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CHAPTER TWELVE

DOCTRINES

Our sixth functional specialty is concerned with doctrines. We shall speak of the varieties of doctrines, of their functions, their variations, of the differentiation of human consciousness and the ongoing discovery of mind with consequently ongoing contexts, of the development, permanence, and historicity of dogma, of cultural pluralism and the unity of faith, and of the autonomy of the functional specialty named doctrines.

1. Varieties

A first step is to distinguish primary sources, church doctrines, theological doctrines, methodological doctrine, and the application of a methodological doctrine that results in a functional specialty named doctrines. Common to all is that they are taught. They differ and are distinguished because the teachers differ in the authority with which they teach.

In the primary sources a distinction is to be drawn between the doctrine of the original message and, on the other hand, doctrines about this doctrine. References to the original message may be found, for example, in I Cor<sup>o</sup> 15, 3 ff. and in Gal I, 6 ff. On the other hand, stages in the proclamation and application of this message yield doctrines about

doctrine. Thus, there is the divine revelation in which God has spoken to us of old through his prophets and most recently in his Son (Heb. I, 1.2). There is the church decree in which the decision of assembled Christians coincides with the decision of the Holy Spirit (Act 15, 28). There are apostolic traditions: Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen all appeal to the teaching given by the apostles to the churches they founded, and handed down from generation to generation.<sup>1</sup> There is the inspiration of the canonical scriptures that provided a far more accessible criterion once the canon had been formed and hermeneutical principles explained.<sup>2</sup>

Next, there are church doctrines. They have their antecedents both in New Testament confessions of faith<sup>3</sup> and in the decision of assembled Christians in Act 15, 28. In general they are not simple reaffirmations of scripture or tradition. However secure it may have seemed to urge with

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1) Irenaeus, Adv. haer., I, 10, 2; III, 1-3; Harvey I, 92; II, 2 ff. Tertullian, De praescr. haeret., 21. Origen, De princ., praef. 1 & 2; Koetschau 7 f.

2) Contrast the crisp principles of Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VIII, 2 ff.; Stählin III, 81 ff.) with the struggles of Irenaeus (Adv. haer. I, 3, 1.2.6; Harvey I, 24-26.31).

3) See V.H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Confessions, Leiden: Brill, 1963, Volume V of New Testament Tools and Studies edited by B.M. Metzger.

Pope Stephen "... nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est..." (DS 110), it remained that new questions did arise and that satisfactory answers were not forthcoming as long as one was content just to stand pat. Why this should be so is a large question to which some answer will be given in the sections on variations of doctrines and on the differentiations of consciousness. But one has only to peruse such a collection of conciliar and pontifical pronouncements as Denzinger's Enchiridion Symbolorum to observe that each is a product of its place and time and that each meets the questions of the day for the people of the day.

Thirdly, there are theological doctrines. Etymologically theology means a discourse about God. Within a Christian context it denotes a person's reflections on the revelation given in and by Christ Jesus. In the patristic period writers concerned themselves mainly with specific questions that currently were being ventilated, but towards its end there appeared such comprehensive works as John Damascene's De fide orthodoxa. In the medieval schools theology became methodical, collaborative, ongoing. Research and classification were undertaken in books of sentences. Interpretation in commentaries on the books of the Old and New Testaments and on the works of eminent writers. Systematic theology sought to put order and coherence into the mass of materials assembled from scripture and tradition. It began, perhaps, with Abaelard's Sic et non, in which one hundred and fifty-eight propositions were both proved and disproved by arguments from scripture, from tradi-

tion, and from reason. In any case, Abaelard's non later became the Videtur quod non of the quaestio; his sic became the Sed contra est; there followed a statement of principles of solution or reconciliation; and finally the principles were applied to each of the conflicting sources. Now when the technique of the quaestio was applied to the materials in a book of sentences, there emerged a further need. The solutions to the endless questions had to be coherent with one another. There was needed some overall systematic view. It was to provide a substructure for such a view that theologians turned to Aristotle.

Fourthly, the methodological problems surfaced towards the end of the thirteenth century in a raucous knock-down controversy between Augustinians and Aristotelians. That controversy, so far from being settled, simply shifted into a permanent opposition between the Thomist and the Scotist schools, as did later the controversies between Catholics and Protestants, between Jesuits and Dominicans, and between the followers of different Protestant leaders. The needed solution to such ongoing differences is a theological method radical enough to meet head on the basic issues in philosophy. What is one doing when one is knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What does one know when one does it?

Though necessary, that is not enough. One must also ask what one is doing when one is doing theology, and one's answer must envisage not only the Christian encounter with God but also the historicity of Christian witness, the diversity

of human cultures, the differentiations of human consciousness.

There is then a methodological doctrine. Just as theology reflects on revelation and church doctrines, so methodology reflects on theology and theologies. Because it reflects on theology and theologies, it has to mention both the revelation and the church doctrines on which the theologies reflect. But though it mentions them, it does not attempt to determine their content. That task it leaves to the church authorities and to the theologians. It is concerned to determine how theologians might or should operate. It is not concerned to predetermine the specific results all future generations must obtain.

There is a fifth variety of doctrines, the ones meant in the title of the present chapter. There are theological doctrines reached by the application of a method that distinguishes functional specialties and uses the functional specialty, foundations, to select doctrines from among the multiple choices presented by the functional specialty, dialectic.

2.

### Functions

In the third chapter on meaning we distinguished the communicative, the effective, the constitutive, and the cognitive functions of meaning. Next, in the fourth chapter on religion we spoke both of an inner grace and of the outer word that comes to us from Christ Jesus. Because of its authoritative source, that word is doctrine. Because that source is one, the doctrine will be a common doctrine. Finally, such

common doctrine will fulfil the communicative, effective, ~~con-~~<sup>f</sup>stitutive, and cognitive functions proper to meaning.

It is effective inasmuch as it counsels and dissuades, commands and prohibits. It is cognitive inasmuch as it tells whence we come, whither we go, how we get there. It is constitutive of the individual inasmuch as the doctrine is a set of meanings and values that inform his living, his knowing, his doing. It is constitutive of the community, for community exists inasmuch as there is a commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another. Finally, it is communicative for it has passed from Christ to the apostles and from the apostles to their successors and from these in each age to the flocks of which they ~~are~~<sup>were</sup> the pastors.

Further, there is the normative function of doctrines. Men <sup>any</sup> or may not be converted intellectually, morally, religiously. If they are not, and the lack of conversion is conscious and thorough-going, it heads for a loss of faith. But the unconverted may have no real apprehension of what it is to be converted. Sociologically they are Catholics or Protestants, but in a number of ways they deviate from the norm. Moreover, they may lack an appropriate language for expressing what they really are, and so they will use the language of the group with which they identify socially. There follows an inflation, or devaluation, of this language and so of the doctrine it conveys. Terms that denote what the unconverted is not, will be stretched to denote what he is. Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company. Conclusions that are unacceptable

will not be drawn. Such unauthenticity can spread. It can become a tradition. Then persons, brought up in an unauthentic tradition, can become authentic human beings and authentic Christians only by purifying their tradition.

But against such deviations there is the normative function of doctrines. For the functional specialty, dialectic, deploys both the truth reached and the errors disseminated in the past. The functional specialty, foundations, discriminates between truth and error by appealing to the foundational reality of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The result of such discrimination is the functional specialty, doctrines, and so doctrines, based on conversion, are opposed to the aberrations that result from the lack of conversion. Accordingly, while the unconverted may have no real apprehension of what it is to be converted, at least they have in doctrines the evidence both that there is something lacking in themselves and that they need to pray for illumination and to seek instruction.

It is to be noted that the normative character of doctrines just indicated pertains to the functional specialty derived from the two previous specialties, dialectic and foundations. It is a normativeness that results from a determinate method. It is a normativeness distinct from that attributed to the opinions of theologians because of their personal eminence or because of the high esteem in which they are held in the church or among its officials. Finally, of course, the normativeness of any theological conclusion is distinct from and dependent on the normativeness attributed to divine revelation,

inspired scripture, or church doctrine.

