

lives they lead and, collectively, for the world in which they lead them.

It is collective responsibility for common or complementary action that constitutes the collective subject, "We," "Us," "Ourselves," "Ours." The condition of the possibility of the collective subject is communication, and the communication in question is not so much accurate statement of objective knowledge but rather revelation of what we are and the communication in question is not saying what we know but showing what we are. For the rationally self-conscious subject has something original, something unedited, to reveal; freely he constitutes himself; freely he makes himself the man he is and freely she makes herself the woman she is; and never in this life is the making finished, always it is still in process

lives they lead and, collectively, for the world in which they live them.

This concern with subjectivity cannot be fitted neatly into the categories devised by the wisdom of Greece, which distinguished the necessary and the contingent, the universal and the particular, the per se and the per accidens, to separate theory and practice, to allot to theory the necessary, the universal, the per se, and to leave to prudent practice the remainder of the contingent, the particular, ~~and~~ the per accidens, ~~from the merely probable~~ and the merely probable. Just as modern science is concerned, not with universals but with ~~from~~ the concrete universe, not with necessary certitudes but with empirically verified probabilities, so too modern concern with subjectivity breaks out of the frame-work of classicist ethics and ~~seeks~~ seeks a new structure in which the breach between "is" and "ought," between universal and particular, between theory and practice, between wisdom and prudence is healed.

I do not think this aim is chimerical. As the dynamic structure of human knowing has its own immanent norms, which are prior and more supple and more nuanced and more extensive than any of their objective formulations in logics and methods, so too there is a dynamic structure of human living with its own immanent norms, and these too possess a reach and delicacy to which the praise of prudence testifies but the techniques of Greek thought are unable to uncover and display.

Objectivity, as misconceived, is transcended. The problem of the ~~bridged~~ bridge from "in^f here" to ~~put~~ "out there" is eliminated by the highly effective device of substituting a new myth for an old one. ~~The distance of hand from eye~~ In place of such separate things as hand and eye, ~~we~~ where the old myth overlooked the organic unity of eye and hand to stress the distance that separated them, the new myth stresses the interpersonal situation, the psychic interchange of mutual presence, the beginnings of a life-long union.

However, objectivity is not the main point. ~~The~~ The myth takes us beyond the dynamic structure of knowing to the fuller and more inclusive structure of human living. It adds the level of rational self-consciousness to the levels of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness. It adds freedom, responsibility, ~~whom~~ encounter, trust, communication, belief, choice, promise, fidelity. It is the level on which subjects constitute themselves and make their world; it is the level on which men individually are responsible for their lives, and men collectively are responsible ~~for~~ for the world in^y which they live ~~there~~ them.

~~Concern with subjectivity, then, is concern with human reality. It asks for an ontology of man.~~

Concern with subjectivity, then, is concern with human reality. It asks not for an ethics to lay down universal laws but for an ontology dealing with concrete facts; and the facts in question are not the facts equally verified in men whether they are asleep or awake; they are not the external facts that can be counted and tabled and handed over to computers to be thought out; they are the inner ^{or partly inner} facts of development, ~~of~~ creativity, ~~of meaning, of~~ freedom, of communication, communion, community, of tradition, interpretation, history.

~~The study of subjectivity, while it cannot be objective in the sense of looking at the reality or appearance that is "out there," must be objective in the sense that it is perceptive, intelligent, rational.~~

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Confusion about objectivity leads to confusion about subjectivity.

In older usage subjectivity was the negation of objectivity. In so far as objectivity was correctly conceived, subjectivity meant the unperceptiveness that neglects the data of experience and the stupidity and silliness that violate the immanent norms of intelligence and rationality. But objectivity ~~was easily misconceived, and then the negation of a misconception was~~ was easily and commonly misconceived. To deny a misconception is, in some manner, to contribute to the reaffirmation of the right concept; and so, in more recent usage, ~~subjectivity has to some extent become the name for objectivity~~ recent usage, subjectivity, while still verbally opposed to objectivity, really is concerned with the foundations of genuine objectivity.

~~In the new myth Jack and Jill do not raise their hands to gaze at ^{not} them. They do not merely gaze at one another; they are busy talking. ~~They are not merely gazing at one another; they are busy talking. Neither of them is a mere object, for both are subjects. Though the two subjects are distinct, still they are not apart but together. There is going on the psychic interchange of mutual presence~~~~

More recent usage is not without its myth, and in ~~the~~ the new myth Jack and Jill are not gazing separately at their hands. They are concerned with one another. They do not merely look but also talk. They are not merely objects, for both are subjects, an "I" and "You" that ~~adds up to the personal total of "We" talking about what interests "Us"~~ add up to the personal total of "Us" talking about "Ourselves" and what "We" have done and shall perhaps do.

Subjectivity in the older, pejorative sense is not excluded explicitly, for there is not enough clarity about its nature. But it is implicitly ^{social worker's} excluded, for the myth is not drawn from a ~~psychiatrist's~~ case book; neither Jack nor Jill is to be imagined as unperceptive, as stupid, as silly. In so far as they know, they know objectively.

~~Still this objective knowing is only incidental. The dynamic structure of human knowing lies within the fuller structure of human being. As was noted~~

Nowhere more than in this field of ~~set~~ properly human studies is the problem of objectivity more pressing or more acute.³ Not only are there the old problems -- and with ~~having said~~ ^{having said} ~~ham saying~~ something on them we must here be content -- but also there are the new complexities that arise when freedom is added to knowledge, and realities emerge from the exercise of freedom, and among the emergent realities are ways of life, gospels, doctrines, *concrete, vivid, appealing* that illumine and direct the future exercise of choice. Is a Weltanschauung true or false? Or does it express a choice? Does it express ~~human consciousness~~ what men know? Or does it express what men choose to be? ~~MEMBERSHIP~~ ~~MEMBERSHIP~~ ~~MEMBERSHIP~~ If the answer straddles the issue, then where does knowing stop and choosing begin? Nor is this all. The problem reduplicates itself in the historian. Does he know objectively what was going on? Or is his act of writing history another act within the history, an act that either recreates and perpetuates the tradition or else criticizes it and thereby initiates the move to change it and substitute something else in its place? Can history be both freely written and true? And if so, is it by general principles or only by calling in ~~the~~ ^{that} honest broker, the prudent man, that the exercise of freedom and the objectivity of knowing are reconciled? Even such merely preliminary questions cannot be tackled when notions on objectivity and subjectivity are confused.

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To resume, I have attempted to state what is ~~clearly~~ ⁽²⁾ meant by a dynamic structure, to indicate such a structure in human knowing, ⁽³⁾ to distinguish consciousness from the self-knowledge which by introspection makes consciousness the source of its data, ⁽⁴⁾ to conclude from the structure of our knowing to the composite character of its objectivity, and ⁽⁵⁾ to illustrate the relevance of the analysis for a clarification of confusions that beset, not only ~~the~~ technical discussions of objectivity and subjectivity, but ~~also~~ ^{properly} also the theory and practice of the human sciences.

and make their world. On this level men are responsible, individually, for the lives they lead and, collectively, for the world in which they live them. Such collective responsibility for common or complementary action is the main constituent of the collective subject, named "We," "Us," "Ourselves," in "Our" world.

Still, there is the condition of possibility of the collective subject; it is communication; and the communication in question is not saying what we know but showing what we are. For a subject to say what interiorly he is, supposes not only consciousness but also introspection; but for him to show what he is, ~~is~~ is something he cannot avoid. Operari sequitur esse, and so every movement, every word, every deed reveal what the subject is. What is to be revealed, finally, is an original creation; for freely the subject makes himself what he is; and never in this life is the making finished, always it is still in process, always it is a precarious achievement that can slip and fall and shatter.

Concern with subjectivity, then, is concern with the reality of man; it is concern with that reality at the high point that eludes the necessary, the eternal, the universal, the per se; it is concern with that reality at the pivotal point where one saves or damns one's ~~own~~ soul
the pivotal point where one contingently, & instantaneously, personally, unpredictably saves or damns one's soul; it is concern with that reality, not as objectively known, but as consciously existing and spontaneously self-revealing

But if the studying must be objective in this sense, still what is studied is not objective knowing but human living

Nowhere more than in this field of properly human studies is the problem of objectivity more pressing or more acute.³ Freely self-constituting subjects rise over a substratum of human knowing and human error. Their utterances may but need not purport to be objective statements of what ~~man~~ is known; primarily they are acts by which subjects reveal what they are and communicate what they would have others be

But if the studying must be objective in this sense, still what is studied is not objective knowing but human living. Nor is it otiose to insist on this distinction. For if there are modes of living that seem vacuous of knowing and modes of knowing too elaborate and technical to be thought of as living. For if there are modes of living in which knowing seems to play a minimal role, and modes of knowing so elaborate and technical that they appear to a layman the negation of living, so rough and ready a distinction

above, human conc consciousness rises on a series of levels. Beyond the three levels of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness, there is a fourth of rational self-consciousness. As intelligence uses sense, as rational consciousness uses both sense and intelligence, so rational self-consciousness is man's use ~~man's~~ not merely of his knowing but also of himself. It is on this fourth level that freedom exists and choice is exercised. It is on this fourth level that knowledge of being transmutes to knowledge of the good, that freedom exists and choice is exercised, that man builds his world and by the same stroke settles the kind of man he is.

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~~Needless to say,~~~~It is this ravelled skein~~

The translucent reality of subjectivity is the disturbing factor that draws ~~away~~ investigations of human knowledge off their course or, when they are precise and accurate, makes them appear wide of the mark. Above I indicated that the objectivity of human knowing is the resultant of experiential, normative, and absolute components. I also noticed that, instead of combining these three, empiricists attended only to the givenness of data, idealists to the consistency and coherency of thought, rationalists to the necessity of affirmation. But if I regard these three philosophies as mistaken, at least I acknowledge that their thinking has hit upon some element that really pertains to the objectivity of human knowing. ~~But However,~~
~~there are other far more common and far more passionately~~

there are other views, far more common and far more passionately advocated, which attend neither to ^{nor to} ~~in which~~ the givenness of data, ^{nor to} ~~the consummation~~ exigences of intelligence and rationality, ^{nor to} ~~the modality~~ with ^{which} judgement reaches its object as independent of its being known. They are the myths by which the translucent reality of subjectivity and the consummations of intersubjectivity ~~draw~~
~~attention to~~ ~~themselves as~~ ~~main~~ ~~claimants~~
 make their claim to be real knowledge of the really real.

Let Jack or Jill raise a hand and look at it. The hand is really out there; it is objectively. The eye is not in the hand but in the head; it is the subject. Yet the eye really sees the hand; it is not blind. It sees what is there to be seen, and it sees nothing that is not there to be seen. In that dramatic image the essence of objectivity stands revealed. On the revelation of essence there follow relentlessly generalization and deduction. Knowing is objective if it is like seeing. If it is not like seeing, it cannot be objective and must be a merely immanent activity.

These conclusions are reached without any scrutiny, let alone any scientific investigation, of ocular vision. There is no question about the validity of the generalization. There is no doubt about the certainty of the validity of the generalization. There is no suspicion that ocular vision may be, not human knowing, but only a component in human knowing. There is no inkling that the objectivity, proper to ocular vision, ~~is~~ falls far short of the objectivity of human knowing. ~~As a vision of the world with mythic thought~~ What is expected is whole-hearted agreement. Anything less would be flying in the face of incontrovertible fact. One is dealing with mythic thought.

Myth has two ~~is~~ meanings. Its ostensive meaning is what it says; and that, to be summary, is nonsense. Its covert meaning is what lies hidden in some deep and sincere conviction that cannot find its adequate expression in objective statement. The covert meaning of the myths of objectivity are the translucent reality of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The overt meaning, if taken seriously, leads to disaster. For the overt meaning of the myth that objective ~~meaning~~ knowledge is a matter of looking, perceiving, Anschauung, provides the spring-board for idealism and makes rational psychology a terra incognita for realists.

It provides the spring-board for idealism. For it ascribes to ocular vision what ocular vision does not attain. Ocular vision has experiential objectivity, the givenness of visual data. But the myth ~~ascribes to~~ ~~ocular vision~~ does not conceive ocular vision as merely a component in human knowing; it does not ascribe to ocular vision merely a component in the objectivity of human knowing; without qualification it finds in ocular vision the essence of objectivity; and so it implies that ocular vision attains what is attained only in judgement, an object known as independent of the knowing. Against this blunder the idealist proceeds with his distinction between reality and appearance.

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We have been indicating the composite objectivity of a single instance of human knowing. But there is needed the long and gradual accumulation of many instances for one to reach knowledge of one's world and oneself. Only when that accumulation has advanced notably, can the question of objectivity arise and then, commonly, it is completely misunderstood. For the question of the objectivity of human knowing is coincident with the question of the intellectual conversion of the human subject and, from the nature of the case, intellectual conversion is beyond the horizon of those not yet converted. They are aware that they are being asked to account for their knowledge; they are unaware that the significance of the question is existential, that it is merely the occasion for a radical purification of their orientation in the world and for a transformation of what they consider the world to be. Accordingly, the existential issue is not met; and accounts of objectivity are considered acceptable only if they justify the orientation in life of the intellectually unconverted.

human

For the converted the real is being, and knowledge of being is a set of determinations of the originating intention that ~~conscience~~ consciously, intelligently, rationally stimulates and guides and penetrates and unites and goes beyond our cognitive activities. By being is not meant being-in-a-place or being-at-a-time, for being is primordial; places are not in places and times are not ~~in~~ at times; yet they are, unless you wish to say that they are nothing, so that being-in-a-place becomes being-in-nothing and being-at-a-time becomes being-at-nothing. Further, as the spatio-temporal manifold does not contain each instance of ~~it~~ but rather is contained in being, so the objectivity of knowledge of being has nothing to do with spatial exteriority; it is not a matter of ~~getting~~ getting from some "in here" to some "out there"; it is a matter of so knowing an object that the object is independent of the knowing. Finally, the meaning of the foregoing remarks is not any negation of spatial extensions or temporal durations; the meaning is a ~~denial~~ denial of materialism. It is a denial of the

coherent

^ materialism that conceives all reality to be a determination, not of being, but of space and time; and it is a denial of the incoherent materialism that conceives some reality to be a determination, not of being, but of space and time, and then adds that there are other, ^{mediately known} realities that are determinations, not of space and time, but of being.

For the unconverted the statement that the real is being is mystifying. ^{they believe} With the real they are quite familiar. They do not claim to know all that there is to be known about it but, at least, they know far more than philosophers could ever teach them. But to talk of being, if not silly, is otiose. What after all is it? A linguistic trick, a grammatical function, the logician's the double negation -- not nothing -- that is the copula, or ~~that~~ ^{the} absolute minimum of information one can have about anything. You say that being includes everything in its every aspect. In that case, you must mean the reality with which we are all familiar from childhood; and if you mean anything else, you must be attempting to replace the life of man and the reality of his world by some bloodless ballet of categories or, even worse, to pass off some idealism under the guise of realism.

~~For the unconverted the reduction of the objectivity of knowledge to its experiential, normative, and absolute components is ludicrous. Human knowing is conceived as a whole, a closed structure, of activities. Experiential, normative, and absolute objectivity are just so many immanent properties of the activities. To combine a set of instances of such closed structures with their immanent properties and thereby reach a set of judgements of the type, I am, it is, I am not it, is to reach a merely immanent account of subject and object and the distinction between them. The real question of objectivity has not been touched. The real question is, How do I know what is out there? To that real question there is one and only one possible answer; it is perception, looking, Anschauung.~~

It is instructive, I think, to work out the consequences of this view. The view itself may be put in two propositions: first, any cognitional activity that resembles looking must, from the nature of the case, be objective; secondly, any cognitional activity that does not resemble looking must, from the

Cognitive Structure

When asked to contribute to this number of Continuum, I naturally thought that I might most usefully address myself to an effort to come to grips with the thought of the other contributors. But I was informed that that could not be arranged. There was, of course, no lack of enthusiasm devotion to dialogue. But there did exist the mysterious complexities of editing and publishing by a fixed date the labors of many authors. So I was not to waste time asking for explanations, still less arguing. I was to sit down at once, select a topic, and write on it.

