The Relationship of Philosophy of God to the Functional
Specialty, Systematics.

For all its length I fear that the title of this lecture
may be found by many to be somewhat obscure. So let me begin
by explaining that "philosophy of God" simply means philosophic
knowledge of God, i. e., knowledge of God that does not have
among its premisses any of the claims based on revealed
religion. It is quite simply what many of you may be familiar
with under the name, natural theology. Next, while "functional
specialty" is somewhat more recondite, at least one can from
the very start indicate what is meant by systematics. First
of all, it presupposes revealed truths of faith such as the
Trinity and the Incarnation. Secondly, it is not concerned
to prove that such doctrines are true. It takes them on faith.
Thirdly, it does ask the question, How on earth can such doctrines
have any intelligible meaning? There is one God and there
are three divine persons. But if there is one God, why is there
not just one person? And if there really are three divine
persons, why are there not three Gods?

I have said something to clarify both "philosophy of God"
and "systematics." I now must say something very general
about the relationship between them. Obviously the two are
distinct. For they have mutually exclusive presuppositions.
Philosophy of God does not presuppose any revealed truths,
any truths taken on faith. On the contrary, systematics
does presuppose revealed truths, it takes them on faith,
it does not expect to understand them perfectly, but it hopes
to find some meaning in them. The two then are distinct.
But two things may be distinct without being separated.
Body and soul are distinct, but they are separated only when
you are dead. Are philosophy of God and systematics to be
treated separately, or are they to be considered two parts
of a single specialty? On this issue there is a difference
of opinion. In recent centuries philosophy of God was

taught by professors of philosophy in a department of philosophy,
and systematics was taught by professors of theology in a
department of theology. But in the high middle ages, while
the two were acknowledged to be quite distinct, none the less
the two could be inextricably mingled, as in the first book of
St. Thomas Aquinas' Scriptum super Sententias, or they could
be treated in separate books of the same work, as in Aquinas'
Summa contra Gentiles, or they could be successive sections
of the same part of one work, as in his Summa theologiae.

The occasion of the present lecture is the fact that,
in my recent book, Method in Theology, I advocated a return
to medieval practice. Philosophy of God and the functional
specialty, systematics, are quite distinct but, so far from
being separated, they can and should fit together as snugly
as they did in Aquinas' treatment of one God and three persons
in the first part of the Summa theologiae.

Such, then, is my topic and my claim. My exposition
of it will fall into three parts, three successive approximations
to the issue as it presents itself today. I shall begin
with the emergence of the issue in the ancient Christian
church. I shall go on to the emergence of systematic
thinking in medieval theology. I shall end by pointing to
subsequent developments.

In his Foundations of New Testament Christology Prof.
Reginld Fuller distinguished three strata or layers in the
thought and language of the gospels. The first layer
was attributed to the primitive Palestinian community.
A second layer was attributed to Hellenistic Jews, that is,
to Jews that read the Old Testament in a Greek translation.
A third layer was attributed to those converts that preached
to pagans.

These distinctions illustrate a very simple but also very
basic principle. All communication has to start from what
people already know. No doubt, people can learn what they
do not already know. But that learning is not just added
on to what already is known. It has to grow out of what
already is known, and that "growing out of" varies with
the soil on which it grows. It makes a difference if people

read the Old Testament in the original, if they read/ it in a
Greek translation, and if they do not know anything about it.

Moreover, these differences offer a first approximation,
a quite remote analogy, to the distinction that is our concern.
If you are preaching to people that know and accept the Old
Testament, your preaching will presuppose revealed truths and,
to that extent, it will resemble systematics. On the other
hand, if you are preaching to people that neither know nor accept
the Old Testament, your preaching cannot be based on a presup-
position that your hearers already know and accept the Old
Testament. It will resemble, accordingly, philosophy of
God at least at the start inasmuch as the latter does not
presuppose revealed truths.

