

Lonergan Workshop 1974 Q&A June 17-24

June 17 (TC 809 A and 809 B)

Walter Conn indicates the order in which the questions (see 13690DTE070) will be addressed.

Questions: Lonergan responds to the first three questions together.

- (1) Would Fr Lonergan specify whether some of the historical figures mentioned in Fr Flanagan's paper (delivered that morning and entitled 'Culture and Morality') and in the discussion following play any significant role in his working out of the fourth level.
- (2) To what extent did contemporary existentialist thinkers such as Jaspers and Heidegger influence his thinking with regard to the fourth level.
- (3) How does Fr Lonergan see the relation between interiority and the fourth level as the problem appears between Kant and Kierkegaard.

Lonergan: I am asked to pronounce on the influence upon me of the unnamed people in Fr Flanagan's paper: I believe Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and then Jaspers and Heidegger and then Kant and Kierkegaard.

I read some of most of those people but I don't connect – you read and you get a lot of new ideas but the stew isn't made immediately on the spot, and when it is made you don't know what parts are due to whom. Before I went to teach in Rome I read Kierkegaard, a fair amount, especially the *Unscientific Postscript* but other things as well. I worked a lot on Kant preparing the first institute I had on *Insight*, in 1958. Jaspers I read in Rome. I had an institute in 1957 at Boston College, and I read a good deal of Jaspers in connection with that – the existentialists. I was talking about existentialism for a whole week. I don't remember how I did it now. Heidegger less. He came to me initially through the Flemish author De Waelhens, and it was all very mysterious. But in general the influence, the way I arrived at my position on this fourth level, as in these first three questions here, will come out much more clearly when I attempt to handle questions later on. The way in which my thinking proceeded and so on comes out later on. There are all sorts of influences in the existential writers that could move me towards that type of thinking. A good deal of it I've used, like Being-in-the-world, self-discovery, the existential moment, all this sort of thing, even Sartre to some extent. But it isn't the precise trip when you are moving over to something else from it. You need it maybe as a run-down, but it is like asking a man which day at training helped to win the race. He has a hard time saying. So that is really all I can say about the first three.

Questions 4 and 5 are addressed together:

- (4) Would Fr Lonergan give us a rundown on the various uses of the word 'critical.'

Lonergan: For me, in my thinking, the principal use of the word 'critical' is with regard to the possibility of metaphysics, and more precisely with regard to the fact that metaphysics had been a matter of disputed questions that were disputed endlessly and for centuries, and with no hope of any mitigation. Thomists and Suarezians on the real distinction, with everything depending on which side you took, and why you should take any side, and what the question meant, and how

could you say what the question meant. Scotus's distinction, formal distinction *a parte rei*: but what could he even mean by the thing? And how could you show that the meaning was nonsense if you thought that? – that type of question.

'Critical' I've used fundamentally with regard to the question of a critical metaphysics, and insofar as I arrived at any solution to that I set up in *Insight* a metaphysics such that any significant statement in the metaphysics could be grounded by a statement of fact about human knowledge. You can get a point-to-point correspondence between metaphysical statements and statements about human knowledge. Consequently, cognitional theory was what one went into to be able to set up a metaphysics in a way in which the disputes at least wouldn't be metaphysical, and they did have an empirical, a matter-of-fact solution. If you ask whether essence and existence are really distinct or not, well, what on earth do you mean by existence and what on earth do you mean by essence? But if you put it in terms of judgment and hypothesis, verification and hypothesis, you can know exactly what you mean by a hypothesis and exactly what you mean by a verification – a judgment saying that's right, or it is probably right. You can work out the nature of a judgment, you can see how the negation of any distinction between the two would be impossible on an intuitive account of knowledge. You can't take a look at the essence of something with the thing not existing right there in front of you. For the intuitive type of knowledge, there couldn't be a distinction between the two. If your account of knowledge rejected the Kantian doctrine that *Verstand*, understanding, is the faculty of judgment – understanding is merely the faculty of forming hypotheses – then you would have made quite a jump from the formation of hypotheses to the verification 'that really is so.' And that for me has been the fundamental meaning of the word 'critical,' the chief instance. Now whenever you have a chief meaning for a word, of course, you can extend it. You can have a critical problem in other areas, and how do you go about solving them? You can have different people conceiving the difference of several critical problems in their respective different ways providing their several different solutions. They supply you a retinue of other meanings of the word 'critical,' but in general I don't think I use the word 'critical' except in that fundamental sense – not with any great vigor and conviction. You can use it of course in a general sense – 'he's in a critical condition, his temperature is 104'—it is not relevant.