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~~Structure is the opposite of abstraction. One can abstract A from B, if one can understand A without attending to B. One cannot abstract A from B, if one cannot understand A without attending to B.~~

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~~Structure begins where abstraction ends. By abstraction one disregards the incidental, irrelevant, insignificant, unimportant. It is not abstraction, however, but obtuseness that takes the further step of disregarding the essential, relevant, significant, important. ~~And~~ where structure holds sway, binding in an intelligible ~~unby~~ the components that, if not taken together, are not understood at all.~~

As the idealist was not impressed by the naive realist, so the critical realist finds fault with both. Against the naive realist he maintains that seeing is not human knowing but a component in human knowing, and further that the objectivity of seeing is merely experiential objectivity and not the full objectivity that is attained only by a set of judgements affirming the reality and the distinction of both knower and known. Against the idealist he argues that, since seeing is not human knowing, seeing cannot be human knowing of ~~any~~ appearances. There is such a thinking thing as knowing that something is merely apparent, but that knowing, like all human knowing, is a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging reality of the distinction of both knower and known. Further, he denies the naive ~~na~~ realist generalization: as the full objectivity of human knowing is not in seeing, so it is not in other operations taken by themselves; similarly, the experiential objectivity that is found in seeing, is quite different from the objectivity found in inquiry, understanding, thought, reflection, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. Finally, not only is true that ~~such~~ cognitional operations

If the idealist was not impressed by ~~the~~ naive realist contentions, the critical realist is impressed ~~by~~ neither by the former nor by the latter. Common to both the naive ~~opinion~~ opinion that we know reality by looking and the idealist opinion that we know appearances by looking is the error of picture thinking. Automatically it reduces human knowing to what can be pictured. The naive realist contends that his picture represents both the ~~real~~ reality of the object and the objectivity of the knowing. The idealist contends

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The mechanism of the dialectic, which we have been illustrating quite schematically, needs perhaps no further comment. The naive realist failed to distinguish between the experiential objectivity of seeing, which consists in the givenness of visual data, and the absolute objectivity of judgement, in which the object is posited as independent of the knower. He placed the whole objectivity of knowing in the act of seeing, and thereby he placed the validity of human knowledge and the realism he so dearly cherished on an utterly false basis. The idealist spotted part of the naive realist's error: he recognized some ^ccompositeness in human knowing by distinguishing between sense and judgement; he recognized some difference in objectivity, but he misconceived it as a difference between objective knowledge of appearances and objective knowledge of reality, and so he granted that we have objective knowledge of appearances, but denied that we have objective knowledge of reality. This he misconceived as a difference between objective knowledge of appearance and objective knowledge of reality. On this misconception rests the idealist's conclusion that we can ~~humanly~~ objectively know not reality but only appearances. And it is a misconception for the proper distinction is between the objectivity proper to sense, the objectivity proper to judgement, and the objectivity proper to human knowing as a structured whole, ^{resultant}.

However, it would be a mistake to fancy that the introduction of all the proper distinctions is going to eliminate the altercation that can go on perpetually between naive realists and idealists and the further complications that can be added by naive realist and idealist histories of naive realism and of idealism. Behind naive realism resides a myth, and it is only by going to the root of the matter that ~~then~~ a fully satisfactory solution can be reached.

By a myth, then, I mean an imaginative expression of a truth. The overt meaning of the myth, the image it presents as a revelation of essence,

is transparent nonsense. The covert meaning, however, is a truth that the myth-maker rightly esteems but cannot succeed in expressing accurately.

On the face of it there is not the slightest reason for taking seriously the contention that the essence of objectivity resides in looking, perceiving, Anschauung. The contention does not rest on any serious scrutiny, let alone any scientific investigation, of ocular vision. It does not envisage the possibility that human knowing is not some single operation but a structure of several different operations. It does not suspect that the different operations in the structure are related to one another, not by similarity, but by functional complementarity. It has no inkling that the objectivity of human knowing is, not one property of one operation, but the combination of three different properties that reside in several different operations. If things really are so complex, where on earth does the naive realist get his supreme assurance and complete certitude? ~~Romans~~

To answer that question we must go on to the covert meaning of the myth, and to discover that meaning the simplest procedure ~~is~~ is to consider the myth in its later, revised form. Instead of Jack ~~and~~ Jill raising a hand and gazing at it, let us ~~im~~ imagine them ^{or} fondly fondling gazing at one another. The distinction of subject and object remains, but it is mitigated. Jack and Jill are not merely objects, ~~h~~ for both ~~are~~ are subjects. Between the two subjects there is the psychic interchange that somehow precedes mere mental distinctions between "I" and "Thou," and that precludes the true love that establishes a higher and fuller union even when the distinctions have been made. In that intersubjectivity and, still more, in supervening love the two subjects cease to be just two to become a duality-in-unity with its own pronoun, "We," its own possessive possessive adjective, "Our," ^{with} and the incessant transaction of mutual self-mediation and dialogue that prevent any experience or emotion or thought from lurking in a merely private domain. Objectivity has been sublated, for it has lost its

primacy to subjectivity and collectivity; yet it is retained, for both Jack and Jill are still both really out there; and it is transformed, for what now counts is, not being out there, but being x together.

The overt meaning of the new myth is that objectivity is quite unimportant and, as always, this overt meaning is nonsense. If ~~Jack~~ Jack and Jill really spurn objectivity, they will be unperceptive, stupid, and silly; and the duality-in-unity cannot stand very much of that. But the covert meaning of the meaning of the new myth is the same as the covert meaning of the old. That covert meaning is that what is meant by really real is not anything objectively known

Besides the collective unconscious, there is collective consciousness which ^{supersedes, and retains} abolishes the distinction between subject and object, by-passes the old debates, and reveals on the level of concreteness the reality of community and ~~existence~~ communion.

The new symbol manifestly is far richer and profounder than the old. Its significance ramifies in all directions. Its relevance to the gravest problems of our time is demonstrated by its power, its penetration, and its efficacy. ~~But its bearing on the question of objectivity~~ efficacy. But it has a bearing on the question of objectivity only if one takes it for granted that the question of objectivity is embodied in the old myth and that it is settled by effecting some union between the "out there" and the "in here." That, I believe, is not at all the problem. ~~Jack~~

~~Jack and Jill are unobservant, stupid, and silly, their knowledge will not be objective. Besides true lovers there are, in current college slang, nuts and sluts. One may say that to distinguish between ~~them~~ true lovers and their sad caricature is easy to be objective, and their union is headed for ruin. Nor have the spatial categories of inside and outside anything to do with the givenness of data, firm and the comprehensiveness of understanding, the cautious reasonableness of judgement.~~

The spatial categories of inside and outside have nothing to do with the givenness of data, the comprehensiveness of understanding, the firm yet cautious ~~and~~ reasonableness of judgement. If ~~Jack and Jill~~ Jack and Jill are unobservant, stupid, and silly, their knowledge will not be objective; and their union will founder on the rocks of unperceptiveness, misunderstanding, and bad judgement.

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as naive notions on objectivity are maintained, idealism results. What is not like seeing is not objective; intellectual operations are not like seeing; therefore, they are not objective. Nor is this all. The naive realist has claimed for seeing an objectivity that it does not possess. He has attributed to it the objectivity, not of seeing, but of human knowing; for it is not in seeing but only in human knowing that there emerges the ^{is known to be} virtually ~~conditioned~~ unconditioned, the object that [^]in its reality ~~is~~ independent of of the knower. To reduce seeing to its proper dimensions, the Kantian will claim that we see, not reality, but appearance. Finally, even when naive notions of objectivity are rejected as ridiculous, the end of idealism is not yet in sight. It is one thing to reject a mistaken notion of objectivity; it is a far more complex matter to discover what the correct notion is; nor may we suppose that idealism has in any way weakened the market for simplistic views of objectivity.

To meet this demand, then, let us forget about Jack and Jill singly gazing at their respective outstretched hands, and let us imagine them fondly ~~gaze~~ gazing at one another. ~~Then~~ The distinction between subject and object becomes blurred, for neither object is merely an object; both are subjects. Moreover, there ^{is} is the intersubjectivity that seems somehow to precede ^{there is} mental distinctions between "I" and "Thou," and further [^]the true love that restores a higher union once distinctions happen to have been made. In that ^{find} union it is less than accurate to speak of two subjects; for there has emerged intersubjectivity and union the two subjects merge into a common subject ^{with} with its own pronoun, "we," [^]and its own pronomial adjective, "our," and with the incessant dialogue that prevents any experience or emotion or thought from lurking in a private domain and thereby tending to break the duality-in-unity that has been established.

The foregoing account of objectivity is immediate and formal. It is immediate, for it is in terms of activities and structures that are not only understood and affirmed but also given. It is formal, for it implies what is meant by the adjective, objective: for the objective is, not what appears to be, not what seems to be, not what I imagine, not what I think, not what I am inclined to say, ^{not} ~~but~~ what ~~in~~ possibly could be or might probably be, but what in fact is, and so would be even if I never thought of it at all. To reach the objective is to transcend the subject, to reach what does not depend upon the subject. That can be done if and only if there is reached an ~~and~~ unconditioned; for what is unconditioned, is not conditioned by the subject; and what is not conditioned by the subject, does not depend upon the subject. Cognitive activities no doubt do depend upon the subject; ~~but contingent and so contingent matters of fact~~ contingent and so conditioned matters of fact depend upon the fulfilment of their conditions; but what cognitive process ends up with is a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled; such a conditioned is a de facto unconditioned; not necessarily but de facto it possesses the properties of an unconditioned; it is what we mean by fact; and while facts cannot be known without subjects and cognitive activities, facts themselves are known to be independent of subjects, to be de facto unconditioned.

~~Such an immediate and formal account of objectivity may be contrasted~~

Such an immediate and formal account of objectivity may be contrasted with a metaphysical account that begins from a metaphysics of the universe, adds a metaphysics of cognitive activities, and employs efficient causality to explain how realities produce knowledge of realities in knowers. There is, ^{however,} ~~only~~ ^a difficulty ~~that~~ ^{and it} that can be urged against the procedure ~~arises~~ ^{arises} from ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~possibility~~ ^{possibility} that a metaphysician may be mistaken about his metaphysics, employ his mistaken metaphysics to work out a mistaken account of objectivity, and employ his mistaken account of objectivity to justify his mistaken metaphysics. Then the only way to break the ^c vicious circle

would be for him to set aside views of objectivity, mediated by ~~an~~ uncritical metaphysics, and work out an account of objectivity that arose immediately from the given activities and structures of human knowing. In particular, this non-metaphysical approach seems to be recommended when metaphysicians disagree among themselves and non-metaphysicians are inclined to doubt the validity of the ^{metaphysical} enterprise. Nor is this recommendation ~~to be weakened~~ ^{by objections that appeal to} ~~when there is objected~~ the priority of being. For the ~~priority~~ priority of being does not prove the priority of the study of metaphysics. ~~Being is everything in every aspect. Metaphysics is not knowledge of being.~~ If being is understood concretely as including everything about everything, being is not the first but the last thing one knows; for when one knows everything about everything, one has nothing more to learn. If being is not understood concretely, then metaphysics is just one study among many studies; its place in the order of studies can be determined only by a study of ~~studium~~ studying, an investigation of investigating, a knowing of knowing; and, as distinct and separate from cognitive theory, metaphysics is not a study of studying, an investigating of investigating, a knowing or ~~of~~ of knowing.

Besides cognitive and metaphysical accounts of objectivity, there are also symbolic accounts. The former are analytic; they presuppose the differentiation of consciousness that makes possible the detached attitude, the concentrated attention, the patient investigation, the grasp of essentials, and the comprehension of detail, that to ~~differentiated~~ undifferentiated consciousness are the stamp and seal of the technical, the abstract, and the unreal. Symbols, in contrast, are affect-laden images that make up for their lack of precision by their intensity and their efficacy. All the complexity of cognitive theory, epistemology, and ontology ~~are rolled up into~~ are passionately rolled up in a picture. Jack or Jill holds up a hand and gazes at it. The gazing eye is in the head. The stretched forth hand is out there. The eye beholds the hand. The hand is the really real object. The eye is the knowing subject. The beholding is objective, for it sees what is there to be seen, and it does not see what is not there. What more could one want?

~~One might, I think, desire that the symbol remain just a symbol, that~~

One might, I think, desire that the symbol remain just a symbol. For essence, when it is supposed to be a revelation of ~~things as they are~~, it is apt to be made a basis of argument and thereby generate myth. ~~Too easily~~ ^{and} ~~too easily~~ ^{to assert that} Too easily may one leap from ~~the~~ image^s to ~~the~~ universal propositions, every cognitive activity that is ~~like~~ like seeing must be objective, ^{that} and any activity that is not like seeing cannot be cognitive for it is not objective. But the activity of human intelligence is not like seeing: either, then, one ^{say} must that one's intelligence is neither objective nor cognitive but a purely immanent activity, or else one must substitute for intelligence a spiritual eye that gazes at universals. Again, the activity of rational consciousness in preparing and eliciting judgements is not at all like seeing: either one must regard judging as a purely immanent activity, or else replace judgement by a spiritual eye that gazes at the correspondence between cognitive operations

and cognitional objects. In brief, unless one denies the validity of one's mind, one has to pretend that one's mind is very different from what it is. Under such a dispensation it would not be surprising if scientists for the most part were positivists, and metaphysicians ^{for the most part} huddled together in some ghetto.

~~The effective way to defeat a misleading symbol help from~~
~~It can be argued, not without an appeal to Plato, that to defeat ~~one~~ a symbol one had best introduce another. Instead of Jack or Jill ^{ab abd singly} gazing at their ^{and} respective outstretch outstretched hands, let them fondly gaze at one another. To ocular vision there are added both the intersubjectivity that precedes distinctions between "I" and "Thou" and the love that restores a higher union once the distinctions are made. The intentional distance of subject and object is abolished. Now, instead of subject and object in the separation of ~~g~~ fragmenting abstraction, there is the concrete duality-in-unity of intersubjectivity and love~~

It can be argued, not without help from Plato, that to defeat a myth one needs another myth, that to oust a symbol one had ~~best~~ best introduce another. Instead, then, of Jack and Jill singly gazing at their respective outstretched hands, let them fondly gaze at one another. Ocular vision is not excluded. But to it is added both the intersubjectivity that seems somehow to precede mental distinctions between "I" and ~~the~~ "Thou" and, as well, the true love that restores a higher union once the distinctions ^{, it is urged,} unfortunately ~~are~~ are made. Too exclusive an attention to knowledge results in a fragmenting abstraction that keeps subject and object irreducibly apart. But if one adds intersubjectivity and love, there emerges the ~~common~~ subject, "We," and the internal transaction of dialogue ^{"our"} common subject, "We," ~~its~~ common experience, and the internal transaction of dialogue to prevent any experience from lurking in a private domain and tending to break the duality-in-unity that has been established.

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component

Cognitive structure is a structure not only of activities but also of partial objects. As inquiry links experiencing with understanding to yield thinking, the data of experience and the content of ideas are combined in objects of thought. As reflection finds objects of thought to be quite other than the being it intends, so reflective understanding and judgement promote the object of thought to the object that is known to be. Hence, just as human knowing is not a single operation but a structured whole that includes experiencing, understanding, and judging, so too the proportionate object of human knowing has to be a ~~simple~~ compound object that unites the data of experience, the intelligibility grasped by understanding, and the factuality posited by judgement. Necessarily, composite knowing and proportionate known are isomorphic.

From the structure, then, of human knowing one may conclude ~~in analogy~~ with Aquinas to its proper object: quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. From the proper object one may conclude to the metaphysical triad of potency, form, and act; and as the structure of the knowing is a structure of cognitive activities, none of which by itself is human knowing, so the structure of the material thing is a structure of component principles, potency, form, and act, none of which is a material thing; ipsa non sunt sed eis aliquid est. From different kinds of knowing one can conclude to different kinds, substantial and accidental, of potency, form, and act. Parallel with the dynamic intentionality of knowing, one will verify the dynamic finality of the material universe. Either from the knowing or from the known, one can extrapolate systematically to angels and to God. On an objective extrapolation angels are a compound of form and ~~act~~ existence, and God is pure act. By extrapolating from the subject one concludes with Aristotle that in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intellegens et id quod id intellegitur, and with Aquinas that God is not only ipsum esse but also by identity ipsum intellegere.

It has been objected that such conclusions violate the priority of being because they violate the priority of the study of metaphysics. But the priority of being does not prove the priority of the study of metaphysics. ^{Being} ~~Per-being~~ includes everything in its every aspect; ^{hence} ~~and that~~ ^{being,} we know, if at all, not first but last; once one knows everything in its every aspect, one has nothing more to learn. What then do we know in knowing metaphysics. The obvious answer is that besides knowledge of being there is the intention of being. ^{It} is on that intention that metaphysics rests. But the study of the intention and its unfolding in human knowing pertains to cognitive theory; the study of the intention and its unfolding in relation to what transcends immanent activity ^{immediately or mediately} pertains to epistemology; and the conclusions that follow ^{from} the isomorphism of composite knowing and proportionate known pertain to metaphysics. Really, cognitive theory, epistemology, and metaphysics are not three distinct subjects; for a distinct subject can be studied independently, but these three are linked together intrinsically. A study of cognitive activity is incomplete as long as it prescind from the objectivity of knowing; yet as soon as objectivity is considered, one has left cognitive theory for epistemology. A study of cognitive theory and epistemology, if it arrives at precise results, settles whether or not metaphysics is possible; it settles the possibility, not merely of the name, metaphysics, not merely of the abstract legitimacy of the undertaking, but also the character and precise content of the metaphysics that is possible. Finally, while being is independent of our knowing it, our knowledge of being ~~is~~ has no such independence; it is by identity our knowing; metaphysics is part of that knowing. Because metaphysics is a part of our knowing, it is one study among many studies; and which study comes first, is settled not by the priority of being but by a study of studying, an investigation of investigating, a knowing of knowing.

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We began from whole and part to pick out the significant instance of structure. We distinguished static, materially dynamic, and normally formally dynamic structures. We argued human knowing to be a dynamic structure, and human self-knowledge to be a reduplicate reduplication of the structure in which consciousness is a part. From structured knowing we went on to its ~~xx~~ composite objectivity, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and the metaphysical theorems composite objectivity, and thence to an indication of metaphysical structures.

~~We skimped details not merely because we attempted to set them forth elsewhere but also because details, while necessary for a firm grasp of the matter, too easily prevent an apprehension of the whole. But we did so as well because the whole can be apprehended yet rejected.~~

We skimped details, not merely because we had attempted to set them forth elsewhere, not merely because their multiplicity obscures what is essential, structure, but also because difficulties and objections tend to center on the enterprise as whole. I consider them, not in the order of their weight and importance, but in the order that allows the discussion to be cumulative and later answers to profit from earlier ones.

