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NB Addendum in Catalogues
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Re the file: Verbum, early draft
plus odds and ends

I have no record as to when this came into
my hands - My guess is that I received it
in the summer of 1953. At any rate, I had
had it for a good many years.

F.E.C.

Dec. 8/72

P.S. I do not guarantee that the various "odds and
ends" are BL's work

F.E.C.

THE CONCEPT OF VERBUM IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

Direct discussion of the concept of verbum in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas is confined, in the main, to two series of questions, a first pertaining to divine knowledge of the ideas or possibles,¹ a second pertaining to Trinitarian theory.² Both series are of notable difficulty: the complexity of Trinitarian theory needs no emphasis; but the problem of divine knowledge of the ideas,^{that is,} of the introduction of a multiplicity into the absolute simplicity of God, is cognate in nature and calls for ^{notably} ~~such~~ refined thinking. ~~that, not only is a satisfactory solution impossible on Platonist lines, but also Aristotelian thought can be developed to meet the issue only by a genius like Aquinas.~~ ^{In outline} For the Thomist procedure was, first, to analyse the act of human rational consciousness, dicere verbum, secondly, to proceed by the methods of affirmation, negation, and eminence, to a divine intellectual consciousness, identical ^{with} ~~of~~ divine being and so also identical with, and knowledge of all within the range of, divine omnipotence³ and, thirdly, on the authority of revela-

not justify the affirmation, It is so. It justifies only the affirmation, It may be so. Because all one can say in virtue of insight is, It may be so, one is confronted with a new problem that is solved by definition, evaluation, and decision. The reflective activity of definition has ~~not~~ been dealt with already in the discussion of abstraction, of analytic and of methodological concepts. Its function is to fix the matter for judgment as evaluation and decision. It may be taken narrowly, simply as the ideal definitions of perfect science that formulate the propter quid in a quod quid est. But it may be taken broadly as well: any question is a definition; any hypothesis is a definition; for questions and hypotheses determine the matter for judgment. It is true, of course, that questions and hypotheses are not definitions in ~~the~~^a lexicographical sense; but we have remarked already that the problem of intellect is ~~not~~ the problem^{not} of language but of knowledge and of science.

Upon the reflective activity of definition follows the critical activity of evaluation. The question or hypothesis enounces^v what may be or may not be. Evaluation proceeds in either of two directions: upwards to logical principles; downwards to matters of experience. If there can be a resolutio in principia, so that a negative or an affirmative answer is necessitated or excluded by one's ~~acceptance~~ acceptance of principles; if there can be a resolutio in sensum or, in the case of Euclidean geometry, a resolutio in imaginationem, so that again a negative or an affirmative answer is necessitated or excluded by these

sources of knowledge; then there will follow first a reflex act of understanding that sees the evidence as a whole and as a sufficient ground for the anticipated judgment and, secondly, from this critical act of understanding¹ there will proceed the rational utterance of assent, the "yes" or "no," the affirmation or negation, that is the specific contribution of judgment to knowledge and that stands to question or hypothesis or definition¹ as act to potency. The judgment may be absolute or modal: it is absolute as simple affirmation, as Est, Est or Non, Non; it is modal ^{if} ~~as~~ qualified ~~by conditions~~ as merely probable or ~~of~~ ⁴⁵ ~~the~~ merely possible and so forth. But in another sense judgment is always absolute: it proceeds from an infinite potentiality of inquiry that ranges without bounds; it is attained only by the exclusion of the possibility of its contradictory, for even modal judgments exclude the possibility ^{of} of impossibility or improbability as the case may be; and between the initial infinite potentiality and the ultimate unqualified determination the gap is absolute. It is because that gap is absolute that truth is absolute; and it is because truth is absolute, that any truth, no matter how trifling, is true for the whole ~~world~~ actual universe through all space and time and for the whole of all possible universes.

With regard to truth, distinguish three things: its proximate criteria; its inner essence; its effect. ~~In~~ ~~its proximate criteria one considers its active efficient cause.~~ ~~A judgment is true because it satisfies criteria, because it~~

A judgment is true because it satisfies criteria, because a reflex act of critical understanding sees a necessary consequence linking first principles of thought or data of sense and of internal experience to the projected judgment. Because a judgment is true in that criteriological sense, it is a necessary event; it is what the mind cannot but utter; it is an instance of what we cannot help thinking. But a true judgment is more than a necessary event that occurs in our minds; still it is more, not from the nature of the criteria on which any particular judgment as a particular judgment is based, but from the nature of the mind itself. The ultimate validation of knowledge is not something that we know -- as is implied in St. Augustine's postulate of a vision of the eternal reasons -- but in something that we are. The ultimate validation of our knowledge cannot be in something we know, for that knowing and known must themselves be validated in an ultimate validation. The ultimate validation lies in what we are, namely, something attuned to the absolute, something in inner harmony with the ground of the actual and all possible universes. This inner essence of truth lies in the nature of its emergence in us, in its procession from the infinite potentiality of unbounded inquiry which might end up anywhere, in its terminus in sufficient reason determining reasonableness by the exclusion of the possibility of other determination. Such a mode of determination from such a range of potentiality