- (5) Does 'critical' relate to criteria so that one has to define 'critical' in relation to the criteria for being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible?

Lonergan: Well, to me there aren't criteria for those things, those things are the criteria for being authentic. If you don't know what it is to attend, no one is going to explain it to you, or to be intelligent. Those are the prime terms we operate with, and the fundamental step in self-appropriation is that those are not words that need further criteria but they are the names of the criteria, the fundamental criteria. At least that's the way I take it. They are the operators in the whole setup, the whole unfolding of the person. It is true what you understand by being intelligent that you reduce all your arguments to saying 'prove that so and so is saying something that is quite unintelligible.' It is the criterion rather than whatever else you bring up. There can be derived criteria like incoherence and so on, but they make it far skimpier.

Question 7 is addressed next.

(7) How does Fr Lonergan relate cosmopolis to the question of pacifism?

Lonergan: I think a bit of historical background is of value. In Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War there is a famous dialogue. The Athenian hegemony had more or less all the islands of the Aegean paying tribute and enabling the Athenians to have ships and they were all on Athens' side when the war broke out. And the Mileans routed. And the Athenians laid siege to the island or the city of Milos and eventually captured it and surrendered it. Thucydides narrates, fabricated, who knows, a dialogue between the Athenian commander and the people of Milos. The Mileans appealed to the idea of justice, and the Athenians held that justice is all right between equals but when one man is the victor and the other the vanquished there is no equality and there is no question of justice, and the argument goes on but the upshot of it was that the Athenians executed all the males in the island and sold the women and children into slavery. Caesar in Gaul, with a tribe that rebelled, had the right hand cut off of ten thousand male members of the tribe. They weren't going to rebel again, they didn't have the right hand to do it.

A propos of the atomic bomb, I remember in Rome once I was talking to Fr Boyer. He said, 'Well you know four centuries ago cities like Florence and Bologna and Pisa used to carry on wars with one another. No one today would dream of a war going on between different cities. It is just out of the question. And the atom bomb, nuclear devices, make all-out war something that becomes out of date, the way wars between cities became out of date. Artillery didn't end wars between the Italian city states, but they made them much less relevant. So when you get citizen armies and so on, the enormous logistics of a modern war, well that type of war becomes meaningless, you need a whole series of cities to supply the sinews of a war. There is a mounting of the ante, as progress of this peculiar military type occurs, that makes earlier types of warfare just senseless, mindless, and a meaning of pacifism at the present time would be when the use of ultimate means of warfare becomes simply ridiculous and people just won't do it. There have been plenty of opportunities for nuclear attacks and so on in the past twenty-five years but we haven't had them. No one wants to start it. Any fool can make a rather inefficient bomb which is enough to destroy a city, and there is going to be plenty of plutonium for them to do it. We may get atomic explosions due to maniacs, but the idea of atomic war is a meaning losing any reasonable point.

Well, anyway, that's one point.

With regard to pacifism in general, it is a rejection of the principle of justified self-defense, and justified self-defense is not merely a matter of egoism, it is whether you want the bad guys to be on top of everyone or not. So I certainly have no pronouncements on the question of pacifism. I think that a bit of historical perspective reveals that war is something that can retreat too. They are the odds and ends that occur to me on the spur of the moment, but I have not devoted any great attention to it.

Question 11 is addressed next.

(11) Does the self-correcting process operate in the same way in judgments of fact and in judgments of value?