3. Variations

Anthropological and historical research has made us aware of the enormous variety of human social arrangements, cultures, mentalities. It follows that we, far more than many of our predecessors, are in a position to understand the variations that have taken place in the expression of Christian doctrines. For if the gospel is to be preached to all nations (Mt. 28, 19), still it is not to be preached in the same manner to all.<sup>4</sup> If one is to communicate with persons of another culture, one must use the resources of their culture. To use simply the resources of one's own culture is not to communicate with the other but to remain locked up in one's own. At the same time, it is not enough simply to employ the resources of the other culture. One must do so creatively. One has to discover the manner in which the Christian message can be expressed effectively and accurately in the other culture.

There is a further point. Once Christian doctrine has been introduced successfully within another culture, its subsequent development will further exploit the resources of that culture. The point is abundantly illustrated by Cardinal Daniélou's account of an orthodox Judaic Christianity that, in its apprehension of the Christian mysteries, employed the

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4) See the opening address of John XXIII at the second Vatican council. AAS 54 (1962), 792, lines 8 ff.

thought-forms and the stylistic genera of Spätjudentum. To conceive the Son and the Spirit as distinct persons, Judaic Christianity identified them with angels. And such and other strange concepts found expression in the form of exegesis, apocalypse, vision.<sup>5</sup> So too down the ages there have developed the idiosyncracies of local and national churches. Nor do such ongoing differences, once they are understood and explained, threaten the unity of faith. Rather they testify to its vitality. Doctrines that really are assimilated bear the stamp of those that assimilate them, and the absence of such an imprint would point to a merely perfunctory assimilation.

While it is the missionary that above all must grasp and accept the fact of cultural differences, still the matter has another application. It arises when one's own culture has been undergoing change. Thus the contemporary notion of culture is empirical. A culture is a set of meanings and values informing a common way of life, and there are as many cultures as there are distinct sets of such meanings and values.

However, this manner of conceiving culture is relatively recent. It is a product of empirical human studies.

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5) J. Daniélou, Théologie du judéo-christianisme, Tournai & Paris: Desclée, 1959; E.T. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1964. Les symboles chrétiens primitifs, Paris: du Seuil, 1961; E.T. London: Burns & Oates, and Baltimore: Helicon, 1964. Études d'exégèse judéo-chrétienne, Paris: Beauchesne, 1966.

Within less than one hundred years it has replaced an older, classicist view that had flourished for over two millenia. On the older view culture was conceived not empirically but <sup>norma</sup>tively. It was the opposite of barbarism. It was a matter of acquiring and assimilating the tastes and skills, the ideals, virtues, and ideas, that were pressed upon one in a good home and through a curriculum in the liberal arts. It stressed not facts but values. It could not but claim to be universalist. Its classics were immortal works of art, its philosophy was the perennial philosophy, its laws and structures were the deposit of the wisdom and the prudence of mankind. Classicist education was a matter of models to be imitated, of ideal characters to be emulated, of eternal verities and universally valid laws. It sought to produce not the mere specialist but the uomo universale that could turn his hand to anything and do it brilliantly.

The classicist is no pluralist. He knows that circumstances alter cases but he is far more deeply convinced that circumstances are somehow accidental and that, beyond them, there is some substance or kernel or root that fits in with classicist assumptions of stability, fixity, immutability. Things have their specific natures; these natures, at least in principle, are to be known adequately through the properties they possess and the laws they obey. Over and above the specific nature there is only individuation by matter, so that knowledge of one instance of a species is knowledge of <sup>any</sup> many instance. What is true of species in general, also is true of

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the human species, of the one faith coming to us through Jesus Christ, through the one charity given through the gift of the Holy Spirit. So it was concluded that the diversity of peoples, cultures, social arrangements can involve only a difference in the dress in which doctrines are expressed, but cannot involve any diversity in church doctrine itself.

Now later we shall find that doctrines named dogmas are permanent, but our conclusion will not rest on classicist assumptions. Again, we are not relativists, and so we acknowledge something substantial and common to human nature and human activity; but that we place not in eternally valid propositions but in the quite open structure of the human spirit—in the ever immanent and operative though unexpressed transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Finally, human individuals differ from one another not only through individuation by matter but also in their mentalities, their characters, their ways of life. For human concepts and human courses of action are products and expressions of acts of understanding, human understanding develops over time, such development is cumulative, and each cumulative development responds to the human and environmental conditions of its place and time. Classicism itself was one very notable and indeed noble instance of such cumulative development, but its claim to be the one culture of mankind can no longer be entertained.

4. Differentiations of Consciousness

To determine the starting-point, the process, the end-result of any particular development of doctrine calls for an exact historical investigation. To determine the legitimacy of any development calls for evaluational history; one has to ask whether or not the process was under the guidance of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. But the deeper issue is the more general question that asks how is it that developments are possible. How is it that mortal man can develop what he would not know unless God had revealed it?

The basis for an answer to this question lies in what I have already referred to as the differentiation of consciousness. Already in the present work I have said not a little on this topic. But here I have to return to it in somewhat fuller fashion, and I must apologize if I become repetitious.

A first differentiation arises in the process of growing up. The infant lives in a world of immediacy. The child moves exultingly into a world mediated by meaning. The common sense adult never doubts that the real world is the world mediated by meaning. But he may not be too aware that it is mediated by meaning and, when he turns his hand to philosophy, he finds it very difficult to objectify the criteria by which he knows his statements to be true, and he easily commits the blunder of saying that he knows by taking a good look.

Next, there is not just one world mediated by meaning for, as human intelligence develops, it can discover new tech-

niques in knowing. There is, however, a fundamental procedure that is practised spontaneously. I refer to it as common sense. There is the spontaneous process of teaching and learning that constantly goes forward in the individuals of a group. One notices, admires, tries to imitate, fails perhaps, watches or listens again, tries again and again till practice makes perfect. The result is an accumulation of insights that enable one both to deal successfully with recurrent situations and, as well, to notice what is novel in a new situation and to proceed to deal tentatively with that.

However, the situations that are recurrent vary with place and time. So there are as many brands of common sense as there are differing places and times. What is common to common sense is, not its content, but its procedure. In each of the very many brands there is a characteristic, self-correcting process of learning. Experience gives rise to inquiry and insight. Insight gives rise to speech and action. Speech and action sooner or later reveal their defects to give rise to further inquiry and fuller insight.

Thirdly, common sense is concerned with this world, with the immediate, the concrete, the particular. But God's gift of his love gives human living an orientation to what is transcendent in loveliness. This orientation manifests itself in uncounted manners and it can be distorted or rejected in as many more.

Fourthly, human knowing and feeling are incomplete without expression. The development, then, of symbols, of the

arts, of a literature is intrinsic to human advance. Already we have drawn the reader's attention to a rich but concise illustration of this by Bruno Snell in his The Discovery of Mind.<sup>6</sup>

Fifthly, there is the emergence of systematic meaning. Common sense knows the meanings of the words it employs, not because it possesses definitions that obtain omni et soli but, as an analyst would explain, because it understands how the words might be employed appropriately. It was no paradox, then, that neither Socrates nor his interlocutors were able to define words that they constantly employed. Rather Socrates was opening the way to systematic meaning which develops technical terms, assigns them their interrelations, constructs models, and adjusts them until there is reached some well-ordered and explanatory view of this or that realm of experience. There result two languages, two social groups, two worlds mediated by meaning. There is the world mediated by commonsense meaning and there is the world mediated by systematic meaning. There are the groups that can employ both ordinary and technical language, and the group that can employ only ordinary or common-sense language.

Sixthly, there is post-systematic literature. Within the culture and influencing its education there have been developed systematic views in logic, mathematics, science, philosophy. The systematic views have grounded a critique of earlier common sense, literature, religion. The educated classes

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6) Harvard University Press, 1953. Harper Torchbook, 1960.

accept such a critique. Their thinking is influenced by their cultural patrimony. But they themselves are not systematic thinkers. They may on occasion employ this or that technical term or logical technique. But their whole mode of thought is just the commonsense mode.

