

Lonergan Workshop 1974 Q&A June 17-24

June 20, Fourth Q&A, Audio Files 813 A & B.

Question: Can speculative theology, even when subject-oriented, help pastoral theology? Specifically, does the kind of speculative work done in the morning papers of this workshop have any importance to the pastoral concerns of the afternoon and evening sessions? How would you envisage a pastoral theology mediating that kind of religious subjectivity which confronts the problems of suffering, guilt, and death?

Lonergan: Well, one could almost write an encyclopedia on the topic. I'll pick out three points that may be helpful insofar as it is possible for a subject-oriented theologian to do so.

First of all, pastoral concern: pastoral concern is more or less what Humpty Dumpty would call a portmanteau word. It contains a lot of different meanings. There are the pastoral concerns of each parish, of each city, of each diocese, of each region, of each country, of the church in the world. And they are not all separate and independent. On the contrary, problems on the local or regional level cannot always be solved on that level. You haven't got a broad enough basis to investigate them and work out solutions, or the resources to carry out solutions. They can be understood only on a broader basis and approached only on a broader basis. And without that broader basis people are banging their heads against a stone wall. So pastoral concerns: unless one takes the larger concern, pastoral concern, and divides issues onto the levels on which they can be dealt with – certainly, issues that can be dealt with on the local level are to be dealt with on the local level, with local means and all the rest of it: the principle of subsidiarity in papal encyclicals. But not all problems are of that type, and the graver problems are most likely not of that type, the really deep ones and the ones that hurt.

Secondly, problems: problems are of two kinds. There is an ambiguity to the word 'problem.' A problem can be an occasion for a direct insight, getting a bright idea, making a discovery, hitting upon an invention. There is a problem for intelligence, and the more you worry about it, rack your brains, the closer you are to a solution. There is another sense of the word 'problem,' where what you are concerned with is an inverse insight. Understanding that understanding is beside the point, that the root difficulty is the presence of stupidity, ill-will; there is not any intelligibility there to be discovered, there is no invention to be made. That's not where the difficulty lies. The inverse insight – what it comes across is an absurdity, an objective surd. Ill will and sin are irrational, and the irrationality is not confined to the will. It is also found in the action, and it is found in the situation that the action produces. It is perpetuated by all the people who say we have to deal with the facts as they are, and consequently they compromise themselves with these things and keep on doing things that are irrational and making the situation still more irrational.

Question: [Here Lonergan repeats the last part of the first question: Does theology mediate the kind of religious subjectivity that confronts problems of suffering, guilt, and death?]

Lonergan: It is about the only thing that does. But ... Note, when one says 'pastoral theology,' one thinks of a specialty. And there are different kinds of specialties, and pastoral theology is not the kind of specialty that divides up an area of data and says, 'Well now, I'll take this little part

here and devote my life to that, and I won't have to bother my head about anything else.' History, anything that is documentary, can be approached in that way. It is field specialization. They divide up the Old Testament into the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings, and then they divide up the Law and the Prophets and the Writings and they subdivide them, and so on; and it's excellent specialization; and similarly, right on through the whole history of theology. But pastoral theology is not that kind of thing. It is taking the whole of theology and applying it to some concrete issue. It is not saying, 'Well, now the other Joes, the fancy Dans, can bother themselves with this stuff you call speculative, and we don't have to bother about that, we are the practical people.' That doesn't work. Theology *is* relevant to enabling people to confront suffering, guilt, and death, and know all about them, insofar as it is profoundly spiritual, insofar as it reveals the necessity of heroism. To give an example from my own work, thesis 17 in my *De Verbo Incarnato*: What is the meaning of Christ's death? It has to do with the way God, divine Providence, proposes to deal with the evil of sin. Not by wiping it all out by a fiat, but by showing the way God himself feels it: absorbing the evils, undergoing them, and inviting – an invitation to others to undergo them and thereby defeat them, not let the evil be a self-perpetuating process. That's the fundamental way of dealing with evil. Don't let it be a self-perpetuating process. But other points in that will appear in answering the other questions. That's about all I can throw out on the spur of the moment.

Question: *Method* promotes pluralism. How can this be done without falling into relativism?