What is adumbrated in the New Testament, has a fuller
expression in later Christian authors. Prof. Jaroslav Pelikan
in the first volume of his The Christian Tradition, A History
of the Development of Doctrine, entitled his first chapter,
Praeparatio evangelica, Preparation for the Gospel. It dealt
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with the interactions between Christian and Hebraic thought and,
again, between Christian and Hellenist thought. The Christians
made the Old Testament their own scripture. They found in
the entronement psalms predictions of Christ's resurrection and of his
xxxdxexaltation at the right hand of the Father. They found
in the prophets' announcements of a Messiah and a new age both
predictions of Christ and his church and proof that the Old xx
Covenant had been liquidated. Such thinking resembles systematics;
it is the interpretation of revealed truths. /xxxx the Greco-Roman
world Christians suffered both calumny and persecution. The
calumny gave rise to the apologists who explained to the
Hellenists just what Christian doctrines meant and what they
did not mean. If not a few Christian writers considered
philosophy the source of all the heresies, still the very need
to answer pagan or heretical arguments encouraged an ever
fuller use of philosophical terms, and such use, in turn,
led to a recognition of something good and true in the
philosophy. Philosophy of God has grown out of that recognition.

We have now to move on to medieval theology, and that
step involves a duplication of human apprehension of reality.
In a famous passage Sir Arthur Eddington spoke of his two
tables. One was brown, rectangular, solid, heavy, plainly
visible. The other consisted mainly of empty space with only
here or there some mysterious entity that at one moment was
to be imagined as a wave and at another as a particle. In fact,
of course, there were not two tables, but there were two
quite different apprehensions of the same reality. In Aristotelian
language the first table was conceived in terms of what is
prior for us, while the second was conceived in terms of what
is prior in itself.

Now the layman usually wants to know why one should
bother about a second apprehension of reality. The simplest
answer to that is, of course, that without the second apprehension
one has to get along without all the technological applications
of science. But a further question may be put. Why should
science involve a second apprehension? The answer here is
a little more recondite. It is to the effect that there is an
enormous difference between the
commonsense and the scientific style and mode of coming
to understand, of formulating what one has understood, and
of passing judgement on what has been formulated.xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx

Let me illustrate the commonsense style and mode from
Plato's early dialogues. In these dialogues Socrates is
represented as inviting all comers to provide satisfactory,
universal definitions for such things as temperance, courage,
knowledge, justice. No self-respecting Athenian could afford
to admit that he did not know the difference between temperance
and gluttony, between courage and cowardice, between
knowledge and ignorance, between justice and injustice. None
the less, none could provide a satisfactory definition. They
knew the meaning of the words. But knowing the meaning of a
word is one thing, and defining that meaning is another.
As the analysts keep telling us, one knows the meaning of
a word when one knows how to use it appropriately.

One can know how to use words appropriately without
being able to define them because defining presupposes system.
This may be seen from a comparison of Plato's early dialogues
and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Slightly less than
eighty
/ sixanix years separate the deaths of Socrates and of Aristotle
but, while Socrates was unable to produce definitions for
the virtues, Aristotle was able to define both virtues and
vices both in general and specifically. He could do so
because he went to work, distinguished the various meanings
that relevant words could have, selected the meanings that
meshed together to form a closed group, and so developed a
linguistic tool in which exact defining was possible.
In this linguistic tool, as in every technical or scientific
language, there are primitive and derived terms and relations.
The derived terms and relations are defined by using the
primitive terms and relations. The primitive terms are fixed
by the primitive relations. The primitive relations, inversely,
are fixed by the primitive terms.   Finally, both primitive
                    primitive
terms and/relations are verified by the realities which
derived terms and relations denote. So in contemporary
physics mass, temperature, and the electromagnetic field do
not denote any data of experience; they are prior in themselves
but not prior for us. On the other hand, weight and momentum,
hot and cold, dynamos and electric power do denote what we
experience; though not prior in themselves, they are prior
for us.

