent effects emerge with all the infallibility, efficacity and irresistibility that are to be found in necessary effects.

The idea may readily be deduced from the fundamental proposition, If God knows, wills, does this, then this must be. On the one hand, the "this" of the consequent is necessary, and so God's knowledge is infallible, his will irresistible, his action efficacious. On the other hand, the necessity of the "this" may be either absolute or hypothetical; which it is, depends on "what" is known, willed, done by God. If God intends to produce the necessary, then the effect cannot but be necessary. If he intends to produce the contingent, then the effect cannot but be contingent.

Since everything depends on the divine intention, and since an intention is an act of will. St. Thomas commonly refers to this property of divine transcendence as the efficacy of divine will(20).

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(20) See 1a., q. 19,a. 8; 6 Mataphys., lect. 3; De subst. separ., 14 (13); 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, $22. The connection of these passages with the generalised theorem on divine foreknowledge appears clearly from 1a., q. 19, a. 8, ad 3m.,".. ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina talem necessitatem habent qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet vel absolutam vel conditionatam tantum."
Confusion in the interpretation of St.Thomas's thought partly arises from the four senses in which he uses the term "contingent" namely, a creature, a corruptible creature (e.g., 1a., q. 2, a. 3, tertia via), the é"per accidens" (e.g., 1a., q. 115,a. 6; q. 116, a.1), and a free act of will.
Two points merit particular attention.
In the Sentences contingence is regularly attributed to the contingent action of the proximate cause (1 dist.3_,q. 1, a. 5; dist.39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m.; dist.40,q. 3,a. 1; dist.47,q. 1, a. 1, ad 2m). In De Veritate (q. 23,a. 5) it is seen that this implies that God could not create a corruptible creature, a cow or a turnip; the position is accordingly corrected. God can give the mode of contingence even without the help of the

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B. Ad Modum Liberi.

Evidently St. Thomas would dream of attributing the property of divine transcendence to any created cause: such a view he explicitly exclude on two distinct occasions(21). So there no need to argue the point. It remains that we explain what St. Thomas does mean by ad modum liberi.

The fundamental point arises from his theorem Deus operatur in omni operante. Because this theorem is a theorem and not the gratuitous supposition of another motion, because the discovery of it is like the discovery of the principle of work and not like the discovery of a new continent or planet, it is quite manifest that God's operation in the operation of nature must be ad modum naturae. On the other hand,

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... corpus caeleste. This of course refers to the production of the prima individua rborum et brutorum animalium. It does not mean that God is a causa impedibilis and so can directly give the mode of the per accidens; nor does it :ean that God can create a free act without the action of a free will (See De Ver., q. 24,a.1, ad 3m.). The fact that St. Thomas speaks generally of contingence proves nothing: see the idea of contingence implicit in C.Gent., 3,72; contrast with this the argument against Albumazar in C.Gent., 3, 86.

Again, observe that the certitudo ordinis of divine providence (See De Ver., q.6, a.3; the correction of this in C. Gent., 3, 94; the repetition in 1a.,q. 19, a. 6;q. 103,a.7) is not a distinct certitude from that of divine transcendence and efficacy. Such an opinion is explicitly excluded by 1a., q.116 a. 3, and it contradicts the whole St. Thomas's theory of foreknowledge.

(21) .. omnis alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens sed necessarius (1Peri Herm., lect. 14,$22; cp. 6 Metaphys., lect. 3, $1222). Accordingly the Banezian praemotio physica cannot be foisted off on St. Thomas: he makes efficacy an exclusive property of God, and reject in anticipation the suggestion that a created cause cold infallibly and irresistibly produce a contingent effect.

were the divine operation like St. Albert's virtus divina creata or Banez's praemotio physica, it necessarily would be an addition to nature and not ad modum naturae. Thus,

> .. Deus operatur in unoquoque agente etiam secundum modum illius agentis; sicut causa prima operatur in operatione causae secundae, cum causa secunda non possit in actum procedere nisi per virtutem causae primae. Unde per hoc quod Deus est causa operans in cordibus hominum, non excluditur quin ipsae humanae mentes sint causae suorum motuum; unde non tollitur ratio libertatis(22).

Now this divine operation in the operation of the free will has all the properties of divine transcendence: it is the actio of God. Therefore, God will infallibly and irresistibly produce the effect he intends, and the effect will be contingent or necessary according to the nature of the cause God uses as an instrument in the production of the effect. Thus,

> .. Deus movet quidem voluntatem immutabiliter propter efficaciam virtutis moventid, quae deficere non potest; sed propter naturam voluntatis motae, quae indifferenter se habet ad diversa, non inducitur necessitas sed manet libertas; sicut etiam in omnibus divina providentia infallibiliter operatur; et tamen a causis contingentibus proveniant effectus contingenter, in quantum Deus omnia movet proportionabiliter, unumquoque secundum suum modum(23).

In this passage, besides the theorem of divine transcendence and that of Deus operatur in operatione creaturae, there is at least the supposition of a third, namely, fate.

Fate is the virtus artis divinae in universo instrumentali. In itself it is simply the dynamic pattern of the four-dimensional universe, the order and arrangement of all secondary causes. So considered, that is, in sensu diviso, it is a cause inasmuch as the secondary causes are causes, and it produces necessary or contingent effects

(22) De Ver., q. 24, a. 1, ad 3m. (23) De Malo, q. 6, a.1, ad 3m.

necessarily or contingently according to the nature of the secoundary causes. But this is not the whole story, but a mere abstraction : it is prescinding from God who creates, conserves, moves, applies and so orders and arranges; further, it is prescinding from God who operates efficaciously in the operation of every creature. Fate, the, taken really, that is, in conjunction with God, in sensu composito, is immobile, infallibile, irresistible, efficacious : the effects are still necessary or continngent according to the nature of their causes; but the contingent effects do not elerge contingently but infallibly, irresistibly, efficaciously(24). As is plain, this theorem is simply the summation of all instances of efficacious divine operation in the operations of creatures.

Thus, when God moves the will to the end, then this motion to the end contingently implies the will's self-motion to the means in sensu diviso; it infallibly implies the will's self-motion to the means in sensu composito.

C. Deus Causa Peccati.

While the theorem of divine transcendence shows that there is no incompatibility between the divine artist and the contingense of the corruptible creature, of the per accidens, or of the free act of will, it is not in itself an explanation of the problem of sin.

(24) fatum secundum considerationem secundarum causarum mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, ommobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis sed conditionatae.. la., q. 116,a. 3. On the nature of fate, see above pp.
Note that the use of in sensu composito and in sensu diviso above is not that of the Banezians, who apply it to praemotio physica, but simply a consequence of St. Thomas's theorem of divine transcendence.

Because God knows, wills, and causes Peter to do this, therefore Peter does this. His doing it is hypothetically necessary. God is the principal cause of his doing it, and Peter simply an instrument(25). Further, God is universal cause, and so responsible for all the circumstances, conditions, motives, and dispositions of mood and temperament that led to Peter doing it.

But it happens that the "this" which Peter did is a sin. Because Peter is the free cause of the act, he is responsible and a sinner. But God is still more a cause than Peter and still freer than Peter. Therefore God is more a sinner than Peter.

That, I think, is the obvious difficulty. It will be well to analyse it.

First is the actus peccati. It is an immanent act effected in Peter's will, the voluntas qua reducta de potentia in actum. It is also, perhaps, some actus imperatus consequent to the act effected in the will.

Second, there is the defectus or deformitas peccati. This pertains to the actus peccati, not as an entity, but as a privation; it is the absence of conformity to the rule of rectitude.

Third, there is the causa actus peccati; there is the proximate cause, namely, the will in act with respect to the end; there is the first cause, God, operans in omni operante.

Fourth, there is the causa defectus or causa deformitatis. This is the ratio culpae. The whole problem is solved if it can be shown that while both Peter and God are causae actus peccati, Peter alone is causa defectus or deformitatis.

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(25) That is, quoad productionem entis.

St. Thomas attends to this problem principally in the De Malo and the Prima Secundae(26)

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(26) De Malo, q. 3,a. 1, 2; la 2ae., q. 79,a. 1, 2. In the Commentary on the Sentences the question was not acute. Then reprobation was conceived as praescientia culpae et praeparatio poenae (1 dist. 4L, q. 4, a. 1) which is not the same as permissio culpae et praeparatio poenae (la., q. 23, a. 3); for in the Sentences grace is not prepared equally for all because, thpugh God is equally towards all, all are not equally towards him (1 dist. 40, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m.); moreover; multa fiunt quae Deus non operatur, and with regard to permission of evils by divine consequent will it is said potest fieri oppositum eius quod permissum est; quod tamen fit secundum permissionem, quia permissio respicit potentiam causae ad utrumque oppositorum se habentem (1 dist/ 47, q. 1, a. 2). in the Pars Prima re= probation is not merely forknowledge of sin but also permission, which is an act of divine will and antecedent to the sinner's sinful will ; but though antecedent it is not, like predesti= nation, a cause (la., q. 23, a.3). In the parallel Commentary on Romans we are told that reprobation is eternal and not temporal, presumably, antecedent and not consequent ; that as predestination prepares glory, so reprobation prepares damna= tion ; but while predestination prepares merits, reprobation does not prepare sins ; so that while the foreknowledge of merits cannot be the cause of predestination, still fore= knowledge of sin is the cause of reprobation inasmuch as the latter is the preparation of damnation (Rom., 9, lect. 2, ad fin.).

The essential element in his thought is that one can be the causa actus deformis without being the causa deformitatis. The former has its criterion in the laws of cause and effect. The latter has its criterion in the laws of morality.

Peter is not merely the causa actus deformis but also the causa deformitatis. He is the former because he produced a given act. He is the latter because in producing it, he did what he ought not have done.

God is the causa actus deformis but not the causa deformitatis. He is the former because he produced the act as principal and universal cause. He is not the latter because in doing so he did not do what he ought not have done.

Thus,

> .. deformitas peccati non consequitur speciam actus secundum quod est in genere naturae, sic autem a Deo causatur ; sed consequitur speciem actus secundum quod est moralis, prout causatur ex libero arbitrio(27).
> .. homo qui peccat, licet per se non velit deformitatem peccati, tamen deformitas peccati aliquo modo cadit sub voluntate peccantis, dum, scilicet, magis eligit deformitatem peccati incurrere quam ab actu cessare. Sed deformitas peccati nullo modo cadit sub voluntate divina, sed consequiter ex hoc quod liberum arbitrium recedit ab ordine voluntatis divinae(28).

(27) De Malo, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2m.
(28) ibid., ad 1m. With regard to God not in any way willing sin, cp. Deus neque vult mala fieri neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri, et hoc est bonum (1a., q. 19, a. 9, ad. 3m.). This presuppose[5] the category of falsitas obiectiva : in voluntariis agentibus.. in quorum potestate est subducere se ab ordinatione divini intellectus, in quo malum culpae consistit (1a., q. 17, a. 1), Cp. 1a 2ae., q. 79, a. 1, ad 3m.; a. 2, ad 2m.

The question, then, is simply this : is God morally bound to refrain from operating Peter's operation when Peter sins(29).

Per se it is certain that God is not: for God is impeccable and yet he operates the operation of all sinners.

It remains that there is a per accidens in the matter, namely, a mistaken theory about God's operation which would imply God to be morally bound to refrain from operating the operation of the sinner. Such a theory is one that posits simply two categories, that asserts that unless God makes it infallibly certain that Peter does not sin, then God makes it infallibly certain that Peter does sin. For, though in such a case it would remain that the sinner sinned freely, it none the less would also be true that God is more a sinner than man. Evidently so, for morality prohibits making others sin.

But, as we have already indicated, St. Thomas does not hold any theory of two and only two categories such as that of Banez. He does not develop his three categories into an explicit system, but he scatters through his pages fairly frequent assumptions of them. On the point in hand, there is

> .. sicut creatura deficeret in nihilum nisi per divinam potentiam contineretur, ita etiam decideret in non bonum nisi non contineretur a Deo. Non tamen sequitur, quod nisi contineretur a Deo per gratiam, rueret in peccatum; nisi solum de natura corrupta, quae de se habet inclinationem ad malum(30).

Here three categories are evident, bonum, non bonum, peccatum. Unless God makes the creature good, then it is not good; but it does not follow that unless God makes the creature gratuitously good, then the creature sins; that holds only in the case of fallen nature.

(29) Such is the assumption of la 2ae., q. 79, a. 1, corp.
(30) De Malo, q. 16, a. 4, ad 22m. On the special case of fallen nature, see below pp. 451, 448.

So much for the fundamental solution. But further objections may be considered to clarify the issue. These are four, first, from the fact that God is principal cause, second, from the fact that God moves the will to the end, third, from the fact of the massa damnata, fourth, in the case of a first sin, as that of the angels.

First, then, God does not merely operate the operation of the creature ; he operates it more than the creature does ; he operates immediatione virtutis ; and his operation prius intrat, vehementius imprimit, tardius recedit.

On the exact meaning of these theorems on the degrees of causality, see above in chapter three. If one allows one's imagination to hypostatize theorems into motions, then the objection is valid. Further, if one substitutes for St. Thomas's theorem on instrumentality (which makes the creature an instrument quoad productionem entis) a predetermining praemotio which regards not simply the ratio entis but also its determination, then, again and separately, the objection is valid. But the objection in neither of those senses is valid against St. Thomas(31)

Second, when God moves the will to the end, it is as certain as fate in sensu composito that the means chosen by the sinner will be sinful.

This sounds imposing. But the certitude of fate in sensu composito coincides with the certitude that the sinner is sinning when he is sinning. In point of fact, when God moves the will to the end, this movement of itself tends to the good ; the divine intention is that the sinner do what is right. St. Thomas presents this situation as follows:

(31) causa prima dicitur esse principalis simpliciter loquendo propter hoc quod magis influit in effectum ; sed causa secunda secundum quid principalis est, in quantum effectum ei magis conformatur (De Ver?, q. 24 a. 1, ad 4m.).

> .. instinctu quodam interiori moventur homines a Deo ad bonum et ad malum ; unde Augustinus dicit in Libro de Gratia et libero Arbitrio, cap. 22, quod "Deus operatur in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quodcumque voluerit, sive ad bona, sive ad mala pro eorum meritis." Unde et Deus dicitur saepius suscitare aliquos in bonum... Dicitur etiam suscitare aliquos ad malum faciendum... Aliter tamen ad bonum, aliter ad mala : nam ad bona inclinat hominum voluntates directe et per se, tamquam actor bonorum ; ad malum autem dicitur inclinare vel suscitare homines occasionaliter, in quantum scilicet Deus homini proponit vel interius vel exterius quod, quantum est de se, est inductivum ad bonum; sed homo propter suam malitiam perverse utitur ad malum... Et similiter Deus quantum est de se interius instigat hominem ad bonum, puta regem ad defendendum iura regni sui vel ad puniendum rebelles; sed hoc instinctu bono malus homo abutitur secundum malitiam cordis sui... Et hoc modo circa Pharaonem occidit, qui cum a Deo excitaretur ad regni sui tutelam, abusus est hac excitatione in crudelitatem(32).

It would seem that there is no fault to be found with the movement of the will to the end.

Still, this leads to a third objection. Though the movement of the will is good and to the good, none the less it leads to sin <u>occasionaliter</u>. When the heart of man is infected with malice, then a good movement to the good is not enough ; what is wanted is an operative grace, that will transform an evil heart into a good heart, a heart of stone into a heart of flesh. This is true : the sins of the morally impotent reduce to their first sin, and moral impotence reduces to the fall of man(33). But the point to be grasped is that neither the sins of the sinner nor the sin of our first parents constitute a claim in justice against God. There is, indeed, a claim to mercy : but God is free to choose his own manner of being merciful.

(32) In Rom. 9, lect. 3, ad fin.
(33) Cp. De Malo, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9m., ad 16m.

This finally brings us to the possibility of the first sin : St. Thomas treats it in some detail in the Pars Prima and then again and somewhat differently in the De Malo(34). But the ultimate solution to this problem can be had only by an explicit theory of falsitas obiectiva. Why did the angels sin ? There is no "why". Later sins can be reduced to earlier sins and to the general corruption of fallen nature. But the first sin is first in the order of unintelligibility. There is no prior unintelligible to be alleged in mitigation of it. It is the mysterium iniquitatis in its pure form, and that mystery cannot be understood: the divine mysteries are understood by God, and that we do not understand them is because of their excess of intelligibility; but the mystery of iniquity is not an excess but a complete absence of intelligibility and an absolute impossibility of understanding. Still, if one understands that there is nothing to be understood, no cause of sin to be sought, no explanation to be made, then one knows all that there is to be known. That is the point of the third category.

$4. 23 Logical Summary.

The various elements in the argument are here collected for the convenience of the reader.

1. The Timeless Copula.

If you choose to imagine time as a finite line, then eternity is

(34) De Malo, q. 16, a. 4. Cp. 1a., 62, 3, 2m.; q. 63, a. 5, 6.

not to be imagined as an infinite line but as a point outside the finite line. Eternity is the negation of time. Duration is merely an image of eternity as though eternity were time, or else it is the same as time.

It is true to say of any creature whatever: This is actually existing. It is not true to say of anything whatever : This is actually existing now, if the now is temporal. It is true to say of anything whatever : This is actually existing now, if the now is eternal. God's now is eternal.

2. The Analogy of Predication.

It is true that John is a man (substantial predication), learned (accidental predication), and a teacher (extrinsic denomination from the learning John causes). All three predications are true, objective, real, and equally so.

Note that by a teacher is here meant not a person who is learned, who speaks most of the time in a school, who knows all the tricks of pedagogy, etc. A teacher is one who causes learning in others.

3. Divine Attributes.

There is no accidental predication with respect to God, for God is simple and immutable.

There is substantial predication with respect to God. All substantial predications are necessarily true whether or not God creates.

All other predication with respect to God involves extrinsic, denomination and presupposes its term as actually existing sub specie aeternitatis.

To this there are three objections.

First, it cannot be really and objectively true that God causes this when there is no change in God. Solution : there cannot be any change in God and it is really and objectively true that God causes everything yet need cause nothing.

Second, it cannot be really and objectively true that God knows this when there is no change in God. Solution : God's knowledge is infinite and so there is no possibility of adding to his knowledge by changing him ; further, it is really and objectively true that God knows this as actually existing and would not know it as actually existing unless he created it.

Third, it cannot be really and objectively true that God makes a free choice when there is no change in God. Solution : a free choice is not the contingent effect but the cause of a contingent effect ; freedom lies in the dominium sui actus ; the dominium does not lie in the act that is dominated but in the act which dominates ; but the act which dominates is not the will of the means (which is effected) but the will of the end (which is necessary in itself, but free as a cause of something else). Hence there is no possibility of adding to God's freedom by putting in him a contingent effect, for it is not the contingent effect which is free but its cause. And in any case God is immutable.

4. Divine Transcendence.

Since any predication with respect to God ad extra presupposes the actual existence (sub specie aeternitatis) of the term, it follows

both that if God knows or wills or does this, this must be and that that the necessity of the this is not absolute but hypothetical.

5. The Grounds of Necessity and Contingence.

Necessarium et possibile sunt divisiones entis.

Hence the ground of necessity and contingence is the divine intellect, the measure of all reality.

The ground of this being necessary or of this being contingent is causally the divine will deciding upon the realisation of the necessary or contingent thing but formally the passive realisation of the divine idea of necessity or contingence by the divine will.

6. Divine Antecedence.

Antecedence may be pure, relative, compound.

Pure antecedence is that of God with respect to any limited being or to any summation of limited beings. That God knows the fall of Peter, is pure antecedence with respect to a single event. That God predestines Peter, is pure antecedence with respect to a series of events.

Relative antecedence is the antecedence of one term to another in the series that God knows, wills, causes.

Compound antecedence is the conjunction of pure and relative antecedence. Thus, if A and B are two terms in a series, then the antecedence of A to B is relative, but the antecedence of A to B through the infinity of divine knowledge, will and causality is compound.

The nexus of pure antecedence is hypothetical necessity : this

is compatible both with absolute necessity and with contingence.

The nexus of relative antecedence is either necessary or contingent ; it cannot be both and it must be either one or the other.

The nexus of compound antecedence is either absolutely necessary or else contingent and hypothetically necessary ; which it is, follows from the nexus of relative antecedence.

7. Predetermination.

Since God is not determined but exactly the same whether he creates or does not create, the only possible prior determination is that in the finite series of events. If the prior determination is a necessary cause, the event is necessary. If it is a contingent cause, the event is contingent.

8. The Conditionally Antecedent Will of God.

The antecedence treated above is absolute. By the conditionally antecedent will of God may be meant: the actus purus with respect to a hypothetical situation ; the per se effect of divine activity, as in the case of Pharaoh treated in the Commentary on Romans ; or the utility of prayer, treated in Contra Gentiles 3, 95 ; or what God wills in universali, as in 1 Tim. 2,lect. 1. On universal salvific will, see In Ioan. 6, lect. 5.

9. The Divine Architect.

The divine architect is not to be conceived anthropomorphically as though he disposed of only two categories. He disposes of three

categories.

There is what he plans, wills, executes, and this is actually existing sub specie aeternitatis.

There is what he does not plan, does not will and does not execute and this is either nothing or else it is malum culpae. If the latter, then God knows it, permits it, and co-operates with its perpetrator. He knows it because it is objective, but does not plan it because it is not intelligible. He permits it and this permission is good and to the manifestation of the divine attributes, but he does not will it to be, just as he does not will it not to be.

10. Deus Causa Peccati.

Divine knowledge and permission of sin is just as much antecedent as divine planning and divine will of what is good.

But divine planning and divine will are causes : because God willed and planned this, therefore this is.

On the other hand divine knowledge and permission are not causes: God knows and permits and, then but not therefore, sin takes place.

The ultimate ground of the difference is that sin as such is unintelligible and not to be explained. To make the nexus a therefore is to explain. To make the nexus a then is simply to state a sequence.

It would be easier to find an explanatory relation between the number of bald heads in Siam and the number of Aztec monuments in Peru, than to find an explanatory relation between divine permission and sin, for in the latter case there is certainly none at all: sin is unintelligible and cannot be explained. Note that causality is a species of explanation.

None the less, divine knowledge and permission of sin is in particulari, antecedent, infallible, efficacious : for God is not limited even by the possibility of sin.

To the objection: Deus causa peccati. God causes the sinful act; the entity of this act is related to God by a causal relation. God causes the sin neither by compound nor by pure antecedence : not by compound antecedence, for God moves to the good ; not by pure antecedence, for in operating the operation of the sinner he does not do what he ought not do.

11. Scientia Media.

It may be asked whether divine knowledge of sin is prior to divine permission of sin or divine permission of sin is prior to divine knowledge of sin.

The Molinist system would require the former to be true. The Banezian system would require the latter to be true.

Since the distinction between divine intellect and divine will has no foundation except in our limited natures and since both divine knowledge and divine will are self-explanatory because identical with the divine substance, it would seem most probable that the question is meaningless.

12. Essence of St. Thomas's Position.

We have not infinite minds and so cannot comprehend predestination and reprobation. We know certain truths from philosophy and revelation. We can develop a technique to solve difficulties against these truths. Most of such difficulties arise from an anthropomorphic concept of God.

$4.3 Transition.

The bearing of the preceding discussion on St. Thomas's theory of operative grace is largely extrinsic. The points made pertain to the sixteenth century field of speculation on the issue, and they have been treated because to a modern reader they constitute the essential questions. But, if for the sake of the reader attention has been paid to these points, now for the sake of an historical knowledge of St. Thomas it is necessary to direct attention to quite different channels.

It was shown in the first chapter that St.Thomas eventually effected the synthesis of the generic and the specific theorems on the necessity of grace, that he worked into a single theory both the doctrine of the supernatural, which was first formulated explicitly by Philip the Chancellor, and, on the other hand, the more primitive psychological theory on the liberation by grace of free will.

Now it is primarily to the latter field of thought that pertains the idea of operative grace. Historically the point is evident(1).But its intrinsic evidence is no less convincing : for if there are no limitations from which liberty is to be liberated, then to operate on liberty is as paradoxical as to mould a statue out of water ; on the other hand, if there are limitations on human liberty, then operation beyond the limits cannot possibly conflict with freedom.

Accordingly, one may distinguish three aspects in the effect of divine operation : the free act is, first, a reality, second, a right act, and, third, a supernatural or meritorious act. Now, from the viewpoint of a theory of operative grace, it is plain that to explain how God effects the free act as a reality may be useful knowledge inasmuch as it answers prior questions, but to treat this point alone is to leave

(2) Contrast the theories of Peter Lombard($2.3) and of St.Albert ($2.9).

untouched the problem peculiar to operative grace. Similarly, an explanation of the supernatural character of the meritoriousness of free acts, however interesting in itself, is not really to the point. The issue that concerns us is this: how does God operate man's operation of a right act inasmuch as that act is right. It is here that there is an apparent conflict between divine activity and human liberty, whether one conceives the rightness as that of moral rectitude, or that distinctive of acts leading to justification, or in the instant of justification, or consequently making for spiritual advancement and final perseverance. For the whole moral aspect of freedom, as opposed its metaphysical or psychological aspects, lies in the fact that man is responsible for his choice between right and wrong. But if man is responsible for the wrong he does, then he must be able to do what is right. If he is able to do what is right, then where does grace come in ?

Observe that this problem, though parallel to that of the preceding section, is not identical. Just now we confronted the problem that man can either act or not act, yet cannot act without God and cannot choose except what God intends. But the new problem is that man can choose either right or wrong, yet needs grace to choose what is right. The former problem is an apparent conflict between God and <u>libertas exercitii</u>, and its solution lies in divine transcendence. The new problem is an apparent conflict between the necessity of grace and <u>libertas specificationis, and</u> here the solution must be different : for grace is a finite entity which does not participate the divine prerogative of transcendence(2).

The aim of the two section is to give an account of St. Thomas's thought on the limitations of human liberty, or what is equivalent, on the need of operative grace.

(2) Banezian thought seems to suffer gravely from a confusion on this ./.

§4.4 The General Theory of the Need of Operative Grace.

The problem in this and the following section has already been defined. Man is free to do right or wrong and yet needs grace to do what is right.

The more specific elements in St. Thomas's complex and highly nuanced solution are treated in the next section(§4.5) Here the general foundation of his thought is explained.

The basic idea is a distinction between different senses of the term "proportion". With one sense, we are all familiar : a cause is proportionate to an effect when it can produce it. To this, three other senses must be added.

There is the proportion of impeccability, of the cause that cannot fail to operate properly.

There is the proportion of the agens perfectum, that is, of the cause that will, as a matter of fact, operate properly most of the time.

There is the proportion of the agens imperfectum, that is, of the cause that can act properly not merely in any instance but in all instances, yet, as a matter of fact, does operate properly only in minori parte.

The above conception may be illustrated from a consideration of the theory of impeccability, of the need of habita, and of the general need of grace.

... point. St. Thomas is explicit in affirmatio that only God can infallibly produce a contingent effect. See 6 Metaphys., lect.3, §1222; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, §22.

§4.4A.

A. The Theory of Impeccability.

Because man is not impeccable, he can be in need of grace to will the good.

Not only is man not impeccable, but absolute impeccability is possible to him only by the grace of the beatific vision(1). The reasons for this statement are as follows.

Only a cause fully proportionate to its effect and not subject to extrinsic interference is naturally incapable of defective operation, of sin. But the finality of man is the true and the good, and God alone is fully proportionate to truth and goodness. Therefore God alone is naturally impeccable(2).

But if man is so closely united to God that God becomes the principle of all men's action, then the possibility of sin is excluded. Thus, the beatific vision realises all knowledge, concrete as well as abstract ; it transforms the body and so excludes the interference of the lower man with intellectual operation ; it unites the will with God in perfect charity(3).

Wittout the beatific vision, there cannot be absolute impeccability in a creature. A relative impeccability is, however, possible. Graces can do for the soul what special privilege did for Adam's body before the fall. For Adam's body was not intrinsically immortal, such as was Adam's soul. It was rendered immortal by a combination of internal perfections and external protection. In similar fashion man can be made

(1) De Ver., q. 24, a. 7-9.
(2) De Ver., q. 24, a.7. Though the categories of the human intellect and will are universal, still only God is absolute truth and goodness. The human categories give the possibility of willing the good for its own sake, knowing the truth for its own sake. But they are not the absolute realisations of truth and goodness and so do not exclude the possibility of sin.
(3) De Ver., q. 24, a. 8.

relatively impeccable in this life(4).

B. The Need of Habits.

In point of fact, though capable of a grace of impeccability, man is naturally the most imperfect of all creatures. Every other grade of being, in virtue of its nature, operates properly at least ut in maiori parte. In man evil predominates. This follows from his nature. The reason may be seen in a comparison of the material and spiritual orders.

The heavenly bodies are full realisations of their potency and cannot become anything else; they always operate properly. The generabilia are also corruptibilia: in them nature succeeds for the most part. But materia prima is pure deficiency.

Again, in the spiritual order, God is pure act and absolutely impeccable ; the angels are in genere intelligibilium ut actus and they do right in the main; but man is the spiritual counterpart of materia prima ; his intellect is, at birth, like a tabula rasa ; since then evil is multiform and the good unique, man for the most part does what is wrong(5).

The problem is then, How make man right ? How perfect him ? How bring him and his operation into conformity with the rule and measure of rectitude, the divine wisdom and goodness ?

There are two possible solutions. First, per modum passionis: let the potency to be regulated be moved by the rule of rectitude.

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(4) ibid., a. 9.
(5) 1 dist.39,q.2,a.2, ad 4m. Note that fallen human nature and nature as such coincide.

Second, per modum qualitatis inhaerentis: let the rectitude of the rule become the form of the potency to be regulated.

The first solution is open to difficulties. If man's rectitude is simply imposed upon him extrinsically, then this is a species of vio= lence : man's operation is made good, but man himself is not. Thus, one is left with the second solution.

What about the inherent quality ?

Distinguish, in the first place, the degrees of its perfection. Incipiently it is simply a disposition. When it is consummated and, as it were, grafted on nature, then it is termed a habit. On this account a disposition is said to be facile mobilis and a habit difficile mobilis: for what has become a part of nature is not easily lost.

For the same reason the presence of a habit is indicated by ease and delight in operation : what is natural is easy and agreeable.

Finally, for the same reason, Averroes says that a habit is quo quis agit cum voluerit. For a habit makes operation one's property, and use of a habit is as unimpeded as use of one's own possessions.

So much for the signs and consequences of the habit. Essentially it is a form determining and perfecting an indeterminate potency(6).

To conclude, as a man without habits does what is right only in minori parte, so with them he becomes an agens perfectum. The will perfected with the virtue of justice performs acts of justice with the spontaneity and regularity with which fire moves upwards(7).

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(6) 3 dist. 23, q. 1, a. 1. Cp. 1a 2ae., q. 49, a. 4.
(7) 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4m. Cp. 1a., q. 49, a. 3, ad 5m.

C. The General Theory of the Need of Grace.

Just as the theory of the need of habits is based on the theory of the nature of impeccability(8), so the theory of the need of grace for good action(9) is based on the theory of the need of habits.

The doctrine of the Sentences that has just been outlined later becomes more precise and specific. In the Contra Gentiles there is substituted for the normative theory, which makes divine goodness and wisdom the rule and measure of right action, a dynamic theory in terms of God's bringing man to his last end. The two aspects of good action and meritorious action superpose, but there is no neglect of the former and concentration on the latter such as is to be found in more recent speculation(10). In the De Virtutibus in Communi and the Prima Secundae the need of virtues in the will is discussed ; two reasons are assigned ; the will needs the virtue of charity to be inclined towards the good that is beyond the proportion of the species ; it also needs the virtue of justice to be inclined to the good that is beyond the proportion of the individual. Charity transcends human nature; justice transcends egoism(11).

The latter point calls for some explanation. In what sense is egoism so natural to man that justice transcends his natural proportion. In the Pars Prima one is assured that the natural inclination of the will, as that of every spontaneity, is to love God more than self(12).

(8) Impeccability follows from perfect actuation; the need of habits follows from the need of actuation, determination, in indeterminate potencies.
(9) We still prescind from the need of grace for meritorious action.
(10) C. Gent.,3,148 & 150-153. (11) De Virt.,q.1,a.5;1a 2ae., q.56, a. 6.
(12) 1a., q. 60,a. 5.

It should seem that, since God is absolute goodness and justice a participation of this absolute; therefore the natural love of God more than self implies a natural love of justice more than self.

The answer would seem to lie in the distinction between the proportion that gives capacity for perfection and the proportion that makes imperfection impossible or exceptional. Thus, the will as a potency (a) naturally tends to the absolute good, (b) is naturally capable of eliciting acts with respect to absolute goodness, but without the added perfection of virtues does so rarely, (c) with the second nature of the virtues spontaneously and so regularly does the right thing, and (d) with the grace of impeccability always does what it should.

This solution, which merely summarises the points already made in this section, enables one to interpret such a passage as the following.

> .. diligere autem Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini et etiam cuilibet creatures, non solum rationali sed irrationali et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturae competere potest... unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum; et ita Deum diligebat plus quam se ipsum et super omnia; sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei(13).

Now, St. Thomas holds that sin does not deprive man of what is natural: therefore, even after the fall, man naturally loves God more than himself. The difference between the two states is that before the fall man not merely tends to the good absolutely but also acts accordingly, while afterwards he does the evil he would not do and omits the good that he would do. In any case, such is St. Thomas's interpretation of

(13) 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 3.

the passage in the seventh chapter of Romans(13).

To conclude, the general theory of the need of grace for good action is that human nature after the fall can desire to do what is right but, in the main, will fail to do so effectually. The general theory does not affirm any impossibility of effectual good action either in single cases or in all cases. It states a fact : man does not in the main do what is right. It accounts for the fact : man has a need of habits of operation if he is to do is right as a general rule. But it only the special theory of the need of grace that establishes an impossibility of good action without grace. To that we turn in the next action.

§4.5 Special Theory of the Need of Operative Grace.

On this background of a general improportion of man to good performance St. Thomas constructs his theory of the need of grace. As in the previous section, so here the argument prescinds from the well-known theory of the supernatural and of merit to treat in turn the need of grace quoad substantiam actus first in the sinner, second in pre=

(13) Dicit ergo primum quantum ad omissionem boni: Non enim ago hoc bonum quod volo agere. Quod quidem uno modo potest intelligi de homine sub peccato constituto; et sic est quod dicit Ago est accipiendum secundum actionem completam, quae exterius opere exercetur per rationis consensum. Quod autem dicit Volo est intelligendum, non quidem de voluntate completa, quae est operis praeceptum, sed de voluntate quadam incompleta, qua homines in universali bonum volunt, sicut in universali habent rectum iudicium de bono, tamen per habitum vel passionem perversam pervertitur hoc iudicium et depravatur talis voluntas in particulari,ut non agat quod in universali intelligit agendum et agere vellet.Rom., cap. 7, lect. 3.

In other words,the natural tendency to the good in general becomes, practically,a velleity.Thus,there is room for a grace to make the will tend effectually to the good.Such would seem to be sense of ut bonum velit in la 2ae., q. 111, a. 2, corp.

paration for justification, third after justification.

As this need of grace corresponds to the function of operative grace and, as it were, defines the latter's effect, it will be well to begin with an account of the relation of this need to human liberty. Thus, there are four points: psychological continuity, the need of grace in the sinner, the need in preparation for justification, the need after justification.

$4.51. The Law of Psychological Continuity.

St. Thomas never affirms that the freedom of the will implies a perfec= tion of equilibrium and indifference that is born afresh with every tick of the clock. A change of will is a motion in the will ; that motion must have its proportionate cause ; and the ticking of the clock is not a proportionate cause. Since a large number, if not all, of the difficulties against God's operation in the will arise from the assump= tion that the will perpetually and automatically springs back to perfect poise and equilibrium, it is necessary to copy out a flat denial of so preposterous an opinion.

> Tertia autem diversitas in quam liberum arbitrium potest, attenditur secundum differentiam mutationis; quae quidem non consistit in hoc quod aliquis diversa velit, nam et ipse Deus vult ut diversa fiant secundum quod convenit diversis tempori= bus et personis; sed mutatio liberi arbitri consistit in hoc quod aliquis illud idem et pro eodem tempore non velit quod prius volebat, aut velit quod prius nolebat. Et haec diversi= tas non per se pertinet ad rationem liberi arbitrii sed accidit ei secundum conditionem naturae mutabilis: sicut non est de ratione visivae potentiae quod diversimode videat, sed hoc contingit quandoque propter diversam dispositionem videntis, cuius oculus quandoque est purus, quandoque autem turbatus. Et simi= liter etiam mutabilitas seu diversitas liberi arbitrii non est de ratione eius, sed accidit ei in quantum est in natura mutabili.

> Mutatur enim in nobis liberum arbitrium ex causa intrinseca et ex causa extrinseca. Ex causa quidem intrinseca: vel propter rationem, puta cum quis aliquid prius nesciebat quod postea cognoscit; vel propter appetitum qui quandoque sic est dispositus per passionem vel habitum ut tendat in aliquid sicut in sibi conveniens, quod cessante passione vel habitu sibi conveniens non est. Ex causa vero extrinseca: puta cum Deus immutat voluntatem hominis per gratiam de malo in bonum, secundum illud Prov., 21, 1: Cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud(1).

The point is clear and emphatically made. Per se the will does not change: thus, the angels decide their eternal destiny by a single choice. Per accidens it may be changed. But this per accidens is not a vague gesture of the voice; it is accuratemy defined. It is conditioned: the free agent must be in natura mutabili. Its causes are assigned: they are either intrinsic or extrinsic; if they are intrinsic then they are either a change in one's knowledge, or a change in one's passions, or a change in one's habits; if the cause is extrinsic, then it is God operating in the will.

$4.52 The Sinner's Need of Grace for Good Action.

While in the Sentences St. Thomas does not consider the sinner's need for grace to be absolute (A), this position is changed in the De Veritate (B). The change involves the acceptance of the Augustinian or psychological theory of the need of grace (C) and this acceptance is later maintained in synthesis with the theory of the supernatural (D).

(1) De Malo, q. 16, a.5. St. Thomas does not enounce this principle of psychological continuity elsewhere. He certainly presupposes it in the De Veritate (see q. 24, a. 8-10, where immutability of will is established by an elimination of the possible causes of change, namely, the reason, passion, habit, divine operation in the will). Perhaps the use of the idea of liberty as non-coercion in the De Veritate and its rejection in the De Malo (see above, $41) have something to do with this clear and explicit statement on psychological continuity.

A. The Position in the Sentences.

Previously to the formulation of the theory of the supernatural by Philip the Chancellor(2) the traditional position on the need of grace was expressed by a distinction between libertas a coactione, libertas a peccato, and libertas a miseria. The first liberty was from nature, the second was the effect of operative grace, the third was the prerogative of the blessed in heaven(3). As has already been indicated(4), it took some time for the theorem on the supernatural to be correlated accurately with earlier thought.

