

Lonergan Workshop 1975 Q&A June 16-20

June 17 (TC 850 A and 850 B)

Question: In the past several years, the American church has seen a serious decline in church attendance, a severe drop in vocations, and a growing alienation of young people from the Church. Would you comment on how *you* see the present state of the Church, and what your views are about the direction the Church is or should be taking.

Lonergan: Perhaps if I said something on the first part of that question I would be doing all that a human being could be expected to do. I am inclined to ask about the cause, to distinguish between internal causes, causes within the Church itself, and external causes, causes outside the Church, and finally, between hypotheses about these causes and their verification. I shall not undertake verification; it is a little difficult to do in forty-five minutes. The internal cause, as I see it, is sitting on the lid for three centuries, followed by an explosion. To elaborate on that account of the internal cause, there is a book by Herbert Butterfield, a rather eminent historian, not perfect but highly respected, on *The Origins of Modern Science*. In the introduction or the introductory chapter, on page 1 of the text, there is the statement that the emergence of modern science is the biggest event in the history of man since the advent of Christianity; the biggest thing that happened since year 1 of our era up to the present occurred towards the end of the seventeenth century. As a corollary the Renaissance and the Reformation are mere episodes, simple displacements in medieval Christendom. While he does not justify this and doesn't attempt to, the thing is that secularism begins with, comes out of, and has its main source in that emergence of modern science. That emergence of modern science is a new datum in what human knowledge is. In other words, what are you doing when you are knowing? Well, it depends on what knowing you're doing. And if a new way of coming to know is developed – and such has been the development of modern science – then you have a new datum on human knowledge. I believe you can find it foreshadowed in Aristotle's account of understanding in the phantasm, *intelligere in phantasmate*. I think you have the root of it there, but in the European or Continental languages there is no word for insight. This presents difficulty in translating books that suppose it, even in German where they have the word *Einsicht*. A collection of twelve articles from *Collection* and *A Second Collection* are being prepared by Herder, and they are on their fourth translator! There is a new datum on human knowledge, and it implies a radical revision of the ideal of science set forth by Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics*. Not that Aristotle was sold on that ideal; neither was Aquinas; but it was the ideal, and it was what people meant by science. Even centuries after the advent of modern science, it is assumed in papal documents that science is certain knowledge of things through their causes, as Aristotle explained in *Posterior Analytics*, though modern science is not knowledge. It is hypothesis, theory and provisional theory, ongoing developing theory. It is not of things but of phenomena, and it is not through causes but through correlations. Not only has there developed this new knowledge, natural knowledge, knowledge of the world of nature, but historical knowledge was transformed in the nineteenth century, revealing a dimension of humanity that was successfully ignored by the standardization of man through classicism, with its *philosophia perennis*, a philosophy that holds for all times and places; its laws and customs were the deposit of the prudence and wisdom of mankind, its works of art were classical, immortal, and so on. The standardization of what it is

to be a man is out the window in the modern world. It has been remarked that the disappearance of the study of Latin and Greek kept pace exactly with the obsolescence of the cane. Thirdly, philosophy has to undergo a shift from the cosmological to the anthropological, *die anthropologische Wende*. And what has the Church been doing for these three centuries, from the end of the 1600s to the end of the 1900s? It has been sitting on the lid, systematic rearguard action, followed by a sudden release, leaving Church leaders at a loss; they are in a world they did not know existed; presenting theologians with an undigested mass of problems to be solved. Some of them are touched upon in the questions for today, but only a few of them. All that any theologian can do is get hold of some one and do something about that. I will be talking about Christology tonight, but this question today might make me think, Well, maybe if I had done work on something else – but everybody has to get in on it, that is ongoing collaboration.

Leaders are at a loss, and what have we had? Well, we have had bright ideas, movements, bandwagons, enthusiasm, and let-downs. Shortly after I returned from Rome, former students of mine – they had become parish priests in the coal fields of Western Pennsylvania – came to see me. It was a little difficult to travel, so they got themselves a plane to travel out, and they would say to me, ‘In my parish, Father, I have the biblical movement, the Christian family movement, the liturgical movement, the catechetical movement, the homiletic movement,’ and I forget what others. ‘How do you put them together?’ Well, how do you put movements together? You set one aside another, and they get along. So much for the internal cause: sitting on the lid, followed by an explosion. You pick up the pieces after an explosion and start again.

