

CHAPTER ELEVENFOUNDATIONS

8 | In Chapter Five on functional specialties, theology was conceived as reflection on religion and it was said to go forward in two phases. In a first, mediating phase, theological reflection ascertained what had been the ideals, the beliefs, the performance of the representatives of the religion under investigation. But in a second, mediated phase, theological reflection took a much more personal stance. It was not longer to be content to narrate what others proposed, believed, did. It had to pronounce which doctrines were true, how they could be reconciled with one another and with the conclusions of science, philosophy, history, and how they could be communicated appropriately to the members of each class in every culture.

It is with the basis of this much more personal stance that the fifth functional specialty, foundations, is concerned. Accordingly, we are seeking the foundations, not of the whole of theology, but of the three last specialties, doctrines, systematics, and communications. We are seeking not the whole foundation of these specialties — for they obviously will depend on research, interpretation, history, and dialectic -- but just the added foundation needed to move from the indirect discourse that sets forth the convictions and opinions of others to the direct discourse that states what is so.

1. Foundational Reality →

Foundational reality, as distinct from its expression, is conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. Normally it is intellectual conversion as the fruit of both religious and moral conversion; it is moral conversion as the fruit of religious conversion; and it is religious conversion as the fruit of God's gift of his grace.

Such conversion is operative, not only in the functional specialty, foundations, but also in the phase of mediating theology, in research, interpretation, history, and dialectic. However, in this earlier phase conversion is not a prerequisite; anyone can do research, interpret, write history, line up opposed positions. Again, when conversion is present and operative, its operation is implicit: it can have its occasion in interpretation, in doing history, in the confrontation of dialectic; but it does not constitute an explicit, established, universally recognized criterion of proper procedure in these specialties. Finally, while dialectic does reveal the polymorphism of human consciousness - the deep and unreconcilable oppositions on religious, moral, and intellectual issues — still it does no more: it does not take sides. It is the person that takes sides, and the side that he takes will depend on the fact that he has or has not been converted.

At its real root, then, foundations occurs on the fourth level of human consciousness, on the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It is a decision about whom and

what you are for and, again, whom and what you are against. It is a decision illuminated by the manifold possibilities exhibited in dialectic. It is a fully conscious decision about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-view. It deliberately selects the frame-work, in which doctrines have their meaning, in which systematics reconciles, in which communications are effective.

Such a deliberate decision is anything but arbitrary. Arbitrariness is just unauthenticity, while conversion is from unauthenticity to authenticity. It is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love.

Again, it is not to be conceived as an act of will. To speak of an act of will is to suppose the metaphysical context of a faculty psychology. But to speak of the fourth level of human consciousness, the level on which consciousness becomes conscience, is to suppose the context of intentionality analysis. Decision is responsible and it is free, but it is the work not of a metaphysical will but of conscience and, indeed, when a conversion, the work of a good conscience.

Further, deliberate decision about one's horizon is high achievement. For the most part people merely drift into some contemporary horizon. They do not advert to the multiplicity of horizons. They do not exercise their vertical liberty by migrating from the one they have inherited to another they have discovered to be better.

Finally, although conversion is intensely personal,

it is not purely private. While individuals contribute elements to horizons, it is only within the social group that the elements accumulate and it is only with century-old traditions that notable developments occur. To know that conversion is religious, moral, and intellectual, to discern between authentic and unauthentic conversion, to recognize the difference in their fruits - by their fruits you shall know them — all call for a high seriousness and a mature wisdom that a social group does not easily attain or maintain.

It follows that conversion involves more than a change of horizon. It can mean that one begins to belong to a different social group or, if one's group remains the same, that one begins to belong to it in a new way. Again, the group will bear witness to its founder or founders whence originated and are preserved its high seriousness and mature wisdom. Finally, the witness it bears will be efficacious in the measure that the group is dedicated not to its own interests but to the welfare of mankind. But how the group is constituted, who was the founder to whom it bears witness, what are the services it renders to mankind, these are questions not for the fifth functional specialty, foundations, but for the sixth, doctrines.

2. The Sufficiency of the Foundational Reality

Foundations may be conceived in two quite different manners. The simple manner is to conceive foundations as a set of premisses, of logically first propositions. The complex manner is to conceive foundations as what is first in any ordered

set. If the ordered set consists in propositions, then the first will be the logically first propositions. If the ordered set consists in an ongoing, developing reality, then the first is the immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in the process.

Now if one desires foundations to be conceived in the simple manner, then the only sufficient foundations will be some variation or other of the following style: One must believe and accept whatever the bible or the true church or both believe and accept. But X is the bible or the true church or both. Therefore, one must believe and accept whatever X believes and accepts. Moreover, X believes and accepts a, b, c, d, Therefore, one must believe and accept a, b, c, d,

On the contrary, if one desires foundations for an ongoing, developing process, one has to move out of the static, deductivist style - which admits no conclusions that are not implicit in premisses - and into the methodical style—which aims at decreasing darkness and increasing light and keeps adding discovery to discovery. Then, what is paramount is control of the process. It must be ensured that positions are accepted and counter-positions are rejected. But that can be ensured only if investigators have attained intellectual conversion to renounce the myriad of false philosophies, moral conversion to keep themselves free of individual, group, and general bias,¹ and religious conversion so that in fact each

1) On bias, Insight, pp. 218-242.

loves the Lord his God with his whole heart and his whole soul and all his mind and all his strength.