cannot be merely a subjectively necessary event. It spans an infinite gap, consciously, intelligibly, rationally, and there is no possibility of assigning any meaning to the term, merely subjective, except by setting that term in opposition to what spans an infinite gap consciously, intelligibly, rationally. The third aspect of truth is its effect. In true judgment, as in a medium, we contemplate reality. Truth is the correspondence between reality and knowledge: quoad se, the real is prior to the true, for the true adds a relation of conformity to the real; but quoad nos the true is prior to the real, for we know reality, ^{as reality,} through the medium of true judgment; and we know judgment is true by reflecting on its proximate grounds in criteria and, ultimately, by reflecting on the nature of the mind. Realism is immediate, not a by a process of self-stultification that supposes a ~~comparative~~ comparison between the real as known and the real as unknown, not by force of sheer assertion that ^{realism} ~~that~~ is obvious and anything else is idealism or materialism, but because we know that the real cannot be other than what ^{is affirmed in} ~~corresponds to~~ true judgment. To posit any other as the real is to posit the unknowable as the real -- and that is gratuitous nonsense -- and further it is to posit the impossible as the real, for true judgment can affirm anything possible.

Before going more particularly into the concept of reality, let us review this outline of mind. First, then, intellect is not the faculty of merely empirical knowledge: it is not ~~the~~ the principle by which we know without knowing why but merely as a matter of brute fact; it is not external sense, nor ~~memory~~ memory, nor imagination, nor instinctive valuations and correlations; properly it not the mere awareness of our internal acts, as far as cognitional theory is concerned, though ontological analysis would attribute to intellect the mere awareness of acts of intellect itself. Secondly, intellect as active is inquiry, wonder, the drive to knowledge of causes that can be satiated -- according to Aquinas¹² -- only by the beatific vision of the first cause and last end of all. Thirdly, the first terminus of this drive is insight into phantasm; the second terminus is the critical understanding that necessitates judgment; the third terminus is the contemplative understanding that regards reality through intelligible truth. Fourthly, intellect as act is ~~inquiry~~, insight, critical understanding, contemplative understanding; but intellect as process, ^{through} ~~from~~ inquiry to insight, from insight to critical understanding, from critical to contemplative understanding is reason, rational consciousness, thought, consideration, method, logic, dialectic -- any name will do~~ll~~, as long as one grasps the idea of process from one act of intellect to another.

By the concept of reality I mean the answer to the question, What is reality? To that question we have already given an answer by affirming that the real is what is known through true judgment; hence one may also say that the real is "what is," that it is "the defined and judged, as opposed to the definition or judgment," that it is "any possible object of true judgment," that it is "being, ens, id quod est vel esse potest." There are two other ways of specifying the concept of reality: the first is to explain the relation of this concept to its grounds in empirical knowledge and in insight; the second is to discuss the denotation of the concept. We shall consider both in turn.

The concept of being emerges with an evident teleological anticipation of the judgment: "being" as a noun is what can be affirmed in true judgment. But the concept of being is not merely a teleological anticipation but also has a proportionate efficient cause. It emerges the instant that rational reflection proceeds to integrate the insight with the rest of knowledge, for at that instant rational reflection utters that the insight ^{gives} ~~is~~ only a "may be," a "can be" and not yet an "is." That utterance goes beyond the insight: the insight as such is prior to utterance; it is an intelligibility in act, a ground of utterance, but not utterance itself. Further, there is utterance that merely expresses the insight, for example, the concept of form and, more particularly, the concept of soul; for the "actus primus corporis naturalis organici" is what is known by insight into a sensitive or imaginal presentation

of a natural, organic body.¹³ But again there is utterance that goes beyond the insight as such, as in the concept of an essence which combines form with common matter or in the concept of an individual thing which combines form with individual matter. Now the concept of being emerges not as an utterance expressing the content of insight as insight nor again as utterance expressing insight along with its necessary conditions of common matter or along with its concrete condition of individual matter but as an utterance expressing the relation of insight, of intelligibility, to the absolute standards of rational consciousness. Thus, being is the utterance/^{expressing} of the intelligible as related to an absolute.

That affirmation needs amplification. The simplest way to provoke the concept of being is to tell a plausible story to a ^{man with a critical mind.} ~~man~~ ^{that what has been related} ~~scripta~~. He will say, ~~It~~ may be so and, as well, it may not be so. If he is an empiricist, he will place the whole meaning of the verification he still desires in a possible experience. For him, being is just another name for what he can experience; all that is uttered by the concept, being, is the possibility of various items of empirical knowledge, the data of external sense, of memory, of instinctive valuations and correlations, of internal awareness. But for the realist these experiences are not the meaning of being; they are merely conditions in certain cases for the rational transition from "may be" to "is." Knowledge of the actuality of contingent being, or contingent knowledge of necessary

For greater detail on the relations between phantasm, understanding, and concept, we have only to turn to the Thomist account of abstraction. ^{Six} ~~Five~~ different aspects are to be distinguished. There is abstraction of species intelligibilis, a metaphysical entity that is a component in the act of understanding; as such, it is not a datum of consciousness; a discussion of it pertains to Thomist psychology as metaphysical analysis and so does not pertain to the present essay. Secondly, there is the potential abstraction of the act of insight into phantasm: as insight into phantasm, the act of understanding is the understanding of particular data; but any data, sufficiently similar, would be understood in the same way; grasping by insight the intelligibility of any "this," is potentially to grasp the abstract nature of anything sufficiently similar to "this." Thirdly, there is abstraction as the activity of forming the concept by expressing the act of understanding along with the ~~xxx~~ elements in phantasm that are essential to that act of understanding; this is coincident with defining; defining the circle proceeds from the insight that the uniform curvature of this plane curve is necessitated by the equality of its radii; defining the circle is expressing this intelligibility with its "common matter," with all and no more ^{than} of the elements given in phantasm that condition ^{such} ~~that~~ intelligibility. This definition is abstract, apart, and its being apart may be viewed as separate for understanding, separate for consideration, and separate for judgment; and these three constitute the fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of

abstraction. Now, of course, St. Thomas did not draw up the foregoing list of aspects of abstraction; the point we wish to make is that to follow St. Thomas in his discussions of abstraction, one has to draw up some such list for oneself.