Accordingly, in the Sentences, St. Thomas flatly denies that the sinner cannot avoid mortal sin without the help of grace.

> Cum igitur libera electio vel fuga boni seu mali ad naturam liberi arbitrii pertineat, non potest esse ut per peccatum subtrahatur homini facultas fugiendi peccatum sed solum quod minuatur, ita scilicet quod illud peccatum quod homo ante vitare de facili poterat, postmodum difficulter vitet ... peccatum mortale requirit consensum determinatum, unde si (homo) potest vitare hoc et illud, potest eadem ratione vitare omnia. Nec iterum potest dici quod ad tempus vitet et non diu: quia liberum arbitrium resistens malo, non efficitur infirmum ad malum vitandum sed multo fortius; unde multo magis postea potest vitare peccatum quam ante(5).

Coherently with this position St. Thomas considers libertas a peccato and a miseria to be merely a matter of the degree of perfection of liberty and in no way to affect its essence(6).

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(2) See above, §1.4D.
(3) See Peter Lombard, 2 dist. 25.
(4) See above, §1.4B.
(5) 2 dist.28,q. 1,a.2.
(6) 2 dist.25,q. 1,a.4; cp. a. 2.

B. De Veritate, q. 24, a. 11. 12.

In his next work St. Thomas denies that such fixity in evil as characterises the demons(7) is possible in this life(8). Passion is ephemeral. A bad habit does not totally corrupt the soul(9). As it is by reasoning that man falls error, so by more reasoning he can be brought back to truth(10); even when error exists in matters of principle, they can be corrected, not indeed by deduction, but by collative thought and by the acquisition of the virtues which effect a right attitude to principles(11). The avoidance of sin may be difficult, but it is not absolutely impossible.

Just what St. Thomas understands by "difficulty" in avoiding sin appears in the next article(12). The sinner can avoid any mortal sin but cannot avoid all mortal sins. The paradox is explained by an extremely subtle psychological analysis, and the conclusion is reached by the combination of three factors.

(7) De Ver., q. 24, a.10; cp.4 dist.50,q. 2,a. 1; 1a.,q.64,a.2; C.Gent., 4, 95; De Malo, q. 16, a. 5. (8) De Ver., q. 24,a. 11.
(9) That is, one bad habit can be corrected by exploiting another good habit, e.g., excessive concupiscence by acts of fortitude. See ibid., a. 10
(10) Contrast the naturally immutable intelligence of the angel: ibid., a. 10.
(11) The thought would seem to be much the same as in Newman's Grammar of Assent. Errors in principle cannot be corrected by syllogisms; St. Thomas's alternative to the syllogism, modus aestimandi quia rationabiliter et quasi collative accipit, suggests the illative sense; finally, Newman's insistence on the importance of moral development has its counterpart in virtus vel naturalis vel assuefactiva est causa eius quod est recte opinari circa principia. See De Ver., q. 24, a. 11, ad 4m. Thus, the alleged opposition between Newman and Aristotle turns out to be merely an opposition between Newman and alleged Aristotelians.St. Thomas attributes his thought on this point to Aristotle.
(12) De Ver., q. 24, a. 12.

The first factor is that an explicit deliberation is not necessary for a free act. The second is that an explicit deliberation is necessary if the sinner is not to sin again. The third is that it is impossible for a man to deliberate explicitly in all his actions. It follows that the sinner who does not need explicit deliberation to act freely, but does need it to avoid further sin, and yet cannot always have it, will inevitably yet freely sin, even mortally, unless aided by grace. Each factor is considered in turn.

Explicit deliberation is not needed for a free act. Normally human action is the spontaneous outcome of habits and of the orientation of mind and will ; in emergencies this is necessarily the case, so that, as Aristotle remarks, it is not foreseen but unforeseen dangers that reveal the brave men. None the less man acts freely in all such operations. Though there is little or no deliberation, still the act is not indeliberate in the sense of not free. There is a real and full consent, for the habit or orientation is in the will; it is a state of willingness with respect to an end, and such a state implies that the means will automatically yet freely be chosen whenever they present themselves unless an explicit deliberation intervene(13).

But though explicit deliberation is not needed for a free act, it is needed if the sinner is to avoid further sin, Even though the sinner in question has committed only one sin, and so has not acquired a vice, still there remains in his will a spontaneous orientation (vis et inclinatio) to the transitory good which he has made his end. When then temptation recurs, he will again succumb unless, by a special effort

(13) .. repentina sunt secundum habitum. Nec hoc est intelligendum quod operatio secundum habitum virtutis possit esse omnino absque deliberatione, cum virtus sit habitus electivus; sed quia habenti habitum iam est in eius electione finis determinatus, unde quandocumque aliquid occurrit ut conveniens illi fini, statim eligitur, nisi ex aliqua attentiori et maiori deliberatione impediatur. loc. cit.

he argues himself out of it.

He will succumb freely, for full advertence merely requires the reflection that the act is a sin and against God, while a consent subsequent to full advertence is of itself a free act.

But this advertence is not sufficient to restrain the sinner. It provides a motive only to the will that is actuated by charity, by love of the absolute or objective good. The sinner's will is turned away from God and to give a sufficient motive the reason must find considerations that are deterrents from the view-point of self-love. Thus, for example, the sinner will have to advert to the danger of eternal punishment and to the fact that the risk is not worth running.

Now this second advertence is consequent to the first and presupposes it; moreover, it is in addition to the first, not explicitly included in it, but the fruit of further consideration(14). It follows, then, that while the sinner can sin grievously with very little deliberation, he needs an explicit deliberation to restrain himself from sin.

At this point the third factor enters, the pressure of circumstance The mind of man has many occupations and nature cannot endure a perpetual strain(15). Deliberate vigilance can succeed for a time, but not for the whole time nor even for a long time. Any mortal sin can be avoided by the sinner if only he puts his mind to it. But he cannot always put his mind to it, and, when he does not, he sins(16). From

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(14) Habitual "fear of the Lord" is not to be presupposed: that is a gift of the Holy Ghost and the beginning of wisdom.
(15) This is just another manner of expressing the necessity of habits in human operation: unless an indeterminable potency is determined by the habit, then it is unequal to the task of right action.
(16) Note that here St. Thomas is treating simply the question of the impossibility of the sinner's avoiding further sin. ~~As has already~~

this necessity of falling again and again into sin, the sinner is liberated only by the infusion of divine charity into the soul(17).

C. The Psychological Theory of the Necessity of Grace.

Brilliant as is this bit of psychological analysis, it is far from the most significant element in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 12. That article does not merely correct the error of 2 dist.26.q.1.a.2. It marks the beginning of St. Thomas's integration of the theory of the supernatural with the Augustinian tradition on the need of grace and the Christian tradition on the field of asceticism. Previously the theory of the habit semply stated a fact ; henceforth it states a law, a complicated and delicate law, indeed, but none the less a law. Previously there were degree of perfection in liberty, and between St.Thomas in the Sentences and the later distinction of a physical and moral potency in the will no difference can be assigned. Now, however, there are limitations to the exercise of liberty ; the principle of psychological continuity has come into play ; the actions of the past remain as a vis et inclinatio, a spontaneous force, ever tending to prejudge the issues of the present and, in the long run, are bound to prove decisive.

Though the analysis of the sinner's impotence is the work of the scientific St. Thomas, the inspiration is clearly St. Augustine. Cogenti cupiditati voluntas resistere non potest, the latter affirms(18) and the former shows how aversion from the incommutable good makes the possibility of sin precede the possibility of avoiding sin(19).

(17) That is the definitive liberation. But providential assistence would suffice in any particular case. See the corpus articuli, last paragraph.
(18) De Ver., q.24, a.12, ob.12a., lae ser. (19) ibid., corp.

Augustine asserts the will of the sinner to be like a crooked leg that cannot but limp along; St. Thomas points out the difference, the crooked will can avoid any sin but cannot avoid all(20).

But not only are there these fundamental Augustinian concepts, not only is the new position itself to be attributed to a deeper study of St. Augustine(21), but the whole traditional theory of the libera= tion of free will by grace passes into the thought of St. Thomas and forms the basis of his solution of the problem of grace and liberty.

The free will of the sinner has to be liberated. Let us take a few examples from the first series of objections. The first objection cites,

> ...non enim quod volo bonum hoc ago, sed quod odi malum illud facio;

the solution runs

> ... intelligendum est quod, cum voluntas naturalis sit ad vitationem omnis mali, non potest homo peccator facere sine gratia ut vitet omnia peccata mortalia quamvis possit vitare singula; et sic non potest sine gratia voluntatem naturalem implere ; et similiter est de iusto respectu peccatorum venialium(22).

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(20) ibid., 4a,ad 4m.lae. ser.; ad 2m., 2ae. ser.

(21) In treating the sinner's impotence St. Albert interpreted St. Augu= stine to mean that the sinner could not merit foregiveness without grace(see, 2 de Creaturis,q. 70,a. 5; 2 dist. a. 6). This position is adopted by St. Thomas in his Sentences (2 dist.23,q. 1, a.2). But the 22nd. objection in De Ver., q. 24, a. 12, cites St. Augu= stine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio to make St. Albert's inter= pretation untenable.

(22) Explicitly St. Thomas speaks only of the indeliberate venial sins of the just both in the De Veritate and in the Summa (1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 8). None the less, what he says with regard to deliberate mortal sin per se would apply to deliberate venial sin. To that one may add, He that contemneth small things, shall fall little by little.

In this sense is interpreted the following from the Glossa,

> ... nunc describitur homo sub lege positus ante gratiam. Tunc enim homo peccatis vincitur, dum viribus suis iuste vivere conatur sine adiutorio gratiae liberantis, quae liberum arbitrium liberat, ut liberatori credat, atque ita contra legem non peccet (23).

But non only must free will be liberated; the significance of this problem is the significance of the whole question of the relations of grace and liberty. The followers of Jovinianus make out that sin is impossible while the Manichaeans make out that sin is inevitable. On the other hand the Pelagians pretend that free will of itself sufficient against temptation. But the Catholic faith holds a middle course and denies neither human liberty nor the necessity of grace(24). The fourteen columns, the thirty-four objections, the brilliant psychological analysis of De Veritate, q. 24,a.12, represent St. Thomas at grips with the problem of grace and liberty. His solution of the problem is, at root, a limitation of human liberty : grace is compatible with liberty because of itself liberty is limited and grace enables it to trascend that limitation. He does not presuppose an unlimited liberty which grace confines to the good ; he presupposes the limited liberty of psychological continuity, and makes grace an escape from the servitude of sin.

Finally, the essential liberation is operated by habitual grace, while the function of actual grace is supplementary.

To the essential liberation he alludes when he writes,

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(23) loc. cit., 3a.ob., Iae ser.;cp. 5a.ob.,St.Gregory's comparison of sin to gravitation ; 21a. ob., Peter Lombard's states of free will.
(24) De Ver., 24,a. 12, 1st. paragraph.

> ... Et ideo supposita adhaesione liberi arbitrii ad peccatum mortale, sive ad finem indebitum, non est in potestate eius quod vitet omnia peccata mortalia... Ab hac autem dispositione non removetur nisi per gratiam, per quam solam efficitur ut mens humana bono incommutabili per caritatem tamquam fini adhaerat(25).

On the other hand, to actual grace there is a reference when he writes,

> ... quidam dicunt hominem absque habituali gratia gratum faciente posse peccatum mortale vitare, quamvis non sine divino auxilio, quod hominem sua providentia ad bona agenda et mala vitanda gubernat: hoc enim verum est, cum contra peccatum conari voluerit, ex quo contingit ut possint singula vitari(26).

D. The Maintenance of the Psychological Theory.

But, it may be asked, does St.Thomas maintain this psychological theory of the need of grace in his later works.

Briefly, if there is a change, the onus probandi lies on those who would assert it.

Positively, one may argue as follows. The theory of the article we have been studying is that man is crooked : there is the fomitis corruptio that makes the avoidance of all indeliberate venial sin impossible even in the regenerate ; in the sinner there is the habituable inclinatio voluntatis ad finem indebitum(27) that makes the avoidance of all mortal sins impossible. The two toghther give an Augustinian massa damnata.

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(25) ibid., last paragraph.
(26) ibid., last paragraph.
(27) A comparison of De Ver.,q.24,a.10 with a.12 reveals that the only difference between this inclinatio and that which constitutes the absolute obstinacy of the demons lies in the fact that man is in natura mutabili.On the origin of this inclinatio in man see De Ver., q. 24,a.12,ad 2m(lae ser.)
(28) loc. cit., corp., last paragraph.

Now, in general, St. Thomas becomes more and more Augustinian in his thought. Therefore there is a presumption against a deparature from the position of the De Veritate.

In 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 8 the sinner's impotence is again treated. The solution is the same, though notnearly so elaborate, as that of the De Veritate.

The whole of 1a 2ae., q.109 presupposes that fallen nature has a twofold need of grace; man needs a sanatio as well as an elevatio. Article 3 affirms that the will of fallen man is egoistic, and 1a 2ae., q. 77,a.4 affirms self-love to be the cause of all sin.

Finally, there is the whole conception of the effect of original sin as a loss of rectitude, and of justification as a restoration of that rectitude(29).

$4. 53 The Need of Grace to Prepare for Justification.

This is a large question and it is treated only in so far as it throws light on the nature of operative grace. Omitting the question of the supernaturalness of this grace(30), of the development of St. Thomas's thought on the subject(31), and leaving to the next section an account of the complementary development in the theory of the will, we here are concerned solely with the general form of the ultimate solution. This is as follows.

In 1a 2ae., q. 9,a. 4,6 there is posited a further limitation of human liberty. The will does not move itself to the good in general ; it does not select its end. That is the work of God who moves the will to an end by an instinctus divinus. Since there is no question of free=

(29) De Ver.,q.28,a.1;1a.,q.94,a.1,2,3,4;q.95,a.1,3;1a 2ae.,q.82,a. 1,3; q.85,a.3,5.

(30) See above, $4.3 (31) See above 2-7,

dom in the realm of ends, it follows that there can be no problem of grace and liberty with respect to the will of the end.

In la 2ae., q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m. the significance of this position for the theory of grace is pointed out. God moves all to the good in general, but he moves some to a determinate good, as in the case of grace.

In la 2ae., q. 109, a. 6 on the preparation for grace, the same point is made in greater detail.

A general principle is first laid down from hierarchic theory,

> ... cum secundum ordinem agentium sive moventium sit ordo finium, necesse est quod ad ultimum finem convertatur homo per motionem primi moventis, ad finem autem proximum per motionem alicuius inferiorum moventium..

It follows that God moves all things to their last end, each according to its capacity and proportion; and, in particular, it is evident that God moves the just to their special end of God himself.

> ...sic igitur cum Deus sit primum movens simpliciter, ex eius motione est, quod omnia in ipsum convertantur secundum communen intentionem boni, per quam unumquodque intendit assimilari Deo secundum suum modum... sed homines iustos convertit ad se ipsum sicut ad specialem finem quem intendunt et cui cupiunt adhaerere sicut bono proprio, secundum illud Ps. V2: Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est, et ideo quod homo convertatur ad Deum, hoc non potest esse nisi Deo ipsum convertente...

St. Thomas later(32) divides this conversion of the will into an imperfect and a perfect conversion : the former is prior to justification and may take place by successive stages ; the latter is in the instant of justification. Both are simply due to God: Deus ad hoc ut gratiam infundat animae, non requirit aliquam dispositionem nisi quam ipse facit(33).

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(32) la 2ae., q. 112, a. 2, corp., cp. ad 1m., 2m.
(33) ibid., q. 113, a. 7, corp.

§4.54. The Need of Further Grace after Justification.

This need may be considered absolutely or relatively; the absolute need arises from the fact that the regenerate has to live on the super= natural level in union with God, and only God can be source of such a life both in its principle, sanctifying grace, and in its fruit, the life of the Holy Spirit in us ; the relative need is with respect to the danger of relapsing into sin.

St. Thomas treats the former in connection with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. What the light of reason is to the natural life of man, the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are to his super= natural life. But though the latter are more perfect in themselves, still we have a fuller possession of the former. Just as the sun of itself gives light, but the moon only by reflecting the light of the sun; just as a doctor cures the sick in virtue of his knowledge, but his apprentice has constantly to be asking advice; so also man is proportionate to human libing, but needs the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit to be guided to everlasting life(34).

But this active guidance of the Holy Spirit may be considered relatively; as such, it tends to the elimination of folly, ignorance, obtuseness and hardness of heart(35), precludes relapse into sin, and if intended to continue throughout life, constitutes the grace of perseverance(36).

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(34) 1a 2ae., q. 68, a. 2. (35) ibid., ad 3m.
(36) ibid., q. 109, a. 9, 10.

Corresponding to this need of divine direction subsequent to justification, there is a third limitation of human liberty which is presented in the Contra Gentiles(37). Not only does human freedom regard the choice of the means and is powerless with respect to the end; it is also true that the exercise of freedom takes place solely in each single free act. Man cannot here and now decide effectively what he is going to will for the rest of his life; his freedom is a succession of free acts, and though each by itself is free, there is no free choice with respect to the series as a whole. The argument is parallel to Aristotle's proof of a primum se movens: the successive generabilia account for a number of motions but cannot account for the terrestrial cycle or series as such; no one of them by itself, for it is not simultaneous with the whole process; nor all together, for all are nottogether(38). Accordingly, just as the multiplicity of motions on earth postulates a first mover in the sky to account for their unity, so the series of human free acts as a series has its cause only outside and above the freedom of man. Now, the constancy of perseverance and the form or pattern of a development pertain not to single free acts but to a series. It follows that the first mover of the will must be the cause both of the fact of perseverance and of the relation (ordo) that each ~~not~~ act in the series bears to the attainment of the final goal.

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(37) C. Gent., 3, 155. That actual grace is here conceived as external providence does not effect the use we make of the passage, namely to point out the third limitation of human liberty.
(38) See 8 Phys., lect. 12.

To carry this question further is to study the keystone in St. Thomas's theoretical arch: supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat se ipsam tamquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo(38). This point will receive attention in the next section.

$4.55. Conclusion.

Preparatory to the study of St. Thomas's theory of operative grace, a distinction has been drawn between the supernatural mode of acts, the existence of acts, and the specification (substance, quality, kind) of acts. God operates all three. But the study of the supernatural mode is not essential to our problem and would be too long to occupy us here. God's causation of the esse of acts is accounted for by the theory of God operating in the operation of the will as in the operation of nature. Thus, the specification of acts is the important matter in an examination of the theory of operative grace.

It has been shown that without habits the will does evil for the most part that the sinner cannot always do good and that, corresponding to this need of grace(39), there is the limitation of liberty arising from the law of psychological continuity. Such a limitation enables God to change the will from evil to good without any interferrence with liberty.

Again, it has been shown that in preparation for justification there is required an orientation of the will to God himself as the will's end, that God alone can produce this orientation, and that cor=

(38) 1a., q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m. constitute titles or nor personal sin claims in justice; need for grace, grace remains gratuitous.
(39) Neither the sin of our first parents hence no matter what the resulting need for grace, grace remains gratuitous.

responding to this need of grace there is the limitation of liberty arising from the fact that freedom regards not the end but the means. Here also there can be no opposition between grace and liberty.

Finally, after justification there is a need of further grace for the realisation of supernatural life and for perseverance, but, though a corresponding limitation of liberty was indicated, no detailed explanation was offered.

$4.6 The Motion and Control of the Will.

The first subsidiary investigation revealed that the theorem, Deus operatur in omni operante, did not provide either a theory of grace or the analogy for such a theory. Grace is a special divine intervention; actual grace is a motion.

The present investigation has considered, first the nature and the possibility of human liberty ($$4.1 - 4.2), second the limitations of human liberty and the need of operative grace($$4.3 - 4.5). It remains that we investigate the development of the theory of special divine operations in the will, for either these are operative graces or else they supply the analogy for that conception.

After outlining the development of St. Thomas's analysis of the will itself(A), we draw attention to the external and purely Aristotelian theory of premotion to be found in the Sentences (B), the introduction of a premotion internal to the will in the De Veritate (C), the theory of the change of the will by God in the same work (D), and the influence of the Eudemian Ethics (E) which leads to the affirmation of a necessity of internal premotion (F). Special cases

of such premotions are affirmed to be graces in the Prima Secundae, and their correlation with the need of grace is indicated (G).

To bring to an end these subsidiery investigations, in which the main concern has been to winnow away the chaff, a general correlation of universal instrumentality, divine transcendence, the limitations of human liberty and divine control of the will is attempted in an account of the grace of perseverance (H). This provides the background and speculative context of St. Thomas's theory of operative grace. With that context established, it will be possible in the fifth chapter a detailed interpretation of the articles that deal explicitly with gratia operans.

A. Different Theories of the Will.

The development of St. Thomas's thought on the motion and control of the will is superposed on a development in the theory of the structure of the will itself .

According to Aristotle appetitus movetur per bonum apprehensum. so that the appetibile is a movens non motum, the appetitus a movens motum(1). It is from this basis that St. Thomas begins his speculation on the nature of the will.

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(1) See 1a., q. 80, a. 2; 3 de Anima, text. 54; 12 Metaphys., lect.7.

In De Veritate, q. 22, a. 1 - 5, the nature of the appetitus is elaborately worked out(2). In the twelfth article of the same question the inter-action of intellect and will is studied, and the first mover of the will is said to be the intellect(3).

Until the De Malo it is not clear that the will moves itself except inasmuch as it moves the intellect(4); and the theory of liberty is worked out, not in terms of the self-motion of the will,

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(2) The analysis proceeds as follows. First, a distinction is drawn between natural and violent motion: the former supposes an internal principle, and such a principle is termed an appetitus naturalis. Next, a distinction is drawn between natural and animal appetitite: the former is any natural spontaneity; the latter is is a distinct faculty that is exclusively a principle of appetitive acts; contrast, for instance, the spontaneity of perceptive faculties with that of appetites properly so called. Third, a distinction is drawn between sensitive and rational appetite. Finally, in rational appetite one has to distinguish between a basic tendency to happiness in general and particular acts of will: the former is to the latter, as is the sense of touch in the eye to seeing in the eye.

(3) De Ver., q. 22, a. 12, ad 2m. Attention to this position was drawn by Th. Deman, Le liber de Bona Fortuna dans la théologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Rev. sc.phil. théol., 17(1928) 38-58. His thought receives important additions from Lottin, Liberté humaine et motion divine, Rech. théol. anc. méd., 7 (1935) 52 - 69; 156 - 173.

(4) As Dom Lottin has noted, loc. cit., the formulae with respect to the motion of the will are in the passive voice: inclinari vel non inclinari; moveri vel non moveri; even moveri ex se. See De Ver., q. 22, a. 6; 1a., q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m.

nor again in terms of the self-motion of man for the animals are also self-moving, but in terms of the self-determination of the rational creature(5).

Corresponding to this orientation is an extrorization of the causation of the free act of will. While in 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 3, the will of the end causes the act of will with respect to the means. in De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5, 6, there is mentioned only the corresponding objective causality, namely, the dependence of the lower appetibilia on an ultimate appetibile. Again, the same argument that in 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 4, is used to prove that God is the first mover within the will, is merely an objection in De Veritate, q. 22, a. 12, and its solution is that the first mover of the will is the intellect(6)

The difficulty against this position is that it offers no explanation of one of its most important assertion. The appetibile does not necessarily move the appetitus; the will may be either moved or not moved. (4). But what effects the decision ? If the appetibile is not a sufficient cause of the motion, then what is the sufficient cause ?

This problem finds its solution in the De Malo and the Prima Secundae. A distinction is drawn between the specification and the exercise of the free act; the former is caused by the appetibile, the latter by the internal mover of the will. This internal mover is God with regard to the will of the end, the will itself with regard to the will of the means.

It is not improbable that there is a further development in the Prima Secundae. The appetitus naturalis of the De Veritate is, in its entitative structure, an Aristotelian accidental form, and no distinction is drawn between its limiting potency and its act. On the

(5) This is particularly evident in the long exposition of De Ver., q. 24, a. 1; the thought is the same in C. Gent., 2, 48; 1a., q. ./.

other hand, there are indications that in the Prima Secundae St. Thomas is perhaps thinking of the will itself as simply a limiting potency on the analogy of the Virtus operativa of the angel in 1a., q. 54, a. 1 - 3(7).

B. External Premotion.

By external premotion is meant the reduction of the will from accidental potency to act, either by the presentation of an object or by a change of mood, disposition or circumstance outside the will itself.

St. Thomas always recognises the existence of this premotion but attaches quite different degrees of importance to it at different times. In the Sentences it is considered a gratia gratis data in preparation for gratia gratum faciens(8). It has the same role in the De Veritate(9)

.....83, a.1. See the section on human liberty, sup. $4.1.

(6) De Ver., q. 22, a. 12, ad 2m.

(7) Thus, 1a 2ae., q.8, a.2 distinguishes between the potentia qua volumus and the ipse actus voluntatis; the latter may be both with respect to the end and with respect to the means. Again, q. 9, a. 3, ad 2m. speaks of the potency of the will as always actually present, while the act of will with respect to the end is only sometimes present. Further, q. 9, a. 6 compares the inclinatio universalis to materia prima, and the response ad 3m. distinguishes between God moving the will to the good in general and to some special end as is the case in the bestowal of grace.

(8) Thus admonitio exterior, segritudo corporis, or anything of the kind is due to divine providence and sufficient to turn man toward God: 2 dist.28, q. 1, a. 4. The theory of motion is derived from Aristotle's denial that, when an animal wakes up, it moves itself; it is moved by the atmosphere or something of that nature; see 8 Phys., lect. 4, $6.

(9) De Ver., q. 24, a. 15. Aristotle on the animals is here mentioned explicitly.

but in the Quodlibetum Primum it is unequivocally rejected as insufficient for this purpose(10) while in the De Malo it is referred to as normally caused by the corpus celeste and classified as a motus per occasionem(11).

C. Internal Premotion.

By internal premotion is meant a change in the disposition of the will itself. As was seen in the theory of physical premotion(12), the transition from the possibility to the actuality of motion is effected either by a change in the motivum or by a change in the mobile. In the previous section the latter type of change was considered ; in the present attention is directed to the former, to a change in the will itself.

This change is not to be confused with an essential transition from potency to act; that consists in the production of the motivum and is a prerequisite to the possibility of motion(13).

St. Thomas treats the internal premotion of the will, perhaps for the first time, in De Veritate, q. 24,a. 14. The question deals with the possibility of doing good without grace(14) and it clearly distinguishes between external premotion, conservation of the virtus naturalis, God operating in the operation of the creature, and finally,

(10) Quodl., 1, a. V. Cited above, p.
(11) De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 21m.
(12) See above, $3.1.
(13) See 8 Phys., lect. 8 ; De Ver., q. 11, a. 1, ad 12m.; Stufler, Gott, der erste Beweger, pp. 5 ff., et passim. To change air into water and so give the forma gravitatis is an essential transition from potency to act; to let a stones fall is an accidental transition, for the stone already has the forma gravitatis.
(14) The idea of grace is not so precise as in 1a 2ae., q. 109,a.2.

the internal premotion. The internal premotion is alternative to an external premotion, and,evidently, must remain as a more alternative until St. Thomas places in separate compartments the specification and the exercise of the act of will. Then each becomes necessary. The passa= ge in question is as follows:

> Quamvis huiusmodi bona(15) homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo ; cum nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina(16), quia causa secunda non agit nisi per virtutem causae primae, ut dicitur in lib. de Causis(17). Et hoc verum est tam in natura= libus agentibus quam in voluntariis; tamen hoc alio modo habet necessitatem in utrisque.
>
> Operationis enim naturalis Deus est causa, in quantum dat et conservat id quod est principium naturalis operationis in re, ex quo de necessitate determinata operatio sequitur ; sicut dum conservat gravitatem in terra, quae est principium motus deorsum(18).
>
> Sed voluntas hominis non est determinata ad aliquam unam operationem, sed se habet indifferenter ad multas ; et sic quo= dammodo(19) est in potentia, nisi mota per aliquid activum ; vel quod ei exterius repraesentatur, sicut est bonum apprehensum; vel quod in es interius operatur, sicut est ipse Deus(20); ut Augu=

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(15) The usual "agros colere", "domos aedificare."
(16) The theorem that God operates in the operation of the creature. De Ver., q. 24, a.1; ad 3m., is another early appearance of the inverse form: see above, $4.22B.
(17) Recall that in the Liber de Causis motions are caused not by the first cause but by soul.
(18) Note that the theorem follows simply from,conservation : see Ia., q. 105, a. 5, where it is deduced from the fact that God is the ultimate final cause.
(19) Clearly, the potency is accidental : see the subsequent alterna= tives : either the presentation of an object, or the change of the the will.
(20) God alone can operate within the will: De Ver., q. 22, a. 9.

stinus dicit in lib. de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, ostendens Deum multipliciter operari in cordibus hominum(21).

There is, then, a difference between the premotion of the will and that of a natural form. Once the latter is in act, its operation is determined and all it needs is the right proximity to its mobile. But the will is naturally indeterminate, and consequently its premotion may lie either in the presentation of the object or in a modification of the will itself.

The same idea reappears in the following article(22), in which the preparation for grace is attributed either to an external admonition or to an instinctus interior such as God operates in the souls of men.

The precise nature of this motion of the will is perhaps the change of will discussed in De Veritate, q. 22,a. 8.

D. Change of Will.

In the De Veritate the doctrine of psychological continuity is clearly implied, but its statement is obscured by the confusion already noted between freedom and non-coercion(23). Different cause of change of will are discussed in the treatment of impeccability and fixity in evil(24) but direct action on the will itself is reserved to God alone(25).

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(21) Chap. 21,PL 44, 909. The same passage is cited in the Glossa Augustini on Rom. 1, 24; see De Ver., q. 22, a. 8, ob. 2a.
(22) De Ver., q. 24, a. 15. (23) See above $4-1; 4-51.
(24) De Ver., q. 24, a. 8 - 12; cp. De Malo, q. 16, a. 5.
(25) 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 3; 2 dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5m; De Ver., q. 5, a. 10; q. 8, a. 13; q. 22, a. 9; C. Gent., 3; 85,87,88, 89,90,91,92; 1a., q. 105, a. 4; q.111, a. 2; q. 115, a.4.

The nature of this change, its possibility, and its different species are explained in q. 22, a. 8, Utrum Deus voluntatem cogere potest. The nature of the change is the substitution of a new inclinatio for an old one(26). Its possibility is that God operates in the will as in nature (27). Finally, this change of inclination may be either simply a motion or else the introduction of a new form or habit.

The effect of the habit is that man does what is right, either always as in the case of the blessed in heaven, or for the most part as with the regenerate on earth(28). But what precisely is the change of inclination that is simply a motion ?

As has already been shown(29), there is in the will, apart from habits, the dynamic disposition that results from previous acts of will. Thus, such a vis et inclinatio, which is explicitly stated to result from a single mortal sin and not to be a vice, renders the sinner incapable of avoiding all mortal sins in future.

Now the change of any such disposition(30) would not be the introduction of a new habit yet would be the substitution of a new inclinatio for an old one. Not only does this satisfy the description given in the present article(31), but it also is the type of internal

(26) Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio, et ita quod prima aufertur et secunda manet.
(27) Cp. 1a 2ae., q.9, a.6. Note that this is not an explanation of the manner in which God changes the will: see De Ver., q.24, a.1, ad 4m.
(28) Cp. the account of the function of the habit, above $4.4B.
(29) See the presentation of De Ver., q.24, a.12, above $4.52B.
(30) The change of the will of the sinner is, at this period, reserved to sanctifying grace(see De Ver?, q.24, a.12, corp. ad fin.), but the reason for this is that the prima gratia is justification(see $2.7B). But obviously there are innumerable other inclinations to be changed.
(31) Immutat autem voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo, movendo tantum;

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premotion(32) spoken of in De Veritate, q. 24. a. 14, and a sufficient explanation of the instinctus interior of De Veritate, q. 24, a.15. Further, one may note the significant fact that both in the second objection to De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8 and in the account of the internal premotion in q. 24, a. 14, St. Thomas refers to St. Augustine's

E. The First Mover from the Liber de Bona Fortuna(33).

Under the pressure of Cor regum in manu Dei: quocumque voluerit,

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... quando scilicet voluntatem movet ad aliquid volendum, sine hoc quod aliquam formam imprimat voluntati ; sicut sine appositione alicuius habitus, quandoque facit ut homo velit hoc quod prius non volebat. Q.22, a.8.

(32) Any change of disposition is a premotion. Nothing but a change of disposition could be the premotion of De Ver., q. 24, a. 14.

(33) On this work, see Deman, loc.cit. It is a medieval Latin translation of Magna Moralia(II, 8, 1206 b 30 - 1207 b 19) and Eudemian Ethics (VII, 14; 1246 b 37 - 1247 b 11). The question treated is the per se and the per accidens of prudence: the prudent succeed because they exercise good judgement ; but the lucky succeed even though their judgement is bad. Eudemus argues that the success of the prudent is also a matter of luck, for there is no possibility of taking counsel about taking counsel in an infinite regression ; it follows that there is an initial impulse prior to deliberation and so prior to any exercise of prudent judgement; either, then, everything is chance or else one must acknowledge a principle higher than intellect and reason ; and as God is the universal first mover, so also must he be first mover, in the soul. The successful, accordingly, are divided into three classes: those that follow a principle higher than reason ; those that follow reason ; and the merely lucky.

The author of the Magna Moralia seems to miss the point made by Eudemus, namely, that without a higher principle than reason even the prudent are merely lucky. He attributes good fortune to nature, refusing to attribute it to God since the wicked prosper and the virtuous are unfortunate.

The interest in the position of Eudemus is that it posits exactly the same divergence from Aristotelian theory that belief in providence requires of St. Thomas. To Aristotle the per accidens, that is, any coincidence of unrelated predicates,

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vertit illud and, as well, of St. Augustine's affirmation that God operates in the hearts of men(34), St. Thomas in the De Veritate added to the external premotion of the will an internal premotion which he seems to explain as a divine intervention in the stream of psychological continuity(35). Naturally enough, when he comes across the Liber de Bona Fortuna, he cites the opinion of Eudemus with whole-hearted approval.

One is not, however, to suppose that he immediately arrived at the conception of 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 4, which places the instinctus divinus simply in the will : that position does not arise until the specification and the exercise of the act of will have been segregated and placed in separate causal series. The Eudemian first mover accounts for the initium consiliandi, for a premotion that is neither from the external world nor, on the other hand, necessarily a change of will, but apparently in the intellect. The texts that impose this interpretation are as follows :

> .. est igitur Deus primum principium nostrorum consiliorum et voluntatum. C. Gent., 3, 89.
> .. non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo(36). Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio ; sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis: sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus.. 1a., q. 82, a. 4, ad 3m.

... any unnecessary combination of causes or conjunction of effects does not admit explanation : it is not considered any science, even by metaphysics, which considers all reality.St.Thomas agrees with Aristotle to the extent of admitting the per accidens to have no natural cause, but, as was shown in treating the significance of the doctrine of applicatio, he attributes all coincidence, conjunction,combinatio to providential design. Eudemus reaches a similar conclusion on the ground that otherwise prudence is merely a matter of luck.

(34) See objections to De Ver.,q.22,a.8;cp.q.24,a.14,corp.
(35) See above,$4.6 D ad fin. (36) Cp. De Ver.,q.22,a.12,ad 2m.

.. agit voluntate; voluntatis autem principium est electio et electionis consilium. Si autem quaeratur qualiter consiliari incipiat, non potest dici quod ex consilio consiliari inceperit, quia sic easet in infinitum procedere. Unde oportet aliquod exterius principium esse quod movest mentem humanam ad consilian= dum de agendis.. Quodl. 1, a. 7.

.. Cum enim homo habeat potentiam ad opposita, puta ad sedendum vel non sedendum, oportet quod reducatur in actum per aliud. Reducitur autem in actum alterius horum per consilium, ex quo unum oppositorum praeeligit alteri(37). Sed cum iterum homo habeat potentiam consiliandi vel non consiliandi, oportebit esse aliquod per quod reducatur in actum consilii; et cum in hoc non sit peo= cedere in infinitum, oportet esse aliquod principium extrinse= cum superius homine, quod ipsum moveat ad consiliandum et hoc non est aliud quam Deus.. Commentary on Romans, 9, Lect.3.

..Hoc etiam Philosophus vult, quod numquam homo per liberum arbi= trium potest quoddam bonum facere sine adiutorio Dei. Et ratio sua est, quia in his quae facimus quaerendum est illud propter quod facimus. None est autem procedere in infinitum: sed est divenire ad aliquod primum, puta ad consilium. Sic ergo bonum facio quia consilium mihi inest ad hoc et hoc est a Deo. Unde dicit quod consilium boni est ab aliquo quod est supra hominem, movens eum ad bene operandum; et hoc est Deus qui et homines movet, et omnia quae agunt, ad actiones suas.. Commentary on II Corinthians, 3, lect. 1 (38).

..Pelagianos qui dicunt principium boni operis esse ex nobis sed consummationem ex Deo. Sed hoc non est verum: quia princi= pium boni operis in nobis est cogitare de bono: et hoc ipsum est a Deo.. Commentary on Philippians, 1, lect. 1.

However, the Commentary on the next chapter of Philippians mentions solely the movement of the will(39), a fact that can be explained by the text under discussion: Deus est qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere.

Other references to the Eudemian first mover are to be found in De Malo, q. 3, a. 3, 11a. and in 1a 2ae., q. 80, a. 1, 3a: both of these are colourless. On the other hand, the first objection to 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 2 is met with an appeal to Eudemus to prove that li= berum arbitrium is in need of an extrinsic mover.

(37) Cp. De Malo., q.3,a.3, ad 5m.11m.; 9 Metaphys.,lect.4,$$1820 ff.
(38) Cp. the interpretation of 2 cor., 3, 5 in De Ver., q. 24, n.14,4m., 2ae. ser.; Quodl., 1, a. 7, Sed contra.
(39) quia interius per instinctum movet voluntatem ad bene operandum.

F. The Necessity of Premotion in the Will.

In general the necessity of premotion is the necessity of an explanation of temporal difference(40). Granted the existence of mover and moved, of potentia activa(41) and potentia passive; and, at the same time, granted the absence of actual motion ; then the emergence of actual motion cannot be accounted for by the more continuance of the existence of mover and moved. They already were existing and ex hypothesi no motion took place. When then motion does take place, a new factor is introduced. This introduction of a new factor is the premotion(42).

Applying this to the will, two cases are to be distinguished : first, suppose the will is in act with respect to some end and then moves itself to act with respect to some means to that end(43); second, suppose the will begins to be in act with respect to an end.

Now in the former case, the premotion is the consilium rationis(44) The will can be in act with respect to the end and not with respect to the means simply because it does not know what means to take : the emergence of such knowledge will be the new factor that accounts for the difference between the possibility and the actuality of willing the means.