But if there is a profound difference between commonsense
understanding and thought and, on the other hand, systematic
understanding and thought, there remains the question how
Christian thought could have shifted from the commonsense
to the systematic mode and style. The answer is that the
process started with the medieval canonists. They had on
their hands the decrees or canons of countless general and
provincial councils of bishops. The trouble was that these
decrees did not agree with one another. So the fundamental
work in canon law was Gratian's Concordia canonum discordantium,
his reconciliation of conflicting canons.

Now the theologians really were in the same boat, but

they did not advert to the fact until Peter Abaelard wrote his
Sic et non. In that work, from statements ʷin scripture, in the
patristic writings, and from reason, he proved both the affirmation
and the negation of one hundred and fifty-eight theological pro-
positions. A second step ᵒin the development occurred when
Gilbert of Porreta taught that there existed a question in
theology when there existed sound arguments from authority or
from reason both for affirming and for denying the same
proposition. A third step occurred when the technique of the
question, quaestio, was developed: it began by proving the
existence of the question by setting forth, first, the reasons
for a negation, Videtur quod non, secondly, the reasons for
an affirmation, Sed contra est, thirdly, the general principles
for a solution, Respondeo dicendum quod, and fourthly, the
application of the general principles to each of the arguments
against the affirmation and, if need be, each of the arguments
for the affirmation.

The quaestio, then, was a technique for reconciling
differing authorities in matters of faith and apparent
oppositions between faith and reason. It could be applied
to random issues, as in the Quodlibeta, when the master
undertook to resolve any matter that students or other
masters chose to raise. But it could also be applied to
orderly series of questions, for example, to all the
questions concerning truth (De veritate), or power (De potentia),
or evil (De malo), or again to all the questions that arose
in reading a classified set of quotations from scriᵖtural or
patristic writings, such as was Peter Lombard's Quattuor
libri distinctionum or, finally, to all the questions that
arose in an account of Christian thought, as in Aquinas'
Summa theologiae.

However, the more exꜜtensive applications of the technique
of the quaestio gave rise to a new and profounder problem.
There was no use reconciling conflicting authorities or
reconciling faith and reason if the reconciliations themselves
needed to be reconciled. Further, the only way to secure
the coherence of the reconciliations was to move from

the commonsense to the systematic mode of understanding and thought. Finally, the simplest manner of moving into the systematic mode of understanding and thought was to adopt and adapt a system that already had been formulated. So it was that medieval theologians found models for imitation and adaptation in Arabic and Greek thinkers and, of these, the most influential was Aristotle.

Now one cannot move from commonsense to systematic thinking without creating a crisis. One is introducing a new language, a new mode of formulation, a new mode of developing intelligence, a new mode of verification. But one cannot expect everyone to catch on at once to the exact significance of these novelties. There are bound to be those that will have no comprehension whatever of what is going on and, the greater their authority, the deeper and the more lasting will be the crisis that results.

John Peckham, who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1272, felt in his day that Dominicans and Franciscans were almost radically opposed to one another on every debatable point, that the Dominicans rejected and in part belittled the teachings of the saints, while they relied almost totally on the dogmas of philosophers.[1] Such an opinion certainly involves some

1)   F. Ehrle, "John Peckham über den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jhs," ZKTh, 13 (1889) 181. The relevant passage is quoted in my De Deo Trino, II, 49, Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964.

oversights. What at least the better Dominicans were doing was not belittling Augustine or other authorities; it was not basing their religious doctrine almost entirely on Aristotle; it was using Aristotle as a source for constructing a systematic expression of Christian doctrine.

It is probable enough that thirteenth-century theologians could not do better than turn to Aristotle for help. It remains that Aristotle had his defects. He conceived science to deduce its conclusions from necessary first principles. He believed that such principles could be reached empirically

after the fashion in which a rout ends in a rally, when first
one man makes a stand, then others join him, then more and
more come to their aid. This, indeed, is a good illustration
of the manner in which insights accumulate to generate discovery.
But what is so discovered is, not a necessary truth, but only
a hypothesis or postulate. Accordingly, there is a profound
difference between "system" in an Aristotelian sense and "system"
in a modern sense. In an Aristotelian sense, system is something
that is intended to be a permanent acquisition: its goal is
truth. In a modern sense, system is something on the move:
its goal is an ever better understanding of the relevant data,
and truth is a goal more or less indefinitely removed.