The external cause is secularism. Scientific understanding is geared to an ever fuller understanding of data. Of its nature, it is not going to tell you anything about ultimate causes; it never can. From its very nature, it is geared to an understanding of this world, and consequently it provides for the indefinite postponement, with a little bit of good will, of all religious questions. Whenever you get questions, they can be postponed by saying, ‘Well, let’s do some science.’

That is one aspect. But it is not the only aspect of it; there were the wars of religion. First of all, there were the wars against the heretics, and then there were the wars of religion after the Reformation. There was the scandal of the wars of religion and the reaction: well, let’s get rid of positive religion, let’s start off with natural religion and Deism, and since that has not much push to it, very shortly, ‘We can get along without any religion.’ Or at least if we don’t consider it evil, don’t consider positive religion evil, as has been the traditional view in continental Europe, then we regard it as a purely private affair, something that public life abstracts from.

There was the mobilization of all these ideas and their organization in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and they were accepted by the enlightened classes, and by and large they were confined to the enlightened classes, up to the twentieth century. But in the twentieth century, with the great benefit of universal education, these ideas have been disseminated to the whole population. And so we have a boy of seven on TV saying that his catechism teacher does not prove what she says! Gadamer’s *Wahrheit und Methode* is a critique of the Enlightenment’s negation of tradition, and so the inability to interpret any document; you need a tradition to do that. But the negation of tradition was the negation of the tradition of religion. That is what they were concerned with – to get rid of traditional religion; they got rid of tradition altogether. When you get rid of tradition altogether, insofar as you succeed, you wipe out the whole history of human development. You approximate as best you can the state of people found in the rain forests of the Philippines a couple of years ago. That is the effect of getting rid of tradition. And

if you don't do it all along the line, you can approximate to it. One of the first steps in the approximation is – don't pay any attention to anyone who does not prove what he says. Well, it is my opinion that 98% of what a genius knows depends upon his beliefs, and consequently if you have a genius who does not depend in any way upon his beliefs, well, he has only 2% of that knowledge, and if he isn't a genius he hasn't got that! So what has hit the twentieth century has been this generalization of the Enlightenment. What was the view of the new people of the eighteenth century has become pretty well general views; it is assumed everywhere. I don't know about the rest of the world, but in the Province of Ontario there is a Catholic school system run by Catholics at terrible expense for Catholics. But the teachers in the Catholic schools have to go to the normal school, the college of education, which is run not by the Catholics but by the educationalists, depending upon their favorite psychologists and sociologists and historians, and so on. I'm not sure that it is not defeating the whole purpose of having a Christian education.

Well, there you have two hypotheses with regard to why we are where we are. What is to be done about it? Well, as the characters in Damon Runyan, we have to do what we can. 'How are you doing?' 'I'm doing what I can.'

Question: Does the basic religious experience of unrestricted loving necessarily include an awareness of being loved unrestrictedly. And if so, what, in that context, is the meaning of suffering as punishment for sin?

Lonergan: I think there is very little that is known necessarily. I think that if you assume certain premises you can get necessary conclusions, that if you define the natural numbers in terms of the recursive 'plus one,' so that one is equal to one more than zero, and two is one more than one, and three is one more than two, and so on to infinity and add certain assumptions with regard to equals and plus and so on, then you can establish the validity. You can set up a subtraction table from that, and then you can go on to a multiplication table, and all your conclusions will follow necessarily from your premises. But your premises are assumptions. So I wouldn't say that anything is necessary. Then, de facto, there is not only God's gift of his grace, there is also God's revelation in Christ Jesus. God so loved the world that he sent his only-begotten Son. There is that objective revelation of God's love to complement the interior experience of God's grace.

What in that context is the meaning of suffering as punishment for sin? Well, I don't know that I ever did a big job on the explanation of suffering in terms of punishment. However, I've always been basically impressed by a text in Isaiah, 'My ways are not your ways, and my thoughts are not your thoughts.' God is not another man. If man's destiny is union with God as God is, then creation as preparatory to that has to be a revelation of God. How do you reveal the infinite through the finite? You can't do it directly because the finite is not infinite. You have to do it indirectly, and that is only through a contrast: the contrast between love and hate, between goodness and malice. God is mystery, and suffering in the world is revelation of mystery, just as the world is revelation.

