

Lonergan Workshop 1974 Q&A June 17-24

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**Question:** Why do you speak of quasi-operator rather than operator in the lower and higher levels of intentional consciousness; could you clarify the upper quasi-operator?

**Lonergan:** The operators and quasi-operators are concerned with vertical finality. There is a whole school of Scholasticism that thinks only of horizontal finality; the supernatural is a terrific problem for them, and it has always been, and as a result a lot of them are trying to get rid of it now, not solve the problem but get rid of it, because it's unintelligible. Vertical finality is [has to do with] what is beyond the proportion of a nature. The natural is defined among theologians as what constitutes, what calls from, or what is demanded by a nature, and the supernatural is none of that.

Vertical finality I have illustrated in two papers in *Collection*: 'The Natural Desire to See God' and 'Finality, Love, Marriage.' Both of them are cases of vertical finality. Vertical finality in man, and as conscious in a way that can be made explicit by being thematized, already is *vécu*, *Erlebnis*, part of living. But it can be thematized and not only thematized globally, but different parts of it, different levels of it, can be distinguished and named, and those distinctions can be based on procedures like asking questions and answering them, deliberate procedures, all of which are quite impossible if your linguistic attainment is no more than that of the Trobriand Islanders. They only had names; a name was equivalent to several sentences, but all they spoke in was names. There is an article on that, I think by Dorothy Lee, anyway in a book, a collection, the general title is *The Self*, and it is edited by a man named Moustakis. I think it is published by Harper & Row. Anyway, it is a collection of big names in connection with the self.

Well, insofar as cultural development goes far enough that you have a process of question and answer, then you can classify questions and distinguish different types of questions with differences that are not merely specific or generic but transcendental, and when you make these distinctions, you get the operators, the intelligent and the intelligible – the intelligent person wonders why; the reasonable person 'Are you right, are you sure?' and the moral person 'Is it worth while, is it good? Am I wasting my time? What on God's earth are we all doing here? Is it worth while?'

Now, vertical finality is not limited to what is sufficiently in consciousness to be thematized. Not everything you know is something you can know because you experience it, live it, and do it without thinking about it. Children may have endless questions and drive their parents crazy – 'You can't understand that yet.' For instances of vertical finality that do not admit this type of thematization, you need a scientific study of some sort to discover them. One example of that is depth psychology in any of its forms. They are asking about the basement of human living, so to speak. And that is the vertical finality of what in man is the vital, the neural; it's the basis, the cellar, the underground of human living; it isn't conscious, but it has to be in relationship with consciousness. Man differs from the other animals insofar as he can acquire endless skills, like playing the piano or the violin. It means that you are speaking, using a language, effectively; terrific skills, just a matter of certain muscles in the right place. They say that children can

produce all the sounds of all the languages and do so, but they learn to use the ones that people can recognize. I believe the Russian M is very different from our M, so you have all sorts of phonetic differences, in language. But anyway, there are all the skills. And that's because the human neural matrix or underground is something that admits endless differentiation and adaptation. People can learn to do all the most extraordinary things imaginable. There is an interaction between the two. Not everything that a man imagines would be a good thing to do is healthy, and there are borderline cases, in need of compensation, guidance from above and below. And vertical finality: the interest in Jung is because he isn't merely concerned with the sensitive integration of neural demands, but the intellectual, the emotional, the moral, the religious, and so on. And as Ricoeur says, in *De L'interpretation*, symbols are food for thought. What does a symbol mean? Well, it's food for thought. Jolande Jacobi in her book *Complexes, Archetypes, and Symbols*, says that the symbol has two functions: either a redistribution of psychic energy or presenting a call for the exercise of free choice, decision. This is another way of saying that symbols are food for thought. They draw your attention to alternatives in your development. Vertical finality rising within us: first of all, we are alive, and most of the things we do in the first case is because we are alive, and that vital part of us is not separate from the rest.