Seventhly, there is the emergence of method. It consists in the transposition of systematic meaning from a static to an ongoing, dynamic context. Originally systems were constructed to endure. They aimed at true and certain knowledge of what was necessarily so. But in modern times systems express, not what necessarily is so, but what intrinsically is hypothetical and in need of verification. Again, they express, not what is expected to be permanent, but what is expected to be revised and improved as further data are uncovered and better understanding is attained. Any given system, ancient or modern, is subject to logic. But the process from any given system to its successor is the concern of method.

Eighthly, there is the development of scholarship, of the skills of the linguist, the exegete, the historian. Unlike the natural scientist, the scholar does not aim at constructing a system, a set of universal principles and laws. He aims at coming to understand the common sense of another place and time. The understanding he reaches is itself of the same style and manner as his own original common sense. But its content is not the content of his own common sense but rather the content of the common sense of some distant land or some former time.

Ninthly, there is the development of post-scientific and post-scholarly literature. They stand to modern science and modern scholarship much as post-systematic literature stood to ancient system.

Tenthly, there is the exploration of interiority. It identifies in personal experience one's conscious and intentional acts and the dynamic relations that link them to one another. It offers an invariant basis for ongoing systems and a standpoint from which all the differentiations of human consciousness can be explored.

5. The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part One →

We have set forth a bare list of the differentiations of human consciousness. But these differentiations also characterize successive stages in cultural development and, as each earlier stage fails to foresee subsequent stages, the series as a whole may be named the ongoing discovery of mind. Finally, this series contributes not a little to an understanding of the development of doctrines, for doctrines have meaning within contexts, the ongoing discovery of mind changes the contexts, and so, if the doctrines are to retain their meaning within the new contexts, they have to be recast.

Accordingly, from a list of differentiations we have now to turn to a series of developments. We shall consider (1) the reinterpretation of symbolic apprehension, (2) philosophic purification of biblical anthropomorphism, (3) the occasional use of systematic meaning, (4) systematic theological doctrine,

- 5) church doctrine dependent on systematic theological doctrine, and in Part Two (6) the complexities of contemporary development.

By symbolic apprehension I here shall mean the apprehension of man and his world that is expressed in myth, saga, legend, magic, cosmogony, apocalypse, typology. The source of such apprehension, as already explained,<sup>7</sup> is the fact that prephilosophic and prescientific thought, while it can draw distinctions, cannot evolve and express an adequate account of verbal, notional, and real distinctions; further, it cannot distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the constitutive and effective functions of meaning; the result is that it constructs its world symbolically.

Such construction, like metaphor, was not untrue. Indeed, later notions of truth had not yet been developed. The Hebrew thought of truth in terms of fidelity, and when he spoke of doing the truth he meant doing what was right. For the Greek truth was alētheia, what was not unnoticed, what was unconcealed, what was conspicuous. For a long time and for many the Homeric tales were conspicuous indeed.

Yet even in an age confined to symbolic apprehension, there was the possibility of rejecting the false and approximating to what is true. This consisted in reinterpreting the symbolic construct. Approximately the same materials would be employed and the same question answered. But there would be additions, eliminations, rearrangements that gave a new answer to the old question.

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7) See above, p. 0000

Such a reinterpretation, it is claimed, was effected by the Old Testament writers. They could use the traditions of neighboring peoples to provide themselves with the possibility of expression. But what they expressed was something quite different. The God of Israel played his role in a very real human history. Questions about creation and the last day were concerns with the beginning and the end of the story. There was no mention of a primeval battle of the gods, of a divine begetting <sup>either</sup> of kings or of an elected people, no cult of the stars or of human sexuality, no sacralizing of the fruitfulness of nature.

Similarly in the New Testament, it is claimed, there did occur the use of symbolic representations also found in late Jewry and in Hellenistic Gnosticism. But these representations were used in a manner that kept them subordinate to Christian purposes and, when such subordination was lacking, they were submitted to the sharpest criticism and rejection. <sup>8</sup>

As reinterpretation occurs within the context of symbolic apprehension, so too it occurs within the context of philosophic concern. Xenophanes had noticed that men made their gods in their own image, and remarked that lions, horses, oxen would do likewise were they able to carve or to paint. It was the beginning of the long effort to conceive God, not on the analogy of matter, but on the analogy of spirit. So it was

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8) See Kurt Frör, Biblische Hermeneutik, München: ~~Kaisert~~ 1961, <sup>2</sup>1964, pp. 71 f.

t/l.c. That Clement of Alexandria bid Christians to abstain from anthropomorphic conceptions of God even though they were to be found in scripture.<sup>9</sup>

Next, the Greek councils mark the beginning of a movement to employ systematic meaning in church doctrine. Thus, the church in the fourth century was being divided by an issue that had not been formulated in New Testament times. It met the issue by speaking of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. This, of course, is not some speculative flight concerned with an apprehension of the divine being or essence. It quite simply means that what is true of the Father also is true of the Son, except that the Son is not the Father. As Athanasius put it: eadem de Filio quae de Patre dicuntur excepto Patris nomine.<sup>10</sup> Or as the Preface for the Mass on Trinity Sunday put it: Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu sancto sine differentia discretionis sentimus.

Again, the council of Chalcedon, in the second paragraph of its decree, introduced the terms, person and nature. But subsequent theology has made very mysterious what, in the decree itself, is quite simple and clear. For the first paragraph asserts that is one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ

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- 9) Clement, Stromata V, ¶¶, 68, 3; MG 9, 103 B; Stählin II, 371, 18 ff.; also V, ¶¶, 71, 4; MG 110 A; Stählin II, 374, 15.  
10) Athanasius, Orat. III c. Arianos, 4; MG 26, 329 A.

that is perfect in divinity and the same perfect in humanity, truly God and the same truly man, consubstantial with the Father in his divinity and the same consubstantial with us in his humanity, born of the Father before the ages in his divinity and these last days the same .... born of the Virgin Mary in his humanity.<sup>11</sup>

When in the next paragraph the decree speaks of person and natures, there is no doubt that the one person is the one and the same Son our Lord, and that the two natures are his divinity and his humanity. Still this statement can occur in a logical context, in an incipiently metaphysical context, and in a fully metaphysical context. When these contexts are not distinguished, when some of them are not even understood, Chalcedon's talk about person and nature can be made very mystifying.

There is a logical context. It simply operates on propositions. It may be illustrated by the account, given above, of the meaning of consubstantiality. It may be illustrated again by the later Christological doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. On this showing, Chalcedon mentions person and nature because it is aware that people may ask whether divinity and humanity are one and the same and, if not, how is it that the Son our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same. To forestall this doubt the council speaks of person and nature: the Son our Lord is one person; divinity and humanity are two natures.

There is an incipiently metaphysical context. About

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11) DS 301.

seventy-five years after Chalcedon, Byzantine theologians discovered that if Christ is one person with two natures then one of the natures must be personless. There followed not a little discussion of enhypostasia and anhypostasia, that is, of being a nature with and without being a person.<sup>12</sup>

There is a fully metaphysical context. It distinguishes verbal, notional, and real distinctions; it further distinguishes major and minor real distinctions; it divides minor real distinctions into the ordinary case and the analogical instance found in the mystery of the Incarnation; and, finally, it seeks the imperfect but very fruitful understanding of the mystery commended by the first Vatican council (DS 3016).

The fully metaphysical context emerges only in a late and fully self-conscious Scholasticism. But in its fundamental intention and style Scholasticism was a thorough-going effort to attain a coherent and orderly assimilation of the Christian tradition. The enormous differences between the two great figures, Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas, were the result of a century and a half of unremitting labors to assemble and classify the data, to work towards an understanding of them in commentaries, to digest them by establishing the existence of questions and by seeking solutions for them, and to ensure the coherence of multitudinous solutions by using the Aristotelian

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12) Recent and original: D.B. Evans, Leontius of Byzantium, An Origenist Christology, Dumbarton Oaks, 1970. Distributed by J.J. Augustin, Publisher, Locust Valley, New York.

corpus as a substructure.

