

Lonergan Workshop 1974 Q&A June 17-24

June 19, Third Q&A, Audio Files 812 A & B (811A is the lecture 'A New Pastoral Theology' given the evening before, and 811B is blank)

**Question:** What do you view as the relationship between the dark night of the mystic and the dark night of those in psychotherapy?

**Lonergan:** I can't give you any more than my own guesses on that. What perhaps is common to both is the disintegration of a prior integration and, particularly in the case of the mystic, a disintegration preparatory to a new and profounder integration. Fr Tyrrell spoke yesterday of the transition from an illusory 'feeling good' to a significant 'being good.' The transition is probably painful. You're giving up what you know and like and moving into something you don't know and suspect is crazy. In the case of the mystic, I think you have to distinguish between the more or less fundamental aspects of it and the incidental aspects of it. The fundamental aspect I have grounds for suspecting is the love of God making or letting all of their love, affectivity, take on an ever smaller proportion of an ever greater whole. It is a withdrawal, not in the sense that you are really withdrawn, but in the sense that it means less and less to you in proportion to the rest. It is the sort of thing that there is no relief from. It is a permanent withdrawal. The other proportion remains, takes over. It just keeps on going. You don't come out on the other side. Being on the other side is not coming back to what you were before at all. That's the impression I got. But answers to those questions— either go crazy, or become a neurotic, or become a mystic — because to speak on them with any authority or any basis in fact, the main thing is the experience, although you can pick up clues. Johnston in his coming book *Silent Music* speaks of the dark night of the spirits. Of course, this is what the mystical writers are talking about, the spirits coming and playing tricks and so on. One might suspect that the spirits in questions are incipient stages in one's development that one has got beyond but hasn't eliminated. Also, incidentally, in his book he has a good deal on healing, and he speaks of the healing of the neurosis through mystical experience, and he says, well, it isn't quite healed, it isn't a perfect healing, it is like the scars, the wounds of Christ after the Resurrection. There are still the traces of the neurosis there, but it is a glorified scar.

**Question:** Comment on the relations between the social-cultural milieu and structures and psychological disturbances. What pastoral concern should be operative here?

**Lonergan:** It is easier to talk about the disturbances than the remedy. The disturbances — we can consider two writers, Horney and R.D. Laing. Horney's analysis of the neurosis is that it is a conflict between one's objectification of one's self and one's self as one really is. One's objectification of oneself is not an objective statement of the facts. It is submission to what one was told to be, what others feel one should be or demand one should be or require one should be, and so on. The conflict between what you think you have to be because of what other people are demanding and all the rest of it, which is a *persona*, in Jungian language. This can come from the milieu; this false idea of the self, of course, can be generated by the self but it can be generated by the milieu and enforced by the milieu. But besides the unrealistic demands of those about one, the enemies of one's own household, there can also be the absurd objective situation. In *Insight*,

chapter 7, I wrote on the major and minor dialectic of sin, producing an absurd situation, an unintelligible situation for which the only remedy is the supernatural, faith, hope, and charity. That type of thing brings us on more to R.D. Laing's notion of insanity as adaptation to an absurd situation. People go crazy to fit into a crazy situation. And also the idea he has that insanity is something rational and that if you let it act itself out – which he does, I believe he has this place in London where he lets them do as they please, all the crazy things they please, it becomes a rather messy place! – that idea of insanity as something that is fundamentally sane, there is something sane about it if you only let people act it out. Now, of course, he isn't regarded, you know, as a leader of thought by everyone – far from it – there is a lot of criticism; however, he does write, and he sells his books!

What pastoral concern should be operative here? Well, anything that you can do to make the situation intelligible and put demands on people that are realistic and sensible. Of course, a certain amount of demanding is sensible; however, it differs from generation to generation, creates a gap too that way. But the pastoral concern: just all the ingenuity you can master in understanding people, understanding situations, seeing what can be done about it. But that's a general description, but not all, because it is a matter of common sense; common sense develops in the concrete milieu, understanding the concrete milieu; there are no generalities; it can't be expressed in generalities. Common sense is a development of intelligence that accumulates a sufficient number of insights to have a multiply adjustable tool; it isn't a universal precept or a system that you apply universals to particulars. It is an unfinished building to which you add on a new something or other to make it fit, a new eventuality that exists. Adding these things on is what the man of common sense does. He comes into a situation and looks around, finds out what's what, what is good and what is bad and what's fitting and what's working and what isn't. The trouble-shooter finds out what's wrong and what you do about it. Meeting the pastoral demands on a thing like that is a matter of trouble-shooting on a humanistic level, not on the mechanical-chemical level where the trouble-shooter is usually thought of working.