Against this position, which is not merely implicitly but explicitly the doctrine of St. Thomas(45), the followers of Banez object

(40) God does not need premotion because he is not an agens in tempore 8 Phys., lect. 2,$19. On the nature of premotion, see above,$3.2.
(41) It is defined, 9 Metaphys., lect.1, $$1776-8.
(42) On actu agit see $3.1. (43) 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 3; De Malo,q.6,a.1.
(44) De Malo, q.3,a.3, ad 5m.,11m.;cp.1a 2ae.,q.80,a.1,ad 3m.
(45) Ad quintum dicendum, quod voluntas, cum sit ad utrumlibet, per aliquid determinatur ad unum, scilicet per consilium rationis,nec oportet hoc esse per aliquod agens extrinsecum.De Malo,q.3,a.3,ad 5m.

that God causes not merely the possibility of willing the means but also the actual act of will with respect to the means. Commonly they appeal to Contra Gentiles, 3, 89, in which St. Thomas affirms the truth of what theh object. However, it is plain that St. Thomas does not draw their conclusion. In the passage in question he begins by pointing out that some people do not understand how God can cause the act of will without prejudice to liberty; he had also pointed out that some people do not understand how the same actio can proceed both from God and from the created cause(46); and in the present instance of contemporary obtuse= ness he refers back to the earlier(47) to obtain a proof that God does cause not merely the virtus volendi but also the actus. The other proofs are of exactly the same character: Deus operatur in omni operente (48).

But while the consilium rationis supplies the premotion that releases the causation of the act of will respect to the means, nothing but a premotion within the will itself can in the last resort account for the emergence of a new act of will with respect to an end.

(46) C.Gent., 3, 70; cited above $3.6B.
(47) Adhuc, Superius (c.70) ostendum est quod Deus est causa omnis actionis et operatur in omni agente. Est igitur cause motuum vo= luntatis.
(48) The nature of this operation has already been treated at length, see $3.6.The arguments adduced in C.Gent., 3, 89, are: first, the argument from instrumentality and universal application; second an argument from analogy, if corporeal motion arises from the motion of the primum mobile, then spiritual motion arises from the first will, which is the will of God; third, the argument already cited, God is the cause of all actio; fourth, God is the first principle of our taking counsel and making acts of will.

The argument is as follows. Were this emergence due to a consilium rationis, then it would be necessary to suppose an act of will with respect to a more general end. Hence the question returns, What about that act of will ? If it also is a new act, then either it is due to another consilium rationis or else there has been a premotion within the will itself. And since there is no possibility of an infinite regression in the matter of taking counsel, one must ultimately admit an extrinsic mover of the will(49).

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(49) 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 4. Observe that this argument is not valid unless one presuppose the distinction between the specification and the exercise of the act of will. Could the intellect cause not merely the specification but also the exercise of the act (as on Aristotle's theory: appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum), then the ultimate act of will with respect to the end could be caused by an apprehension. That this is the case is presupposed by 1a., q. 82, a. 4, ad 3m. In the interval the theory of the will has developed (see $4.6A).

Further observe that the argument presupposes a new act of will with respect to an end. But what precisely is the sense of the term "new" is not determined : on general grounds we know that the soul has merely ordinal time ("before" and "after" but no "so much before or after") and only per accidens stands in the measurable time of the flow of sensitive consciousness.

Finally observe that the argument aims at proving no more than it proposes, namely, that there must be some extrinsic mover of the will. It does not prove in the general case that God must do more than move the will to the good in general.

G. Special Cases of Premotion within the Will.

... Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum(50); et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle(51): sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum (52): sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum; sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur(53).

The purpose of this section is to correlate the doctrine of special premotion with the doctrine on the need of grace.

Such a premotion may be either the infusion of a form or habit(54) or else simply a change of inclination(55).

If it is the infusion of a habit, it will end the state of the agens imperfectum, a radical egoist(56) who operates wrongly for the most part(57), and it will be the beginning of the agens perfectum,

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(50) Whether this is simply the conservation of the appetitus naturalis of the will or a transition from potency to act, depends on another issue, namely, Does St. Thomas still think of the will as an appetitus naturalis ? If he does, then this motion must be conservation as in De Ver., q. 24, a. 14. If he does not, then the will is conceived on the analogy of the angelis virtus operativa (see above, §4.1.A n.7) In the latter case, the question of the frequency of the motion arises, and that depends on whether one goes by the ordinal time of the soul or the measurable time that pertains to the soul per accidens(see §4.6F n.49).

4.6 ii

(51) This follows from 1a 2ae.,q. 9,a,4: see §4.6F n.49, ad fin.

(52) That man determines himself by his intellect to choose this or that is St.Thomas's constant position.It is the very idea of liberum arbitrium as conceived in all his writings: 2 dist.25,q.1, a.1;De Ver.,q.24,a.1;C.Gent.,2,48;1a.,q.83,a.1; De Malo, q.3,a.3, ad 5m.11m.;q.6,a.1;1a 2ae.,q.9,a.3.But in the latter passages the more vague question of the freedom of man(his difference from the animals)is replaced by the precise question of the self-motion of the will.

(53) 1a 2ae.,q.9,a.6,ad 3m.

(54) 1a 2ae., q. 113,a.6-8.

(55) De Ver.,q.22, a. 8.

(56) Above, §4.4 C.

(57) §4.4 B.

who does what is right for the most part(58). However, only God is naturally proportionate to unfailing good action(59) and only dynamic union with God can make the creature always do what is tight(60). Accordingly, there will remain the need of an auxilium Dei moventis(61).

Simple motions may effect a turning away from sin(62) a conversion to God and a preparation for justification(63); they also are necessary if fallen man, after regeneration, is to live the life of the Holy Spirit(64) and to persevere unto the end(65).

In treating the general and special needs of operative grace, prescinded from the question of the entitative perfection of actual graces prior to justification. Though St. Thomas's position does lead to that question, it remains that he did not treat it explicitly: he distinguished between general providence and actual grace, he divided actual graces into internal and external, but he did not investigate the distinction between internal actual graces that are entitatively supernatural and those that are not. We cannot but follow him, for one must determine what St. Thomas did say before attempting to meet the exigence of his thought for ulterior development.

H. The Grace of Perseverance.

The grace of Perseverance is the pattern of graces internal and external, habitual but especially actual, by which God produces the predestined unto eternal life(66). Per se it is the cause of both

(58) $4?4 B. (59) De Ver., q. 24,a.7;$4.4 A.
(60) De Ver., q.24,a. 8,9. (61) Follow the thought from De Ver., q.27, a. 5, ad 3m., through C.Gent.,3,88-92,155 to la 2ae.,q. 109.
(62) la 2ae.,q.109,a.7;$4.52 B. (63) ibid.,a.6;$4.53,$2.7
(64) ibid.,q.68,a.2;$4.54 (65) ibid.,q.109,a.9,10;$4.54.
(66) la 2ae,, q. 109, a. 10.

merit and glory(67), but it attains its effect infallibly only(68) be= cause it is an instrument in the hands of the transcendent artifex(69).

Corresponding to this grace is the limitation of human liberty by which man is free in his single acts but exercises no free act with respect to the series of acts as a series(70). Since the series as a series must have a cause(71) and since God alone operates in the will, it follows that God alone can be the cause of perseverance(72). How= ever there is a notable difference between perseverance given to natura integra and to natura lapsa: the former for the most part does what is right; the latter for the most part does what is wrong, while the sinner is incapable of avoiding all sin(73). Though this difference does not correspond exactly to St. Augustine's distinction between adiutorium sine quo non and adiutorium quo, I think it can be regarded as a legitimate extrapolation of his thought.

Though predestination infallibly and the grace of perseverance is per se a cause of merit and of glory, it does not follow that reprobation is a cause of sin and damnation. The two are not parallel(74): reprobation is permissio culpae et praeparatio poenae; the permission is not causal, while the praeparatio poenae, though causal, is itself caused by the sin that is permitted(75).

(67) 1a., q. 23, a. 5.
(68) 1 Peri Herm., lect.14, $22; 6 Metaphys., lect.3, ad fin.
(69).. intentio Dei deficere non potest..certissime liberatur quicumque liberatur..1a 2ae., q. 112, a. 3. (70) C.Gent., 3, 155.
(71) Cp. 8 Phys., lect. 12.
(72) I.e., the sole principal cause, for God alone is proportionate to the effect.
(73) V. sup., $$4.4, 4.5. (74) 1a., q. 23, a.3.
(75) Rom., cap. 9, lect. 2. V. sup., $4.22 C, note 26; $4.23.

§4.7. Conclusion.

The first subsidiary investigation ended with the conclusion that the general theorem of Deus operatur in omni operatione and universal instrumentality did not provide either a grace nor the analogy for a grace. In this second inquiry it has been shown how St.Thomas gradually developed the idea of the necessary internal premotion of the will with respect to the end, and in this premotion found his analogy for grace which he asserted to be a special premotion to a determinate good.

Since a motion has two terms and the terminus a quo obviously supplies a clue to the nature of the terminus ad quem, we also inquired into the need for operative grace and found it to consist generally in the lack of habits of operation with a consequent ineffectualness in willing the good; more particularly it was seen that corresponding to the triple limitation of human freedom - psychological continuity, freedom with respect to the means, freedom with respect to each single act but not the series of acts - there exists in man the need of operative grace to effect his conversion from sin, to direct him to God as a special end, to maintain him in the supernatural life on the level of the Holy Spirit's wisdom and love.

This immediate context of gratis operans has a remote context in the cosmic theorems of Deus operans. Connecting the two was the investigation of the nature of human liberty and of the prerogatives of the transcendent artifex.

One may legitimately infer from the gradual development of St. Thomas's theory both of the structure of the will and of the nature

of freedom, that his theory of operative grace will attain its more general formulae prior to the explicit expression of points to which subsequent controversy lends an excessive importance. It follows that more general and earlier statements are to be interpreted by later and more precise statements.

Interpretation of St. Thomas's Articles on Gratia Operans.

The point of view established in the first chapter by the outline of the movement from St.Augustine to St.Thomas enabled us in the second chapter to interpret most of the data relevant to gratia operans. It was found, however, unequal to the task of eliminating all obscurity from the activity of the habit in the Sentences, while the cooperative actual grace of the DeVeritate and its operative counterpart in the Prima Secundae were plainly beyond its competence. The intervening subsidiary investigations on the idea of operation and on divine operation in the will have to light the nature of the materials St. Thomas might have used in developing his theory of actual grace. Accordingly we turn to consider, briefly the theory in the Sentences, with greater care that of the De Veritate, and in detail the free act in justification and the actual operative grace of the Prima Secundae.

£5.1 The Position of the Sentences.

Only habitual grace is conceived as operative and cooperative (1), but two aspects are distinguished. There is the function of supernatural information: accordingly, inasmuch as grace elevates man to a higher order of being, it is said to be operative; but inasmuch as it informs human acts and renders them meritorious, it is termed cooperative (2). But grace is not merely a formal cause; it is an efficient cause as well. Through its concomitant virtues, it fulfils the ro-

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1) 2 dist. 26, p. 1, a.6, ad 2m. See above, £2.5
2) See above, £ 2.5

le of a second nature and with the spontaneity of a natural principle inclines man to acts of a certain kind (3).

£5.1

Both the De Veritate and the Prima Secundae retain the distinction between habitual grace as a formal and as an efficient cause, but in these later works, instead of a further subdivision into operative and cooperative, the formal causality of habitual grace is said to be operative and its efficient causality is said to be cooperative (4).

Plainly this efficient causality is to be interpreted in the light of the general theory of habits. As has been shown (5), habits are determinations of indeterminate potencies: they make the standard and rule of rectitude an inherent form of the faculty to be ruled; without them man is, from the spiritual viewpoint, an agens imperfectum who for the most part fails to do what is right: on the other hand, with them, man becomes an agens perfectum, and for the most part operates as he should (6). Such is the efficient causality of the habit (7).

In the Sentences St.Thomas attempts to divide this causality into operative and cooperative grace: inasmuch as the habit causes the internal act of will, it is operative: inasmuch as it causes

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3) "operans effective " "secundum quod habitus effective causat opus" "motum meritiorum voluntatis operatur eliciendo ipsum, licet mediante virtute" (2 dist. 26, p.1, a.5, ad 2m.); "inclinat ad talem actum per modum cuiusdam naturae "(ibid., ad 3m.)
4) De Ver., p.27, a.5, ad 1m.; 1a 2ae., p.111, a.2.
5) Above, £4.4 b
6) ibid., and cp. De Ver., p.22, a.8.
7) This position of the Sentences later becomes more rigid: without charity the sinner not only fails to do what is right for the most part but cannot avoid all mortal sins; the former is a statement of fact, the latter of impossibility.

the external act, it is cooperative (8). His purpose is clear: he has found St.Augustine basing the distiction between operative and cooperative grace on the difference between good will and good performance (9). But the difficulties to the theory he presents are no less clear: first,inasmuch as grace cooperates with free will in the production of the internal act,it is said to be operative; plainly,there is no clear idea of a difference between operation and cooperation to be found in such a statement. Further,when grace cooperates with free will in the production of the external act,it is said to be cooperative: the same difficulty recurs,nor is it alleviated by pointing out that actus interiores in moralibus potentiores sunt exterioribus (10). At the expense of dropping the Augustinian distinction between good will and good performance,this position is deserted in the De Veritate (11),to return under a totally different form in the Prima Secundae (12

£5.2 The Position in the De Veritate.

In the Sentences St. Thomas modifies the thought of his master,St.Albert,in two ways. He makes explicit an implicit distinction between the formal an the efficient causality of habitual grace (13). He adverts to St.Augustine's distinction between good will and good performance.On the other hand, he has clear distinction between divine providence and actual grace (14);the only special divin operation

8) 2 dist. 26, p. 1, a. 5,corp. ad fin.
9) See above,p.
10)2 dist. 26,p. 1, a.5, ad 4m.(cited p.). 11) At least superficially,inasmuch as both the internal and the external acts are attributed to cooperative grace.
12)See pp.
13)See pp.
14)pp.

in the will appears to be the infusion of the virtues (15); any absolute limitation of human liberty is denied (16);and the theory of the preparation for justification seems inadequate (17).On all of these points there is to be found some development in the De Veritate, and on all except the first and the last that development is notable.

First of all, psychological theory makes great advances.The law of psychological continuity,though not explicitly stated,is consistently implied in the long treatment of impeccability and fixity in evil (18).The analysis of the sinner's impotence to avoid sin is as fine a specimen of exquisitely balanced thought as could be imagined (19). Cognate to both of these points is the article on God's ability to change the will(20),and complementary to this article is the theory of an internal premotion alternative to the external premotion of the will (21).

Next, the development of psychological theory is accompanied with a development in the theory of grace.The sinner can no longer avoid sin without grace; he is dominated by cupidity and this crookedness inevitably will result in some sin;his only liberation is by the infusion of charity (22).Again,there is more than one grace in man

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15) It alone is mentioned in 2 dist.26,q.1,a.5.
16) See pp.
17) See pp.
18) De Ver.,q.24,a. 8-12; see £4.52.
19) De Ver.,q.24,a. 12; see £4.528
20) De Ver.,q.22,a. 8; see £4.6D
21) De Ver.,q.24,a. 14,15;see £4.52C
22) De Ver.,q.24,a. 12; see £2.6

for even after the reception of grace one must pray for further divine assistence: and this special need arises from the fallen state of human nature (23). Finally, the term gratia gratis data is assigned its current meaning of the charismatic gift, and any operation by which God directs man to eternal-life such as causing good thoughts and holy affections -may be termed a gratia gratum faciens (24).

This coincidence of developments in psychology and in the theory of grace would by itself indicate Augustinian influence and, indeed there is no lack of specific evidence that the whole movement is predominantly indebted to St. Augustine.

Thus, De Veritate, q.27, a.5, ob. 3 proves from St. Augustine a real distinction between prevenient and subsequent grace: the solution of the objection appeals to fallen human nature, an appeal that recalls the "crookedness" of man in De Veritate, q.24, a. 12. But in that article we find a citation from St. Augustine's De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio which eliminates ST. Albert's theory of the sinner's impotence and, consequently, the theory held by St. Thomas in the Sentences (25). Next, the acceptance of the sinner's impotence and the formulation of a psychological explanation of this fact require in turn a theory of God changing the will of man, and not only is such a theory worked out in De Veritate, q.22, a.8, but there the second objection consists in another citation from the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio which asserts divine control over the human will (26). Finally,

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23) De Ver., q.27, a.5, ad 3m.; see £ 2.6
24) De Ver., q.27, a.5, corp.; see £2.6
25) See above, £ 1.4 B, £2.6 £4.52 C

the same passage is alluded to, when the theory of internal premotion of the will appears in the discussion of the need of grace to do good (27) and the same premotion reappears in the discussion of the preparation for grace (28).

Notable as are these developments, the position of the De Veritate is transitional. The theory of the preparation for grace remains unsatisfactory and the need of grace for human rectitude is more broadly stated than in the Summa (29). The affirmation of psychological continuity is only implicit, and it is obscured by the traditional confusion between noncoercion and liberty (30). Liberty itself is vaguely and inadequately conceived as the difference between rational and irrational being (31).

The incidental treatment of the distinction between operative and cooperative grace reveals the same of definitive formulation. (32).

The second part of the division offers no difficulty: as a formal cause, habitual grace is operative ; as an efficient cause, it is cooperative (33). The only point to be noted is that now habitual

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26) De ver., q.22, a. 8 cites the Glossa Augustini but De Ver., p.24,14 names the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio; 1a 2ae., p.79, a.1, ad 1m. mentions both. The passage in questionis ,Manifestum est Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum pro misericordia sua, sive in malum pro meritis eorum. Uniformly St. Thomas rejects the implication that God operates evil will: De Ver., q.22, a.8, ad fin., De Malo, p.3, a.1, ad 1m.; In Rom., 9, lect.3; 1a 2ae., q.79, a.1, ad 1m. But what is most significant is the occurrence in this passage of the term "inclinare voluntatem".
27) De Ver., q.24, a.14. see above ,
28) ibid., a.15. £ 4.6c
29) De Ver., q.24, a.15; ibid., a.14; cp. 1a 2ae., p.1o9, a.2.
30) De Ver., q. See above, £4.1
31) See above, ibid.
32) De Ver., q.27, a.5, ad 1m. See above, £2.6
33) De Ver., ibid. See above, £2.6

grace not merely makes the difference between the agens imperfectum and the agens perfectum (34) but also liberates the will of the sinner from the impotence caused by selflove (35).

With regard to the first part the division, there is some difficulty in saying what precisely is cooperative grace (36). The passage runs,

> Ex parte vero eiusdem (gratuitae Dei voluntatis) gratia cooperans dicetur secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur, motum eius causando, et exterioris actus exsecutionem expediendo et perseverantiam praebendo: in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium (37).

The question that arises is, Does motum eius causando refer to an internal premotion of the will or to the general theorem of divine operation in all operation? Arguments can be found for both views, as follows.

The subject of the verb operatur in secundum quod in libero arbitrio operatur is, from the context, gratuita voluntas Dei. If this is understood in the sense that God operates in the will as in nature, then there is simply the general theorem. But it can also be understoot in the sense of De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8, ob. 2, namely, that God operates in the heasts of men inclining their wills as he pleases.

The expression motum eius causando clearly means that God causes the motion of free will, which is equivalent to saying that God causes the act of free will: that is the general theorem (38), for man also causes his act of free will (39). Further, exterioris actus ex-

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34) As in the Sentences, see £4.4 B
35) See £4.4 C
36) Operative grace here is ipsa iustificatio impii.
37) De Ver., q. 27, a. 5, ad 1m.
38) See the parallel remark in 2 dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4: etiamsi gratia gratis data dicatur ipse actus liberi arbitri, quem Deus in nobis facit
39) De Ver., q. 24, a. 1, ad 3m.

pediendo refers to general providence(40) and so does perseverantiam praebendo (41); by analogy, then, motum eius causando also refers to general providence.

But one can argue from the parallel De Ver., q.24, a.14 to arrive at a different conclusum. There, after explaining both the general theorem and internal premotion, St. Thomas sums up his position with,

> Unde si gratiam Dei velimus dicere non aliquod habituale donum sed ipsam misericordiam Dei, per quam interius motum mentis operatur, et exteriora ordinat ad hominis salutem, sic nes ullum bonum potest homo facere sine gratia Dei.

Now there is a rough correspondence between gratuita Dei voluntas and ipsa misericordia Dei, between motum mentis operatur and motum eius causando, between exteriora ordinat and exsecutionem expediendo, perseverentiam praebendo. But motum mentis operatur certainly does not merely refer to the general theorem but also to a possible internal premotion. Therefore, motum eius causando does so as well. Further, it would be strange if St. Thomas in the corpus refered to special illuminations of intellect and inspirations of will (42), if he defined gartuita Dei voluntas ex parte effectuum as anything by which God directs man to eternal life, and yet wished to exclude the internal premotion of the will when speaking of cooperative grace.

In conclusion one may say that motum eius causando means

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41) C. Gent., 3,155, ad fin.
42)..sicut quod immittit nobis bonas cogitationes et sanctas affectiones. De Ver., q. 27, a. 5, corp.
43)

that God cooperates with the act of free will according to the general theorem; that is does not exclude a previons internal premotion of the will; but that it is not probable that St. Thomas is thinking explicitlt of such internal premotion while it is certain that motus liberi arbirii does not mean a premotion to a free act but a free act itself (43).

It seems to us improbable that St. Thomas is thinking explicitly of an internal premotion, for if he were, he would have an actual grace that is operative. So great and sudden a leap from current modes of thought was hardly possible, and in the De Veritate the only operative grace is habitual.

£ 5.3

The Position of the Prima Secundae: Habitual Grace.

As in the De Veritate, so also here habitual grace as a formal cause is operative, but as an efficient cause it is cooperative.

..habitualis gratia, in quantum animam sanat vel iustificat sive gratam Deo facit, dicidur gratia operans; in quantumvero est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans (43)

The only question is, Just in what way is habitual grace the principle of the meritorious act? Does it merely cause the forma meriti (44) or does it also cause the substance of the free act?

The answer is in no way doubtful. St. Thomas does not say principium operis meritorii qua meritorii, and there is no reason

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43) Note that in quibus omnibus aliquid agit liberum arbitrium refers also to motum eius causando; but the premotion of De Ver., q. 24, a. 14, precedes any free act of will.
43) 1a 2ae., q. 111, a. 2.

for supposing that he means something different from what he says. The theory of the habit remains the same in the Summa as it was in the De Veritate and Sentences.

However, what is of special interest is that in the Summa the infusion of the donum habituale is not merely a change of will but also a premotion of the will. At the instant of justification God does not supply the grace and man the free act of will, God by infusing grace moves the will to its free act.

In this conception three distinct lines of development converge: first, there is the development with respect to the initium fidei, that is, with respect to operative grace in general (45); second, there is the development with respect to the change of the will as an internal premotion; third, there is the special character of the premotion that consists in the infusion of a habit, which is a new spontaneity, a second nature. Each of these points will be touched upon in turn, and then attention will be directed to the freedom of the consequent act of will in the instant of justification.

£5.3 A

A. Development in the Analysis of Justification.

The first fact to be noticed is the analysis of the pro-

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44) ...liberum arbitrium ministrat substantiam actus, et a gratia est forma per quam meritorius est. 2 dist. 26, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m. sup., £2.5.

45) The point is that God not merely cooperates with the will but also causes its cooperation

process of justification in the De Veritate (46). Justification consists in the infusion of grace, acts of faith and contrition, and the remission of sins: all four elements are simultaneous and instanteous (47). None the less is a logical or "natural" precedence among them. Thus, from the viewpoint of final and formal causality the infusion of grace precedes the remission of sins; from the viewpoint of material causality the remission of sins the precedes the infusion of grace (48). Again, the infusion of grace precedes the free acts of faith and contrition as a formal cause; but the free acts precede as material cause (49). Further, there is no mean position between the infusion of grace and the remission of sins (50). Finally, it seems quite plain from the objections that, with regard to the free acts, grace supplies the forma meriti and free will the substance of the act (51)

This is all quite different from the analysis in the Summa, where there is no mention of formal and material causality, and the infusion of grace is motio moventis, the free acts are motus mobilis and the remission of sins is perventio in finem motus (52). Plainly the whole manner of conceiving the process has been profoundly changed.

Now this change would seem to be connected with the theory

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46) De Ver., q. 28. Cp.4 dist. 17, p. 1.
47) De Ver., q. 28. a. 9.
48) ibid., a. 7
49) ibid., a. 8.
50) ..inter gratiae infusionem et culpae remissionem nihil cadit medium ibid., a. 8.
51) See the solutions to the whole second series of ocjections in a.8. There are all of the type: illud quod est ex parte dantis est prius formaliter, sed quod est ex parte recipientis est prius materialiter, ad 6m.
52) la 2ae., q.113, a.6.

of the preparation for grace. Not only are the early articles (53) that deal explicitly with this issue unsatisfactory, but one frequently comes across very significant passages in the treatment of other subjects. Thus, in discussion the possibility of fixity in sin in this life, St. Thomas distinguishes between a capacity to liberate oneself from sin and a capacity to cooperate with grace towards such a liberation; the latter member is further divided into an absolute inability to cooperate with grace, and such is the obstinacy of the demons, and grave difficulty in cooperating with grace, and that is the obstinacy possible in this life (54). Now such a definition of obstinacy is quite incompatible with the doctrine that God in giving grace makes a bad will into a good will (55): for no matter how fixed in evil the will may be before it is changed, still the changed will is no longer obstinate. Only if one conceives human cooperation with/to be simultaneous with grace and not its consequent, can obstinacy be defined as inability or difficulty in cooperation. But it is precisely such a simultaneity of grace and cooperation that is implied in the statement: grace precedes as the formal cause, the act of free will precedes as the material cause.

The full grasp of the nature of Pelagianism in the Quodlibetum Primum (56) necessitates a change here: not merely the supernatural

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53) 2 dist. 28, q. 1, a. 4; De Ver., q. 24, a.15.
54) De Ver., q.24, a. 11; cp. a. 10. See also, ibid., a.14, ad 2m.
55) ..puta cum Deus immutat voluntatem hominis per gratiam de malo in bonum, secundum illud, Prov., 21, 1: Cor regum in manu Dei, et quocumque voluerit vertet illud. De Malo, q. 16, a. 5, corp.
observe that though there may have been speculative difficulties against such a position in the Sentences, they are certainly removed by De Ver., q. 22, a. 8 on the change of will.
56) See above, £2.7 Cp.1a., q.62, a.2., 6, lect. 3; 9, lect. 3; 2 Cor., 3, lect.1

form of the good act but the goodness of the will itself quoad substantiam actus proceeds from grace. This is reflected, delicately but clearly, in four succesive responses on Qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te."

..Deus non iustificat nos sine nobis consentientibus..Iustificat tamen nos sine nobis virtutem causantibus (57).

..Deus virtutes in nobis operatur sine nobis virtutes causantibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus (58).

..virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consensientibus; et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, Quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur; quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus; ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura (59).

..Deus non sine nobis nos iustificat: quia per motum liberi arbitrii, dum iustificamur, Dei iustitiae consentimus : ille tamen motus non est causa gratiae (60) sed effectus; unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam(61).

All four statements coincide inasmuch as the infused virtue or grace is caused solely by God and inasmuch as this divine action does not take place without our consent; but only the fourth adds the statement that our consent is caused by the infused virtue (62).

The same point appears still more clearly in the account of the process of justification. Only God can cause grace, for only God can deify (63). Only God can prepare man for grace (64) and therefore

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57) 2 dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 7m.
58) De Ver., q. 28, a. 3, ad 17m.
59) la 2ae., q. 55, 4, ad 6m.
60) See la 2ae., q. 112, a. 1-3.
61) la 2ae., q. 111, a. 2, ad 2m.
62) Note that the definition of the infused virtue, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, is St. Augustine's definition of the good will God causes in a stony heart .See £2.14
63) la 2ae., q. 112, a.1.
64) ibid., a. 2.

it makes no difference whether this effect is produced gradually or instantaneously (65). The justice of justification is the rectitude and order of the internal disposition of man; it involves the subordination of the rational element to God and of the irrational element to the rational (66). The process of justification is a transition from the state of injustice or disorder to the state of justice (67). In a normal human being this transmutation of the will not occur without acts of free will (68) and these regard both terms of the motion, contrition for past sin and faith in God who justifies (69). In the process the infusion of grace causes both the motions of free will and the remission of sins (70-: so that the infusion of grace is a motio moventis, the acts of free will are the consequent motus mobilis, while the remission of sin is the consummatio motus sive pervenitio in finem (71).

£ 5.3 B

B. Justification as a Premotion.

Thus , the infusion of grace involves a premotion of the will. But one must distinguish between essential and accidental potency: air is accidental potency to motion upwards, for all it requires is a removens prohibens; water is in essential potency, for first it must lose the forma gravitatis and acquire the forma levitatis. Similarly. a tea-

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65) ibid., a. 2, ad 2m.
66) q. 113, a. 1.
67) ibid. Cp. all passages on original sin, the need of the virtues.
68) q.113, a. 2.
69) ibid., a. 3,4.
70) ..tota iustificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione: per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur et culpa remittitur. ibid., a. 7, corp.
71) q.113, a. 6-8.

cher of mathematics is in accidental potency to understanding a given theorem, for all he requires is that his attention turn to it; but his pupil is in essential potency, for he must first acquire the habit of science (72).

Note that any internal premotion of the will ,involving as it does a change of will and the substitution of a new inclination for an old one, is of the type of essential premotion. It changes the agent qua agent and does not merely fulvil the conditions of his activity. Contrast the internal premotion necessary for the act of will with respect to a new end, with the external premotion, the consilium rationis, which fulfils the condition of the will's selfmotion to an act with respect to the means. See above ,£4.6F.

With regard to the seriation,motio moventis, perventio in finem, compare la 2ae., 23, a.4; q. 26, a.2. In these passages the general theory of local motion is taken as an analogy for the distinction of love,desire, joy.Just as in local motion there is first the production of the forma gravitatis,then the motion downwards according to the form, finally rest in the locus connaturalis: so also in the appetites there is first the assimilatio appetitus which is love,then there is the motion following from this assimilation, which is desire, and finally there is possession of the object loved and desired, and that is joy. Observe that in these passages ,appetibile movet appetitum is presupposed: this is not quite coherent with the distinction between specification and exercise of the act of will. To understand,generans movet gravia et levia, merely note that local motion is not an entitative change but simply a change of extrinsic denominations.

This parallel St.Thomas clearly has in mind in his theory of habitual grace as operative and cooperativeCompare,

..agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens: primo quidem dat formam; secundo formam, dat motum consequentem sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem et motum consequentem ipsam..la 2ae.,q.26,a.2.

si vero accipiatur gratia pro habituali dono, sic set duplex gratiae effectus,sicut et cuiuslibet alterius formae: quorum primus est esse, secundus est operatio, sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum et exterior calefactio...
la 2ae., q.111, a.2.

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72) See 8 Phys., lect. 8.Cp.De Ver., q.11,a.1,ad 12m.

Nor is one to fancy that this is merely an extrinsic analogy: the virtue or habit is a principle of activity; it makes the difference between the agens imperfectum and the agens perfectum; it liberates the will from the servitude of sin; it is a antecedent "willingness" that inclines the will ad motum naturae (73). Thus, St. Thomas writes,

> ....alio modo dicitur aliquis esse sub lege quasi a lege coactus; et sic dicitur esse sub lege qui non voluntarie, sed timore cogitur legem observare. Talis autem caret gratia, quae si adesset inclinaret voluntatem ad observantiam legis, ut ex amore moralia eius praecepta impleat voluntarie legem, peccatum in eo dominatur, ex quo voluntas hominis inclinatur ut velit id quod est contrarium legi. Sed per gratiam tale dominium tollitur, ut scilicet homo servet legem, non quasi sub lege exsistens, sed sicut liber. Galat., 4, 31: "Non sumus ancillae filii sed liberae: qua libertate Christus nos liberavit," Hanc autem gratiam, facientem homines libere implere, non conferebant legalia sacramenta, sed conferunt eam sacramenta Christi (74).

Accordingly, as the sinner to avoid further sin stands in need of a notable deliberation, a marshalling of motives to counteract the spontaneous inclination of his will (75), so also regenerate need to be sorely tempted if their spontaneity is not to result automatically and freely in good action (76). But the parallel goes no further: The sinner is unable to do what he really wants to do, "for the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do (77); "while the regenerate do the good that they would (78). Again, the lack of deliberation in the sinner is a defect, for if he deliberated effectively, he would not sin; but the lack of deliberation in the regenerate is a perfection, for, no matter how great their deliberation, their choice would not be altered (79).

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73) Cp. sup. £4.4 B.
74) In Rom., 6, lect. 3. Cp. 1a 2ae., q. 108, a. 1, ad 2m.
75)

But not only is habitual grace a form, a spontaneity, a second naturae, that automatically leads to good action; it is also a premotion.

Recall the nature of premotion: it is a condition of activity in the agens in tempore. If there is action now and not before, then there is some reason for the difference. That reason is the premotion. God continuously causes habital grace in the regenerate, but he does not continuously premove the regenerate; only the infusion of habitual grace is a premotion, for only the infusion effects a change

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75) Nec hoc est intelligendum quod operatio secundum habitum virtutis possit esse omnino absque deliberatione, cum virtus sit habitus electivus; sed quia habenti habitum iam est in eius electione finis determinatus, unde quandocumque aliquid occurit ut conveniens illi fini, statim eligitur, nisi ex aliqua attentiori et maiori deliberatione impediatur...De Ver., q. 24, a. 12 corp.
76) ...voluntas perfecta virtute iustitiae se habet ad opera iusta, sicut ignis ad motum sursum.....2 dist. 39, p. 2, a. ad 4m. V. sup. £4.4
77) Rom., 7,19
78De Ver., q. 24, a. 12, ad 1m. V. sup., &4.52 C
79)Distinguish two functions of deliberation: per se deliberation is required to attain knowledge of the course of action to be followed in a given situation; per accidens it is required to marshal motives that counteract the imperfection of the will without habits, the false bias of the will that has sinned. Habitual grace liberates from the accidental need of deliberation but not from the essential. But the perfection of angelic intellect, of the blessed in heaven, and of our divine Saviour, dispense with the essential need of deliberation: they know at once .See 3a., p. 34, a. ad 2m.; De Malo, p. 16, a.5.
80)Were the infusion of the habit a premotion in the Banezian sense, it would ba metaphysically necessary that the will always made acts of faith and contrition. See 1a 2ae., q.113, a. 3, ad 3m.
81) 8 Phys., lect. 2. V. sup. £3.2
82) 1a 2ae., Q 113, a. 3,
83) 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m
84) ibid. , a. 4; De Malo , q. 16, a. 5; cp. sup., £4.51.
85) V. sup., £ 4,6 F On the terms, 1a 2ae., q. 8, a. 2; qq. 13. 15.

in the situation (80); by definition (at least in Aristotle and St. Thomas) a premotion is the change in the situation that accounts for the emergence of subsequent change(81).

Two cases are to be distinguished: first, that of the normal human being; second, that of the parvuli, amentes and furiosi (82).

Three causal factors in the production of the free act of will are to be distinguished: first, the appetitus naturalis or tendency to the good in general; second, the internal premotion of the will, a change of its inclination, whether by the introduction of a form or by a simple motion; third, the external premotion of the will, the consilium rationis. The first is needed for any free act (83). The second is needed when the will is orientated to a new end (84). The third is needed for the will to move itself from a will of the end to a will of the means, from the actus voluntatis properly so called to the electio or consensus (85).

Now in the normal case the infu-sion of grace causes a consensus ad detestandum peccatum et ad accedendum ad Deum (86). In abnormal cases it does not (87). The reason for the difference is,

..in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a Deo ad iustitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii: sed ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandam in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces (88).

Where does this second motion enter? Presumably the parvuli, amentes and furiosi tend to the good in general. Certainly, their wills receive the internal premotion that consists in the donum habituale. But in normal cases there is also the illumination of the intellect, Repent and believe, and his constitutos the external premotion necessary for the selfmotionof consent; in abnormal cases this is lacking (89).

The case is parallel to the analogous motion of the grave and leve: if the generans gives the forma gravitatis to an object impeded from falling, then the object does not fall (90); otherwise motion immediately ensues. The difference in the case of the spiritual motion is that it not merely begins immediately but also is immediately completed.

.. in eodeminstanti in quo forma acquiritur, incipit res operari secundum formam: sicut ignis statim cum est generatus, movetur sursum; et si motus eius esset instantaneus, in eodem instanti compleretur: motus autem liberi arbitrii, qui est velle, non est succesivus sed instantaneus; et ideo non oportet quod iustificatio sit succesiva (91).

There is, of course, another difference. The motion that follows the form of fire is a blind spontaneity; that following from the infusion of grace is a free act, which is caused not merely by the grace but also by the will which the grace informs. Hence,

....habitualis gratia, in quantum animam sanat sive iustificat sive gratiam Deo facit, dicitur gratia operans; inquantum vero est principium operis meritorii, dicitur gratia cooperans.

It will be profitable to apply this definition of the distinction to the motio moventis and motus mobilis in the instant of justification.

It has been argued from the objection and response ad 2m., that St. Thomas would attribute the meritorious and free act in justification not to cooperative grace (according to the above definition) but to operative grace. Perhaps the principal reason for this view lies in the wording of the objection in question.

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86) la 2ae., q. 113, a. 7, ad lm.
87) ibid., a. 3.
88) ibid.
89) This is interpreting St. Thomas on the general principles arrived at above, £4.6 F. The only objection that might be made is that this rids Thomist thought of the "profound" view that the greater the passitivity, the greater the perfection of afree act. Such an opinion has no basis in St. Thomas's writings: liberum arbitrium is selfdetermination; free will is selfmotion of the will. One gas only to read the first paragraph in De Malo, q. 6, a.1, copp., to know exactly what St. Thomas thinks of such a view and of the kind of peoble who propose it.

...Si gratia aliquid operetur in nobis,maxime operatur in nobis iustificationem: sed hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis: dicit enim Augustinus super illud,Ioan.14: Opera, quae ego facia,et ipse faciet, Qui creavit te sine te,non iustificabit te sine te; ergo nulla gratia debet dici simpliciter operans.

What causes confusion is to assume that this expresses the mind of ST. Thomas is out to deny in his response is the conclusion nulla gratia debet dici simpliciter operans and not the minor premise hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis. Both of these assumptions appear mistaken .

First, it is quite plain that ST. Thomas would not pretend that any grace is simpliciter operans. He explicitly asserts that identically the same grace is both operative and cooperative. If, then there is no real difference between operative and cooperative grace, to speak of a grace being simpliciter operans is absurd.