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Now the greater part of this work resembles the medieval anticipations of modern science. What has often been described as a transition from the implicit to the explicit, really was a transition of Christian consciousness from a lesser to a fuller differentiation. That consciousness had been differentiated by a common sense, by religion, by an artistic and literary culture, and by the slight dose of systematic meaning found in the Greek councils. In the medieval period it began to acquire a strong dose of systematic meaning. Terms were defined, Problems were solved. What had been lived and spoken of in one way, now became the object of reflex thought that reorganized, correlated, explained. About the middle of the twelfth century, Peter Lombard worked out a precise, explanatory meaning for the old and ambiguous name, sacrament, and in the light of this meaning discovered that there were seven sacraments in Christian practice. On each of these seven, traditional doctrines were collected, ordered, clarified, presented.

Again, the middle ages inherited from Augustine his affirmation of both divine grace and human liberty. For a long time it was difficult to say that there existed any finite thing that was not God's free gift. Though it was obvious that grace named not everything but something special, still lists of graces properly so called not only differed from one another but also betrayed not a little arbitrariness. At the same time it was very difficult for a theologian to say what he meant by liberty. Philosophers could define it as immunity from necessity.

But theologians could not conceive liberty as free from the necessity of grace, or good without grace, or even evil with it. But what tortured the twelfth century found its solution in the thirteenth. About the year 1230 Philip the Chancellor completed a discovery that in the next forty years released a whole series of developments. The discovery was a distinction between two entitatively disproportionate orders: grace was above nature; faith was above reason; charity was above human good will; merit before God was above the good opinion of one's neighbors. This distinction and organization made it possible (1) to discuss the nature of grace without discussing liberty, (2) to discuss the nature of liberty without discussing grace, and (3) to work out the relations between grace and liberty. <sup>13</sup>

I have been sketching what may be considered the bright side of medieval theological development. I now must express some reservations. There can be little doubt that it was necessary for medieval thinkers to turn to some outside source

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13) On this process see my Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.

The significance of Philip's distinction was that the two orders constituted the definition of grace and thereby eliminated the earlier extrinsic view that conceived grace as the liberation of liberty.

to obtain a systematic substructure. There is little doubt that they could not do better than to turn to Aristotle. But today it is very evident that Aristotle has been superseded. Magnifi-  
cently he represented an early stage of human development — the emergence of systematic meaning. But he did not anticipate the later emergence of a method that envisaged an ongoing succession of systems. He did not envisage the later emergence of a Philologie that made its aim the historical reconstruction of the construction of mankind. He did not formulate the later ideal of a philosophy that was at once critical and historically-minded, that would cut to the roots of philosophic disputes, and that would ground a view that embraced the differentiations of human consciousness and the epochs of human history.

Not only has Aristotle been superseded, but also certain defects have become manifest. His ideal of science in terms of necessity has been set aside not only by modern empirical science but also by modern mathematics. Again, there is to his thinking a certain blurring of the difference between the common names developed by common sense and the technical terms elaborated by explanatory science. Both of these defects, magnified several times, reappear in the fourteenth and fifteenth century Scholasticism. The excessively rigorous ideal of science offers some explanation for the emergence first of scepticism and then of decadence. The blurred distinction between common names and technical terms has some responsibility for the verbalism for which Scholasticism has been so bitterly reproached.

Church doctrines and theological doctrines pertain to

different contexts. Church doctrines are the content of the church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and values that inform individual and collective Christian living. Theological doctrines are part of an academic discipline, concerned to know and understand the Christian tradition and to further its development. As the two contexts are directed to quite distinct ends, so too they are unequal in extent. Theologians raise many questions that are not mentioned in church doctrines. Again, theologians may differ from one another though they belong to the same church. In Catholic circles, finally, the relations of theological schools to one another and to church doctrines is a carefully mapped terrain. What are called theological notes and ecclesiastical censures not only distinguish matters of faith and theological opinions but also indicate a whole spectrum of intermediate positions. <sup>14</sup>

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 Now from the middle ages right up to Vatican II the doctrines of the Catholic Church have been deriving from theology a precision, a conciseness, and an organization that in earlier times ~~it~~ did not possess. In general, the meaning of these doctrines is not systematic but, commonly, it is post-systematic. One cannot infer what a church document must mean from one's knowledge of theology. At the same time any exact interpretation will presuppose a knowledge of theology. But it will also presuppose a knowledge of the stylus curiae. Finally, these presuppositions are necessary but not sufficient conditions.

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14) See E.J. Fortman, "Notes, theological", NCE 10, 523; and the systematic index to DS at H 1d and H 1bb, pp. 848 and 847.

To know what church documents actually do mean calls for research and exegesis in each case.

No doubt, what readers would wish to find here is an account of the legitimacy of this influence of theology on church doctrine. But that, of course, is not a methodological but a theological question. What the methodologist may do, however, is point to the different contexts in which such questions have been raised. First, prior to the emergence of historically-mindedness, one had the alternatives of anachronism and archaism. The anachronist attributed to scripture and to the Fathers an implicit grasp of what the Scholastics discovered. The archaist, on the other hand, regarded as a corruption any doctrine that was not to be found in the plain meaning either of scripture or of scripture and patristic tradition. Secondly, as historical knowledge increased, various theories of development were worked out and applied with greater or less success. There is, however, a third option: it would contend that there can be many kinds of developments and that, to know them, one has to study and analyze concrete historical processes while, to know their legitimacy, one has to turn to evaluational history and assign them their place in the dialectic of the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

But at this point it is necessary to interrupt our sketch of the ongoing discovery of mind and to introduce the notion of ongoing contexts.

6. Ongoing Contexts →

Already a distinction has been drawn between material and formal context. Thus the canon of the New Testament is the material context of each of the books in the New Testament: it tells which are the other highly privileged areas of data on early Christianity. On the other hand, a formal context is reached through investigation: data give rise to questions; questions to opposed answers; opposed answers to further questions and further opposed answers. The puzzle keeps increasing, until a discovery is made. Gradually, things begin to fit together. There may occur a period of rapidly increasing insight. Eventually further questions begin to yield decreasing returns. A viewpoint is attained, and, while further questions can be asked, answers to them would not significantly modify what has already been ascertained. There has been built up a formal context: a set of interwoven questions and answers that reveal the meaning of a text.

Ongoing context arises when a succession of texts express the mind of a single historical community. Such an ongoing context necessitates a distinction between prior and subsequent context. Thus a statement may intend to deal with one issue and to prescind from other, further issues. But settling one does not burke the others. Usually it contributes to a clearer grasp of the others and to a more urgent pressure for their solution. According to Athanasius the council of Nicea used a non-scriptural term, not to set a precedent, but

to meet an emergency. But the emergency lasted for some thirty-  
| five years and, some twenty years after it had subsided, the  
first council of Constantinople felt it necessary to answer in  
a non-technical manner whether only the Son or also the Holy  
Spirit was consubstantial with the Father. Fifty years later at  
Ephesus, it was necessary to clarify Nicea by affirming that it  
was one and the same that was born of the Father and also born  
of the Virgin Mary. Twenty-one years later it was necessary to  
add that one and the same could be both eternal and temporal,  
both immortal and mortal, because he had two natures. Over  
two centuries later there was added the further clarification  
that the divine person with two natures also had two operations  
and two wills.

Such is the ongoing context of church doctrines that  
did not exist prior to Nicea but, bit by bit, came into existence  
subsequently to Nicea. It does not state what was intended at  
Nicea. It does state what resulted from Nicea and what became  
in fact the context within which Nicea was to be understood.

As one may distinguish prior and subsequent stages in  
an ongoing context, so one ongoing context may be related to  
another. Of these relations the commonest are derivation and  
interaction. Thus, the ongoing context that runs from Nicea to  
the third council of Constantinople derives from the doctrines  
of the first three centuries of Christianity but differs from  
them inasmuch as it employs a post-systematic mode of thought  
and expression. Again, the ongoing context of conciliar doc-  
trines gave rise to a distinct but dependent context of theological  
doctrines. This presupposed the councils, distinguished Christ

as God and Christ as man, and raised such questions as follow. Could Christ as man sin? Did he feel concupiscence? Was he in any way ignorant? Did he have sanctifying grace? To what extent? Did he have immediate knowledge of God? Did he know everything pertaining to his mission? Did he have freedom of choice?