**Question:** Questions have been raised about the way you relate faith and beliefs and seem to give a priority to faith. Would you indicate the temporal and ontological relationship between the two? What is the relevance of the distinction to the notion of the church?

**Lonergan:** According to Vatican I and earlier theological tradition in the Catholic Church, faith *is* believing; faith is the supernatural virtue by which we believe all that God has revealed. I used to know the numbers in the old Denzinger for that. Now, belief supposes judgments of credendity and credibility. That's traditional doctrine, and it also comes up in my own account of belief, rationale of belief. People don't find out everything they know for themselves. It is the genius that finds out some one little thing for himself. Most people find out for themselves what other people have already found out and told them about, perhaps several times! What a genius knows, is perhaps 99% belief or perhaps 98%, but it is something like that. In other words, human knowledge is an achievement of the race, not of the bright little boy of whom his parents expect everything. It is gradually build up down the centuries. That we know more than our ancestors did is a part of universal history. It goes back to the Stone Age. It is not something peculiar to our own time, unless you lack perspective.

So faith as believing depends upon judgments of value, and the judgments of value depend upon apprehensions of value. Underpinning apprehensions of value are our loving and

hating, according to Max Scheler, who did a lot of thinking about that sort of thing. That loving I'd identify with what in Scholastic and traditional Catholic language is called the *lumen fidei*, the light of faith. It happens to coincide very happily with what everyone else except the Roman Catholics mean by faith. It is something distinct from belief and prior to belief, and as I was writing not in Latin but in English I called it faith. But it is a matter of semantics, my use of the word 'faith.' I have a footnote saying that what I am talking about is called the *lumen fidei*, if I remember correctly.

Now that faith, insofar as it is coincident, it is the value, the apprehension, the source of the apprehensions of the values of believing and believing the Christian religion, is identical with God's gift of his love, that being in love; it is love that founds positive apprehensions of value, and especially of potential value. The loving mother sees not the actual but the potential values in her child. She does what she can to actuate them. It's a love without an object. Rahner interprets the first of Ignatius's second set of the rules for the discernment of spirits, and of course the rules for the discernment of spirits are traditional lore, they go back to the monks in the desert, or wherever it is. But this first is about this consolation without a cause. And in Thomist psychology, what is an object? It's a cause. It is either the efficient cause, the moving cause: color causes sight, seeing; or the final cause: the image is the object of imagining, and the inner word is the object of understanding, the expressed object of understanding. So consolation without a cause – this is according to Rahner's interpretation – is consolation without an object. God's gift of his love as such is a gift of love, and having an object that interprets that gift is something further, something distinct. It may be prior; it may be simultaneous; it may be subsequent; but it is distinct. So, as such, God's gift of his love, insofar as it is relevant to faith, is a gift awaiting its interpretation. The faith of the patriarchs of the Old Law was faith in Christ, faith as awaiting its interpretation. Rahner in his Christology, in the fifth volume of his *Theological Investigations*, has an essay on Christology in an evolutionary view of the world. He has a good deal there about – well, when did the Christian era begin, does it begin everywhere in the world at the same time, a non-Einsteinian simultaneity? Or does it occur at different times in different places? And he takes the latter. He thinks that there are some places where the new law has not yet started: in other words, according to the fullness of time in various places. In other words, that awaiting for the interpretation may not be identical with the Christmas day of the year minus -8 – or was it 8? So, God's gift of his love qua faith is awaiting an interpretation. That interpretation is had when you have the revelation of Christ. It is awaiting the interpretation when you haven't got it, and that distinction between faith with the interpretation and without it is traditional. The Old Testament had faith in Christ in some sense.

What is the temporal and ontological relationship between the two? Well, the ontological relationship is that believing presupposes judgments of value, and judgments of value presuppose apprehensions of value, and apprehensions of supernatural value presuppose God's gift of his love. The temporal relationship depends upon the relationship between the individual and the effective coming of Christ. Insofar as it is prior to the effective coming of Christ for him, it is a gift awaiting its interpretation, and insofar as it is after the effective coming of Christ, it is a gift that fits in with and is already present in the interpretation.