Lonergan: I studied philosophy at Heythrop in England from 1926 to 1929, and I was extremely skeptical about universal concepts, demonstrations, and I have remained so. I have a section in

Insight on the limitations of the treatise, and that is something that is very fundamental in my thinking. It is the sort of thing that my thinking is not. You can have systematic thinking only if you set up a system – you can have precise definitions and so on only if you set up a system. Socrates, in the earlier Platonic Dialogues, was himself convinced and convinced anyone that would talk to him that while they knew perfectly well what they meant by temperance or courage, still they couldn't produce a definition that held *omni et soli*, in all cases and in no cases but the terms they were defining. A short time later, a couple of generations perhaps later, Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* defined all the virtues and all the vices and paired off each virtue with two opposed vices. He had no difficulty whatever defining them. And the reason was that he departed from ordinary language. He used ordinary language but he picked out all the meanings and terms and set them up and said they are the terms I'm going to use. And he constructed for himself a technical vocabulary, and once he had this technical vocabulary and moved out of ordinary language and had effected a technical vocabulary such that in the fundamental meanings the terms were fixed by their relations and the relations by the terms that were related, once you have that, you can do exact definition. But what you have done is moved out of ordinary language. As the analysts tell us so eloquently, repeatedly, you present the meaning of a word by showing how it is used appropriately. The meanings of ordinary language are the proper usages of the words; it is not a matter of any sort of definition.

But further, I have in the chapter on judgment, on the foundations of judgment, reflective understanding, the distinction between analytic propositions and analytic principles. Analytic propositions are a dime a dozen. If what you mean by A is what has a relation R to B, then you have the analytic proposition, Every A has a relation R to B by definition. You have as many analytic propositions as you have different meanings you can assign to A, R, and B. But to have an analytic principle, you have to verify your analytic proposition in the sense in which the definitions demand. This verification is like all verifications; at best it is probable, and we hope that no one will come along too soon and find a contrary instance. So analytic principles let one down, they are reduced to hypotheses, and definitions take one out of ordinary language. Moreover, there's a famous theorem, this century about 1935, Gödel's theorem, to which the conclusion – Dr McShane will tell you about the proof some time – is that a deductive formalization is either trivial, or incoherent, or incomplete. Trivial if it really just keeps marching around in the circle, incoherent if you can prove both the affirmation and the negation of the same proposition, and incomplete if you can use the defined terms to ask questions that the system cannot answer. That theorem for me is very much a good example of what meaning one might give to Thomas's statement that *intellectus possibilis est in genere intelligibilium ut potentia tantum*, possible intellect is a potency and it keeps on being in potency; you can always learn more. In other words, you can't get it all boxed up neatly in a gift package of a deductive system. That's something that doesn't work, and once you drop that, what have you got? Where to you go? Scholastic philosophy tended to be presented in terms of proofs; you defined your terms, listed the adversaries, gave the 'status quaestionis,' and you proved your assertion, at least to the satisfaction of the Professor that had taught you.

That's fundamentally the reason why Cardinal Newman's *Grammar of Assent* was a fundamental influence in my thinking. What he called the illative sense is a forerunner of what I call reflective understanding. There you have what Newman was talking about, the illative sense with regard to real apprehension as distinct from notional apprehension, and real assent as distinct from notional assent, and the grounding for this real assent. The assent is unconditional,

you don't assent in proportion to the evidence, so that if you have a lot of evidence, you have a further strong assent; with less evidence, you give it a weaker assent. You assent absolutely that P is probable. That sort of thing was extremely relevant, and it has remained so and fundamentally anything I present is along that line. It is not just some odds and ends of thinking; it's the whole shooting match as far as my thinking goes.

So this self-correcting process of learning too, insofar as it occurs on the level of common sense – and that is principally where it does occur; there are other occurrences because in the other fields, like hermeneutics, history, and so on, you are using commonsense procedures with regard to another brand of common sense – but there is no fundamental split between judgments of fact and judgments of value. You advance in both pretty much in the same way; you don't know how you do it. I have a younger brother; one summer he was in Western Canada, he was studying engineering, at the time he was working on a survey in Western Canada. He acquired a great admiration for Indian guides. How on earth do they do it? He cornered one of them. 'You are out following a buck for a couple of days. You finally get him. How do you know which way to head back for camp, which way do you go?' 'You know.' He said, 'Yes, but what do you go by to know which way to go.' 'You know.' And he kept pressing, and the Indian said, 'Well, you go by the streams.' 'But how do you know whether to go up or down the stream?' 'You know.' And he finally got an answer to that, and he said, 'Well, you follow the downward stream and you come to another stream – do you go down it or up it?' 'You know.' And that's the way the self-correcting process of learning works; analyzing it is an entirely different process, and you can do it for a few simple cases but in a case of any complexity you can't.