Again, the theological context derived from the Greek councils (expanded in the medieval schools to envisage the whole of scripture and tradition. It was not only ongoing, collaborative, and methodical but also dialectical. It was a context that embraced mutually opposed schools of thought, that came to distinguish between opposition in theological doctrine and opposition in church doctrine, that agreed to differ on the former and declined to differ on the latter.

Finally, interacting contexts are represented by the context of theological doctrines and the context of church doctrines from the medieval period up to Vatican II. The theologians were under the influence of the church doctrines on which they reflected. Inversely, without the theologians, the church doctrines would not have had their post-systematic precision, conciseness, and organization.

7. The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part Two

The medieval decision to use the Aristotelian corpus as a substructure involved an integration of theology with a philosophy and with a detailed account of the material universe. Such an integration offered the advantage of a unified world-view,

but neither classicist culture nor Aristotelian thought inculcated the principle that unified world-views are subject to notable changes.

For centuries the Christian's image of himself and of his world was drawn from the first chapters of Genesis, from Jewish apocalyptic and Ptolemaic astronomy, and from the theological doctrines of the creation and immortality of each human soul. That image has been assaulted by novel scientific traditions stemming from Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Freud, Heisenberg. It has been the great merit of Teilhard de Chardin to have recognized the Christian's need of a coherent image of himself in his world and to have contributed not a little towards meeting that need.

Once it was held that science was certain knowledge of things through their causes. Too often churchmen have presupposed that that definition was applicable to modern science. But modern science is not certain but probable. It attends to data rather than things. It speaks of causes but it means correlations and not end, agent, matter, form.

Once it was held that science was concerned with the universal and the necessary. Today in mathematics necessity is a marginal notion: conclusions indeed follow necessarily from their premisses; but basic premisses are freely chosen postulates and not necessary truths. In the early decades of this century scientists still spoke of the necessary laws of nature and even of the iron laws of economics. Quantum theory and Keynesian economics have put an end to that.

Scholarship once made its aim the attainment of

humanistic eloquence. But early nineteenth-century Philologie set itself the goal of reconstructing the constructions of mankind. Its initial successes were in the fields of classical studies and of European history. But it has long since moved into the fields of biblical, patristic, and medieval studies. Its works are specialized, collaborative, ongoing, massive. What formerly was supposed to lie within the competence of a single dogmatic theologian, now can be undertaken only by a very large team.

There was a time when necessary principles were the acknowledged basis of philosophy, and these principles were identified with the self-evident propositions that were the basic premisses for philosophic deductions. Now it is true that there exist analytic propositions: if one defines A by the possession of a relation, R, to B, then there cannot be an A without a relation, R, to B. But it is equally true that there need exist no A with a relation, R, to B. For finite existence is known, not by defining terms, not by constructing analytic propositions, but by a process named verification.

Aristotle and his followers acknowledged special sciences that deal with beings of determinate kinds and a general science that dealt with being as being. Now the natural and human sciences aim at accounting for all the data of sense. Accordingly, if there is to be any general science, its data will have to be the data of consciousness. So there is effected the turn to interiority. The general science is, first, cognitional theory (what are you doing when you are knowing?), secondly,

epistemology (why is doing that knowing?), and thirdly metaphysics (what do you know when you do it?). Such general science will be the general case of the methods of the special sciences and not, as in Aristotelianism, the general case of the content of the special sciences.

The foregoing shift to interiority was essayed in various manners from Descartes through Kant to the nineteenth-century German idealists. But there followed a still more emphatic shift from knowledge to faith, will, conscience, decision, action in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Newman, Nietzsche, Blondel, the personalists, and the existentialists. The direction of this shift is correct in the sense that the fourth level of intentional consciousness - the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action - sublates the prior levels of experiencing, understanding, judging. It goes beyond them, sets up a new principle and type of operations, directs them to a new goal but, so far from dwarfing them, preserves them and brings them to a far fuller fruition.

Not only does the fourth level sublate the previous three, but also the previous three differ notably from the speculative intellect that was supposed to grasp self-evident and necessary truths. Such a speculative intellect could and did claim complete autonomy: bad will could hardly interfere with the apprehension of self-evident and necessary truth or with the necessary conclusions following from such truth. In fact, however, what human intelligence grasps in data and expresses in concepts is, not a necessarily relevant intelligi-

bility, but only a possibly relevant intelligibility. Such intelligibility is intrinsically hypothetical and so always in need of a further process of checking and verifying before it be asserted as de facto relevant to the data in hand. So it has come about that modern science is under the guidance of method, and the method that is selected and followed results not only from experiencing, understanding, and judging, but also from a decision.

I have been indicating in summary fashion a series of fundamental changes that have come about in the last four centuries and a half. They modify man's image of himself in his world, his science and his conception of science, his history and his conception of history, his philosophy and his conception of philosophy. They involve three basic differentiations of consciousness, and all three are quite beyond the horizon of ancient Greece and medieval Europe.

These changes have, in general, been resisted by churchmen for two reasons. The first reason commonly has been that churchmen had no real apprehension of the nature of these changes. The second reason has been that these changes commonly have been accompanied by a lack of intellectual conversion and so were hostile to Christianity.

Modern science is one thing and the extra-scientific opinions of scientists are another. Among the extra-scientific opinions of scientists up to the acceptance of quantum theory was a mechanist determinism that misrepresented nature and

excluded human freedom and responsibility.<sup>15</sup>

Modern history is one thing and the philosophic assumptions of historians are another. H.G. Gadamer has examined the assumptions of Schleiermacher, Ranke, Droysen, and Dilthey.<sup>16</sup> In more summary fashion Kurt Frör has stated that the work of historians in the earlier part of the nineteenth century was marked by a mixture of philosophic speculation and empirical research, and that what eliminated the speculation in the later part of the century was an ever more influential positivism.<sup>17</sup> The resultant historicism penetrated into biblical studies and there the resounding reactions were the work of Barth and Bultmann. Both acknowledged the significance of moral and religious conversion. In Barth this appeared in his contention that, while the bible was to be read historically, it also was to be read religiously; and religious reading was not merely a matter of pious feelings in the reader; it had also to attend to the realities of which the bible spoke.<sup>18</sup> In Bultmann, on the

15) For an account of the scientists' philosophic successor to mechanist determinism, see P.A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, The Hague: ~~Nijhoff~~, 1965.

16) H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: ~~Mohr~~, 1960, pp. 162 ff.

17) K. Frör, Biblische Hermeneutik, München: ~~Kaiser~~, 1964, pp. 28.

18) Ibid., pp. 31 f.

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other hand, religious and moral conversion is the existenziell response to the appeal or challenge of the kerygma. But such a response is a subjective event, and its objectification results in myth.<sup>19</sup> While Bultmann is no ordinary positivist, for he knows about verstehen, still for him biblical study falls into two parts: there is the scientific part that is independent of religious belief; and there is the religious part that penetrates beneath the mythical objectifications of the bible to the subjective religious events to which it testifies.

In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion. Only intellectual conversion can remedy Barth's fideism. Only intellectual conversion can remove the secularist notion of scientific exegesis represented by Bultmann. Still intellectual conversion alone is not enough. It has to be made explicit in a philosophic and theological method, and such an explicit method has to include a critique both of the method of science and of the method of scholarship.

8. The Development of Doctrines

Already I have suggested that there is not some one manner or even some limited set of manners in which doctrines develop. In other words the intelligibility proper to developing

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19) Ibid., pp. 34 ff. On the dualism in Bultmann's exegesis see Paul Minear, "The Transcendence of God and Biblical Hermeneutics," Proceedings, Cath. Theol. Soc. Amer., 23 (1968), 5 f.