Now, besides this vertical finality of what we begin from, there's the vertical finality that still goes on, simply because we are self-transcending subjects, and that's the second quasi-operator. It's the self-transcending subject finding a realization in the family, in the social group, and in the new creation, in an orientation to the universe: three ways of being in love. A clarification of that operator is all that I have said about self-transcendence in *Method*, and all that I was prepared to say about self-transcendence in *Insight*, prior to *Method*; and more particularly what I have said about probability and emergent probability and explanatory genera and species. The new genus is a matter of a new system, integrating, systematizing, making organic what is merely a coincidental manifold on a lower level. We talked about that yesterday. That for a start is all I have to say on that first question.

**Question:** Why are they called quasi-operators?

**Lonergan:** Well, it's not something that's a matter of phenomenology simply. Phenomenology is something that is conscious but has not been articulated, has not been thematized. There is a difference between what is already in consciousness and is not thematized and what is going beyond consciousness. Discovering a new world, falling in love: people don't decide about that; it happens. You may decide for it or against it after it does happen, but it happens, I mean fundamentally it happens. Similarly, there were a lot of people all along the ages who paid a lot of attention to dreams, and so on, but they didn't make a science of it the way it has been done in this twentieth century. But if anyone doesn't want to use the word 'quasi' there for that reason, OK. You can all follow Humpty Dumpty's rule, paying the words double and making them mean what you want.

**Question:** What is the relation between consciousness in your thought and the conscious/unconscious polarity in, for example, Jung, and particularly in relation to the function of the lower quasi-operator?

**Lonergan:** Consciousness in my thought is ... tricky. There are intentional operations. I list 18 kinds in *Method*. Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and so on; and there are some that aren't intentional, like feeling hungry. It's when you get hold of 'Oh, the trouble is I want something to eat.' You have got to explain that feeling that is called hunger before you connect it with food: that's what the trouble is. But the majority of feelings are intentional. They are connected with an object, and 'intentional' is having an object, in a broad sense of object, not in the sense of objectivity. Then there are inquiry, understanding, formulation, reflection, weighing the evidence, and judging, and so on. All those operations that are intentional also are conscious. Both intentionality and consciousness ground presence: intentionality – an operation is intentional insofar as it is awareness, presence, of an object. It is conscious insofar as it is awareness of the subject and the operation: of the operation and, therefore, the subject, because the subject is what integrates the whole set of operators. That set of consciousness of course is just the opposite of taking an inward look. What people call introspection – what is it? – it's generalizing empirical method. Just as the sciences are a matter of the sensible data and understanding them and forming hypotheses and carrying on processes of experimentation and verification as to whether they are right – some form of judgment – so, introspection is a matter of heightening consciousness. You are not merely thinking of the object; you are also aware that I'm the one that's talking, and you are the one that's listening. So, it is heightening and attending, but not merely to the operator and the operations to forget altogether about the object, because if you do that, the operator or the operation will also be blacked out. Using some form of symbolic representation, so that you can have an image, have something to understand, the way the operations are connected with one another, and checking out whether that understanding really works.

I promised yesterday to say something more about how one gets into this fourth level that I introduced. I forgot when I came to it. The fundamental thing was that *Insight* de facto was not a faculty psychology, but the fact that it wasn't a faculty psychology was not thematized. I spoke of the experience of operations, and one's experience of one's own operations and adverting to one's experienced operations. But I didn't say, 'Well, now forget about all this metaphysics.' We just didn't bother about potency, habit, and act, and all the rest of it. We just went right ahead for the first 14 chapters of *Insight* without any thought of metaphysics whatever. If you haven't got any metaphysics, you haven't got a faculty psychology. If you don't know that you have a metaphysics, and you have a faculty psychology, then you just have a fragmentary metaphysics. You are not quite aware of what you are doing. At least that's my idea of it. So *Insight* was a matter of intentionality analysis, but my pupils had to tell me it was. And I adverted to the fact that I didn't have faculty psychology, the faculty analysis. When you haven't got a faculty psychology, you haven't got a faculty called will: you haven't any faculties at all. And when you have experience, understanding, and judgments of fact on three successive levels, well, where on earth are you going to put will? You advert to the fact that of course with all this intellectual approach you have in *Insight* you are forgetting about feeling. So, when you get on to questions of deciding and so on, you are bringing feeling back into the picture. The fourth level integrates the cognitive with the conative, emotional, and so on. They come together, and consequently you need another level that is going to integrate the previous levels with what had been passed over, the feelings, and since you ask questions there too, it is very much like the other two operators.