Now there is no need here, I trust, to argue against the revival of a Denzinger theology or a conclusions theology. They offer necessary elements in theology but by themselves they are notoriously insufficient. On the other hand, it does seem necessary to insist that the threefold conversion is not foundational in the sense that it offers the premisses from which all desirable conclusions are to be drawn. The threefold conversion is, not a set of propositions that a theologian utters, but a fundamental and momentous change in the human reality that a theologian is. It operates, not by the simple process of drawing inferences from premisses, but by changing the reality (his own) that the interpreter has to understand if he is going to understand others, by changing the horizon within which the historian attempts to make the past intelligible, by changing the basic judgments of fact and of value that are found to be not positions but counter-positions.

Neither the converted nor the unconverted are to be excluded from research, interpretation, history, or dialectic. Neither the converted nor the unconverted are to follow different methods in these functional specialties. But one's interpretation of others is affected by one's understanding of oneself, and the converted have a self to understand that is quite different from the self that the unconverted have to understand. Again, the history one writes depends on the horizon within which one is attempting to understand the past; the converted and the unconverted have radically different horizons;

and so they will write different histories. Such different histories, different interpretations, and their underlying different styles in research become the center of attention in dialectic. There they will be reduced to their roots. But the reduction itself will only reveal the converted with one set of roots and the unconverted with a number of different sets. Conversion is a matter of moving from one set of roots to another. It is a process that does not occur in the marketplace. It is a process that may be occasioned by scientific inquiry. But it occurs only inasmuch as a man discovers what is unauthentic in himself and turns away from it, inasmuch as he discovers what the fulness of human authenticity can be and embraces it with his whole being. It is something very cognate to the Christian gospel, which cries out: Repent! The kingdom of God is at hand.

3. Pluralism in Expression

While conversion manifests itself in deeds and in words, still the manifestation will vary with the presence or absence of differentiated consciousness. There results a pluralism in the expression of the same fundamental stance and, once theology develops, a multiplicity of the theologies that express the same faith. Such a pluralism or multiplicity is of fundamental importance, both for the understanding of the development of religious traditions, and for an understanding of the impasses that may result from such development.

We recall, then, the four basic realms of meaning: the realm of common sense, the realm of theory, the realm of

interiority, and the realm of transcendence. To these for present purposes may be added the realm of scholarship and the realm of art. Any realm becomes differentiated from the others when it develops its own language, its own distinct mode of apprehension, and its own cultural, social, or professional group speaking in that fashion and apprehending in that manner.

If we presume that every normal adult operates in the realm of common sense, then undifferentiated consciousness will operate only in the realm of common sense, while all cases of differentiated consciousness will operate both in the realm of common sense and in one or more other realms. Considering only the mathematically possible combinations, one can list some thirty-one different types of differentiated consciousness. There are five cases of singly differentiated consciousness; these operate in the realm of common sense and as well in the realm either of the transcendent or of art or of theory or of scholarship or of interiority. There are ten cases of doubly differentiated consciousness; then to the realm of common sense there are added the realms either of religion and art, or religion and theory, or religion and scholarship, or religion and interiority, or art and theory, or art and scholarship, or art and interiority, or theory and scholarship, or theory and interiority, or scholarship and interiority. There are ten more cases of triply differentiated consciousness, five cases of a fourfold differentiation of consciousness, and one case of a fivefold differentiation.

Undifferentiated consciousness develops in the manner

of common sense. It achieves an accumulation of insights enabling one to speak and act in a manner appropriate to any of the situations that commonly arise in one's milieu and, on the other hand, to pause and figure things out when an unfamiliar situation comes along.

As a style of developing intelligence, common sense is common to mankind. But as a content, as a determinate understanding of man and his world, common sense is common not to mankind but to the members of each village, so that strangers appear strange and, the more distant their native land, the more strangely they appear to speak and act.

In their endless varieties common sense and ordinary language are not unaware of the realms of religion, art, theory, scholarship, interiority. But their apprehension of these realms is rudimentary, and their expression vague. Such defects are remedied as consciousness attains an ever fuller differentiation, but this implies that each new differentiation will involve some remodeling of one's previous commonsense views on matters on which common sense is not competent. Not only does the more differentiated consciousness master more realms but also it understands the people that are at home in these realms. Inversely, less differentiated consciousness finds more differentiated consciousness beyond its horizon and, in self-defence, may tend to regard the more differentiated with that pervasive, belittling hostility that Max Scheler named ressentiment.

Religiously differentiated consciousness is approached

by the ascetic and reached by the mystic. In the latter there are two quite different modes of apprehension, of being related, of consciously existing, namely, the commonsense mode operating in the world mediated by meaning and the mystical mode with drawing from the world mediated by meaning into a silent and all-absorbing self-surrender in response to God's gift of his love. While this, I think, is the main component, still mystical attainment is manifold. There are many mansions within Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle and, besides Christian mystics, there are the mystics of Jewry, Islam, India, and the Far East. Indeed, Mircea Eliade has a book on shamanism with the subtitle, Archaic techniques of ecstasy.