This modern view of system first came to light in the
nineteenth-century discovery that Euclidean geometry was not
the one and only geometry. In this century it seems to be
established in mathematics by Gödel's theorem that a deductive
system, if not trivial, is either incomplete or incoherent:
incomplete, if the system gives rise to questions it cannot
resolve; incoherent, if the system can demonstrate both the
affirmation and the negation of the same proposition. In physics
the same view of system was imposed by the success of quantum
theory, which ousted Laplace's deductivist determinism and
put in its place a statistical indeterminism.

Interestingly enough, this modern critique of Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics compromises Scotus and Ockham and other
fourteenth-century celebrities without seriously diminishing
the stature of Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas was a constructive
genius. His thinking was within the methodical mould of
lectio and quaestio that spontaneously arose and was developed
in the high middle ages. He wrote commentaries on numerous
books in the Old and New Testaments, on Aristotle, on the
Pseudo—Dionysius, on Al Farabi. He sought Latin translations
of Aristotle made, not from the Arabic, but directly from the
original Greek. He knew the whole of Aristotle and did not
take very seriously any totalitarian ambitions expressed in
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Hence his programme in the
~~Summa contra Gentiles was not restricted to demonstrative~~
~~arguments but was willing to set forth merely probable reasons~~

<u>Summa contra Gentiles</u> distinguished between matters in which
both faith and reason had a say and other matters in which
faith alone was relevant. The former were treated in the
first three books and included man's naturally desired end,
the beatific vision, and the external and internal means to
that end, namely, the law and grace. The latter were treated
in the fourth and final book and they included the Blessed
Trinity, the Incarnation, original sin, and the sacraments.
In the first three books not only demonstrative but also
merely probable arguments were to be employed. In the fourth
book the objections of adversaries were to be resolved and
the faithful were to be confirmed in their position by probable
arguments.[2] When one turns to fourteenth-century critiques
of Aquinas, one finds oneself in a different world. The
Augustinain-Aristotelian conflict had left them with the
conviction that Aristotle was a pagan, that his other works
could be disregarded, that his Organon was however sound.
Their thinking seems dominated by the notion of science
expounded in the <u>Posterior Analytics</u> and gradually they
became convinced that there was nothing scientific about
either the philosophy of God or the functional specialty,
systematics.

2)   <u>C. Gent</u>., I, 13 #3.

     A further criticism of the Aristotelian notion of
science is implied in the independence of modern science from
philosophy.   In Aristotle the basic and over-arching science
is metaphysics. It expounds the basic system. Other sciences
are constructed by adding further determinations of the
terms and relations presented in metaphysics. But modern
science has fought tooth and nail against this domination
by metaphysics. It has worked out its own basic terms and
relations in physics, in chemistry, in biology; and these
basic terms and relations -- mass, temperature, the electromagnetic
field, the periodic table, the evolutionary tree -- are something
quite different from anything any metaphysician could
dream up.

These two criticisms of Aristotle -- the discovery
that so-called necessary truths are just hypotheses or
postulates, and the discovery that the basic terms and
relations of the sciences are anything but metaphysical --
call for a complete revision of the relations between
philosophy and science. In my opinion Aristotle was quite
correct in conceiving philosophy as the ground and the
principle of unification of the sciences. His mistake
was in thinking philosophy to be the logical ground and
the logical principle of unification of the sciences,
at least, as the sciences today are conceived. For the
sciences today take their stand, not on the principles
and conclusions they have reached, but on the method by
which they have reached their present principles and conclusions
and on the same method by which they will correct and
revise the principles and conclusions they now consider
the best available opinions of the day. If then philosophy
is to recover its position as the ground and the principle
of unification of the sciences, it has to shift its
stand from what logically is prior to what methodically
is prior. It has to become, not a transcendental logic,
but a transcendental method. But method is operational;
it is concerned with what is to be done. On this showing
the basic and proper questions in philosophy are cognitional
theory (What is one doing when one is knowing?), epistemology
(Why is doing that knowing?), and metaphysics (What does
one know when one does it?). How these questions can
be answered, I have illustrated in my little book on Insight.