**Question:** What is the relevance of the distinction to the notion of the church?

**Loneragan:** Well, the church mediates both the objects of belief and the inner gift of grace: the objects of belief through preaching the gospel, the inner gift of grace through the sacraments. But when one puts an emphasis on love as ontologically prior one mitigates the famous problem of the salvation of the infidel. Traditionally in the treatise on divine providence the pupils were told, well, that will be treated in the treatise on grace; and in the treatise on grace, well, that will be treated in the treatise on baptism; and in the treatise on baptism, well, you've already heard that explained twice! It is very hard to explain how they are saved if it is purely a matter of knowledge. The problem has a certain mitigation when you take that in.

**Question:** How much does your notion of religious conversion derive from Christian tradition, and how much from your work as methodologist?

**Loneragan:** Well, it derives from the Christian tradition, the religious tradition. I have that documented. I have a book on grace and freedom preceded thirty years earlier by four articles in *Theological Studies* on *gratia operans*. It is entirely about God's gift of conversion, and its different ways – the development in Thomas's thought, on its occurrence. He ends up with having three conversions: the final conversion of the beatific vision, the intermediate conversion of the gift of sanctifying grace, and the initial conversion of turning to God: actual grace, sanctifying grace, and the life of glory. That religious conversion, I'd like to emphasize once more, I think I said it often enough in the book, but I would like to emphasize it once more, is not a fruit of doing theology. People aren't converted because they study theology. Traditionally, theologians are not supposed to be holy. St Teresa was supposed to have wanted her director to be a learned theologian rather than a holy man. The difference between being a theologian and being a holy man is always insisted on, especially by non-theologians.

Anyway, religious conversion is not a product or an element in doing theology, and it is not a product of *Method in Theology*, thinking out a method in theology or carrying out a method in theology. It doesn't occur in between the first and the second phase of doing theology. It can occur even if you never studied any theology. In most people it does occur without any study of theology. It is an event not in the pursuit of theology but in religious living. Dr Johnson, the famous man of English letters, in his *Lives of the Poets*, which he wrote to be able to pay for his meals, always spent some time praising the time when the poets were suffering privation, how much it helped their views. And it is non-theological events of religious conversion perhaps more than anything else. But that is religious conversion as vécu, as lived, as *Erlebnis*, and you can have it without the label. To have a label for it is the work of interpretation, of theologizing.

It became thematic in my work on method in theology, through work on horizon, horizon analysis. Horizon is the limit beyond which one knows nothing and cares less. And there's the limit of horizon as cognitive, and there the goal of the cognitive is truth, and truth as a value, as a particular value. The further aspect of horizon is values. You are not concerned then simply with the value of truth, but with all values, values generally. And the ground of value is loving and hating, and consequently love provides an ultimate in the field of horizon, and that is where religious conversion comes in as a process, as a methodical point.

So it is the label and the fitting into a method of theology. People do work which provides a framework for creative collaboration, the theologian. You have to attend particularly to the points where they are going to talk by one another: the 'dialogue between people who are deaf problem.' And the deafness of people in this talk about horizon, if you are talking about

things beyond their horizon, you are talking in vain. Well, where are the horizons, what kind of horizons are there? They are cognitive with regard to values, with regard to love, and that's the point to the conversions in *Method*.

**Question:** Would you say that special theological categories are special because they come from revelation, or do they come from reflection on religious conversion? What would be examples of special theological categories for the theology of the Church?