Next, what is quite clear from the response is that St.Thomas wishes to distinguish the minor premiss of the argument: hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis. For first he points out that the motion free will takes place dum iustificamur; he then states that this motion is not a causa gratiae sed effectus; finally, he concludes tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non sine nobis nos iustificat, quia per motum liberi arbitrii, dum iustificamur,Dei iustitiae consentimus ,ille tamen motus non est causa gratiae sed effectus;unde tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam.

Plainly, if the motion of free will is not a cause of grace, then the minor premiss of the objection is false: hoc non sola gratia operatur in nobis. The point is that the free act is a condition, not

a cause; the parvuli, amentes and furiosi may be justified without any free act; hence dum iustificamur, consentimus and not ut iustificemur, consentimus. Further, the fulfilment of the condition is itself caused by grace, for it is an effectus gratiae: this is contrary to the earlier position which made grace prior as the formal cause and will prior as the materisl cause of justification; now, tota operatio pertinet ad gratiam.

Personally, I can find nothing in this that contradicts the very clear definition of the distinction of operative anc cooperative grace to be found in the corpus. In the instant of justification, the same grace has two effects. The soul is healed, justified, made acceptable to God; this effect is caused by God alone and so is attributed to gratia operans. But there is a meritorious act that proceeds from free will, and this effect is caused not only by God but also by the will premoved by grace: accordingly it is attributed to gratia cooperans. The point of the second objection and response is simply to make clear that despite the fact that there are free acts in the instant of justification, non the less the grace of justification itself is an operative grace, an effect produced by God alone. Because the will cooperates in the fulfilment of the conditions of justification, it does not follow that the will cooperates in producing justification itself (93).

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93) The free act in justification is meritorious (1a 2ae., q.112.a.2. ad 1m. Hence it satisfies in all respects: habitualis gratia..in quantum est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans.

C. The Free Act in Justification.

But if it cannot reasonably be maintained either that the will does not cooperate with cooperative grace or that gratia cooperans refer to the operatio following from the forma, still it may be objected that the will cannet but cooperate. Three arguments may be advanced for such a view. First, the angel cannot but do what is right in the first instant of its being; but the free axt in justification seems parallel. Second, the sinner cannot but sin again; but, pari ratione, the regenerate in the instant of regeneration cannot but consent to divine justice, Third, even though there exist an abstract possibility of the will not consenting in the instant of justification, still there is not the slightest probability for such a lack of consent, and so, practically, the will is not free.

With regard to the parallel from the angel, St. Thomas holds different theories in the Pars Prima and in the De Malo. In the earlier work he advances that sin in the angel, though not possible through ignorance or error, is possible through exclusive attention to self (94); but God does not create angels with such a defect. therefore, there can be no sin in the first instant of creation (95). It would seem that the argument presupposes the incomplete theory of liberty of the early period. In any case, in the De Malo it is pointed out that this argument is insufficient: malitia culpae non repugnat bonitati naturae (96). Accordingly, a distinction is drawn between the first act th

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94) 1a., q. 63, a.1, ad 4m.
95) ibid., a.5.
96) De Malo, q.16, a.4.

of the angel, which is in the natural order and cannot be a sin (97),and a second act which is in reference to the supernatural order and van be a sin (98).

To the objection, then,one may say:first,the cases are not parallel,for the angel's first act is in the natural order,while the free act in justification is with respect to the supernatural order; second ,that ability to sin is not essential to freedom (99),so it cannot be maintained that angel is not free.

With regard to the inverse parallel of the sinner'simpotence, the answer is to distinguish two interpretations of St.Thomas'sargument on this point.

He might be thought argue that there is bound to be some particular case in which the sinner cannet but sin,though what or whenthat case will arise is not predictable. But plainly this is to interpret by the method of contradiction:what St.Thomas affirms is tha that, though in no particular case the avoidance of sin is impossible, still avoidance in all cases is impossible.

The true interpretation should seem to be as follows.The absence of an evil orientation is necessary if sin to be avoided over any period of time.The sinner is orientated towards evil action. Therefore,he cannot avoid sin over any period of time.Thus,the argument turns on the necessity of the absence of evil habits or evil

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97) Cp.ibid. a. 2.
98) ibid.,a.4.
99) ibid.,a.5.

orientation (100).This necessity proves impossibility with regard to the general case but not with regard to any particular case.

In other words,the sinner cannot avoid all sins,not because there is bound to be some particular case in which he cannot but sin, but because he is orientated towards evil action.The former rason would imply the impossibility of not sinning in some particular case,though which one that is cannot be predicted.The latter reason has no such implication; it deduces from "he cannot avoid all sins" not "he cannot avoid some sin" but "he will not avoid some sin."

Accordingly, to the ohection against the free act in justification, one may,if one chooses,affirm that the will consent,and that this affirmation is so probable as practically to amount to certitude; one cannot infer that the will cannot but consent,for it is never true that the sinner cannot but sin.

This brings us to the third objection.It is essentially superficial.For freedom does not require the slightest degree of probability that action be other than it is;it merely requires the possibility of its being different.All rhetoric is pathetically beside the point.

For an event to be contingent,it must be possible for it tobe other than it is:otherwise,there is a contradiction in terms (101)

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100) The impossibility of perpetual vigilance proves this necessity, as, more generally, it proves the necessity of habits.That would seem to be the real significance of the impossibility of vigilance, and not as the other interpretation supposes,an implication of an impossibility of not sinning in some particular case.

102)

On the other hand, grandet this possibility, contingence follows necessarily and to pile up indefinitely a cumulation of probabilities proves nothing (102).

£ 5.4 The Position of the Prima Secundae: Actual Grace.

This concluding section may be written in the form of a commentary on 1a 2ae., 111, a.2: Utrum gratia convenienter dividatur in operantem et cooperantem.

£5.41 The Theory of Actual Grace.

Respondeo dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est (q.110, a.2), gratia dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo divinum auxilium quod nos movet ad bene volendum et agentum; alio modo habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum..

The passage raises a single question, what precisely is St.Thomas's concept of actual grace? The answer is supplied by the reference of the text to an earlier article.

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101) Hence St.Thomas consistently rejects the possibility of certitude in causa with respect to a contingent event. It is worth noting that he considers not merely free acts of will but any terrestrial event to be contingent (see 1 Peri Herm., lect.14, ££11-22). The modern cosmic determinist says: grandet knowledge of all the factors relevant to a future event, one can predict that event with cetitude. To Aristotl and St. Thomas this is ingenous question begging: only an infinite mind know with certitude that it knows all the factors relative to a future event; but to an infinite mind, nothing can be future; hence universally there is no possibility of prediction with certitude with respect to contingent future events. The exception of prophecy is by t the infinite mind revealing its present to a finite mind to which that present happens to be future.

102) We to not wish to affirm that any grace makes consent so probable that consent becomes practically certain. From that question we prescind. Our contention is simply that, even were consent practically certain or anything else short of true certitude (which excludes the possibility of its contradictory), none the less the consent would be free.

..in eo qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere,significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis:dictum est autem supra (q.109, a.1) quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur:uno modo in quantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agentum: et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas sed motus quidam animae, actus enim moventis in modo est motus,ut dicitur in 3 Phys. (text. 18):alio modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur.....

Thus, actual grace is any effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis, apart from the dona habitualis, that produces a motion in the soul of man.

This is a large category,and St. Thomas is quite aware of the fact. The definition was established in De Veritate, q;27,a.5 (102), and is complemented by the discussion in the Contra Gentiles of the cognate ideas of necessithi and justice (103).

Similarly,in De Veritate, q.27,a.5,ad 3m., the divinum auxilium quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet is described as a providential aid and direction of fallen man.This idea is developed against a cosmic background in Contra Gentiles 3, 88-92 and provides the speculative framework within which appears the donum habituale in the discussion of grace as productio creaturae rationalis in finem supernaturalem to be found in Contra Gentiles, 3, 147-163.

1o2) V.sup., pp.
1o3) C.Gent., 2,28-30.

The same general idea is to be found in la 2ae.,q.109, a. 1-5. The first of these articles takes one no further than the assertion that God is the first mover in the spiritual order as well as the material. The second distinguishes between the two functions of habitual grace, elevatio and sanatio, but merely mentions the need of an auxilium Dei moventis both before and after the fall. The third, fourth and fifth articles go no further: the gratia sanans they mention is habitual grace.

However, the gratuitous character of this auxilium appears clearly in articles 6,7,and 9.

Article 6, on the preparation for grace, distinguishes between the general motion by which all things are turned to God secundum communem intentionem boni and the special motion that converts man to God sicut ad specialem finem cui cupiunt adhaerere sicut bono proprio.

In article 7, on the cognate subject of conversion from sin, an interior Dei motio is mentioned.

In article 9, on the need of grace after justification, a distinction is drawn between the ratio generalis anf the ratio specialis for the auxilium Dei moventis. The ratio generalis is that nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute Dei moventis. Since this applies to the need of the heavenly speres, of animals, plants, minerals and elements, and is simply the general theorem of God operating in the operation of the creature; it is not ratione sui gratuitous or a grace. On the other hand, the ratio spacialis is propter conditionem status humanae naturae, and clearly this in itself makes

the auxilium gratuitious: the special needs resulting from the culpa of original sin constitute no claim in justice.

To conclude, actual grace is a gratuitous motion, produced in the creature, directing and aiding him to God as his special end. Nothing is said about manner in which such a motion is produced in the soul, whether medialely or immediately. However, it would seem necessarily to be a motion and not simply God or grace operating an operation: for cooperative grace and the grace of perseverance are identifid with other graces because they are not distinct motions (104).

£ 5.42

Operative Grace and Instrumentality.

The response continues,

..utroque autem modo gratia dicta convenienter dividitur per operantem et cooperantem.

This position is in advance of the De Veritate where actual grace was not operative but only cooperative.

The cause of the change is quite easily assigned. As the distinctionbetween prevenient and susequent grace led to actual grace as cooperative in the De Veritate, so the development of the theory of the preparation for justification necessarily implies an actual grace that operates, converts.

In the preceding section the differences between the De Veritate and the Prima Secundae in this respect were presented. It is now necessary to consider the intervening period, for it is the development that does most to exlain the operative character of actual grace in

the article we are commenting.

Theoretically, then, the whole question is resolvet by Contra Gentiles, 3,149, where it is demonstrated that all initiative pertains to God. Man cannot move himself to attain divine aid towards an end above the proportion of his nature. Man is an instrument in the hands of God. No particular cause can prevent the action of the universal cause. Were man not moved by God, then his action would not be proportionate to the end. Apprehensuin precedes acts of will, but knowledige of the supernatural end of man is only from God. The second last paragraph is quoted to give the tone of St. Thomas's position.

Hinc est quod dicitur: Non ex operibus iustitia quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit (Tit., 3,5); et Non volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere, sed miserentis est Dei (Rom., 9,16). Quia scilicet oportet quod ad bene volendum et operandum homo divino praeveniatur auxilio, sicut consuetum est quod effectus aliquis nos attribuitur proxime operanti sed primo moventi; attribuitur enim victoria duci, quae labore militum perpetratur, non ergo per huiusmodi verba excluditur liberum voluntatis arbitrium, sicut quidam male intellexerunt, quasi homo non sit dominus suorum actuum interiorum et exteriorum, sed ostenditur Deo esse subiectum. Et dicitue, Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur (Thren., 5,21) per quod patet quod conservio nostra ad Deum praevenitur auxilio Dei nos convertentis.

However, as remarked above (105), there is no clear evidence that St. Thomas in the Contra Gentiles had thought of a conversion prior to the instant of justification. The above position will inevitably lead to it, but the citation of the passage from the Epistle to Titus is not easily reconciled with an actual consideration of such an anterior conversion. Accordingly, we have not yet an actual grace that is operative.

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104) 1a 2ae., q. 111, a. 2, ad 4m; ibid., q.109, a. 10.
105) V. sup., p.

Thus, it is perhaps in the Pars Prima that actual grace as operative makes its first appearance. After laying down the general principle in the response to q.62, a. 2, on the conversation of the angels, namely, that our last end is supernatural and so nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agente, there appears in the ad 3m. the recognition of an actual grace directing to this end.

> ..quilibet motus voluntatis in Deum potest dici conversio in ipsum. Et ideo triplex est conversio in Deum. Una quidem per dilectionem perfectam, quae est creaturae iam fruentis: et ad hanc conversionem requiritur gratia consummata. Alia conversio est, Quae est meritum beatitudines: et ad hanc requiritur habitualis gratia, quae est merendi principium. Tertia conversio est, per quam aliquis praeparat se ad gratiam habendam: et ad hanc non exigitur aliqua habitualis gratia, sed operatio Dei ad se animam convertentis, secundum illud Thren., Converte nos Domine ad te, et convertemur...

On the supernatural character of this act, it is not our intention to write in the present work for the reasons already given (106). A point on which we must insist, however, is the close relation in St. Thomas's thought between these three propositions: God prevents the will of man; God moves the will to the end; God operates the free act of will more than the will itself.

The logical connection of these propositions is manifest: the first and third are necessary consequents of the second. Unless God moves the will to the end, the will cannot act at all (107). If God moves the will to the end, then clearly the divine action is prior to the end, then clearly the divine action is prior to the human choice. Again, since the will moves itself in virtue of willing the end, then its operation is virtute motionis divinae.

106) V. sup., £ 7.8
107) 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m.

Following up De Veritate, q.22, a. 8, on divine control of the will, there are capters 88, 89, in the third book of Contra Gentiles .

The first accounts for Deus est operatur in nobis et velle for God, but no one else, can operate in the will.

The next chapter accounts for the et perficere: for if God causes the virtus volendi. it necessarily followa that he causes the actus volendi)110).

The dogmatic significance of this position is very clearly presented in the Commentary on Romans (111) with respect to the text, Igitur non est volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei. The passage is as follows.

Deinde cum dicit, Igitur non volentis etc. concludit propositum ex praemissa auctoritate. Et potest haec conclusio multipliciter intelligi. Uno modo sic. Igitur ipsa salus hominis non est volentis neque currentis: idest non debetur alicui per aliquam eius vluntatem vel exteriorem operationem (quae dicitur cursus, secundum illud 1 Cor. m 9,24: sic currite ut comprehendatis) sed est miserentis Dei; idest, procedit ex sola Dei misericordia, ut maxime sequitur ex auctoritate inducta, Deuter., 9, 4: Ne dicas in corde tuo... Propter iustitiam meam introduxit me Dominus ut terram hanc possiderem. Potest autem et aliter intelligi, ut sit sensus: Omnia procedunt ex Dei misericordia: igitur non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet currere, sed utrumque est miserentis Dei, secundum illud 1 Cor., 15, 10: Non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. Et Ioann., 15,5: Sine me nihil potestis facere.

Sed si hoc solum in hoc verbo intellexisset Apostolus, cum etiam gratia sine libero arbitrio hominis non velit neque currat, potuisset e convenso dicere: Non est miserentis Dei sed volentis et currentis; quod aures piae non ferunt. Unde plus aliquid est his verbis intelligendum, ut scilicet principalitas gratiae Dei attribuatur. Semper enim actio magis attribuitur principali agenti quam secundario:

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110) V. sup., pp.

111) the chronological position of this work is not known with exactitude. Of interest is the fact that the theory of the will seems the same as in the Pars Prima (v. sup., pp.). There is also the question of the origin of the development between the Sentences and the Pars Prima on the matter of reprobation (v. sup., pp. where the relevant passages from the Commentary on Romans are mentioned).

puta si dicamus quod securis non facit arcam, sed artifex per securim. Voluntas autem hominis movetur a Deo ad bonum: unde supra, 8,14, dictum est: Qui spiritu Dei aguntur hi sunt filii Dei. Et ideo hominis operatio interior non est homini principaliter sed Deo attribuenda; Phil., 2,13: Deus est quioperatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate.

Sde si non est volentis velle, neque currentis, sed Dei moventis ad hoc hominem, videtur quod homo non sit actus, quod pertinet ad libertatem arbitrii. Et ideo dicendum est quod Deus omnia movet, sed diversimode: inquantum scilicet unumquodque movetur ab eo secundum modum naturae suae. Et sic homo movetur a Deo ad volendum et currendum per modum liberae voluntatis. Sic ergo velle et currere est hominis ut libere agentis, non autem est hominis ut principaliter moventis sed Dei 112).

The point is clear. It is not enough to say that divine mercy is a necessary condition of good will and good performance. Free will is a necessary condition, yet one cannot say, non est miserentis Dei sed volentis et currentis.

Therefore one must hold that the free act proceeds from God as principal cause and from man only as instrumental cause. Just as it is not the axe but the craftsman using the axe that makes the box, so it is not man's will but God using man as a tool that produces good will and good performance, velle et currere.

Nor is this contrary to freedom: velle et currere est hominis ut libere agentis, non autem est hominis ut principaliter moventis sed Dei.

The same position reappears in the De Malo.

..etiam interior voluntas movetur ab aliquo superiori principio quod est Deus; et secundum hoc Apostolus dicit quod non est volentis scilicet velle, neque currentis currere, sicut primi principii, sed Dei miserentis 113).

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112) Rom., cap.9, lect.3
113) De Malo, q. 6, a.1, ad 1m. Cp.C.Gent., 3,149; 1a., q.83, a.1ad 2m. 3m 1a

On top of this St. Thomas immediately places his theorem of the transcendent artifex. Because the human will is moved, its operation virtute motionis divinae. God operates in its operation, and the actio Dei is infallible, efficacious, irrestible, as already explained (114)

To conclude, the idea that actual grace is operative is contained in the fact that is a conversion prior to justification. That all initiative comes from God follows from St Thomas's philosophic position that all created action is instrumental. It is in terms of this philosophic position that St, Thomas interprets Igitur non est volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei, in Contra Gentiles, 3,149; in the Commentary on Romans, 9, lect. 3; in 1a., q.83, a.1, ad 2m.; in De Malo, q.6, a. 1, ad 1m. and in 1a 2ae., q. 111, a. 2, ad 3m. The possibility of a free act of will being instrumental follows from the fact that the free act is with respect to the meanswhile the will of the end is not a free act but a natural motion: thus, while De Malo, q. 6, a.1 represents the solution of the problem of freedom (115), it would seem that the detailed study of the will at the beginning of the Prima Secundae (116) is the culmination of the whole series of texts on divine operation in the will (117) and that its aim is to decribe accurately the created mechanism on which God operates.

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114) De Malo, q.6, a.1, ad 3m. V sup., £ 422 B
115) V. sup., £4.1
116) qq.6-17.
117) De Ver., q.22, a.8; q.24, a.14; C.Gent., 3,88-92; 1a., q.83, a.1, ad 2m. 3m.

5·43

The Divergence from St.Augustine.

Operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili (L18) sed moventi. In illo ergo effectu/ in quo mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens, operatio Deo attribuitur :et secundum hoc dicitur gratia operans. In illo autem effectu in quo mens nostra et movet et movetur, operatio non solum attribuitur Deo sed etiam animae: et secundum hoc dicitur gratia cooperans.

St. Thomas's idea of operation has already been explained at length (119), so that here we need only advert to the difference between St.Augustine's conception of operative grace and tht of St. thomas. Obviously such a difference is of considerable importance if one is to grasp what precisely St. Thomas has in mind in writing this article.

St.Augustine, then, does not distinguish between operative and prevenient nor between subsequent and cooperative grace. St, Thomas holds a similar position in the Sentences and the De Veritate but in the Prima Secundae introduces the following distinction.

The terms, prevenient and subsequent, are used with respect to the time series (121). The terms, operative and cooperative, are used with respect to the causal series: causation proceeds from the first cause through the creature to the effect; inasmuch as this causation is received in the creature and effects a change in it mens nostra mota et non movens grace is said to be operative; but inasmuch as

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118) Note that operatio immanens attribuitur mobili: I will the end thoughI do not cause that act of will.
119) V. sup., £ 3.1, 3.6

the causation is not merely received in the creature but also causing the creature's mens mota movens grace is said to be cooperative.

Plainly, this is not merely a consequence of St. Thomas's theory of operation and of cosmic hierarchy: it is also required by his explanation of Non est volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei and the complementary Deus est qui operatur in nobis et velle et perficere. The theory of grace coincides with the philosophic theory that the creature is an instrument and with the psychological theory that the will of the end is a natuaral motion.

It is not surprising that such a synthesis of dogma, metaphysic and psychology should result in a point of view that is not identical with St.Augustine's.

If the reader will turn back (122) to the context of ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens, he will find that the example of operative grace is the initial good will St. Peter had the Last Supper when he professed his willingness to diefor our Lord;but the example of cooperative grace is the perfect goodwill St.Peter had when he did not profess andthen deny but confessed Christ and underwent martyrdom.In other words, St.Augustine's distinction refers to the temporal series,to succesive stages inthe spirutual life.The first thing needed is a desire to do what is right.

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121) ..dilectio Dei nominat aliquit aeternum, et ideo numquam potest dici nisi praeveniens;sed gratia significateffe otum temporalem,qui potest procedere aliquid et ad aliquid subsequa;et ideo gratia potest dici praeveniens et susequens.la 2ae.,q.111,a.3,ad 1m.

122) V.sup.,£2.14

Without such a desire man cannot even begin to move towards eternal life: he has a heart of stone that has to be transformed into a heart of flesh. But, granted the desire, one has yet performance under dicult circumstances: St. Peter professed readiness for martyrdom at the the Last Supper but he was ready for martyrdom only after his apostolate. Thus, the grace of good desires is one thing and the grace of good performance is another. But there is this difference between the two: for good desires one cannot even pray; but with good desires one can pray for good performance. Accordingly, God operates initial good will and then cooperates with this good will towards its perfection.

But St. Thomas's theory of the creature as an instrument results in a far more rigid analysis. If God is principal cause, then he must operate the whole effect throughout the whole course of the spiritual life. Not merely the initial stage of the life of grace is the result of operative grace: there must always be operative grace, for the instrument must always be moved and moved in the right way. God is prevenient, not only temporally but also causally: if the former prevention can be circumscribed by a given moment in time, the latter cannot, for <u>sublata causa, tollitur effectus.</u>

Thus, just as the logic of his polemic against the Pelagians who spoke of the initial <u>merita bonae voluntatis</u> led St. Augustine to point out that there is no initial <u>bona voluntas</u>, so the more exigent logic of St. Thomas's philosophic interpretation of scriptural texts led him to the assertion that at no time is there <u>bona voluntas</u> without grace.

This basic difference leads to others . While for St. Augustine St. Peter's initial good will and his protestation at the Last Supper are attributed to operative grace, St. Thomas would attribute the internal act to operative, the external act to cooperative grace. Again, while both St. Peter's perfect charity in martyrdom and his endurance of the ordeal are attributed by St. Augustine to cooperative grace, St. Thomas again attributes the internal act to operative, the external to cooperative grace. Finally, while for St. Augustine operative and cooperative denote distinct graces, for St. Thomas the terms, operative and cooperative, denote one and the same grace (124) while St. Augustine's different graces would be operans et praeveniens and operans et subsequens.

& 5.44 Internal and External Acts.

...est autem in nobis duplex actus: primus quidem interior voluntatis...alius autem actus est exterior.

It will be well before considering the next phrases in detail, to determine what St. Thomas usually means by the terms, actus interior, actus exterior. As the reader is aware, such an inquiry is not decisive in the interpretation of the present article (125); it remains that it may be useful.

Uniformly, then, St. Thomas uses the term, actus interior, to denote the free act of will, the election; actus exterior denotes the corporeal and sensibly perceptible act. It corresponds to the difference of the actus elicitus and the actus imperatus.

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124) gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia, sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus. 1a 2ae., q.111, a.2, ad 4m.
125) V. sup., £3.13

This usage is found in the De Malo in the discussion of internal and external sins (126): in the Prima Secundae in the analysis of human acts from the point of view of morality (127), in the contrast between the end of divine and the end of civil (128), between the Old Testament and the New (129); in the Secunda Secundae in the treatment of th vitues (130). It is applied to grace in the Sentences (131) and in the De Malo (132).

Thus if the mere number of instances and the uniformity of usage were the sole criteria, it would not be possible to have a greater antecedent probability with respect to the meaning of the terms in the article we are discussing. But a little consideration changes considerably the significance of the evidence set forth above. For when St. Thomas is discussing sin, morality, law or virtue, it is not surprising that the internal act is always the free act of will. The uniformity is determined by the matter under discussion. Again, any other meaning would hardly be possible in the Sentences before the development of the theory of the will in the form to be found only in the Prima Secundae. Finally, the usage in the De Malo with respect to grace occurs in an objection and so may be merely the expression of a current point of view.

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126)De Malo. q. 2., a. 2., corp., 1m., 5m., 6m., 8m., 11m., 12m., 13m. ibid., 2. 3, etc.
127)1a 2ae., q. 18-20.
128)ibid., q. 98, a. 1.
129)ibid., q. 108, a. 1-3.
130)2a 2ae., qq. 2, 3, 28 -43, in the general divisions of the questions; see in particular, q. 3, a. 1; q. 31, a. 1, ad 2m.
131)2 dist. 26, q. 1, a. b, ad 4m. Cp. 2 dist. 25 q. 1, a. 3; 2 dist. 35, q. 1, a. 4.
132)De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ob. 2.

Indeed in the following passage, though the actus interior certainly means the election, none the less there is a very close approximation to the other point of view.

.. in actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus: actus interior voluntatis et actus exterior. Et uterque horum actuum habet suum objectum: finis autem proprie est objectum interioris actus voluntatis; id autem circa quod est actio exterior est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ex obiecto circa quod est, ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine sicut a proprio obiecto.. (140).

Now, were St. Thomas not analysing the actus voluntarius ,the actus humanus,but treating generally of the causalithy of the act of will, he could very easily make the term actus interior the act that is with respect to the end not merely derivatively, as is the case ,above but formally.

Accordingly, we may continue our interpretation of la 2ae., q.111,a.4, without any antecedent presumption on the meaning of actus interior.

£5.45

Operative Grace and the Internal Act.

Est autem in nobis duplex actus:primus quidem interior voluntatis;et quantum ad istum actum voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, et presertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat; et ideo secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur gratia operans.
....homo autem per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a Deo ut bonum velit; et idio ,praesupposito iam fine,consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur (ad 3m.).

The meaning of the passage may be determined as follows.

a) The act in question is an act of will,that is, not some act outside the will, nor a mere disposition in the will,nor the act of will taken simply quoad formam meriti.

14o)la.2ae., q. 18, a. 6.

This follows from the statement actus interior voluntatis and from the example praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat.

Against the opinion that St. Thomas is thinking solely of the forma meriti (141) the following objections arise: the forma meriti is caused by habitual grace; there is no forma meriti when the will begins to will the godd, except in the special case when this initial good will is also justification; the position overlooks the whole development of St. Thomas's thought on grace.

b) The sole efficient cause of this act is God.

Man and, in particular, man's will are the material cause: for the will is moved.

Again, man is the subject of the act of will producet: he begins to will the good.

But neither man's will nor consequently man himself is the efficient cause of this act: voluntas mota et non movens.

An opinion has been put forward that non movens means non movensaliquid aliud, for example, the bodily members. Such a view has its attractions. But what it lacks is evidence. St. Thomas says non movens and he does not say non movens aliud.

c) The act of will in question is with respect to an end, not with respect to the means; it is the act of will properly so called, and not an election nor a consent.

That it is with respect to the end and not with respect to the means to an end is clearly stadet in the response ad 3m. Once the will wills the end, it follows, consequens est, that grace becomes cooperative

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141) V. sup., £ 2.8

But the internal act is considered as an effect of operative grace : therefore it is not a will of the means but of an end.

Hence it is not an election: voluntas est finis,electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem (142);nor a consent: consensus proprie loquendonon est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem (143);but an act of will in the strict sense: si autem loquamur de voluntate,secundum quod proprie nominat actum,sic proprie loquendo est finis tantum(144).

Observe that this does not imply that the act of will in question is specifiesd by the bonum in genere, for thet is not the only possible end of the will. It simply means that the will tends to some object absolutely and not because it tends to some other object.

d) Against the foregoing it will be objected:if the actus interior is the will of the end and the actus exterior is the corporeal act, then rhe article under discussion makes not explicet mention of the election, consent,or free act of will that mediates between the divine motion and the human external act.

To this the proper answer would seem to be:undoubtedly such a fact appears anomalous to us and if true requires and explanation; but the text of St. Thomas is never explained by modifyng the data or twisting them into a meaning that they do not posses.The conclusion that the internal act of will in this article is with respect to an end follows necessarily from the text; as has been shown the more ordinary usage of the term actus interior does not make it impossible that actus interior here means the act of will with respect to the end.If anyone knows a reason for rejecting the authenticity of prae -

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142) 1a. 2ae., q.13, a.3.
143) ibid. ,q. 15, a. 3.
144) ibid.,q.8,a.2.

supositio iam fine ,consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur, then is becomes possible to discuss theories that require the actus interior to be or to include the election, consent,will of the means. But as long as those words remain in the text, suppordet as tfey are by the instrumental idea of operative grace, all discussion of the matter is futile.

e) The act of will in question is not a free act.

The opinion to the contrary is based on the response ad 2m: dum iustificamur,Dei iustitiae consentimus.As already remarked, it kan arise only from inattention to the corpus articuli: St Thomas distinguishesbetween forma et operatio;for instance,the heat by which the fire is hot, and the heat which the fire transmits to other objects . Inasmuch as grace is a formal cause,it is operative;inasmuch as it is a principle of meritorious acts of will,it is cooperative.

.... in quantum animam sanat vel iustificat sive gratam Deo facit, dicitur gratia operans; in quantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit,dicitur cooperans.

Those who would ascribe the free act of will in justification to operative grace and so have an anslogy to justify the assertion that the actus interiorunder discussion is a free act must either contradict the passage just cited or else maintain that the free act in justification is not meritorious, does not proceed from free will, and is a formal constituent of the regenerate so that the infantes,amentes et furiosi are not justified.For unless the free act in justification is a formal constituent of justification, then it does not pertain to gratia operans.And if it is a meritorious act (145) and proceeds

from free will, then it does pertain to gratia cooperans.

Since then number of writers argue from the analogy of habitual grace to the effect that habitual grace as operative produces free acts, therefore actual grace as operative produces free acts, we are quite entitled to make a right use of the analogg. Because habitual grace, as a matter of fact, simply cures and justifies the soul inasmuch as it is operative and since its function relative to free acts is defined to be cooperative, it follows that actual grace as operative has nothing to do with the free act. This position is easily confirmed. St. Thomas considers that the free act is not the will of the end but the will of the means, the election, the consent. But the actus interior is not the will of the means nor an election nor a consent. Therefore it is not a free act.

Again, in the actus interior the will is mota et non movens. But St. Thomas throughout all his works maintains that liber est qui est causa sui in the sense of efficient causality (146). Therefore it is unreasonable to suppose that St. Thomas suddenly changed his theory of freedom in 1a 2ae., q. 111, a. 2, that is, in an article in which he makes no effort to discuss the nature of freedom.

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145) It is meritorious: 1a 2ae., q. 112, a. ad 1m.
146) V. sup., £ 4. 1. Cp. 1a, q. 2ae. q. 108, a. ad 2m.
147) Ad huiusmodi autem positionis ponendas inducti sunt aliqui homines partim quidem propter proteviam, partim propter aliquas rationnessophisticas, quas solvere non potuerunt, ut dicitur in IV Metaphysicorum. De Malo, q. 6, a. 1. cop. init. Among the sophistries on this subject appear to be the following.

God operates suaviter and ad modum naturae; therefore the voluntas mota et non movens is free. The premiss is true but the supposition is Scotist doctrina, namely, that it is the nature of the act of will with respect to the end to be free.

Finally, if one asserts that the will mota et non movens elicits a free act, then one draws no distinction between the spontaneity of natural causes and the free act of will. According to St Thomas such a position is heretical, alien to philosophic throught, destructive of the principles of moral science. Indeed, what is extremely rare, he casts aspersions on the intelligence and probity of the authors of such opinions (147).

f) Though the act of will described in the text is not a free act, Stl Thomas elsewhere speaks quite clearly of free internal acts consequent to the beginning of good will.

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147) .The act is free because the will can place impediments)Cp. C.Gent., 3,159). Because the will can impediments, the placing of impediments is free and the will is to blame if it does not receive grace. But this does not imply that when God by grace takes away the impediments without consulting the will, the will exersises another free act. The act is free because the will can dissent. If the dissent is another act of will distinct from the voluntas mota et non movens, then undoubtedly this possible act of dissent is free. But that does not show that the voluntas mota et non movens is free: to prove that Pharaoh is an Egyptian does not imply that Socrates is an Egyptian.

If however one means that will can dissent in and by the very act it elicits when mota et non movens, then one has a contradiction: for the will is both willing and not willing not merely at the sametime and with respect to the same object but also by the same act.

If one means that the will can either be moved or not moved, that if it is moved, it consents, and if it is not moved, it dissents, then one is confusing the freedom of God wih the freedom of the will.

If one means thet the will can either produce the motion in question or not, then one is talking beside the point: there is no question of the will qua mota et non movens producing anyhing.

Finally, if one means that God can produce the nesessary and the contingent at his good pleasure, the act and the mode of the act, then one appears merely to misunderstand St, Thomas's theorem of divine transcendence. No doubt God can produce what he pleases. But the question is, What does it please God to produce when the will is mota et movens? Is he excuting an instance of his idea of contingence? Or is he executing an instance of his necessity? Above, three reasons were given in confirmation of the manifest implication of the text: according to St. Thomas the voluntas mota et non movensis not a free act. On this point we are happy to be in agrement with Dominicus Banez who rightly adranced: Nullus effectus cuius Deus solus sit causa, potest esse contingens. In 1m. q.19.a.8, sexta conc.p.370 e.

The principl example given by St. Thomas of actual grace operative is the beginning of converstion: praesertim cun voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat. Now in the Pars Tertia the causal sequence susequent to conversion is described as follows.

Respondeo dicendum quod de paenitentia loqui possumus dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad habitum, et sic immediate a Deo infunditur sine nobis operantibus, non tamen sine nobis dispositive cooperantibus per aliquos actus (148); alio modo possumus loqui de paenitentia quantum ad actus, quibus Deo operante in paenitentia cooperamur. Quorum actum primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor, secundum illud Thren., Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur) 149); secundus actus est motus fidei; tertius est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur; quartus actus est modus spei, quo quis sub spe veniae consequendae assumit propositum emendandi; quintus actus est motus charitatis quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum se ipsum et non iam propter supplicis; sextus actus est motus timoris filialis, quo prpter reverentiam Dei aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius offert. (150).
Here the subsequent acts are caused by the primum principium, for .....ipse etiam motus timoris procedit ex actu Dei convertentis cor... Et ideo per hoc quod paenitentia a timore procedit, non excluditor quin procedat ex actu Dei convertentis cor. (151).

Further, the other five acts subsequent to the conversion of the heart are internal acts: this is evident, and it is explicitly stated wih respect to the act of fear (152).

Thus, in theabove passage on repentence, there is an obvions parallel between actual grace as operative and cooperative and, om the other hand, habitual grace as operative and cooperative.

Habitual grace is operative and cooperative: paenitentia.... quantum ad habitum....immediate a Deo infunditur sine nobis operantibus (153) non tamen sine nobis dispositive cooperantibus per aliquos ac-

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148) I.e., the free acts in justification are cooperation.
149) This text is cited: C.Gent., 3, 149; 1a., q.62, a.2, ad 3m.; Quodl., 1, a.7; 1a.2ae., q.109, a.6, ad 1m. That is, along the whole line of the development of the idea of conversion and actual operative grace.
150) 3a., q.85, a;5.
151) ibid., ad 3m.
152) ibid., ob.3a.

tus.

Actual grace is operative and cooperative : alio modo possumus loqui de paenitentia quantum ad actus, quibus Deo operante in paenitentia cooperamur.

In the latter case a distiction is drawn between a primum principium and five other acts that are consequent to the primum principium.

Further, this first principle is a divine operation: Primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor. Observe that this divine operation has no presuppositions: it does not presuppose en object, as does the act of faith; nor a motive, as the fear of punishment, the hope of pardon, the hatred of sin, or the resolution of amendment. It is a first principle: hoc quod homo moveatur a Deo non praeexigit aliquam aliam motionem, cum Deus sit primum movens (154). Further, it is an act which man himself cannot cause: liberum arbitrium ad Deum converti non potest nisi Deo ipsum ad se convertente (155). Clearly, then, with respect to this act, the will is mota et non movens. No less clearly is it an operative grace: praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat.

But once the will has begun to will the good, them the intellectual premotions enable it to move itself to a number of consequent acts. The thought of religion is met with an act of faith; the truths of faith call forth fear of divine retribution; fear brings to mind divine mercy and the will hopes for pardon; quietened by such hope, the mind thinks of the objective malice of sin and the will hates it; finally, the mind turns to God whom sin offends, und the will proposes amendment.

It is with respect to these acts that man prepares his soul and does what in him lies by his own free will: conversio hominis ad Deum fit quidem per liberum arbitrium (156), else there would be no meaning in the precept of repentence.

But in the production of these acts man is an instrumental cause: cum dicitur homo facere quod in se est, dicitur hoc esse in potestate hominis secundum quod est motus a Deo (157). For etiam interior voluntas movetur ab aliquo superiori principio quod est Deus; et secundum hoc Apostolus dicit quod non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis currere sicut primi principii, sed Dei miserentis (158).

To return to the parallel between habitual and actual grace, in the former case, the infusion of grace is the motio moventis, free acts of faith and contrition are the motus mobilis; the motus moventis as such is operative grace; the motus mobilis is the operation of the infused form, and so cooperative grace. But in actual grace, in the case of conversion, the motio moventis or primum principium is the divine operation that changes the heart of man, not by infusing a habit but by a simple motion; on the other hand, the motus mobilis are the consequent acts of faith, fear, hope, sorrow and repentence(159).

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153) See the texts cited, sup. £5.3A
154) 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 6, ad 3m.
155) ibid., ad 1m. 156) ibid., ad 1m.
157) bibid., ad 2m. 158) De Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1m.
159) It may be objected that there is not a parallel but an identity: in both cases St. Thomas is speaking of the infusion of habitual grace in 3a., q. 85, a. 5, but first he speaks explicitly with respect to the habit, second with respect to the acts when the habit is infused.

Such an interpretation is evidently forced. St. Thomas speaks generally quantum ad actus and does not, in the Pars Tertia, consider justification the prima gratia. Further, in the instant of justification there is no servile fear: caritas foras expellit timorem. But

To such a parallel St. Thomas had already adverted in the De Veritate, when he wrote:

Immutat autem (Deus) voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo movendo tantum... alio modo imprimendo aliquam formam (160).

To conclude: the parallel passages, 3a., q. 85, a. 5 and la 2ae., q. 109, a. 6, confirm the interpretation already given. The voluntas mota et non movens is the reception of divine action in the creature antecedent to any operation on the creature's part. So far from being a free act, it lies entirely outside the creature's power. But though not a free act in itself, it is the first principle of free acts, even internal free acts such as faith, fear, hope, sorrow and repentence.

g) It is now possible to meet an objection raised above, Why does St. Thomas make no mention of the election, consent, will of the means, when he treats actual grace as operative and cooperative?