The simplest contrast occurs in answering the objection that abstraction involves falsity in intellect. Then it is pointed out that to judge as separate what are not separate really, does involve falsity; but to consider separately one aspect of a thing while disregarding others, that does not necessarily involve falsity. This contrast is between the fifth and sixth aspects of abstraction, between the concept as object of consideration and the concept as entering into a judgment. Were this all that Aquinas had to say about abstraction, it would be difficult to suppose that he based abstraction upon insight; on the contrary, it would be natural ~~x~~ to take it for granted that Aquinas, like Scotus, made abstraction a mere matter of metaphysical mechanics. But the fact is that the foregoing contrast is but a minor corollary in the Thomist theory of abstraction.

The basic element in Thomist theory is abstraction from matter. There is no difficulty in considering materia prima by itself, but one cannot abstract it; one has no species intelligibilis of it; when one abstracts, it is what one leaves behind; and in so far as one knows it, one knows it by its proportion to form.²¹³ Now the role of prime matter in the metaphysics of knowledge is paralleled by the role of what is termed "individual matter" within the data of consciousness.

Natural philosopher, mathematician, and metaphysician all abstract from individual matter.²¹⁴ To abstract the universal from the particular is common to all science which considers the per se and disregards the per accidens.²¹⁵ Intellect abstracts from the hic et nunc.²¹⁶ One cannot account for divine or angelic knowledge of the singular by accumulating any number of universal predicates, for the resultant combination will not be singular but "communicabilis multis."²¹⁷ The astronomer can predict all the eclipses of coming centuries; ~~ix~~ but his science by itself will not give him the knowledge of particular eclipses as particular "sicut rusticus eenga cognoscit";²¹⁸ for in so far as he knows particular future eclipses it is by relating his calculations to a sensibly given here and now. Properly, intellect does not remember; for to know the past as past, like knowing the present as present, is the work of sense.²¹⁹ But how is that Aquinas is so certain that intellect abstracts from the here and now, from the "materia individualis, quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans"?²²⁰ Presumably because it is universally per accidens, because time and place as such explain nothing, because the reason for anything is never in terms of this instance at this time but always in terms of a nature that, if found here, can be found elsewhere and, if found now, can be found later. In other words, the basic element in Thomist theory of abstraction is derived from a property of our way of understanding. The "here and now" ~~ix~~ of the phantasmal presentation never is a factor in the insight; it always pertains to the purely sensuous residue that is irrelevant

to insight as insight, that is not essential to the occurrence of the insight (as are equal radii and plane curve to understanding this uniform curvature) but always accidental to the occurrence of the insight (as white radii on a black background in understanding this circle).

Now the mathematician abstracts not only from individual but also from sensible matter; and in this he differs from the natural philosopher. By sensible matter is meant the aggregate of the sensibilia propria; eliminate from a phantasmal presentation all colors, sounds, tastes, odors, and tactile qualities such as rough and smooth, hard and soft, and one has left the average man's idea of nothing, namely, the space-time continuum, the pure matter of the sensibilia communia, namely shape, size, number, motion, and rest. This pure matter is termed materia intelligibilis; it is necessary to give the geometer a second triangle, similar in all respects to a first, and to give the mathematician a second "two" ^{that can be added to} ~~to-multiply-by~~ yet a first ~~that~~ ⁱⁿ meaning and definition is identical with the first. ^{Now} ^{the difference between these ~~two~~ ^{first and second} degrees of abstraction is a difference ⁱⁿ ~~between~~ what one is attempting to understand. What is the ^{main} difference between a ^{projective} ~~perspective~~ geometry and a science of optics? Simply that in the former one is not while in the latter one is attempting to settle properties of light rays; in the former case one disregards light rays not only in one's concepts but also in one's judgments; in the latter case such disregard is ruinous. Hence "qui sensum negligit in naturalibus, incidit in errorem"; on the other}

hand, "in mathematicis enim oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum" for sense will not give a straight line touching a circle at only one point.²²²

The third degree of abstraction prescind from all matter, particular, common, individual, sensible, intelligible; it deals with such concepts as "ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi."²²³ Such concepts, accordingly, proceed from understanding, not as understanding ~~of~~ phantasm, but simply as understanding. They are absolutely universal, because they proceed from any understanding, any intelligibility in act. They may be utterly concrete, because what is understood may be utterly concrete. They are analogous, for ~~they~~ each is derived in its own way from intelligibility in act and so possesses its peculiar habitus to intelligibility in act while, at the same time, ~~each~~^{each} varies in content as the intelligibility from which it is derived varies ~~in~~ in content. Intelligibility is the possibility of being, as unintelligibility is the impossibility of being; and this reflection of intelligence in act on intelligibility in act is the most fundamental and first of concepts, ens, id quod est vel esse potest.²²⁴ So intimate is the relation of ens to intelligibile in actu and to quod quid est that all three are named the object of intellect;²²⁵ the relations between them should be clear, for the intelligible in act is what insight knows in phantasm and the anima separata knows without phantasm; the quod quid est is the conception of intelligibility in act as this particular instance of intelligibility; ens is the conception of the