Chapter nineteen of that book presents a philosophy
of God in a somewhat condensed form. Now at a meeting
at St. Leo's near Tampa, Florida, in Easterweek 1970 --
a meeting in which Fr. Bernard Tyrrell was among the prime
movers and organizers -- there was considerable resistance
to that chapter nineteen. The main objection, I think,

was that it did not fit in with its context, that it was simply
a survival, if not a piece of wreckage, from an earlier,
medieval or even rationalistic context. At the time my answer
was simple and factual. I had been engaged in a general
exploration of methods preparatory to doing a work on the
method of theology. I had been told that I was due to be
shipped off to Rome in a year's time to teach theology there.
I decided to round off what I had done and publish the lot
as/A Study of Human Understanding. Insight,

I think that my more recent work, Method in Theology,
provides the context for a philosophy of God that is more
in accord with the direction in which Insight was moving.
Though I did not anticipate my later position in that earlier
work, none the less I then was taking the steps that eventually
led to what I now advance. This can be summarized under four
headings, as follows.

First, there is the transition from faculty psychology
to intentionality analysis. The transition had already taken place
in Insight, but there it was only implicit. Actually I was
doing intentionality analysis. But I was still using the
language of faculty psychology, and speaking about sense,
intellect, and will. Such language is just a survival of
the Aristotelian idea that metaphysics is the basic science
and that it supplies all other subjects with their basic
terms and relations. On this showing objects are not the
terms intended in conscious acts. Objects are efficient or
final causes. Acts are known not because they are conscious
but by directing attention to their objects. As acts are
known through their objects, so habits are known through
the acts they make spontaneous. Similarly potencies are
known through the habits that perfect them, and the essence
of the soul -- vegetable, animal, human -- is known through
its potencies.[3] In contrast, intentionality analysis begins
from the data of consciousness. Its basic terms and relations
are derived, not from a metaphysics, but from the data of
consciousness. Basic terms name conscious and intentional
operations. Basic relations name the dynamic relations

that consciously and intentionally lead from one operation
to another.

    The transition from faculty psychology to intentionality
analysis has two advantages. First, it puts cognitional
theory in line with the rest of modern science. The rest of
modern science derives its basic terms and relations, not from
a metaphysics, but from its own resources. When cognitional
theory is expressed as intentionality analysis, it too derives
its basic terms and relations from its own resources. The
second advantage of intentionality analysis is that it eliminates
the old discussion over intellectualism and voluntarism.
It eliminates voluntarism by replacing a vague concept, will,
by a precise concept, conscience. It eliminates intellectualism
by distinguishing four levels of conscious and intentional
operations: each higher level sublates the preceding levels
by introducing a new principle, setting up a new goal,
preserving the integrity of previous levels, reorganizing
them, and vastly extending their significance and relevance.
So understanding sublates experiencing, judging sublates
understanding and experiencing, and conscience sublates
experiencing, understanding, and judging.

    The last of these sublations was not expected by some
readers of Insight. Both the speculative intellect of the
Aristotelians and the pure reason of pre-Kantian rationalists
were thought superior to conscience. Indeed the necessary
truths at which they arrived were thought to be the salutary
guides that directed conscience. But already in Insight
I had distinguished between analytic propositions and analytic
principles. Analytic propositions were tautologies. Analytic
principles were tautologies verified in their defined sense.
Because they had to be verified, they were not necessarily
true but only de facto true.[4]   Finally, one arrives at