~~It is contended, then, that there is not one but two types of human knowing. Besides the knowledge by description which can be analysed and itself described, there is knowledge by acquaintance which is prior, non-technical,~~

First, then, there is the psychological fallacy. The cognitional theorist uses words, concepts, judgements. But it does not follow that he is talking about words, concepts, judgements. Neither internal nor external experience, neither inquiry nor reflection, neither direct nor reflective understanding are words, concepts, judgements; nor do they bear any resemblance to words, concepts, judgements. Further, what is mentioned briefly, may occur only over a long interval of time; things treated separately, may occur in conjunction. In brief, the language and thought of the cognitional theorist

objectively known. He is not alone but with others who also are subjects. His inner citadel is transformed by the psychic interchange of mutual presence; it is haunted by the longing that night and day invades his affectivity and his imagination; his communication with others, so far from being limited to objective statements of objective knowledge, principally consists in rises from in the ~~innumerable~~ endlessly variable shifts of his countenance, his voice, his movements, that express not what he knows but what he is; it finds its adequate form, not in treatises, but in ~~in play and in work~~ art and symbol, in work and play, in love and hatred, in poetry and ~~in~~ ~~in~~ literature.

The subject of which we have been speaking is the subject as subject.
Though we cannot know him objectivity objectively, though we cannot speak of
him from the basis of objective knowledge
As soon as we know him

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An account of objectivity is incomplete unless one also

An account of objectivity suffers from an extrinsic incompleteness unless one also adverts to subjectivity. For the mysteries of subjectivity easily make claims to objectivity, and then they become myths that block any clear-headed view of what objectivity is.

The empiricist's appeal to the givenness of data, the idealist's insistence on consistency and coherence, the rationalist's demand for necessity, though inadequate accounts of objectivity, at least have the merit of drawing attention to the several components that, taken together, are the real constituents of the objectivity of human knowledge. But there are views of the objectivity of h

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We have been saying (1) that human knowing is a dynamic structure, (2) that human self-knowledge is a reduplication of the structure and so that consciousness is not the whole but only the experiential part of that reduplication, and (3) that the objectivity of human knowing is not some single property of some single act but the combined properties of several different acts. There are many ways in which our statements can be misunderstood. It is hardly possible to anticipate all of them. But, since our purpose is clarification, it will not be amiss to indicate the principal devices which misunderstanding employs.

The first and most efficacious device of misunderstanding is to disregard presuppositions. I have been outlining structures. It has not been possible to ~~explain~~ help the reader to arrive at an immediate and personal experience of each of the activities that enters into the structure. But unless a reader acquires that immediate, personal, identified experience, then he will not be able to identify the activities that enter into the structure and, consequently, his apprehension of the structure will be empty. Our account will not explain his knowing to him; he will read it as a blind man uses Braille to read about sight and color.

A second device is the psychological fallacy. A cognitive theorist expresses himself with words; but it does not follow that he is talking about words. The words he is employing are related to concepts and judgements; but it does not follow that he is talking about concepts and judgements; he may be talking about sensations, images, inquiry, acts of direct or reflective understanding, reflection, ~~inner~~ consciousness, introspection. No one of these is the same as any of the others; and none of them are either words or concepts or judgements. One knows each by direct personal experience, or else one knows them the way the blind know color.

The psychological fallacy has various extensions. If the cognitive theorist expresses himself in logical fashion, it does not follow that he is

talking about logical process. If he does not say everything at once, it does not follow that the many things he ~~s~~ says do not or cannot occur at once.

If he states one thing after another, it does not follow that he means that they can occur only in that order. The growth of a tree adds new to old; ce.
and the dependence of the new on the old is not a logical dependen
but the new is not independent of the old; Similarly, the growth of human
knowledge by mounting experience, developing understanding, maturing judgement,
addw adds new to old; but the new is not independent of the old, for our
new knowledge is an adaptation of what we already knew; and that ^dasaptation
is a matter, not of logic, but of intelligence and rationality.

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As above we distinguished between consciousness of ourselves and our inner activities and, on the know other hand, knowledge of ourselves and our inner activities, so now it is important to advert to the application of the d same distinction to ~~my~~ objectivity. It is one thing to be aware that we are knowing and that our knowing is objective; it is quite another to know what

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Against any analysis of knowledge there ~~x~~ is a set of stock objections, of mistakes that commonly are made. As our present purpose is clarification, it may be well to run through them.

First, of course, is the psychological fallacy. Because the psychologist's account of our inner activities employs concepts, judgements, and words, it is concluded that the inner activities in question cannot possibly be emotions, sensations, images, inquiry, insights; they must be concepts, judgements, or words. This conclusion does not follow from its premisses. So I beg to draw attention that the words, experience, understanding, consciousness, reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, do not refer to concepts or to judgements or to words.

Next comes the habitual fallacy. We have been analyzing a single instance of human knowing. But there is needed the ~~y~~ long and gradual accumulation of many instances before one reaches knowledge of one's world and of oneself. During this process of mounting experience, developing understanding, and maturing judgement, we build up a store of habitual knowledge on which we draw for the rest of our lives. Further accretions to the store occur, but they do not ~~x~~ occur as totally new and ~~ix~~ totally independent increments; later judgements qualify and revise earlier judgements; fresh insights would not occur had earlier insights non occurred; and new experience merges with old. Now the habitual fallacy consists in ignor~~ing~~ing this temporal dimension in the acquisition of human knowledge. ~~It~~ It supposes that if one knows something today which one did not know yesterday, then the added knowledge must be independent of what one knew before. The conclusion does not follow from its premisses. The growth of a tree ~~adds~~ adds to the true tree; but what is added is not independent of what went before. In similar fashion to learn what we did not know is largely a matter of adapting what we already know.

Thirdly comes the logical fallacy which fancies that, because logic is sometimes relevant to an account of cognitional process, therefore there is no cognitional process to which logic is not relevant. This conclusion does

not follow from its premisses. Logic formulates the ideal of consistency and coherence; occasionally it makes plain that the ideal has been attained; normally its usefulness is that it reveals that the ideal has not been attained. But the pursuit of knowledge is not merely the pursuit of consistency and coherence. But the pursuit of consistency and coherence is only incidental to the pursuit of knowledge; and so the contributions of logic are similarly ~~and~~ incidental to the pursuit of knowledge.

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We have been indicating the composite character of the objectivity of a single instance of human knowing. But there is needed the long and gradual accumulation of many instances before one reaches knowledge of one's world and of oneself. Data accumulate in memories; insights remain with us as habits of understanding; about the age of seven years we are thought to be able to make certain elementary judgements and by the age of twenty-one we are no longer accounted minors before the law. During this long process of mounting experience, developing understanding, and maturing judgement we build up the store of commonsense knowledge on which we draw for the ~~new~~ rest of our lives; and principally it is about this store that philosophers inquire and debate.

There is, I believe, no reason to distinguish between the initial store and later accretions, to name the former a knowledge by acquaintance and the latter a knowledge by description, and to maintain that the two types of knowledge are essentially different. No doubt, adults know more than children; no doubt, their broader knowledge makes their judgements more secure; science, while children are restricted to the ~~development of~~ more spontaneous development of intelligence that specializes in the particular and concrete and is named common sense. But such differences do not suffice to justify the opinion that what is called human knowing is not one thing but two. Adults and children have the same sensitive apparatus; most adults have no grasp of science, so that their understanding of things improves in the same manner as does the child's; most adults make few strictly personal judgements and, like children, they are content to accept as true or false what others repeatedly tell them; most adults have no accurate notion of the nature of human cognitive process or of its objectivity; in them, as in children, the originating intention of being consciously, intelligently, rationally, but not ~~knowingly~~ knowingly assembles the constituent parts of an instance of knowing, and so is aware ~~of the assembly~~ when the assembly is complete without being able to understand in what the assembly consists and why its completion is knowledge.

psychology

It must be like ocular vision. Were it not, it would not be objective.

These are the main points of the theory.

One of the main points of the theory is that the mind is not a container of information.

The mind is a process of information processing. The mind is not a container of information.

One of the main points of the theory is that the mind is not a container of information.

The point to this distinction between reality and appearance emerges as soon as one asks what precisely do we know by sense alone. Does touch merely know "feels heavy," or does it know "is heavy" as well? Does sight merely know ~~is~~ "looks green," or does it know "is green" as well? It is very difficult to assert that the "is" comes, not from judgement, but from touch or from sight. Who on earth ever touched "is" with his body or ^{saw} ~~saw~~ it with his eyes? But if no one has done so, it follows that touch and sight do not yield knowledge of the objective properties of things. By touch we know of lead not that it is ~~is~~ heavy but only that it feels heavy; by sight we know of fields not that they are green but that they look green; by our external senses we know not reality but appearance.

In fact, by our external senses we no more know appearance than reality; it is just as much a judgement to affirm ~~what~~ appearance and deny reality as to affirm reality and deny mere appearance. The function of ~~the~~ external sense in human knowing is, not to know, but to be a component in knowing. But that fact is beyond the grasp of picture thinking which insists on a merely spatial notion of objectivity and, if it were consistent with itself, would have to claim that objective knowledge was reported, not by "is green" and "is heavy," but by "looks green" and "feels heavy." For picture thinking, it is when the grass looks green that one is seeing what is outside, ^{it is} and when the lead feels heavy that one is in ~~contact~~ contact with reality; ^{for picture thinking,} "is green" and "is heavy" are meaningless until the "is" is replaced by "really out there."

~~Secondly, the naive view of objectivity eliminates not only the objectivity but also the very nature of consciousness. If consciousness is to be objective, it will have to be a species of looking; and as consciousness is some sort of knowledge of one oneself and one's inner activities accordingly~~

A second instance is provided by

Secondly, the naive view of objectivity narrows the field, obscures the nature, and eliminates the objectivity of consciousness. It conceives objective knowing on the model of the look; but looking is ~~merely~~ merely empirical; so far from being intelligent or rational, it is compatible with stupidity and silliness. Consciousness, therefore, inasmuch as it is objective, must be merely empirical; it is an inner sense; and to speak of intellectual or rational consciousness must be either a misnomer or else the name of an activity that ^{act or} contributes nothing to the objectivity of knowledge. Besides narrowing the field of consciousness, the naive or spatial view of objectivity obscures its nature. When we look, we know what we are looking at. Inner sense, accordingly, knows what it looks at; but it knows the self and its inner activities; therefore, inner sense looks at the self and its inner activities. Hence, to speak of the subject as subject is to be speak of what cannot be known; all that can be known is the subject as object. Finally, there is eliminated the objectivity of consciousness. Looking inward is no better off than looking outward. ^{For the very same reasons,} But looking outward is knowledge, not of reality, ~~but~~ but of appearance. Therefore, looking inward is knowledge, not of reality, but of appearance. The sensible world ~~of appearance~~ appears to a subject; and the subject too merely appears. Nor can the phenomenal subject in his phenomenal world be saved by his intellectual and rational consciousness; for intellectual and rational consciousness cannot be conceived when looking provides the model for objective knowing ^{act or} pertain to the subject as subject; and when looking provides the model for knowing, the subject as subject does not even appear.

Thirdly,

~~nature of the case, be a merely imman immanent activity; of itself, it is not objective; and if in any manner it makes any contribution to human knowing, then that contribution adds nothing to the objectivity of human knowing. Such is the view both as an assertion and as a consequent negation. Its~~

~~Its consequences fall in two different and opposed categories. If one starts from the assumption that human knowing is objective, one ends up with a systematic falsification of cognitive fact; and if one starts from the facts of human cognitive activity, one ends up with a series of idealisms.~~

Let us begin from the assumption that human knowing is objective. Manifestly, then, ocular vision is knowledge of reality; it is the supreme realization of the look; from the nature of the case it must be objective. Further, as the colors we see, so the sounds we hear, the odors we smell, the hot and cold, wet and dry, rough and smooth, hard and soft that we touch, all are really out there. Animals and men reside in a world, not of appearance, but of reality. Still, human knowing is not restricted to the sensible order; our intellects too are objective. Now there is a good deal of obscure and doubtful stuff that can be written about inquiry, insight, definitions, postulates, hypotheses, theories, heuristic structures, and so on. But our concern is knowledge as knowledge, knowledge as objective; and the essence of objectivity stands revealed in the image of Jack or Jill raising a hand and gazing at it. To get down to the nub of the matter then, to the validity of our intellectual activities, the one thing ⁿ necessary is to see that intellectual activity is objective because it is like taking a look. Nor is the proof of the matter difficult, provided one goes about things the right way. One would run into endless obscurities and complexities if one tried to find out what actually took place in the genesis of our sciences. But the sciences are ~~independent~~ universal; no less than the particular, the universal can be ~~known~~ known objectively only by something resembling a look; and so the essential feature of our intellectual activity consists, first, in the ~~ax~~ abstraction of the universal from the reality known by sense and, secondly, in an intellectual

look at the abstracted universal. There remains a final point, for men by their intellects not only know but also know that they know; in judgement, there is known not only the real thing but also the truth of the knowing; ~~inasmuch as~~ truth is correspondence of knowledge to reality; therefore, since in judgement the truth of the judgement is known, it follows that the correspondence of the judgement is known and, indeed, known objectively. But ~~object~~ knowing is objective inasmuch as it is like looking; and therefore in judgement one must see the correspondence of the judgement ~~to the~~ to the object ~~is~~ known by the judgement.

~~Next, instead of beginning from an assumption of the objectivity of human knowing and deducing what human knowing must be if it is to be objective,~~

However, matters of fact cannot be simply postulated. It is all very well to take it for granted that human knowing is objective and that objectivity is the property that stands revealed in looking. But ~~it is also necessary that the conclusions one deduces from one's assumptions~~

Now the foregoing view clearly affirms the objectivity of human knowing. But it can be maintained only by ~~the~~ disregarding large areas of ~~the~~ cognitive fact and by evading those that are forced upon one's attention. There is attributed to ocular vision an objectivity it does not possess; there is ~~are~~ cognitive character and the ~~disregarded the~~ objectivity proper to intellectual and rational activities; and there is forced upon them a cognitive character and an objectivity that they do not possess. Attention to the facts will have one of two results: if the naive notion of objectivity is ~~maintained~~ maintained, then the facts will exclude the objectivity of human knowing, and there will result an idealism; if the naive notion of objectivity is dropped, then the facts will lead to a correct notion of objectivity and to a critical realism. Such is the logic of the issue, and we propose to illustrate that logic; the illustrations will touch on themes ~~familiar~~ familiar from the history of philosophy; but this contact with historical themes is not intended to be and, indeed, it ~~cannot~~ cannot be anything like a history of the course of philosophy thought.

First, the naive or spatial view of objectivity attributes to ocular vision properties that it does not possess. Ocular vision is, not human knowing, but a component part in human knowing; and the objectivity of ocular vision is, not the absolute objectivity that in judgement posits objects as independent of the subject, but the experiential objectivity, the givenness, proper to the data of sense and of consciousness. When then the picture thinking claims that ocular vision is objective knowledge of reality, three errors are involved: there is the picture thinking itself; there is the oversight of the structural character of human knowing; and there is the oversight of the composite character of the objectivity of human knowing. Naturally enough not all three mistakes are corrected immediately and simultaneously, and so the transition from naive to critical realism is a period of idealism.

Take, for instance, the distinction between reality and appearance. When I lift a lump of lead, I can report that the lead is heavy or that it feels heavy. When I see a green field, I can report that the field is green or that the field looks green. But the two reports in each case are not identical. When I say "is heavy" or "is green," I am attributing properties to objects that are outside me. But when I say "feels heavy" or "looks green," I am reporting impressions made on me. In the former case I am talking about external realities; in the latter I am talking about their appearances.

Plainly, in this context, "appearances" are not instances of illusion or hallucination

In this context, plainly, there is no suggestion that by appearance is meant anything like illusion or hallucination. Indeed, as yet, there is no suggestion that we do not know external realities. Still, an ominous note is struck. Instead of saying that "looks green" has to do with external reality, as coherent picture thinking demands, it is struck.

In this context, plainly, there is no suggestion that by appearance is meant anything like illusion or hallucination.

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It is one thing to be aware of the objectivity of one's knowing; it is quite another to explain just what knowing and objectivity are. Because our knowing is a dynamic structure that consciously, intelligently, rationally assembles itself, it has only to follow its own immanent norms to be aware when it arrives at its term. So it is that those who are ignorant of philosophy experience little need of learning it, while those that have been inviegled into ~~xxx~~ taking up the study commonly feel that they are being asked to learn what they already know. Moreover, they are apt to regard with utter ~~any~~ incredulity any long-winded, technical, abstruse, complicated, difficult account of what objectivity is. After all, they know what it is; they experience no difficulty in distinguishing knowledge from opinion, conjecture, supposition, hypothesis, theory; and yet they can make neither head nor tail of the difficulties that are raised and the implausible solutions that are offered. Things, they feel, must be far simpler than that. Nor can this feeling easily be dispelled. Before one can distinguish between consciousness, which is aware when knowing reaches its term, and the part of self-knowledge ^{one's} that is knowing what knowing is and in what its objectivity consists, one must have grasped that human knowing is a structure and that self-knowledge ^{complete} is a reduplication of the structure.

Spontaneously, then, there exists a market for simpliste views on objectivity. Let Jack or Jill hold up a hand and gaze at it. The intently gazing eye is in the head; it stands for the subject. The really real hand is out there in front of the eyes; it stands for the object. The eye sees the hand. It sees what is there to be seen. It does not see what is not there to be seen. That is objectivity. "hat more could anyone want?