Faith is the substance of things unseen, and the goodness of God is seen only partly in the good things of the world. The mystery of the goodness of God is revealed in the evils of the world. Hope is counting on an ultimate revelation of the goodness of God, and God's love is revealed in suffering. God so loved the world as to give his only Son. I think that is the

fundamental meaning of evil and of suffering, the revelation of the infinite in the finite, the ultimate meaning of love as self-transcendence, self-donation.

There is also the humanistic meaning of suffering. In Greek literature, there is the play upon *mathē pathē*; you have it in the Epistle to the Hebrews: Christ learned through what he suffered. Martindale has the story of some sailor; he worked on the docks, part of the rearguard action. There was a sailor who saw a crucifix for the first time in his life, and he was talking to Martindale in his room or somewhere, and the sailor looked at it and said, 'Well, that fellow had very little to learn, did he?' There is learning through suffering, and most people have the opportunity to learn like that. It operates in two ways: as change in the subject; in suffering you begin to see things that you didn't see before, also things about yourself; but it is also motivation for overcoming evil. Toynbee's fundamental category is challenge and response. The challenge must not be too stiff, or people will never meet it, but it is useless if it is too easy; they won't get down to doing anything; they'll never roll up their sleeves and get down to doing something about it.

Perhaps that is a start for a discussion of an enormous question. My treatment of the question of evil has usually been incidental, either before I start talking about God or talking about the problem as raising the question of God, and so on.

Question: Contemporary evidence does not show that the great classical therapies of, say, Freud, Jung, Adler are more effective in bringing about psychological healing than the more recent third-force types of therapy (Frankl, Maslow, Rogers, and Hora, etc.). What does this indicate about the validity of the sophisticated classical models of the psyche as against the less finely-drawn contemporary models?

Lonergan: First of all, the classical models may be theoretically very fine, but not easy to apply effectively. Vergote, the professor of religious psychology at the University of Louvain, holds that Freud has the perfect analysis of the perversions. Being good at that is something, but it is not the whole story. Indeed, there is a recent book by Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death*, given the Pulitzer Prize, and according to Becker neurosis is a matter of living a lie, and we all do it to a certain extent insofar as we all disguise the fact that we are animals in a great variety of ways. If you push it a little too far and disguise the fact that you are a mortal animal, that immortality is the game, then you get yourself into the same box as Freud, who immortalized himself through the discovery of psychoanalysis, with the result that he fainted on two different occasions when pupils would defect; his immortality scheme was going up the spout. These various theories are not more than hypotheses; they are like the rest of science; they're not meant to be the whole story. And knowing the theory, of course, does not mean that you can put it into practice. A scientist can know a lot about atoms and not be able to make a good cake.

Again, problems can have many levels, problems can be on the level of the logos, of eros, of religion, and so on, but they can be on an entirely far deeper spontaneous level of the id. According to Vergote, the id reveals itself in displacement and condensation. Displacement: the great principle that if you dream about lions that you are not afraid of, it really isn't lions that you are dreaming of. You put another image in the place of what you are dreaming about, and imagining a lion is dreaming about something else you are covering up. Condensation: the merging of disparate and different themes, of which the outstanding example are the lines in Macbeth, 'and pity like a newborn babe striding the blast, etc., etc.' A terrific mixture of

disparate images all bearing and sounding wonderful put together. That is one aspect of it. Another aspect of it was the professor of pedagogical psychology at the Greg, Cuchon, a Frenchman. In an article, he spoke about people undergoing anesthesia and coming out. Undergoing anesthesia, the first thing that disappears is the superego, and then the ego, and finally the id. Coming out of anesthesia what first appears is the id, then the ego, and then the superego; and a correlation of these Freudian terms with sections of the brain. The superego corresponding with the frontal lobe and the ego with the temporal lobe and the id with, I think, the thalamus. In other words, from the neural level to the spiritual life, there are a whole series of levels, and you are going to have different therapies for different things. And, of course, there is a hypothetical element in all of this. But the more recent theories have the advantage that they are more humanistic, they are less out of this world.

Question: Within what functional specialty would one work out the psychotherapeutic dimensions of Christian revelation?