Artistically differentiated consciousness is a specialist in the realm of beauty. It promptly recognizes and fully responds to beautiful objects. Its higher attainment is creating: it invents commanding forms; works out their implications; conceives and produces their embodiment.

Theoretically differentiated consciousness occurs in two phases. In both of these phases objects are apprehended, not in their commonsense relations to us, but in their verifiable relations to one another. Hence, basic terms are defined implicitly by their relations to one another, and these relations in turn are established by an appeal to experience. However, in the first phase, the basic terms and relations pertain to a philosophy, and the sciences are conceived as a further and fuller determinations of the objects of philosophy, as in Aristotelianism. In the second phase, the sciences are emancipated from philosophy; they discover their own basic terms and

relations; and as that discovery matures, there occurs in a new setting the distinction Aristotle drew between the priora quoad nos and the priora quoad se. Eddington adverted to this distinction by speaking of his two tables: one of them was visible, palpable, brown, solid, and heavy; the other was mostly empty space with here and there an unimaginable wavicle.

The scholarly differentiation of consciousness is that of the linguist, the man of letters, the exegete, the historian. It combines the brand of common sense of its own place and time with a commonsense style of understanding that grasps the meanings and intentions in the words and deeds that proceeded from the common sense of another people, another place, or another time. Because scholarship operates in the commonsense style of developing intelligence, it is not trying to reach the universal principles and laws that are the goal of the natural sciences and the generalizing human sciences. Its aim is simply to understand the meaning intended in particular statements and the intentions embodied in particular deeds. Accordingly, the scholarly and the theoretical differentiations of consciousness are quite distinct.

Interiorly differentiated consciousness operates in the realms of common sense and of interiority. While theoretically differentiated consciousness seeks to determine its basic terms and relations by beginning from sense experience, interiorly differentiated consciousness, though it must begin from sense, eventually deserts this beginning to determine its basic terms and relations by adverting to our conscious opera-

tions and to the dynamic structure that relates them to one another. It is on such a basis that the present method is erected. It has been toward such a basis that modern philosophy has been groping in its efforts to overcome fourteenth-century scepticism, to discover its relationship to the natural and the human sciences, to work out a critique of common sense which so readily blends with common nonsense, and to place abstractly apprehended cognitional activity within the concrete and ⁺sub₊lating context of human feeling and of moral deliberation, evaluation, and decision.

Each of the foregoing differentiations of consciousness can be incipient or mature or receding. In a devout life one can discern the forerunner of mystical experience, in the art lover the beginnings of creativity, in a wisdom literature the foreshadow of philosophic theory, in the antiquarian the makings of a scholar, in psychological introspection the materials of interiorly differentiated consciousness. But what has been achieved need not be perpetuated. The heroic spirituality of a religious leader may be followed by the routine piety of his later followers. Artistic genius can yield place to artistic humbug. The differentiated consciousness of a Plato or Aristotle can enrich a later humanism though the cutting edge of genuine theory does not live on. High scholarship can settle down to amassing unrelated details. Modern philosophy can migrate from theoretically to interiorly differentiated consciousness but it can also revert to the undifferentiated consciousness of the ^{Presocratics}~~pre-Socratics~~ and of the analysts of ordinary language.

I have been content to offer brier descriptions of each of the single differentiations of consciousness. But besides such single differentiations, there are double, triple, fourfold, and fivefold differentiations. As there are ten types of double differentiation, ten more of triple differentiation, and five of fourfold differentiation, there are many different routes through which one might advance to the fivefold differentiation. Again, as each differentiation occurs, it takes over a realm of the universe and spontaneously requires of previous attainments a readjustment of their previous practice, which hitherto somehow or other had tried to make do in that realm. In particular, theoretically differentiated consciousness enriches religion with a systematic theology but it also liberates natural science from philosophic bondage by enabling it to work out its own basic terms and relations. Scholarship builds an impenetrable wall between systematic theology and its historical religious sources, but this development invites philosophy and theology to migrate from a basis in theory to a basis in interiority. In virtue of that migration, theology can work out a method that both grounds and criticizes critical history, interpretation, and research.

4. Pluralism in Religious Language

Besides the radical pluralism that results from the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, or religious conversion, there exists a more benign yet still puzzling variety that has its root in the differentiation of human consciousness.

The most common type by far is undifferentiated consciousness. To this type will always belong the vast majority of the faithful. Because it is undifferentiated, it is only puzzled or amused by the oracles of religiously differentiated consciousness, by the exertions of artists, by the subtleties of theorists, by the plodding labors of historians, and by the complex use of familiar words that results from an interiorly differentiated consciousness. Hence, to preach to this majority and to teach it one must use its own language, its own procedures, its own resources. Unfortunately these are not uniform. There are as many brands of common sense as there are languages, social or cultural differences, almost differences of place and time. So it is that to preach the gospel to all men calls for at least as many preachers as there are differing places and times, and it requires each of them to get to know the people to whom ^{of the} he is sent, their ways of thought, their manners, their style of speech. There follows a manifold pluralism. Primarily it is a pluralism of communications rather than of doctrines. But within the limits of undifferentiated consciousness, there is no communication of doctrine except through the rituals, narrative forms, titles, parables, metaphors that are effective in the given milieu.