Lonergan: What is meant by 'promotes'? Do you mean that *Method* creates a pluralism that otherwise would have no existence whatever? Or does *Method* acknowledge a matter of fact and attempt to deal with it? There is a pluralism as a matter of fact. The manner of thought and speech in the New Testament is not the manner of thought and speech in the Council of Nicea, of Constantinople I, of Ephesus, of Chalcedon, and of the Third Council of Constantinople. Medieval theology is more similar to the Greek councils than it is to the New Testament, but still it differs from the Greek councils too in its way of going about things. And historical theology, which is a fact forced upon us whether we want it or not, at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century – we got around to acknowledging it with regard to scripture in 1943, in *Divino afflante Spiritu*. Those differences exist. Are they saying the same thing? If they are saying the same thing, are they saying it in the same way? And what's the difference? And is the difference justified? You can try and sweep all that under the mat. 'It is far too complicated. Don't bother me.' That is what will provoke relativism. But if you face the issue and find out the solution, you will be defeating the defeatism of relativism. The most notable relativist in this field was Ernst Troeltsch, a man of terrific learning, incredible learning, a pupil of Dilthey. And he came to the conclusion that there is no way of choosing between the great religions. In religion he was a relativist. Why? Because he had problems of knowledge, cognitional theory, fundamentally. He belonged to a whole tradition in which Kant was the dominant figure. You get into things like relativism or into any 'ism' by failing to deal with problems, not by facing them and dealing with them.

Question: Is the notion of heresy consistent with pluralism?

Lonergan: Well, pluralism can be taken to mean doctrinal development: the difference between the New Testament and the Greek councils, between the Greek councils and medieval thought, which became conciliar in the Council of Trent; and between any of the three and the historical process that adverts to the differences between the three and says they are not the same in all respects. That's pluralism in one sense, the fact of doctrinal development. It has been kicking around since 1845 at least. And there's pluralism in the sense of religious indifference, where one religion is just as good as another; there are a lot of them. That doesn't merely promote heresy, or is consistent with heresy, it implies heresy. You are accepting all the heresies as long as they are true when they say that it doesn't make any difference.

Question: If ortho-praxy is stressed over against orthodoxy, is it an equivalent to heresy?

Lonergan: Well, what does 'stressed over against' mean? What ortho-praxy stresses over against is cackle-praxy. There is no opposition between ortho-praxis and orthodoxy. Ortho-praxis sublates orthodoxy, and that doesn't mean rejects: it means to keep, to preserve, to maintain, and to add on something that's more perfect. You can go back to the Epistle of James: it is not the people that talk, it is the people that do, that count.

[Re-reading the question: 'If ortho-praxy is stressed over against orthodoxy, is it an equivalent to heresy?'] Well, if you understand by ortho-praxy a rejection of orthodoxy, and your rejection of orthodoxy is a rejection of the substantials of the faith, then there is not only a danger of heresy; you're right there!

Question: If there is, what should the community do about it when it occurs?

Lonergan: On that topic there is a little book – I don't know whether it was first published in French or German: *Die Antwort der Theologen*. Anyway, it is published in English under the title *Crucial Questions*. It is a series of interviews with Congar, Daniélou, Schillebeeckx, Schoonenberg, Rahner, and Metz. Rahner and Metz responded simultaneously. It is more or less a dialogue between the two of them: 'I agree with you entirely, but ...' Rahner at one point states, 'There does come a time when the Church simply and flatly has to say "No."' He goes on to say, 'That time is not a remote or an abstract possibility. When you can meet a person actively engaged in teaching theology who will confide to you that for him it would make no difference to the faith if Jesus Christ never existed.' His difficulty isn't the historical existence of Jesus Christ, it is the theological significance of Jesus Christ. So you have an example from Rahner of what to do about it when it occurs. But note, he is picking on something that is substantial to the faith. Rahner is apt to insist upon the order of the truths of faith, that they are not all standing exactly on the same plane or are of the importance.

Question: Why must the counterpositions eventually reverse themselves? What about the long run of general bias?