In the first place, his theory on actual grace as operative and cooperative was a more recent development than his theory of the free acts in justification. The same degree of explicitness is not to be expected in both cases.

In the second place, the reason why he treats actual grace as operative and cooperative is to show that his systematic thought covers all the data to be found in St. Augustine. This appears from the Sed contra and the conclusion of the treatment of actual grace in the corpus articuli. The former cites: ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. The latter continues the citation: ut autem velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, ut

the third act, fear of punishment, is explicitly stated to be servile

perficiamus, nobis cooperatur. If one reflects St. Thomas's intention is not to give a full account of his system of thought, a thing he rarely if ever does, but to interpret St, Augustine by means of his omission of the election is quite natural. St. Augustine speaks of initial good will and effective good will: so also does St. Thomas.

Before turning to the wider aspects of the point before us, it willbe well to summarise what has been attained.

This amounts to a material correlation of the account of the actus interior with other passages in St. Thomas's writings. Thus, we have shown that the actus interior might possibly mean the act of will with respect to the end (§5.44) and, as a matter of fact, is that act (§5.45 a-g). For it is an act of will (a), caused by God alone (b), with respect to the end (c)ø; from this results a lak of symmetry in the response, but such alack of symmetry cannot justufy a contradiction of the text (d); accordingly, the act in question is not free (e) but simply for example, the conversio cordis that is the beginning and the cause of repentence (f); finally, the lack of symmetry mentioned (d) is accounted for by the text of St. Augustine which St. Thomas is interpreting.

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the third act, fear of punishment, is explicitly stated to be servile fear. It is true that the fifth act is said to be a motus charitatis but this is qualified as quo alicui peccatum displicet prepter se ipsu and so equivalent to the initialis dilectio of the Council of trent (DB., § 798).

16o) Ve Ver., q.22, a.8.

There remains to be explained the phrase secundum hunc actum dicitur gratia operans. This is considered from various viewpoints: in so far as it is motion to the good (j); in so far as it is a conversion from sin (k); in so far as it is the beginning of faith (m); and in the genearl case of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (n). There follows a general definition of operative grace (o).

j) The mere fact that the will is mota et non movens is not, on intrinsic grounds, a grace (162). Still, in the Sed contra one finds the following minor premiss: operationes Dei quibus movet nos ad bonum ad gratiam pertinent. To the modern reader this may appear a surprising lack of precision, but such surprise will, perhaps, be largely eliminated by considering St. Thomas's conception of the need of divine motion under all its aspects. It is necessary to begin with a distinction between nine different needs.

1) There is the need of divine motion from the creature's improportion to produce esse: nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum produre nisi virtute motionis divinae (163).

2) There is the need of divine motion from the creature's natural improportion to the production of esse supernaturale (164).

3) There is the need of divine motion from the creature's natural improportion to constant good action: only God is naturally impeccable. This is the basis, it would seem, of the need of the Auxilium Dei moventis both before and after the fall (165).

4) There is the need of divine motion from fallen nature's improportion to constant good action. Natura integre is an agens per-

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161) See 1a 2ae., q.a.6, ad 3m.
162) Cp. sup., pp.
163) 1a 2ae., q.109, a.

fectum spontaneously doing what is right ut in maiori parte. But natura lapsais an agens imperfectum for the most part doing what is wrong. This wouldseem to be the basis of the special need of the auxilium Dei moventis that arises propter conditionem status humanae naturae(166).

5) There is the need of divine motion arising from personal sin, whether the sin has generated a vicious habit or simply an evil orientation; whether the divine motion simply enables man to reflect and so react against his spontaneity (167)or effects a change of heart (168); and in the latter case, whether the change is brought about by a motion or by the infusion of habits.

6) There is the need of divine motion to orientate the creature to God tamquam bono proprio (169) .this differs from the need listed in second place as psychology differs from metaphysics.

7) There is the need of divine motion to rffect perseverance and advance in the life of the Sprit. Even in natura integra the supernatural life is not altogether connatural to man, for that life living on the divine level (170).

8) There is the need of divine motion to effect perseverance and advance in the life of the Spirit in a member of fallen nature: for regeneration does not alter the disordered conditions of hu-

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163) The idea is common: e g. C.Gent., 3.47
165) la 2ae., q. 109, a. 1-5; cp. De Ver., q.27, a. 5, ad 3m, q.24, a.7.
166) la 2ae., q.109, a. 9, cp.a. 7, ad 3m., De Ver., q.27, a.5, ad 3m., C.Gent., 3,88-92.
167) De Ver., q.24, a.12, copp. ad fin.
168) De Ver., q.22 a. 8, cp.De Malo, q.16, a.5, corp.c.med.

man life, so that the spiritual life of the justified is like the operation of an apprentice in constant need of direction an help from his master (171).

9) There is the same need, with at least an added nuance of gratuitousness, in the case of the converted sinner: but, in addition, the psychological effects of personal sin remain, to some extent, after justification; the spiritual life of a penitent is not the same as thet of one who has remained innocent.

If now we turn to the Sed contra, it will be found, I think, quite adequate in its context.

> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (cap.17), cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando incepit; quia ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens: sed operationes Dei, quibus movet nos ad bonum, ad gratiam pertinent; ergo convenienter gratia dividitur per operantem et cooperantem.

Complementing this statement in the response are,

> .....divinum auxilium quod nos movet ad volendum et agendum,

and

> .....qua movet nos ad bonum meritiorum.

The last of these certainly refers to the supernatural order; it can include to justification for a motion includes not merely its terminus but also the whole antecedent process. The second last, in which the word bene may have the technical sense of the actus virtutis, perhaps excludes so broad an interpretation; more probably it simply refers

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169) la 2ae., q. 109, a. 6; cp. la., q.62, a.2; C.Gent., 3,149.
170) See the distinction between the angels' ability to sin in the natural and supernatural order: De Malo, q. 16. a.2,4.
171) la 2ae., q. 68, a.2.

to the auxilium Dei moventus in the third and fourth senses of the need of divine motion; yet it certainly can be maintained that even such an aid is a grace. Finally, the Sed contra itself refers to some special divine operation: that appears not only from the Augustinian context but also from the use of the word nos which refers to fallen nature.

k) The example of operative grace given by St. Thomas praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat quite clearly corresponds to St. Augustine's transformation of the heart of stone into a heart of flesh.

As has already been shown, this is no incidental and isolated instance of Augustinian influence. The heart of stone is studied in detail in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 12 (174). The theory of divine operation in the will is worked out in De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8, Contra Gentiles, 3, 88 - 92, 1a., q. 105, a. 4, and 1a 2ae., q. 9, a. 6. In the last of these there appears a synthesis of severa cognate ideas that hitherto had had no precise correlation, namely, God causing the appetitus naturalis, God moving to the good in general, God operating in the will, God changing the will, God inclining the will, God premoving the will, God directing the will,

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174) V. sup., £ 4.52 B On Augustinian influence, £ 4.52 C

An extremely interesting remark occurs in 1a 2ae., q.109, a. 7, ad 3m. Natura integra can repair itself after sin with respect to its connatural good but natura lapsa cannot. Natura integra is the human agens perfectum, endowed with habits and though not with sanctyfying grace(q. 109, a. 3). The difference would seem to be that while a single sin renders natura lapsa impotent, it does not have this effect on natura integra since per se a single act does not destroy a habit. The position has many implications with regard to the general theory of grace and, in particular, with regard to asceticism.

God giving grace to the will. All are reduced to two categories: either God moves to the good in general, or he moves to some determinate end;The outstanding example of the latter motion is grace (175).

Perhaps the closest parallel to the present remark on the beginning of good will occurs in the account of psychological continuity,

.....mutabilitas seu diversitas liberi arbitrii non est de ratione eius, sed accidit ei in quantum est in natura mutabili.Mutatur enim in nobis liberum arbitrium ex causa intrinseca et ex causa extrinseca. Ex causa quidem intrinseca,vel propter artionem,puta cum quis aliquid prius nesciebat quod postea cognoscit,vel propter appetitum qui quandoque sic est dispositus per passionem vel habitum, ut tendat in aliquid sicut in sibi conveniens, quod,cessante passione vel habitu,sibi conveniens non est.Ex causa vero extrinseca, puta cum Deus immutat voluntatemhominis per gratiam de malo in bonum,secundum illud Prov.,21, 1: Cor regum in manu Dei et quocumque voluerit vertet illud.(176).

The implication of the passage is twofold: first,a change of will requires a proportionate cause; second,underlyng this law of continuity, there is the assumption that the will admits dispositions,qualities, habits,that orientate it in a given way,thatspecialise it and make it selective of objects of a given type.In other words, we have simply the Aristotelian theory of the habit in all itspresuppostions and , consequently, the Aristotelian law: qualis quisque est,talis finis videtur ei (177).

From this it follows that the operative grace as such is some

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175) 1a 2ae., q.9,a.6,ad 3m:...Deus movet voluntatem hominis sicut universalis motor ad universale obiectum voluntatis....et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle..interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquit determinate volendum..sicut in his quod movet per gratiam....A different instance would be the motion of Pharaoh ,V.sup.,

modification or development of existing habits and dispositions. This change results in the will receiving a new orientation, acquiring a fresh selectivity, attaining a new strength and efficacy. Combine this with the motion to the good in general, and there arises the conversio cordis, the voluntas mota et non movens and, indeed, ad aliquid determinate volendum.

m) The foregoing interpretation of the idea of operative grace may be confirmed by considering St.Thomas's account of Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum. The text occurs in the Sed contra of Ia 2ae., q.109, a. 6 on preparation for grace: it is treated at length in the Commentary on St John.

The passage begins with an objection: One goes to Christ by believing; but one believes because one wills to do so. But drawing, tractio, involves violence. Therefore those who go to are coerced.

The answer is thet not all "drawing" involves coercion.

First, man may be drawn through his intellect, whether by an interhalrevelation as was St. Peter (187), or by the objective evidence of Christ's miracles (179).

Again, a man may be drawn by the attraction exercised by the object on the will (180). Thus, a man may be drawn to Christ by the majesty of the Father revealed in him: in such a way Arius was not drawn, who denied Christ to be the substance of the Father; nor was

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176) De Malo, q.16, a.5.
177) Note that in Aristotle this remark is an objection against the freedom of the will. The solution amounts to affirming that human freedom is limited, that it is not absolutely new freedom recreated at each instant of material time.
178) Beatus es Simon Bar Iona, quia caro et sanquis non revelavit tibi...
179) Opera quae dedit mihi Pater, ipsa testimonium perhibent de me.
180) Blanditiis labiorum suorum protraxit eum (Prov., 7, 21).

S Aug., Homilia, Feria IV, Oct. Pentecost.

Photinus so drawn, who affirmed Christ to be a mere man. But besides the majesty of the Father there is also the beauty of the Son:

> ..trahuntur etiam a Filio, admirabili delectione et amore veritatis, quae est ipse Filius Dei. Si enim ..trahit sua quemque voluptas, quanto fortius debet homo trahi ad Christum, si delectatur veritate, beatitudine, iustitia, sempiterna vita, quod totum est Christus? Ab isto ergo si trahendi sumus, trahamur per dilectionem veritatis, secundum illud Ps., 36,4: Delectare in Domino et dabit tibi petitionis cordis tui. Hinc sponsa dicebat, Cant., 1, 3: Trahe me post te, curremus in odorem unguentorem tuorum.

But beyond the appeal to the intellect and the appeal to the will's love, there is a third way in which the Father draws to the Son:

> Sed quia non solum revelatio exterior vel obiectum virtutem attrahendi habet, sed etiam interior instinctus impellens et movens ad credendum; ideo trahit multus Pater ad Filium per instinctum divinaeoperationis moventis interius cor hominis ad credendum, Phil., 2,13: Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Oseae, 2,4: In funiculis Adam traham eos in vinculis caritatis. Prov., 21, 1: Cor regis in manu Domini: quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud (181).

The first and last of these texts constantly recur in St. Thomas's treatment of divine control over the will, divine operation in the will The cumulative evidence is that the instinctus interior is not merely a metaphysical transition from potency to act, nor simply an entitative difference between natural and supernatural, but, more prominent than either of these, a phsychological modification, a new orientation, a more perfect selectivity and efficacy the will interested in the external evidence and commensurate with, resonant to, the majesty of the Father and the beauty of the Son, who is truth.

n) There remains the question, Why does St. Thomas say praesertim, when he illustrates operative grace by the conversio cordis? We do

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181) In Ioan., 8, lect. 5. On universal salvific will, see the context.

not mean, Why was this example chosen? For it is precisely conversion that St.Augustine has in mind when he writes: ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens. The point is, Why is conversion merely an example for St. Thomas, when for St. Augustine it is the unique instance of ut velimus operatur incipiens?

To this question, the answer has perhaps already been given. While for St. Augustine both the distinctions, operative and cooperative, prevenient and subsequent, refers to the time series, to different stages in the spiritual life, St. Thomas gives only prevenient and subsequent this meaning ; operative and cooperative he transfers to the causal series.

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On metaphysical grounds, for God alone is the proportiaonate cause of being, on cosmic grounds, for God is the first mover of the universe and the first agent, as well, on dogmatic grounds, for Romans,9,16, cannot be inverted it is necessary to say that human action is instrumental. Such a proposition is universal: God is always first operative and then cooperative. On the other hand, corresponding to this truth, is the structure of the human will and the limitation of human freedom for the will is moved naturally to the end to be free only in the consequent and implied selfmotion to the means; the will is free in each in each single act but makes no free act with respect to the whole series of its choices; finally, the law of phychological continuity, as it enables the will to advance in perfection, so also it constitute the possibility of a selfimprisonment from which only grace brings liberation.

Thus,grace is operative not merely in the first step along the purgative way but throughout the spiritual life.As the conversion of the purgative way presupposes the grace of conversion, so the perfection of the illuminative way presupposes the fulness of conversion, white the intimacy of mystical union is the creature,purified and perfected, yet still as much in need of divine direction and aid as any novice or apprentice.Each advance must be caused by God,for God is the principal cause of all perfection and all advancement.Nor does the attainement of the past ever make further aid in the future superfluous it omly makes it greater, for the goal is harmony with the Infinite.Quicumque spiritu Dei aguntur,hi sunt filii Dei.

Since in his Commentary on that text St.Thomas reveals with particular clarity divine domination over the will, we cite it in confirmation of the points that here have been little than repeated.

...Sed quia ille qui ducitur,ex se ipso non operatur (homo autem spiritualis non tantum instruitur a Spiritu sancto quid agere debeat,sed etiam cor eius a Spiritu sancto movetur),ideo plus est intelligendum in hoc quod dicitur,Quicumque spiritu Dei aguntur. Illa enim agi dicitur quae quodam superiori instinctu aguntur (185):unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt sed aguntur, quia a natura moventur et non ex instinctu Spiritus sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum, secundum illud, Is.,59,19: Cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus,quem Spiritus Dei cogit. Et Lc.,4, quod Christus agebatur a Spiritu in desrtum. Were it not for the terms principaliter,instinctu inclinatur,one might be inclined to surmise that this passage dealt with something outside St Thomas's ordinary theory of instrumentality. But he immediately continuea:

Non tamen per hoc excluditur quin viri spiritualis per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur,quia ipsum motum volunatis et liberi arbitrii Spiritus sanctus in eis causat,secundum illud,Phil.,2, 13:Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere.(187).

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185) Cp. the three classes of men of Eudemus:those ruled by chance, those ruled by a divine instinct (sup.£ 4.6 e)

As is plain,the passage is parallel with all the others on divine control onthe will (188);it sets no more a problem for freedom than the assertion of a free act in the instant of justification; it leaves true the principle Praesupposito iam fine, gratia cooperatur; but it reveals the significance of control over the will of the end.

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..... est autem in nobis duplex actus:primus quidem interior voluntatis,et quantum ad istum actum voluntas se habet ut mota,Deus autem ut movens,et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat;et ideo secundum quod Deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum,dicitur gratia operans.

As has been shown, the act in question is an act of the will with respect to an end,but produced solely by God and passively elicited in the will. It is illustrated by the first instant of conversion, but that is not an unique instance, for God is the principal cause of all human perfection and development and so is constantly operating. It would seem that the act the act itself is not the operative grace. More accurately,grace is said to be operative with respect to this act. The operative grace as such would be had by distinguishing two elements in the act:first,an universal motion to the good in general; second, some ulterior determination of this motion.The former may be found in all wills at any time. The latter under given circumstances

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187) See Rom.,8,lect.3.Cp. la 2ae.,q.68,a.2.

188) Cp.Rom.,9, lect.3 (sup.,£5.42).Observe however that St.Thomas's thought very gradually comes to a focus on the action of grace in the will. Even la 2ae.,q.9,a.6,ad 3m.,is not too explicit;la 2ae., q.111, a.2, ad 3m. and 3a.,C.85,a.5 have to be taken into account to obtain a balancet interpretation.

is a grace, namely, when it is a factor in the productio creaturae rationalis in vitam aeternam.

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Cooperative Grace and the External Act.

...alius autem actus est exterior, qui cum a voluntate imperetur, ut supra habitum est (q.17,a.9). etiam ad hunc actum Deus nos adiuvat, et interius confirmando voluntatem, ut ad actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi praebendo, respectu huismodi actus dicitur gratia cooperans. Unde post praemissa verba subdit Augustinus (ibid): Ut autem velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, ut perficamus, cooperatur.

....gratia operans et cooperans est eadem gratia, sed distinguitur secundum diversos effectus (ad 4m.).

The passage calls for a few notes.

Strictly, the imperium is not an act of the will but of the intellect (189). However, since in man the intellect is the principle that directs, the will the principle that effects, the imperium of the reason takes place virtute voluntatis (190). Accordingly, the statement that the external act a voluntate imperatur, is quite natural.

There is no reason for supposing that the term actus exterior has any but its ordinary meaning, the act of the human body (191).

In this act as such, there is no difficulty: St. Thomas cites St. Augustine on the point,

.....imperat animus, ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servition discernatur imperium (192).

The whole difficulty lies in eliciting an effective imperium, in really making up one's mind,

...animus, quando perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult: sed quod aliquando imperat et velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat. Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio es diversas partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum; unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat (193).

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189) 1a 2ae., q.17.
190) 1a 2ae., q.17, a.1.

Thus, the psychological setting reveals the significance of interius voluntatem confirmando. When a man is caught between two fires, then a grace in the will decides the issue in favour of the spirual appetite.

It is to be observed, however, that this divine impulse is a gratia operans, inasmuch as it is received in the will; it becomes a gratia cooperans, inasmuch as with the will it causes the external act. This is clearly stated in the response ad 4m. The corpus articuli can give rise to a different impression, for there one finds St. Augustine and St. Thomas expressing their somewhat different views simultaneously (194).

The objection may be raised that the introduction of an instinctus interior in the will when man himself is hesitating is to intrude into human liberty. But the whole force of such an objection dervies from the imagination. Were this an intrusion into human liberty, then the whole of St. Thomas's porition on divine control of the will is an intrusion into human liberty: the only difference is that normally one represebts St. Thomas's theoty as God first moving the will to the end and then the will moving itself within this orientation, while in this case the motion to the end may be imagined as God deciding an otherwise doubtful issue.

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191) On the usage, see. £5,44
192) 1a 2ae., q.17, a.9.
193) ibid., a. 5, ad 1m.
194) On the difference, see. £ 5.43.

With respect, then, to the general case for there is no real difference, wheter God decides the issue beforehand or at the last minute the answer is,

...de ratione voluntario est, quod principium eius sit intra: sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio; unde motus voluntarius, etsi habeat principiumproximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra (195).

.....si voluntas ita movetur ab alio, quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum (196).

In a word, the apex of the will which causes our free acts is, itself, not a free act. But God causes it, causes its causation, causes all that it causes. Since what it causes are free acts, divine action upon it passes through the process of and self-motion to the effect. Just as divine causation of free will does not prevent the will from being free, so also divine causation of free acts does not prevent the acts from being free, But though divine causation of free acts does not interfere with their freedom, it does mean that God governs the will above the will's self-government.

...creatura rationalis gubernat se ipsam per intellectum et voluntatem; quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem, qua creatura rationalis gubernat se ipsam, tamquam domina sui actus, indiget guberanri a Deo (197).

Further, one is not to suppose that the greater determinateness given the will by grace is some narrowing or contraction of the universal category of the good, as though the general motion of the will were to the good in all possible forms, but the special motion of grace were

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195) la 2ae., q. 9, a. 4, ad 1m.; cp. ad 2m., ad 3m.; q. 1o, a. 1, ad 3m.;
196) De Malo q. 6, a. 1, ad 4m., ad 17m; la., q. 1o5, a. 4, ad 2m; q. 83, a. 1, ad 3m.
196) la., q. 105, a. ad 3m.
197) la., q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m. Cp. C. Gent., 3, 111-115.

to the good in all possible forms, but the special motion of grace were to some particular species of the good. Such an opinion overlooks the fact that grace is a motion to God and God is not some particular species of the good but transcending all differences and possibility of differentiation he is goodness itself. What grace does is break down the narrowing of past sin and orientate the will to what is a goodness beyond the universal good, to absolute goodness in its transcendence. Thus, grace is in every sense a liberation of the will, liberating it from the self-imprisonment of sin, and giving it the liberty of the sons of God, that is, a liberty that follows from an orientation fixed not by the abstract category of goodness but by a personal relation to the ipsum esse separatum (198).

Hence after stating that grace moves the will ad aliquid determinate volendum (199), St. Thomas in the very next article writes,

...cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum; sicut etiam intellectu aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum vel ens, vel quidquid est huismodi. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur (200).

The coherence of the two statements lies in the fact that God is not some instance of the good. So much for voluntatem interius confirmando. There remains the statement exterius facultatem operandi praebendo.

This idea is to be found in the account of co-operative grace in the De Veritate (201). It recurs in connection with a text from

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197) 1a., q.103, a. 5, ad 3m. Cp. C. Gent., 3, 111-115.
198) Cp. 1a 2ae., q.109, a. 6.
199) 1a 2ae., q. 9, a.6, ad 3m.
200) ibid., q. 10, a.1, ad 3m.
201) De Ver., q.27, a.5, ad 1m.

Jeremias both in the Pars Primaand the De Malo.Thus, to the objection,

...homo est dominus suorum actuum:quia ut dicitur Hier.,10,non est in homine via eius,nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos..the answer reads,

....dicitur non esse in homine via eius quantum ad exsecutiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest,velit, nolit;electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis,supposito tamen divino auxilio (102).

The objection and solution are substantially identical in the De Malo (203).

It would seem that in recalling this in the article we are commenting, St. Thomas's thought slips from gratia operans to Deus operans.

&5.5 The Movement of Thought:1a 2ae., q.111, a. 2.

In the Prima Secindae St. Thomas again had occasion to treat explicitly the distinction between operative and co-operative grace. Since writing the article in the Sentences he has combined the Augustinian theory of grace as a liberation of will with the later more metaphysical analysis in terms of the supernatural.He had also worked into synthesis the ideas of divine prevention, creaturely instrumentality, and the natural motion of the will to the endm and divine control of human freedom.Moved more by the meaning of the terms than by historical considerations he resolvet to restrict the terms, prevenient and subsequent, to the time series of gratuitous effects of divine will, and refer the distinction of operative and co-operative to the causal series.

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201) De Ver., q.27, a. 5, ad 1m.
202) 1a., q. 83, a. 1, ad 4m.
203) De Malo, q.6a;1, ad 1m.

Selecting as his guiding idea St.Augustine's Ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens. he proceeded to bring together the elements of his theory of grace that were related to that statement.

Grace, then, is of two kinds: an habitual gift and a divinum auxilium.The former is needed to cure us of the effects of sin and raise us to the level of eternal life. The latter is necessary, to for God alone is naturally proportionate to unfailing operation.But in the case of both of these graces it is true to say that God operates and we co-operate.For the operation referred to is the production of an effect:when then God alone produces an effect, grace is operative; when not only God but we as well produce an effect, grace is co-operative.

Thus, man has both internal and external acts.But with respect to the production of the former, the human will is moved but it does not itself operate :this is particularly evident when a bad will is changed into a good will. On the other hand, with regard to external acts, man's will is a cause; but God also acts, internally confirming the will and externally favouring us with opportunities.Accordingly, it is quite reasonable to say that the divinum auxilium is now operative and co-operative.

Again habitual grace, like any other form, has a double function: heat, for instance, constitutes the fire as hot but it also makes other things hot. Inasmuch, then, as habitual grace cures of the effects of sin and justifies us before God, it is operative; but inasmuch as it inclines free will to act in a proper fashion, it is co-operative.

Certain difficulties occur. It may be thought that grace is an accident and that an accident does not operate (204).But one has only to recall that an accident has a formal effect: whiteness makes a wall white.

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204) The objection was treated at length by St. Albert. V. sup.,2.4

Again, St.augustines's Qui creavit te sine te non iustificabit te sine te may be thought imcompatible with the existence of any operative grace.

But clearly St. Augustine means simply that our free act in justification is a condition and not a cause of that grace; indeed our free act is caused by the grace itself,and so the wholw operation belongs to grace (205).

Further one may cite St. Paul's Non est currentis neque vo- which shows that grace is the prinicipal cause and man instrumental (206),and argue that grace cannot be said to cooperate.

But to say that a cause cooperates does not mean that it is subordinate. Inasmuch as grace makes man will the good,it is operative inasmuch as man's converted will itself acts,it follows that the grace which at first was operative now becomes cooperative.

A final objection may be drawn from the logic of the issue. A good division supposes a real difference.But the same thing can both operate and cooperate,as appears from the answer to the preceding. While this is true,it remains thet the same thing does not produce the same effect when it operates as when it cooperates.But the divisio of grace given in the article is based not on the grace itself but on its effects.

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205) Cp.la 2ae.,q.55,a.4,ob.6 and Sed contra.

206) See C. Gent., 3,149; Hom., 9,lect.3; De Malo,q.6,a.1,ad 1m.

1.) Though no one disputes that anachronism (1) is a fallacy, the mere admission of the point is not an effecacious antidote to its spontaneous intrusion and disastrus effects.

To depend on the indefinable "historical sense" to hold it in check is not a scientific procedure.

what is needed is an articulate analysis of the historical process: for such an analysis can alone pass into the common and easy heritage of distingtions and arguments to establish, not as a mere matter of opinion but as a scientific conclusion, a true historical perspective.

Such a need is peculiarly manifest in a study of St.Thomas's thought on gratia operans. For such a study is only too apt to be biassed by the controversies that have raged over the question of grace and free will, and the development of St.Thomas's position cannot be properly appreciated unless consideret in relation to its antecedents.

2) Dogma is one thing and speculation on dogmatic truth is quite another .Whether or not there is development of dogma, it is manifest thzt speculation develops. Such advance takes place between an initial and final dialectical position: first it assembles the dogmatic data relevant to a given point; by philosophically defining the natural element in problems and by introducing analogies for the conception of the supernatural, it elaborates theorems that explanatorily organize and correlate the body of dogmatic truths.

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1) The outstanding example of such anachronism is Jansenism. It insisted that the categories of cotemporary thought could not be valid unless found in the writings of St.Augustine. From this preposterous premiss which denies all development it was led to reject the ideas of the supernatural and of sufficient grace, while, quite arbitrarily, it transmogrified St.Augustine's aiutoriumhuo into a contemporary gratia efficax.

3) The compound theorem that grace is both elevans and sanans needed both because eternal life is supernatural and because man is a fallen and sinful creature, developed slowly.

The specific element appears in St. Augustine's De Correptione et Gratia. It reached its full formulation in Peter Lombard's description of the states of human liberty, a formulation which precluded the development of a philosophic idea of liberty without being equal to the task of accounting for the idea of merit. The solution to these problems came with Philip the Chancellor's presentation of idea of the supernatural, and in the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas one finds the synthesis of the functions of grace. It is to be observed, that St. Thomas makes this synthesis explicitly only with respect to habitual grace: he does not discuss the question, Is actual grace by itself a gratia elevans? It remains that his position has an obvious exigence for a discussion of this issue.

Underlying the purely theoretical movement, which regards the functions of grace, is the subsidiary movement with respect to t the concept of grace itself. At first grace was conceived as a gratuitous gift of God; wth the advent of the theorem of the superantural, there also crystallized manifold tendencies to make the divine virtues of faith, hope and charity habits in the Aristotelian sense. There remained the tasks of distinguishing actual grace from genaral providence, distinguishing internal and external actual graces, and finally discussing the functions of actual grace.

Complementary to these two movements is the development of thought on the nature of human liberty. Until the theorem ~~of theorem~~

of the supernatural was introduced, it was inevitable that the "dialectical position" found its place in the very idea of liberty: such is clearly the case in St. Anselm, St. Bernard and Peter Lombard. But with Peter the Chancellor speculation on the nature of liberty assumed a new vigour: according as writers were moved by philosophic interest or influenced by the earlier theory of the four states of human liberty, they tended to regard freedom as a potency or as a habit.

4) The development of thought on gratia operans is a function of the variables enumerated above. The extremes of the movement are as follows.

In St. Augustine the donum Dei is operative or prevenient that man may will the good, it is cooperative or subsequent lest man should will in vain.

In the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas the gratuitous effects of divine will are divided into habits and motions; both the habits and the motions may be operative or cooperative; further, the distinction between operative and cooperative is differentiated from that between prevenient and subsequent, for the latter refers to the time series of graces while the former refers to the causal series.

5) The intermediate stages between these two extremes are, roughly four.

In St. Anselm and Peter Lombard, the former highly speculative and the latter notably positive, grace is a donum Dei, its function tends to be conceived as that of a gratia sanans, and the "dialectical position" is in the idea of liberty. Grace is operative in as much as it causes the good will that brings one to eternal

life; subsequently the same grace cooperates with good will to bring forth the fruits worthy of eternal life.

In the Sentences of St. Albert and St. Thomas, grace is a donum habituale et supernaturale. It is operative in two respects: first, it informs man, making him acceptable to God; second, it exerts the influence of a habit or virtue inclining the will to the good on the analogy of a natural spontaneity. Again, it is cooperative in two respects: it gives good acts the forma meriti and it inclines the will in the performance of good acts. In St. Thomas there is an attempt to correlate the function of the habit with the Augustinian distinction between good will and good performance.

In his De Veritate St. Thomas adverts to the inadequacy of the theorem of the supernatural to explain fully the need of grace. Gratia gratum faciens becomes any effect of gratuitous divine will: the direction and aid of divine providence is recognised as a divinum auxilium quod ad gratiam cooperantem pertinet. The division of grace into operative and cooperative is asymmetrical.

While the Contra Gentiles greatly develops the idea of providence and treats in detail the manifold ways in which God directs and aids the spirit of man, its most notable contribution is the speculative solution with respect to divine prevention of human liberty. Man cannot prevent God because man is an instrumental cause. In this connection is cited Romans 9, 16, and it is asserted that though God is the principal cause of man's acts of choice, it remains that man is also the free cause of them. The idea recurs in the Pars Prima, in the Commentary on the Romans, in the De Malo, and in the

third objection to la 2ae., q. 111, a. 2.

Since man is always an instrumental cause, it follows that there is always a motio moventis that precedes causally the motus mobilis. This explains why St. Thomas distinguishes between the time series of graces (reserving for them the names"prevenient" and "subsequent") and the causal series with gratia operans predicated of the voluntas mota et non movens, gratia cooperans predicated of the voluntas et mota et movens. The same fact accounts for the anomalies of la 2ae., q. 111, a. 2: St. Thomas is attempting to equate his distinction in the causal series with St. Augustine's temporal distinction between initial good will and the perfect charity of supremely difficult performance.

6) Bricks are not made without straw. For a more adequate grasp of the idea of gratia operans in St. Thomas, it is necessary to review the materials he worked into an analogy for the conception of the supernatural and the positions he modified to elaborate a satisfactory definition of the natural elements in his problem. Here it will be well to reverse the order of the inquiry, first considering the theory of liberty and then the theory of operation.

7) St. Thomas did not find a theory of liberum arbitrium already fashioned for him. St. Bonaventure considered it a habit; St. Albert considered it a potency distinct from intellect and will. Not only did he have to build from the very foundations, but the distorted speculative situation in which he began his work led to his building two structures instead of one. Thus in both De Veritate and the Pars Prima he devotes separate questions to the will and to

liberum arbitrium, but in twelve successive questions and sixty-three articles on the will in the Prima Secundae there is not a title that includes the term, liberum arbitrium.

Another notable point is that St. Thomas did not work on the problem of liberty in isolation from the problem of its relations with grace. In the article in the De Veritate, ten objections out of twenty proceed from the doctrine of grace; in that in the Pars Prima there are four out of five; even in the article in the De Malo, which was occasioned by the controversy over determinism, eight objections out of twenty-four are connected with grace.

Thus, accompanying the movement of thought from the freedom of the self-determining rational creature to the self-moving will which is determined (quoad specificationem actus) by no finite object, there is a complementary movement which works out the limitations of human liberty and corresponds to the idea St. Bonaventure attempted to express by saying that liberum arbitrium is a habit.

The theory of the habit, even in the Sentences, involves a distinction between the agens perfectum and imperfectum; it is complemented in the De Veritate with a theory of psychological continuity even in simple orientations; and this development moves into the theory of grace when it is made explain the impotence of the sinner and again when it is correlated with the principle that God alone is naturally impeccable so that every creature, no matter what its perfection, needs for good action an auxilium Dei moventis.

A number of diverse influences - Avicenna's rule that the cause of the will controls the will; St. Augustine's affirmation that

God operates in the hearts of men and inclines their wills at his good pleasure; the idea of the Eudemian Ethics that, unless prudence itself is to be reduced to change, there must be a higher cause of human counsel - are blended into a single theory when Aristotle's appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum is met with a distinction in the De Malo and, in the Prima Secundae it is argued that the will of the end quoad exercitium actus must, ultimately, be produced by the First Mover. The corollary that special internal premotions in the will are graces is almost immediately drawn and, later in the article on operative grace, in answer to the objection from Romans 9, 16, one reads,

> .. homo autem per gratiam operantem adiuvatur a Deo ut bonum velit; et ideo, praesupposito iam fine, consequens est ut gratia nobis cooperetur.

This incidental statement reveals explicitly the obvious synthesis of human instrumentality, divine operation in the will, and the Aristotelian theory that freedom lies in choosing but choosing presupposes the dynamic orientation from which free acts spring. As a man wields a whole sword though he grasps only the hilt, so God controls the whole will by grasping it beyond the limits of liberty. Complementary to this fundamental position - essentially opposed to the Scotist view which makes the will not a compound of nature and of freedom but something whose nature is freedom - is the theorem on perseverance: man has no act of choice with respect to the series of his choices, so that the series as a series must be caused by God.

It will be useful to correlate the foregoing with the general theory of the instrument. In an instrument there is the effect

of the principal cause on the instrument, there is the effect produced by the instrument in virtue of the action of the principal cause, and, further, in that effect there is what is within the proportion of the instrument and what is beyond that proportion. Accordingly in the will there is the will of the end produced by God, there is the will of the means produced by the will of the end in virtue of divine action, and, further, in the will of the means there may be distinguished the free act as this single act, which is within the proportion of man, and the free act as part of a series tending to a given goal, and that is beyond the proportion of man.

This gives the immediate context of gratia operans: it is a special effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis, a habit or a motion, that modifies the will of the end, the voluntas mota et non movens, and supplies the instrument by which God makes issue with the gravitation of that other instrument, fallen man, and directs its dynamism unto eternal life.

8) It remains that gratia operans has its transcendental context of Deus operans, and no small part of the problem faced by St. Thomas was to work out the distinction between the two.

Most important in this connection is the fact that while sixteenth century thought begins with the idea of actual grace and attempts to find a satisfactory theory of divine foreknowledge and operation, St. Thomas began with a satisfactory theory of divine foreknowledge and operation but had to develop the theory of actual grace.

Already in the Sentences St. Thomas's familiarity with

Aristotelian thought on time and Platonist thought on eternity - it is equivalent to the presupposition of the Einsteinian theory of space-time - had enabled him to see that all suggestion of incompatibility between divine foreknowledge or will and created contingence was no more than anthropomorphic fallacy. Further developments occur in meeting the Aristotelian idea of contigence, in resolving the Aristotelian postulate of an eternal world, and in developing the idea of providence; but though they enrich, they do not radically modify the position of the Sentences (2).

However this reduction of the problem of reconciling divine attributes with human liberty to the category of fallacies is equivalently a dialectical position. To assert that some things are

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2) Throughout the work we have tended to treat these issues in foot-notes. The subtlety of Aristotle's idea of contigence was too much for even the subtle Scotus, who dismissed it as arrant nonsense. St. Thomas accepts Aristotle and then christens him by refining on his refinements. Aristotle held that the future could not be true; St. Thomas that the future is not future to God. Aristotle maintained that the world must be eternal; St. Thomas that divine activity is timeless but its products temporal. Aristotle held that celestial beings and events were necessary, terrestrial ones contigent; St. Thomas that God produced both, making the necessary necessary and the contigent contigent. Aristotle denied providence in the terrestrial sphere; St. Thomas affirmed God to be an agens per intellectum eternally planning and efficaciously producing a temporal and contigent world-order.

Engaged in problems on this high level, St. Thomas looks upon the alleged incompatibility of divine knowledge, will or action with human liberty as a mere frivolity (C. Gent., 3, 94). He solves the problem as a corollary to his general solution. Conceive the existence of the stars as necessary but that of cows as contigent, eclipses as necessary but the falling of a stone as contigent; reconcile this contigence with the divine attributes; and it will become apparent why St. Thomas was not perturbed by the problem of grace and free will from this point of view.

However, this reduction of the problem of reconciling divine attributes with human liberty to the category of fallacies is equivalently a dialectial position. To assert that some things are contingent and others are necessary is no more than to admit the existence of the problem. To add that God knows infallibly, wills efficaciously, acts irresistibly, is to affirm what is self-evident in its truth yet inexplicable for the very reason that it is a first principle. To conclude that God infallibly knows, efficaciously wills, irresistibly produces both the necessary and the contingent is perfectly logical but it is not an explanation. Nor is explanation provided by arguing that the demand for an explanation involves fallacy; for even if we cannot coherently make the demand, it remains that we do not understand.

To the question, then, where does St. Thomas place the mystery, it must be answered that he does not place it. He affirms nothing merely to have a theory of divine control. He affirms nothing merely to have a theory of the possibility of human liberty. He simply asserts all the truths he knows on both points and then argues that all arguments against the compatibility of these truths are fallacious. Thus his thought is properly a "dialectical position" and it is easily extended to the problem of Deus causa peccati by adverting to his three categories: positive truth, negative truth, objective falsity; good, not-good, sin; what God wills, what God does not will, what Godd permits. It is this subtle folding of his thought, like the mathematical movement into the region of complex

numbers, that justifies his assertion in Romans 9, lect. 2 that predestination is ante praevisa merita while damnation is post praevisa peccata .