An exception to this last statement must be noted. The educated classes in a society, such as was the Hellenistic, normally are instances of undifferentiated consciousness. But their education had among its sources the works of genuine philosophers, so that they could be familiar with logical

principles and could take propositions as the objects on which they reflected and operated.

In this fashion Athanasius was able to include, among his many clarifications of the term, homocousion, a rule concerning propositions about the Father and the Son: eadem de Filio, quae de Patre dicuntur, excepto Patris nomine.²

Again, there can be introduced new technical terms, when the context makes their meaning clear. Thus in the decree of the council of Chalcedon there are introduced in the second paragraph the terms, person and nature. But the first paragraph leaves no room for doubt about what was meant. Repeatedly it insists that it is one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ that is perfect in divinity and the same perfect in humanity, truly God and the same truly man, consubstantial with the Father in his divinity and the same consubstantial with us in his humanity, born of the Father before the ages in his divinity and these last days the same/... born of the Virgin Mary in his humanity.³

Now the meaning of this declaration is luminous, but to a logically trained mind it raises a question. Is the humanity the same as the divinity? If not, how can one and the same be both human and divine? It is after these questions have been raised, that it becomes relevant to explain that a distinction can be drawn between person and nature, that

2) Athanasius, Oratio 3a c. Arianos, MG 26, 329 A.

3) DS 301.

divinity and humanity denote two different natures, that it is one and the same person that is both God and man. Such logical clarification is within the meaning of the decree. But if one goes on to raise metaphysical questions, such as the reality of a distinction between person and nature, not only is one moving beyond questions explicitly envisaged by the decree, but also one is being enticed out of undifferentiated consciousness and into the theoretically differentiated consciousness of a Scholasticism.

First, however, let us consider religiously differentiated consciousness. It can be content with the negations of an apophatic theology. For it is in love. On its love there are not any reservations or conditions or qualifications. By such love it is oriented positively to what is transcendent in loveliness. Such a positive orientation and the consequent self-surrender, as long as they are operative, enable one to dispense with any intellectually apprehended object. And when they cease to be operative, the memory of them enables one to be content with enumerations of what God is not.⁴

4) See Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, Montreal: Palm, and Freiburg: Herder, 1964, pp. 129 ff. More fully: William Johnston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing, New York, Rome, Tournai, Paris: Desclée, 1967.

It may be objected that nihil amatum nisi praecognitum. But while that is true of other human love, it need not be true of the love with which God floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit he has given us (Rom 5, 5). That grace could be the finding that grounds our seeking God through natural reason and through positive religion. It could be the touchstone by which we judge whether it is really God that natural reason reaches⁵ or positive religion preaches. It could be the grace that God offers all men, that underpins what is good in the religions of mankind, that explains how those that never heard the gospel can be saved. It could be what enables the simple faithful to pray to their heavenly Father in secret even though their religious apprehensions are faulty. Finally, it is in such grace that can be found the theological justification of Catholic dialogue with all Christians, with non-Christians, and even with atheists who may love God in their hearts while not knowing him with their heads.

Next, artistically differentiated consciousness, especially if joined to religious sensibility, heightens religious expression. It makes rituals solemn, liturgies stately, music celestial, hymns moving, oratory effective, teaching ennobling.

5) On the transition from the context of Vatican I to the contemporary context on natural knowledge of God, see my paper, "Natural Knowledge of God," Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 23 (1968), 54-69.

Thirdly, there is theoretically differentiated consciousness. As already explained, there was a slight tincture of this in the Greek councils at Nicea, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople III. But in the medieval period there was developed in the universities a vast, systematic, and collaborative task of reconciling all that had been handed down in the church from the past. The bold speculative efforts of an Anselm had aimed at comprehension before a sufficiently broad basis of information had been obtained. A more precise approach was illustrated by Abaelard's Sic et Non,⁶ in which one hundred and fifty-eight propositions were both proved and disproved by arguments drawn from scripture, the Fathers, the councils, and reason. From this dialectical display there was developed the technique of the quaestio: Abaelard's Non became Videtur quod non; his Sic became Sed contra est; to these were added a general response that outlined principles of solution and specific responses that applied the principles to each of the alleged pieces of evidence. Parallel to this development was the erudite activity of composing books of sentences that collected and classified relevant passages from scripture and tradition. When the technique of the quaestio was applied to the materials set forth in books of sentences, there resulted the commentaries and with them a new problem. There would be no point in reconciling the diverging materials in the books of sentences if the solutions to the multitudinous questions were themselves incoherent. There was needed, then,

6) ML 178, 1339 ff.

some conceptual system that would enable theologians to give coherent answers to all the questions they raised; and this need was met partly by adopting and partly by adapting the Aristotelian corpus.

Scholastic theology was a monumental achievement. Its influence in the Catholic church has been profound and enduring. Up to Vatican II, which preferred a more biblical turn of speech, it has provided much of the background of pontifical documents and conciliar decrees. Yet today by and large it is abandoned, partly because of the inadequacy of medieval aims, and partly because of the short-comings of the Aristotelian corpus.

The Scholastic aim of reconciling all the elements in its Christian inheritance had one grave defect. It was content with a logically and metaphysically satisfying reconciliation. It did not realize how much of the multiplicity in the inheritance constituted not a logical or metaphysical problem but basically a historical problem.