**Lonergan:** Well, I have written a method of theology which says very, very little about revelation. And that's part of the fact that my idea of theology is not a deduction from premises. I spoke already that I did not accept the deductivist ideal. I referred to the section in *Insight* on interpretation, on the limitation of the treatise. The distinction between analytic propositions and analytic principles, and the analytic principles commonly turned out to be hypotheses that were more probable, because you had to verify the terms in their defined sense, and the verification normally is a probable verification of a hypothesis. The datum, the *donnée*, for theology, is religion. I conceive theology as reflection on religion, a reflection that mediates between the religion and the culture. The culture is the carrier of meanings and values, and it is insofar as religion enters into and puts its meanings and values in the culture that it is lived. The problem of the theologian is making religion livable and lived. Usually it is conceived, of course, by non-theologians as making it impossible or absurd. And it follows from this view of theology that there are as many theologies as there are religions and cultures, so that with cultural change you have a need for a renewal of the theology. What's the possibility of Fr Claude Geffré writing a book on a new age of theology that is orthodox and sound and the most apposite thing a person can do? The point – it is apposite and sound and the best thing a person can do if the religion and the culture are not fitting. If the meaning of the religion and the values of the religion are something totally other from those of the culture, there has to be an adjustment in the conception of the religion and the way it is thematized. Method, then, is a reflection on the theologies, and there are different methods at different times. The thing about the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was that they had a method. They were not carrying out the program that came in with Melchior Cano or a century after Melchior Cano. It was only a century after his death that his ideas of theology began to be applied. The medieval thing was an interaction between *lectio* and *quaestio*, and the big problem of that interaction was coherence. The canonists and notably Gratian in his 'Concordantia discordantium canonum,' had gone through the Canon Law and all the decrees of all the Councils and found them incoherent, setting up all sorts of contradictions. How do you bring them into concord. They are discordant; how do you get a concord? And a similar thing was started with the theologians by Peter Abelard, who selected 158 propositions and proved both the affirmation and the negation from scripture, the Fathers, and reason (not equally from all in each case, but *Sic et non*, it's so and it isn't so). The technique of the *quaestio* came out of that: 'Videtur quod non,' 'Sed contra est.' Principles of solution and the application of the principles of solution. Questions multiply. There were also collections of sentences: the *lectio*. Peter Lombard was the basic book, the Denzinger and Rouet de Journal of theology for about four-and-a-half centuries, from 1150, say – well, no, he didn't immediately take over because there were several books of sentences in the middle of the twelfth century, but say from 1200 to 1600. Why? Because he put down all the opinions, and when there was a conflict that he couldn't easily resolve, he left it to the *prudens lector* to find the solution. And the commentaries

on the Sentences were the busybodies working out the solutions. And there were all sorts of them. But you have there sources and systematics, the *authentica* and the *magistralia* going on in an interaction, and there was a method of theology there. It was alive as long as it lasted. The first step in its death, of course, was when they started writing commentaries not on the Lombard's collection of scriptural statements and patristic statements, but on St Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences*: a commentary on the commentary beginning to paint itself into a corner. But at least it still had a contact through these Sentences with the data. That was Capreolus; he had a commentary on the commentary; in Cajetan you start commentaries on the *Summa theologiae*, a purely systematic work. Then you get the second coat of paint.

So method as reflection on theology; and the functional specialties: the functional specialties are not relevant to every theology today. They are relevant to theology insofar as it is very highly specialized. Not highly specialized in the sense that there are different groups of specialists; you can have the groups of specialists too, but there are different jobs to be done. Whether you have one man doing the eight jobs or eight sets of men, the fundamental issue is not the division of men but the division of jobs and knowing that something different is to be done. So this method in theology that I have been engaged in is relevant to our time insofar as it is highly specialized and, in particular, insofar as historical questions are the problems of our time. In other words, the problem that came into theology, that made the manual tradition impossible, was that, when all the specialists in scripture and the Fathers and the medieval period and so on stood between the poor dogmatic theologian and his sources, he had to take on all the specialists in all fields or give up. The only thing for him to do was to give up, write a *Method in Theology!*

More fundamentally, my idea of theology as non-deductive is the answer to Lessing's claim that necessary truths are not derived from contingent events. And my conviction is that human truths, truths known by man, are contingent on contingent events. 'If you're intelligent, you will do this.' OK, the fact that you are intelligent is a contingent event, and so on for everything that requires intelligence. In other words, the fundamental thing is matters of fact.

Now the special categories: the special categories are the categories where theology differs from the human sciences. The sociologist does not appeal to belief, or to Christian belief and so on, for the psychology and so on. It has no religious presuppositions. Theology has; it is reflecting on a religious fact. And method in theology is method in theology precisely insofar as it presents special categories and integrates them with the general categories that the theologian needs. So the method in theology differs from the method in the human sciences precisely insofar as those special categories arise.

What are the special categories for the theology of the church? They are all the categories that are involved in the ongoing communication of the cognitive, constitutive, and effective meaning of the Christian fact and the Christian message. So there are a lot of them!

**Question:** You say in *Insight* that the formal element of a treatise on the church would be incomplete so long as it does not draw upon a theory of history. What are the other components that would be required for an integral formal element?