Lonergan: The word 'must' no longer occurs even, I think, in mathematics, except for conditional necessity. Must, necessity, has become a marginal notion in the intellectual world. There are occasions when it occurs, but usually it is the hypothetical necessity: If A, then A. Now, 'must the counterpositions eventually reverse themselves?' I don't know that I ever said

that they must. What they do is just keep on making things worse and more impossible, and more hopeless and more messy. Of course, they can make things so bad that people won't tolerate them any longer. But then they have to be reversed. It is someone that does the reversing. There is the possibility of the reversal, and the fact of the reversal, and they are two distinct things. The possibility of the reversal is faith, hope, and charity. Charity, so that you won't be perpetuating the evils that already exist; if you try to clean up the situation on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, there won't be many eyes or teeth left. When they get around to dealing with you for having destroyed them, well, there are still fewer. So there's charity. There is hope to deal with determinisms, economic determinisms, psychological determinisms, nationalist and racial determinism, social determinism: all the ones you can think of, that crush people, that mean that 'I can't do anything about it, we're trapped.' There is hope, hoping against hope, that pulls people out of that. It is a fact, and the meaning of hope is that you do get out. And faith, to eliminate all the false notions that people have got into their heads as a result of the long-term cycle. The long-term cycle not merely is that people do what is irrational, but they adjust their thinking to the irrational facts they have created, and their thinking becomes irrational. It becomes *Realpolitik*: you have to accept the world as it is. And the world as it is is 'nature red in tooth and claw.' So we might as well use our own teeth and claws. Faith is what enables people to see what man can and should do despite all the impossibilities and all the irrational notions that people have gradually built up. That's the possibility of reversal. The fact of reversal is understanding the mistakes made in the past and not merely the mistakes of the politicians, but the mistakes of the theorists, the mistakes of the professors, the mistakes of the administrators in hiring the professors, the mistakes of the people that force upon the country a least common denominator of intelligence and reasonableness in the universities. It is understanding the mistakes that have been made and not stopping and saying, 'Well, I can't correct them, can't hope to correct all these mistakes.' What you have to do is first of all discover them, pin them down in all their details and so on. That's just a first negative step. There is a positive step: discovering the new theories and the new theorems that retain what is right in the old and correct what is mistaken.

Christian Duquoc, a professor, I think, in the Institut Catholique de Lyons, France, a Dominican, has a book, *The Ambiguity of Secularization Theologies*. I forget where it is published. But it is one of those things with the plastic colored covers. And it contains a critique of 'Gaudium et Spes.' He praises 'Gaudium et Spes' and the papal encyclicals of John XXIII and Paul VI, in which it is no longer assumed, as it is in the earlier papal encyclicals, that we live in a pre-industrial, agricultural society. So he praises the great leap forward, but he goes on to point out that, unfortunately, the people in the Council did not have the technical knowledge to talk about the current situation, and they satisfied themselves with vague moral advice. That gets nowhere. You need people that are going to give you something more than vague moral advice if you are going to deal with real problems. There is a lot of talk about theology of liberation, and so on, in South America, and in those whom I have met or read there is a total absence of a realization of errors in economic theory that they are struggling against. I think one has to go into theory and do it seriously and not be afraid to differ from common opinion. Especially now that learned opinion realizes they are up a tree! Two years ago I was giving a brief series of lectures at MIT, and I was talking to the man in charge of the seminar and mentioned economics, and he said, 'Well, you can take it for granted that the economists at MIT don't know how to handle inflation; they all admit it.' That was his opinion on it. There's a lot of people that agree with

him. We have a political candidate in Canada at the present time, and there was a cartoon of him seated on the lakeshore, in the area where you would expect water, but in this area around where he was seated, the water stopped in a perpendicular line – you could see the fishes going around – and he was saying, ‘I mean no inflation in this segment.’ In other words, besides the possibility of reversal through a deep spirituality, a self-sacrificing spirituality, there is also needed the equipment for the fact of reversal, and that’s on the level of creative thinking, and being as popular as Karl Marx for a century before you begin to have any effect. People talk about speculative thinking, but Karl Marx was the most influential thinker in the modern world. In the nineteenth century he was an old fool with a long white beard who wasted his time in the British Museum. And what the Catholic Church lacked in the 19th century was other old fools with the same ... (applause).

Question: Should foundations include categories for fields other than theology? Could you enlarge on your statement that theological categories will be invoked in other areas?