basis of all intelligibility; "quidquid esse potest, intelligi potest"²²⁶ and conversely "quaelibet natura essentialiter est. ens."²²⁷ The concepts, unum, verum, bonum are convertible with ens for, like ens, they express what is proper to the intelligible as such. Aristotle's "indivisibilia intelligencia" is of the indivisibles that are indivisible because intelligible;²²⁸ the intelligible is always a unity; and indivisibility indivisibility is identical with unity.²²⁹ Next, because ens and unum proceed from intelligibility, they must be commensurable to intellect, and so verum. Finally, because the real is grounded in intelligibility, and intelligibility is system, mutual adaptation and coherence, it follows that the real is good, "conveniens appetitui."²³⁰ As the transcendental concepts proceed from intelligibility as such, so also do the basic analytic categories of potency and act; they cannot be defined, Aristotle maintained, but are known by a proportion that may be seen in examples;²³¹ in fact, they are known by insight that grasps in the data what might be there, that grasps possibility; what is possible is the act, and that it is/possible is the potency; and in a contingent universe such categories have a universal range. But to pursue this topic any further would be to write a summary of Thomist metaphysics; enough has been said to illustrate the point at issue, that the Thomist theory of abstraction is not some obscure matter of metaphysical mechanism but basically a statement of the data of consciousness; "homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatis, et recipit mente intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in

nobis experiremur."²³² Abstracting from individual matter is grasping the irrelevance for science of the hic et nunc. Abstracting from sensible matter is grasping the irrelevance for mathematics of empirical data as such. Abstracting from all matter is grasping ^{The ultimate irrelevance of the merely empirical,} the transcendence of intelligibility, the possibility of metaphysics. In each case the activity of abstraction is the activity of intelligence in act knowing the intelligible in act and rationally stating, analysing, determining what it is; the term of the activity is the "conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens."²³³

The relation of insight to concepts is not one-to-one but one-to-many, for many concepts are needed to express one insight, as is evident from the very structure of a definition. The more powerful the intellect the greater the extent of distinct detail that it masters and correlates in a single view. Hence the repeated affirmation that the higher angels know more by fewer species than the lower, and the repeated confirmation that the same is observed among men since the less intelligent need detailed explanations but the more intelligent grasp the whole from a hint.²³⁴ Less grandiose is the illustration from propositions, which involve at least two terms, subject and predicate, but can involve only one act of understanding, since intellect can have only one act of understanding at a time.²³⁵ This recalls two points already made, that the conceptualization of understanding is, when fully developed, a system and that one must advert to the

implication of systematic knowledge in the Aristotelian and Thomist quod quid est if one would grasp the precise nature of the concept; the concept emerges from understanding, not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of its^a/source which is equally the source of other concepts. From this follows the second observation, namely, the apparent paradox of stating that distinct terms cannot be abstracted from one another: as distinct terms, they are abstracted from one ~~an~~ another in the sense that they can be objects of distinct acts of attention or consideration; but it does not follow that one can understand the one without introducing the other, and in this sense they cannot be abstracted one from the other.²³⁵ A final observation is, of course, that if one starts out to determine the nature of intellect by ~~examining~~ examining concepts taken in isolation, ~~one~~ one almost inevitably ends up with a mere logical machine dignified with the name of intellect. To follow the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, it is necessary to follow their method of introspection; and that they proclaimed; one knows intellect by reflecting on its act, intelligere.²³⁶

VERBUM VERUM PER SCIENTIAM

The second of Aristotle's operations of intellect, which Aquinas identified with verbum and frequently refers to as a conceptio, conceptus, conceptum,²³⁷ is the compositio et divisio in which truth ~~and~~ and falsity are found.²³⁸ As the first operation corresponds to the quiddity of the thing, so the second corresponds to its existence.²³⁹ In God both operations are a single act, but completing the first leaves us in potency to performing the second;²⁴⁰ for just as human intellect introduces a complexity into its knowledge of simple things, so divine intellect knows the complexa incomplexa.²⁴¹ The beginning of our knowledge is sense; its development is through sensitive elaboration, through understanding and reasoning; its term and perfection is judgment.²⁴² This term, as a determinatio intellectus ad unum, is certitude.²⁴³ More generally, this term is assent, which includes not only certain judgments but also opinions accepted provisionally and with a fear of error.²⁴⁴ Just as the intelligentia indivisibilium directly expresses and knows an abstract quod quid est and has to pivot back to the phantasm to know indirectly the abstract quiddity in the concrete,²⁴⁵ so in judgment a fuller use of the unity of consciousness²⁴⁶ occurs, for then intellect must refer back to external sense;^{hence} one cannot judge when one is asleep.²⁴⁷ Again, just as one has to distinguish the reasoning that leads up to an insight from the insight, and the insight from the concept, so also one has to distinguish preparatory thinking from assent,²⁴⁸ and, I believe, advert to the difference ~~between two~~ kinds of insight that occur in the preparatory

thinking.²⁴⁹

It is easy enough to distinguish the two basic meanings of composition: there is the ontological composition of the real thing, of form in matter, or of accidents in substance; there is the conceptual composition of true judgment which affirms this ontological composition; and quoad the former is the cause of the latter; "dispositio rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione."²⁴⁹ However, that causation is not immediate: it is mediated by sense, memory, the cogitative, the phantasm, insights, and reasoning. Now just as reasoning ^{helps} enables one to understand in the first instance, so also reasoning prepares the way for a special type of understanding that is the coalescence into a single view of what previously were distinct insights. Logicians, precisely because they deal with worn instances, easily come to the conclusion that by deduction we learn nothing; the reason for this is the fact that in the worn instance the insight is already developed into the coalescence of minor insights. On the other hand, any competent teacher knows that reasoning with pupils helps them to understand, helps them to learn; the reason for this is that in the pupil there has not yet taken place the coalescence of minor insights into a major insight, that is one to a greater many. Here we have a composition that is distinct both from the ontological composition in the real object and the conceptual composition in the judgment; it is an intellectual composition in developing understanding.