On the other hand, so far was the Aristotelian corpus from providing either guidance for historical research or an understanding of the historicity of human reality, that it set forth its scientific ideal in terms of necessity. Moreover, this mistaken ideal infected not only Scholasticism but also much of modern thought. It was the discovery and acceptance of non-Euclidean geometry that brought mathematicians to acknowledge that their postulates or axioms were not necessary truths. It was quantum theory that led physicists to drop their talk about the necessary laws of nature. It was the depression of the

nineteen thirties that obliged economists to retreat from their insistence on the iron laws of economics.

It is to be noted, however, that Aquinas was as little influenced by the ideal of necessity as had been Aristotle himself. His various commentaries, quaestiones disputatae, summae, fall under the description of research followed by a search for understanding. It was, perhaps, only in the wake of the Augustinian-Aristotelian controversy towards the end of the thirteenth century that Aristotle's Posterior Analytics was taken seriously with a consequent burst of scepticism to be followed by decadence.

Whatever the cause, Aquinas held an outstanding position in subsequent theology. Commentaries continued to be written on the sentences of Peter Lombard up to the end of the sixteenth century. But a diverging tradition was begun by Capreolus (ob. 1444) who wrote his commentary on Aquinas' commentary on Peter Lombard's sentences. A more radical departure was initiated by Cajetan (ob. 1534) who wrote his commentary on Aquinas' Summa theologiae to be followed in this practice by Banez (ob. 1604), John of St. Thomas (ob. 1644), the Salmanticenses (1637 to 1700), Gonet (ob. 1681), and Billuart (ob. 1757). But for all the excellence of Aquinas and for all the erudition of these theologians, their procedure was unsound. Commentaries on a systematic work, such as was the Summa theologiae, are related only indirectly to Christian sources. The Reformation demanded a return to the gospel, but the proper meaning of that demand could be grasped only through the emergence

of the scholarly differentiation of consciousness.

It is true, of course, that Melchior Cano (ob. c. 1560) in his De locis theologicis outlined a method of theology that involved direct study of all sources. But as the resulting manualist tradition reveals, direct study is not enough. There has to be discovered the historicity of human reality. There have to be worked out the techniques for reconstructing the diverging contexts presupposed by different persons, peoples, places, times. And when such techniques are mastered, it becomes apparent that the old-style treatises could be taught, not by any single professor, but only by a team.

The complexities of the scholarly differentiation of consciousness have been set forth in our chapters on Interpretation, History, History and Historians, and Dialectics. But such a presentation in turn presupposes interiorly differentiated consciousness, aware of its several kinds of operation and of the dynamic relations that organize their multiplicity into a functioning whole. For it is only through such awareness that there can be had either an accurate description of what scholars do or an adequate elimination of the confusions arising from mistaken theories of knowledge.

While elements of modern scholarship may be found here and there down the ages, its massive development was the work of the German Historical School of the nineteenth century. First its attention was directed to ancient Greece and Rome and to modern Europe. Gradually it penetrated biblical, patristic, medieval, and later religious studies. Long resisted

in Catholic circles, today it is offered no serious opposition. The era dominated by Scholasticism has ended. Catholic theology is being reconstructed.

5.

Categories →

It has been pointed out that medieval theology turned to Aristotle for guidance and help in clarifying its thought and making it coherent. On the method we are proposing the source of basic clarification will be interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

The transcendental notions are our capacity for seeking and, when found, for recognizing instances of the intelligible, the true, the real, the good. It follows that they are relevant to every object that we come to know by asking and answering questions.

While the transcendental notions make questions and answers possible, categories make them determinate. Theological categories are either general or special. General categories regard objects that come within the purview of other disciplines as well as theology. Special categories regard the objects proper to theology. The task of working out general and special categories pertains, not to the methodologist, but to the theologian engaged in this fifth functional specialty. The methodologist's task is the preliminary one of indicating what qualities are desirable in theological categories, what measure of validity is to be demanded of them, and how are categories with the desired qualities and validity to be obtained.

First, then, Christianity is a religion that has been developing for over two millenia. Moreover, it has its antecedents in the Old Testament, and it has the mission of preaching to all nations. Plainly, a theology that is to reflect on such a religion and that is to direct its efforts at universal communication must have a transcultural base.

Next, the transcendental method outlined in our first chapter is, in a sense, transcultural. Clearly it is not transcultural inasmuch as it is explicitly formulated. But it is transcultural in the realities to which the formulation refers, for these realities are not the product of any culture but, on the contrary, the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. Moreover, since it is to these realities we refer when we speak of homo sapiens, it follows that these realities are transcultural with respect to all truly human cultures.

Similarly, God's gift of his love (Rom 5, 5) has a transcultural aspect. For if this gift is offered to all men, if it is manifested more or less authentically in the many and diverse religions of mankind, if it is apprehended in as many different manners as there are different cultures, still the gift itself as distinct from its manifestations is transcultural. For of other love it is true enough that it presupposes knowledge — nihil amatum nisi praecognitum. But God's gift of his love is free. It is not conditioned by human knowledge; rather it is the cause that leads man to seek knowledge of God. It is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather

is the principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness into any culture. All the same, it remains true, of course, that God's gift of his love has its proper counterpart in the revelation events in which God discloses to a particular people or to all mankind the completeness of his love for them. For being-in-love is properly itself, not in the isolated individual, but only in a plurality of persons that disclose their love to one another.