**Lonergan:** I think I make that remark contrasting the church with liberalism and Marxism. Liberalism is a theory of history in terms of progress. Marxism is a theory of history in terms of a materialist dialectic. Things that are alive, things that are going, are theories of history in our age. You have that coming into the Second Vatican Council insofar as they talked about the signs of

the times. Insofar as the ‘Rahner and company’ Handbook on Pastoral Theology is concerned with understanding the present situation in the world, as the first step in understanding what the church is to do about it; the fundamental pastoral problem is the general pastoral problem of the whole world, which subdivides into the parts that are confronting individuals all over, or sections all over.

With regard to theories of history, distinguish between a cognitional analysis of history – what does the historian do? – and a theory of history, in a sense the metaphysics of history – what is the general analysis of human history? And that I conceive as expressed in *Insight* in terms of progress, sin, and redemption, mainly chapters 7, 18, and 20.

What is there needed besides the theory of history for an integral formal element? Well, the treatise on the church is concerned with the internal constitution of the church and the function of the Church in the world. The theory of history mainly is concerned with the function of the church in the world. But that is of fundamental importance for an understanding of its internal constitution. But the internal constitution is not simply that. It is something in itself.

**Question:** Could you expand on the relevance of emergent probability for a theology of the church?

**Lonergan:** Well, emergent probability is conceived as a sequence of schedules of probabilities of emergence and survival of species and environments, and all the words are a little difficult. But some probabilities, when they are realized, make other things possible and eventually perhaps probable. And what is probable occurs if you have large enough numbers and long enough periods of time. There is a theorem on that called the De Moivre-Laplace theorem. It is a reflection on probability. Say that if twenty times three million is the probability, then 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 times out of three million – if you have enough three millions it is asymptotic with unity, asymptotic with certainty and quickly asymptotic – the asymptotic tendency is not indefinitely remote. It is, I believe, the most sophisticated statement of what’s known as the theorem of large numbers, which goes back to Bernoulli. The probability of emergence is the sophisticated name for Darwin’s chance variations, and probability of survival for survival of the fittest. But it regards emergence and survival not merely of species, which are treated in chapter 8, but also of environments and components in environments, which are treated in chapter, I think, 4.

When one comes to the human level, emergent probability is still functioning, but you also have the probability of people getting the insight, the idea, and figuring out the conditions of possibility of realizing the idea: the entrepreneur. Emergent probability is taken over by human history insofar as men see what can be done and do it, create the conditions for doing it. Creating the conditions of having people sitting in this room involved an awful lot of thinking about architecture and engineering and all the rest of it. Now, in general, that’s emergent probability.

**Changeover of tape, to 812 B.** What’s probable occurs if you have enough time and enough, large enough numbers, and long enough periods of time. And when it occurs, something else becomes probable, and it does on. Now, probability is a matter of human knowledge; it’s you might think of something in the nature of things. **Something skipped here.** But it is in the sense that it’s the best men can do with regard to things that cannot be known both precisely and systematically. Every throw of the dice is completely controlled by the laws of mechanics; there’s nothing that’s untoward in the laws of mechanics in each and every throw of the dice. But

you can't predict what will be thrown unless the dice are loaded, simply because, if the calculations of the elasticity of the board on which is dropped the dice and the angle at which you cast them and the way the dice are in your hand or in the cup and all the rest of it, all that information on the data is just not available. And even if, in particular cases, it is available, still you can't go from that case on to the next one. There are no set of rules governing the succession of prior conditions. And there are a lot of things like that in this world – like explosions; well, the way things will be after an explosion you don't calculate with any great accuracy to more than a very large number of decimal points. And accurate calculations can need an indefinitely large number. In other words, systematic thinking things out is not always possible, and that's when men use probabilities. However, God knows, plans. When men can think of all the eventualities they don't go by probabilities; they plan. Planning is beyond that, and all eventualities are taken into account. And there are no eventualities that God doesn't bring about. His plan is infallible. You can get that in Thomas and in 'Gratia operans.' And in the divine plan there is the mystery hidden from former ages and now disclosed in Christ Jesus, according to Romans 16. And that's where the church fits into emergent probability. It's part of the divine plan, which to us can be conceived in terms of emergent probability because everything that has happened has some probability, no matter how slight.