Now while the quod quid est cannot be demonstrated, though it can be presented in a syllogism,²⁵⁰ the coalescence of insights runs parallel to the scientific syllogism which Aquinas called "syllogismus faciens scire." Indeed, when Aristotle discusses the twofold operation of intellect in the De Anima, the compositio et divisio that at least initially is uppermost in mind is not the judgment but the development of understanding. This appears in the example from Empedoclean evolutionary theory which supposed that first there were heads without necks and legs without feet and then concord brought these disiecta membra together. "Sicut ergo Empedocles posuit quod amicitia composuit multas partes, et constituit ex eis unum animal, ita et intellectus multa incompleta prius separata componit et facit ex eis unum intellectum...."²⁵¹ If the term, intellectum, suggests the concept rather than the insight, clearly it is the latter that is referred to in the following passage: "Symmetrum et diametrum aliquando separatim et seorsim intellectus intelligit, et tunc sunt duo intelligibilia: quando autem componit, fit unum intelligibile, et simul intelligitur ab intellectu."²⁵² Presumably the two concepts do not fuse into one concept; they remain two but for understanding become one; and they become one by the scientific syllogism, namely, an irrational cannot be measured, but the diagonal of a square is an irrational, and so it cannot be measured.²⁵³

One must not conclude, however, that as the simple insight expresses itself in a definition, so the compounded insight expresses itself in a judgment; what corresponds to

the compounded insight is not yet an assent but only a conclusion. Moreover, it should seem that judgment can follow not only compounded but also simple insight and that its immediate ground is neither of these but rather what I may term a critical act of understanding. In the writings of Aquinas this critical act is acknowledged implicitly rather than explicitly, a fact to be explained, perhaps, by the tendency of Aquinas to cover his personal developments of what is at best rudimentary in Aristotle by restricting himself, in so far as possible, to Aristotelian terminology.

The existence of this critical act of understanding, which stands to the judgment as Newman's illative sense to Newman's assent,²⁵⁴ may be argued as follows. There exists, first, the judgment as a content: it is what is true or false, in the full sense of these terms; and on this ground it is distinguished from the Aristotelian intelligentia indivisibilium.²⁵⁵ Secondly, the judgment is not only a content but also an act of a subject, personally committing the subject; under this aspect, judgment is assent; and as assent, it is divided into scientific certitude, opinion, belief.²⁵⁶ Thirdly, the division of assents is based upon their motives or grounds which, from the nature of the case, are within knowledge and consciousness and, also, prior to the judgment itself; they are constitutive of judging in the sense in which judging is assembling the evidence and weighing it with a view to effecting the determination that is assent. Of this activity, prior to the judgment and cause of it, Aquinas speaks as a resolutio in

principia. Generally, this resolution is conceived as a reduction of the conclusion to principia per se nota, so that one sees that to deny the conclusion would necessitate denying the principles and so committing intellectual ~~suicide~~ suicide.²⁵⁷ Still these passages cannot be taken in an exclusive sense; for the resolution is not only to abstract principles but also to concrete sensible data.²⁵⁸ Further, the three degrees of abstraction are not merely types of conceptualization but also norms of judgment: while metaphysics reduces its conclusions to pure intellect, Euclidean geometry judges by a reduction to imagination, and positive science must include a reduction to sensible data.²⁵⁹ Thus Aquinas appears fully aware of the fact that the act of judgment is preceded by a marshalling of all the relevant evidence. But in what precisely does this ~~marshalling~~ marshalling and ~~weighing~~ weighing the evidence consist? It cannot be a mere presenting in empirical consciousness, concomitant or reflective, for it is not ~~enough~~ enough to know the evidence without knowing that the evidence necessitates the projected judgment. To grasp a necessary nexus between the evidence, on the one hand, and the projected judgment, on the other, is to understand; it is a reflective act of understanding, for the matter understood is what is given within the ~~relevant~~ field of knowledge relevant to a projected judgment; it is a critical act of understanding, inasmuch as a failure to grasp the necessity of the judgment in the grounds means that the judging will be unfavorable and the judgment will not be forthcoming.

patic position "quia, ut puto, latuit eum."¹⁰⁰ It would be difficult to be more devastating in fewer words. As far as Cajetan could see, ut puto, Scotus just did not know what Aristotle was talking about. With regard to the Scotist esse cognitum, Cajetan is eloquent: "Ego autem, peripatetico lacte educatus, ac in aere, ut aiunt, loqui nesciens, praeter latitudinem entis realis, solum ens rationis novi. Ens autem rationis relationem aut negationem a s. Thoma didici, in Qu. de Ver., qu. xxi, a. 1. Unde cum esse obiectivum non sit modus essendi secundum rem, neque sit negatio, restat quod sit esse relativum secundum rationem, in communi loquendo."¹⁰¹

On what seem to me to be the two central issues, Cajetan is resolutely and whole-heartedly anti-Scotist.