So the fourth level comes out of the previous three. That is a propos of this question of consciousness, what I think about consciousness.

Now Jung – on Jung there is a book by a Catholic priest by the name of Hostie, and I gather that he explicitly states that for Jung the unconscious is what is not articulated. I don't know that about Jung. I haven't read enough of him to put it that way. But I do know that for Stekel that is true, and that is true for Horney. The unconscious for them is the vécu that is not thematized. For Horney the conflict is between the ideal self – your parents convince you of what you ought to be and you said, 'Yes, that's what I am,' trying to make out that's what you were – and the self that you actually are. What's thematized is what someone else told you to be, and what is lived is something else, and the two don't get along too well together. That's the unconscious, then, where the unconscious is simply the unthematized.

I don't think that's true of Freud. According to Vergote the Id speaks only in displacement and condensation. In displacement: if you dream about lions and you are not afraid of them, it really isn't lions that you are dreaming about. It's displaced on the lion. It is somebody else. And condensation: when several themes come together on a single topic to express a single thought, it makes wonderful poetry, especially in Shakespeare. I forget how the first part goes – something about 'the unhors'd couriers of the air' – but it goes on, 'Pity shall blow the horrid deed in every eye 'til tears doth drown the wind.' So you have pity blowing the horrid deed to every eye and tears drowning the wind. This is a condensation of all sorts of images. They have a wonderful poetic effect, and it is the way the Id talks, according to Vergote. The Freudian distinctions, according to a man in psychology and pedagogy in Rome, Fr. Curzon, with an article in *Revue théologique* in 1951 or 1952, something like that, tying up the Superego, the Ego, and Id with the hypothalamus, the occipital part of the brain, and the frontal part, and so on. When a person is on the operating table and they are into anesthesia, perhaps not now when you go out like a light, with the various needles that they use, but at least with the older types of anesthesia, the first thing to disappear is the Superego. You are chattering, and the Superego vanishes, and then the Ego, and finally it is only the Id speaking. And when you are coming out, well, first of all is the Id that does the talking, and then the Ego begins to appear, and finally the Superego. Now, that has something to do with the idea of the unconscious, its close relationship to the neural in certain types of analysis of the unconscious. That's in general.

With regard to Jung in particular, Jung has the personal unconscious, the part that's the dregs from one's own past, and what's called the collective unconscious, the accumulated wisdom of the race on the psychic level. And his archetypes are not symbols, at least according to Jacobi. They are principles that can express themselves in a variety of different symbolic forms. They are not tied down to a particular form. Jung emphasizes – at least Jungians – the compensatory interactions in development between the conscious and the unconscious. That sort of thing is useful for accounting for the sort of things that occur that aren't explained in terms of experience, understanding, and judgment but are relevant to it: that's the vertical finality I spoke about before. It can also be, I suppose, the compensation between what at the present time some people at least are attributing to the left and the right hemispheres. The left hemisphere does all this analytic stuff of mathematics, science, and so on, and the right-hand hemisphere is occupied with the Gestalt and the feeling; the arts and so on, and possibly you have to get a balance between the two.