I give an example of a judgment of fact in *Insight*, about the man who leaves his beautifully ordered house in the morning and he comes back in the evening and the windows are broken and there's water on the floor and smoke in the air, and so on. And he says, 'Something happened,' and it is the sort of judgment that you can explain just what he means and how he arrived at it. But when you get beyond that, the explanation gets more and more enormously difficult, and if you wanted to do it for all the judgments you make in your lifetime, well, you'd need about a hundred lives to do the analysis. So this self-correcting process of learning is what we've got, and the extent to which we can analyze it is limited, but most people find it works fairly well.

It doesn't operate in the same way in judgments of fact and judgments of value because the two types of judgment are quite distinct. They have different bases; they involve different developments. But it is a matter of a gradual process. Watch parents with their children, teaching them the moral principles and so on. My grand-nephew was doing something; he went out in the kitchen and took an apple and he ate it, goes into the sitting room and threw it on the floor, and was just ready to step on it – he took two bites out of it. 'Stop! Did you ever see your mother do that? Did you ever see Uncle Bernie do that? Did you ever see me do that?' I don't know whether that's a sound pedagogical way to teach children or not, but that's the way things are learnt or picked up. Anyway, it is a process that does on for years with children.

But while the self-correcting process of learning with regard to judgments of fact is a matter of understanding, the type of understanding of the trouble-shooter, the man who sees just how things are working out and so on; it is a matter of increasing understanding. When you get a wrong result, well, you step back, and you do it again, and you find different ways of doing things, and so on. The brother to whom I already referred was in charge of a section of a plant – the standards people didn't like him – they had the tools for doing all the accurate measurements,

and they were finding fault with his product, and so on. He was able to solve problems in his own way, like the salinity of a solution. Well, he'd fill a barrel with the stuff and let it dry, weigh it before and after; you don't need the fine instruments if you can do it on the grand scale. It is a matter of understanding just how the thing works and why it works, what you can do and what you can't do. That's one side. The other is a different matter, and one of considerable complexity. You'd have to go into things like Kohlberg's analysis, stages in morality, and so on. The gradual process – people can think they are a little further one than they really are. It is all very complex, and it is not easily analyzed. So it operates but the criteria are different. Now that difference of criteria – we move on to 9.

Question 9: Is personal authenticity as a criterion as central to the judgment of fact as it is to the judgment of value?

Lonergan: Well, it is much more personal in the judgment of value. because in the judgment of fact you are making yourself as a knower, you are constituting yourself as a knower; and you can turn out to be an ignorant person, but not a bad person – wicked in your ignorance, what the moralists call 'ignorantia crassa.' But the element of authenticity is operative in both. You present the problem. You understand. How do you know you understand? It is very much a matter of 'You know.' In other words, the ability to ask questions is also the ability to know when the question is answered. The ability to ask questions for intelligence – How does it work? Why is that so? – is the ability to be satisfied with a good answer and dissatisfied with a bad answer. Consequently, this intelligence, this capacity for inquiry, is not only the source of questions but also the source of the criteria that discriminate between the good answer and the poor answer and the incomplete answer. With the incomplete answer, you ask further questions.

Now, what is true on the level of intelligence is also true on the level of judgment. In chapter 10 of *Insight*, on reflective understanding, I have a rather elaborate analysis of what is meant by having sufficient evidence. When is your judgment right? When you have sufficient evidence. When is it wrong? When you pass judgment without sufficient evidence. Anyone will tell you that. And what do you mean by sufficient evidence? Well, I have a long, complicated answer to that in terms of the virtually unconditioned, and I apply it to a series of different instances. I am sure that millions and millions of people make correct judgments without ever in the world having the slightest notion of the virtually unconditioned. That's an analysis of what goes on. It's an account of what goes on, it's a reflection upon it that seems to hold in a series of instances that I use. But it is not what people go by when they are making correct judgments and know that they are correct. What they are going by is the same sort of thing that leads them to ask the question, Is that so? They ask, 'Is it so? Show me; I'm from Missouri.' They put the issue, because they are reasonable, because they are rational. It is their rationality that wants to know, Is it so or is it just a bright idea?