**Question:** Would you say something about what you are now doing in Christology as distinct from what you did in *De Verbo Incarnato*?

**Lonergan:** Well, what I am now doing in Christology is nothing! I've been busy with many things. However, what I would do: one thing, I think, first of all, is with regard to the use of the New Testament in Christology. The world of thought dominated by Aristotle's speculative intellect, and so on, is looking for truths and attending principally to that element in the New Testament. When you have sublated orthodoxy by ortho-praxy, you get a different slant, a different emphasis. What before was taken as a sort of *confirmatur* – the high opinion people had of Christ, and so on, and the extraordinary demands he made on people – 'he who loves father and mother more than me is not worthy of me' – and so on. Things that regard ortho-praxy and a supreme exigence with regard to ortho-praxy would be the thing that would demand first and fundamental emphasis. You understand the later development in terms of grounding that demand in the New Testament – that's just an idea; working it out I leave to others, if it'll work.

Christ as subject: another topic I handled. And if the human subject is something that develops, as seems highly likely – in other words the location of the subject – there becomes a distinction – if the Jungians are correct in saying that the self is the center of the human being, the real center of the human being, and very few people have that as their subject, the psychological subject, that to approximate towards it is a great stage in the process of individuation, well, you have questions that come up about Christ as subject, the development in Christ and so on, it can make things a lot more complex than my analysis of the thing went.

When you write a textbook in theology, you do what you can, for the rest you hand out the *commune doctorum*. One of the things that I wanted to treat and worked toward treating but never got around to actually putting it in a thesis form, is the historical causality of Christ. It is the sort of thing that you need the theory of history and Christ as historical cause; even to communicate the notions connected with it in Latin would be a matter of some difficulty, which I did not altogether surmount, didn't get around to doing when I was teaching. But it is a



fundamental question, a fundamental issue, and it's perhaps the expression in our time of Christ the King, Christ the historical cause fit in more with the way people have been thinking. Categories that have meaning, a category more than a symbol.

(General questions from the floor):

**Question:** Is *ressentiment* as Scheler and Nietzsche express it or a related notion of dread as Fr Flanagan spelled it out – is that a fifth kind of a bias, or is it related to the general bias?

**Lonergan:** I think that those notions are in terms of feeling. Bias I worked out in terms of understanding. You can get an analysis of things in terms of feeling that ... you can put it the opposite way: feelings are, as it were, a global apprehension of intelligibility. And *ressentiment* is a form in which bias comes to life as feeling or unintelligibility. Does that say anything?

**Question:** Could you relate your concept of faith with your concept of religious conversion?

**Lonergan:** Religious conversion is God's gift of his love, faith is the eye of love. People who are in love – 'What do you see in him?' Well, the person in love sees all sorts of things that the people who aren't in love don't. Whether they're illusory or not is another question.

**Question:** You commented on Christology. Would you have any comment on your systematics of the Trinity in relation to the stuff in the last ten years?

**Lonergan:** Oh yes. My systematics on the Trinity starts from *ipsum intelligere*, and then the word and proceeding love. You can now start off from *agapē*. 1 John 4.4-9 and 4.20, God is love, where God is *ho theos*. And *ho theos* in the New Testament is God the Father, unless there is contradictory evidence, and there's no contradictory evidence in 1 John. So it is the Father that is *agapē*, and the *agapē* is being in love, Absolute Being in Love; and the Logos is the Eternal Judgment of Value; and the Spirit is the Gift; and the person gives his loving, the act of loving; the Spirit is proceeding love from the Judgment of Value. A minor change: the structure remains the same, but we shift from orthodoxy to ortho-praxy.

**Question:** Possibly following up that question, I would wonder, even in terms – you'd say a minor shift, perhaps it is a bigger shift. I remember Fr. Bourassa tried to work out an analogy of friendship for the Trinity, and I wonder if it is shifting from *Ipsium Intelligere*, from an intellectual analogy and that developed into a psychology analogy of Augustine to the intellectual analogy of Thomas –if you are switching to *agapē* are you switching perhaps more to a social analogy, which would involve more than the individual.

**Lonergan:** It involves the free person, in a certain sense of the word 'person,' a relevant sense of the word 'person,' the person in relation.

**Question:** I wonder if there isn't a major shift there even in terms of your primary analogue?

**Lonergan:** Oh, you can call it major, you know, too, but insofar as the technique of working out the analogy remains the same, it's a material difference as far as the technical business of building up the analogy, drawing out the argument, and all the rest of it. In other words, you don't have to change the whole thing. You just have to use different words at certain key points.