No one could want more, provided he intended to remain on the level of picture thinking. But pictures, affect-laden images, passionately espoused symbols, tend to be mistaken for revelations of essence; and then they become the generators of myth. If the essence of objectivity is

supposed to reside in the image of Jack or Jill's outstretched hand and gazing
 at one's disposal
 eye, one has ~~to hand~~ a criterion by which one can, on inspection, settle
 which ~~x~~ activities are objective, valid, truly cognitional and, no less,
 which ~~infrathings~~ cannot be objective or valid and must be, of themselves,
 merely immanent. An activity that is similar to looking cannot but be objective
 for, no less than looking, it too possesses the essence of objectivity. On the
 other hand, an activity that is not similar to looking cannot be objective
 and must be merely immanent, for in it there cannot be discerned the essence
 of objectivity.

These principles, ~~of~~ of course, are far more convincing ~~when~~ when they
 are not explicitly stated, when they operate on the level of unscrutinized
 assumptions, when they are ~~also~~ employed with equal conviction by ^{naive} realists
 and by ^{subtle} idealists.
^{naive}

The ^{naive} realist insists on the objectivity of his knowledge. Seeing, of
 course, is objective; what one sees is real; and it is no less real when one
~~human~~ touches it, tastes it, smells it, hears it. Not merely ocular
 vision is objective, but intellectual activity as well; for it is like seeing.
 As the eyes of the body see colours, so the eyes of the soul perform the
 difficult feat of seeing ~~my~~ universals. The feat may be ^{hard} difficult to explain;
 but the fact cannot be doubted ~~for~~ for, without universals, there is no science,
 and to deny the validity of science is tantamount to scepticism. Finally,
 while sense does not know its own objectivity, intellect does; not only
 does intellectual vision correspond to its objects but also, in judging,
 it sees the correspondence of its acts to their objects. Introspective
 analysis may not succeed in uncovering this performance, but that makes no
 difference. Man not only knows but also knows that ~~x~~ he knows and so his
 knowledge not merely corresponds to reality but the correspondence itself
 must be seen.

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~~This defence of realist objectivity is somewhat weak on cognitional
 fact. Hence, if one attends to the facts, while retaining the same notion of~~

The naive realist account of the objectivity of our knowledge is somewhat weak on cognitional fact. Hence, if one attends to the facts, while retaining the same criteria of objectivity, one will arrive at an idealism. ^{Not, For,} ~~But,~~ whatever may be the exact process of rational consciousness in arriving at its judgements, at least it bears no resemblance to ~~an~~ ocular vision. The process of judging, then, must ^{be} a purely immanent activity; of itself, it possesses no objectivity whatever; and so it can make no contribution of its own to the objectivity of human knowing. Further, the activities of human intelligence bear no similarity to ocular vision; they generate thoughts, definitions, postulates, hypotheses, theories; and none of these, of themselves, even pretends to be true or false; no less than the process of rational judgement, the activities of intelligence are purely immanent; of themselves, they make no contribution to ~~human~~ the objectivity of human knowing. It remains, of course, that ocular vision is ocular vision; it has to be of its nature objective; but what are the objects it reaches? Are they reality, or are they appearance?

Let us explain the distinction. When I lift a weight, I can make two different reports. I can say, This feels heavy. I can also ~~say~~, ^{that} this is heavy. When I say, ^{that} this feels heavy, I am speaking of an impression made on me. But when I say that this is heavy, I am speaking not of my ^{feelings} weight ^{the} but of the weight of the object. The first report regards ^{the} appearance of an object, its impression ~~of an~~ on a subject. The second regards the reality of an object; the thing is asserted to be heavy. Now, no doubt, when we judge we say that things are heavy. But the question is, ~~not~~ not what we think we know when we have employed ~~our~~ our intelligence and our rationality, but what we know simply and solely by the operations of sense alone. When I look out my window at the green lawn, do my eyes ~~see~~ see the objective reality of green, or do my eyes see green while my mind adds the categories of reality and objectivity? Unless one is ready to assert that these categories are objects of ocular vision, it is a little hard to say that one sees them with one's eyes.

of itself

But if external sense ^{of itself} knows only appearance, what of internal sense?

Parity suggests that looking inward at myself and my activities is no better off than looking outwards. If what is seen outwardly is just appearance, concomitant my experience of seeing is in no better case. A slight adaptation of the analysis already employed will reveal that ~~the~~ claims to reality and to objectivity arise, not in the experience of seeing, but in the ~~subject~~ subsequent use of my intelligence and my rationality. And what goes for the experience of seeing, also holds for the experience one has of oneself in seeing.

A phenomenal ego operates in a phenomenal world. Nor can his intelligence and rationality transfer him and his world ~~out~~ out of the realm of appearances and into the realm of reality. For, as we have seen, ~~human~~ his intellectual and judicial operations of themselves are merely immanent; ~~operations~~ they are not like seeing.

In brief, picture thinking, if taken seriously, leads to difficulties. The essence of objectivity is not revealed by the image of ^J Jack or Jill raising a hand and gazing at it. As seeing and, more generally, experiencing are not human knowing but only a part of human knowing, so the ^{element} component of objectivity in seeing or experiencing is, not the whole objectivity of human knowing, but only a component part in that objectivity. Further, as inquiry, understanding, and thought are quite different from ocular vision, as reflection, grasping the unconditioned, and judging are quite different both from ocular vision and from inquiry and its retinue, so too the objectivity of these operations is nothing like the objectivity proper to experiencing. The naive realist attempts to impose the objectivity of ocular vision upon intelligence and rationality; ~~and~~ the effect of his imposition is that he has to pretend that his mind is quite different from what it is; and to keep up the pretence he has ~~condemned~~ ^{to} exert a constant and selective inattention to very elementary facts of human cognitive process. Such naive realism paves the way for idealism. Matters of fact cannot be hidden in perpetuity. It comes out that intellectual operations are not like seeing. Then, as long

involves

But knowledge of "is green" and "is heavy" includes judgement. Because judgement is involved, it is not sight alone that knows "is green" and it is not touch alone that knows "is heavy." By themselves, therefore, our senses know not the objective properties of the things but only their impressions on subjects or their appearances to subjects.

Now it is no solution to the idealist argument to urge that, though sensitive looking gets no further than appearance, still there is an intellectual looking that pierces the veil of sense and penetrates to the objective reality behind the appearances. For, in the first place, the intellectual look is a mere fiction. In the second place, our intellectual activities are mediated by sense: nihil in intellectu, nisi prius fuerit in sensu by sense; they are operations with respect to the data of sense; and so, if the data of sense are appearances, the operations of intellect are mediated by appearances and with respect to appearances. In the third place, even if one supposes that there are intellectual operations not mediated by sense and that thi these operations are intuitions, ^{remains to be shown some} still there ~~is~~ reason ~~for~~ ^{for supposing} suppose that intellectual intuition will not be of intellectual appearance just as sensitive ~~int~~ intuition is of sensitive appearance.

But knowledge of "is green" and "is heavy" involves judgement. Because judgement is involved, it is not sight alone that knows "is green" and it is not touch alone that knows "is heavy." What is known by our senses alone, is not the objective properties of things but their impressions on subjects, their appearances.

Now the critical realist easily disposes of the idealist argument. For the argument supposes that sensitivity activity is For the argument fails to distinguish between human knowing and its component parts; and it further fails to distinguish between the several components in the objectivity of human knowing. Seeing, touching, sensing is not human knowing but only a component part in human knowing; and so such activities by themselves are the objectivity of that component part is experiential; it consists simply in the givenness of data; it does not include the absoluteness to be attained in judgement

But knowledge of "is green" and "is heavy" involves judgement. What is not known without judgement, is not known by sense alone. Sight alone, then, does not know "is green," touch alone does not know "is heavy," and in general sense does not know objective properties but subjective impressions. Moreover, if by sense we know only subjective impressions, then what we perceive or ~~imagine~~ intuit on the level of sensitivity must also be subjective impression. The concepts we abstract by intellect~~x~~ have to be abstractions from ^{not} ~~subjective~~ objectively known properties but from subjective impressions. The judgements we form by using such concepts are just combinations of abstractions from subjective impressions

But knowledge of "is green" and "is heavy" involves an act of judgement. It is not, then, by sight alone that we know "is green" and it is not by touch alone that we know "is heavy." Sense does not reveal the objective properties of things. For idealists it follows that sense reveals only appearances.

Now the idealist is mistaken in his conclusion, but the naive realist is incapable of showing that any mistake has occurred. The only showing he can do will be with his fingers, for he has taken his stand on a merely spatial notion of objectivity. And no matter what he uses his fingers to ~~point~~ point out, point out, the idealist will recall the distinction between point out, the idealist

Now the idealist is mistaken in his conclusion. The activities of sense are not so many instances of human knowing; they are merely components in human knowing. The objectivity of sense is the experiential objectivity that consists in the givenness of data; it is not the absolute objectivity that in judgement knows its object as independent of the knowing, as unconditioned. Accordingly, it would be a twofold blunder to attribute to sense the function, not of experiencing, but of knowing; and to suppose that it possessed the objectivity, not of experiencing, but of the full structure of human knowing.

First, the naive view of objectivity attributes to ocular vision an objectivity it does not possess. Ocular vision, it claims, is knowledge of reality. But, in fact, ocular vision is, not human knowing, but a component in human knowing. Further, the objectivity of ocular vision is experiential objectivity; it consists simply and solely in the givenness of visual data; it does consist in the absolute objectivity by which the object is stripped of relativity to the subject, by ^{which} ~~what~~ the object is known to be whether or not it is known. But when it is claimed that ocular vision is knowledge of reality, there is claimed for ocular vision not ~~it~~ merely experiential but also absolute objectivity.

The result of an exaggerated claim is its negation. The assertion that ocular vision is knowledge of reality leads to the assertion that ocular vision is knowledge of appearance. When I lift a lump of lead, I can say either that the lead is heavy or that the lead feels heavy. When I see a green field, I can say either that the field is green or that the field looks green. To know "is heavy" or "is green" is to know objective realities; but to know "feels heavy" or "looks green" is to know subjective impressions. One can attribute to touch knowledge of "feels heavy" and to sight knowledge of "looks green." But by touch alone we do not know "is heavy" and by sight alone we do not know "is green." This cognitive fact is expressed by idealists with their inaccurate distinction between reality and appearance and the assertion that external sense is knowledge, not of reality, but of appearance.

The naive notion of objectivity functions as an a priori that settles what an activity must be if it is to be cognitive. Applied to the fact of consciousness, it results in the view that consciousness is an internal sense, a look at what is going on inside. From the nature of the case it will follow, first, that internal sense is knowledge not of reality but of appearance and, secondly, since our intellectual activities are not sensitive and so presumably are not sensible, that we have no consciousness

of our intellectual and rational activities. ~~in~~ The world of appearances then is apprehended by a merely apparent ~~subject~~ and empirical ego. An intellectually and rationally conscious subject cannot be apprehended by an inner sense, and so must be no more than a conclusion reached by working out the conditions of the possibility of objects being known.

The point to this distinction is that it turns the tables on picture thinking. Looking is associated with appearance; "is" is associated with objective reality

Now the point to this distinction between reality and appearance is that it turns the tables on picture thinking. For picture thinking "is" and "is not" are quite mysterious until they are given substance by being extended into "is out there" or "is not out there."

First, the naive or spatial view of objectivity attributes to ocular vision properties it does not possess. Ocular vision is not human knowing but a component in human knowing, and the objectivity of ocular vision is not the objectivity of human knowing but only the experiential component in that objectivity. When then it is claimed that ocular vision is objective knowledge of reality, there occur two mistakes. To correct both of them it is not enough to rid oneself of . . . Nor are there mistakes easily corrected; it is not enough to get beyond picture thinking about objectivity; it also is necessary to discover that that human knowing is a dynamic structure and that the objectivity of human knowing is composite. Merely partial corrections result in an idealism.

Take, for example, the distinction between reality and appearance. By appa appearance is not meant illusion or hallucination. By appearance is meant, not any illuston or hallucination, but the everyday data of sense which, in fact, are components in objective knowledge but by naive realists are claimed to be the whole of objective knowledge. To refute the claim, one has only to analyse and to argue

as naive notions on objectivity obtain, idealism results. What is not like seeing, is not objective; intellectual operations are not like seeing; therefore, they are not objective. Nor is even the objectivity of seeing all that the naive realist thinks it is; for the naive realist attributes to seeing the objectivity, not of seeing, but of human knowing; ~~Man knows~~ The idealist corrects this blunder with another he attributes to seeing, not the presentation of data, but the apprehension of reality; and the idealist, if a Kantian, corrects this blunder with another, for he claims not that visual data are given but that we see appearances

that proved so satisfactory and satisfying in childhood. Argument closes the case: what everyone in his right mind knows, must be simple and obvious, and ~~a~~ cannot be any abstruse, technical, complicated, difficult, obscure theorem that has yet to be discovered.

What is objectivity? Let Jack or Jill hold up a hand and gaze at it. The intently gazing eye is in the head; it is the knowing subject. The really real hand is out there; it is the object~~x~~. The eye sees the hand; it sees what is there to be seen; it does not see what is not there to be seen. That is objectivity. What more could one want?

No more is wanted, provided one intends to remain on the level of picture thing thinking. But pictures, affect-laden images, passionately espoused symbols, tend to be mistaken for revelations of essence and thereby become generators of myth. If the essence of objectivity is supposed to reside in the image of a look, not only will it be evident that any cognitive activity that resembles seeing must be pronounced objective, but also it will follow that any ~~magnitudinal~~ ^{cognitive} activity that does not resemble seeing cannot be objective and so, of itself, must be purely immanent

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The myths that block the advance of science are transitory. In their day they are obvious, manifest, unmistakable, self-evident, necessary, absolutely certain truths. But their day comes to an end and then, though they may linger on in modes of speech, such as the rising and setting sun, they have been exorcized from men's minds.

But the myths that block a grasp of philosophy are permanent. Each generation, each individual, has to win through to his own victory. For the myths, with which philosophy has to contend, are generated spontaneously by the very course of human development. Before reaching the age of reason, we learn to talk, to distinguish dreams and stories from real people and real events to add to the world of immediacy given to an infant's senses the far broader world that is mediated by meaning, and to distinguish dreams and stories from real events and real people. The criteria we then develop and employ suffice to meet a child's needs and fulfil a child's responsibilities and later, as we come more and more to do things for ourselves, to decide for ourselves, to find out for ourselves, the old criteria are qualified, supplemented, transformed, superseded. Still, this process of growing up is so multiform, its elements are so numerous, its successive stages are so gradual, its concern is so intent on things to come, so impatient of the present, so forgetful of the past, that we arrive at its term with little awareness of how we got there, indeed, with little awareness of the manifold changes we have undergone.

So it is that the philosopher asks questions to which everyone knows the answers, provided they do not attempt to philosophize. For when they do, when they have been inveigled into the foolishness of learning what they already know, there commonly occurs a reversal to childhood. Profundity adopts a child's language to speak about the "really real" or the "really and truly real." Deep meditation brings to light the criteria of true knowledge and reality

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If one combines the foregoing account of objectiveity with the preceding distinction between consciousness and self-knowledge, one reaches at once the explanation of the strange fact that, while any mature person has little difficulty in distinguishing between what he really knows and what is mere conjecture or supposition or probability, still philosophers

It has been objected that such conclusions violate the priority of the study of being by violating the priority of metaphysics. But the priority of metaphysics does not follow from the priority of being. For being is understood either concretely or not concretely. If being is understood concretely, then it includes everything in its every aspect; and that we know, if at all, not first but last; for once one knows everything about everything, one has nothing more to learn. On the other hand, if being is not understood concretely, then the study of metaphysics can be only one study among many other studies; and which study comes first can be settled only by a study of studying, an investigating investigation of investigation investigation of investigating, a knowing of knowing.

cognitive apparatus. Now, if I have no doubt that this argument holds against many cognitive analyses, I cannot admit that it holds absolutely. A process that intends the transcendent and by self-transcendence reaches the transcendent (1) has its conditions for it is a process and (2)

~~the~~ cognitive apparatus. The objective overlooks the possibility of an act of understanding that discovers the parts or components to be not only functionally related but also so related that their process is a process that intends the transcendent and by self-transcendence reaches the transcendent

reached. This, however, can be grasped only if human knowing is understood as a dynamic structure. Without the dynamism there is not the overarching intention of being. Without the structure there is overlooked the multiple character of objectivity, which is experiential in the ~~data~~ givenness of data, normative in the exigences of intelligence and rationality, absolute inasmuch as there is reached a virtually unconditioned from the combination of (1) normative objectivity which links conditions to conditioned and (2) experiential objectivity which supplies the fulfilment of the conditions.

It remains that we meet the common objection: an analysis of human knowing can reveal what men must think is real; but no analysis can reveal knowing can reveal the inevitabilities of human cognitive process and so it can reveal what men inevitably will pronounce to be real; n but no analysis can establish more than a relative validity for human knowing, for every analysis arrives at some determinate set of activities and it is only relative to those activities

It remains that we meet the common post-Kantian objection. An analysis of human knowing can reveal the inevitabilities of human cognitive process and so it can reveal what men will inevitably ~~pr~~ pronounce to be real. But ~~nonetheless~~ such an analysis establishes no more than a relative validity for human knowing; it see settles what men cannot but consider real; it does not settle what is real

reached. So, quite manifestly, a grasp of dynamic structure is essential to a grasp of the objectivity of our knowing. Without the dynamism there is overlooked the overarching intention of being, which ~~is~~ is not to be confused with an idea or concept or affirmation of being. Without the structure there is overlooked the compound character of objectivity, which is experiential in the givenness of data, normative in the exigences of intelligence and rationality, absolute in the ~~combination~~ act of reflective understanding which ~~derives~~ derives from normative objectivity links between conditions and conditions conditioned and from experiential objectivity the fulfilment of conditions and so, from a twofold source, arrives at the virtually unconditioned, the conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled.