I once gave a talk to a group of psychiatrists on *Insight*. At the end there were questions from the doctors, and one of the doctors said, 'Our patients have all sorts of insights; the trouble is they're wrong.' There's a further question, the question, Is it right? And it is a bad defect when people don't think of that further question, because insights are a dime a dozen, and you have to have a lot of them before you have anything that amounts to much. Putting that further question, Is it correct? Is that so? is man's exhibition of his rationality. The power of that question, the seriousness of that question, is the fact that none of the modern sciences will answer that

question absolutely. They will say, ‘Is that previous doctrine wrong? Oh yes.’ They are quite certain about that. But is this one right? Oh well, no, someone else may come along with something better, and we have no way of telling that. They are not certain, and they are not talking about the virtually unconditioned when they are saying that. They are going by their innate rationality. Insofar as they are authentically rational, they make true judgments. Similarly, I said that the criterion of the correct judgment of value is the good conscience of a virtuous man. It is a question-begging answer. But it is the answer of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. The vicious man can do what’s wrong with a quite good conscience – the people in ‘The Sting’ – but the virtuous man has a good conscience, and then his judgment of value will be correct. But who is a virtuous man? Who is going to claim he is a virtuous man? The Stoics’ human ideal was the *sophos*, and the question that everyone else was asking was, ‘Well, I’d like to meet him!’ Karl Rahner would say, ‘I’d like to shake his hand.’ The criterion lies in that direction. Just as people call it the moral sense; there are various philosophical approaches to that, the validity of the judgment of value, there are lots of theories. But when you come down to it, people can dull it – not completely, there is honor among thieves, but there are such things as the rat and the double-cross and so on. But there is that; its applications will vary with people according to their virtues and their ideals. Aristotle in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* says that the life of *theoria* is something that’s more than human, but don’t listen to the people that tell you to think the thoughts of mortal man. Do your best. It is something divine in man that is leading to that life, and do what you can to get there. It illustrates vertical finality. But anyway, it is a different type of authenticity, it is authenticity on a different level. But it is authenticity on a different level operating in a similar fashion to authenticity on the level of intelligence and on the level of reasonableness. It is much more personal because you are making yourself as a person, as a good person, on the fourth level.

Now we have questions 6, 8, and 10, and they are all connected. Question 6: ‘Will Fr. Lonergan respond to the question at the end of Fr Crowe’s paper, What becomes of isomorphism on the fourth level?’ and **Question 8:** ‘It seems that Fr Lonergan has not worked out in *Method* where human love is really an exception to the ordinary development from level to level. Has he anything further to say on this question since writing *Method*?’ and **Question 10:** ‘Will Fr Lonergan specify the difference in the ontological constitution of the person as morally authentic and as religiously authentic?’

Lonergan: I think my answer comes directly on question 8 but it bears on all three. I have something further to say. Emergent probability: you have a higher level, you move from a lower to a higher level, insofar as system emerges upon coincidental manifolds. The subatomic particles are not free particles when they become parts of an atom, and they behave differently. The atoms, the various chemical elements, enter into cells. They behave, follow their own laws within the cell. But the (end of 809 A, a few lines are filled in here) performance of the cell is a higher system – the coincidental manifold of things that the chemistry will explain in the operation of the cell (note: some mumbling here), but not the whole story – there’s a higher system. There’s a book on that. (809 B starts) Dr McShane has a book on that, *Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence*, and in general the emergent probability is from the system, the coincidental manifold, on the lower level to something that becomes organic, systematic, normative on a higher, on a further level.

Now the account of the authentic subject is also an account of self-transcendence. There is self-transcendence cognitively on its various levels, in dreams, sensitive experience, intelligence; intelligence constructs the world; man doesn't live in a habitat but in a universe; The independence of that universe of oneself, the level of judgment; and then the moral subject, the self-transcendence of the moral subject. That self-transcendence in several individuals constitutes a coincidental manifold, ready to snap into something further. That something further is being in love: on the domestic level – the family; on the human group level – the tribe, the city, the state, humanity; and with regard to the universe.

The difference in the ontological constitution of the person as morally authentic and as religiously authentic is that moral authenticity is being a citizen of the *civitas terrena*, and religious of the *civitas caelestis*. That's Aquinas on the distinction between the human virtues and the theological virtues. There are other differences, which can be added on to that, but that's the way it goes.