However, there is the Jungian analyst Erich Neumann's books that occur in Fr Doran's paper, and there we get into very fundamental issues, namely, the genesis of the ego. Jacobi

talking about the complex: well, the complex, it could be the Ego if you let it go far enough, and if it were really bad, everything you felt, it's the complex taking over, and if it takes over completely, well, you get into hot water there. The genesis of the ego, the possibility of several egos, of reverting to earlier egos, multiple personality, the existence downstairs of potential egos that come out and start running things in what are called, what some literature, mystics, refers to as the dark night. William Johnston, who has a number of books like *the Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing*, *The Still Point*, *Christian Zen*, and coming out with Harper this fall, *Silent Music*. About sixteen chapters, four, I think, on healing. That development of the ego is something that is quite interesting from the viewpoint of the consciousness of Christ, for example, for theologians. And then the further development from the ego to the self: there is a book by Gerhard Adler in the Bollingen series, on the living symbol, and it is a case of a pictorial representation and a commentary on the pictures on the process from the ego to the self, the self being the center of the human reality, very rarely out on top and in the open: at least that's the impression I get. So there is an awful lot to be said about the unconscious and so on, and interrelations; it hasn't been fully explored yet, but it is with that that we expect things to be done. Any questions on that? I have just been talking perhaps rather aimlessly. If anyone wants to pull it together – if I could, I don't know.

**Question:** Would you see anything in the tradition to back up this sort of approach in Christology, that is, in those functional specialties?

**Lonergan:** Well, the whole question of the consciousness of Christ and what was the subject: texts that cause difficulty, and so on. It is a new question in Christology. They were satisfied with metaphysics pretty much up until 1935, insofar as they were satisfied. But at least the question of the consciousness of Christ was coming out by perhaps 1929. That was the earliest, at least among Catholics. Consciousness of Christ was a big thing in non-Catholic theology in the last century, but in Catholic theology, the consciousness of Christ, conscious of his being the Messiah, when did he become conscious that he was the Messiah – all these questions were 19<sup>th</sup>-century questions in Protestant theology.

**Question:** Conversion is spoken of in *Method* as an about-face. What is the about-face in religious conversion?

**Lonergan:** Well, you get different answers in different religions. In Christianity it is justification. St Thomas's *Summa theologiae*, Prima-Secundae, question 113, they are all on justification. And if you want all the buildup leading to that and around it and so on, well, I have a book, *Grace and Freedom*. It is the transition from the state of sin to the state of being in grace. It is described in Ezekiel as 'plucking out the heart of stone and inserting the heart of flesh.' And the heart of stone is not plucked out because the heart of stone wants to be plucked out; it is accepted. The heart of flesh is accepted after it is installed. The heart of flesh likes being in. That is religious conversion. Now, religious conversion – that's the main, like in Christianity. You have the traditional Catholic account of it, and the huge emphasis on it with Luther, on justification by faith alone and so on. But it's still on justification. You can have religious divisions and conversions from one communion to another. It is another way of speaking of religious conversion; it is a minor meaning. Speaking of a conversion from being non-religious

or anti-religious to being religious and again the about-face is from one to the other and the varieties of being anti-religious and so on, endless varieties of being religious. The concrete expressions of it, realizations of it, are more or less. But in general, it is from sin and rationalizations of sin to the rejection of sin and the rationalizations of sin, whether individual or social or historical, traditional.

**Questions:** Is that a first step that is to be distinguished from falling in love?

**Lonergan:** Well, the account of justification, especially after Trent, is that there are preparatory acts to it; attrition is distinct from contrition. In Thomas you have a whole series of, well, first of all, prior to justification he speaks about providential events like falling ill or external things. A good sermon like the preaching on hell that James Joyce read kept him in church for about three months. All these external aids, and there can be internal, what are called the illuminations of intellect and the inspiration of will: actual graces. Conversion in Thomas, justification in Thomas: you have the infusion of grace; simultaneously, as an effect of grace, free acts of repentance, of faith and repentance; and consequently the remission of sin, at the same time; it all occurs at the same time. The grace is prevenient; then the acts. And that's in the *Summa*. Earlier he has grace as the formal cause and the acts as the material cause: the acts being prior from the viewpoint of the material cause, and grace being prior from the viewpoint of the formal cause. In *Contra Gentiles* you have the changeover, and you have the *motio moventis* and the *motus mobilis*. The *motio moventis* is the infusion of grace and the *motus mobilis* is the free acts of the repentant sinner.