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3)   S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Aristotelis Librum de Anima,
   II, lect. vi ##304-308, Taurini: Marietti, 1948.
4)   B. Lonergan, Insight, London and New York, 1957 ff.,
   pp. 304 ff.

a puzzling remark. He concludes to a first mover and adds
that this all understand to be God. He concludes to a first
efficient cause and adds that all name such a cause God.
He concludes to an intrinsically necessary being, and adds
that all/it is God. He concludes to a cause of all the
reality and goodness and other perfection in things, and that cause
not all but we say is God.

a puzzling remark. He proves that there exists a first mover,
and then adds: ".. this all understand to be God." He proves
that there exists a first efficient cause, and then adds:
".. which all name God." He proves there must exist a being
that in itself is necessary, only to add: ".. that all say is
God." He proves that there must exist a being that is the
cause of the reality and goodness and every other perfection
in all other beings, and adds: ".. and this we say is God."
He proves that there must exist an intelligent being ᴎ
that directs all other beings to their ends, and adds:
".. and this we say is God."

Now what puzzles me is that most people have not
conceived God as a first mover, or a first efficient cause,
or an intrinsically necessary being.

                              true
what is only <u>de facto</u>/by following a method, by observing
the prescriptions laid down by a good conscience.

        The first difference between my earlier and later positions,
           that
then, was/my earlier intentionality analysis became an explicit
rejection of faculty psychology. A second difference was
the introduction of the question about God. Chapter nineteen
of <u>Insight</u> was concerned to work out an answer to that question
within a highly sophisticated context. But chapter four of
<u>Method in Theology</u> considers the question as prior to the
answer, more basic than the answer and, unlike the answer,
arising in any context whatever simply in virtue of human
intelligence, human reasonableness, human responsibility.
Particularly today it is far more urgent to show that the
question of God exists than to attempt to work out an answer
in terms of this or that philosophy or mentality.

        A third difference arose when I directed my attention,
not to the philosophic answer to the question of God, but
to the specifically religious answer to the question of God.
That specifically religious answer I found in God's gift
of his grace. To that gift St. Paul referred when he said
that ".. God's love has flooded our inmost heart through
the Holy Spirit he has given us" (Rom. 5, 5). That gift
he described when he wrote: "For I am convinced that there
is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or
superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it
shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths --
nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love
of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8, 38 f.). To the
exercise of that gift we are commanded in the Old Testament
and the New: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is the only
Lord; love the Lord your God will all your heart, with
all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength"
(Mark 12, 29 f.; Deut. 6, 4 f.).

        As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning,
as all our questioning is a manifestation of the dynamism of
the spirit of man, so the gift of God's love is the basic

age.

At the time my response was brief and merely factual.
I had been conducting a general investigation of methods
preparatory to writing on the method of theology. I had
been informed that in one year's time I was due to be
shipped off to Rome to teach theology at the Gregorian.
Aware of the burdens of teaching there, I decided to round
off what I had written under the title, Insight, A Study of
Human Understanding, and to postpone my main project until
such time as providence might provide. My chapter nineteen
was part of the process of rounding things off.

Providence did provide, and now I can give a more
nuanced response. Proof, in any serious meaning of the
word, presupposes the erection of a system in which all
terms and relations have been assigned exact meanings
and all procedures from some propositions to others are
rigorous. But the system, in turn, has its presuppositions.
It presupposes a horizon, a world-view, a differentiation
of consciousness that has unfolded under the conditions
and circumstances of a particular culture and a particular
historical period.

Now today we know much more about these presuppositions
than was known in the classicist period. That period was
fully aware of the differences between Greeks and barbarians,
between Roman citizens and subject peoples, between
civilized men and savages, between the educated and the
uneducated. But the prevalent notion of culture was not
empirical but normative. It did not think of culture as
the set of meanings and values that happened to inform any
of myriad different ways in which men lived and worked.
For it there was just one culture. It consisted in the
right set of meanings and values. To possess it anyone
might aspire by taking the proper means to that end. Of
course, not everyone was to be expected to succeed, for
there were enormous advantages in having the right family
background, attending the right school, knowing the right
people.

two apologies, at least you can respect him for his martyrdom.

two apologies, at least you can infer from his martyrdom that
he had some reason for his writing.