It is not in this field that St. Thomas found difficulty. Obviously one can possess all the foregoing and not yet have a theory of actual grace. Deus operans is not of itself gratia operans. Accordingly, we have seentthat in the Sentences he attempted to make the external Aristotelian premotion a grace preparatory to grace, and only gradually, through the development of the theory of the will and of the manner in which God moves and controls it, did he arrive at the motion which is the gratia operans of la 2ae., q. 111, a. 2.

9) There remains but a single difficulty, namely, the crux of the controversy De Auxiliis. It is formulated by the Molinists with the question, How does God know when he causes the will of the end that the will will freely choose the means God intends to be chosen? The same question is put from a different view-point by the Banezians, How can God's causing the will of the end make it true that God infallibly and irresistibly causes the will to choose the means?

To the former question the answer would seem to be that St. Thomas does not explain the divine knowledge in terms of any antecedent but makes it a first principle. God knows because he is ipsum intelligere.

To the latter question, since it is many, the answer

is more involved. God's moving the will to the end per se causes the will to choose the good, per accidens permits it to choose evil. God's causality is efficacious not because of the finite motion caused but because of the infinite mover: the prerogatives of divine transcendance cannot be attributed to any finite entity, not even the praemotio physica. Finally, by causing the will of the end God really and truly causes ipsum actum volendi media, because in the case of instrumental activity there are only two products (the will of the end and the will of the means) but three actiones (God causing the will of the end, the will of the end causing the will of the means, and God causing the causation of the will of the means by the will of the end). The third is cooperation. It is not true that Peter merely moves his rapier and the rapier kills Paul; Peter also kills Paul, and does so more than the rapier. The comparison limps, but the limping is twofold. If the will is free and so not like a rapier, it is also true that God is a transcendent artifex and so not like Peter.

10) That the thought of St. Thomas suggests a point of view different from that of the contending parties in the controversy De Auxiliis is easily seen.

His gratia operans et cooperans, considered as a grace, does not notably differ from the gratia excitans et adiuvans of Molina. The difference lies in the metaphysical and psychological context in which St. Thomas places his grace. He is as devoted to

divine sanctity and human liberty as any Molinist, but, at the same time, he succeeds in maintaining a theory of divine dominion to which no Banezian can take exception.

I think it may be said that Banezian thought, point for point, corresponds to the thought of St. Thomas, yet between the two there is a notable difference which arises from the arrangement of the points. St. Thomas's synthesis of premotion, application, instrumental participation; his affirmation of universal instrumentality, of divine transcendence and efficacy, of operative grace as a special case of instrumental control - all these points are to be found in the Banezian interpretation. But the difference lies in the analysis of the instrument: St. Thomas posits three actiones but only two products; Durandus maintained that if there are only two products, there are only two actiones; both Molina and Banez were out to discover a third product that they might have a third actio, and the former posited a concursus simultaneus, the latter a concursus praevius.

We have argued that on every point the Banezian idea does not square with what St. Thomas says: their distinction between posse agere and actu agere is not his; their idea of premotion is not his; their idea of application is not his; their idea of instrumental participation is not his; their idea of liberty is not his; their idea of divine transcendence communicated to their praemotio is unacceptable to him. The root of the whole trouble is that they

take it for granted that a third actio postulates a third product.

But if we conclude that the Banezian position is not what the Molinist has hardly claimed to be, an exact interpretation of St. Thomas, we would not be thought to mean that it is a strange or surprising interpretation. That history is a science and not merely a diversion, useful for the illustrations it provides for moral lessons, that the development of speculative positions is to be studied in its perspective and not telescoped into a somewhat Homeric list of allies and adversaries, these are not truths, however much admitted today, that always were taken for granted. Yet without the toil of purely historical study, St. Thomas's thought on the issue treated in these pages cannot but be enigmatic. His theory of actio lies hidden under endless complexities. His idea of premotion finds its clearest expression in his study of Aristotle's Physics. The doctrine of application can be understood only as a transformation of the Aristotelian cosmic system. Universal instrumentality is a corollary from Platonist universal causes, and instrumental participation is a generalisation of Aristotle's theory of the generation of animals. That God operates in the operation of the creature, initially is from the Arabic Liber de Causis, but later is interwoven with ideas of premotion and application. Thought on liberty suffers from its starting-point a distorting bifurcation. Solidary with all that precedes, the idea of divine transcendence is a "dialectical position" that can be adequately illustrated only by later conceptions of space-time and of complex numbers. Finally,

the idea of operative grace is an unsuspected compound of metaphysics and psychology that develops the pages of Aquinas through the last stages of a movement that began with Augustine.

To achieve that development I do not think that St. Thomas extended himself, making it an objective as he made the reconciliation of the scientific spirit of Aristotle with the spirit of Christian faith. On theother hand, the elaboration of satisfactory theories of grace andof liberty was a long sustained, if also a quiet, effort and concern. To one who reads the discussions of predestination and reprobation, providence and divine operation, grace and human liberty, that are to be found in the Commentary on the Sentences, and then turns to QQ. 5, 6, 22, 23, 24, 27, of the De Veritate, there is at once apparent a vast intellectual ferment: the pupil has discerned that the position of his master is not merely to be improved upon in matters of detail - such as the reduction of liberum arbitrium to intellect and will and the substitution of immediatio virtutis for the virtus divina creata - but that he himself has fundamental problems to face and radical developments to achieve, Progress, however, is to the unknown and cannot be planned. The majestic sweep of the Contra Gentiles organises the whole field of thought, but its detailed achievement in the theory of divine providence and government is not too relevant to the elaboration of a theory of grace. Yet the view-point there established will remain to rpovide a pattern into which all further ideas can be fitted, so that a closer analysis of human liberty, a grasp of the existence of internal graces prior to justification, a convergence of ideas on divine operation on

in the will and on the limitations of human freedom, all automatically combine under the theorem of creaturely instrumentality and the interpretation of St. Paul's Igitur non est volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est Dei. When, then, St. Augustine's Ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens turns up in the Prima Secundae, no great deliberation is required for St. Thomas to distinguish the causal series from the temporal series in the effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis and to refine on the thought of St. Augustine by making operative grace the divine grasp upon the human instrument, cooperative grace the product of God and of man guided and aided by God.

It is sometimes argued that St. Thomas devoted so little attention to the problem of grace and free will that, had he lived in the sixteenth century, he would have notable altered his position. With that opinion we can hardly be expected to agree.

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§3.11 Aristotle's Hierarchy.

Aristotle's hierarchy is in the field of motion. It consists of three elements: an immovable first mover; the animated celestial spheres; the terrestrial order. The cosmic scheme is put together with incredible skill and, though no one to-day would think of accepting it, there are extremely few who would be able to write a serious refutation of it. A summary presentation may be made by outlining: the fundamental fact; the problem it constitutes; the solution to the problem.

The fundamental fact is the intermittence of all terrestrial motion (1). Everything on earth quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur.

1) That this is the fundamental fact may be shown as follows. The first seven books of Aristotle's Physics are simply an introduction to the eighth. The eighth book is one argument, and its major premiss is the enumeration of the five following cosmic schemes:

A. Nothing ever moves.

B. Everything always moves.

C. Some things always move, the others never move.

D. All things sometimes move and sometimes are at rest.

E. Some things are always at rest, others always in motion, others sometimes are in motion and sometimes at rest. (See 8 Phys., lect. 5 and 6.)

Aristotle aims at demonstrating the fifth (E) scheme. But clearly the fourth can be eliminated only on a priori grounds: the necessity of a first mover proves something to be always at rest; the necessity of an eternal first motion proves something to be always in motion. It follows that the a posteriori element, the basic fact, is intermittent motion, which eliminates the first three schemes. The eighth book of the Physics is as follows: Lect. 2 - 4, motion neither begins nor ends absolutely; Lect. 5, 6: there is intermittent motion; Lect. 7 - 13: there is a primum se movens; Lect. 14 - 20: the first motion is perpetual and uniform circular local motion; Lect. 21 - 23: the first mover is spiritual.

The fact of intermittent motion is not established merely by experience. Like the modern physicist, Heraclitus had maintained that everything is always in motion but not all motion is apparent. To meet this Aristotle appeals to his analysis of motion (2).

Motions are of three and only three kinds (3): change of place (4), change of sensible quality (5), and change of size (6). Except circular local motion, all other local motion is to a definite place. Change of sensible quality is simply to the opposite quality. In both these cases, since the motion is limited in scope, it comes to its term and ends. It may be followed by another motion, but the point is that we then have another motion and not a continuation of the same motion. Finally, change of size is intrinsically intermittent, for it takes place by definite quanta and not by infinitesimals.(7).

2) Motion defined: 3 Phys., lect. 2, 3; 11 Metaphys., lect. 9.

3) 5 Phys., lect. 2 - 4; 11 Metaphys., lect. 12. Generation is not a motion: 11 Metaphys., lect 11; 1 de Gen., lect. 10.

4) According to Aristotle and St. Thomas this is merely a change of extrinsic denomination: 3 Phys., lect. 5, §15. This invalidates a good deal in Fr. Stufler's argument, Gott der erste Beweger, pp. 1 - 13.

5) It consists exclusively in the change of the sensibilia propria: hot cold, wet dry, black white, heavy light, bitter sweet, hard soft, etc. See 7 Phys., lect. 4, 5.

6) Augmentation is the combination of local motion and alteration, e.g. carry coals to the fire (local motion) where they burn (alteration) thus making the fire bigger. See 1 de Gener., lect. 11 - 17.

7) The argument is principally from 8 Phys., lect. 5, 6; use is also made of the point that only circular local motion can be perpetual, 8 Phys., lect. 15, 16.

Thus, terrestrial motion not merely happens to be intermittent: it must be so. Still, this constitutes a problem, and the scientist must find its solution.

It constitutes a problem. Motion in general presupposes the existence of both mover and moved (8), and for a continuous and perpetual motion that is all that is needed. In intermittent motion one has also to explain why the motion arises now and not previously. To account for its previous non-existence, one must posit a cause of the state of rest. To account for its present existence, one must posit a motion that eliminates the cause of the state of rest (9). It makes no difference whether the change is produced in the mover or in the moved or in both: but there must be some change, and that change is a motion (10). Now, this previous motion in turn presupposes not only mover and moved but, in addition, another previous motion or premotion. And that premotion another premotion. And so forth, back through the whole of unending time. Thus terrestrial motions form an infinite series.

8) The principle, quidquid movetur ab alio movetur, is established by an induction in 8 Phys., lect. 7, 8; it is proved a priori in 7 Phys., lect. 1, from the principle that whatever moves is necessarily an extended body.

9) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §6. Cp. De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8: .. non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus..

10) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §8. The motion envisaged is a local motion. To melt an iceberg it makes no difference whether the sun moves up to the Pole or the iceberg moves down to the equator. The fact that the premotion is fundamentally a local motion explains St. Thomas's referring to it in the De Potentia as a metaphorical transition from potency to act.

Such is the problem. Now a solution must be found for it: one cannot, like Democritus, simply say that things happen to be so or always were so. The three angels-e angles of a triangle were always equal to two right angles; none the less, the geometer must reduce this eternal fact to its first principle. Similarly, eternal motion has to be explained (11).

We now come to consider the arguments by which Aristotle establishes his explanation of the infinite series of terrestrial motions.

First, motion is not self-caused: the gravia and levia are moved by the generans (12); every case of alteration presupposes a local motion, else the alteration would have taken place previously (13); change of size presupposes both local motion and alteration (14); corruption and generation presuppose all three (15). The animals are self-moved only locally (16) inasmuch as one part moves another (17), but this motion presupposes a premotion from some outside source, food or the atmosphere (18)

11) 8 Phys., lect. 3. 12) 8 Phys., lect. 8; 3 De Caelo, lect. 7.
13) 8 Phys., lect. 14, §3. 14) ibid., and 1 De Gener., lect. (11-17)
15) 1 de Gener., lect. 10; //16/ 5 Phys., lect. 2, §§8,9,10.
16) 8 Phys., lect. 4, §6. 17) 8 Phys., lect. 7, 10.
18) 8 Phys., lect. 13, §4.

Second, an infinite series of things moving and moved does not account for motion. It will be convenient to distinguish between two types of series, the vertical and the horizontal. The ~~veritcal~~ vertical series is concentrated at the instant: the will moves the hand, the hand moves the ~~cue~~ cue, the cue moves the ball. The Horizontal series is spread out in time: heat evaporates the water of the sea; lightness lifts the vapour to the air; condensation forms clouds; the wind carries them over the land; precipitation causes rain which fills the rivers flowing to the sea (19).

A vertical infinite series is no explanation, for a <u>movens motum</u> is an instrument, and an infinity of instruments with no one to use them results in nothing being done (20).

A horizontal infinite series is not self-~~explanation~~ explanatory. The necessary continuity of the process as a whole is not accounted for: it cannot be caused by any single mover within the process; it cannot be caused by all together, for all are not together (21).

It follows that one must posit an immovable mover outside the whole process (22). Since this mover is immovable, he can cause only one unchanging motion: for if he caused now this and now that, he himself would have to change; that is impossible, for he must be immovable (23). On the other hand, the <u>primum mobile</u>, moving perpetually and uniformly and so continually changing, accounts for the intermittent character of terrestrial motion. (24).

19) See 2 Meteor., cap. 2, §§5, 13, 17; cap. 3, §32. For the distinction between the two types of series: 2 dist. 1, q. 1, a. 5, <u>ad 5m 2a ser</u>. In Aristotle the distinction seems implicit.

20) 8 Phys., lect. 9. 21) ibid., lect. 12. The presupposition is that a single effect (a perpetual process) must have a cause that is one.

22) 8 Phys., lect. 12, 13. 23) 8 Phys., lect. 13, §§8, 9.

24) ibid. Cp. 12 Metaphys., lect. 6, Cathala §§2510 ss.; 2 de Gener., ~~index~~ text. 56.

Such is the Aristotelian theory of motion. Certain points are to be observed.

It attends to corporeal movements: change of place, of sensible quality, of size. These alone are actus exsistentis in potentia; those of the soul are actus exsistentis in actu (25). St. Thomas strictly observes this distinction and when he uses the broad sense of motion, he warns the reader (26).

Premotion consists in a change of either the mover or the mobile and the change envisaged is basically a local motion (27). This type of premotion is required just as much by the agens per intellectum as by the agens naturale (28).

The need of the first mover regards quite impartially the premotion and the motion: for each motion is the premotion of its successor. The function of the first mover is to account for the whole series (29).

Since the function of the celestial spheres (30) is established indirectly, there is no close definition of just what they do to be the causes of all terrestrial motions. All that is known is that they must be the causes of everything below the circle of the moon; what precisely they do is indeterminate and determined only by fancy (31). This involves a serious break in the chain of causality between the first mover and terrestrial corruption and generation.

25) Cp. De Anima, lib. 3, lect. 2.

26) E.g., la 2ae., q. 109, a. 1.

27) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §8.

28) ibid.

29) 8 Phys., lect. 12.

30) The eternal circular motion is the first motion. The implication of "first" is that it accounts for all other motion. But this is proved not by showing what the celestial spheres do, but by an a priori argument which involves the supposition that God cannot be a free agent.

31) Such fanciful determinations account for our epithets: saturnine, jovial, martial, mercurial, lunatic. Cp. 12 Metaphys., lect. 9, §2561.

That he was the author of the Liber de Causis has recently been established (32). In his later period St. Thomas wrote a commentary on this work, showing it to be by some Arab. Earlier in his life he refers to it as though it were written by Aristotle (33). This fact, combining with the influence of the pseudo-Dionysius and with the special attention of Aristotle to the material world, has probably not a little to do with the Thomist synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonist thought (34).

Al-Farabi's system is to collect the Platonic ideas into an absolute being and divide the rest of the world into higher and lower intelligences, higher and lower souls, higher and lower bodies (35).

He influenced St. Thomas, as far as we are concerned here, first by his theory of degrees of causality and second by his theory of divine activity in the universe (36). It will be more convenient to present his thought on these points when the occasion arises.

32)

33) Cp. St. Albert: 2 de Creaturis, q. 80, Borgnet 35, 649. For St. Thomas, see

34) See Bremond,

35) See Liber de Causis, prop. 3a, Mandonnet 1, 207 ff.

36) Prop., 1a, 20a., 31a. Vide inf.,

3.13 Avicenna's Hierarchy.

Avicenna combines a Plotinian emanationism with Aristotelian cosmic theory and Ptolemaic astronomy.

His basic principle is that from the One proceeds only the One. In other words, he evidently fails to ~~grasp the~~ elaborate the concept of God as an intellectual and free agent. His system may be outlined briefly, for it was through the Arabs that St. Thomas first knew Aristotle and their position had a notable influence upon the development of St. Thomas's conception of God moving the will.

Avicenna begins by positing the necessary being. This, being one, causes only one, viz., the first intelligence. The first intelligence knows both the necessary being and himself, and so is twofold; he accordingly causes the second intelligence and the first soul. The first soul, presumably from the potency of matter, receives the first body, which is the utmost and invisible celestial sphere discovered by Ptolemy. The second intelligence causes the third intelligence and the second soul, and this process continues till the number of celestial spheres is complete. The lowest of the intelligences is the <u>intellectus agens</u> which causes and dominates the terrestrial region (9).

9) Avicenna (Ibn Sînâ) 988 - 1035, born near Bokhâra, knew no Greek and used Syriac versions of Aristotle, influenced by Platonist Al-Farabi of Bagdad (ob. 949, 950). Because of Platonic element in his thought, he was favoured in the West more than Averroes. Though a syncretist, he is exceptionally brilliant at pure metaphysics. For the argument in which he evolves his hierarchic conception, see Compendium Metaphysices, Bk. I, Part IV, Tract. II, Cap. I and III. ~~Edit~~ Latin trans. by Nematallah Carame, Romae 1926, Pont. Inst. Orient. Stud.

§3.14 Hierarchy in St. Thomas.

First, St. Thomas has no need of the idea of hierarchy.

God is an agens per intellectum free to execute whatever he conceives. Again, God's activity is creative, productive of being and all its differences, and so can have no presuppositions of any kind (38).

Second, though St. Thomas does admit hierarchy, yet he makes notable reservations.

First, hierarchy does not regard esse but only fieri. The point is illustrated by the principle, sublata causa tollitur effectus. Take away the master builder, and the process of construction ceases. Suppose God not to be acting, and what is in process of construction is annihilated (39).

Second, the human soul is not a product of the world process but in each instance created by God. Accordingly, God alone acts directly on the human will (40).

Third, hierarchy in St. Thomas does not imply, as it does in Aristotle (41), any limitation of the universality of divine providence. God exerts an absolute and universal sway that descends to the least detail. None the less, this does not mean that the design of providence is not executed through the mediation of creatures. The execution of providence is a motion (42); motion is hierarchic (43); and so what divine

38) See 8 Phys., lect. 2. C. Gent., 2, 31 - 38.

39) 1 dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1; 1a., q. 104, a. 1; et passim.

40) 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 3; et passim.

41) 12 Mataphys., lect. 12.

42) .. gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante.. 1a., q. 103, a. 5, ad 2m.

43) 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2; De Ver., q. 5, a. 8, 9; C. Gent., 3: 77 - 79, 82, 91, 92; 1a., q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6; q. 110, a. 1; q. 115, a. 3; et passim.

providence conceives, is executed hierarchically not by direct divine intervention but through the hierarchy of angels, celestial spheres, and human wills. Accordingly, did God not control the will freedom of rational creatures, there would be no execution of divine providence in either the spiritual or the material world (44).

St. Thomas's admission of the influence of the heavenly bodies, that is, their causation of all material change in the terrestrial order (45), seems fundamentally to be a matter of yielding to authority (46) None the less, he advances the ordinary reasons. Arsit Aristotle's basic argument in 8 Phys., lect. 12, is accurately reproduced by oportet reducere omnem multitudinem in unitatem (47). The function of the heavens as the first cause of alteration (48) and as causa speciei (49) is defended on rather Platonic principles (50). Since this Platonism leads to a notable rigidity in St. Thomas's hierarchy - a rigidity that cannot be accounted for on purely Aristotelian grounds - something more must be said about it. To this we turn in the next section.

44) This is not only a deduction but also an explicit statement to be found in C. Gent., 3, 90. It is not retracted in later works.

45) Despite frequent assertions to this effect, none the less the angels act directly on terrestrial bodies in many ways: la., q. 110, a. 1, 2m.

46) 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2: To reject all celestial influence is omnino contra sensum et sanctorum auctoritates.

47) la., 115, a. 3; C. Gent., 3, 91; cp. ibid., 3, 82. De Ver q 5 a 8 (?)

48) Vide sup. notes 23, 24, 31.

49) The famous "homo generat hominem et sol."

50) Cp. C. Gent., 3, 82; la., 115, 3, 2m.; De Subst. Separ., 8, Mandonnet, 1, 107.

§3.2 Systematization of Hierarchy.

St. Thomas does some borrowing from the Platonists to systematize the Aristotelian hierarchy. It is of no little importance to grasp that this does not involve the introduction of more motions - in Platonist thought motion is caused by "soul" - though it does imply a greater rigidity of thought and a more emphatic manner of assertion.

For the Platonist, causation is a participation of the absolute idea. It follows that everything belonging to a given species must be caused by the idea: si esset forma ignis spe separata ut Platonici posuerunt esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis (51). The mere fact that a statue is a statue does not prove it to be the work of Michelangelo and not of Bernini; but it would prove it to be the work of the sculptor separatus, if there were one. Thus, this type of causation is of its nature necessarily universal, and necessarily occurs whenever an effect is of a given kind.

Now in the De Substantiis Separatis, after distinguishing between the causation of individuals in a species and of the species as such, St. Thomas writes:

> Relinquitur igitur quod operteret super omnes participantes naturam equinam esse aliquam universalem causam totius speciei. Quam quidem causam Platonici posuerunt speciem separatam a materia, ad modum quo omnium artificialium principium est forma artis non in materia exsistens. Secundum Aristotelem autem hanc universalem causam oportet ponere in aliquo caelestium corporum.. (52).

Here then the celestial bodies are universal causes on the analogy of the Platonic ideas. The superiority of Aristotle's position and its implication appears in the Pars Prima:

51) Ia., q. 115, a. 1, corp. post med.

52) De Subst. Separ., 8, Mand., 1, 107.

.. Platonici posuerunt species separatas secundum quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas consequuntur: sed hoc non videtur sufficere, quia species separatae semper eodem modo se habent, cum ponantur immobiles; et sic sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa ~~variation~~ corruptionem et generationem inferiorum corporum: quod patet esse falsum. Unde secundum Philosophum in 2 de Gener., text. 56, necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per suam absentiam et praesentiam causet ~~variationem~~ variietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum; et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat et movet ad speciem, est sicut instrumentum corporis caelestis, secundum quod dicitur in 2 Phys., text. 28, quod homo generat hominem et sol (53).

The student of the De Potentia will recall,

.. nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis (54).

But in the same passage we have asserted the principle,

Quanto aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior; et quanto est efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum (55).

This is Al-Farabi's first proposition (56) and simply derives from Porphyry's tree applied to a Platonic hierarchy. St. Thomas makes Proclus the author of the basic principle,

.. quanto virtus alicuius causae est perfectior, tanto ad plura se extendit (57),

and so we find in the Physics the following clear and full statement:

53) Ia., q. 115, a. 3, ad 2m. cf. De Ver., q. 5, a. 9. 54) De Pot., q, 3, a. 7. 55) ibid.

56) Mandonnet, 1, 193 - 200. 57) ibid., p. 198, post med.

Manifestum est enim quod quaelibet virtus extenditur ad aliqua secundum quod communicant in una ratione obiecti (58); et quanto ad plura extenditur, tanto oportet istam rationem esse communiorem; et cum virtus proportionatur obiecto secundum eius rationem, sequitur quod causa superior agat secundum formam magis universalem et minus contractam.

Et sic est considerare in ordine rerum (59): quia quanto aliqua sunt superiora in entibus, tanto habent formas minus contractas et magis dominantes super materiam quae coarctat virtutem formae. Unde et id quod est prius in causando, invenitur esse prius secundum rationem universalioris praedicationis; ut puta, si ignis est primum calefaciens (60), caelum non tantum est primum calefaciens sed primum alterans (61).

It is to be noted that this theorem reverses the logic of the cosmic hierarchy. Aristotle proceeded from the generation and corruption of the terrestrial cycle to the primum se movens. St. Thomas presupposing the universal causality of the heavens explains it by assigning the celestial agents a generic category of activity, alteration.

The significance of the generic category is not to be overlooked. Fire is the primum calefaciens; but nothing can be heated without being altered; therefore the activity of fire presupposes the activity of the heavenly bodies. There follow such brusque statements as,

> .. quantumcumque ignis habeat calorem perfectum, non alteraret nisi per motionem corporis caelestis (62).

58) ie the category of effects. 59) Application to cosmic hierarchy.
60) Cp. ignis caldissimus. 61) 2 Phys., lect. 6, §3.
62) la 2ae., q. 109, a. 1. Cp. De Pot., q. 5, a. 8; 2 De Coelo, lect. 4 # 13.

It is not to be inferred that this introduction of Platonist universal causes has added any precision to the conception of the action of the heavenly bodies on terrestrial causes. The idea of the first cause of alteration is present in the Contra Gentiles (63), but in the De Potentia, when it is asked whether the elements could act, were the heavenly spheres to stop, the answers to difficulties are as vague as one would expect. Fire is always hot and always determined to act; it is in contact with other elements; but also all the same, unless you presuppose the motion of the corpus caeleste, it cannot act (64). Such a conclusion could not be had from the argument in Aristotle's Physics.

The systematization of hierarchy, however inept when applied to the celestial spheres, results in very brilliant syncretic thought when applied to the summit of the hierarchy, God. In truth, God is a substantia separata and his substance is ipsum esse separatum and, as well, ipsum intelligere separatum.(65). That God is the cause of all being is established by the familiar argument,

> Oportet autem effectus proportionaliter causis respondere: ut scilicet effectus particularis causae particulari respondeat, effectus autem universalis causae universali.. (66).

and a few lines later,

> Quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto est universalior, et virtus eius ad plura se extendit. Sed id quod primum invenitur in unoquoque ente, maxime est commune omnibus.. (67)

which recalls

> .. secundum ordinem causarum esse ordinem effectuum, quod necesse est propter similitudinem effectus et causae.. Et propter hoc

63) C. Gent., 3, 82. 64) De Pot., q. 5, a. 8 and ad 1m, 5m. 6m. This article is very interesting from the view-point of the "intentio." For Al-Farabi on motion caused by soul, see Liber de Causis, prop. 3a., Mand., 1, 211. 65) De Subst. Separ., 12, Mand., 1, 112. 66) ibid., cap. 8, pp. 105, 6. 67) ibid., p. 106.

nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei (68).

A particularly brilliant statement of the idea that God is universal in knowledge, will and activity, I cannot refrain from copying,

.. ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile, cadat sub eius cognitione; et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum, cadat sub eius voluntate; sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens (69).

~~We may allow St. Thomas to write the summary of this section.~~ The meaning of the passage is accurately defined by its parallel in the De Substantiis Separatis where the universality of divine knowledge is proved from the premiss that God is ipsum intelligere separatum (70).

To conclude this section on systematic hierarchy, St. Thomas himself is most competent:

Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum gradus.

Est enim primo causa incorruptibilis et immutabilis. Sub hac secundo est causa incorruptibilis (71) sed mutabilis, scilicet,

68) De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7. The fact that St. Thomas also uses this argument to prove that God alone creates does not mean that this argument can prove nothing but creation and conservation. Fr. Stufler seems to slip into this error, Gott, der erste Beweger, pp. 67 - 83. However, he perhaps would not deny that God as head of the hierarchy of motion is the cause of all production of being under the title, universale principium essendi, and that this is distinct from conservation.

69) 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14, §16.

70) cap. 12, Mand., 1, 112. 71) The heavenly spheres are quintessential, and the only change they undergo is local motion which does not involve anything but change of extrinsic denomination. 3 Phys., lect. 5, §15.

corpus caeleste. Sub hac tertio sunt causae corruptibiles et mutabiles.

Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu exsistentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios fines effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.

Causa autem secundi gradus est quodammodo universalis et quadammodo particularis.

Particularis quidem quia se extendit ad aliquod genus entium determinatum, scilicet ad ea quae per motum in esse producuntur; est enim causa movens et mota.

Universalis autem quia non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium (72) se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.

Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis: eius enim effectus proprius est esse: unde quidquid est et quocumque modo est, sub causalitate et ordinatione illius causae proprie continetur (73).

72) Hence the sun is a causa aequivoca: horses generate horses and men men, but the sun does both and does so more than either.

73) In 6 Metaphys., lect. 3, Cathala §§1207 - 1209.

St. Thomas is always careful to point out that while providence takes into immediate consideration every detail, none the less the execution of providence is through the mediation of creatures (66). The angels are universal mediators (67), the heavenly bodies mediate between the angels and lower bodies (68). The exception, on earth, to the rule of the celestial spheres is the human will, which is under the triple influence of God, who alone acts immediately, of the angels and of the heavenly bodies (69).

Basically St. Thomas's cosmic hierarchy (70) is that of Aristotle's Physics. It will be well to cite a passage that makes this hierarchy particularly clear.

> Est Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum gradus. Est enim primo causa incorruptibilis et immutabilis, scilicet divina. Sub hac secundo est causa incorruptibilis sed mutabilis, scilicet corpus caeleste. Sub hac tertio sunt causae corruptibiles et mutabiles.
>
> Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu exsistentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.

66) De Ver., q. 5, a. 8, 9; C. Gent., 3, 77 - 79, 82, 91, 92; la., q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6; q. 110, a. 1; q. 115, a. 3.

67) De Ver., q. 5, a. 8; C. Gent., 3, 78; la., q. 110, a. 1.

68) De Ver., q. 5, a. 9; C. Gent., 3, 79; la., q. 115, a. 3.

69) C. Gent., 3, 91. Cp. De Malo, q. 3, a. 3: disponens, consilians, perficiens

Causa autem secundi gradus est quodammodo universalis et quodammodo particularis. Particularis quidem quia se extendit ad aliquod genus entium determinatum, scilicet ad ea quae per motum in esse producuntur; est enim causa movens et mota. Universalis autem quia non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.

Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis: eius enim effectus proprius est esse: unde quidquid est et quocumque modo est, sub causalitate et ordinatione illius causae proprie continetur (70).

Very little of this is not exactly Aristotle. The three caus levels of causes are plainly his: the immovable mover is the causa divina incorruptibilis et immutabilis; the corpus caeleste is again his. The argument that because the heavenly sphere is the primo motum therefore it is the cause of all other motions would seem to be a fair deduction from the eighth book of the Physics. The motion envisaged - alteration, corruption, generation - is exactly what he defined and scientifically elaborated. The only notable exception is to be found in the words *causalitate et ordinatione. Aristotle's first cause is, at least explicitly, only a final cause; and it does not pre-ordain the course of all events.

However, St. Thomas does intercalate the angels between the Absolute First and the heavenly spheres, as has already been noticed (71). His angelic hierarchy is based upon the pseudo-Dionysius; and its relation to the material world derives quite obviously from Avicenna's combination of Plotinian emanations with Aristotelian cosmic theory and Ptolemaic astronomy (72).

70) 6 Metaphys., lect. 3, Cathala §§1207 - 1209. 71) Vide sup. note 67.
72) See the convenient: Compendium Metaphysices, Carame, Rome, 1926.

Again, though the heavenly bodies are the causa essendi (73) and the causa speciei (74) of all earthy bodies, even in the elements (75), still they are only ~~elementary-ea~~ instruments of the substantiae separatae for the production of animal souls (76). Moreover the angels exercise a great deal of direct influence over terrestrial agents (77). None the less were the corpus caeleste to stop moving, all motion and activity on earth would cease (78).

§3.23 Limitation of the Idea of Hierarchy.

Though St. Thomas by his affirmation of the mediated execution of providential designs (79) and of a modified Aristotelian cosmic scheme (80) most certainly affirms a hierarchic universe, there is none the less a vast difference between his hierarchy and that of Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Proclus, Plotinus or Aristotle. Appealing to Avicenna he defines this difference in his earlist work:

> .. duplex est agens: scilicet, agens divinum quod est dans esse, et agens naturale quod est transmutans. Dico ergo quod primus modus actionis soli Deo convenit, sed secundus modus etiam aliis convenire potest. Et per modum istum dicendum est corpora caelestia causare generationem et corruptionem in inferioribus, in quantum motus eorum est causa omnium inferiorum mutationum (81).

Now, this activity of ~~kma~~ of God, dare esse, is not an operation that is performed once and for all:

> .. esse cuiuslibet rei et cuiuslibet partis eius est immediate a Deo, eo quod non ponimus, secundum fidem, aliquem

73) Ia., q. 104, a. 1, 2. 74) De subst. sep., cap. 8; De Pot., 3, 7.
75) 1 Meteor., lect. 4, §5. 76) Ia., q. 70, a. 3
77) Ia., q. 110, a. 1, ad 2m. Cp. De Occultis Operationibus Naturae.
78) De Pot., q. 5, a. 8; De Coelo, lib. 2, lect. 4, §13.
79) Vide sup. pp. 80) Vide sup. pp.
81) In 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2.

creare nisi Deum. Creare autem est dare esse. .. illud, quod est causa esse, non potest cessare ab operatione qua esse datur, quin ipsa res etiam esse cesset. Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, lib. I, Sufficientiae, cap. XI, haec est differentia inter agens divinum et agens naturale, quod agens naturale est tantum causa motus, et agens divinum est causa esse. Unde, juxta ipsum, qualibet causa efficiente remota, removetur effectus suus; et ideo remoto aedificatore, non tollitur esse domus, cuius causa est gravitas lapidum quae manet, sed fieri domus, cuius causa erat (aedificator). Et similiter, remota causa essendi, tollitur esse. Unde dicit Gregorius.. quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Unde oportet quod operatio ipsius qua dat esse non sit intercisa sed continua; unde dicitur Ioan. 5, 17, Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor (82).

From this it immediately follows that God is intimately present in every creature:

.. Deus est unicuique intimus, sicut esse proprium rei est intimum ipsi rei, quae nec incipere nec durare ~~potest~~ posset, nisi per operationem Dei.. (83).

82) In 1 dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1. Cp. C. Gent., 3, 65; De Pot., q. 5, a. 1; 1a., q. 104, a. 1. For the difference between this divine conservation and the conservation exercised by the heavenly spheres inasmuch as they continue moving, see De Pot., q. 5, a. 1, ad 7m.

83) In 1 dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1, corp. ad fin.

It is best not to confuse this creative activity with divine providence. Providence is not universally immediate; this creative activity is universally immediate. Were there no providence over angelic and human wills, there would not be any providence at all, for the will is the first in the chain of mediators (c. Gent., 3, 90). But ~~were there no~~ did not creative activity immediately sustain every being in every part, then that being would cease to exist.

§3.24 Development by Theorems.

Aristotle's cosmic scheme could be developed in two ways. First by the introduction of new elements into the scheme. Second by the elaboration of theorems for a profounder understanding of the scheme.

Between these two there is all the difference between discovering another planet or another continent, and discovering a natural law ~~of~~ or a principle. When Columbus discovered America, he discovered something concrete, distinct, palpable. When he discovered that one can make an egg stand on its end by breaking the shell, he did not discover either eggs or egg-shells or anything else concrete, distinct, palpable. He simply understood, got an idea.

So far we have been studying the simpler developments of the Aristotelian cosmic scheme that St. Thomas maintained. Aristotle's first mover is a final cause; St. Thomas's is also an efficient cause. Aristotle's universe contains a great deal of chance; St. Thomas's eliminates all chance. Aristotle does not concern himself with the creative activity of God; St. Thomas does and so cuts away from hierarchic causation a fundamental element. This sort of thing is easy to understand.

Now we have to consider an utterly different sort of development. In this case no new change is introduced, though a new idea is introduced. When Galilei discovered the ~~way-bodies-fall~~ law of falling bodies, he did not ~~change-the-way bodies-fall~~ discover that bodies fall. When Archimedes grasped the principle of work, he did not give the lever an efficacy or a power of work which it did not previously possess. Similarly, the theorems with which St. Thomas elaborates the Aristotelian cosmic scheme are simply theorems, intellectual elaborations, fuller expressions of what is latent or implicit. But they are not additions nor changes.

§3.4 The Pure Cosmic Theorem.

This theorem is one of the profoundest elements in St. Thomas's thought. In the opinion of the present writer, it provides basis for a ~~is the~~ solution of the metaphysical problems of the XVIth century. But of that later. The first step is to grasp the fundamental points. These are three: first, Aristotle's position; second, the formulation of Aristotle's position; third, St. Thomas's position.

§3.41 Aristotle's Position.

Aristotle's first mover can produce only one unchanging motion (96); he cannot but produce it, for he is simply the final cause, the object of the affections of the caelum animatum (97). Accordingly, Aristotle compares the universe to a household, in which the sons of the family (the celestial spheres) have their conduct mapped out for them, but the slaves and the domestic animals (all terrestrial beings) wander about pretty much as they please (98).

Plainly, this confronts St. Thomas with the famous problem, How precisely does divine providence exercise absolute sway over the world and the destinies of men?

§3.42 The Formulation of Aristotle's Position.

Unless Aristotle's position is formulated exactly in the categories of Aristotelian thought, there is no clue to St. Thomas's method and manner of correcting and transcending Aristotle. This necessitates a digression on the per se and the per accidens.

Speaking generally, the per se is what is so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the intelligible, the explanatory, the

96) 8 Phys., lect. 13, §§8, 9. Cp. 12 Metaphys., lect. 5 - 7.

97) 12 Metaphys., lect. 7. Cp. 8 Phys., lect. 2.

98) 12 Metaphys., lect. 12.

necessary. The per accidens is what is so without being so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the empirical, the to-be-explained, the merely contingent. A philosopher or a scientist is interested in the per se. A positivist is concerned with the per accidens, what merely happens to be.

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Aristotle is constantly ~~recurring~~ treating this distinction: he has to free science from the futility of the sophists (99). For him the per accidens is a metaphysical pariah. The ens per accidens is excluded from the company of the decem genera entis (100). It is not the object of any science whatever (101). It has no cause or explanation (102).

The stock example is the musicus albus, that is, the coincidence of unrelated predicates in the same subject.

Now the per accidens is the root of contingence. There has to be a cause of Socrates's being white. There has to be a cause of his musical ability. But there can be no cause (except a causa per accidens) of his being both white and a musician. The accidental coincidence of the effects is due to the accidental combination of causes. That accident to a previous accident, and so on indefinitely. No matter how far back the inquiry is carried, it is impossible to assign a causa per se for the combinations or the coincidences. Any causa per se is an unum per se; its effectus per se must also be an unum per se.(103). Since then the per accidens can have no causa per se, it cannot be necessitated: the necessity referred to is, of course, not the necessity

99) See any Aristotelian index. 100) 5 Metaphys., lect. 9.