**Question:** Would you say something about the relationship between ortho-praxis and moral discipline, as it has been known, the normative moral discipline of the church. And doesn't ortho-praxis in a certain way lead to social anarchism?

**Lonergan:** Well, it could. Ortho-praxis, as I conceive it, would be in terms of my second chapter, 'The Human Good,' where the good is not *id quod omnia appetunt* but it is a whole lot of very relevant things to human living, in a certain order. An apprehension of that as something that sublates knowledge – ortho-praxis is not something that rejects knowledge, it sublates it. It needs it, it goes beyond it, it introduces a new principle, it perfects it, it gives it applications and effects that otherwise it would not have. That's the sense in which ortho-praxis goes beyond. Its relation to the normative views, and so on: that notion of the human good in chapter 2 is not a set of laws, it is an account of the situation, in which different things are done according to differences in the situation, differences in development and so on. It is something that views the good as something concrete. My transcendental notions are comprehensive, not abstract; they regard the concrete. They include doing the right thing in the concrete situation. When I was teaching at the Greg, the question of situation ethics came up, and Fr Hurth in the Holy Office, I would think, had a great deal to do with the decree, to the effect that maintaining all that is taught in Aristotle and Thomas in the Christian tradition on *prudencia*, on *phronesis*, still there are these laws and so on, and they cover everything with regard to morality, apart from *prudencia* and *phronesis*, which also have something to do; but what they have to do with is the concrete, and the concrete is not just a collection of abstractions. If you conceive doing the right thing in the concrete as carrying out a number of abstractions, you will probably do the wrong thing. The more convinced you are of it, the grander the scale you'll do the wrong thing, and the greater harm you'll cause. Probably you'll provoke anarchy! Not an anarchy you intended, but an anarchy you didn't have enough sense to avoid. Perhaps that's enough about that. It raises the whole question of foundations of morality, and so on.

**Question:** Could I go back to the Trinity for a moment? The Father is Love and the Spirit is also love in the analogy you are using now.

**Lonergan:** The Father is being in love.

**Question:** And the spirit is the gift of love.

**Lonergan:** Is the ... well, to bring in the gift is to bring in Augustine, because Augustine reaches love through *donum*. But the Holy Spirit is Proceeding Love, just as in the traditional thing, *Amor Procedens*. In the traditional thing, you distinguish between essential love and proceeding love. Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost have essential love, which is identified with the divine essence, because they are God. But only the Holy Spirit was Proceeding Love, love as dependent upon the source, that's the Spirit. But this love as dependent upon the source is the same as one's

acceptance of God's gift of love. You have the infusion of grace. That's God's gift of his love, and that's being in love. But that isn't a free act, that's plucking out the heart of stone and putting in the heart of flesh. But the acceptance of that is a free act consequent upon the gift. Similarly, the Spirit is the acceptance of the being in love with the Father, you could say.

**Question:** Could I push it one step further?

**Lonerger:** Sure.

**Question:** Your analogy, then, is drawn from the supernatural order. Is there an analogy also in the natural order when there is a being in love of husband and wife and a judgment of value proceeding. Is there some corresponding third?

**Lonerger:** Yes.

**Question:** The gift is something more than the being in love?

**Lonerger:** Forget about the gift. I just brought that in because that's the way Augustine gets it, the Holy Spirit as *donum*.

**Questioner:** Yes, yes.

**Lonerger:** Think of ... Augustine's point is that the first gift one makes to another is one's love of him, that's the ground of all the other gifts.

**Question:** This morning we heard of five models in contemporary theology. Dave Tracy was rather reluctant to locate your theology in any one of them. I was wondering if perhaps any one of the ones that he gave rang a bell with you, or if you would want to add a sixth category for yourself?

**Lonerger:** No. I astounded a professor of theology once when some question arose, and I said, 'Well, I never taught that.' I have written a method in theology, and that's what I think about method, and I have written a couple of treatises in theology, and that's what I thought of those things at the time. And I know that there are a lot of questions about a lot of other things that I haven't thought out for myself as yet, and I will if I get the time and have the occasion and so on. So perhaps my theology is not precise enough to fit into any category. Anyway, it's a bit difficult to categorize oneself.