Isomorphism is with regard to knowledge as cognitive self-transcendence, and the isomorphism is between the knowing and the known, between experience, understanding, and judging – potency, form, and act. But on the fourth level, one is moving beyond the individual to something distinct, to a new creation, to a vertical finality, to the next level of emergent probability, which for Teilhard de Chardin is Christogenesis. So I thought of something further since writing *Method*.

(Lonergan asks if there are any questions from the floor, and Walter Conn invites his 'distinguished colleagues' to go first. Phil McShane starts.)

Question: I'd like to ask a very stupid question, and it connects up with a suggestion of one of this morning's papers about functional specialties and the expansion up through the levels. It came up this morning, from the third to the fourth. I put a context in Fr Tracy's work on the problem of conversion not being within functional specialization – that's another context – and the question comes out of Fr Crowe's suggestion that recently you talked about this question of love as a fifth level. Now, I was going to suggest – the stupidity of this is that I am putting now six functional specialties on each side – because you have the What Question and the Is Question constituting two operators; you have a What Ought To Be Done Question, and an Is Ought To Be Done, Am I To Do It Question, and then you have this fifth level you may have mentioned recently in an interview, and then that goes on the sixth level, so you have now got this problem of twelve functional specialties.

Lonergan: Well, I don't know if they would all be functional specialties. But with regard to levels, I have moved from three operators to three operators and two quasi-operators, and there is a quasi-operator before the other three, the symbolic operator on which Fr Doran will be talking tomorrow perhaps. In other words, the emergence into consciousness, the control over what emerges into consciousness: it is not an operator in which you ask questions, but it is an operator that operates, controls, no matter how you conceive it. You can conceive it as finding solutions to problems, advertent to evidence for a judgment. What brings things into consciousness? What releases them? And the quasi-operator that moves to the next stage of emergent probability, when you get a new synthesis, a new order.

Now, functional specialties: what would they be? If you want to go ahead and do it, I'm not going to stop you, but with regard to stages in a process of creative collaboration that's another issue. I don't know if I'm ready to add four more chapters.

Question continued: What about the distinction between the What Ought To Be Done Question, which is less personal than the question, Am I To Do It?

Lonergan: Well, it is a distinct question, no doubt, but are there distinct criteria for it, and so on? Am I going To Do It? Well, am I going to grow up or not? Until I get further on it I wouldn't say.

Question (Joseph Flanagan): I'm curious about the quasi-operator on the other end. You spoke about the quasi-operator before the three levels. Would you say something about that?

Lonergan: Well, when you do Dr. McShane's problem in geometry. (Goes to board.) You have a circle, rectangular diameters: center O and you take any point P, drop a perpendicular PM and a perpendicular PN, join MN: how long is MN? And the symbolic operator, of course, tells you the right construction: you join OP, and that's the radius, so MN is the same length as the radius: diagonals of the same rectangle are equal. But you have to draw the construction, and the trick is of course -- there is no problem what construction you draw in that case, but the more complex the problem becomes the luckier you have to be to hit upon the construction, and that's one instance of it. In general, problem solving, the whole business of problem solving -- and you can tie that onto Kuhn's book on Scientific Revolutions, since normal science is problem solving.

Then on the level of judgment. You do think of things, and 'Oh, I hadn't thought of that,' and it makes all the difference to your judgment. And you don't think of everything under the sun, it isn't by a complete enumeration that you come to *this*. There is a conspiracy between the unconscious and conscious living. Jung speaks of compensatory functioning. But anyway, there is something going on there. And then the -- well, to go into the archetypes, development of the ego, and from the ego to the self, and so on; Freud's censor is a quasi-operator.

Question (Matthew Lamb): I am kind of fascinated by this, the question of Christogenesis. Do you see that then as on the fourth level introducing the emergence of a theology of history that moves beyond the categories of what we would normally gain through simply a metaphysics with historical process?

Lonergan: In other words, theological categories are largely on the fourth level, aren't they? Largely, not exclusively: there is some use for a metaphysics, but as soon as you start talking about things that are distinctively human, you are going to be getting your theological categories out of subjectivity, not out of metaphysics; but you will need your metaphysical categories for the same and the different, and so on, things that Plato discusses so eloquently.