There exist, then, bases from which might be derived both general and special categories that in some measure are transcultural. But before attempting to indicate the manner in which such derivation might be achieved, let us first say something about the validity to be expected in the derivation.

First, with regard to the base for general theological categories in transcendental method, we have only to repeat what already has been said. The explicit formulation of that method is historically conditioned and can be expected to be corrected, modified, complemented as the sciences continue to advance and reflection on them to improve. What is transcultural is the reality to which such formulation refers, and that reality is transcultural because it is not the product of any culture but rather the principle that begets and develops cultures that flourish, as it also is the principle that is violated when cultures crumble and decay.

Secondly, with regard to the base of special theological categories, a distinction has to be drawn between being in love in an unrestricted manner (1) as it is defined and (2) as it is achieved. As it is defined, it is the habitual actuation of

man's capacity for self-transcendence; it is the religious conversion that grounds both moral and intellectual conversion; it provides the real criterion by which all else is to be judged; and consequently one has only to experience it in oneself or witness it in others, to find in it its own justification. On the other hand, as it actually is achieved in any human being, the achievement is dialectical. It is authenticity as a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and the withdrawal is never complete and always precarious. The greatest of saints have not only their oddities but also their defects, and it is not some but all of us that pray, not out of humility but in truth,⁷ to be forgiven our trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us.

Accordingly, while there is no need to justify critically the charity described by St. Paul in the thirteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians, there is always a great need to eye very critically any religious individual or group and to discern beyond the real charity they may well have been granted the various types of bias that may distort or block their exercise of it.⁸

7) DS 230.

8) On bias, see Insight, pp. 191-206, 218-242. More generally, see the manifold warnings against various forms of illusion in devotional and ascetical writings. While this tradition should be integrated with the findings of depth psychology, it is of great importance to be aware of current corrections of earlier views. See L. v. Bertalanffy, General System Theory, (New York:

Thirdly, both with regard to transcendental method and with regard to God's gift of his love we have distinguished between an inner core, which is transcultural, and an outer manifestation, that is subject to variation. Needless to say, theological categories will be transcultural only in so far as they refer to that inner core. In their actual formulation they will be historically conditioned and so subject to correction, modification, complementation. Moreover, the more elaborate they become and the further they are removed from that inner core, the greater will be their precariousness. On what grounds, then, are they to be accepted and employed?

Before answering this question, there must be introduced the notion of the model or ideal-type. Models, then stand to the human sciences, to philosophies, to theologies, much as mathematics stands to the natural sciences. For models purport to be, not descriptions of reality, not hypotheses about reality, but simply interlocking sets of terms and relations. Such sets, in fact, turn out to be useful in guiding investigations, in framing hypotheses, and in writing descriptions. Thus,

(Braziller), 1968, pp. 106 ff., 188 ff. A. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton: (Van Nostrand), 1962, esp. pp. 19-41. Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil, New York: (Braziller), 1968, pp. 154-166. Arthur Janov, The Primal Scream, New York: (Putman), 1970.

a model will direct the attention of an investigator in a determinate direction with either of two results; it may provide him with a basic sketch of what he finds to be the case; or it may prove largely irrelevant, yet the discovery of this irrelevance may be the occasion of uncovering clues that otherwise might be overlooked. Again, when one possesses models, the task of framing an hypothesis is reduced to the simpler matter of tailoring a model to suit a given object or area. Finally, the utility of the model may arise when it comes to describing a known reality. For known realities can be exceedingly complicated, and an adequate language to describe them hard to come by. So the formulation of models and their general acceptance as models can facilitate enormously both description and communication.

Now what has been said about models, is relevant to the question concerning the validity of the general and special theological categories. First, such categories will form a set of interlocking terms and relations and, accordingly, they will possess the utility of models. Further, these models will be built up from basic terms and relations that refer to transcultural components in human living and operation and, accordingly, at their roots they will possess quite exceptional validity. Finally, whether they are to be considered more than models with exceptional foundational validity, is not a methodological but a theological question. In other words, it is up to the theologian to decide whether any model is to become a hypothesis or to be taken as a description.

6. General Theological Categories →

If categories are to be derived, there is needed a base from which they are derived. The base of general theological categories is the attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating subject along with the operations that result from attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating and with the structure within which the operations occur. The subject in question is not any general or abstract or theoretical subject; it is in each case the particular theologian that happens to be doing theology. Similarly, the relevant attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating are the attending, inquiring, reflecting, deliberating that he has found to go on in himself; the consequent operations are the operations he has uncovered and identified in his own operating; and the structure within which the operations occur is the pattern of *dynamic* relations which, as he knows from his own experience, lead from one operation to the next. Finally, the subject is self-transcending. His operations reveal objects: single operations reveal partial objects; a structured compound of operations reveals compounded objects; and as the subject by his operations is conscious of himself operating, he too is revealed though not as object but as subject.

Such is the basic nest of terms and relations. Now there has been for millenia a vast multitude of individuals in whom such basic nests of terms and relations can be verified: for they too attend, understand, judge, decide. Moreover, they do so not in isolation but in social groups, and as such groups develop and progress and also decline, there is not only society but also history.