**Question:** In the new theological context is it still advisable and necessary to speak of a distinction between nature and grace – supernatural and natural?

**Lonergan:** It depends on what you mean by it.

**Question:** Well, Rahner – I'm not that deep into Rahner, but I get the impression that he says it is not necessary, but it is advisable. There are so many different theologies today; I would like your position on that.

**Lonergan:** To lay down anything on that would be to legislate on the meaning of the word 'nature.' No one can legislate on the meaning of the word 'nature.' Perhaps the pope can, like Pius XII wanted to, but from what you are saying it hasn't been efficacious. There is a definite meaning to this distinction, and you get it out of the history that gave rise to it. The twelfth-century writers had one terrible time handling the notion of grace, and they had all sorts of opinions on it. They had two definitions for liberty – one for the philosophers, immunity from coercion, but for the theologian, liberty is that by which you do what is right when you have God's grace and evil when you don't. They couldn't get the two separate, couldn't think of them separately. The idea of the supernatural blossomed between 1213 and 1230, and the first fruit of it saw people started writing theses on *liberum arbitrium*. This had not been possible beforehand. Why did it become possible? Because you had two orders set up. Grace is above nature, faith is above reason, charity is above human good will, merit before God is above the good opinion of man. You've got two entirely different orders, and human liberty was in the order of nature, and

grace in the other order, the so-called supernatural. Rahner thinks of the supernatural in the strongest possible sense, the self-communication of God. God's gift of God is the key instance of the supernatural. As in the Incarnation – God becomes man – or in grace, where the Holy Ghost is given to us, or in the beatific vision, where God is, the divine essence is, that by which we know. You have to have a metaphysics of knowledge to be able to talk about that. But in general, I don't believe you can have a critical metaphysics without having a priority of intentionality analysis and epistemology. But I also want an intentionality analysis and epistemology so that a metaphysics is possible. People who just want to brush it all aside – 'We won't ask those questions,' 'We want to sweep this stuff under the mat.' It's hard, hard to teach, you can't sell books writing on it – all those arguments are very impressive, very effective if not impressive. But the old questions remain, the problems remain; in other words you have to have some way of handling it.

**Question:** I realize the realities there, but you don't talk so much about it in *Method*.

**Lonergan:** Oh well, no, I am not doing theology in *Method*; I am talking about the operations of theologians.

**Question:** Well, if you would elaborate, wouldn't it be advisable to mention the old categories?

**Lonergan:** Or something equivalent. You can talk about the gratuitous divine initiative, and so on. The gratuitous divine initiative: all different ways of saying it. You can talk about vertical finality, that's a way of saying it, except that the finality is the Infinite, God Himself.

**Question:** I would like to relate the popular phrase that other religions use or some Christians use, to accept Jesus as your personal savior, in being saved. How would you relate that to religious conversion? Is that what you mean by that too? Do you think they are speaking about the same reality, from their context?

**Lonergan:** Very possibly. The fundamental difference in the talking is that you can be using a language that has developed over centuries. Aquinas's doctrine on grace: Aquinas is the one who developed the whole category of actual grace. St Albert, his teacher, was sometimes described as the theologian of sanctifying grace. He was very much so because he didn't know anything about actual grace. So that is what he was theologian of, as far as the field of grace goes. In other words, as soon as they got hold of this notion of the supernatural, they tried to explain everything on grace in terms of the supernatural habit: something that made the infants Christian in baptism, the supernatural habit. And all the properties of grace were there. Thomas from his reading of Augustine mainly, directly or indirectly through passages in Peter Lombard, found himself gradually setting up this category of actual grace. He never used in his whole life the words *gratia actualis*, never. That came later. He spoke about the divine movement, motion, as distinct from the infusion of habit, form.