A third step arose in the interpretation of scripture.
Christians did not worship the solitary God of the Jews,
or the many gods of the pagans. They worshiped one God and
with him his Son and his Holy Spirit. The position was not
without its obscurity. Obscurity lends itself to misinter-
pretation. Misinterpretation can be met only by clarification.
Efforts at clarification lead one to the use of technical
tools. In illustration of this process we recall that in
the early years of the third century an otherwise unknown
Praxeas asserted that the Father and the Son were one and the
same, so that it was the Father that was crucified on Calvary.
He was met by Tertullian who wrote a treatise, <u>Against Praxeas</u>,
in which Stoic influence seems apparent. He asked who would
deny that God is a body, and Ernest Evans has learnedly
expanded on Tertullian's sources, his meaning, and other
Christian writers supposing a similar view.[2]

2)   Ernest Evans, <u>Tertullian's Treatise against Praxeas</u>,
      <u>The Text edited with an Introduction, Translation, and</u>
      <u>Commentary</u>, London; S. P. C. K., 1948, pp. 234 ff.
      See also M. Spanneut, <u>Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise</u>,
      <u>De Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie</u>, Paris 1957.

A fourth step was taken/when Clement of Alexandria
denied that biblical anthropomorphisms were to be taken
literally,[3] and when Origen adopted much Middle Platonism
the better to assert and defend the strict spirituality of
God and of the human soul.[4]

[Footnote 14 continued]

in De princ., II, 2; Koetschau, 111, 28 - 113, 10.

15) B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Rome; Gregorian Press, 1964,
II, 98 - 112.

intruder and idol. On the other hand, it leads uninterested
students of theology to rationalize their indolence by pro-
claiming systemtic theology to be just so much more philosophy
and so of no religious importance.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the union
of philosophy of God with systematic theology is but a single
aspect of a more general trend. What is most permanent in a
modern discipline lies in its method. Beyond the special
methods of particular disciplines, there is the transcendental
method that underpins all methods. It does not ask what
are physicists doing when they are knowing, what do chemists
do when they are knowing, what are biologists about when they
are knowing. It asks the completely general questions that
call for completely general answers. It is cognitional
theory: what are we doing when we arc coming to know. It
also is epistemology: why is doing that knowing. It finally
is metaphysics: what do we know when we do it. As in other
disciplines, so also in theology transcendental method
provides its basic framework.

intruder and idol. On the other hand, the separation leads
uninterested students to justify their ways by proclaiming
that systematic theology is just so much more philosophy and
so of no religious concern.

In conclusion I wish to point out that the union of
philosophy of God with systematic theology is just a single
instance of what I consider a general trend. For a theology
is concerned to work out the significance of a religion within
a cultural matrix. A contemporary theology, accordingly,
is worked out in the context of modern science, modern philo-
sophy, and modern scholarship. In all three method is fundamental.
So theology today, to be an academic discipline, has to work

out its method. But working out the method is part of theology,
and so certain philosophic tasks thereby c

intruder and idol. On the other hand, the separation leads uninterested students to justify their ways by proclaiming that systematic theology is just so much more philosophy and so of no religious concern.

In conclusion let me point out that the union of philosophy of God with the functional specialty, systematics, is just one aspect of the integration of what in the past, the more recent past, were considered to be basically distinct and to be kept apart. The origin of that distinction and separation was the conceptualism I attacked in five articles in Theological Studies during the late forties and in the sixties in book form under the title, Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas.[5] By conceptualism is meant two things: first, it is not aware that concepts are either the anticipation or the result of acts of understanding; secondly, it assumes that acts of understanding are the result of comparing concepts. On this position the one and only issue is who has the correct concepts, an issue that can and has been debated for centuries. On the contrary position, the proximate question is who understands the data more accurately and more fully, while the fundamental question is whose method leads to an ever fuller and more accurate understanding of the data.