8/ Further, the basic nest of terms and relations can be differentiated in a number of manners. So one can distinguish and describe: (1) each of the different kinds of conscious operation that occur; (2) the biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, practical, or worshipful patterns of experience within which the operations occur; (3) the different quality of the consciousness inherent in sensing, in operating intelligently, in operating reasonably, in operating responsibly and freely; (4) the different manners in which operations proceed towards goals: the manner of common sense, of the sciences, of interiority and philosophy, of the life of prayer and theology; (5) the different realms of meaning and the different worlds meant ~~As~~ as a result of the various manners of proceeding: the world of immediacy, given in immediate experience and confirmed by successful response; the world of common sense; the world of the sciences; the world of interiority and philosophy; the world of religion and theology; (6) the diverse heuristic structures within which operations accumulate towards the attainment of goals: the classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic structures ⁹ and, embracing them all, the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a meta-¹⁰physics; (7) the contrast between differentiated consciousness that shifts with ease from one manner of operation in one world to another manner of operation in a different world and, on the

9) Insight, pp. 33-69, 217-244, 451-487, 530-594.

10) Ibid., pp. 390-396.

other hand, undifferentiated consciousness which is at home in its local variety of common sense but finds any message from the worlds of theory, of interiority, of transcendence both alien and incomprehensible; (8) the difference between those that have or have not been converted religiously, or morally, or intellectually; (9) the consequent dialectically opposed positions and counter-positions, models, categories.

Such differentiation vastly enriches the initial nest of terms and relations. From such a broadened basis one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development.

r/ various
Finally, since the basic nest of terms and relations is a dynamic structure, there are various ways in which models of change can be worked out. Fire, for instance, has been conceived as one of the four elements, as due to phlogiston, and as a process of oxydization. But while the answers have little in common, they are answers to the same question, What will you know when you understand the data on fire? More generally, the nature of any x is what one will know when the data on x are understood. So by turning to the heuristic notions behind common names, one finds the unifying principle of the successive meanings attributed to the name.¹¹

Other illustrations mostly from Insight follow.

11) Ibid., pp. 36 ff.

Developments can be analysed as processes from initial global operations of low efficiency, through differentiation and specialization, to the integration of the perfected specialties. Revolutionary developments in some department of thought can be schematized as successive higher viewpoints.¹² A universe in which both classical and statistical laws are verified will be characterized by a process of emergent probability.¹³ Authenticity can be shown to generate progress, unauthenticity to bring about decline,¹⁴ while the problem of overcoming decline provides an introduction to religion.¹⁵ The problems of interpretation bring to light the notion of a potential universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression.¹⁶

12) Ibid., pp. 13-19.

13) Ibid., pp. 115-128, 259-262.

14) Ibid., pp. 207-244.

15) Ibid., pp. 688-703, 713-730.

16) Ibid., pp. 562-594.

7.

Special Theological Categories →

Let us now turn from deriving general theological categories to deriving special theological categories. In this task we have a model in the theoretical theology developed in the middle ages. But it is a model that can be imitated only by shifting to a new key. For the categories we want will pertain, not to a theoretical theology, but to a methodical theology.

To illustrate the difference, consider the medieval doctrine of grace. It presupposed a metaphysical psychology in terms of the essence of the soul, its potencies, habits, and acts. This presupposition represented the order of nature. But grace goes beyond nature and perfects it. Grace, accordingly, calls for special theological categories, and these must refer to supernatural entities, for grace is tied up with God's loving gift of himself to us, and that gift is due not to our natures but to God's free initiative. At the same time, these entities have to be prolongations perfecting our nature. Accordingly, they are habits and acts. Supernatural acts ordinarily proceed from supernatural operative habits (virtues) and supernatural operative habits proceed from the supernatural entitative habit (sanctifying grace) which, unlike the operative habits, is radicated not in the potencies but in the essence of the soul.

Now to effect the transition from theoretical to methodical theology one must start, not from a metaphysical psychology, but from intentionality analysis and, indeed, from

transcendental method. So in our chapter on religion we noted that the human subject was self-transcendent intellectually by the achievement of knowledge, that he was self-transcendent morally inasmuch as he sought what was worth while, what was truly good, and thereby became a principle of benevolence and beneficence, that he was self-transcendent affectively when he fell in love, when the isolation of the individual was broken and he spontaneously functioned not just for himself but for others as well. Further we distinguished different kinds of love: the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children; the love of mankind devoted to the pursuit of human welfare locally or nationally or globally; and the love that was other-worldly because it admitted no conditions or qualifications or restrictions or reservations. It is this other-worldly love, not as this or that act, not as a series of acts, but as a dynamic state whence proceed the acts, that constitutes in a methodical theology what in a theoretical theology is named sanctifying grace. Again, it is this dynamic state, manifested in inner and outer acts, that provides the base out of which special theological categories are set up.

Traditionally that dynamic state is manifested in three ways: the purgative way in which one withdraws from sinning and overcomes temptation; the illuminative way in which one's discernment of values is refined and one's commitment to them is strengthened; the unitive way in which the serenity of joy and peace reveal the love that hitherto had been struggling against sin and advancing in virtue.