Now, when anyone has a religious experience, or a conversion experience, they express it in whatever language is available insofar as they express it. And a lot of them will be inarticulate about it, and in anything like that, well, one judges from the fruits. By their fruits you will know them. And the fruits with regard to the Christian religion are rather complex. It is not as simple

as, when was it, 1968 I think, we had an institute here, and one day there was Donald Evans, who has written a book on performative meaning, and someone asked him what his position was, and he replied, 'I'm an Austin Friar – Austin, the English philosopher – an Austin Friar with the three vows of clarity, triviality, and sterility. In that case, it is quite easy to verify; he knew exactly what the fruits were, and it was easy enough to verify them. In other words it wasn't any problem; you knew if you were sterile or not. But in Christianity the fruits are a little more elaborate.

**Question:** Would you be able to relate that question to Rosemary Haughton's talk on conversion?

**Lonergan:** Well, Rosemary Haughton is marvelous from the viewpoint of expressing religious education in terms of concrete situations and all the rest of it.

**Question:** I'm thinking of her notion of conversion in terms of a fundamental religious conversion and somehow depending also on the community to push that forward, to expand the language and the expression of the experience?

**Lonergan:** I think she would be very good, very helpful on it, and able to do it in a way that is hardly possible for me, endless detail and concreteness. My experience of it was the tertianship. (changoover of tape here). **810 B begins.** I did my tertianship in France, and after I left the ministry we were herded to the *Action Populaire* in Amiens, and for a week we listened to the heads of the Movements Spécialisées at the time. We heard the leaders of all these people. They were all men except one leader of the – well, it was the only hour you knew exactly what was being said all the time. You weren't lost in abstractions or anything else like that.

**Question:** Does intellectual conversion heal a psychic rift? Does it have a healing function? Is it necessary for psychic wholeness?

**Lonergan:** It is being an intellectual that can give rise to a psychic rift, because, insofar as you are intellectual, your feelings and so on don't get too much attention or expression. I have already spoken of that specialization of the intellectual life experiencing, understanding, and judging. And the experiencing is separated from the feeling – 'Oh, what a wonderful color, isn't it sublime?' Well, you don't do any of that art appreciation in this intellectual life. It is a specialization apart from feeling. It needn't cause a psychic rift, because you can do your working day, your intellectual pursuits, but that won't be the whole day. Normally, shifting from one differentiation of consciousness to another takes care of wholeness. On the other hand, being immoral or irreligious can much more directly be involved in a psychic rift, simply because it is on the fourth level and in religious living that you have this integration of feeling with the cognitive. Consequently, if the cognitive side, or the deliberative side, is incomplete, unbalanced, whatever you please, well you are setting up a basis for distortion.

**Question:** Question 6 comes in here: Comment on the different uses of the term 'intellectual conversion.'



**Lonergan:** There's intellectual conversion in the sense of the child; for a certain period the criteria of knowing, of objectivity, of reality, are the criteria of the naive realist. It is a matter of seeing – is it there? Is it not there? And so on. As the child learns to speak, it gradually learns to use new criteria of reality. I remember once I was at my brother's. My nephews now must be well on in their 30s, but this time they were 3 and 4 or something like that. There was another boy there. He was about 8 or 9, and the home had been equipped by a doctor, with side offices and main office and so on, and it was now adapted to different purposes, and one of these side offices was known as the side hall. The bigger boy was talking to the little boy; it was night time too. 'There is a bear in the side hall.' The children were petrified, and they went to their mother and said, 'There is a bear in the side hall.' And she would tell them not to be silly. And then he would start again, 'There's a lion in the side hall,' and they would go to their mother in fear. They knew what the words meant, but they hadn't got to the point of distinguishing between what is true and what is fictitious. In other words, you have to learn these distinctions, and they are learned by anyone who talks. You would have to be very deprived not to catch on to and actually apply the criteria of objectivity in terms of the experiential component, the normative component, and the absolute component. Everyone knows about them, and is able to use them and apply them.