But Cajetan was not born an anti-Scotist. He underwent an intellectual conversion. In listing opinions on the nature of the beatific vision he set forth an obviously Scotist view in terms of the cooperation of the object and the faculty in producing the act. But he does not name it Scotist; he names it the "communis cursus iudicantium". Not merely does he name it common opinion, but he also acknowledges that at one time he himself held it, that he taught it, that even perhaps it crept into his writings.¹⁰² But if Cajetan had to have a conversion to grasp the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity, may one not say that that theory is anything but obvious? If Cajetan was exceptionally intelligent, if his

his commentary was ^{chosen} ~~the obvious choice~~ for the Leonine edition, can one place implicit reliance on lesser commentators who fail to betray an appreciation of the subjective difficulties involved in grasping the issues? One may, if one pleases, deprecate Cajetan's dédain coutumier for the material mindedness of men, but I think it much more relevant to observe that it is not a question of disdain at all; it is a frankly humble recognition of the difficulty of the issues and a friendly warning against a trap which he knew because he ^{himself} had fallen into it.

~~If anything, Cajetan does too fine a job of putting together the various metaphysical strands in Thomist cognitional theory. He distinguishes knowledge by real identity and from intentional knowledge by information. He distinguishes different knowers: God who knows everything by real identity; angels who know some things by identity and others by information; men who know everything by information; animals who know some things by information~~

If anything, Cajetan does too fine a job of putting together the various metaphysical strands in Thomist cognitional theory. Aristotelian identity derives from the analysis of motion in the Physics: motion as from the agent is action; as in the patient is passion; so that the one act, motion, is the act both of agent and of patient. Explicitly it is this analysis that yields "sensible in actu est sensus in actu."¹⁰³ And it is an extension of the same analysis that yields "intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu."¹⁰⁴ Aristotelian immateriality

is another equally simple thing: "quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur" and, on the other hand, the agent acts by its form and reproduces not its matter but its form; trees are alive and freeze but they do not feel cold, because they receive the form, coldness, not immaterially but only in different matter; knowing is ~~an immaterial~~ immaterial reception of form.¹⁰⁵

Cajetan with an appeal to Averroes fixes the specific characteristic of immaterial reception: matter does not become form; what becomes is a third, the composite of matter and form; on the contrary, the actuation of intellectus by the the intellectum does not yield a third, but the intellectus becomes the intellectum; that is the idea of Aristotle's affirmation that "anima est quodammodo omnia." Hence, in every case, "cognoscens est ipsum cognitum, actu vel potentia." The knower, intellectus, is the very known.¹⁰⁶ But it may be the known in either of two ways. Here there comes into operation the Thomist idea of the intentional. The knower may be the known ontologically: God is his own substance; eminenter he is all being; hence God knows all things by what he is really. Similarly, the angel is his own substance and that is a pure form, an intelligibility, so that the angel knows himself by his own substance. But to know other angels and other things, the angel's own substance does not suffice. It has to be eked out by species, similar to the known, more or less comprehensive. Species are intentional reality, the reality of the known in a knower who is not knowing in virtue of ^{his} ~~its~~ own natural, ontological perfection.¹⁰⁷

This is brilliant. It runs true to the basic exigences of the problem. It clearly grasps both the theorem of immaterial identity and the distinct theorem of intentionality to account for identity in subordinate cases. But from the view-point of Cajetan's own difficulty in coming to grasp it, and still more from the view-point of later history, its very brilliance is a defect. For the ^{practical} ~~real~~ role of epistemology is not to inquire into mind as mind but to bring my mind to a grasp of the manner in which really I do ~~know~~ know, to purge from it illusions about knowledge that too easily I may entertain. To that end a purely metaphysical account ~~of~~ of knowledge is not particularly helpful, and an extremely elegant synthesis of the whole of gnoseological metaphysics is apt to be even less helpful, for it will encourage others to fancy things much simpler than really they are. It would be anachronistic to expect to find in Cajetan an epistemologist. But one may say that it is regrettable that he is so jejune in his treatment of the Thomist transposition of the ~~the~~ Augustinian theory of truth, ¹⁰⁸ or that he ^{affirms} ~~regards~~ the need of an intentional identity for knowledge to be knowledge because all sound philosophers take it for granted that simile simili cognoscitur.¹⁰⁹ For had Cajetan been more interested in knowledge simply as knowledge, it would not have been possible for him to think out so accurately the nature of the analogy of being without recalling the twofold verbum of definition regarding natura rei and judgment regarding esse rei. Cajetan's analysis of the concept of being ~~is exactly the~~ squares perfectly with

the analysis of rational consciousness, first by reflection fixing on an essence, and then by affirmation positing an existence. But Cajetan, commenting on the Summa, writes of the Thomist verbum without any advertence to definition and judgment, indeed he writes as though he were describing a Scotist species. ~~or species in actu~~ "... sciendum est quod in parte intellectiva, praeter potentias, actus et habitus, posuit terminum actus, ea necessitate, ut obiectum actus secundi haberetur praesens ipsi ~~actu~~ actu obiective." ¹¹⁰

Why the intellect has not in the phantasm its present object is not explained though Cajetan could advance that "... sp̄ndet in phantasmate intelligibile in actu, natura scilicet abstrahens ab hic et nunc: et tale intelligibile in actu movet intellectum possibilem." ¹¹¹ On the other hand, how we get beyond the immanent object ~~status~~ ^{does} to the real thing, Cajetan/explain by recalling Aristotle's remark in the De Memoria et Reminiscentia: "idem est motus in imaginem et rem cuius est imago." ¹¹² That may do for animal faith; but it hardly does justice to the verbum of rational consciousness, or to Cajetan himself.