Lonergan: Besides theology as a specific subject, there are the interdisciplinary realms. I think the question of the psychotherapeutic dimensions of Christian revelation is interdisciplinary. You have to know two things. You can be a very good theologian without knowing an awful lot about psychotherapy. You have to combine the two. There are all the different human realms which generate areas for interdisciplinary activity between theology and other fields. There is the new university in Germany, Bielefeld, where everything is going to interdisciplinary. Everyone is in favor of it, but the last I heard of it about a year ago, the Catholics were dragging their feet; they don't know what an interdisciplinary theology would imply, and until they know, they are not going ahead; at least that's what I heard. So perhaps that will do on that, we can have more input later.

Question: Does the fact that God's gift of his love exists concretely in each individual person imply that the more one moves towards self-appropriation on all levels, the more one is responding to that gift. In other words, is authentic self-appropriation on all levels equivalent to the authentic response to God's gift?

Lonergan: I think the answer to that is no. But the things are related. Self-appropriation heads towards, it does not achieve but it heads towards, fully conscious, open-eyed, deliberate self-transcendence. The top level in self-transcendence is religious self-transcendence, in response to God's gift of his love. So the two are related. But self-appropriation and self-transcendence are not the same thing. A part of self-appropriation is understanding that the business of the self is self-transcendence. But you can have the self-transcendence known, and realized practically, in the rites of passage of primitives. Primitives communicate to youth the fact that being a man or a woman just isn't a matter of being born and growing. It has an existential moment, in which one somehow discovers for oneself that one has to decide for oneself what one is to make of oneself, or, at least, to choose the assumptions of the tribe and the clan and so on. So the more self-transcendence in real life, one can say, the fuller one's response to God's gift of his love. But self-transcendence and self-appropriation are not identical.

Question: Although a world that is not merely finite but also material necessarily involves a certain number of false starts, breakdowns, and consequent suffering on the part of its sentient inhabitants (e.g., children), is there still not something absolutely wrong about the suffering of children, something that can never be set right by any ‘reward,’ no matter how great? How, then, could a material cosmos with sentient inhabitants (and especially children) be justified under *any* circumstances?

Lonergan: I think the first point is: what is absolutely wrong is what is morally wrong. It is not suffering itself that is absolutely wrong; it is what is morally wrong. The suffering of children can be a means of revealing the wrongness of what is absolutely wrong; but it is not the same as identity. That things are set right by any reward, well, I don’t know if that is part of a viable theory of suffering. It depends on what one means by reward. If one means that one compensates for pains by pleasures, it is an over-simplification of the issue.

How, then, could a material cosmos with sentient inhabitants be justified under any circumstances? Well, if the world is a revelation of divine mystery, I don’t know if that justifies it, that one accepts it in love and faith and hope, and so on. Whether that is justification or not is another question. But God’s ways and God’s thoughts would have to be our ways and our thoughts for us to be competent judges on what God does, to decide if he is just or not.

Question: In a functionally-differentiated theology, the objectification of the authentic subject’s position on such issues as knowing, objectivity, and reality is part of foundations [**change of tape here**]. Does not the objectification of the authentic subject’s position on an issue such as evil, in similar fashion, ultimately become part of foundations, or is it confined to systematics?

Lonergan: Well, it is not confined to systematics. Insofar as theology is a method, foundations of any method involve the objectification of the authentic subject on such issues as objectivity, reality, knowing; that holds in any method. And in theology, the specific foundations of a theology are in the objectification of God’s gift of his love. In dealing with God as evil and wicked, and so on, if you have not got some sort of a way of dealing with the problem of evil, your foundations are out. It pertains to foundations insofar as it is a fundamental subdivision.

Question: To what extent does total Christian adherence to the law of the cross conflict with the contention of liberation theology that the Christian, precisely as Christian, must never be passive in the face of evil?

Lonergan: Well, I think there is a conflict there, and I think that there is a danger that liberation theology becomes tainted with Marxist hatred. ‘The Christian precisely as Christian must never be passive in the face of evil.’ Well, Christ wasn’t particularly active in his suffering and death. That he was not Christian is somewhat paradoxical. I will have more to say on Marxism on Thursday night in my paper ‘Healing and Creating in History.’ Marxism isn’t a Christian view; it is an atheistic view of the world and of history and so on. There are elements of truth in the Marxist analysis of the economy, political economy and capitalism, and so on, and that people have no other way of conceptualizing that is a lamentable fact; it is part of sitting on the lid. But that one has to buy the whole of Marxism to deal with it is a conclusion that I’m not inclined to accept.