The need for intellectual conversion occurs only after people have been introduced to philosophy. In the class I was in, the professor, an extremely honest man, teaching us epistemology, raised the question, 'Well, how do you know that is real, you know?' And one of the boys put up his hand and said, 'Well, couldn't you tell him to come in out of the rain?' The questions don't exist; it takes some time for the questions to exist. And for people for whom the questions being to exist – well, they are apt to have an infantile reversion, to go back. What do I mean what I say it's real? They get right back to infancy, to childhood. It's there, you know, and there is no doubt about that! And the naive realist is still a realist in the full and proper sense of the word, but he has a wrong account of it, mistaken account of it. The account to justify his realism really is a reversion to infancy, the criteria that worked then, before he learned to speak. Learning to speak gives you a world mediated by meaning. I need not go into that. It is an enormous world. It is the world we all live in, the real world, you know. Contrast it with the world of immediacy, the world of the nursery, to which you revert when you set up the criteria that are really convincing about the really real. The empiricist empties the world mediated by meaning of everything that doesn't satisfy the criteria of the world of immediacy. And the idealist agrees with him about reality but says, well, of course, knowledge is something entirely different: in knowledge you are inquiring, finding out what is intelligent, testing it, the validity and so on. From these philosophies you can get a psychic rift insofar as you take them seriously. But usually, as Gilson said, 'You don't find many idealists neglecting to collect their salaries.' So, while there is a possibility of psychic rift, usually it doesn't work too far, but it can distort things, very concrete things. Does the name Morton White, the positivist who wrote on history, and so on, mean anything? He was one of the main agents in turning down Bellah at the Princeton Institute, a man who wants to reduce history into sociology, because science is about the universal. The mistaken way the historians are going about it they are not fitting in the universal at all. They are not trying to be universal. You have to get rid of the historians, and so on, and get down to doing science. So that's where positivism can give rise to a rift that is not merely psychic; it is in the body social. Now, my different uses of the term 'intellectual conversion' – well, there's the intellectual; it is not so much intellectual conversion of the child,

it's learning language and learning all that's implicit in language, and it comes by degrees. But there's the need for intellectual conversion when philosophy is started but doesn't really take. And people take it seriously, yet don't test it.

**Question:** I'd like to comment. There are a number of elements that center around this concept of a psychic rift, and the intellectual conversion. A number of times in your writings you imply that the authentically good man, when he performs his acts, is left with a good conscience and a feeling of OK-ness. And at other times you point out, especially I recall when you said it in *Insight*, where you outlined the three ways that we go about avoiding the drive to be consistent in our knowing and doing. My concern here is with the problematic of having a false notion of what is to be done, so that historically speaking we do something and we know that it is right and yet our feeling tone is against that. And we have guilt feelings about what we intellectually affirm to be what needs to be done. So we are left – I would express it personally – with doing something that we intellectually affirm to be good yet feeling guilty about it and knowing that our guilt is not valid. I was wondering whether you would comment if this is something that needs to be dealt with and how would you look at that.

**Lonergan:** It is not so much intellectual conversion as a clarification of moral imperatives. Moral imperatives can be simply the sort of thing that give rise to guilt feelings. They are inaccurate. They are applied wrongly. Or you are going by what people will say, what people will feel. Well, people will say, you know, that all there is to conscience is what people would say if they saw you, that you would have no conscience if there weren't other people to express opinions about it. That's not so much a question of intellectual conversion as the conflict between moral judgment, your own moral judgment, your own value judgments, and whatever your tradition or milieu classifies it as good and bad. There can be a conflict there, but that type of conflict is something different from something like a psychic rift coming from intellectual conversion.