Lonergan: I think it is best for theologians to leave the other areas to think out their own categories, and to begin by learning what their categories precisely are. Père Carrier, Rector of the Gregorian, Doctorate from the Sorbonne, talked about ‘Fr So and So working on the nature of the church, who has done some excellent work on the church and done some rather profound thinking on the nature of society. It is really very good. Of course, if he had read the sociologists, he would have had something far better.’ Look, theologians, insofar as they move into other fields, have to be able to learn from the other fields. That’s the first and fundamental step. Theology will do its job if it succeeds in discovering and correcting what is insufficient or erroneous or aberrant in the fundamental concepts that are being held. The common error is the practical realistic error: ‘unless you do that it won’t work.’ Anything that is intelligent and reasonable, you can be certain that it won’t work easily, or it would have been done long ago. And the point to the possibility of reversal insisting on faith, hope, and charity is to offset that conviction that it won’t work. Can we have an economy without the profit motive? Will people risk their savings without the hope of gaining something more? And if they won’t, will we simply collapse, have a dead economy? ‘Unless you have the profit motive, it won’t work.’ Well, of course, you have to refine a bit: the question is not the profit motive, the question is the profit criterion: ‘the only thing that’s worth doing is what yields a maximum profit.’ That’s what loads the market with things that nobody wants, and you have endless advertising to sell it. In other words, you have to not merely ... this business of ‘it won’t work’ – acknowledge the significance of religious motivation coming in to offset the fact of sin and ill will. But you also have to have *factual* reversal, and that’s a matter of thinking things out accurately, thinking out the precise flaw. For a century socialists have been inveighing against ownership of the means of production. In a recent series of articles, first in the *New Yorker* and now in a book, *The American Condition*, a man by the name of Goodwin points out – well, of course, Marx was right, property will vanish; the shareholders don’t own anything in the corporation. All they own is shares; they have no right to any of the property of the corporation. They haven’t got a right to a single axle in a freight train; that’s owned by the corporation, not by the shareholders. And what do the shareholders get? They get what the directors see fit.

A friend of mine in Canada, talking about the recent declaration of the state of Barclay’s Bank – a commercial bank in England: their profit for the previous year had been 189 million

pounds; it wasn't too difficult given the state of the rate of interest. Of that they spent about 80 million pounds in taxes and (I forget exactly) something like 10 million pounds for the shareholders. And they remarked in their declaration to the shareholders what a marvelous state the company was in, that they had all these reserves to guard against evil days ahead. Of course, inflation had gone up. The shareholders had got a return of something like 7% on their earnings, but inflation was 10%, so they were getting minus 3%. And the employees had a raise in salary but that wasn't equal to the rate of inflation either. What's the corporation? It is an ongoing thing that doesn't have to worry about anybody or anything. One has to, with regard to that again, pick out the precise flaw and that brings me on to question 8.

Question: Would you comment on multinational corporations in the light of your work on economics?

Lonergan: Well, my work in economics is unfinished, and it has been unfinished for a long time. However, with regard to corporations: corporations exist by legislative fiat. In England they were prohibited by law, from the early 1700s, the time of the South Sea Bubble, until 1855. You had partnerships, but when a partner died or retired you got a new partnership. You didn't have something that kept on going no matter how many people died, that retained its identity. In the United States, there was a movement towards the corporation, which was called trusts. There was anti-trust legislation. The State of New Jersey enlarged the concept of the corporation, so that the corporation there was equivalent to what had been called a trust before, and that attracted a lot of industry to the State of New Jersey. No other state could compete with that, so the notion of the corporation was enlarged. So any time that the corporation is found to be inimical to the well-being of a given country or all countries, all you have to do is change the law. They are there because you want them to be there. Because you said, 'Let it be,' 'Fiat.' Now with regard to that, that's just an opinion, as far as I know about it; check it out before you repeat it to anyone else.

(Questions from the floor)

Question: In the light of the notion that pastoral theology is the application of the whole of theology to a concrete issue, do you have any comments on how you determine the agenda? In other words, which issues the Christian community, the theological community – do you have any suggestions as to how they should go about setting the agenda?

Lonergan: One way is 'what should I do something about?' 'What can we do something about?' 'Have we got the resources to do something about it?' And secondly, 'What have we not got the resources to do something about?' and 'Is there a higher level on which there would be the resources to do something about it?' Maybe we can't answer that question whether something can be done about it or not. Well, is there anything we could learn that would enable us to find out whether we could do something about it? Put in a little delay. Because there is no use rolling up your shirtsleeves before you know what ditch you are going to dig! You can consult a book on pastoral theology, and in almost any book you will find lists of things to be done. You can go from that, work from that. But it is a matter of knowing your concrete situation with which you are dealing. Who are the people there? That's fairly hard especially in a modern parish, even in a

fairly small city, because the population is changing. You have 50-60% new names on a parish list in a couple of years. To know the people is quite a job. The question arises, Well, have we got something adapted to this type of problem, is our setup dealing with it in the parish itself? It was fine in the feudal situation, in that agricultural situation. Well, is there a change for that, and so on? You can start asking questions.