It remains that we say a word about the common post-Kantian objection. An analysis of human knowing can reveal the proper use of our cognitive apparatus; it can reveal what conclusions results or conclusions men will reach by that proper use; but it cannot justify the apparatus itself by showing that it reaches the really real; the most analysis can do is show what men will inevitably pronounce to be real.

Finally, let us note that the conditions of the possibility of human knowing are the conditions of a process of self-transcendence. When human knowing is analysed but not understood, there are discovered conditions for the occurrence of human knowing but there is not discovered the fact that those conditions are the conditions of self-transcendence. So there arises the common post-Kantian objection that an analysis of human knowing can settle the proper procedures of the human mind and so it can settle what men must regard to be so. But no analysis can get beyond such a merely relative validity, and so no universe known by man can be more than an als ob universe. This argument obviously holds as long as the conditions of human knowing are not found to be coincident with the conditions of a self-transcending process that intends and reaches the transcendent. But once that discovery is made

reached. But ~~thamponik~~ this can be grasped only if human knowing is understood as a dynamic structure. If one attends only to the several activities and overlooks their ~~functions and interactions~~ mutual relations, one is unable to conceive the data of sense and consciousness as what is presupposed by inquiry and insight and what is appealed to

would be for him to set aside views of metaph objectivity, mediated by uncritical metaphysics, and work out an account of objectivity that arose immediately from the given activities and structures of human knowing. In particular, this non-metaphysical approach seems to be recommended when metaphysicians traditionally disagree with one another and anti-metaphysicians attribute their disharmony to the impossibility of their undertaking.

It remains, however, that against such a recommendation there is urged the priority of being. Nothing can know unless it is; and nothing can be known unless it is. Therefore, it is concluded, the study of metaphysics must precede the study of knowledge and of its objectivity. ~~Just as what happens to be a major premise of this argument is a metaphysical claim, so the conclusion is a metaphysical claim. The argument is somewhat rapidly introduced. That only exists is known. If I find the antecedent irreproachable, I fail to But, if I find the antecedent irreproachable, it is less clear that the consequent follows. Metaphysics is not knowledge of everything about everything and so it is not knowledge of being in the sense in which being equates with reality~~

objectivity,
 would be for him to set aside views of metaphysics, mediated by
 uncritical metaphysics, and work out an account of objectivity that arose
 immediately from the given activities and structures of human knowing.
 In particular, this non-metaphysical approach seems to be recommended
 when metaphysicians traditionally disagree with one another and
 anti-metaphysicians attribute their disharmony to the impossibility
 of their undertaking to undertaking.

It remains, however, that against such a recommendation, there
 is urged the priority of being. As being is the first object, so
 metaphysics is the first science. But it is not clear that this
 argument does not overlook the fact that science is knowledge, ~~and~~
 that human knowledge is structured, and that its structure ~~in man~~
 admits a reduplication. But may one not ask which being is the
 first object of human knowing? Ontologically, God is first, but He
 is known by us in this life not first but only mediately.
 metaphysics is the first science. This statement seems clearer than
 scrutiny reveals it to be. Is it being as an abstract universal that
 it
 is first, or is it God, or is material things, or is it the conscious
 being of the subject

It remains, however, that against this recommendation there
 is urged the priority of being. Nothing can know unless it is; and
 can
 nothing be known unless it is. Therefore, the first science has to
 be the science of the first object, the science of metaphysics.
 I do not find this argument conclusive. After all, nothing can be known
 science knows not unknown but known being

would be for him to set aside views of objectivity, mediated by metaphysics, and work x out an account of objectivity that arose immediately from the given activities and structures of human knowing. In particular, the non-metaphysical approach seems to be recommended when metaphysicians disagree with one another and many thinkers doubt the very possibility of ~~that~~ ^{their} enterprise. Nor is this recommendation in any way weakened by those that urge the priority of being. For metaphysics is not being but a being, a habit in the intellect of a metaphysician, a habit that no less exists when the metaphysician is asleep than when he is awake. The conscious subject and his conscious activities are just as much beings as is that habit; and they ~~possess~~ possess the advantage of being conscious, of being immediately given, of being the originating intentio intendens and the originated ~~intenta~~ intentio intenta x that is the relation of objectivity^{ty}, the relation that makes knowing in its strong sense knowing what really and truly is.

~~Besides the cognitive and metaphysical accounts of objectivity, there is the far more familiar and far more common mythical account. Its basis is, not any scientific study of ocular vision, but the image of Jack and Jill both holding up their hands in front of their faces and looking at them. Jack sees his hand; Jill sees hers. Jack and Jill are subjects. The hands are objects. The objective is what is out there to be seen. Objectivity is the property of the seeing that sees what is out there to be seen. That is all there is about it. Cognitive activity that is like seeing is objective; cognitive activity that is not like seeing is not cognitive at all, for it is not objective. Intellect, then, cannot be intelligent; it must be a spiritual eye that gazes at universals. Judging cannot be the activity of rational consciousness; it must be a spiritual eye that gazes at the correspondence between cognitive acts and their objects.~~

cog struct

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has no mind at all. Under the such a dispensation it would not be surprising
if scientists opted for positivism while metaphysians huddled together in
a ghetto.

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It might be thought that our consideration of human knowing and of its reduplication in self-knowledge has been purely immanent. For a structure, in its very nature, seems to be closed: it is a whole in its relation to its parts, and the parts in their relations to one another and to the whole; ~~in~~ ^{indeed,} the parts so lock together that to omit any part would destroy the whole and to add any further further part would be as otiose as the fifth wheel of a coach.

cogni ional structure

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We have been considering human knowledge and self-knowledge as
cognitive structures

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Our attention has centred on human knowing as activity, and now it must shift to human knowing as knowing. So far we have been stressing the immanent aspect of our cognitive activities: they form a whole; they are so related one to the other that no functional part can be omitted without destroying the whole and none can be added for the simple reason that, like the proverbial fifth wheel on a coach, it would have nothing to do. We have now to turn to their transcendent aspect of our cognitive activity, to the fact that the structure in question is not only materially but also formally dynamic, and that this formal dynamism is intentional, that this intentionality is comprehensive.

An organism is formally dynamic. By the division and subdivision of cells there is effected not merely an increase in bulk but also the emergence of the organs, the functional parts, that constitute the organism. Still, it is only in a weak or metaphorical sense that one can say that the ~~embryo~~ seed intends the plant, the embryo intends the animal

We have spoken of structure, of dynamic structure, of the reduplication of dynamic structure. The structure in question is of cognitive activities.

cognitial structure

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So far we have limited ourselves to a consideration of activities
named cognitional, to their formally dynamic structure, and to the reduplication
of this structure in self-knowledge

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Our attention, so far, has concentrated on the immanent aspects of human cognitional activity. If something has been said about knowing, practically nothing has been said about the known or about the relation of knowing to the known. Indeed, it might be urged that nothing has been said about knowing as knowing; for knowing is essentially *rea relatio* related to the known, while our efforts have been limited to knowing as a mere structure of activities

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From human knowing as a structured set of activities we have now to proceed to human knowing as knowing. In other words, to a grasp of the structure of human cognitive activities and, further, from a grasp of the manner in which this structure is reduplicated into self-knowledge, we have to come to a grasp of the structured activities as cognitive

From human knowing as a structured set of activities we have now to proceed to human knowing as knowing. Again, from structure, from dynamic structure, from reduplicated dynamic structure To structure, to dynamic structure, to reduplicated dynamic structure there must be added the adjective cognitive, not as a mere label, but by way of a grounded affirmation.

What is at issue is an absolute -- certainty -- with regard to a particular and contingent matter of fact -- the right time now. What I fail to attain may be named absolute objectivity.

The three parts of objectivity

The three different criteria of objectivity pertain to different moments in cognitive process. Experiential objectivity regards data whether of sense or of consciousness. Normative objectivity regards the exigences of intelligence and reasonableness in the process from data to the act of judging. Absolute objectivity results from the combination of experiential and normative objectivity in a virtual (rarely, an explicit) syllogism: the judgement is the conditioned; normative objectivity is the link ~~from~~ between the conditions and the conditioned; experiential objectivity is the fulfilment of the conditions.

the act of judging. Absolute objectivity ~~resides~~ resides in the judgement which must (by rational necessity) occur if its conditions are fulfilled; and its conditions are fulfilled if both both experiential and normative objectivity are satisfied.

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As human knowing is, not a single operation, but a dynamic structure of different activities, and as human self-knowledge is, not a single operation, but a reduplication of the dynamic structure, so the objectivity of human knowing and of human self-knowledge is, not a property of a single operation, but an ordered conjunction of different properties of different operations.

Further, just as consciousness differs from introspection and from self-knowledge, so too awareness of the objectivity of one's knowing is one thing, and knowing what objectivity is is quite another. One is aware of the objectivity of one's knowing, because human knowing is a dynamic structure that fills itself out consciously, intelligently, rationally. When one reaches the term of the process, it is manifest that one has done so. To anyone that objects, one may point to this ground or that but the sum and little more than a substance of one's defence usually usually amounts to reiteration of one's initial assertion. It is so, and that's all there is about it. initial assertion. It is so, one says; and one may add that that's all there is about it. Moreover, for most people that is all that there is ever will be about it. With some of them one might perhaps succeed in explaining the meaning of the question, What is objectivity? But explaining the question falls far short of getting them to understand the answer. Not only must they be made familiar with the precise nature of each of man's cognitive activities, not only must they be able to identify these activities in the most diverse settings, but also they have to grasp ~~mutually~~ the and structure of human knowing, the reduplicated structure of self-knowledge before they begin to grasp the further structure of properties that is the objectivity of human knowing.

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Our topic has been cognitional structure. We have considered structure, dynamic structure, cognitional dyn reduplicated dynamic structure. It remains that we attend to the epithet, cognitional, not as a convenient label, but as an intrinsic property of the structures we have been considering.

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If human knowing is intrinsically related to reality, knowledge of our knowledge necessarily includes knowledge of that intrinsic relation

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We have considered activities and their structures. We have now to grasp why the structured activities are cognitional.

This necessitates the introduction of further terms. Let us say, then, that knowledge is objective when it is knowledge of reality

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We have hitherto been using such terms as knowing, knowledge, cognitional, as convenient labels that directed the reader's attention to a certain area in his experience. We have now to give these words their full meaning. Knowledge, henceforth, is to mean knowledge of reality. Objectivity is to mean the intrinsic relation of cognitional activities to reality

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Hitherto such words as knowing, knowledge, cognitive, object, have been employed as so many convenient labels. They indicated to the reader what we were talking about. They prescinded from the epistemological theorem that knowledge, of its nature, is knowledge of reality, or that knowledge, of its nature, is objective, and objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowledge to reality.

To this theorem we must now turn our attention, for our topic has been, not mere structure, but cognitive structure.

Hitherto we have been employing such words as knowing, knowledge, cognitive, object, as so many convenient labels that directed the readers's attention to what we were talking about but contained no aspiration to

Hitherto we have prescind from the epistemological theorem that knowledge, of its nature, is knowledge of reality or, more fully, that knowledge of its nature is objective and that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowledge to reality. To that theorem we must now advert. For an account of knowing and of knowing knowing should lead to the discovery of a relation that is intrinsic to knowing.

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One of the notable advantages of studying the structure of cognitive activities is that it is not involved in any premature attempt to establish the epistemological theorem. That theorem ~~must~~ has it that knowledge, in its proper sense, is knowledge of reality or, more fully, that knowledge is intrinsically objective and that objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowledge to reality. For exactly what is meant by reality, by objectivity, by knowledge in its proper sense, have long been matters of dispute. And one's chances of success are far greater when one begins, not from the midst of a controversy where all positions ~~appear~~ are contested, but from a marginal yet relevant area where sure footing seems attainable. Now the structure of cognitive activities is just such a topic. Few will care to keep on discussing knowledge yet deny the existence of cognitive activities. Few will fail to grasp that such activities combine into structural wholes. Finally, structure, in its very conception, is not only limited but also closed in upon itself: not only do the constituent parts form a whole but also, by that very fact, everything beyond the whole and its parts is quit quietly excluded.

It remains, however, that our topic is not just structure but ^{keep on prescinding} cognitive structure. Accordingly, we cannot ~~intentionally~~ prescind from the epistemological theorem, but must now make use of our outline of the ^{of} structure of human knowing and the reduplicated structure of our knowing human knowing to discover in that knowing its objectivity, its intrinsic relation to reality. The argument will be divided into two steps. First, we shall advert to the fact that human cognitive activity is, indeed, related to something beyond itself which, for obvious reasons, shall be named "being." Secondly, we shall raise the question whether or not what we have named being is identical with reality.

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At this point, if not earlier, the reader will demand, Why is it that performing the activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging, knowing results from performing the activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging? After all, knowledge in its proper sense is knowledge of reality. But of reality nothing, as yet, has been said. Nor has anything been said of objectivity, which is the intrinsic relation of knowledge to reality. What has been discussed is, not cognitive structure, but merely structure, a whole in its internal relations to its parts.

I admit, of course, the charge. But it may not be amiss to point out that a discussion of the objectivity of knowledge can be premature. For if knowing is some single operation, its intrinsic property of objectivity will have to reside in that operation; on the other hand, if knowing is a structure of activities, then the intrinsic property of objectivity will be found to be, not some simple and homogeneous property, but a set of properties divided up and parcelled out among several activities. Hence, ~~the long debates of empiricists, idealists, and rationalists are transcended when one adverts that there is no need to choose between experience, coherence, and necessity, that objectivity may very well consist in a conjunction of all three~~ The long debates of empiricists, idealists, and rationalists are transcended when one adverts that there is no need to choose between experience, coherence, and necessity, that objectivity may very well consist in a conjunction of all three

Accordingly, in arguing for the structural aspect of human knowing, we also were moving beyond the level of empiricist, rationalist, and idealist debate that would ground objectivity either in experience or in necessity or in coherence but not in a conjunction of all three. Further, if objectivity is an intrinsic property of human knowing, then it will be discovered only by knowing human knowing. If one thinks of human knowing as some single operation such as looking, then to know the objectivity of one's knowing one will take a good look at one's looking, and then announce to the world that one has seen or not seen objectivity

As human knowing is, not a single operation, but a dynamic structure of different activities, as human self-knowledge is a reduplication of the structure, to so the objectivity of human knowing and human self-knowledge necessarily has a structural aspect. For it cannot be a single property residing in some single operation, for then it would not be a property of human knowing. ^I it has to be a conjunction of different properties residing in the different operations that together constitute an instance of human knowing.

Further, just as consciousness differs from introspection and from self-knowledge, so too it is one thing to be aware that one's knowing is objective, and it is quite another to know the answer to the question, 'What constitutes the objectivity of human knowing?' To be aware of the objectivity of one's knowing, one has only to perform the operations required by the structure; for the performance is conscious, intelligent, rational; the criteria of the performance are immanent in the performing; and so when one reaches reaches the term of the process, it is manifest that one has done so. On the other hand, to raise and answer the theoretic question presupposes that already one knows all about the several operations involved and the structure in which they are unified, and it asks one to employ introspection in an effort to discover the properties that make human knowing objective.

Moreover, it is of some importance to note why the theoretic question ^I is put. it is not put because there is any reasonable doubt about the validity of ordinary awareness of the objectivity of knowledge. It is put because there are methodical and collaborative efforts such as science, history, hermeneutics, theology, in which the theoretic issue is of paramount importance. It also is put because, where theoretic disciplines are not cultivated seriously and successfully, common sense proceeds beyond its field of usefulness and loads the minds of men with stirring myths and entertaining fictions. Now, manifestly, is the twentieth-century twentieth century any exception to this rule.

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At this point, if not earlier, the reader will demand why it is that knowing results from merely performing the immanent activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Knowledge, in the proper meaning of the word, is knowledge of reality. Knowledge is intrinsically objective, and objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowledge to reality. But of reality and objectivity nothing as yet has been said; and so, as yet, nothing has been said of knowledge in the proper meaning of the word.

The charge, of course, is true. But this, I think, is one of the cases in which the longest way round is the shortest way home. The property of objectivity has been sought in experience by empiricists, in necessity by rationalists, in coherence by idealists and relativists. But their debate is transcended the moment one adverts to knowledge as structure, for then objectivity will reside not in some single type of operation then objectivity will be not some single property but an ordered set of properties divided up and parcelled out among the many activities that enter into the structure of knowing.

Again, as long as knowing is thought of as some single operation, such as looking, then knowing the objectivity of knowing can be attained only by taking a good look at looking. This mysterious performance and the oracular affirmations and negations that follow it are, however, all superseded as soon as knowledge is conceived as a structure of activities. As knowing anything is a matter of experiencing and understanding and judging, so knowing objectivity will be a matter of experiencing this and that and of understanding one's experience and of arriving at the judgement that one's understanding is correct.

Whether objectivity, then, is one property or many, whether knowing objectivity is a single operation or many, are questions that are settled by attending to the prior question of knowledge as structure.