101) 6 Metaphys., lect. 2; 11 Metaphys., lect. 8.

102) 6 Metaphys., lect. 3. 103) ibid.; cp. 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, 14.

104) 6 Metaphys., lect 2; 11 Metaphys., lect 8.

of violence but the necessity of the logico-metaphysical parallel that conceives objective necessity on the analogy of the syllogism (104).

So much for the distinction between per se and per accidens and the relation of the latter to contingence.

Aristotle's position, then, is this:

The first mover is necessitated, but the terrestrial order is contingent. Terrestrial laws are either contingens ut in minore parte or contingens ut in maiori parte. The former are the results of chance combinations of causes. The latter are the results of causae per se, but not necessary effects, for chance interference by other causes might prevent them (105).

Again, there is a causa per se for the perpetuity and continuity of the world process. But it regards this perpetuity and continuity as such. It does not regard the precise course of human and world history. That is an effectus per accidens (106).

§3.43 St. Thomas's Position.

No amount of guessing or a priori thinking would ever discover St. Thomas's position.

St. Thomas holds that God is an agens per intellectum; that an intellectual agent can apprehend and so intend any accidental coincidence or combination of causes, effects, or predicates; that, therefore, God is the causa per se of every event, every coincidence, every combination; finally, that though God knows infallibly, wills irresistibly, effects omnipotently every instance of the per accidens, none the less they are all contingent (107).

105) Cp. 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, §9 ad fin. 1a., q.115, a.6 ; 1a., q.116, a.1

106) See 8 Phys., lect. 12; 12 Metaphys., lect. 5, 6.

107) 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, 14; 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1a., 115, a. 6 together with 1a., 116, a. 1 - 3; C. Gent., 3: 72 -74, 86, 94. The distinction between contingent being and contingent event, though overlooked in C. Gent., 3, 72, is clearly made against Albumazar [illegible]

St. Thomas does not arrive at this position immediately. In the Sentences he is engaged in defining more fundamental ideas (108). Providence pertains to the practical intellect; it is the ~~work~~ thought of the artist designing the work he is to execute (109). According to the Christian's faith omnia providentiae subiacent (110). Predestination is predicated not of the predestined but of God predestining (111); it involves a good more than providence (112); it is certain that each person predestined will be saved (113).

The certitude of predestination is more fully considered in the De Veritate (114). There it is explicitly stated that predestination is certain not merely because of the certitude of God's foreknowledge but also because of the certitude of the aggregate of means God uses to obtain his end. A comparison between providence and predestination makes this clear. Prescinding, then, from the certitude of divine foreknowledge, we find that providence is certain in two different ways but uncertain in a third. First, it is certain with regard to the effects of necessary causes, for instance, the activity of the heavens. Second, it is certain with regard to the general rule of the effects of contingent causes: the process of terrestrial corruption and generation inevitably continues. Third, it is not certain with regard to particular cases within this process: nature fails now and then, but such failure is natural to contingent nature, and God ordains it to the general good. On the other hand, predestination is a certitudo ordinis and in particulari even though its finite causes are contingent. To reconcile the opposition between contingent cause and certain effect

108) Vide inf. pp.

109) In 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 1.

110) ibid., a. 2.

111) In i dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1.

112) ibid., a. 2. Predestination ~~xxx~~ adds to providence ~~x~~ chiefly propositum, praeparatio, et praescientia exitus.

113) In 1 dist. 40, q. 3. The emphasis is on foreknowledge apparently.

114) De. Ver., q. 6, a. 3.

St. Thomas urges that God gives so many aids to good action that either the predestined does not sin at all or, if he does, then he rises from his sin. Thus, though there is no certitude from the proximate cause, free will, there is certitude from the first cause, predestination (115).

In the philosophic Contra Gentiles the hitherto untreated question of the causal certitude of providence is raised. The main objection, exposed at length and accurately, is Aristotle's theory of contingence. The objection concludes with a trilemma: either every effect is not subject to providence; or, if there is providence, then its effects are contingent and so not certain; or, if providence is certain, then its effects are not contingent but necessitated (116). St. Thomas answers that the effects of providence are contingent and certain. His explanation is that what is first is the divine plan; therefore, since God is universal cause, there is no possibility of a coincidence, combination or interference except such as is ordained by the plan. Therefore divine providence cannot but be certain (117). The argument clearly establishes the certitude of providence; but how this leaves intact the contingence of a frost under Arcturus we may consider later (118).

In the Pars Prima the same position is again presented:

> .. praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae aliquis effectus ex evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua causa impediente (119); quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem... cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter

115) De. Ver., q. 6, a. 3. 116) C. Gent., 3, 94 Ostendit ..
117) ibid., Primo namque.. Note that this position gives certitude not merely of foreknowledge but also of causality, not only with regard to necessary causes but also with regard to particular contingent effects. 118) Vide inf. pp.
119) "causa impediens" points to Aristotle's theory of contingence.

totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis; sed ex hoc ipso quod ex aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae, qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eumdem ordinem relabitur secundum aliam causam (120).

So much then for the causal certitude of divine providence and the assertion, though not yet the explanation, of its compatibility with contingence.

43.432 If now attention is turned to the details of God's control over all events, what immediately comes to mind is the distinction between the possibility of created activity and its actuality. The existence of mover and moved gives merely the possibility of motion. For actual motion, as we have seen, there is required a previous motion or physical premotion. To avoid all confusion or obscurity on the exact nature of this premotion, let us cite St. Thomas himself.

Quies enim est privatio motus: privatio autem non inest susceptivo habitus vel formae nisi per aliquam causam. Erat ergo aliqua causa vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis (121) quare quies erat: ergo ea durante, semper quies remanebit. Si ergo aliquando movens incipiat movere, oportet quod illa causa quietis removeatur. Sed non potest removeri nisi per aliquem motum vel mutationem (122)

That states the principle with admirable clarity: if the mover now begins to move the mobile, there must be some previous motion or change produced in either the mover or the mobile.

Next, this is an universal law: it applies not merely to natural agents but also to rational agents. Motion requires besides mover and moved the right degree of proximity, the right disposition, the right situation, the right mutual relation:

120) 1a., q. 103, a. 7. Cp. q. 19, a. 6, ad 3m.

121) "Motivum" is to "movens" as "mobile" to "motum." Note the vel.. vel..

122) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §6 ad fin.

a premotion. The two theories are obviously complementary. Nothing can interfere with the divine plan, because to interfere it would need a premotion which can come, ultimately, only from the universal cause. On the other hand, God inasmuch as he is the first mover, is merely a causa per accidens of terrestrial events; ~~it/is~~ only inasmuch as he is a first mover that plans, does he differ from Aristotle's substantia separata and become the causa per se of ~~ex~~ each and every event.

Thus, providence is certain because of the need of premotion.

On the other hand, God is the causa per se of motion not because he moves but because he is a mover who plans.

The first point is ~~farily~~ fairly evident in the proof of the certitude of providence from the universality of divine causation: interference arises from a cause whose action has ultimately to be reduced to the first cause (131).

The second point is expressed in a general way as follows:

> Non est autem alicuius causa Deus, nisi sit intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere.. Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae. Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines (132).

But there are also more concrete expressions. Thus, in the Contra Gentiles,

> Quidquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo; applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias ~~actiones~~ operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis vel animae; primum autem principium utriusque motus

131) Ia., q. 103, a. 7.

132) De Subst. Sep., cap. 13, Nand 1, 1

From this it is clear that (A) motion presupposes premotion universally, (B) the premotion affects either the movens or the mobile and (C) the premotion consists in a change of mutual relation (habitudo) which may be either a change of distance (proximitas) or a change of disposition (dispositio).

#3.433 Now it may be asked whether St. Thomas had any special term to denote the change effected by the premotion. The following passage is illuminating:

> .. in potentiis irrationabilibus necesse est, quando passivum appropinquat activo, in illa dispositione qua passivum potest pati et activum potest agere, necesse est quod unum patiatur et alterum agat; ut patet quando combustibile applicatur igni (127).

This is exactly what was said above. But an ~~exapl~~ example is added and the term applicatio is used. It seems an excellent choice, for, like usus, applicatio simply means the intentional conjunction of two things (128). Further, just as the premotion affects indifferently either the mover or the moved, so St. Thomas speaks of the woodsman applying his axe to the tree (129) or of the cook applying the food to the fire (130).

#3.434 ~~So far we have been~~ The next question is whether or not St. Thomas saw the connection between his theory of providence and his theory of motion. According to his theory of providence all activity is according to the divine plan; and nothing can interfere with that plan, for God is universal cause and any interferences that do occur, only occur because they have been planned. According to the theory of motion the existence of mover and moved is alone insufficient; the two have to be brought together; they have to be given the right disposition; and this application requires

127) 9 Metaphys., lect. 4, §1818. The will is treated in the same place, and on the same principles. But it is more convenient to consider it separately. Vide inf. pp. Cp. the previous citation, second paragraph

128) Cp. De Ver., q. 17, a. 1; then 1a 2ae., q. 109, a. 1.

129) C. Gent., 3, 67. 130) De Pot., q. 3, a. 7.

§3.2 St. Thomas's Theory of Motion.

It consists of three elements: Aristotle's theory; developments of Aristotle's theory; modifications of Aristotle's theory.

~~Having made,~~
As Aristotle's theory has no possible relation to a theory of grace, it follows that developments of Aristotle's theory have no possible relevance. However, in this section we study simply the developments. The reason for this is obvious: unless one knows what is irrelevant, one will not know what ~~think that it~~ is relevant. To put the question in the concrete, to what extent does De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7 bear on St. Thomas's theory of grace? Is it a development of Aristotle or a modification of Aristotle?

Four points are treated: development in the idea of the first mover; development in the cosmic hierarchy; theorems regarding hierarchy; the operation of God in the operation of nature.

§3.21 Development in the Idea of the First Mover.

St. Thomas knows the first mover ~~and~~ as the Christian his God. ~~On this point~~ Between Aristotle's few vague remarks on the first mover and St. Thomas's idea of God there is an immeasurable abyss. We treat only the points that bear on the present issue.

First, God is the Absolute, ipsum esse, ipsum intelligere (48), and we might add ipsum amare.

Second, God is the unconditioned condition of everything.

> .. ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile, cadat sub eius cognitione; et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum, cadat sub eius voluntate; sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens (49).

48) De subst. separ., cap. 12 (Mandonnet), p. 115, 6.

49) Peri Herm., 1, lect. 14, §16.

Third, not only is God the fount of all reality, truth and goodness, but these proceed from him not by blind spontaneity but as from an intelligent agent.

Thus, there are two fundamental developments of Aristotle's thought.

Aristotle's first mover moves because he is the good, sought by all things (50). His causation is that of a final cause, the object loved by the coelum animatum (51). But St. Thomas's first mover is not only the final cause of all activity, but also the efficient cause of all activity but of all reality.

Again, Aristotle's first mover is no more than a causa per accidens of particular events. He moves the heavenly bodies and the alterating heavens continuously keep terrestrial activity from the death of entropy. There is a causa per se only of the world process as a process; there is no conceiving, intending, executing this world process complete in its every detail. Aristotle compares his universe to a well-ordered household, in which the conduct of the sons of the family is mapped out for them, but the slaves and the domestic animals wander about pretty much as they please (52).

But St. Thomas affirms divine providence and, indeed, as a matter of faith (53). God knows all, intends the good and permits the evil (54). Without providence the beneficence of nature would be mere chance (55): since then nature succeeds either always or for the most part, natural law is as much the effect of an intention as the movement of an arrow to its mark (56). Still, providence has different modes.

50) Cp. De Ver., 22, a. 1; la., q. 105, a. 5.

51) 12 Metaphys., lect. 7.

52) 12 Metaphys., lect. 12.

53) In 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 2.

54) ibid.

55) De Ver., q. 5, a. 2.

56) ibid.; cp. la., q. 103, a. 8.

Rational creatures are provided for on their own account; natural agents for the sake of the species (57). But all are directed to the final end, goodness itself, which is God (58).

Providence is the prudence of an artist: as the prudent man foresees, arranges, provides; as the artist conceives, intends, executes; so God is the prudent architect of the universe and everything in it (59). Not only does is God an artist in as much as he plans coincidences and combinations that lead to the end (60), but, in a profounder way, nature itself is his art. Sicut artifex se habet ad artificiata, ita Deus se habet ad naturalia (61).

57) De Ver., q. 5, a. 3, 5, 6; C. Gent., 3: 112, 113; etc.

58) De Ver., q. 5, a. 1; C. Gent., 2: 16 - 24; etc.

59) In 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 1; De Ver., q. 5, a. 1; C. Gent., 3, 94.

60) Omnia divinae providentiae subdantur. Passim.

61) Apparently based on the comparison of nature and art in the study of the Platonic idea: 7 Metaphys., lect. 5 - 8. On the principle that nature is God's art are explained: objective truth (1a., 16, 1), objective falsity (1a., 17, 1), the justice of God (1a., 21, 1), the eternal law (1a 2ae., 93, 1, 3m.), the natural law (1a 2ae, 91, 2), the law of irrational creatures (1a 2ae., 93, a, 4, 5), the causality of divine knowledge (1a., 14, 8), the identification of ratio gubernationis divinae with lex aeterna (1a 2ae., 91, 1; 1a, 22, 1), which is also providence (1a., 22, 3) extending as far as divine activity (1a., 22, 2) and divine finality (1a., 103, 5), that is, with absolute ~~finality~~ universality (1a., 19, 6; 103, 7).

In the passages cited the pivot of the explanation is in each case: Sicut artifex se habet ad artificiata, ita Deus ad naturalia.

But though St. Thomas pushes the idea of divine providence to the ultimate extreme, he none the less maintains the Aristotelian theory of contingence. The point is one of considerable importance (62).

The modern thinker derives his idea of determinism from the assumption of an initial situation (63) from which all else could, theoretically, be deduced, ~~were all the data known.~~ Aristotle supposed the world to be eternal and so had no premise for such a deduction. The first mover moves the heavens; the heavens prevent the entropy of terrestrial activity. It follows that motion is necessary, but not that this or that terrestrial motion is necessary. Natural laws hold not absolutely but <u>ut in maiori parte</u>; they are frustrated <u>in minori parte</u>; and this frustration is due to chance (63).

Now while St. Thomas admits that there can be no natural cause for the combination of ~~chance-effects~~ chance causes or the fortuitous coincidence of effects (64), he maintains that God knows, intends and brings about these products of chance ~~of~~ and fortune. Further, though God's foreknowledge is infallible, his will irresistible, his activity necessarily efficacious, none the less the effects of chance and fortune remain contingent (65).

62) It settles outstanding questions regarding <u>omnia applicat</u> and <u>scientia media</u>

63) 5 Metaphys., lect. 2, 3, 5, 9; 6 Metaphys., lect. 2, 3; 11 Met., lect 8.

64) C. Gent., 3: 86, 94; 1a., 115, 6; 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1 Peri Herm 14.

65) C. Gent., 3: 72, 86, 94; 1a., 116, 3; 6 Metaph., lect 3; 1 Peri Herm 14.

Scotus ridicules this position, Opus Oxon., 2 dist. 1, q. 3, n. 15.

There is no possibility of doubt that St. Thomas means exactly what he says. C. Gent., 3, 86 clearly distinguishes between "contingent being" and "contingent event" even though C. Gent., 3, 72 does not. 6 Metaphys., lect. 3 sets its problem in terms of the Aristotelian <u>per accidens</u> and then faces the problem of providence. 1 Peri Herm., lect. 14 first sets the problem of the <u>per accidens</u> joins to it the problem of free choice, and then argues that foreknowledge or divine will cannot necessitate.

§3.245 Theorem of Causation by Intellect.

The present theorem is distinctively the property of St. Thomas. A man of extreme intelligence, he very naturally would evolve a theorem of causation by intellect. Moreover, while Aristotle does not introduce the idea of providence, St. Thomas does. He does so on the ground that God is not an agens naturale but an agens per intellectum. It will be well to cite a notably explicit passage:

> Non est autem Deus alicuius causa Deus, nisi sit intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere.. Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae. Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines. Hoc autem providere est. Omnia igitur divinae providentiae subsunt (108).

How then does God move all things to their appointed ends by his intellect?

Let us recall the basis of the Aristotelian problem of motion. For motion there is needed besides mover and moved the precise situation in which motion takes place. To produce this situation a motion is needed. To produce that motion a prior situation. And so forth, backwards through the eternity of the past (109).

Next recall the Aristotelian solution to this problem. It is not providence that provides the continuous emergence of apt situations. It is the continuous round of the celestial spheres. They insure the perpetuity of terrestrial motion; they do not cause this or that motion. What is more they could not. For an apt situation requires the coincidence of different lines of causation: it needs the mover in the right place and the moved in the right place. In simpler terminology, the mover has to be applied to the moved, or the moved has to be applied to the mover. But the corpus caeleste cannot cause precisely this or that coindidence;

108) De Subst. Separ., cap. 13, Mandonnet 1, 121.

109) Vide sup. p.

it can merely keep things going on the chance that there will be some coincidence.

> .. sicut quod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generatur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem; et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium; sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. (110).

How then is it that either always or in maiori parte natural processes take place and succeed (111)? How is it that the tempering of humours which is life to the lion but death to a man (112) is regularly found in lions and rarely in men? Divine providence. God acts by his intellect. His mind and providential plan is the causa per se of the coincidences, the combinations, the situations, that make the difference between the mere existence of mover and moved and, on the other hand, actual motion.

Note that this is the real solution to Aristotle's problem of motion. Aristotle could not leave the world to chance; he needed a causa per se. On the other hand, his immovable mover could cause only one uniform eternal motion. He found in the heavenly bodies a causa per se of the world process as such. But the idea of providence had to be elaborated before a causa per se of each single event could be conceived.

To conclude, Aristotle's first mover is the causa per se of the world process as such, but only a causa per accidens of this particular world process. St. Thomas's first mover is the causa per se of the world process as such inasmuch as he moves; he is the causa per se of this particular world process in all its details because he is an agens per intellectum. Deus igitur per suum intellectum omnia movet ad proprios fines.

110) la., 115, 6; cp. C. Gent., 3, 92; 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1 Peri Herm 14.

111) De Ver., q. 5, a. 2; C. Gent., 3, 64 (Item, Probatum); la., q. 2, a. 3.

112) Example from 7 Phys., lect. 5, §6.

An objection may be considered. It will be said, perhaps, that the effects of chance and fortune arise only in minori parte. Therefore in maiori parte Aristotle has a causa per se of precisely what happens.

First, then, what actually does occur in minore parte could occur in maiore parte. Because of the exceptions the whole rule becomes contingent. The division is contingens ut in maiore parte and contingens ut in minore parte.

Next, why does the proper effect emerge in maiore parte? It will be said that this is the natural finality of the heavenly spheres and the terrestrial agents. True, but they are many. Being many, they interfere with one another in minori parte. Why do they not interfere in maiore parte and succeed only in minore parte?

To answer that question it is necessary to posit a still higher universal cause that is to nature itself as an artisan is to the product of his art. The natures of individual things cannot account for the order of the universe.

~~§3.246 Theorem of Immediatio Virtutis.~~

The theorem has two aspects, one logical, the other ontological. It will be well to begin from the latter aspect.

St. Albert followed Avicenna in distinguishing two kinds of virtus motiva: the first imperans, such as the will, the pars irascibilis, or the pars concupiscibilis; the second efficiens which is explained as

> .. infusa in nervis et musculis, contrahens chorda et ligamenta coniuncta membris, aut relaxans et extendens (113).

§3.5 Per Intellectum Agens.

In this section the characteristic product of St. Thomas's genius is considered. It is a master-piece in synthesis, and the foregoing sections of this chapter have been written merely to clear away the lumber that obscures ~~this~~ a magnificent structure.

Seven points are considered: first, the essential difference between St. Thomas and Aristotle; second, Aristotle's position; third, St. Thomas's position in relation to Aristotle's; fourth, the idea of application; fifth, the theorem of universal instrumentality; sixth, the nature of the virtus instrumentalis; seventh, the absolute value of St. Thomas's position.

§3.51 St. Thomas's First Mover.

In the De Substantiis Separatis one reads,

> Non est autem alicuius causa Deus, nisi sit intelligens, cum sua substantia sit suum intelligere... Unumquodque autem agit per modum suae substantiae. Deus igitur PER SUUM INTELLECTUM omnia MOVET ad proprios fines. Hoc autem providere est. Omnia igitur divinae providentiae subsunt (141).

In the opinion of the present writer, one misses one of the finest things in St. Thomas - and missing it, one misinterprets most of the rest of his writings - unless his affirmation that God moves all things by his intellect is seen to be of peculiar significance.

The point that God is per intellectum agens by itself ~~consit~~ constitutes the refutation and the practical elimination of the whole creaking mechanism of hierarchy. As has already been pointed out, ~~Hierarchy~~ this cosmic mechanism in Aristotle, in Plotinus, in Avicenna, is ~~simply and purely~~ little more than a blunder. They posit hierarchy, not because reality is hierarchic, but because they fail to conceive the liberty of an Absolute Being.

141) De Subst. Separ., cap. 13, Mand. 1, 121. Cp. cap. 12, pp. 115, 6.

Now one has only to glance through St. Thomas's Contra Gentiles to grasp the fundamental significance of the affirmation, Deus est per intellectum agens. In the first book chapters 63 to 96 on God's knowledge and will, in the second book chapters 1 to 45 on the emergence of creatures, in the third book chapters 1 to 63 on finality, and chapters 64 to 97 on providence, and chapters 111 to 146 on law, are but expansions of this basic truth in its essential opposition to pagan hierarchy. They form a vast but closely knit synthesis in which the central idea is the Christian idea of God transforming the philosophy of the Gentiles. If you would find St. Thomas in his keenest mood and his most brilliant mood, read in book two, chapters 31 to 38, the discussion of the Aristotle's position that the world must be eternal. But further, in the seventh book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle draws the parallel between nature and art: both act in the same way; briefly, both are the domination of matter by the intelligible (142). But turn now to the Summa Theologica and you find, cropping up all over, the profounder parallel: Sicut artifex est ad artificiata, ita Deus ad naturalia. The analogy of the artisan or artist or master-builder is the explanatory synthesis of the relations, for our thought, of the Absolute Truth, the Absolute Goodness, the Absolute Reality, whence all things come and whither they go. It explains objective truth (143) and objective falsity (144), the justice of God (145), the eternal law (146), the natural law (147) and the law of irrational creatures (148), the causality of divine knowledge (149), the identification of providence with the eternal law (150), a providence that extends as far as divine activity, and divine finality (151).

142) 7 Metaphys., lect. 5 - 8. 143) la., q. 16, a. 1. 144) ibid., q. 17, a. 1.
145) la., q. 21, a. 2. 146) la 2ae., q. 93, a. 1, ad 3m.
147) la 2ae., q. 91, a. 2. 148) la 2ae., q. 93, a. 4, 5.
149) la., q. 14, a. 8. 150) la 2ae., q. 91, a. 1; la., q. 22, a. 1.
151) la., q. 19, a. 6; q. 22, a. 2, 3; q. 103, a. 5, 7.

But not only did St. Thomas affirm God to be an intellectual agent and make this affirmation the basis of a Christian theory of providence, ~~and cosmic order~~ nature and cosmic order. The idea extends into the theory of motion itself, though to show how it does so necessitates a further exposition of Aristotelian thought.

§3.52 Aristotle and Divine Providence.

According to Aristotle the universe ~~is like~~ resembles a household. Like the sons of the family, the heavenly bodies have their conduct mapped out for them. Like the slaves and domestic animals, terrestrial beings wander about pretty much as they please (152).

It cannot but be so. The first mover can produce only one unchanging motion (153). He cannot but ~~de-se-~~ produce it, for he acts only as a final cause, as the object of the affections of the caelum animatum (154). Through the mediation of the wheeling heavens, he is the causa per se of the continuity and perpetuity of the terrestrial process (155), but it is one thing to guarantee the process as a process and quite another to determine what precise effects by what precise causes at what precise times emerge from the process (156). Aristotle's first mover attends to the former, to the process as such; he cannot attend to course of human or earthly history (157).

This general description of Aristotle's position must be given its technical formulation, else it will be impossible to see just how St. Thomas meets and transcends it. ~~Aristotle.~~

152) 12 Metaphys., lect. 12. 153) 8 Phys., lect. 13, §§8, 9; cp. 12 Metaphys. lect. 5 - 7. 154) 12 Metaphys., lect. 7; cp. 8 Phys., lect. 2.

155) 12 Metaphys., lect. 5; 8 Phys., lect. 12.

156) For the contrast, cp. 1a., q. 115, a. 6; 1a., q. 116, a. 1.

157) Vide sup. note 152, 153.

Scotus, then, thought ~~considered~~ it ridiculous ~~of~~ that Aristotle ~~to~~ consider"ed the first mover and the heavens necessitated and yet maintained ~~that~~ earthly events ~~are~~ to be contingent (158). Whether the reader chooses to agree with Scotus on this point or not is of no importance to the argument. But it is necessary to grasp Aristotle's reason for affirming contingence. This lies in his theory of the per se and the per accidens.

In general, the per se is what is so from the nature of the case: it is cognate to the intelligible, the explanatory, the necessary. On the other hand, the per accidens, to sumbebêkos, is what merely happens to be so: it is cognate to the empirical, the fact, the datum, the contingent. The essence of philosophy or of science is that it is concerned with the per se. The essence of positivism is that it is concerned with the per accidens: more accurately, positivism ~~is~~ per se is concerned with the per accidens and per accidens it is concerned with the per se.

Constantly Aristotle returns to this distinction, for he has to free science from the futility of the sophists (159).

Metaphysically, the ens per accidens ~~(160)~~ (160) is a pariah. It is excluded from the company of the decem genera entis (161). It has no cause and no explanation (162). It is not the object of any science, not even of metaphysics which treats everything (163).

158) E.g., Opus Oxon., 2 dist. 1, q. 3, n. 15.

159) Aristotle's scientific errors are not due, as many a vulgarisateur has proclaimed, to neglect of fact: he collected more facts than most scientists have. They are not due to his views on finality: the modern concept of evolution is simply a surreptitious and inarticulate return to the idea of finality. The great error of the Physics, the idea of alteration, is in violation of Aristotle's ~~his~~ own principle that the primum quoad se is not the primum quoad nos. By definition alteration is change of the sensibilia propria, so that a primum quoad nos is made of fundamental importance.

160 ~~159~~) See any Aristotelian index. 161) ~~6~~ 5 Metaphys., lect. ~~2~~ 9; ~~11, 16, 17, 8.~~

162) 6 Metaphys., lect. 3. 163) 6 Metaphys., lect. 2; 11 Met., lect. 8.

Since the ens per accidens has no cause it cannot be necessitated.

Take the stock example, the musicus albus, or any other coincidence of unrelated predicates in the same subject.

There has to be a cause of Socrates's whiteness. There has to be a cause of his musical ability. There can be no cause of the coincidence of both predicates in the same subject.

For the accidental coincidence of these effects is due to an accidental combination of causes. That accident to a previous accident. And this regression continues indefinitely, for the world is eternal. The, until recently, modern determinist might offer to explain the relation of the number of bald heads in Siam to the number of Aztec monuments in Peru by the simple process of deducing both from some initial world situation. Aristotle would deny that the relation was explanatory. That and not the negation of any initial situation is his real point. Because the two conclusions are disparate, the initial situation would have to contain disparate elements; and the disparate elements of the initial situation cannot constitute an intelligible first, a basis of explanation. The whole effort would merely reduce one instance of the per accidens to another instance which merely happens to be first in time (164).

~~Now any terrestrial cause may fail to produce its effect because of the interference of another cause~~

But though it is granted that the per accidens cannot be an object of scientific thought, what has that to do with contingence? The answer appears to be that Aristotle thinks of necessity in terms of the parallel of the real and logical orders. The necessity which he denies is not the necessity of violence but the necessity that is to be found in the syllogism. In other words, the per accidens is contingent

164) See 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, 14.

because it does not admit syllogistic treatment (165).

To carry the argument a stage further, terrestrial causes may fail to produce their effects because of the interference of other causes. The modern scientist speaks of the necessity of natural law; but his natural law is an abstraction; in the concrete he settles down to approximations and the theory of probability. Aristotle speaks simply of the concrete and so makes his division of contingens ut in maiori parte and contingens ut in minori parte. The former corresponds to natural law: heavy bodies fall, light ones rise. The latter covers the exceptions: heavy bodies are prevented from falling, light ones from rising. But whether or not the general rule is obeyed, the effect remains contingent: in any given case, what does take place might not have taken place (166).

This brings us back to the Aristotelian negation of providence. The heavenly spheres act under necessity. The world process as a process is necessary, for it has a causa per se. But terrestrial events are contingent. Nature works for the best, and, usually, succeeds; in any particular instance, she might fail; and so in all instances the result is contingent.

It follows that while Aristotle's first mover is a causa per se of the perpetuity and continuity of the world process, he is a causa per accidens of the actual course of world events. On Aristotelian principles, a causa per accidens is not a cause at all.

When, then, St. Thomas affirms God to be per intellectum agens and providence universal, he not merely affirms a divine attribute and divine governance of the world. He affirms a whole field of divine causality that Aristotle overlooked. Deus igitur per suum intellectum movet omnia ad proprios fines.(167).

165) 6 Metaphys,, lect. 2; 11 Metaphys., lect. 8.

166) Cp. 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, §9, ad fin.

167) De Subst. Separ., cap. 13, Mand. 1, 121.

§3.53 St. Thomas on Providence.

St. Thomas's theory of providence undergoes a brilliant development when confronted with the Aristotelian theory of the per accidens.

In the Sentences he is content to define fundamental ideas. Providence pertains to the practical intellect (168) like the thought of the artist designing the work he is to execute. According to the Christian faith omnia providentiae subiacent (169). Predestination is predicated formally not of the predestined but of God (170); it includes three elements, namely, propositum, praeparatio and praescientia exitus (171 It is certain that each person predestined will be saved (172).

In the De Veritate an important distinction is made between two kinds of certitude regarding the outcome of providential activity. There is the certitude that arises from foreknowledge. There is another that arises from causality. With regard to the former St. Thomas had already reached his definitive solution in the Sentences. With regard to the latter his thought is not yet fully developed.

Confining his attention to certitude based on causality, he distinguishes three kinds of certitude in the field of providence. There is certitude with regard to the effects of necessary causes, the heavenly bodies. There is certitude with regard to the general rule of contingent causes: God sees to it that the order of the universe is maintained, that nature attains its end in maiori parte (173). There is not certitude in particulari, for terrestrial causes are contingent.

Here St. Thomas does not yet see his way to reconciling the causal certitude of providence with the contingence of secondary causes. This is manifest from his theory on predestination. For he explains the causal certitude of the salvation of the elect on the ground that God gives so many graces, helps, occasions of doing right,

168) In 1 dist. 39, q. 2, a. 1. 169) ibid., a. 2.

170) In 1 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1. 171) ibid., a. 2. 172) ibid., q. 3, a.

173) We are discussing De Ver., q. 6, a. 3. Here see De Ver., q. 5, a. 2.

In the Contra Gentiles all this is transcended. Not merely predestination but providence is as well is causally certain with regard to every particular event. The responsibility of Aristotle for this development seems patent.

The main objection is devis derived from Aristotle's theory of contingence. This is exposed at some length and with considerable accuracy, though without the detail of later treatments (174). The conclusion from this theory is a trilemma against the causal certitude of providence:

Either every event is not a product of providence; or, if there is providence, its products are contingent and so not certain; or, if there is providence and it is certain, then its products are not contingent but necessitated.

The answer is that providence is certain while events remain contingent.

The reasoning is clear and cogent, provided the reader understands the Aristotelian position.

Contingence arises from the chance combinations and interferences of causes. But there are no causes except those produced by God and there are no combinations or interferences except those planned by God. Because God is the universal cause of being and because he is per intellectu agens, divine providence cannot but be causally certain (175).

174) Cp. 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1a., q. 115, a. 6; q. 116, a. 1; 1 Peri Herm., lect. 13, 14.

175) Contrast Scotus's view: God would not know the futura contingentia unless one posits what he calls concursus

Compare the argument of later theologians that unless you add a divine influence over and above what is metaphysically certain, God would not have absolute control of his universe. They do not put their argument in this precise form. But that is what it amounts to. However, note above all that they are thinking of the contingence of an act of free will, while St. Thomas is thinking primarily of the contingence of a frost in the dog days.

The metaphysical necessity of the causal certitude of providence is repeated throughout the Pars Prima.

.. praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua causa impediente; quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.. cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis; sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae, qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eumdem ordinem relabitur secundum aliam causam (176).

The reference to the causa impediens clearly makes this assertion the rejection of the Aristotelian negation of providence. If a nature fails to attain its end in any given case, that is only because of the interference of some other nature. But the action of the other nature has to be accounted for, and this action cannot be accounted for without referring ultimately to the universal cause of all reality. It follows rigourously that the causal certitude of divine providence is a metaphysical necessity.

It remains to be seen just what it is, exactly, that the universal cause does effect. This appears from the contrast between the specific universal cause, the heavenly spheres, and the absolute universal cause, God. On the former, one reads:

.. omne quod est per se habet causam; quod autem est per accidens non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae, ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens;

176) Ia., q. 103, a. 7; cp. Ia., q. 19, a. 6, ad 3m.; q. 22, a. 2, ad 1m.

unde talis concursus non habet causam inquantum est per accidens; et propter hoc id quod ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexsistentem ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aëris generetur et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem; et similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium; sed quod ignis cadens huic materiae ~~occurrat~~ occurrat, et comburat eam, non habet causam aliquod corpus caeleste, sed est per accidens (177).

Thus, though the heavenly spheres are the universal causes of all terrestrial change, their causality regards the terrestrial process as such. The virtutes caelestes account for this, and they account for that, but not for the coincidence of this and that, nor ~~for~~ for the consequents of the coincidence.

But ~~though~~ while the heavenly spheres do not explain coincidence, combination, interference, it remains that God is the causa per se even of the per accidens. For God is per intellectum agens.

.. id quod est per accidens non est proprie ens neque unum; omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum; unde impossibile est quod id, quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis; nulla ergo natura per se hoc facere potest, quod intendens fodere sepulchrum inveniat thesaurum. Manifestum est autem quod corpus caeleste agit per modum naturalis principii; unde et effectus eius in hoc mundo sunt naturales; impossibile est ergo quod aliqua virtus activa caelestis corporis sit causa eorum quae hic aguntur per accidens, sive a casu sive a fortuna. Et ideo dicendum est quod ea, quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus, sive in humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina, quia nihil prohibet, id quod est per accidens accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu. Alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem: fodiens

177) Ia., q. 115, a. 6. Cp. 6 Metaphys., lect. 3; 1 Peri Herm, lect. 13, 14

sepulchrum invenit thesaurum. Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere; sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulchrum. Et sic nihil prohibet ea, quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae per intellectum agat, et praecipue intellectum divinum... (178).

The foregoing meets Aristotle on his own ground. Natural science cannot make a combination of disparate elements a first principle; theology can make an intellectual apprehension of the disparate a first principle. It is to be noted, however, that providence is not confined to the effects of change and fortune. Its principal object is what occurs ut in pluribus, the constant order of the universe. Plainly, if nature can be interfered in any instance nature can be defeated by interference, then all the success of nature is contingent. The tempering of humours that is life to the lion is death to a man; that such a temperament should regularly be found in lions, rarely in men, cannot be explained by natural causes. There has to be a reason why what sometimes interferes does not always interfere. Nothing less than the absolute cause can explain nature's normal success.

So much for the metaphysical necessity of the causal certitude of Providence. It is posited in answer to the Aristotelian theory of contingence. How contingence really and truly remains, is a matter for further study (179). But concerns us for the present is this: God, because he acts by intellect, is the causa per se of each particular event; in this respect, he differs from the Aristotelian first mover which is a causa per se of the world process as such but not of world history. In the next section, further details of St. Thomas's thought are examined.

178) la., q. 116, a. 1; cp. in 1 Peri Herm., lect 14, §§15, 16.

179) Vide inf. pp.

There is no difficulty in determining what precisely St. Thomas means by the term applicatio.

In the De Veritate (180) the nature of conscience is discussed. Is it a potency or a habit or an act? The answer is that it is an act, the application of knowledge to something. Apply knowledge to what is or was, and there is conscientia in the sense of consciousness. Apply knowledge to what ought to have been, and conscience is said to be remorse. Apply knowledge to what ought to be, and conscience is said to warn. It appears quite clearly that applicatio consists in the conjunction of two things and that it is an aspect of usus.

Turning to the field of the theory of motion, one finds applicatio used four times, usus once.

In the Contra Gentiles the cook applies the meat to the fire; in other words, he makes use of the fire to cook the meat. In the De Potentia and the Pars Prima the artisan applies his axe to cutting; which does not notably differ from using the axe to cut. In the Prima Secundae it is asserted that any usus involves some motion and so is impossible without the first mover (181). Finally, in a passage in the Commentary on the Metaphysics there is a passage exactly parallel to the proof of physical premotion in the Physics, namely,

> .. in potentiis irrationalibus (182) necesse est, quando passivum appropinquat activo, in illa dispositione qua passivum potest pati et activum potest agere, necesse est quod unum patiatur et alterum agat; ut patet, quando combustibile applicatur igni. (183).

The use of applicatio here is exactly the same as in the foregoing instances. It follows that the term is used by St. Thomas to denote physical premotion. There remains only two questions: first, what is physical premotion; second, is physical premotion what is meant in the well-known passages of the Contra Gentiles, De Potentia, Pars

180) De Ver., q. 17, a. 1. 181) C. Gent., 3, 67; De Pot., q. 3, a. 7; Ia., q. 105, a. 5; IIa IIae., q. 109, a. 1. 182) On rational activity see fourth chapter. 183) 9 Metaphys. lect. 4 Cath. §1818.

Prima, and Prima Secundae. As the answer to the second question will be clearly affirmative, there need be no inquiry into other possible meanings of the term applicatio.

First, then, what is physical premotion?

In proving the eternity of motion Aristotle points out that the existence of mover and moved accounts solely for the possibility of motion but not for its actuality. The matter is not of any great difficulty. The jungle is hot enough to melt any iceberg. There are endless icebergs in the Arctic seas. But ~~the heat of the jungle~~ the existence of the jungle and of the icebergs will not necessarily result in the corruption of the latter. This simple truth is universalised as follows. Any given motion either is eternal or it is not. If eternal, then motion is eternal in that instance. If not eternal, then it began to be. If it began to be, then there must be a reason why it did not exist previously yet does exist now. That reason can be only first the absence and then the presence some other motion. With regard to that other motion, the question returns. There follows an infinite regression. Thus, whether or not particular motions are eternal, motion itself must be eternal. The essential point is presented as follows by St. Thomas:

> Quies enim est privatio motus. Privatio autem non inest susceptivo formae vel habitus nisi per aliquam causam. Erat ergo aliqua causa vel ex parte motivi vel ex parte mobilis (184) quare quies erat. Ergo ea durante semper quies remanebit. Si ergo aliquando movens incipiat movere, oportet quod illa causa quietis removeatur. Sed non potest removere nisi per aliquem ~~causam~~ motum vel mutationem (185).