The data, then, on the dynamic state of other-worldly love are the data on a process of conversion and development. The inner determinants are God's gift of his love and man's consent, but there also are outer determinants in the store of experience and in the accumulated wisdom of the religious tradition. If civil law recognizes adult responsibility at the age of twenty-one years, the professor of religious psychology at Louvain had it that man reaches genuine religious faith and a properly personal assumption of his inherited religion about the age of thirty.¹⁷ But just as one can be a highly successful scientist and yet have very vague notions regarding his own intentional and conscious operations, so too a person can be religiously mature yet have to recall to mind his past life and study it in its religious moments and features before he can discern in it a direction, a pattern, a thrust, a call, to unworldliness. Even then his difficulties may not be at an end: he may be unable to associate any precise meaning with the words I have used; he may be too familiar with the reality of which I speak to connect it with what I say; he may be looking for something with a label on it, when he should simply be heightening his consciousness of the power working within him and adverting to its long-term effects.

But I do not think the matter is in doubt. In the realm of religious experience Olivier Rabut has asked whether

17) A. Vergote, Psychologie religieuse, Brussels: Dessart,
 3 1969, p. 19.

there exists any unassailable fact. He found such a fact in the existence of love. It is as though a room were filled with music though one can have no sure knowledge of its source.

There is in the world, as it were, a charged field of love and meaning; here and there it reaches a notable intensity; but it is ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join. And join we must if we are to perceive it, for our perceiving is through our own loving.¹⁸

The functional specialty, foundations, will derive its first set of categories from religious experience. That experience is something exceedingly simple and, in time, also exceedingly simplifying, but it also is something exceedingly rich and enriching. There are needed studies of religious interiority: historical, phenomenological, psychological, sociological. There is needed in the theologian the spiritual development that will enable him both to enter into the experience of others and to frame the terms and relations that will express that experience.

Secondly, from the subject one moves to subjects, their togetherness in community, service, and witness, the history of the salvation that is rooted in a being-in-love, and the function of this history in promoting the kingdom of God amongst men.

The third set of special categories moves from our

18) O. Rabut, L'expérience religieuse fondamentale, Tournai: Castermann, 1969, p. 168.

loving to the loving source of our love. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.

A fourth set of categories results from differentiation. Just as one's humanity, so too one's Christianity may be authentic or unauthentic or some blend of the two. What is worse, to the unauthentic man or Christian, what appears authentic, is the unauthentic. Here, then, is the root of division, opposition, controversy, denunciation, bitterness, hatred, violence. Here, too, is the transcendental base for the fourth functional specialty, dialectic.

A fifth set of categories regards progress, decline, and redemption. As human authenticity promotes progress, and human unauthenticity generates decline, so Christian authenticity - which is a love of others that does not shrink from self-sacrifice and suffering - is the sovereign means for overcoming evil. Christians bring about the kingdom of God in the world not only by doing good but also by overcoming evil with good (Rom. 12, 21). Not only is there the progress of mankind but also there is development and progress within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and as there is decline, there also is the problem of undoing it, of overcoming evil with good not only in the world but also in the church.

So much for a sketch of general and special theological categories. As already noted, the task of a

methodologist is to sketch the derivation of such categories, but it is up to the theologian working in the fifth functional specialty to determine in detail what the general and special categories are to be.

8.

Use of the Categories →

I have been indicating how general and special categories can be derived from a transcultural base. For general categories the base is the authentic or unauthentic man; attentive or inattentive, intelligent or slow-witted, reasonable or silly, responsible or irresponsible, with the consequent positions and counter-positions. For special categories the base is the authentic or unauthentic Christian, genuinely in love with God, or failing in that love, with a consequent Christian or unchristian outlook and style of living.

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and, as well, as an a priori whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny.

The purification of the categories - the elimination of the unauthentic - is prepared by the functional specialty, dialectic, and it is effected in the measure that theologians attain authenticity through religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Nor may one expect the discovery of some "objective"

criterion or test or control. For that meaning of the "objective" is mere delusion. Genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. It is to be attained only by attaining authentic subjectivity. To seek and employ some alternative prop or crutch invariably leads to some measure of reductionism. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has contended at length in his Wahrheit und Methode, there are no satisfactory methodical criteria that prescind from the criteria of truth.

The use of the general theological categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties. The genesis of the special theological categories occurs seminally in dialectic and with explicit commitment in foundations. The commitment, however, is to the categories only as models, as interlocking sets of terms and relations. The use and the acceptance of the categories as hypothesis about reality or description of reality occur in doctrines, systematics, communications.

It is to be stressed that this use of the special categories occurs in interaction with data. They receive further specifications from the data. At the same time, the data set up an exigence for further clarification of the categories and for their correction and development.

In this fashion there is set up a scissors movement with an upper blade in the categories and a lower blade in the data. Just as the principles and laws of physics are neither mathematics nor data but the fruit of an interaction between mathematics and data, so too a theology can be neither purely a priori nor purely a posteriori but only the fruit of an ongoing process that has one foot in a transcultural base

and the other on increasingly organized data.

So, as theology is an ongoing process, as religion and religious doctrine themselves develop, the functional specialty, foundations, will be concerned largely with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians understand themselves, communicate with one another, and preach the gospel to all nations.