Besides the collective Unconscious, there is collective consciousness which abolishes the distinction between subject and object, by-passes the old debates, and reveals on the level of concreteness the reality of community and communion.

Now it would be the gravest of blunders to suppose that this new symbol did not correspond to the deepest needs of our time or that any barrier, raised by moving mountains, could withstand

Now it would be, I suspect, a grave blunder to suppose that this new symbol did not correspond to the deepest need and yearning of our time, or that any barrier, raised by moving mountains, could block the onrush to tribalization that, it seems, is the psychic exigence of the age of electricity. But I would suggest that it is important to consider in what precise manner the new symbol ~~has~~ has any bearing on the question of objective knowledge. ^{It} is thought, indeed, to make the old debates obsolete. But that is true only if one supposes had their real center in the ~~new~~ old symbol

one supposes But that is true only in so far as the old debates were mistakenly engaged in discussing the old symbol and became hopelessly bogged down in so far as the old debates were mistakenly engaged in discussing the old symbol and became hopelessly bogged down by their unconscious acceptance of its ^{as} in so far as the old debates were mistakenly engaged in discussing the old symbol and becom became hopelessly bogged down through its mythical employment.

Besides the cognitive and metaphysical accounts of objectivity, there is also the symbolic account. Its basis is, not any scientific investigation of any kind whatever, but the image of Jack and Jill holding up a hand and looking intently at it. Neither of them is blind. Each sees the hand stretched forth before ~~it~~ their gaze. What they see is objective, for it is there to be seen. And their seeing is objective, for it sees what is there to be seen. To fail in objectivity, to lapse into mere~~x~~ subjectivity, is to see what is not there or to fail to see what is there.

This symbolic account becomes a ~~xxx~~ myth when it is incorporated into a cognitive theory. Then, evidently, every cognitive activity that is like seeing must be objective; and any cognitive activity that is unlike ~~seeing~~ ^{primordially} seeing cannot be objective, for the essence of objectivity resides in seeing, and any other view of objectivity ~~ix~~ has to be, if not plain nonsense, then a surreptitious attempt to pass off an idealism for a realism.

~~The fruits of the myth are disastrous. Either intelligence surrenders itself to become a spiritual eye gaping at universals, or else intelligence maintains itself at the price of being regarded as a merely immanent activity.~~

The fruits of the myth are disastrous. Intelligence is not like seeing what is out there. One must accordingly either regard intelligence as a merely immanent activity or else substitute for intelligence a spiritual eye that gapes at universals. The activity of rational consciousness in judging is not like seeing. Therefore one must either regard judging as a purely immanent activity or ~~x~~ else replace judgement ~~k~~ by a spiritual eye ⁱ that gapes at the correspondence between cognitive activity and its object. Unless one denies the validity of one's mind, one has to pretend that one has no mind at all. Under that dispensation one cannot be surprised that ^{most} ~~most~~ scientists are positivists and that ^{most} ~~metaphysicians~~ huddle together in a ghetto.

Besides the myth there are the liberators from the myth. ~~Too often~~ Too often they overlook the fact that the dragon they would ~~only~~ slay is, like all dragons, mythical. For Jack and Jill looking at their hands, they

give us Jack and Jill looking at one another. Jack really knows Jill, and Jill really knows Jack. Their knowledge is not thematized, not formulated, ~~not abstract~~ not explicit, not abstract, not worked out in concepts, not said in words. That is real knowledge. That is the kind of knowledge by which all other knowledge must be judged. That is the mode of knowledge that, above all, effective ~~teaching~~ teaching, sound preaching, healthy dialogue, must ~~be~~ seek to communicate.

settles no issues; it only ~~is~~ raises them. It is not knowledge of essence or ext existence; it intends them. What the essence is and whether that essence exists are, not answers, but questions. Still the questions ~~x~~ have been raised and the very fact of raising them settles what the answers will have to be about. The question, What ^{is} this? Why that? , cannot be answered by pointing to the same or to another datum of sense. ^{It} can be answered only by understanding and conceiving. The question, Is that so?, cannot be answered either by sense data alone or by ~~understanding~~ ~~and~~ thought alone or by their merely material conjunction but only by a reflection that unites ~~them~~ data and thought into a virtually unconditioned.

This intrinsic relation of the dynamic structure of human knowing to being and so to reality x is neither idea nor concept nor judgement. It is not an idea, the content of an act of understanding, for the only act of understanding that understands everything about everything is the act of divine understanding. It is not a concept, for a concept presupposes and expresses and objectivifies what has been understood

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human

As human knowing is a dynamic structure, as self-knowledge is a reduplication of the structure, so the objectivity of human knowing and of human self-knowledge ~~is a property, not of some single act, but~~ ~~of the structure.~~ is, not a single property of some single operation, but a compound of different properties of different operations. For this reason we employ quite different criteria in making successive claims that statements are not objective.

☞ I hold up my hand before the class and say, My hand is white. I pick up a sheet of white ~~pat~~ paper and hold it alongside my hand. Obviously, my hand is not white. The appeal is simply to data, to what is given. It is an appeal to experiential objectivity.

I make the postulate: No valid proposition regards all classes. But my postulate is a proposition. ^{It} regards all classes. Therefore, it is self-refuting. The postulate cannot be objective but the appeal, now, is not to experiential but to normative objectivity.

I am asked the time. ^I glance at my watch and say, Half past four. Again, I am asked, Are you sure your watch is right? Well, it is highly probable that my watch is approximately right, but ^I cannot undertake to be certain about ~~the~~ the exact minute. There is a defect in the objectivity of the statement, Half past four. But the defect is not a lack of experiential objectivity, for I see clearly enough the hands on my watch. Nor is the defect in the realm of the immanent norms of intelligence and reasonableness.

~~What is at issue is a contingent matter of fact that could be known with certainty only if a number of other items were known with certainty. When did I last check my watch? Did I check it by a reliable time-piece or signal? How accurate have I found my watch to be in the past? Has that accuracy been maintained since I last checked it? Certainty with regard to matters of fact is neither an experiential nor a normative objectivity. It is not normative~~

What is at issue is an absolute (certainty) with regard to a particular and contingent matter of fact (the right time now). What I fail to attain is may be named an absolute objectivity.

The three criteria pertain to three components in the objectivity of human knowing, and the three components reside in different stages of cognitive process. Experiential objectivity is the givenness of the data either of sense or of consciousness. Normative objectivity is the fruit of meeting the exigences of intelligence and reasonableness in the process from the data to the judgement. Absolute objectivity resides in the judgement which must (by rational necessity) occur if its conditions are fulfilled; and its conditions are fulfilled & when both experiential and normative objectivity are seen to be ~~atisfied~~ satisfied.

~~This is very summary. But the difficulty, does not lie~~

This is excessively summary. But the common difficulty against this view of objectivity is not going to be met by ~~it~~ filling in the details. For the common difficulty is the Kantian premiss that, whatever our mediate knowledge may be, our cognitive activities are immediately related to objects only by Anschauung. ~~But the foregoing~~ ^{Our} view simply ~~neglects~~ disregards Anschauung. Therefore, it does not account for objectivity.

To put the matter differently, the issue is between two entirely different accounts of objectivity. The Kantian and, ~~the naive~~ of course, the naive realist distinguishes immediate and mediate knowing. He finds that the objectivity of immediate knowing is something too manifest to be ~~discussed~~ investigated or discussed. He asserts that that objectivity resides in taking a look. But when the Kantian goes on to explain that sense is restricted to phenomena and that there is no ~~intelligible~~ intellectual Anschauung, the naive realist asserts that sense ~~knows the real and that we look and see not only with the eyes of the body but also with the eyes of the mind~~ perceives the real and, somehow, intellect does so too.

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I have been attempting to clarify what is meant by saying that human knowing is a dynamic structure, and I have described a whole whose parts are cognitive activities, a whole which consciously, intelligently, rationally assembles its parts, a whole therefore that is aware when it reaches its term, a whole finally that can use this awareness to attain knowledge of its knowledge.

It will be objected however that such an account of knowing is purely immanent. A structure relates whole to parts and parts to whole. But it does not go beyond ~~the~~ both parts and whole to other wholes that are independently existing realities. That, however, is precisely what knowing does. There has been offered a complicated analysis that systematically disregards the one thing necessary: the objectivity of knowledge.

For the unconverted the reduction of the objectivity of human knowing to its experiential, normative, and absolute components is ludicrous. For they conceive objectivity in terms of spatial difference: knowing is inside; the known is outside; and the only really significant question is how can one possibly get from inside to ~~man~~ outside, from "in here" to "out there." We have conceived human knowing as a whole, as a structure of activities. But a structure is, of its nature, closed: it relates the whole to the parts and the parts to one another and to the whole. We have conceived objectivity in terms of the properties, experiential, normative, absolute, of the internal parts of a closed structure. ~~Now~~ Not a word has been said concerning the real issue, How does one get outside? It is, of course, true that the dynamic structure is quite capable of ~~man~~ bringing forth endless judgements about dogs and cats, horses and cows, pigs and chickens, men, women, and children. It can even bring forth ^{the} judgement that all these animals really and truly are outside. But the question is whether or not these judgements are founded on real knowledge of the outside; and to the unconverted it is incontrovertible that there is one and only one possible species of cognitive activity that constitutes knowledge of what is out there; it is looking, perceiving, Anschauung.

~~Butavwemhava vmaidennm~~

^S
It is instructive, I think, to work out the consequences of this view.

The view itself may be put in two propositions. First, any cognitive activity that is or resembles looking must, from the nature of the case, be objective and valid. Secondly, any cognitive activity that does not resemble looking cannot, from the nature of the case, be objective; it goes on inside and it does not look outside. It may be called cognitive because of some ~~primary~~ subordinate and derivative role within knowing; but it is not cognitive in the strong sense of the word, for it is by itself not objective and so it has nothing whatever to contribute to the objectivity of human knowledge.

Such is the view, both as assertion, and as consequent negation. But its consequences fall into two distinct and opposed groups. If one starts

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It sometimes seems to be thought that such naive views on objectivity are favourable to realism. In fact, they are the bulwark of obscurantism and the seed-bed of idealism. They attempt to foist on human intellect a type of objectivity it does not possess and, thereby, they attempt to make out that human intellect, so far from being intelligent, is just another sense. At the same time they claim for sense far more knowledge than sense attains; and since this claim is easily refuted, the broad and easy path to realism turns out to be a broad and easy path to idealism.

Take, for instance, the old distinction between appearance and reality. When I lift ^ta lump of lead, I may report either that the lead is heavy or that the lead feels heavy. When I see a green field, I may report either that the field is green or that the field looks green. The alternatives in each report are not ~~identical~~ identical. When I say "is heavy" or "is green," I am attributing properties to objects that are outside me. ~~When~~ When I say "feels heavy" or "looks green," I am speaking of impressions I receive. Now this distinction is very awkward for the naive realist. Objectivity is granted to "is heavy" and "is green," yet for the naive realist "is" acquires a meaning only when it is replaced by "really out there." At the ~~same~~ same time, it is when the grass looks green, that one is seeing what is outside; and it is when the ~~na~~ lead feels heavy, that one is in contact with reality. Yet, contrary to ^{naive realist} ~~his summary~~ views, seeing what is outside and being in contact with reality are associated, not with the properties of things, but with the subject's impressions.

~~The use-~~ ^{that} ~~the idealists have made of this inversion of naive realism is, of course, familiar.~~

When the tables can be turned on the naive realist in this simple fashion, the idealist marches in. What precisely is it that we know by sense alone? Clearly, by sight alone we know some \approx equivalent of "looks green," and by touch alone we know some \approx equivalent of "feels heavy."

But knowledge of "is green" and of "is heavy" is not without judgement; therefore, it is not had by sense alone. It follows that sense alone knows not the objective properties of external realities but only their impressions on subjects, their appearances to subjects. Further, it follows that human intelligence has only appearances to investigate, to understand, and to think about; and that human rationality has only phenomenal evidence to base its judgements on. Finally, it follows that, if we think any knowledge we have of "is green" or "is heavy" is knowledge of reality and not appearance, then we must be suffering from some sort of transcendental illusion.

Now while the naive realist, no doubt, will leap into the breach ~~and~~ to refute idealism and, as he believes, defend realism, it may be more instructive to forget about him for the moment and inquire into the possibility of this deduction of idealism. How does it come about? The answer is quite simple. The naive realist has brushed aside the objectivity really possessed by human knowing and, in its place, he has substituted its symbol, its appearance. The idealist ~~employs~~ tacitly employs the objectivity really possessed by human knowing and, thereby, he reveals the appearance of objectivity to be merely appearance. Let us expand these two statements.

The objectivity really possessed by human knowing is (1) in potency the intention of being and (2) in its second act the absolute objectivity of judgement by which objects are known to be independent of our knowing them. The naive realist, however, is a plain blunt man. He won't have any of such hair-splitting. He bids Jack or Jill to raise a hand and gaze at it. The raised hand is out there; it is the object. The gazing eye is in here; it is the subject. The eye sees the hand; it sees what's out there to be seen; and it does not see what is not out there to be seen. That's objectivity. The essence ^{of objectivity} stands revealed in the image. So for the objectivity in potency that is the intention of being, we are given the symbolic objectivity of ^{sensitive} extroverted consciousness. Similarly, for the absolute objectivity that

knows its objects to be independent of their being known, we are given an act of seeing and, to drive the point home, a shout: That's objectivity.

In turn, the idealist tacitly employs the objectivity really possessed by human knowing. The distinction between "looks green" and "is green" embodies the distinction between experiential and absolute objectivity. The objectivity of sense is experiential; it consists in the givenness of sensible data. The objectivity of judgment is absolute; its object is known as unconditioned, as independent of the knowing. When then the ~~naive~~ idealist asks whether sight knows "is green" or "looks green," he puts the ~~question~~ concrete question that reveals the naive realist's mistake. For if sight does not know "is green," then the naive realist was mistaken in ~~identifying objectivity with looking and seeing,~~ supposing that the essence of objectivity stands revealed in the image of Jack or Jill's raised hand and intently gazing eyes.

~~Still, if the idealist tacitly employs the objectivity really possessed by human knowing, he makes the mistake of taking over, in whole or part, mistakes the realist's mistakes about knowing the naive realist's mistakes about knowing and about objectivity. Just as the naive realist supposes that by sense we know, so too does the idealist. In fact, sensitive activities are not human knowing but only a component in human knowing. Again, just as the naive realist supposes that the objectivity of human knowing is some single property enshrined in looking, perceiving, ~~Anschauung Anschauung,~~ so too does the idealist.~~

Still, if the idealist tacitly employs the objectivity really ~~pos~~ possessed by human knowing, still he cannot acknowledge that objectivity and remain an idealist. So it is that idealism is essentially a half-way house. It is intelligent enough to reject naive realism; but it suffers from mental fatigue before reaching a critical realism. Berkeley stopped at a naive idealism. Kant invented the complicated ~~mix~~ mixture of naive assumptions

and † astute observations that he named a critical idealism. Hegel broke with naivete, yet he did not discover what is meant by being or the significance of rational judgement. The human mind does not suffer from any transcendental illusion; but it has quite a time when it tries to heal the vulnus ignorantiae, when it tries to learn even † a sketch of what it is to know.

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If the naive realist provides the man of straw that the idealist so easily defeats, he also is the doughty warrior whose defence of realism spreads obscurantism far and wide. The idealist is mistaken; the realist is right; and it never occurs to him that his childish notion of objectivity is not the foundation on which realism stands merely symbolic apprehension of objectivity is the source of all the trouble.

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If the naive realist is the man of straw that the idealist so easily defeats, he also is the doughty warrior whose defence of his misconceived ^m realist spreads obscurantism far and wide. For him to acknowledge that his apprehension of objectivity was merely symbolic would involve him in the existential change of an intellectual conversion. ~~What is the man of straw~~ ~~What is the man of straw~~ He would have to begin to think not in pictures but in propositions. He would have to do so not just occasionally but all along the line. That he refuses. The symbolic view of objectivity has to be maintained at all costs. Otherwise the door will be open to idealism, and on the evils of idealism he is abundant.

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The dialectic, which we have been illustrating quite schematically, is not merely a matter of confusion to be eliminated by distinctions, but far more seriously a myth that is overcome only by an intellectual conversion. With considerable labor one can help people to arrive at an immediate experience and of each of their cognitive activities, to grasp their interrelations of the several activities, to distinguish human knowing from its components, ~~man's~~ self-knowledge from consciousness, the objectivity proper to particular activities

This procedure would be ludicrous if it were not disastrous. For, once the essence of objectivity has been grasped in a dramatic image, there relentlessly follow generalization and deduction. Intellectual knowledge is objective. Therefore it must be like ocular vision. ^{Now, there} There is a functional relation but no resemblance between human understanding and ocular vision. There is a functional relation but no resemblance between the objectivity proper to ocular vision and the objectivity proper to human intelligence and rationality. When such enormous differences are systematically overlooked, rational psychology becomes a terra incognita, even when treatises on the subject abound.

Nor is this all. Picture thinking about ~~an~~ ocular vision does not even grasp the objectivity proper to ocular vision. That objectivity is experiential; it consists simply and solely in the givenness of visual data. But picture thinking attributes to ocular vision, not a mere component in the objectivity of human knowing, but the total resultant. It claims for seeing what is attained only through the conjunction of seeing, understanding, and judging, namely, knowing an object as independent of the knowing.