Let us term this previous motion or change that makes the difference between possible and actual motion, a physical premotion. As appears from the following passage, which is somewhat more detailed, physical premotion is necessary not merely for the emergence of natural motions but also for the motions of intellectual agents:

184) Because it makes no difference whether the premotion affects the mover or the moved, sometimes the transition from otium to actus is a change in the mover, sometimes it is not. Vide sup. pp.

185) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §6, ad fin.

Dicit ergo (Aristoteles) quod ex quo ita est, quod simili modo se habet in iis quae agunt secundum naturam et secundum intellectum, possumus universaliter de omnibus (~~123~~) 186 loquentes dicere, quod quaecumque sunt possibilia facere aut pati aut movere ~~aut~~ vel moveri, non penitus possibilia sunt: id est, non possunt movere aut moveri in quacumque dispositione se habeant; sed prout se habent in aliqua determinata habitudine et propinquitate ad invicem.

Et hoc concludit ex praemissis, quia iam dictum est, quod tam in agentibus secundum naturam quam in agentibus secundum voluntatem non est aliquid causa diversorum nisi in aliqua alia habitudine se habens. Et sic oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum moveat et aliud moveatur, necesse sit hoc movere et illud moveri (~~124~~ 187).

Si ergo non semper erat motus, manifestum est quod non se habebant in ista habitudine ut tunc unum moveret et aliud moveretur; sed se habebant sicut non possibilia tunc movere et moveri. Postmodum autem se habent in ista ~~dispositione~~ habitudine ut unum moveat et aliud moveatur. Ergo necesse est quod alterum eorum mutetur (~~125~~ 188).

Hoc enim videmus accidere in omnibus quae dicuntur ad aliquid, quod numquam venit nova habitudo, nisi per mutationem utriusque vel alterius: sicut si aliquid, cum prius non esset duplum, nunc factum est duplum, etsi non mutetur utrumque extremorum, saltem oportet quod alterum mutetur. Et sic si de novo adveniat habitudo per quam aliquid moveat et aliud moveatur, oportet vel utrumque vel alterum moveri prius (~~126~~ 189).

~~125~~ 186) Though Aristotle makes no exception for the first mover, St. Thomas very neatly does. Since God is not in time, one cannot ask why he did not act previously: "before time" is meaningless. Cp. C. Gent., 2, 31 - 38; 8 Phys., lect. 2, §§18 -20; 12 Metaphys., lect. 5, Cath. §2498, 9.

~~124~~ 187) Cp. 9 Metaphys., lect. 4, Cath. §§1818ss. ~~126~~ 188) "mutatum sit" ?

~~126~~ 189) 8 Phys., lect. 2, §8.

It will be well to review the foregoing paragraph by paragraph.

In the first paragraph there is the distinction between the possibility of motion and its actuality. What makes the difference is the precise dispositio, propinquitas, habitudo of the mover and the moved.

In the second paragraph the doctrine is asserted to be true of both natural and rational agents. When the requisite dispositio or propinquitas is had, motion must follow. It is this paragraph that is exactly parallel to the already cited passage in the Metaphysics on applicatio.

In the third paragraph the doctrine is applied to any case of intermittent motion. The necessity of a physical premotion to account for the intermittence is deduced. However, it makes no difference whether the premotion affects the mover or the moved. What counts is the relation between the two. This is obvious: to melt an iceberg one may either move it down to the equator or tilt the earth's axis so that the equator passes through the poles.

In the fourth paragraph St. Thomas insists on the fact that premotion is given either to the mover or the moved. In any case of relation, the relation is changed by changing either of its terms. The one thing necessary is some previous change, but that is absolutely necessary.

This, I think, should settle the very disputed question of physical premotion. Though for some centuries people have argued at length on ~~the point~~ St. Thomas's meaning, still even the most combative should be willing to yield to St. Thomas himself on the matter.

It remains to be seen whether or not St. Thomas refers to physical premotion when he uses the term applicatio. ~~Ex~~ The passage in his earliest expression of this theorem is as follows:

> Quidquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum dicitur esse causa illius actionis; artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad

operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo; applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias actiones operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis vel animae; primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus; est enim primum movens omnino immobile ut supra (1, 13) ostensum est (190).

Here it is argued that anyone applying an active principle to its action or operation is said to be the cause of that action or operation. The cook cooks the dinner, not because he heats the meat for the fire does that, but because he puts the meat on the fire. Obviously, if he left the meat on the board, it would not be cooked; not even if he had a roaring fire in his stove. It would seem that application here means physical premotion. Further, God is said to apply all things because he is the immovable mover, the source of all motion. If then God is the first agent, the one who primo et principaliter omnia applicat, because he is the first mover, it follows that application has to be a motion. Finally, the motion God causes is the physical premotion the cook gives the food that it be cooked. Nothing more follows from the assertion that God is the first mover, as that is proved in chapter 13 of book 1. Nor is anything more here asserted: God is not said to give the cook or the fire any other application than that of physical premotion, for what he does is attributed to him not exclusively but primo et principaliter. There is no need to seek any further interpretation of the passage, unless, of course, one has committed oneself to some blunder and is out to defend the blunder at all costs.

Turn to the De Potentia.

Sed quia nulla res per se ipsam movet vel agit nisi sit movens non motum, tertio modo dicitur una res esse causa actionis alterius in quantum movet eam ad agendum; in quo non intelligitur collatio aut conservatio virtutis activae, sed applicatio virtutis ad actionem; sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli ex hoc ipsum quod applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum movendo ipsum.

190) C. Gent., 3, 67.

Et quia inferior agens non agit nisi mota, eo quod huiusmodi corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata; caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum, et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum; sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum (191).

In this passage the first paragraph explains the nature of applicatio while the second demonstrates (sequitur de necessitate) that God is the cause of all activity inasmuch as he moves and applies all active principles.

There is nothing in the first paragraph to exclude from applicatio the meaning of physical premotion. The applicatio is not the creation or the conservation of the virtus activa. Neither is physical premotion. The applicatio is the result of motion; but the need of physical premotion is not for its own sake but for the sake of its result, namely, the right proximity, disposition, relation of mover and moved. Finally, to use a knife to cut is an instance of applicatio. But inasmuch as the knife is moved to what is to be cut (or vice versa), there is need of physical premotion. In fact the parallel between the two is so striking that one wonders why theologians have been drawing on their imaginations for centuries instead of reading St. Thomas's account of physical premotion in 8 Phys., lect. 2. The work has ~~been published~~ not lain in the manuscripts all these years. It has been, I believe, published.

But not only does the first paragraph leave physical premotion as a possible meaning of applicatio. The second paragraph excludes all other meanings.

Observe, the second paragraph is an argument, a demonstration. Because terrestrial bodies are alterantia alterata and celestial bodies, if alterantia non alterata, none the less are moventia mota,

191) De Pot., q. 3, a. 7.

and this transmission of motion does not cease till one comes to the first mover, God, for this reason it is necessary that God moves and applies every active principle.

~~No-interpretation-of-the-passage-need-be-considered~~

To offer an interpretation of this passage and overlook the fact that it is a demonstration, that St. Thomas explicitly states sequitur ex necessitate, is sheer nonsense. Either St. Thomas means what he says, or there is no possibility of determining what he means. What, then, is the demonstrative force of the argument?

First, ~~than~~ Aristotelian physics recognises three types of motion and demonstrates that there are only these three: change of place, change of sensible quality and change of size (192). The second of these ~~kinds-of~~ types of motion, change of sensible quality, alteration, is very much in evidence in the passage. First we are told that corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata. Then we are told that caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum.

What does the first of these expressions mean: corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata?

They are alterantia inasmuch as they produce change of sensible quality, change heavy to light, hot to cold, wet to dry, black to white, bitter to sweet, hard to soft, rough to smooth. That is the defined meaning of alteration. It is the only meaning (193).

They are alterata because the heavens act upon them. In the spring when the sun is near the earth, all things flourish. In the autumn when it recedes, all wither away (194). This is an essential point in the Aristotelian hierarchy: because the heavens are in different places at different times they can cause intermittent motion, the quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur, of the terrestrial process (195).

192) 5 Phys., lect. 2 - 4; 11 Metaphys., lect. 12.

193) 7 Phys., lect. 4, 5. 194) 12 Metaphys., lect. 6, Cath. §2511.

195) 8 Phys., lect. 13, §§8, 9; 12 Metaphys., lect. 6; 2 de Gener., text. 56

What does the second expression mean: caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum?

It is movens because it is alterans. It is alterans because it is the primum mobile, the cause of all other motion and change. As is demonstrated in the Physics, the first motion is necessarily a circular local motion (196). Here "first" means "presupposed by all other motion." As St. Thomas describes it,

> .. non ad unam tantum speciem mobilium se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad omnia quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est primo motum oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium (197).

Though alterans, it is non alteratum. For the heavens are quintessential. They have a different materia prima which is in potency not to contraries but ad unum tantum. It is impossible that they should suffer any change, except the change of extrinsic denomination that is involved in local motion. For alteration is from one contrary to another, but the heavens are neither hot nor cold, wet nor dry, heavy nor light, sweet nor bitter, but aliquid eminentius (198).

But if the heavens are non alteratum, none the less they are motum. Any cause of alteration must be moved locally. This is demonstrated in the Physics as follows:

> .. ante omnem alterationem praecedit motus localis. Quia si aliquid alteratur, necesse est quod sit aliquid alterans, quod potentia calidum faciat actu calidum. Si autem hoc alterans semper sit eodem modo propinquum in eadem distantia ad alteratum, non magis faceret calidum nunc quam prius. Manifestum est ergo quod movens in alteratione non similiter distat ab eo quod alteratur, sed aliquando est propinquius, aliquando remotius; quod non potest esse contingere sine loci mutatione(19

196) 8 Phys., lect. 14 - 20. 197) 6 Metaphys., lect. 3, Cath. §1208.

198) De Caelo et Mundo, passim.

199) 8 Phys., lect. 14, §3.

Alteration then presupposes change of place. The heavens are causes of alteration. Therefore they must be moved locally. Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur. ... et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum.

The premiss of the argument is simply a statement of the Aristotelian cosmic hierarchy. It is not a point to be debated; the matter cannot but be an absolute certainty.

What then is the connection between the premiss and the conclusion? How can St. Thomas say:

> sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.

One has only to ask another question, What is the connection between the Aristotelian cosmic theory and the world of experience? What is the fact Aristotle is trying to explain? We have already shown it to be the fact of intermittent motion, the quandoque movetur, quandoque non movetur. The whole structure is raised to explain that fact. But what is the immediate mechanism of the quandoque movetur? What makes the difference between the possibility of motion and the actuality of motion? It has been shown to be physical premotion in Aristotle's and St. Thomas's and not Bañez's sense of the term. It has also been shown that applicatio is a technical term used by St. Thomas to denote physical premotion. I submit the conclusion to be obvious.

If Aristotle's first mover does not apply all things to their activities, St. Thomas's does: he is per intellectum agens.

In the sense assigned, that God moves and applies all things because he is the intelligent and free first mover of the Aristotelian hierarchy, and in no other sense, is it true to say,

> .. sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.

Q.E.D.

§3.55 Universal Instrumentality.

The idea of instrumentality in St. Thomas cannot be understood without a preliminary consideration of the idea of causality.

There are basically two conditions of causality: act and proportion.

The cause must be actu: omne agens agit quatenus est actu.

But this alone is not enough; otherwise anything could produce anything else. There must also be proportion between the cause and the effect; four modes in which such proportion or similarity may be attained are enumerated.

.. alio modo per sui similitudinem, secundum quod causa producit effectum sibi similem; et hoc contingit quattuor modis.

Uno modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale et secundum eamdem rationem, sicut est in effectibus univocis; per quem modum potest dici quod calor aeris est in igne calefaciente.

Secundo quando similitudo effectus est in causa secundum esse naturale, sed non secundum eamdem rationem, sicut patet in effectibus aequivocis, per quem modum calor aeris est in sole (202).

Tertio modo quando similitudo effectus est in causa non secundum esse naturale sed spirituale, tamen quietum, sicut similitudines artificiatorum sunt in mente artificis; forma enim domus in aedificatore non est natura quaedam, sicut virtus calefactiva in sole vel calor in igne; sed est intentio quaedam intelligibilis in anima quiescens.

Quarto modo quando similitudo effectus non secundum eamdem rationem, nec ut natura quaedam, nec ut quiescens, sed per modum cuiusdam defluxus est in causa; sicut similitudines effectuum sunt in instrumentis, quibus mediantibus defluunt formae a causis principalibus in effectus (203)

202) The point is that the sun is not hot. The heavenly bodies are quintessential, neither hot nor cold, heavy nor light, wet nor dry, but aliquid eminentius. Hence they are the cause of all natural species and not merely of this or that one; they are causae aequivocae. On the other hand terrestrial agents are causae univocae. 203) De Ver., q. 27, a. 7.

To become an apostle of the obvious and repeat what has just been said, a cause may be proportionate to its effect in four ways. The first two regard natural agents. The third regards intellectual agents. The fourth regards instruments in the strict sense of that term.

Natural agents are proportionate to their effects in virtue of their forms. Thus, heat causes heat, cold cold, wetness wetness, plants plants, horses horses. Similarly, the sun causes heat, cold, wetness, plants and horses, and it does so in virtue of its form; but still it is neither hot, cold, wet, a plant or a horse, but something more eminent than all these.

Intellectual agents are proportionate to their effects in virtue of their ideas. The house-builder is proportionate to his effect, houses. But he is not a house, either naturally or eminently. He merely has in his head the idea of a house.

Finally, instruments in the strict sense are proportionate to their effects, for instance, this typewriter is proportionate to this study of St. Thomas. But the proportion of the instrument is not that of a natural form: a typewriter is not a book. It is not that of a more eminent form: a typewriter does not enjoy the marvellous properties of the celestial spheres. It is not that of an intellectual agent: a typewriter does not think. Still there is some similarity, some proportion between the flow of instrumental movements and the effect produced; in the case of the typewriter the pattern in which the letters appear on the pages is identical with the pattern in which the keys of the typewriter are moved. To write out "qwertyuiop," one must strike in succession q, w, e, r, t, y, u, i, o, p. The similarity of the typewriter to "qwertyuiop" arises solely from given instrumental movements taking place in a given order.

After this elaboration of the obvious, it is possible to proceed to the distinction between instruments in the broad sense and instruments in the strict sense.

In the broad sense any movens motum whatever is an instrument. Thus, the moon in reflecting the light of the sun is the instrument of the sun in illuminating the earth.

In the strict sense not every movens motum is an instrument, but only such as is proportionate to its effect in virtue of a similarity per modum cuiusdam defluxus. Thus, the moon reflecting the light of the sun to illuminate the earth is not an instrument. The reason is that the moon is actually bright, it has in it the natural form of light, the esse naturale of light. But the carpenter's saw used in making a desk is strictly an instrument: for at no time nor in any way is the saw a desk, except per modum cuiusdam defluxus (204).

According to St. Thomas all creatures are instruments.

First, they are instruments in the broad sense. They are all moventia mota. This follows automatically from Aristotle's cosmic hierarchy (205).

Second, they are instruments in the strict sense. This follows automatically from the Platonist systematization of Aristotle's cosmic hierarchy. God alone is naturally proportionate to the production of being, for he alone is by nature. The heavenly bodies alone are naturally proportionate to the production of species qua species, for if the terrestrial agent were the cause of its own species, it would be the cause of itself (206). Since, then, other agents are not naturally proportionate to the production of being or of species, it remains that they are merely instrumentally proportionate, and therefore they are instruments in the strict sense.

204) De Ver., q. 27, a. 4 elaborates this point.

205) Read 8 Phys., lect. 9, §5. The remark, non quilibet consideraret secundum movens esse instrumentum primi, is very apposite.

206) Cp. De Subst. Separ., cap. 8, Mand. 1, 107.

§3.56 Virtus Instrumentalis.

There will be no need to ~~make~~ investigate the whole of St. Thomas's theory of instrumentality: for those who wish to do so, some indication of the sources for such a study is given (§3.561). Our aim is merely to determine the precise nature of the intentio of De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m., ~~This-determination-The-argument-is-extremely-simple~~ and the and the argument will be extremely simple. First (§3.562), it will be shown that St. Thomas frequently conceives the virtus instrumentalis as something from the mind of the artist and in the instruments. Second (§3.563), it will be shown ~~that~~ precisely what St. Thomas ~~conceie~~ conceives to proceed from the mind of the divine artist and to exist in the universe of his instruments. Thus, there will be three brief sections: sources, principles, parallels.

§3.561 Sources.

There are five lines of investigation: the theory of the generation of animals; the theory of light and colour; the theory of the sacraments; miscellaneous items; and the theory of the limitation of instrumental causality.

The theory of the generation of animals is the fundamental source. Practically all the elements in St. Thomas's thought are to be found in Aristotle's De Generatione Animalium 1, 21 - 2, 5. After reading this see St. Albert on the same subject in 2 de Creaturis, q. 17, a. 3, Borgnet 35, 154ss. In St. Thomas the main passages are 2 dist. 18, q. 2, a. 1; C. Gent., 2, 86; De Pot., ~~qx~~. 3, aa. 11, 12; 7 Metaphys., lect. 6 - 8; and 1a., q. 118, a. 1. Observe that in the earlier passages St. Thomas differs notably from Aristotle while in the Pars Prima reproduces a number of elements right out of Aristotle. With regard to Aristotle's automatic puppets, see Farquharson's note, De Motu Animalium 701^{b} 4, in the series of Oxford Translations.

On the theory of light and colour, see St. Albert, 2 de Creaturis, q. 21, a. 5, Borgnet 35, 205ss. Then, in St. Thomas, 2 dist. 13, q. 1, a. 3; 2 dist. 19, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1m.; De Pot., q. 5, a. 8; 1a., q. 67, a. 4; 2 de Anima, lect. 14. Observe that the intentio can never produce any effect except as a perception; the same is true of the esse spirituale that supplants the intentio in all later works. On the nature of immateriality, intentionality, spirituality see 1a., q. 14, a. 1 and parallel passages. Relative to the vis spiritualis in voce of 3a., q. 62, a. 4, see just what the teacher does in 1a., q. 117, a. 1 and parallel passages. Finally, observe the negation of the existence of any intentio in the instrument in 3a., q. 64, a. 8, ad 1m.

On the theory of the sacraments there are, 4 dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2 and qc. 4; De Ver., q. 27, aa. 4 and 7; 1a., q. 43, a. 6, ad 4m.; 3a., q. 62, aa. 1, 3, and 4; q. 63, a. 4. On the problem of reconciling this theory with the flat assertions of limited instrumentality, study Cajetan's interpretation of St. Thomas ~~(intentional causality)~~ in his commentaries on 3a., q. 62, a. 4 and q. 78, a. 4. For a clear and cogent exposition of Cajetan, see De San, De Deo Uno, 1: 719, 720 in note.

The principal miscellaneous items are the opusculum, De Occultis Operationibus Naturae; the account of prophecy 2a 2ae., q. 171, a. 2; the instrumentality of the heavenly spheres in 2 dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2, and 1a., q. 70, a. 3 with ad 3m., 4m., 5m., and the numerous parallel passages; all the passages that make the accidental form the instrument of the substantial form, e.g., 1a., q. 115, a. 1, ad 5m, or the lower faculties the instrument of the higher faculties; the always interesting De Pot., q. 5, a. 8. On intentio in general see H.D.Simonin, Rev. sc. phil. theol., 19 (1930) 445 - 463.

Finally, instrumental causality is not unlimited. In proving that a creature cannot create even as an instrument, St. Thomas argues that an instrument merely serves to dispose the ~~matter-for-the-reception-of~~ recipient of the effect of the principal effect: see 1a., q. 45, a. 5. Again, to show that the

human soul has to be created, he maintains that there cannot be a virtus activa for the production of a spiritual effect in a material subject: see la., q. 118, a. 2.

§3.562 Principles.

Anyone who is interested enough in St. Thomas's thought to read through the foregoing will be certain of this: there is no simple and straightforward theory that covers absolutely all the data. It follows that there is no possibility of deducing what St. Thomas must mean in De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m. So much, then, in answer to the secular assertions of what that passage clearly, obviously and certainly does mean.

In the second place, the data can be divided into three classes. First, there are occasional passages that favour the opinion which assimilates St. Thomas's virtus instrumentalis to Avicenna's virtus motiva efficiens and St. Albert's virtus divina creata: such for example is what one spontaneously imagines St. Thomas to have imagined to be the virtus in the imagines necromanticae. Second, there is an imposing mass of evidence in favour of the opinion that St. Thomas held a purely rational theory such as Aristotle's, namely, the virtus instrumentalis is the pattern of the instrumental movements determined by the idea in the mind of the artisan. Third, there are passages that can be interpreted either way, thus, in the sacramental theory one may either agree with Cajetan or one may choose to agree with those that support the theory of "physical" causality.

The question arises, Is De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7, ad 7m., to be interpreted in accordance with the first view or in accordance with the second? The best answer is that of St. Thomas himself. There happens to be a whole series of passages in which he discusses the subject of fate; taken together these passages form a clear parallel to the passage in question, for fate is a virtus artis in instrumento artificis

But before considering the treatment of "fate" it will be well to give a few data that reveal the parallel.

From the De Veritate it is clear that the idea of the artisan is of first importance: the instrument has a special effect in quantum est mota ab artifice (207); it is proportionate to its effect not in virtue of a natural form, nor in virtue of an idea that is static in the mind, but in virtue of the idea in motion from the mind to the effect (208). From both these passages and those cited from the Pars Tertia there is the analogy: the proportion of the instrumental cause is to the proportion of the principal cause, as the motion of the former is to the idea or the form in the latter.

It should seem that the intentio is this instrumental proportion as such; it is the proportionateness of the motion in distinction from the motion which is made proportionate. For it clearly emerges from all the passages on light and colour that the intentio, by itself, produces no effect except a perception. This repeated assertion (Sentences, De Potentia, Pars Prima, De Anima) may be reconciled with instrumental causality by saying: the intentio as such is merely perceptible; the intentio as immanent in a motion is causal inasmuch as the motion it informs is causal.

Finally, it is to be born in mind that instrumental causality does not require the immediate action of the principal cause: whether one agent uses one instrument or one million instruments, all the instruments are instruments. This is clear from the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies and from the explicit statement in 3a., q. 62, a. 4, ad 4m.

§3.563 Parallels.

There remains only the presentation of the series of passages on fate "fate." There is no mention of instrumentality as such; there is frequent mention of the idea of the artisan, the first cause, and of the mode of its presence in his instruments, secondary causes.

207) De Ver., q. 27, a. 4. 208) De Ver., q. 27, a. 7.

Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera Omnia, ed. Leon., Romae

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Thomas de Vio Caietanus, O.P., S.R.E.Card., Commentaria in Summam Theologicam S. Thomae Aquinatis, (in sup.)

2 Gr. cap. b, lat. b.

In art. sec. q. lll, omisso primo, dubium occurrit circa differentiam inter gratiam operantem et cooperantem pro gratuita Dei motione sumptam. Implicantur siquidem duo contraria simul. Nam assignando differentiam, dicitur quod operans dicitur quando mens nostra se habet uti mota tantum; cooperans vero, quando mens nostra se habet ut mota et movens. Applicando autem ad actus nostros, subiungitur quod cum movemur ad velle est gratia operans; cum vero movemur ad exterius opus est gratia cooperans. Constat autem quod ad velle voluntas se habet non ut mota tantum: nam velle a voluntate est et in voluntate; alioquin non esset liberum.

Et confirmatur. Quia movere ad velle, nihil aliud est quam facere ut velimus: ut Augustinus, allatus in littera testatur. Facere autem ut velimus, est facere ut moti moveamus nos ad volendum.

Praeterea, aut Auctor intendit quod mens nostra se habeat sic respectu actus interioris et exterioris: aut respectu formae actus, puta bonitatis meritoriae. Si respectu actus, cum uterque sit a voluntate imperatus, respectu utriusque gratia dicitur cooperans, iuxta doctrinam litterae. Si respectu bonitatis meritoriae, cum utraque sit a voluntate informata caritate et gratia, par est etiam ratio de utraque quoad hoc, quod est a voluntate mota a Deo.

II. Ad hoc dicitur dupliciter.

Primo quod nulla est inter dicta contrarietas. Quoniam non dicitur in littera quod respectu omnis actus interioris voluntatis dicitur gratia operans: sed dicitur indefinite, remittendo se ad supradicta in q. ix, a. 4. Ibi enim habuimus quod respectu primi actus voluntas se habet ut mota tantum, et Deus ut movens. Et nomine primi actus non intelligitur solus ille quem voluntas in principio operationum suarum omnium habet: sed quicumque ~~xxxxx~~ primus absque consilio et praevio

motivo ad bonum. Et propterea Auctor dixit: et praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat. Similiter igitur se habet voluntas mota a Deo ad huiusmodi velle, sicut grave ad motum deorsum. Et propterea sicut grave non movet seipsum ad descensum, sed est motum a generante; ita voluntas mota a Deo ad huiusmodi novum velle, non movet seipsam ad hoc sed est tantum mota a Deo. Est tamen tale velle ipsius eliciative, sicut descendere est motus gravis. Et est liberum quia potest dissentire a tali velle: Deus enim movet suaviter liberum arbitrium secundum conditionem eius.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad caetera. Nam facere ut velimus, non contingit uno modo sed duobus: scilicet ut velimus movendo nos ipsos ad hoc: et ut velimus moti tantum ab ipso Deo. Secundo modo spectat ad gratiam operantem; primo, ad cooperantem: iuxta calcem corporis articuli de opere meritorio.

Et similiter non omnis actus elicitus a voluntate est imperatus ab ea. Et propterea non est eadem aut par ratio de actu et bonitate meritoria intus et extra.

III. Secundo dicitur quod, quia in littera, distinguendo gratiam gratuitam Dei motionem, etc., expresse dicitur, <u>qua movemur ad bonum meritorium</u>, intentio Auctoris est loqui de bono meritorio. Ita quod dupliciter invenitur voluntas se habere ad bonum meritorium, scilicet ut mota tantum et ut movens mota: quidquid sit de actu substrato. Et quia etiam in littera manifeste distinguitur inter actum interiorem meritorium ut est ex gratia, idest ex habituali dono, et ut est a gratia, idest, gratuita Dei motione; et primo modo attribuitur gratiae cooperanti, secundo vero operanti: et quia etiam ex littera habetur quod effectus gratiae operantis habet rationem primi boni meritorii, effectus vero cooperantis habet rationem secundarii, extenso nomine boni meritorii etiam ad esse quo constituitur aliquis in statu meritorio: consequens est quod intentio Auctoris est dicere quod tunc voluntas se habet ad bonum meritorium ut movens mota, quando ex praecedenti esse vel actu meritorio facta in actu

iam movet se ad meritorium bonum; sunt enim tunc duo operantes, scilicet Deus et voluntas facta in actu in tali esse. Et propterea gratia cooperans dicitur tam confirmans voluntatem ad exterius opus, facultatemque exterioris operis praebens; quam ut est principium interioris operis meritorii secundum habituale donum iam datum facultati liberi arbitrii ad utendum cum vult. Tunc autem voluntas se habet ut mota tantum in hoc esse, quando non ex praecedenti merito aut esse meritorio ad actum vel statum meritorium ducitur, Et propterea gratia operans dicitur tam gratuita Dei motio ad actum interiorem meritorium tam gratuita Dei motio actum interiorem meritorium qui non procedit ex ~~xxxxxxx~~ habitu vel actu altero meritorio; quam gratia ipsa habitualis ut dat esse, Ad nihil enim horum sunt duo operantes, proprie loquendo, sed unus tantum, scilicet Deus: voluntas autem, etsi ad actus substratos se habeat ut operans, ad rationem tamen meritorii, cum eam non praehabeat in actu, non se habet ut operans, sed ut obsequens; ut in responsione ad secundum in littera habes.

Unde patet responsio ad obiecta. Quoniam in aequivoco laboratur de esse a voluntate. Aliud quippe est esse a voluntate; et aliud est esse a voluntate in actu in tali esse, ita ut moveat se ad meritum. Longe plus ad hoc exigitur quam ad illud, ut patet.

Ex hoc etiam patet quod primo modo primus actus voluntatis est ab ea ut praedictum est, et tamen non est ab ea ut movente se: sicut nec descensus deorsum est a gravi ut movente se, proportionaliter loquendo semper.

IV. Unum superest dubium: an actus idem interior possit simul esse a gratia operante et cooperante. Verbi gratia, Deus gratuita sua motione excitat Petrum iam exsistentem in gratia, ad interiorem actum caritatis, et consentit Petrus novo cuidam zelo honoris Dei: an actus ille sit ab utraque gratia, et ut est ab habitu, sit cooperantis, ut a gratuita Dei motione, sit operantis gratiae; an ipsa gratuita Dei motio, propter praecedentem habitum, spectet ad gratiam cooperantem.

Sed hoc non est difficile solvere intuenti rationem litterae,

et formaliter rationes actuum consideranti. Nam actus meritorius praeexsistentis in gratia, aut est imperatus a gratia: et tunc sine dubio ad solam gratiam cooperantem spectat, sicut et actus exterior. Aut non imperatus a gratia, sed gratia se habet ad illum obsecutive: ut contingere videtur in novis actibus excedentibus proportionem gratiae, qui illam valde augent. Et tunc gratuita Dei motio operantis gratiae rationem habetad talem actum sub tali ratione: quamvis sub communi ratione meritorii, etiam a gratia cooperante sit, quando ut sic a gratia habituali imperatur propter praeexsistentem finem in eo. Et ex hoc habes quod gratia operans non solum invenitur in infusione gratiae et iustifiatione impii, sed post acceptam gratiam pluries; quamvis manifestius in iustificatione impii. Et propterea in littera dicitur quod, quantum ad actum interioris meriti, voluntas se habet ut mota, Deus autem ut movens, praesertim quando voluntas quae prius malum volebat, incipit bonum velle.

V. Haec secunda solutio principalis dubii magis videtur ad mentem Auctoris. Una tamen aliam clarificat.

Banez

la 2 3 la q.2 a 3 67

p 122 C obiectio Scoti de potentia formali et actu virtuali

p 124 D responsio .. potentiae mediae quales sunt sensus et intellectus non secundum eamdem rationem sunt actu et potentia, nam per speciem sunt in actu primo et ab extrinseco actuantur, scilicet ab obiecto vel auctore naturae ut angelicus intellectus. Ad manent in potentia ad ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ actionem, ad quam reduci non possunt, nisi a cognoscente qui semper est in actu qualis est Deus. Unde applicatio harum potentiarum ad agendum esto sit operatio, est tñ ab aliquo alio movente, scilicet Deo de quo latius D. Tho. de Poten. q. 3, a. 7. et alibi saepe.

la 14 13

p 312 F Tertia conclusio. Deus cognoscit futura contingentia in suis causis sed determinatis et completis. Primam partem conclusionis docet aperte D. Th. in littera dum inquit, Cognoscit autem Deus contingentia non solum in suis causis, etc.

p 313 B .. Deus cognoscit omnes causas creatas per suam essentiam prout est prima causa dans esse et virtutem et determinationem omnibus causis.

p 313 C .. Infallibilitas et certitudo divinae cognitionis circa futura contingentia non solum pensatur ex eo quod cognoscuntur a Deo prout sunt praesentia in aeternitate, sed etiam prout cognoscuntur in suis causis ad sensum expositum in praecedenti conclusione (in sensu composito, determinatae et completae ad operandum; in sensu diviso, indeterminatae et incompletae 313 B). Itaque etiam si Deus non cognosceret futura contingentia tamquam praesentia in sua aeternitate, sed solum in causis ipsorum, eius cognitio esset certa et infallibilis. Istam conclusionem, sicut et praecedentem, intelligo de omnibus ~~xxxxix~~ futuris contingentibus etiam et de illis quae pendent ex sola libera voluntate. Itaque contingens in praesenti comprehendit liberum.

p 314 D .. voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet circa quamcumque materiam virtutis, nisi efficaciter determinatur a divina voluntate ad bene operandum. Quo circa ex eo quod Deus cognoscit suam voluntatem

non determinasse voluntatem creatam ad bene operandam, in materia, v.g. temperantiae, cognoscit evidenter quod voluntas creata peccabit et deficiet in materia illius virtutis. Itaque alia futura contingentia cognoscit Deus in suis causis, prout sunt determinata ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ a causa/prima: malum vero culpae futurum cognoscit in sua causa, quatenus non est determinata a prima causa ad bene operandum.

314 E .. quartam conclusionem D. Tho. in qua dicitur quod cognitio futurorum contingentium , quae habetur in eorum causis, non potest esse certa, debet intelligi de cognitione quae habetur in causis prout sunt indeterminatae et incompletae. Quae cognitio omnino repugnat Deo, qui, ut diximus, cognoscit futura in suis causis, prout subsunt determinationi primae causae.

314 B .. Si ad infallibilitatem et certitudinem divinae cognitionis circa futura contingentia sufficit quod cognoscantur a Deo in suis causis, cur ergo D. Tho. in hoc articulo tam anxie explicare/conatur Deum cognoscere futura contingentia prout sunt illi praesentia in aeternitate.

Ad hoc respondetur D. Th. in hoc articulo voluisse radicitus explicare omnem modum quo possumus salvare infallibilitatem divinae cognitionis circa futura contingentia. Et quidem si semel admittamus futura contingentia esse praesentia Deo in aeternitate, facillime intelligitur qua ratione divina cognitio est infallibilis omnino et certa.

Secundo respondetur quod D. Tho. voluit nobis exponere in hoc articulo, Deum non solum habere notitiam infallibilem et certam futurorum contingentium sed etiam intuitivam. Itaque docet nos D. Tho. Deum cognoscere futura contingentia non scientia simplicis intelligentiae aut cognitione abstractiva, sed scientia visionis et cognitione intuitiva.

369 B .. contingens naturaliter et contingens moraliter differunt a contingen dialectice tantum. Nam contingens dialectice solum dicit possibiliter aliquid esse..

370 B Tertia conclusio. Nullus effectus aut dicitur formaliter contingens per respectum ad voluntatem vel providentiam Dei, sed per respectum formalem ad causas proximas seu particulares defectivas. Probatur prima pars. Omnis effectus per ordinem ad Deum est infallibiliter eveniens nec impedibilis; ergo formaliter per talem ordinem non est contingens, alias esset impedibilis et non impedibilis respectu eiusdem causae.

Sexta conclusio..

370 E /Nullus effectus cuius Deus solus sit causa potest esse contingens. Probatur, quia effectus contingens, ut in praesenti loquimur, intrinsece et formaliter dicit ordinem ad causam impedibilem : sed Deus non potest esse causam huiusmodi: ergo se solo non potest producere effectum contingentem.

371 A Septima conclusio. Si Deus operaretur omnia ex necessitate naturae, nihilominus esset contingentia in rerum natura. Haec conclusio est contra Scotum in 1 d. 2, q. 2 et d. 8, q. 2, qui tenet Aristotelem cum caeteris philosophis contradictoria asseruisse.

371 C Ultima conclusio. Si Deus ad extra operaretur ~~in~~ ex necessitate naturae, nullum esset liberum arbitrium in rebus.

If "quandoque movetur" explained as in 1a 2ae 9 3 2m, true; if explained as 1a 2ae 10 1 2m, then false. Argument from "primum liberum" per se is valid, but not to point for we consider a hypothesis that is impossible

1a 19 10

376 E ... causa totali et prorsus eodem modo et invariabiliter se habente, neque impedibili aut modificabili ab aliquo extrinseco, necessarium sit ut idem semper effectus ab illa producatur, et qui non producitur, non possit produci..

380 B&D Admits God exactly the same even if he had not created; but openly admits the point is hard to understand.

381 ef .. libertas actus voluntatis, quae formaliter in ipsa est, consurgit ex radice actus intellectus.

382 B Quotiescumque actus voluntatis oritur ex praedicta radice iudicii,

semper erit liber. Unde rursus colligo. Quidquid antecesserit, vel comitabit vel supervenerit ad actum voluntatis, si non tollat iudicium illud circa medium respectu finis, non destruet libertatem operationis. Haec consequentia evidens est. Quia stante definitione actus liberi necesse est actum esse liberum. Nunc ergo ad difficiliora paulatim accedo. Antecedit quidem operationem nostram liberam ~~[illegible]~~ divinae voluntatis aeternum et immutabile consilium sive divinae providentiae

C infallibilis praedefiniitio, quae omnem bonam operationem liberam praedefinivit, imo et omnem operationem in quantum bona est circa bonum exercet. At vero quia ipse Deus sua providentia et immutabili consilio non ligat neque destruet iudicium nostrum, quo iudicamus indifferentiam medii et ordinabilitatem eius et ordinandum esse ad finem, non et nostram operationis libertatem destruit sed potius illam efficaciter efficit, fovet, atque conservat. Ecce quomodo cum divina providentia infallibili et efficaci stat nostrae operationis libertas, imo sine illo stare non potest.

Iam vero de gratia Dei et divinis auxiliis efficacibus atque praeceptis planius intelliges, quo pacto nostrae voluntatis libertati non adversentur sed potius faveant. Ratio eiudes est, si nolis praedictum documentum, quod necessario concessisti, negare. Etenim universa haec tantum absunt, ut nostrae rationis iudicium perturbent, aut ligent, ne possint praedicto modo iudicare indifferentiam obiecti, quod potius illuminent atque perficiant et ad Dei similitudinem transferant...

382 E Tandem colligamus inter omnes creaturas intellectuales perfectissimam libertatem fuisse in anima Christi domini. Quoniam divinae libertati super omnes maxime assimilata est.

393 (441) F Takes Caietan to task because on la 22 4 "quiescit intellectus non evidentia veritatis inspectae sed altitudine inaccessibilis veritatis occultae."

124 C Ad secundum respondetur, quod si nomine motus solum intelligatur motus physicus, bene dicit Gaietanus quod per illam rationem solum devenitur ad primum motorem, immobilem quidem per se, per accidens tamen potest esse mobilis. Sed non debet sic sumi, sed ut comprehendat etiam motus spirituales et metaphysicos qualis est quaevis operatio et etiam quaevis applicatio ~~xp~~ potentiae spiritualis ad suum actum, et etiam motus metaphoricos qualis est motio finis.

Lennerz p 355 ex Alvarez probat gratiam sanctificantem praemotionem

4, de Gratia Redemptoris, Romae 1934