Reminiscentia

When one turns to ~~the example of a contemporary cult,~~ John of St. Thomas, ~~the illustration~~ one still finds epistemology neglected and, as well, the fruit of that neglect. For John immateriality and intentionality are synonymous: immateriality is not the mere negation of matter but a mode of the reception of forms; spiritual beings receive forms in two ways, entitatively, to make them what they are, and on the other hand intentionally, representatively, immaterially.¹¹³ This is Cajetan with a difference. The difference is that Aristotle and the ultimate identity of knower and known, the ultimate transcendence of the distinction between subject and object, have passed out of the picture. For John knowledge is knowledge of the other. Commenting on I, q. 14, a. 1, he does not turn for light to the next article, but goes to the De Veritate, q. 2, a. 2, where knowledge of the other is in the foreground.¹¹⁴ Defining the formal concept of understanding, he writes: "... illud est formaliter intelligere, ex quo formaliter et immediate sequitur intelligi in obiecto et attingentia illius in subiecto, ita quod constituatur intellectus attingens obiectum; tunc enim principaliter denominatur intelligens, quando constituitur apprehendens obiectum."¹¹⁵ Again, "Quare principalis ratio intellectionis, ut intellectio est, non est ipsa egressio seu origo ab operante, sed actuatio ipsa, qua in genere intelligibili constituit intellectum in actu secundo coniunctum ipsi obiecto seu tendens ad illud intentionaliter et intelligibiliter."¹¹⁶ Might I suggest that ~~the proper~~ ^{a more obvious} context for that notion of intellect is not a

commentary on St. Thomas but a commentary on Scotus. In his Quodlibetum XIII Scotus examines in detail his interesting compound of immanent operation and consequent relation to the object; he carefully distinguishes between intuitive knowledge in which the object must be real and abstractive knowledge in which the object need not be real;¹¹⁷ from this there follows a distinction in the relations. In either case two relations are involved: "Una potest dici relatio mensurati, vel verius mensurabilis ad mensuram. Alia potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medi ad terminum, ad quem unit, et ista relatio medi unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relatio attingentiae alterius, ut termini, vel tendentiae in alterum, ut in terminum."¹¹⁸ Now when there is no real object, the cognitive act is/ rather the measure; when there is, it is the measurable.¹¹⁹ But in both cases there is the unio, attingentia, tendentia, and this relation is real in the case of a real object;¹²⁰ otherwise, it is notional, namely, between the knowing and the esse cognitum of the object in the knowing.¹²¹ It is, then, a quite accurate account of Scotist intellection to say that "... illud est formaliter intelligere, ex quo formaliter et immediate sequitur intelligi in obiecto et attingentia illius in subiecto..." and "... principalis ratio intellectionis... constituit intellectum in actu secundo coniunctum ipsi obiecto seu tendens ad illud intentionaliter et intelligibiliter." But whether Scotus is simply a faithful and humble disciple of St. Thomas on this point, is a further question.

Scotus was content with the act of knowing ~~is~~ as the esse cognitum of the known: if there is a knowing of the object, then the object is known. But John of St. Thomas, for obvious reasons, needed a verbum distinct from the intelligere and consequent to it. Hence among other ^{arguments} ~~reasons~~ he advances: "Ad haec si obiectum est absens, ita ut in seipso terminare non possit cognitionem, necessario requiritur, quod haec terminatio suppleatur in aliqua representatione. Nec sufficit ipse actus intelligendi, quia ipse est ipsa cognitio, non res ipsa cognita...."¹²² That he is not thinking of definition or judgment as the intentional essence and existence of the thing within the intellect and distinct from the act of understanding, appears partly from silence and partly from the fact that he does not consider his verbum to lie within internal experience. To an objection on that score he answers: "... imago est duplex. Alia exterior et instrumentalis, quae ut cognita ducit in cognitionem obiecti, et talis imago prius debet attingi et cognosci quam obiectum ipsum. Alia est interior et formalis, quae non est obiectum cognitum, sed ipsa est ratio et forma terminans cognitionem, et haec non debet esse cognita obiective, sed solum cognitionem reddere terminatam formaliter respectu obiecti."¹²³ Thus his verbum would seem to be the metaphysical condition of it being true that the object is known; and this is to be taken in an absolute sense, for there is no need of a verbum in the beatific vision because of himself God is known while the vision ~~is~~ adds

only another instance with respect to which "God is known" is true. ¹²⁴ Indeed one might say that John's verbum is ^{sort of} a meta-physical reduplication of the distinction between subject and object: so ultimate and paramount is that distinction that mere knowing does not suffice to make the object known; hence "... esse intellectum in actu dupliciter dici potest, vel respectu obiecti, quia de se solum est intelligibile in actu primo, redditur autem in actu ultimo intellectum; vel respectu subiecti, quia applicata ad istud subiectum redditur intellectum, idest apprehensum et tentum ab ipso. Dicimus ergo, quod verbum ponitur, ut reddat obiectum intellectum in actu ultimo ex parte obiecti, secundum quod intellectum in actu ultimo contrahitur contra intelligibile in actu primo." ¹²⁵