It is this blunder that generates the idealist distinction between appearance and reality. When I lift a lump of lead, I may report either that the lead is heavy or that it feels heavy. When I gaze out my window and see a green field, I may report either that the field is green or else that the field looks green. The alternative reports are not equivalent. When I say "is green" or "is heavy", I am speaking of the objective properties of things. When I say "looks green" or "feels heavy", I am reporting impressions made on me. Once these differences are made plain, the idealist has only to ask what is known by sense alone. Sight alone can be credited with the information, "looks green." Touch alone can be credited with the information, "feels heavy." But "is green" and "is heavy" involve judgement. And what involves judgement is not the work of sight alone or of touch alone.

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Above we had occasion to draw attention to the difference between consciousness and self-knowledge. Now we must apply this distinction to the particular case of objectivity. Because the dynamic structure of our knowing assembles its ~~na~~ component parts consciously, intelligently, rationally, by that very fact we are aware of our cognitional activities and aware of their success or failure to meet their own immanent norms. In that awareness ~~manifes~~ consists the consciousness every one has that he is knowing and that his knowing has or has not attained objectivity. But such awareness or consciousness, while it is the condition of the possibility of knowing knowing or knowing the objectivity of knowing, none the less is not its attainment. For human knowing is a structure, and so human knowing of human knowing and of its objectivity involves not only the experience of knowing and knowing objectively ~~subjectivity~~ but also an understanding of that experience and a judgement that such understanding is correct.

~~Accordingly, it is a blunder to argue that, because everyone is aware of his knowing and of its objectivity, therefore it must be an extremely simple matter to arrive at knowledge of objective knowledge~~

~~Accordingly, it is only ignorance of the difference between consciousness and self-knowledge that can be guilty of the ~~paranatural~~ common error that because everyone is aware of the objectivity of his knowing, therefore it must be a simple matter to know what objectivity is~~

~~However, if the structure of our knowledge makes it evident that awareness of the objectivity of our knowing is only the condition and not the attainment of knowledge of objectivity, few have adverted to the fact that human knowing is a structure.~~

It remains, however, that few have grasped the structural character of human knowing, ~~and so it commonly is thought~~ and so it commonly is thought a luminous truth that, since everyone can be aware when his knowing is objective, therefore anyone that momentarily pauses and reflects can say just what objectivity is. As nothing could be further from the truth, one cannot be surprised either that many endeavor to arrive at simple theories of objectivity or that refutations of the simple theories are not at once followed by discoveries of the ~~more~~ correct theory.

I have already had occasion to remark that empiricists stress the experiential component in objectivity, idealists the normative component, and rationalists the absolute ~~more~~ component. But the really simple theories are neither empiricist nor idealist nor rationalist. They attend neither to the givenness of data nor to the exigences of intelligence and rationality nor to the fact that judgement expresses an unconditioned, an object known to be independent of the knowing. They are above all such hair-splitting and proceed by picture thinking. The naive realist invites Jack or Jill to raise a hand and look at it. The hand is really out there; it is objectively. The eye is not in the hand but in the head; it is the subject. The eye sees the hand; it sees what is there to be seen; it does not see what is not there to be seen. That's objectivity. ~~Once the essence of objectivity has been grasped in this dramatic image, one has only to generalize relentlessly and one can conclude, not what intellectual knowledge is, but what it must be. If anyone ventures to examine the facts of intellectual knowledge and comes to the conclusion that intellectual knowledge is not what picture thinking demonstrates intellectual knowledge must be, then so much the worse for the facts; they cannot be facts; they cannot be anything but an insidious attempt to disseminate idealism. So we get whole treatises on rational psychology in which consciousness, since it is objective, must be some inward look, in which ~~understanding~~ it is not understanding but a spiritual~~

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We have considered what is meant by saying that human knowing is a dynamic structure and, further, what is meant by saying that human knowledge of human knowledge is a reduplication of the structure

Still, if the meaning of the distinction is clear, the usage of the adjectives, internal and external, is not literal. External experience is of spatial objects, but it is not itself spatial; and still less is internal experience spatial; but, in their literal sense, "internal" and "external" refer to spatial objects. Accordingly, we must ask what is the hard fact, the original datum, that commonly finds expression in a spatial metaphor.

The original datum, then, is different modes of presence. Besides the presence of the spectacle, there is the presence of the spectator; but the second presence is quite different from the first. The spectacle is object; the spectator is subject. As the parade of objects marches by, the spectator is present to himself, not by standing outside himself and entering the parade, not by becoming an object ~~for himself~~ for his own beholding, but by not by becoming an object and so present objectively, but by a concomitant and correlative and opposite presence quite distinct from the presence of objects.

As the parade of objects marches by, the spectator is present to himself, not because he stands outside himself and enters the parade, but because there is not only the presence of objects but also the concomitant and correlative and opposite presence of subjects. For any object to be present to me, I have to be present to myself; and my presence to myself is not the presence of a second object dividing my attention; on the contrary, just as the present object is the totality of what is attended to, so the presence of the acting subject is the totality of attending.

Sixthly, internal experience or, to use its proper name, consciousness is quite different from introspection. In ~~the~~ introspection the subject is attending to himself; he is not only attending as subject but also the object that is attended to; but ~~unless,~~ unless he were conscious prior to any introspection, there would be no data of consciousness for him to introspect. Consciousness is the first step in knowing knowing; it is experiencing experience and understanding and judging. By introspection we begin to move on to the second and third steps in knowing knowing, to understanding experience of experience and of understanding and of knowing, and to judging the correctness of that understanding of internal experience.

~~The necessity of the distinction between consciousness and introspection~~ may be shown in another manner. There is a real change in the subject when he passes from unconsciousness to consciousness. But cognitive activity with respect to an object involves no real change in the object. There follows a reductio ad absurdum of the proposition that identifies consciousness and introspection. For on that identity one must be unconscious when one is not introspecting, and when one begins to introspect, that cognitive activity changes its object from being an unconscious object to being a conscious object.

The instance of structure most familiar to Thomist metaphysicians is the material existent, compounded of prime matter, substantial form, and existence. The threefold compound is a thing, but it is not composed of things. Prime matter is not a thing; substantial form is not a thing; existence is not a thing. Ipsa non sunt sed iis aliquid est. Moreover, as the three components are intrinsically related to the whole they constitute, so too are they related to one another. One cannot understand or intelligently conceive prime matter except by its relation to form; for form is the act of matter and unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Again, form and matter together constitute essence; but essence is intrinsically related to existence; it is that through which and in which being has existence.¹

1) De ente et essentia,

There is no need to regard the foregoing instance as unique. Rather, it illustrates the quite general principle that abstraction is limited, that by abstraction one may and should disregard the incidental, the irrelevant, the insignificant, the unimportant, but it is obtuseness, not abstraction, that takes the further step of disregarding the essential, relevant, significant, important. In the latter realm one is not free to pick and choose, for there structure holds sway, binding in an intelligible unity components that, unless taken together, are not understood at all.²

2) See In librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3.

Accordingly we turn to further and no less instructive instances of structure, to (1) human knowing, (2) consciousness and self-knowledge, and (3) objectivity. In each case it will be found, I believe, that the notion of structure will ~~provide a little clarity~~ make some contribution to dispelling the obscurity and confusion that too often prevails.

Human knowing

What is human knowing? The question regards, not knowledge in general, not God's knowledge, not angelic knowledge, not animal knowledge, but man's. To make the issue even more concrete, let us ask whether or not ~~an~~ an act of ocular vision is human knowing, whether or not an act of hearing or smelling or tasting or touching or ^{feeling} ~~feeling~~ is human knowing, ~~we~~ whether or not asking a question or having an insight or formulating a definition is human knowing, whether or not doubting, or weighing the evidence, or making a judgement is human knowing. In brief, as are we to say that each and every cognitional activity, taken be by itself, is an instance of human knowing? Or are we to adopt the view that human knowing occurs if ~~only~~ ^{and} only if there occurs a set of different cognitional activities satisfying a very general yet quite determinate pattern? On the latter alternative human knowing is a structure. ^{On} the former, it is not.

No doubt, human knowing begins with sense. But the question ^{is} whether it finishes there. If one sees with ~~one's~~ one's eyes, one performs a cognitional activity. But is that activity human knowing? It could be mere gaping, a seeing unaccompanied by any understanding whatever; and then surely one would say of the gaper that, while there is nothing wrong with his vision, still he is exercising not human knowing but human stupidity. Ocular vision, then, is not human knowing but rather a ~~component~~ potential component in human knowing; and what holds for seeing, also holds for hearing, touching, feeling, tasting, and smelling; they are ^{human} cognitional activities without being human knowing; they are a beginning of human knowing but only the beginning.

Is inquiry knowing? Obviously, it is not, for if one ~~knows~~ knew, one would not be inquiring. No less obviously, it has something to do with knowing; it ~~evinces~~ evinces an awareness of ignorance, it reveals a conviction that there is something further to be known, it manifests an intention and effort to come to knowing it. Without the notion of structure one ~~would be hard put~~

would, perhaps, be hard put to say what it is. But one has only to advert to the fact of inquiry to uncover an instance, not ~~merely~~ ^{merely,} of structure, but ~~sub-~~ of dynamic structure. Inquiry is human knowing spontaneously constructing itself; inquiry is process that has become not only conscious but also intelligent; inquiry is ^{the} perpetual escalator lifting us above the data of sense and making us reach for intelligibility; yet inquiry is essentially dependent; it presupposes data, for we cannot ~~by~~ inquire without having something to inquire about; and it heads for understanding and, through understanding, for truth and, through truth, for being. When we inquire, we ask, What is it?

I know of no one that prefaces his books, or being ~~g~~ begins his articles, or opens his lectures, or even privately avers, that never in his life has he had the experience of understanding anything whatever. The occurrence, then, of acts of understanding may be regarded as an undisputed fact

The need for a distinction between consciousness and introspection may be shown in other manners. Were consciousness and introspection identical, identical, then we would be unconc unconscious except when we were introspecting; but, in fact, without any inst introspection whatever we ~~can~~ consciously carry on out our sensitive activities, our intelligent investigations, our rational reflections, and our responsible deliberations. Again, were consciousness and introspection identical, then introspection would be a cognitive activity that produced a real change in its object; we would become conscious not on awakening from sleep, not on beginning to inquire, not on beginning to reflect, not on beginning to deliberate

standing of experiencing, understanding, and judging is correct. When knowing is a structure, knowing knowing has to be a reduplication of the structure.

But the complexity is only an initial difficulty. What is it to experience experiencing, to experience understanding, to experience judging? It is to be conscious. It is to be conscious in three quite different modes of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness. Still, if this is to be more than a multiplication of words, we must advert to the thing and, as a first step, advert to mistakes that may be made in adverting to the thing.

By consciousness, then, is meant not human knowing but only a potential component in human knowing: it stands to self-knowledge as sense experience stands to ^{other} human knowledge. Again, by consciousness is not meant introspection; introspection presupposes the data of consciousness; for without the data we should have nothing to introspect. Finally, by consciousness is not meant some inward look, some apprehension of an interior object; for consciousness is the intentional presence, not of any object whatever, but of the subject and his acts; or, to say the same thing in another way, the data of consciousness are not parts of any ~~spectacle~~ spectacle, but the self-awareness of the acting subject while is beholding the spectacle. As the parade of objects marches by, the data of consciousness are never in the parade; they are the intentional givenness of the subject to himself and of his acts to himself.

I have used the word, presence, and it may be helpful to distinguish a threefold presence. There is the material presence of the statue in the courtyard. There is the presence of objects to a subject, of statue and courtyard to a visitor. There is a third quite different presence of me and my activities to myself. The third presence is correlative and opposite to the second; without the third there would be no subject present to whom objects could be present; when I am not conscious, not present to myself, then nothing else is present to me.

stimulates inquiry, and inquiry is intelligence bringing itself to act; it leads from experience through imagination to insight, and from insight to the concepts that combine into single objects both what is grasped by insight and what has been experienced. In turn, concepts stimulate reflection, and reflection is the conscious exigence of rationality; it marshalls the evidence and weighs it to constrain our reasonableness either to judge or else to doubt. ~~Because human knowing puts itself together consciously,~~

~~intelligently,~~ ^{can} rationally, we not only know but also know that we know.

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If I have clarified what is meant by the statement that human knowing is a dynamic structure, I shall be asked a further question. To clarify is to give some sort of answer to the question, quid sit. But an answer to that question only raises the next, an sit. Is human knowing really a dynamic structure? Conception heads towards judgement. Grasping the idea raises the question of fact.

To be convinced of the fact

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Because human knowing is a dynamic structure that puts itself together consciously, intelligently, rationally, we not only know but also can know that we know. For we know when we experience, understand our experience, and judge our understanding to be correct. And we can know that knowing, because we do experience it and can understand it correctly, both understand it and judge our understanding to be correct.

This is not without its complexity. Because human knowing is, not some single activity, but a set of activities, human knowing of human knowing has to be a ~~structure of~~ set of activities performed with respect to a set of activities; it has to be experiencing experiencing and experiencing understanding and experiencing judging, and then understanding experiencing and understanding and judging, and then judging that our under-

and so the cognitional theorist also will be intelligent. Finally, human knowing is not without an empirical element, not without the data of experience; and so the cognitional theorist will be as empirical as any hard-headed scientist. How, then, does human knowing of human knowing differ from other, more familiar instances of human knowing? It differs in the data that are relevant. To know colours one does not have to hear them; to know sounds one does not have to see them; though data are always needed for knowledge, not every different kinds of data are relevant in different inquiries. The data relevant for knowing knowing are the data of consciousness.

By consciousness, then, is meant not human knowing but merely a potential component within an instance of human knowing. Again, by consciousness is not meant introspection; introspection presupposes the data of consciousness, for without consciousness we would have nothing to introspect. Finally, by consciousness is not meant the apprehension of any object whatever, for consciousness resides not in the apprehended object but in the apprehending subject and his acts of ~~apprehension~~ *appetition* and apprehension. If one would speak of consciousness in terms of presence, then it is not the material presence of the statue in the courtyard; it is not the objective presence of what is seen to the seer or what is heard to the hearer; it is a third type of presence of me and my activities to myself. This third presence is correlative and opposite to the second presence, which is of objects to the subject; and without the third presence, without the presence of me to myself, there is no subject, no conscious nunity, to which objects could be present.

Consciousness is not all of a piece, but rises on successive levels of radically different quality. We are conscious in our dreaming, yet there we are hardly ourselves. We are conscious in a fuller fashion when we are awake: as seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, we are present to out ourselves and have present to us sights and sounds, odours and tastes,

the hot and cold, wet and dry, rough and smooth, hard and soft. Still, such consciousness is merely empirical; there is no reason to deny it to animals; and we reach it in its purity only in a lotus land in which the spark of inquiry, the gravity of reflection, the responsibility of deliberation and decision have no place. Consciousness becomes intellectual when we are puzzled, wonder, inquire, investigate, when we are illumined by insight and proceed to formulate what we have grasped in definitions, postulates, hypotheses, theories.

There are many human cognitive activities. X Thus, one readily distinguishes and, I believe, finds irreducible: seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, doubting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, and judging.

No one of these activities, along alone and by itself, constitutes an instance of human knowing. One is knowing if one is judging correctly; but a correct judgement necessarily presupposes other activities; ~~then~~ it is not, for example, human knowing but human arrogance if one passes judgement on what one does not understand. As judging presupposes understanding, so understanding presupposes a presentation of data; for without data there is nothing to be understood for without some prior presentation there is nothing to be understood; and when there is nothing to be understood, there is no understanding. Inversely, the mere presentation of data is not human knowing; ocular vision, without a glimmer of understanding, is mere gaping; and mere gaping is an exercise of human stupidity rather than of human knowing. Finally, it is not enough to experience and to understand; one has to take the further step of judging; for it is only by judging, by rejecting the false and accepting the true, that one prefers logic to sophistry, philosophy to myth, history to legend, astronomy to astrology, or chemistry to alchemy.

Human knowing, then, is not some single activity or operation; it consists in an appropriate combination of operations. Seeing is not knowing but a potential component in knowing; understanding is not knowing but a potential component in knowing; judging, by itself, is not knowing, but it is a terminal component in an instance of knowing.

We began from cognitive activities; we now have reached cognitive structure. A whole is related to its parts each of its parts and, inversely, each part is related to the other parts and to the whole. Moreover, the less the whole is an arbitrary quantity or collection and the less the parts

standing of experiencing, understanding, and judging is correct.

But this complexity cannot be avoided. No doubt, if human knowing were just looking, then knowing human knowing would be just looking at looking. But human knowing is not just looking, and so knowing it is not looking at looking. Human knowing is a conjunction of quite different activities; to know it is to repeat the conjunction with respect to the conjunction; and that repetition is possible because the conjoining is conscious, intelligent, and rational.

From the multiplicity of cognitive activities we have advanced to the notion of cognitive structure. Single activities are not human knowing but parts of knowing; knowing itself is a whole; and what unites the parts into the whole is a structure, an interlocking set of functional relations.

Now cognitive structure is dynamic, not merely in the sense that its parts are activities, but also in the sense that the structure is filled out not by external constraint but by internal exigence. Experience stimulates inquiry, and inquiry leads from experience to understanding and then from understanding to conception which unites the data of experience with the intelligibility reached by understanding. Conception stimulates reflection; reflection leads from conception to ~~judgement~~ marshalling and weighing the evidence and thence to judgement or to doubt and further inquiry.