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doctrines is the intelligibility immanent in historical process. One knows it, not by a priori theorizing, but by a posteriori research, interpretation, history, dialectic, and the decision of foundations.

One cluster of manners, in which doctrines develop, I have named the ongoing discovery of mind. When consciousness constructs its world symbolically, it advances by reinterpreting traditional materials. When it leans towards philosophy, a Xenophanes or a Clement of Alexandria will rule anthropomorphism out of man's apprehension of the divine. The resulting purely spiritual apprehension of God will create a tension between biblical and later Christology, and the technical means available in a post-systematic culture may be employed to clarify the faith. The use of such technical means opens the door to a theology in which systematic meaning becomes predominant, and such theology in its turn can give to church doctrines a precision, a conciseness, and an organization that otherwise they would not possess. Finally, such a general involvement in the systematic can be undercut by the methodical, the scholarly, and the modern philosophic differentiations of consciousness to present the church with the dilemma of reverting to an antenicene Christology or of advancing to a thoroughly modern position.

However, the foregoing cluster, while it envisages not a little of doctrinal development, is not to be considered the whole story. Often enough development is dialectical. The truth is discovered because a contrary error has been asserted.

Again, doctrines are not just doctrines. They are

constitutive both of the individual Christian and of the Christian community. They can strengthen or burden the individual's allegiance. They can unite or disrupt. They can confer authority and power. They can be associated with what is congenial or what is alien to a given polity or culture. It is not in some vacuum of pure spirit but under concrete historical conditions and circumstances that developments occur, and a knowledge of such conditions and circumstances is not irrelevant in the evaluational history that decides on the legitimacy of developments.

In closing this brief section, I note Prof. Geiselman's view that the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption of our Lady differ from those defined in ecumenical councils. The latter settle controverted issues. The former repeat what was already taught and celebrated in the whole Catholic church. Accordingly they are named by him "cultic".<sup>20</sup> Their sole effect was that the solemn teaching office now proclaims what formerly was proclaimed by the ordinary teaching office. Perhaps I might suggest that human psychology and specifically the refinement of human feelings is the area to be explored in coming to understand the development of Marian doctrines.

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20) J.R. Geiselman, "Dogma", Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe, edited by H. Fries, München: Kösel, 1962  
I, 231.

9. The Permanence of Dogmas

The permanence of the meaning of dogmas was taught in the constitution, Dei Filius, promulgated in the first Vatican council. This occurs in the last paragraph of the last chapter of the decree (DS 3020) and in the appended canon (DS 3043). Just what was meant, supposed, implied in this affirmation of permanent meaning, comes to light from a study of the constitution itself.

To the fourth and final chapter there were appended three canons. They reveal that the thrust of this chapter was directed against a rationalism that considered mysteries non-existent, that proposed to demonstrate the dogmas, that defended scientific conclusions opposed to church doctrines, that claimed the church had no right to pass judgment on scientific views, and that granted science the competence to reinterpret the church's dogmas (DS 3041 - 3043).

To deal with such rationalism the council had distinguished (1) the natural light of reason, (2) faith, (3) reason illumined by faith, and (4) reason operating beyond its competence. Something must be said on each of these.

Reason, then, or the natural light of reason has a range of objects within its reach (DS 3015). It can know with certitude of the existence of God (DS 3004), and it can know some but not all of the truths revealed by God (DS 3005, 3015). It should accept divine revelation (DS 3008), and such acceptance is in harmony with its nature (DS 3009). In no way does the church prohibit human disciplines from using their proper prin-

ciples and methods within their own fields (DS 3019).

Faith is a supernatural virtue by which we believe to be true what God has revealed, not because we apprehend the intrinsic truth of what has been revealed, but because of the authority of God who reveals and can neither deceive nor be deceived (DS 3008). By faith that is both divine and catholic there are to be believed all that has been revealed by God in scripture or tradition and, as well, has been proposed to be believed as revealed either in a solemn pronouncement by the church or in the exercise of its ordinary and universal teaching office (DS 3011). Among the principal objects of faith are the mysteries hidden in God, which, were they not revealed, could not be known by us (DS 3015, cf. 3005).

Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, piously, soberly, reaches with God's help some extremely fruitful understanding of the mysteries. Such understanding rests on the analogy of things known naturally and on the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with man's last end. But it never becomes capable of grasping them after the fashion it can understand the truths that lie within its proper range. For the divine mysteries by their very nature so exceed created intellect that, even given in revelation and accepted by faith, they remain as it were wrapped in the veil of faith (DS 3016).

It would seem to be the understanding attained by reason when illumined by faith that is praised in the quotation from Vincent of Lerina. For such understanding is of the mystery,

and not of some human substitute, and so from the nature of the case it must be "... in suo dumtaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia" (DS 3020).

In contrast there is reason that steps beyond its proper bounds to invade and disturb the realm of faith (DS 3019). For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed as some sort of philosophic discovery to be perfected by human talent. It is a divine deposit, given to the spouse of Christ, to be guarded faithfully and declared infallibly. Hence there is ever to be retained that meaning of the sacred dogmas that once was declared by the church. From that meaning there is to be no departure under the pretext of some profounder understanding (DS 3020).

In the corresponding canon there is condemned anyone that says it is possible that eventually with the progress of science there may have to be given to the dogmas propounded by the church a meaning other than that which the church understands and understood (DS 3043).

First, then, there is affirmed a permanence of meaning: "... is sensus perpetuo est retinendus ..... nec umquam ab eo recipiendum.... in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia". (DS 3020). " ... <sup>re</sup>sensus tribuendus sit alius ..." (DS 3043).

Secondly, the permanent meaning is the meaning declared by the church (DS 3020), the meaning which the church understood and understands (DS 3043).

Thirdly, this permanent meaning is the meaning of dogmas

(DS 3020, 3043). But are dogmas revealed truths or revealed mysteries? The difference is that revealed mysteries lie beyond the competence of reason, but some revealed truths do not (DS 3005, 3015).

It would seem that the dogmas of DS 3020 and 3043 refer to the church's declarations of revealed mysteries. For the recurring contrast of the fourth chapter is between reason and faith. Only in the first paragraph (DS 3015) is there any mention of truths that are both of reason and of faith. Human disciplines would not be stepping beyond their proper bounds if they treated such truths (DS 3019). Nor can they be denied the status of a philosophic discovery to be perfected by human talent (DS 3020). Again, truths within reason's competence would seem capable of being known more accurately with the progress of science (DS 3043). Finally, it is only the mysteries that transcend the intelligence of the human mind (DS 3005), that stand beyond created intellect (DS 3016), that are accepted simply on God's authority (DS 3008), that could not be known unless they were revealed (DS 3015), that can admit no more than an analogous and imperfect understanding by human reason and then only when illumined by faith (DS 3016), that accordingly can claim to stand beyond the status of the products of human history.

Fourthly, the meaning of the dogma is not apart from a verbal formulation, for it is a meaning declared by the church. However, the permanence attaches to the meaning and not to the formula. To retain the same formula and give it a new meaning is precisely what the third canon excludes (DS 3043). 2

Fifthly, it seems better to speak of the permanence of the meaning of dogmas rather than of its immutability. For permanence is the meaning of "... perpetuo retinendus ... numquam recedendum... (ne) sensus tribuendus sit alius...." Again, it is permanence rather than immutability that is meant when there is desired an ever better understanding of the same dogma, the same meaning, the same pronouncement.

To conclude, there are two grounds for affirming the permanence of the meaning of revealed mysteries. There is the causa cognoscendi: what God has revealed and the church has infallibly declared, is true. What is true, is permanent: the meaning it possessed in its own context can never be denied truthfully.

There is also the causa essendi. The meaning of a dogma is not a datum but a truth. It is not a human truth but the revelation of a mystery hidden in God. One is denying divine transcendence if one fancies man has at his disposal the evidence that would enable him to substitute some other meaning for the meaning that has been revealed.