Now there are two meanings to the distinction between intelligibile and intellectum. What I shall contend is the ^{pertinent} Thomist meaning, has intelligibile as what is known by understanding, for example, a form as opposed to matter and to contingent existence, for matter and contingency are not in themselves intelligible but only as related to form or to necessary being respectively; on the same view, the intellectum is the thing, form existing in matter; on the same view, the necessity of a verbum is, ^{on the one hand,} the impossibility of ^{or} knowing a contingent material thing directly and exclusively by understanding, for that type of thing is not in itself intelligible, ^{on the other hand,} and, the necessity of acts of rational consciousness, of thought, to reflect and judge if it is one is to proceed from understanding to knowledge of the thing, the intellectum. ~~on the~~

Thus, I should say, that ^a ~~the~~ Thomist distinction ^{would have} ~~has~~ to do with different objects of intellect: the intelligible is the quidditas; but the intellectum as conceived is ens and as affirmed is ~~verum~~ verum. On the other hand, the Scotist ~~view~~ ^{distinction} does not involve different objects but different stages of the same object: the actu intelligibile is the species produced by agent intellect and phantasm; the actualis intellectio is the verbum, the act of taking a look at the species.¹²⁶

The position of John of St. Thomas is a modification of the latter view: John was not speaking of the transition from the object known in understanding to the object known by rational consciousness, from the intrinsic intelligibility of the thing to the compound of form and matter, essence and existence; he was speaking of the same psychological event as Scotus was, namely, knowing a concept; his intelligibile in actu primo is ~~the~~ ^{parallel to the Scotist} species, and his intellectum in actu secundo is ~~the~~ verbum; and neither is an event within psychological consciousness. The human analogy to the divine processions has gone up in metaphysical smoke.

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Conclusions.

The chief aim in this second part has been to indicate the issues behind the various theories of verbum. According to Scotus the verbum is a knowing proceeding from a known. According to Thomistic writers the verbum is a known as known, or the formal condition of a known as known, proceeding from a knowing. According to the interpretation we wish to put forward ~~our~~ ^{the} verbum is an act of rational consciousness proceeding from an act of understanding.

Common to the two positions that are in possession of the contemporary field is the Platonist duality of subject and object, knowing and known. On both positions that distinction has to be ultimate; it has to be such that it can be verified within the pure act; were it true that the distinction between knowing and known had no ^{real} meaning within ^{the self-knowledge of} the pure act, then both positions simultaneously ~~for~~ would fall and for the same reason. Now if one is an Aristotelian, that distinction ^{must} ~~does~~ really vanish: "... secundum sententiam Aristotelis... intelligere contingit per hoc quod intellectum in actu fit unum cum intellectu in actu."¹⁷ On the other hand, if one is a Platonist, the distinction cannot really vanish: "secundum autem positionem Platonis intelligere fit per contactum intellectus ad rem intelligibilem;"¹⁸ and so Plato had to hold that ideal being would be eternally asleep were it without motion.¹⁹

If a new star has arisen in the philosophic firmament to ^{ground} ~~stand~~ a third position, let us get out ^a our telescopes and inspect it. But meanwhile we can be quite certain where Aquinas stands in this matter. He is uncompromisingly Aristotelian: "Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quo in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis...." ¹³⁰

There is no potency in God and so there is not ^{an} absolutely ultimate distinction between subject and object, knowing and known.

Now this Platonism of Scotist and Thomistic Trinitarian theory is not due to Plato; it is due to the same cause as Plato's Platonism is due, to naive realism, to the illegitimate/^{and unconscious} transference into analytic thought of what seems obvious to common sense. For common sense knowing is identical with knowing an object, contacting an object, being in the presence of an object, being confronted with an object, standing opposite an object. ¹³¹ Knowing is attinentia objecti for common sense, for Scotus, for John of St. Thomas, and for not a few of my prospective readers. It was necessary to begin by attacking that notion. It was necessary to make plain that it is possible to conceive knowing as not necessarily and invariably and, above all, unquestionably attinentia objecti. Without making that point endless texts from St. Thomas would seem to the reader to be no more than strange and paradoxical. Without making it, ^{one would} ~~it, it should~~ plough the ocean. ~~of unresponsive minds~~ Quidquid recipitur...!

If I have made any head way, then it also will be true that I have given some of the evidence for the Trinitarian Thomist interpretation of Trinitarian theory~~x~~ at which I am aiming. First, there is the point that the distinction between subject and object, knowing and known, is irrelevant to Trinitarian theory; it vanishes when one considers the self-knowledge of the pure act. Secondly, there is the point that the Thomist verbum is an act of rational consciousness; for it is a definition or a judgment; both are acts of rational consciousness; both suppose and proceed from understanding; for if one does not understand, one may still prattle, but one can neither define¹³¹ nor judge. Thirdly, it should be clear that the emanatio intelligibilis¹³³ of the Eternal Word is not a passive intelligibility, such as is found in material causality, but an active intelligibility such as is proper only to intelligence in act and acting as intelligence; such proper activity of intelligence in act is rational utterance, dicere; and that is the reason why the human mind is uniquely an image of God; in it alone, in our material universe, is there active intelligence in act.¹³⁴ Fourthly, there is the outstanding problem of the processio operati according to the will; but with verbum conceived as rational act, it is natural to conceive love as rational act; as verbum proceeds from understanding, is "because" of understanding, so love proceeds from both, is "because" of both.

(to be continued)