Inasmuch as judgements are definitive, cognitive process is cumulative; inasmuch as doubt leads to further inquiry, cognitive process is on-going. But what makes the process cognitive, is that its elements coalesce into structured unities that are instances of human knowing; and what makes these unities manifest, is that the exigences of inquiry and reflection and, as well, the meeting of exigence by conception and judgement are conscious. But what is consciousness?

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If human knowing is a dynamic structure, human knowing of human knowing will also be a dynamic structure. It follows that human knowing of human knowing will not be some single activity but an appropriate combination of activities. Nor are these activities entirely new. Human knowing is not without the rationality of reflection, weighing the evidence, judgement; and so human knowing of human knowing is not without that rationality; the cognitive theorist is not irrational. Again, human knowing is not without the exercise of intelligence in inquiry, understanding, conception;

My topic will be

The notion that human knowing is a structure, while fundamental,
has been thought obscure

To say that human knowing is a structure

The statement that human knowing is a structure has been thought obscure.

My modest purpose will be an attempt to clarify the matter. and to

We began from the multiplicity of cognitive activities, and we have led to acknowledge been lead to acknowledging cognitive structure. Human knowing is not this or that activity or operation; it is a set, an appropriate combination, of activities. Single activities are components or parts; human knowing is a whole; and what unites the parts into the whole is a structure, an interlocking set of functional relations. Inquiry moves from sense experience to understanding; conception combines the data of sense with the intelligibility reached by understanding; reflection leads from conception to judgement; and weighing the evidence determines whether one is to judge or still should doubt.

If human knowing is not some single act, its properties are not the properties of some single act. Inversely, if single cognitive activities are not human knowing, then the properties of single single cognitive activities are not the properties of human knowing. Still, human knowing is not something apart from human cognitive activities, and its properties are not something apart from the properties of cognitive activities.

We began from the manifold of cognitive activities and we have been brought to a sketch of cognitive structure. A whole is related to each of its parts, and each of the parts is related to the other parts and to the whole. Such a closed set of relations is a structure; it is the intelligibility and, in that sense, the essence of the whole. For a whole is intelligible in the measure that it is not a merely arbitrary quantity or collection and its parts are not the result of mere arbitrary division. The absence of arbitrary arbitrariness is the presence of intelligibility; and that presence consists

a matter of arbitrary division,

We began from a multiplicity of cognitive activities; we now are ready to consider cognitive structure. By a structure is meant a closed set of relations

by accepting the true and rejecting the false, that one prefers logic to sophistry, philosophy to myth, history to legend, astronomy to astrology, or chemistry to alchemy.

Human knowing, then, is not the name of some operation. ~~It~~ It names some combination of operations. Hence, to understand human knowing is to understand, not an operation, but a combination; it is to understand a structure; and, since the structure is of operations or activities, it is to understand a dynamic structure.

Two modest conclusions follow. The first is that one is on the wrong track when one discusses knowledge in general begins from a discussion of knowledge in general

Two modest conclusions follow. Over the centuries there has recurred the question, What is knowledge? ^I I suggest that that question is misleading. When one asks about knowledge in general, one asks about an abstraction. Not only will every answer be equally abstract, but also no answer will include any reference to structure. For what is true of knowledge in general, is true of divine knowledge; and divine knowledge has no structure; it is one, simple, eternal, infinite act. On the other hand, if one begins from concrete experience of cognitive activities, one has only to ask which of them is human knowing to be forced to the conclusion that human knowing is, not an activity or an operation but a dynamic structure.

Our second conclusion is equally simple. Over the centuries there has recurred the same analogy or metaphor of the spiritual eye. Just as ~~the~~ our corporeal eyes look at colours, so we have spiritual eyes that look at universals, that see some to be necessarily connected, some mutually exclusive, and some ~~are~~ merely compatible, etc., etc. Now, there is not the slightest ground for supposing that the parts of a functional whole resemble one another. A motor-car is a functional whole; but the tires do not resemble the engine; there is no analogy between the tank and the muffler; and the carburettor is not does not provide an apt metaphor for the differential.

The nature of human knowledge

Discussions of human knowledge are easily involved in a vicious circle. For an account of knowledge expresses knowledge of knowledge

A whole is related to each of its parts, and each part is related to each of the other parts and to the whole. The set of such relations is the structure of the whole. Nor is there any difference between understanding a whole and understanding its structure; for human understanding consists in grasping unities and relations.

Our concern is cognitive structures, and the point we wish to make is elementary. We do not propose to give a full account of such structures, but merely to draw attention to their existence (1) in human knowing, (2) in human self-knowledge, and (3) in objectivity.

1. Human knowing. Human cognitive activities are a vast manifold: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, feeling, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging. Each of these genera may be divided into as many species as there are objects; and each of the species may be divided into as many individuals as there are occurrences of the specific activity.

However, there are not as many instances of human knowing as there are instances of human cognitive activity. For no single cognitive activity, alone and by itself, can be named human knowing. One is knowing if one is judging correctly; but a correct judgement necessarily presupposes other cognitive activities; a man that passes judgement on what he does not understand, is exercising not human knowing but human arrogance. Similarly, an act of understanding necessarily presupposes other cognitive activity; without a prior presentation of data, one has nothing to inquire into and nothing to understand; and when there is nothing to be understood, there is no understanding. Inversely, the mere presentation of data is not human knowing; ocular vision without a glimmer of understanding is mere gaping; and mere gaping is an exercise of human stupidity rather than of human knowing. Nor, finally, is it enough to experience and understand; one must take the further step of judging, for it is only by judging,


knowledge, and (3) the objectivity of human knowledge. From the nature of the case, adequate descriptions will have to be omitted. But such omissions may, I think, be pardoned, partly because they distract from the present issue which is structure, partly because they can be found elsewhere, and partly because it is not someone else's description but one's own personal experience of cognitional activities that are relevant.

(1) Human knowing. There is no structure to divine knowledge, for it is one, simple, unchanging, infinite act

1) Human knowing. Divine knowing is a single, simple, unchanging, infinite act. Its simplicity excludes structure. But human knowledge activities are cognitional activity is a manifold. One may distinguish as many genera as there are kinds of act, and as many species as there are objects, as many individual acts as there are occurrences within the same genus and species.

No single cognitional activity, alone and by itself, can be named human knowing. One is knowing if one judges correctly; but one cannot judge correctly unless one ~~was~~ understands what one is judging; and one has nothing to understand without a previous presentation of data. Inversely, the mere presentation of data is not yet human knowing; ocular vision without a glimmer of understanding is mere gaping; and mere gaping is an exercise not of human knowing but rather of human stupidity. Nor is it enough to understand if one does not go on to judge, for it is only by judgement, by accepting what is true and rejecting what is false, that one is an astronomer rather than an ^rastologist, a chemist rather than an alchemist, an historian and not a fabricator of legends, a logician and not a sophist.

~~If single cognitional activities are not instances of human knowing, it seems to follow that human knowing is a functional whole and cognitional~~



To say that signⁿ single cognitive activities are not instances of human knowing, is not to claim that they have nothing to do with human knowing. Each, by itself, pertains to human knowing, but it does so, not by being a complete instance, but by being a functional part within a potential complete instance. Stupid gaping is not human knowing; but it is ocular vision; and ocular vision is a ~~potn~~ potential component within a potential whole. One does not immediately understand everything one sees; but one can always inquire about visual data; eventually, ^{one may} come to understand them; and, when one ^{one may} has understood, advance to the task of judging.

Human knowing, then, is a functional whole; its functional parts are cognitive activities; and so human knowing occurs, not because a lot of cognitive activity has been going on, not because one has been studying for ten or twenty or thirty years, but only ~~but~~ because there occurred such activities as fit together into completed structures. So it is that simpliste methods lead nowhere. It is perfectly true that scientific investigation demands an accurate apprehension of data. But it is no less true that scientific investigation is advanced only if the data are relevant and intelligently reported. Nor are there simple answers to the questions, Which data are relevant? What reporting is intelligent?

But there is a more philosophic conclusion to be drawn. In a merely quantitative whole, every part is similar to every other. In a functional whole, the parts are dissimilar; for each part is designed by nature or by art to fulfil its own function; and it is the combination of different functions that results in ^a a functional whole. From pint of milk one can accurately conclude what a quart of milk is like. But from an automobile tire one cannot conclude what an automobile engine is like. This aspect of the functional whole seems to be overlooked when theories of intellectual activity are worked out, not on the basis of the data of consciousness, but on the analogy of ocular vision.

A merely quantitative whole lacks structure. It may be divided arbitrarily, and any arbitrary part may be conceived as a whole. One may speak of a whole pint, a whole quart, a whole gallon, a whole litre; similarly, one may take any fraction or multiple of any of these, and consider it the whole.

A functional whole has a structure. Parts are determined, not by arbitrary division, but by their functions; and the functions settle what the whole is. So there is little danger of confusing the parts of a watch with the parts of a motor-car, of assembling a watch without its escapement, or of adding a fifth wheel to a coach.

~~The greater the number of parts in a functional whole, the greater the number of relations connecting each part with each of the other parts and with the whole. It is the set of such relations~~

To understand a functional whole, one has to understand the relations of each part to each of the other parts and to the whole. But this set of relations is the structure of the functional whole. Hence, it is one and the same thing to understand a functional whole and to ~~see~~ understand its structure.

Inversely, one will fail to understand a functional whole, if one understands some relations but overlooks others, or if one fails to advert to the fact that there is a structure to be understood, or if one takes it as obvious that any talk about structures must be incomprehensible nonsense.

Though the name, structure, was not current in mediaeval Scholasticism, there was no lack of interest in the reality. A part is not the whole. A door, accordingly, is not a house for it is a part of a house. Prime matter is not a material thing, for it is part of a material thing.

It remains, however, that mediaeval writers were content to analyze cognitional activity ontologically, and to treat cognitional structures in only a fragmentary fashion. For this reason it may not be out of place to consider briefly the ~~the~~ structures of (1) human knowing, (2) human self-

A whole is related to each of its parts, and each part is related to each of the other parts and to the whole. The set of such relations is a structure.

When a whole is determined by some arbitrary or merely conventional unit, structures are of no great interest. Very quickly one exhausts the relations of pints, quarts, and gallons

BY a structure is meant the set of relations

in which a whole lacks structure.

structure

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if single cognitional activities are not instances of human knowing,
it remains that they are parts that coalesce into functional wholes

structure

4

activities are its functional parts. If stupid gaping is not human knowing, still it is seeing; and though seeing alone is not human knowing, still it is a potential component of human knowing. One does not understand everything one sees, but one can come to understand visual data; and once they are understood, one can go on to the task of judgement

The parts of a whole are related both to the whole and to one another. Such relations are constitutive of the parts as parts. A structure, accordingly, is the set of relations constitutive of the parts in a whole. The utility of attending to structures is, of course, that it runs counter to ~~the~~ fragmentary thinking. This I propose to illustrate, and ¹ take four instances: (1) human knowing; (2) self-knowledge; (3) objectivity; and (4) things.

1) Human knowing. Our topic is not knowledge in general, not divine knowledge, not angelic knowledge, not animal knowledge, but the knowledge men commonly attain.

Now in man there occur many different cognitional activities: he sees, hears, touches, smells, tastes, feels; he inquires, investigates, understands, defines, thinks; he doubts, reflects, weighs the evidence, judges. Is one to say, then, that any human cognitional activity is human knowing? Or that some are to be regarded as human knowing, while some are not? Or that all must be performed for human knowing to occur? Or, finally, that human knowing occurs when a certain pattern or structure of human cognitional activities is satisfied?

Clearly, there is no single cognitional activity that can be named human knowing. One might think that what one sees clearly and distinctly with one's own eyes in broad daylight. And it is true enough that, when one sees in that fashion, one is knowing; but it is not true that ocular vision alone is constitutive of that knowing. When one merely gaps gapes, there is nothing wrong with one's one's seeing; gaping is seeing without any glimmer of understanding; and to see clearly and distinctly what one in no way understands is to exercise, not human knowing, but human stupidity. Nor is it enough to add understanding to seeing; ~~many~~ many for acts of understanding are a dime a dozen; what is difficult is, not understanding, but understanding correctly; and whether or not one has understood correctly, calls for the further activity named judging. Judging, finally, is not an activity that,

alone and by itself, can be named human knowing. To pass judgement on what one does not understand is, not human knowing, but human arrogance. To pass judgement without any appeal to experience, direct or indirect, is not human knowing. Neither seeing nor understanding nor judging, then,

We have considered three different cognitional activities and found that no one them of them by itself is human knowing. But what is true of seeing, is no less true of hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, feeling. What is true of understanding, is no less true of defining and thinking. Nor would anyone claim that inquiring or imi imagining or invesigating or doubting or weighing the evidence was, alone and by itself, human knowing.

If no single cognitional activity is constitutive of human knowing, one cannot swing to the opposite extreme and claim that an instance of knowing requires the exercise of all cognitional activities. One can know colours without hearing them, sounds without tasting them, heat and cold without smelling them. So one is led to the conclusion that human knowing is a structure; it is a whole and cognitional activities are its parts; and what is required for knowing is filling out the parts.

Just what is the whole, and what the parts? A complete answer would require a catalogue of all different types of human knowing

Just what is the whole, and what the parts? These questions are not answered by enumerating cognitional activities, for the parts in question are functional parts, parts as fulfilling a role within the whole, parts not as described but as explained. Consider, then, three cognitional functions: an experiential function, an intellectual function, and a rational function. One does not have to hear colours or taste sounds to know them; but one can have no proper knowledge of them without experiencing them; and one experiences colours by sight, sounds by hearing. The function fulfilled by seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, feeling is the experiential function. Next, the intellectual function is both the desire to understand and the efforts made to meet the desire. The desire is

wonder, intellectual curiosity, inquiry. The effort to meet the desire, as effort, is investigation, as using a heuristic device, is imagination simplifying the data of experience, as attaining its goal, is understanding and, as mastering what has been attained, is definition, postulation, inference, hypothesesⁱ, theory, thought. Finally, the rational function ~~is~~ both demands sufficient evidence if one is to judge and demands judgement if sufficient evidence is reached. Reflection is the emergence into consciousness of the rational function. ~~is~~ Marshalling and weighing the evidence is its work. Judging or doubting follow with rational necessity ~~from~~ on attaining or failing to attain sufficient evidence.

Because ordinary human knowing is a whole composed of three functional parts, we were able to argue above both that single cognitional activities are not human knowing and, as well, that not all human cognitional activities must be performed in each instance of human knowing. But now we are able to go on to illuminate other obvious features of human knowing.

Human knowing is a cumulative process. To know a material object, one must have some experience, direct or indirect, of it. But that experience may be minimal and remain there; it may begin tenuously and remotely and gradually be increased; it may be as full as man's senses, his instruments, and his experiments permit. In each case the same object is being known, but there is a vast difference between the first case and the second, and between the second and the third. Again, human knowing includes some understanding of an object; but that understanding may be commonsense or scientific; scientific understanding advances from elementary experiments and empirical laws ~~through~~ through ever broader systematic hypotheses to reach comprehensive theories; and commonsense understanding varies from the minimal insight we have into objects on the horizon of our interests to the complete mastery of materials, tools, machines, situations, attained by the trained worker, the expert, the professional. Finally, as experience accumulates and understanding mounds mounts, our capacity to pass

A whole may be merely quantitative or functional. A merely quantitative whole may be divided

In a functional whole the parts are related to one another and to the whole, and such relations are both constitutive of the parts and determinative of the whole

structure

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to place inquiry in knowing, for essentially it is structural; one does not just inquire; one inquires about the data of experience and one inquires in order to understand

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wstructural. One

Strcut

Structure begins where abstraction ends. By abstraction one disregards the incidental, irrelevant, insignificant, unimportant. But by abstraction one may not take the further step of going on to disregard the essential, relevant, significant, important. There structure holds sway. It binds in an intelligible unity the components that, if not taken together, are not understood at all.

If, however, ancient and mediaeval writers were far from overlooking structure,¹ it remains that certain basic applications of the notion were

1)

The word, abstraction, has a negative connotation^a. It suggests disregard of the incidental, the irrelevant, the insignificant, the unimportant.

But such disregard is only a by-product of the primary purpose of intelligence which is to grasp the essential, the relevant, the significant, the important.

Moreover

Structure begins where abstraction ends. By abstraction one can attend to the essential and disregard the incidental, attend to the relevant and disregard the irrelevant, attend to the significant and important to disregard the insignificant and unimportant. But abstraction cannot take the further step of invading and, so to speak, atomizing or pulverizing the realm of the essential, relevant, significant, important. There structure holds sway. So foot and anikal animal are different words listed separately in the dictionaries; but the whole intelligibility of foot lies in its organic functions in an anika animal holds sway. Abstraction is the work of intelligence; its function is negative; its end is to facilitate the

Abstraction is not an unlimited possibility. Always one can abstract from the incidental, insignificant, irrelevant, unimportant. But this does not mean that one can go on and abstract from the essential, the significant, the relevant, the important. Abstraction is a work of intelligence, and intelligence, as it freely disregards the irrelevant, so it insists on attending to all that ~~is essential~~ ^{what is beside the point,} to the point.¹

This close association of intellect and intelligence,

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- 1) This close association of intellect and intelligence, though it may have been overlooked in later writers, was clearly grasped and emphatically expressed by Aquinas. See In librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3.
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structure

2

Because abstraction is a work of intelligence and consists in attending to the essential, significant, relevant, important, while disregarding what is merely incidental, insignificant, irrelevant, unimportant, it follows