Such I believe is the doctrine of Vatican I on the permanence of the meaning of dogmas. It presupposes (1) that there exist mysteries hidden in God that man could not know unless they were revealed, (2) that they have been revealed, and (3) that the church has infallibly declared the meaning of what has been revealed. These presuppositions also are church doctrines. Their exposition and defence are tasks, not of a methodologist, but of a theologian.

10. The Historicity of Dogmas →

The constitution, Dei Filius, of Vatican I was occasioned by two currents in nineteenth-century Catholic thought. There were traditionalists that had little trust in human reason, and there were semi-rationalists who, while not denying the truths of faith, tended to place them within the competence of reason. Among the latter were Anton Günther, whose speculations attracted a wide following but were rejected by the Holy See (DS 2828 ff.), and Jakob Frohschammer, whose views on human perfectibility were no more acceptable (DS 2850 ff.; cf. 2908 f.). Such views were further pursued by Cardinal Franzelin both in the votum he presented to the preconconciliar committee<sup>21</sup> and in the schema he presented for discussion in the early days of Vatican I.<sup>22</sup>

But as earlier we remarked about Nicea, so now we must repeat about Vatican I that its statements lie not only within the prior context of the thought of 1870 but also within

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21) The votum has been published by Hermann J. Pottmeyer in his work, Der Glaube vor dem Anspruch der Wissenschaft, Freiburg: Herder, 1968. See the appendix, especially pp. 50\*, 51\*, 54\*, 55\*. There is a valuable discussion of DS 3020 and 3043 on pp. 431-456.

22) See Chapters V, VI, XI, XII, and XIV of Franzelin's schema in Mansi 50, 62 - 69, and the abundant annotations, Mansi 50, 83 ff.

the consequent context that attends to issues from which Vatican I saw fit to prescind. For Günther and Frohschammer in their different ways were concerned with historicity and specifically with the historicity of church doctrines. Vatican I was content to select an aspect of their views that was unacceptable. But it did not attempt to deal with the underlying issue of the historicity of dogma that since has come into prominence. We must ask, then, whether the doctrine of Vatican I on the permanence of the meaning of dogmas can be reconciled with the historicity that characterizes human thought and action.

Briefly, the theoretical premisses from which there follows the historicity of human thought and action are (1) that human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses of actions are expressions of human understanding, (2) that human understanding develops over time and, as it develops, human concepts, theories, affirmations, courses of action change, (3) that such change is cumulative, and (4) that the cumulative changes in one place or time are not to be expected to coincide with those in another.

However, there is a notable difference between the fuller understanding of data and the fuller understanding of a truth. When data are more fully understood, there result the emergence of a new theory and the rejection of previous theories. Such is the ongoing process in the empirical sciences. But when a truth is more fully understood, it is still the same truth that is being understood. It is true that the sum of two and two is four. That same truth has been known in quite different contexts, say, by the ancient Babylonians, by the Greeks, and

by modern mathematicians. But it is better understood by the modern mathematicians than it was by the Greeks, and in all likelihood it was better understood by the Greek thinkers than by the Babylonians.

Now the dogmas are permanent in their meaning because they are not just data but expressions of truths and, indeed, of truths that, were they not revealed by God, could not be known by man. Once they are revealed and believed, they can be better and better understood. But that ever better understanding is of the revealed truth and not of something else.

Nor is this opposed to the historicity of the dogmas. For dogmas are statements. Statements have meaning only within their contexts. Contexts are ongoing, and ongoing contexts are related principally by derivation and by interaction. Truths can be revealed in one culture and preached in another. They may be revealed in the styles and fashion of one differentiation of consciousness, defined by the church in the style and fashion of another differentiation, and understood by theologians in a third. What permanently is true, is the meaning of the dogma in the context in which it was defined. To ascertain that meaning there have to be deployed the resources of research, interpretation, history, dialectic. To state that meaning today one proceeds through foundations, doctrines, and systematics to communications. Communications finally are to each class in each culture and to each of the various differentiations of consciousness.

The permanence of the dogmas, then, results from the

fact that they express revealed mysteries. Their historicity, on the other hand, results from the facts that (1) statements have meanings only in their contexts and (2) contexts are ongoing and ongoing contexts are multiple.

What is opposed to the historicity of the dogmas is, not their permanence, but classicist assumptions and achievements. Classicism assumed that culture was to be conceived not empirically but normatively, and it did all it could to bring about one, universal, permanent culture. What ended classicist assumptions was critical history. What builds the bridges between the many expressions of the faith is a methodical theology.

11. Pluralism and the Unity of Faith →

There are three sources of pluralism. First, linguistic, social, and cultural differences give rise to different brands of common sense. Secondly, consciousness may be undifferentiated or it may be differentiated to deal expertly with some combination of such different realms as common sense, transcendence, beauty, system, method, scholarship, and philosophic interiority. Thirdly, in any individual at any given time there may exist the abstract possibility, or the beginnings, or greater or less progress, or high development of intellectual or moral or religious conversion.

There are two ways in which the unity of the faith may be conceived. On classicist assumptions there is just one culture. That one culture is not attained by the simple faithful, the people, the natives, the barbarians. None the less,

career is always open to talent. One enters upon such a career by diligent study of the ancient Latin and Greek authors. One pursues such a career by learning Scholastic philosophy and theology. One aims at high office by becoming proficient in canon law. One succeeds by winning the approbation and favor of the right personages. Within this set-up the unity of faith is a matter of everyone subscribing to the correct formulae.

Such classicism, however, was never more than the shabby shell of Catholicism. The real root and ground of unity is being in love with God - the fact that God's love has flooded our inmost hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom<sub>5</sub>, 5). The acceptance of this gift both constitutes religious conversion and leads to moral and even intellectual conversion.

Further, religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state of mind and heart. Essential to it is an intersubjective, interpersonal component. Besides the gift of the Spirit within, there is the outward encounter with Christian witness. That witness testifies that of old in many ways God has spoken to us through the prophets but in this latest age through his Son (Heb<sub>1</sub>, 1.2).

Thirdly, the function of church doctrines lies within the function of Christian witness. For the witness is to the mysteries revealed by God and, for Catholics, infallibly declared by the church. The meaning of such declarations lies beyond the vicissitudes of human historical process. But the contexts, within which such meaning is grasped, and so the

manner, in which such meaning is expressed, vary both with cultural differences and with the measure in which human consciousness is differentiated.

Such variation is familiar to us from the past. According to Vatican II revelation occurred not through words alone but through words and deeds.<sup>23</sup> The apostolic preaching was addressed not only to Jews in the thought-forms of Spätjudentum but also to Greeks in their language and idiom. While the New Testament writings spoke more to the heart than to the head, the Christological councils aimed solely at formulating the truths that were to guide one's mind and one's lips. When Scholastic theology recast Christian belief into a mould derived from Aristotle, it was deserting neither divine revelation nor scripture nor the councils. And if modern theologians were to transpose medieval theory into the categories derived from contemporary interiority and its real correlates, they would be doing for our age what the greater Scholastics did for theirs.

In the past, then, there has existed a notable pluralism of expression. Currently in the church there is quietly disappearing the old classicist insistence on worldwide uniformity, and there is emerging a pluralism of manners in which Christian meaning and Christian values are communicated. To preach the gospel to all nations is to preach it to every class in every culture in the manner that accords with the assimilative powers of that class and culture.

For the most part such preaching will be to a

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23) Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, I, 2.

consciousness that is little differentiated. So it will have to be as multiform as are the diverse brands of common sense generated by the many languages, social forms, and cultural meanings and values of mankind. In each case the preacher will have to know the brand of common sense to which he speaks, and he will have ever to keep in mind that, when consciousness is only slightly differentiated, coming to know does not occur apart from acting.

But if the faith is to be nourished in those with little education, it does not follow that the educated are to be neglected. Now just as the only way to understand another's brand of common sense is to come to understand the way in which he or she would understand, speak, act in any of the series of situations that commonly arise in his <sup>or her</sup> experience, so too the only way to understand another's differentiation of consciousness is to bring about that differentiation in oneself.