It is very difficult to find out exactly what people have in mind in putting these questions. So if anyone wants to subsume or carry forward the answers that came to me in the short time at my disposal and in general, as I've already stated, one theologian is not going to answer all the problems that are part of our inheritance as a result of the explosion.

Questions from the floor

Question: I did not submit any questions, but I would like to have a few more comments on question 4, the question of the interdisciplinary. It raises quite complex issues. *Method in Theology* is not method just in theology. That would mean that if you take the specialty of the history of psychotherapy, you are looking now for two functional specialists or a collaboration of functional specialists [**Loneragan:** a collaboration of disciplines, each with its functional specialties] each with its full canopy of functional specialties. Would you like to expand on that?

Loneragan: Well, it is quite a job, eh? To do it, and still more to expand on it before it has been done. In general, we learn after we do things. I remember asking a mathematical friend what he thought about the new math in the schools. He said that one thing was certain: it was good for the teachers. Whether it is good for the pupils is something we don't know yet. He said this some years ago; they may know by now. The difference between the old math and the new math is that the new math begins at the maximum of generalization. In the old math you did things in a particular way, and you gradually learned to generalize. Your generalizations would regard corrections of assumptions and so on involved in the particular way of doing things. But you first learned to take square roots long before you knew why square roots worked. People who never learned why it worked generally have forgotten how to take it, although they could observe all the rules. This is just an example of how these functional specialties work. Well, that's the thing to be found out. It is one thing to have a general blueprint, it is another thing to build the house. And in doing this, you find the faults in the blueprint and discover that you forgot this and forgot that. It reminds me of the building of a Motherhouse. One nun could imagine perfectly just what any given room would look like, what would be the effect of certain colors on the walls and certain lighting and all the rest of it. That is a terrific gift of concrete imagination, envisaging everything, and it does not come from the fact that it is the first time in your life that you thought of interior decorating; the more you have done of it the more likely you are to hit things off correctly. Similarly with regard to things like this. One learns by doing it, *solvitur ambulando*, in any new field.

Question: In our group we came up with that sort of problem, and the question was related to *Method in Theology*, that if you take the cycle of method at Dialectic, the question of assembly is of interpretations and histories, etc. It seems that there is a sequence of events that have entered and are included in your assembly, but they lack interpretation and history. Is that a sense in which we don't have enough grist for the mill?

Loneragan: Solutions to problems are done by trouble-shooters, people who understand the concrete situation and what they are trying to do; they can see where the block is coming, and it is just that, concrete intelligence, insight into concrete situations. The point to functional specialties is the perfectly general point. Stanislas Lyonnet, professor at the Biblicum, on the

interpretation of Romans 5.12, ‘... in whom all men sinned.’ People say he is a heretic. Well, if you keep interpretation distinct from systematics and doctrines, you don’t leap to that conclusion. The first conclusion is, well, if he is right we will have to change one of our arguments for original sin or drop one, which is an entirely different conclusion. In other words, keep distinct tasks distinct, apart; don’t mix them all up. That is one point. Another point is restraining totalitarian ambitions. When I was a student, the cock of the walk was systematic theology, and of course in my teaching days scripture became cock of the walk, and both had the same defect. They both suffered from totalitarian ambitions. Four or five years ago someone no less than John McKenzie announced that the Old Testament has peaked. In other words, if you are going to have a balanced situation you are not going to have one of the functional specialties claiming to be the whole show, and the rest ... ‘Well, revelation is in scripture, and theology is concerned with revelation; therefore, theology is scripture.’ And you can get a corollary, of course; scripture says nothing about the *homoousion*, therefore it has nothing to do with theology. That is a point on which I will be talking tonight.

Question: Carrying this notion of collaboration along and the blueprint in *Method*, how do you see this being enfolded by theologians and eventually by the larger academic community? Do you see a need for organization? What are some of the things that need to occur if this kind of thing is to have a high probability of succeeding?