5)   <u>Method in Theology</u>, p. 132.

6)   See Karl Rahner, "Transcendental Theology," <u>Sacramentum</u>
<u>Mundi</u>, 6(1970), 287-289.

7)   <u>Theol. Stud</u>., 7(1946),349-392; 8(1947), 35-79; 404-444;
10(1949), 3-40; 359-393. <u>Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas</u>,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, and London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968.

from scriptural or patristic writings, such as were Peter
Lombard's _Libri quattuor sententiarum_. Finally, it could
be applied to all the questions that arose in an exposition
of the whole of Christian doctrine, as in Thomas Aquinas'
Summa theologiae.

However, the larger the scale of these operations,
the more urgent became a new problem. It was all very
well to attempt a reconciliation in the theologians'sources,
but one's labor would be lost if the reconciliations them-
selves were incoherent.

can be settled demonstatively. It was an approach that
eventually collided with the Christian doctrine of divine
omnipotence

can be settled demonstratively. It was an approach that
could not be reconciled with the Christian view of divine
omnipotence: God could do anything that did not involve an
internal contradiction. Eventually it brought to light
the argument: it would be contradictory to advance both
that I intuit and I do not intuit an object as both existent
and present; but it is not contradictory to say that I intuit
an object as existent and present when the object neither is
present nor exists; and since God can do anything that does not
involve an internal contradiction, how do you know that you
do not live in a world in which objects, which neither are
present nor exist, are intuited as existing and as present.[19]

19) See DS 1033, 1048

But the Augustinian-Aristotelian conflict also left its
mark on other schools. Fr. Congar has expressed his surprise
that Scotist vocabulary became the vocabulary of subsequent
scholasticism.[20] Interest became absorbed in systematic
theology to bring about a neglect of sources. Capreolus
wrote a commentary, not on Peter Lombard's Sentences, but on
Aquinas' Scriptum super Sententiis. Theology painted itself
into a corner when Cajetan and his many followers in Spain
wrote commentaries on Aquinas' purely systematic work, the
Summa theologiae.

20) Yves Congar, A History of Theology, New York: Doubleday,
  1968, pp. 130 f.

philosophy of God be taught by theologians in a department of
theology.

My aim, of course, is not to disqualify philosophers from
speaking about God or from teaching their doctrine about God.
My aim is to legitimate theologians in the performance of a
task that under former suppositions was not theirs and under
contemporary suppositions I believe to be theirs.

Let me note just what the former suppositions were and
what are the suppositions that have replaced them. The former
suppositions were Aristotelian. They took it for granted that
the basic discipline was metaphysics, and that all other disciplines
had to derive their basic terms and basic relations by adding
further determinations to the basic terms and basic relations
set up by metaphysics. They took it for granted that all
disciplines had their field defined by a material object and
their interest defined by a formal object.

In my opinion and, perhaps, only in my opinion contemporary
suppositions are quite different. The basic discipline is,
not metaphysics, but cognitional theory. It is cognitional
theory, that is not a faculty psychology presupposing a
metaphysics, but an intentionality analysis that presupposes
the data of consciousness. From this cognitional theory
there can be derived an epistemology, and from the cognitional
theory and the epistemology there can be derived a metaphysics.
Neither the cognitional theory nor the epistemology nor the
metaphysics supplies other disciplines with their basic terms
and relations or with the nucleus of their basic terms and
relations. However, they do supply other disciplines with
a rudimentary or transcendental account of their methods.
They provide such an account both for the sciences, natural
or human, that aim at establishing unversal principles and
laws, and for scholarship which aims at the interpretation of
particular texts and particular series of events.

In conclusion I wish to remark that I have no doubt that
on Aristotleian suppositions the philosophy of God and the
functional specialty, systematics, are not only distinct but
also separate. My view that they are distinct but need not be
separate is proposed only on the supposition that Aristotelian
suppositions are out of date.