Question: The pastoral workshop this afternoon found us ranging across the board of individual ministry and one-to-one counseling all the way to very broad questions about the role of institutions and the church, and having impact and goal setting and all that sort of thing. And the result of it was a question which perhaps has to do with your talk tomorrow, but I think the group

could be helped by some kind of response to it: your understanding of pastoral theology and pastoral ministry in a broad context.

Lonergan: Not so much mine as that of Arnold, A. Klostermann, Rahner, Schurr, and Weber, *Handbuch der Pastoraltheologie*. It is concerned with implementing a bright idea had by someone in the middle of the last century, in which pastoral theology was conceived or to be conceived not in terms of what the parish priest does for the parish, ‘helpful hints for the parish priest,’ but what the church should be doing in the world, and what each part of the church, each section of the church, or each division of the church should be doing in its part of the world, from all the aspects you can think of: psychological, social-psychological, sociological, and so on. It includes in its over 2,600 pages essays on such tidbits as the psychopathology of the Roman Catholic Church. So what is pastoral theology? The church’s pastoral theology as a concrete reality, is not isolated individuals in isolated areas doing a limited number of things. It is the job of the whole church carrying out its mission at the present time, appropriately to the situation of the world at the present time. What are the key issues at the present time, what are the strategic issues, what are the tactical issues, where do you get the biggest results with the least effort – the economy of effort. The question of the missions, for example, is just one example of it, the problem of making disciples of Christ of people who haven’t got our culture.

In the Congo, there were people very Pentecostal, very devout Christians, but they wouldn’t have anything to do with any of the products of European culture or Graeco-Roman culture, and as long as the Belgians were running the country they were more or less persecuted. When the Belgians stepped out, they went ahead on their own, enjoyed themselves enormously, and developed according to their own culture. Well, what about it? What about the training of missionaries? Are you going to train people who are able to step out of the twentieth century into the Stone Age? The North American Martyrs, Jesuits in Canada and northern New York in the seventeenth century, the relations say, were writing home about these barbarians, and about what they were doing and how they were and so on and so forth. They realized they had souls, but weren’t good Frenchmen, yet! Is the missionary effort to be purged of the communication of an alien culture and simply made a communication of Christ’s message? That’s a fundamental problem in missiology, and it presupposes a tremendous grasp of the whole of anthropology, because stepping into another culture is no slight task. You travel into another country. At a more elementary stage, of course, you move to the next village. Does that give any sort of a clue? And there’s Vatican II, the Constitution on the Church and the Pastoral Constitution on the Church. If there’s a pastoral constitution on the Church, it isn’t the constitution of the pastor in the parish. The word ‘pastoral’ received a big thrust forward. Rahner had out a mimeographed scheme of this book before the Council actually met, after, I think, the fact that it was to be a pastoral council was announced, and he got these people together. Between them they gathered together the endless display of talent and went to work and put out these volumes. There was a volume in 1964, two books of the second volume in 1966, another volume in 1968, another volume in 1970, with a reprint of the first volume in 1970. The tables of contents, if you add up the tables of contents of the several volumes, you get something over 50 pages, on the topics which have been treated under the various headings.

Question: What is the locus of this type of reflection on pastoral theology?

Lonergan: Communications.

Question: What about the institutional locus? I'm thinking in terms of seminaries, where I know, generally speaking this doesn't happen.

Lonergan: Well, with regard to the institution we have Fr Komonchak.

Question (Pat Byrne): In *Insight* there is a brief discussion about whether or not prime potency is to be equated with energy, and it seems that from the way you have it laid out there, although these questions need to be further posed and so on, it seems you have a sense in which perhaps that is the direction. Energy would be prime potency. In Patrick Heelan's book on Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, he raised some objections against that, and I began to wonder if I had read it correctly. So I'm wondering, was that the direction you had intended, and did you have any reactions to his objection on that?

Lonergan: Well, I have no reaction to his objection because I don't understand what his objection is. It was a bit beyond me. But with regard to the thing, my reason for it was that just as a differential gives you the law of a process, so integration goes from the law down to the concrete, and energy is integration. Ergo. But that's as far as the argument goes, that particular argument I don't think Heelan handled. I threw it out then. I am still throwing it out, but I am not averse to seeing it settled by any manner of means.