Lonergan: Well, it is a matter of people working at it and letting other people see their work and say what’s wrong with it and finding out how that can be avoided in the future. It is a continual build-up. Where did the method of modern science come from? It does not come out of cognitional theory. It comes out of doing it and knowing what works and what does not work. The fundamental formulation of the method of modern science was the rule of the Royal Society that we do not discuss questions that cannot be settled by observation and/or experiment, a negative rule. By doing things under those circumstances, scientific method was discovered, developed. And there have been people giving accounts, different philosophies give different accounts of what science is, and mistaken philosophies give misleading accounts, with the result that continental European philosophers in general make no effort and pay no attention to science, natural science. They do all their thinking prescinding from it or attacking it as purely utilitarian, un-Christian.

Question: Do you see a difference, say, in terms of the advancement of science relative to your own extrapolation of method, how this gives the theologian this awareness that there is this method that maybe the scientist wasn’t aware of as science was developing?

Lonergan: Insofar as he achieves self-appropriation and knows how his own mind works, he will be able to profit from the experience of attempting to do scientific work and succeeding to some extent and in other respects not succeeding. But it is a big order; it isn’t just, ‘We will summarize this book and then go on from there.’ It is a transformation of the subject that is the fundamental thing: intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, with all their implications. And what are the implications? Well, you can find them out in living it and in doing it. The implications are not deductivist. Method is concerned with doing, not deducing.

Questioner: That will take years.

Lonergan: Oh, at least!

Question: Perhaps I'm going to make the same mistake. In your work with transcendental method, after you had kind of gone through it and felt that you really had a hold on it and applied it to theology, you developed a set of functional specialties. In moving to the area of ministry and trying to apply transcendental method there, could you anticipate the possibility of functional specialties arising there?

Lonergan: Well, ministry is one of the functional specialties, communications, the eighth functional specialty. There is from our Aristotelianism a totally mistaken distinction between theory and practice. For Aristotle, theory was knowledge of what is necessary; it is knowledge of the field in which free will has no place. Praxis is knowledge of fields in which free will has a place, of contingent matters, and it is non-scientific. You have a sharp distinction between the two, and people can say, 'I'm a practical person; I don't need to bother my head about this nonsensical theory that never did anyone any good at any time or place as far as I can see. In any contemporary account of knowledge, theory and practice are just different stages of the same thing. There is a continuum between fundamental research, theoretical physics or chemistry, applied science, engineering, industry, trouble-shooters: it is always the same thing, but in different stages of the process. And functional specialties are precisely that. What are the stages in the process in theology from the data down to the communications? A fundamental point about communications and about pastoral work and so on is that it is not a matter of applying principles. At the beginning of Vatican II, there was this Cardinal Archbishop of Turin, I think, who held that all Councils were pastoral. They taught revealed truth. And what does the pastor do? He communicates the revealed truth to his parishioners. The first man I directed in a doctoral dissertation was a young priest from France. Some of you may have heard this story before. He was complaining bitterly about preaching and how irrelevant theology was to preaching. Finally, I caught on to what he was saying and remarked that no one gets up in a pulpit and presents a thesis from dogmatic theology. He said, 'In France you have to.' The idea of a pastoral council has a relevance in France that does not exist in America. You have not been troubled in America with pastors getting up and preaching theses from dogmatic theology. In 1949 I received the Cardinal Spellman Award from Cardinal Spellman, and he said, 'They tell me you are a systematic theologian. I suppose you are like the men that examined me in theology at the end of my course. I didn't understand any of it.' Well, he wasn't going to preach dogmatic theses. That idea is just totally alien to an English-speaking milieu, but it can be extremely relevant to another milieu. But it is not repeating, and it is not applying. You have a process from the undifferentiated, the compact consciousness of the New Testament to the slightly differentiated, incipient differentiation of consciousness of the Greek councils – very, very slight. And a further stage in the medieval world of systematic theology, where that is worked out rather fully, although its underpinnings are not too clear, with the result the Scholastic schools have always been divided on all fundamental questions, and the Scholastic theologians have agreed on the dogmas and on nothing else. Those differentiations of consciousness are starting from the preaching in the New Testament, the pastoral work of the early Church. And the pastoral work of the Church today is the same concrete form of preaching, and you don't arrive at the concrete

form of New Testament preaching by taking doctrines, functional specialties named doctrines and systematics and finding a concrete dress for it. You do it by speaking from the heart and leading a Christian life and talking about it on the basis of it. The spiritual formation of seminarians is the greatest part in their pastoral formation, especially if they don't like it.