Question: You said about *Gaudium et Spes* that the critique would be we didn't have the knowledge to deal with the problem; we didn't have the resources in the church, or if they were there they weren't called upon. So I would think that in the church there would be a need to develop a type of theologian, a type that meets those kinds of problems. A type of economist!

Lonergan: Right, right, quite correct. But you don't create creative minds, you make them probable by setting up the situations in which they could flourish if they existed. You have to have a certain amount of trust in the fruitfulness of the ground, you know. If you plant the seed and then pull them up to see if the roots are still there – You have to have a certain confidence in the process.

Question: In your analysis of common sense, you made the point that common sense makes errors, but the critical thing is that it doesn't even know that it knows, so common sense can't solve the problems, so there is a need for the theoretical to enter in. Now, the difficulty that I have with this is, How do we deal with the fact that the culture and the praxis are done by people of common sense, and yet what they are using to deal with the problems are inadequate? They often-times find that what the theoretic is saying is nonsense. It doesn't make sense to them, or it is crazy, as you oftentimes put it. How does the theoretician deal with this coming up against people who can't understand him?

Lonergan: Well, he hopes for the best, does his best, hopes for results, like Karl Marx. He did not see it in his own lifetime. With regard to how do they do it: well, take industry; it subsidizes fundamental research, finding out things that no one knows anything about; and a more practical type of research. And the teaching of pure science, the teaching of applied science and the teaching of engineering and the training of superintendents and supervisors and foremen and workers and the cultivation of trouble-shooters, people who can find out what's wrong and what can be done about it. And adaptability: normally in a plant, if you have a new and better idea, well, it is no use talking about it while things are running. If there is a breakdown, well, they might listen to you, now that things have stopped anyway. You might be able to get something better put in, something new put it. So people with ideas have to bide their time. The world isn't eager to buy them! What common sense doesn't understand is common sense. It hasn't got a more general theory that includes science and interiority, and so on. But it is perfectly competent in its own field. And of course there are all sorts of common sense. There isn't just one common sense for the whole of humanity. The common sense of Americans isn't the common sense of Mexicans or Russians or Japanese. The common sense of the East isn't the common sense of the West or the North or the South. And the common sense of the next village is not the common sense of this village. 'The people over there are a little strange, you know.' Common sense develops in its own concrete sphere. If you move into another, you don't carry on as if you were

always there. You keep your eyes open and your mouth shut until you catch on and see the way that things are done, and how they can be done, and how they can't. That's all common sense.

Question: It would seem that you are saying that ortho-praxy is a sublation of orthodoxy. Is it also a sublation of technique? I think that would apply to the pastoral question in terms of the fact that the emphasis in pastoral theology many times has been on orthodoxy. It is shifting now, I think, to techniques or gimmicks, and it seems that ortho-praxy would involve not only a sublation of orthodoxy but also of technique.

Lonergan: Well, God forbid you should say anything against technique! As long as it doesn't think it's the whole show, as long as it knows that it is a tool, then it will have its day of usefulness, its day of limited usefulness. And it can leave room for lots of other techniques. That the time may come when it won't be as useful as the other things over which it has advantages at the present time, and so on. As long as it doesn't provide the foundation for a lot of vested interests that will perpetuate very shortly what is antiquated. But 'sublate,' the precise meaning of sublation: intelligence sublates sensitivity. The intelligent man, the man that has learned a science doesn't see less than a person who hasn't. His specialization in intelligence means that he sees an awful lot more. If there is a bug that walks across this table, I see it and say, 'There's a bug.' An entomologist would see it and tell you a thousand things about it. And you wouldn't understand most of the words. He has names for all sorts of things that you never bothered to acquire the name for. And he can see all sorts of differences and talk about them because he's got the names. You can see and talk about what you have the names for. If you haven't got a name for it, you hardly see it, not unless you have your nose rubbed in it, of course. The more developed the intelligence, the greater and the finer the perceptivity. And the more accurate and the fuller and the more detailed; and that's what is meant by sublation: Making it really something. Orthodoxy that is just orthodoxy is faith without works, which according to James is dead. The sublation brings it to life, and it can be orthodox without being so militant.