**Question:** The two papers both speak of a psychic or psychological conversion, related to yet something different from the conversions of foundations. Would you comment on this?

**Lonergan:** I think that, as Fr Tyrrell's paper made clear, there is a connection between intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and psychic problems. There is a connection between the two. Frankl's logotherapy is perhaps the clearest instance of it: if the world is meaningful for you, you can get through a concentration camp. I've already spoken of my experience in tertianship at *Action populaire*. There was a man with me that year in tertianship who was in a first-class concentration camp for a number of months, and well, your nails had stopped growing, wounds wouldn't heal, there was privation of food, vitality was at a minimum, hard work all day long, sleeping in bunkers, people screaming with their nightmares, people committing suicide though you tried to prevent them, help them, and so on. He gave me quite a story about how he escaped, but we can't go into that. He was in Canada recounting to the theologians, and at the end of the long list of horrors, after he escaped, the scenes from the concentration camp superimposed themselves on his daytime vision. But one still could see that God was good, and that's the thing, that type of thing is what enabled Frankl to go through this

thing and enabled this man to go through it. The validity of meaning in life and values in life will carry a person through all of that.

On the other hand, there *are* such things as psychic aberration. In Montreal, about thirty years ago, a friend of mine knew a psychiatrist rather well, and he would say if a person is twenty-five years old the problem is likely to be sexual and you use Freud. If he is thirty-five and he has to get on in life and he is having a hard time you use Adler. And if he is forty-five, well he probably wants peace of soul and you use Jung. There are such things as aberrations. Allport will reassure you that everyone isn't suffering from aberrations, not in any notable extent. He says projective tests are all right for people who are mixed up. They'll reveal something in projective tests that they don't know. But with the majority of people, if you want to find out about them, the simplest way is to ask them a question and they will give you the answer. There is no conflict. They know already. Of course, Stekel's idea too when I say that Stekel certainly held that by the unconscious he meant what was not thematized. He said, 'They know, but they won't admit it.' And it was a matter of cornering them and getting them to admit it that his therapy to a great extent consisted. So the conversions of foundations – and then, of course, there is at the present time, symbolism and the significance of symbolism, of the whole humanistic, literary world, which is something that has been starved, and there is a need to emphasize it. For example, education as it was fifty years ago and as it is today are two entirely different things. At the present time in the Province of Ontario, which is supposed to have the best education system in Canada, high school students spend more than half their time at mathematics and science. They will be good with the computer, but will you want them to be running your politics and your press? That negation of the humanistic as being useless – there is a starving of a certain component in the human makeup at the present time that is not exactly individual aberration and does call for an emphasis on the symbolic. That is a dimension in the human being that under a humanistic, rhetorical type of civilization which we had before the sciences came in and which we still had when I was a boy going to school, that has pretty well vanished, gone out, and there are problems that come with it. Fingarette, a Freudian, insofar as Fingarette represents a valid reinterpretation of Freud – he considers it a interpretation, I consider it is at least a reinterpretation – a neurosis is cumulatively misinterpreted experience. The experience is conscious, otherwise it wouldn't be experience. The misinterpretation is experienced, otherwise it wouldn't be misleading. And the cumulative result – one misinterpretation leading to another. What is dynamic about it is the need for the correct interpretation, and the working through is the eliminating, getting the insights, the bright moment, and the cure is the insight that ties in with the emotions. And the working through deals with all the ramifications of the cumulative misinterpretation. Now, the Jungian type of analysis (sound fades) – so there is a distinct dimension which I spoke of in terms of the quasi-operator, and insofar as it deals with the quasi-operator it is something distinct. It is concerned with symbols and the meaning of symbols, and so on.