Further an exact grasp of another's mentality is possible only if one attains the same differentiation and lack of differentiation. For each differentiation of consciousness involves a certain remodelling of common sense. Initially common sense assumes its own omniscience because it just cannot know better. But as successive differentiations of consciousness occur, more and more realms are controlled in the appropriate fashion and so are removed from the competence of common sense. Clarity and adequacy increase by bounds. One's initial common sense is purged of its simplifications, its metaphors, its myths, and its mystifications. With the attainment

of full differentiation common sense is confined entirely to its proper realm of the immediate, the particular, the concrete.

However, there are many routes to full attainment and many varieties of partial attainment. Preaching the gospel to all means (preaching it in the manner appropriate to each of the varieties of partial attainment and, no less, to full attainment. It was to meet the exigences of proper to the beginnings of systematic meaning that Clement of Alexandria denied that the anthropomorphisms of scripture were to be taken literally. It was to meet the exigences of fully systematic meaning that medieval Scholasticism sought a coherent account of all the truths of faith and reason. It was to meet the exigences of contemporary scholarship that the second Vatican council decreed that the interpreter of scripture had to determine the meaning intended by the biblical writer and accordingly had to do so by understanding the literary conventions and cultural conditions of that writer's place and time.

The church, then, following the example of St. Paul, becomes all things to all men. It communicates what God has revealed both in the manner appropriate to the various differentiations of consciousness and, above all, in the manner appropriate to each of the almost endless brands of common sense. Still, these many modes of speech involve no more than a pluralism of communications for, though they are many, still all can be in eodem dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia.

Still, becoming all to all, even though it involves no more than a pluralism of communications, none the less is

not without its difficulties. On the one hand, it demands a many-sided development in those that govern or teach. On the other hand, every achievement is apt to be challenged by those that fail to achieve. People with little notion of modern scholarship can urge that attending to the literary genre of biblical writings is just a fraudulent device for rejecting the plain meaning of scripture. Those with no taste for systematic meaning will keep repeating that it is better to feel compunction than to define it, even if those that attempt definition insist that one can hardly define what one does not experience. Those, finally, whose consciousness is unmitigated by any tincture of systematic meaning, will be unable to grasp the meaning of such dogmas as Nicea and they may gayly leap to the conclusion that what has no meaning for them is just meaningless.

Such difficulties suggest certain rules. First, because the gospel is to be preached to all, there must be sought the modes of representation and of expression appropriate to communicating revealed truth both to every brand of common sense and to every differentiation of consciousness. Secondly, no one, simply because of his faith, is obliged to attain a more fully differentiated consciousness. Thirdly, no one, simply because of his faith, is obliged to refrain from attaining an ever more differentiated consciousness. Fourthly, anyone may strive to express his faith in the manner appropriate to his differentiation of consciousness. Fifthly, no one should pass judgment on matters he does not understand, and no one with a less or a differently differentiated consciousness is capable

of understanding accurately what is said by a person with a more fully differentiated consciousness.

Such pluralism will have little appeal to persons with a propensity to over-simplification. But the real menace to unity of faith does not lie either in the many brands of common sense or the many differentiations of human consciousness. It lies in the absence of intellectual or moral or religious conversion. The pluralism that results from lack of conversion is particularly perilous in three manners. First, when the absence of conversion occurs in those that govern the church or teach in its name. Secondly, when, as at present, there is going forward in the church a movement out of classicist and into modern culture. Thirdly, when persons with partially differentiated consciousness not only do not understand one another but also so extol system or method or scholarship or interiority or slightly advanced prayer as to set aside achievement and block development in the other four.

12. The Autonomy of Theology →

What Karl Rahner refers to as Denzingertheologie, the late Pierre Charles of Louvain named Christian positivism. It conceived the function of the theologian to be that of a propagandist for church doctrines. He did his duty when he repeated, explained, defended just what had been said in church documents. He had no contribution of his own to make and so there could be no question of his possessing any autonomy in making it.

Now it is true, of course, that theology is neither

a source of divine revelation nor an addition to inspired scripture nor an authority that promulgates church doctrines. It is also true that a Christian theologian should be an authentic human being and an authentic Christian and so will be second to none in his acceptance of revelation, scripture, and his church doctrine. But these premisses do not lead to the conclusion that a theologian is just a parrot with nothing to do but repeat what has already been said.

From the history of theology it is clear that theologians treat many matters which church doctrines do not treat and that they have been the first to propound theological doctrines that, particularly in the Catholic church, provided the background and some part of the content of subsequent church doctrines. So it is that in our chapter on Functional Specialties we drew a distinction between religion and reflection on religion, identified such reflection with theology, and found theology so highly specialized that over and above field specialization and subject specialization we distinguished eight functional specialties.

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The theologian, then, has a contribution of his own to make. Consequently, he possesses some autonomy, for otherwise he could make no contribution that was his own. Moreover, on the present account of theological method, there has been worked out the criterion that is to guide the theologian in the exercise of his autonomy. For the functional specialty, dialectic, assembles, classifies, analyzes the conflicting views of evaluators, historians, interpreters, researchers. The functional

specialty, foundations, determines which views are the positions that proceed from the presence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, and which are the counter-positions that reveal its absence. In other words, each theologian will judge the authenticity of the authors of views, and he will do so by the touchstone of his own authenticity. This, of course, is far from a foolproof method. But it will tend to bring the authentic together; it will also tend to bring the unauthentic together and, indeed, to highlight their unauthenticity. The contrast between the two will not be lost on men of good will.

As autonomy calls for a criterion, so too it demands responsibility. Theologians are to be responsible for keeping their own house in order, for the influence they may exert on the faithful, and for the influence theological doctrine may have on church doctrine. They will fulfill this responsibility the more effectively, I believe, if they turn their thoughts to the topic of method and if, instead of waiting for the perfect method to be provided them, they adopt the best available and, in using it, come to discern its shortcomings and remedy its defects.

Now it may be thought that one endangers the authority of church officials if one acknowledges that theologians have a contribution of their own to make, that they possess a certain autonomy, that they have at their disposal a strictly theological criterion, and that they have grave responsibilities, that will all the more effectively be fulfilled by adopting some method and working gradually towards improving it.

But I think the authority of church officials has  
~~nothing to do with~~

nothing to lose and much to gain from the proposal. There is no loss in acknowledging the plain historical fact that theology has a contribution to make. There is much to be gained by recognizing autonomy and pointing out that it implies responsibility. For responsibility leads to method, and method if effective makes police work superfluous. Church officials have the duty to protect the religion on which theologians reflect, but it is up to the theologians themselves to carry the burden of making theological doctrine as much a matter of consensus as any other long-standing academic discipline.

There is a further aspect to the matter. Though a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious and church doctrines, I have written a chapter on doctrines without subscribing to any but the doctrine about doctrine set forth in the first Vatican council. I have done so deliberately, and my purpose has been ecumenical. I desire it to be as simple as possible for theologians of different allegiance to adapt my method to their uses. Even though theologians start from different church confessions, even though their methods are analogous rather than similar, still that analogy will help all to discover how much they have in common and it will tend to bring to light how greater agreement might be achieved.

Finally, a distinction between dogmatic theology and doctrinal theology may serve to bring to focus points that repeatedly we have attempted to make. Dogmatic theology is classicist. It tends to take it for granted that on each issue there is one and only one true proposition. It is out to deter-

mine which are the unique propositions that are true. In contrast, doctrinal theology is historically-minded. It knows that the meaning of a proposition becomes determinate only within a context. It knows that contexts vary with the varying brands of common sense, with the evolution of cultures, with the differentiations of human consciousness, and with the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. In consequence, it distinguished between the religious apprehension of a doctrine and the theological apprehension of the same doctrine. The religious apprehension is through the context of one's own brand of common sense, of one's own evolving culture, of one's undifferentiation or differentiation of consciousness, of one's own unceasing efforts to attain intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. In contrast, the theological apprehension of doctrines is historical and dialectical. It is historical inasmuch as it grasps the many different contexts in which the same doctrine was expressed in different manners. It is dialectical inasmuch as it discerns the difference between positions and counter-positions and seeks to develop the positions and to reverse the counter-positions.