Question: I thought that one of the best parts of Professor Lamb's paper this morning was how he tried to develop a philosophy of language out of your work and relating the levels of syntactics, semantics, sigmatics, and pragmatics to your levels. I wonder, if you were going to sketch an outline for a philosophy of language, if it would follow that, or what are your thoughts on the philosophy of language?

Lonergan: I think I'd have left Professor Lamb carry on with his own work rather than attempt what he has done. When I was in Florida, we had a group of people who had read my books, or studied under me, wanted to meet one another. (Changeover of tape, **switch to 813B**). And the larger audience took me as a focal point, and one of them, who is now chairman of philosophy at Stonybrook in the State University of New York, said to me, 'We're not your disciples. You taught us to think for ourselves, and that's what we're doing.' That's the kind of disciples I want: non-disciples! OK? Does that meet your question?

Question: Yesterday, you spoke briefly about the way in which attention to the notion of love, of value, can provide a somewhat richer analogy for grasping something about the mystery of the

Trinity. I am wondering if you could expand on this a bit, paying particular attention to the human terms, or the human members, the human elements in that analogical explanation?

Lonergan: You can't do it briefly, you know. But – The treatise on the Trinity, Thomas went at it several times and his final one: 26 questions on the existence of God, God as One. Well, one question on theology and 25 on God, and then three questions, process from God as One to God as Three. Then the Trinity in question 30. 27, 28, and 29 are transition questions. The first one: 'Are there processions in God?' The second: 'Are there relations in God?' The third: 'Are there persons in God?' And the persons turn out to be subsistent relations, and the relations turn out to be implicit in the processions. Now, you can conceive those processions on a semi-intellectual analogy. I say 'semi-intellectual' because even in St Thomas the Word, the judgment, is a judgment of value, *Verbum spirans Amorem*. The source of the Spirit is the Word breathing love. So the Thomistic theory and what I am now saying are identical with regard to the Son and the Spirit. The Word breathing Love, and the judgment of value, and the Act of Love that follows upon the judgment of value, the rational act of love, the responsible act of love. The source in Augustine is *memoria*. Well, that's one of the sources; he has several analogies, but mainly with regard to *memoria*. In Thomas it is *intelligere*, understanding. I am saying now that you are more scriptural if you take the First Epistle of St John and say God the Father is love, in the sense of being in love. Being in love is not the same as acts of love. Being in love is a dynamic state from which result an endless succession of acts of loving, in us. But the agapē, the Father, is that being in love, that dynamic state; it is eternal and infinite and so on.

Now, again, when I say Father, Son, and Spirit are these three things, they are not just three things. They are the relations, the terms of these processions, and the three are identical with the divine essence.

Question: Could you say something about the being in love that is the gift to the finite person in relation to the Trinity?

Lonergan: Well, it's the gift of the Holy Ghost. There are complex theological things on it, views about how it can be true that a divine person is given to somebody. You begin by saying, now, what do you do in metaphysics? Well, you laid down the conditions of the truth of proposition. What are the conditions, the propositions, that are eternally true about God and necessarily true about God, one kind. And those that are contingently about God with regard to others. And those that are eternally true about God with regard to God himself in his infinity. It is not some aspect of God that becomes man, it is God the Son that becomes man, and something is true about God the Son as God the Son, and it is contingent, and there is nothing contingent in God the Son. How do you get a true proposition about that? That's a question of theological systematics, and one doesn't start from scratch and build it up. One spends a term teaching it.

Question: The analogy of the Trinity when applied to the beatific vision with the Father as being in love: would that make a change in the way one might approach that?

Lonergan: Well, it is only the Son that becomes Man. It is not just an appropriation. The Holy Ghost is the one that's given. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost inhabit, indwell in the just. But only the Spirit is the one that's given. The Father and the Son are giving, not gift. They give the Holy

Ghost. The giver and the gift are opposed relations, like Father and Son. If you want the beatific vision to be something that's proper to the Father, in other words, that it pertains principally to the Father, you can take something like 1 Corinthians, where St Paul says, the Son will present us all to God the Father at the end of days. And with that I wish you well!