

~~First, there is the neighbouring notion of soul. We are subjects only when we are conscious~~

A first cause, then, is the objectivity of truth. For the criterion by which, I believe, we arrive at the truth is a virtually unconditioned.<sup>1</sup> But an unconditioned has no conditions. It is independent simply. It cannot depend on the subject. So it is that truth is never a matter of who said so, of why he said so

A third source of neglect of the subject is the metaphysical account of the soul. We are subjects only when we are conscious. We are more fully subjects as we become actively intelligent, actively reasonable, actively free and responsible. But we have souls whether we are awake ~~or~~ or asleep, whether we are saints or sinners, whether we are geniuses or ~~and~~ imbeciles. Moreover, to study ourselves as subjects we have to enter into ourselves, attend to our inner activities, note their relationships, discover how they make us what we are. But the study of the soul begins from objects; the analysis of objects leads to <sup>acts, habits, and</sup> potencies; the combination of potencies reveals the essence of the soul; and this whole list ~~of~~ of objects, acts, ~~and~~ habits, potencies, essence, and soul is a list of objects to be attributed to organic compounds, plants, animals, and men.<sup>3</sup>

Note, please, that I am not saying that the doctrine of soul is false or even that it is misleading. Again, the doctrine of soul is in no way incompatible with the subject's self-appropriation. But the doctrine of soul is distracting. ~~It is easier to grasp that the than sets a far easier~~ It sets a far easier task than the self-appropriation of the subject. Commonly it fails to point out that one has far more to learn about oneself than can be learnt from the metaphysics of the soul. And so it may be said to be source of the neglect of the subject.

A third defect of conceptualism has to do with the notion of being. Conceptualists make no ~~sped~~ mistake when they speak of the concept of being, when they find it at least implicitly in every concept, when they emphasize its importance and discuss its character. But they do not derive concepts from acts of understanding, and so they do not advert to the ~~main~~ problem to be faced when that derivation is accepted. For a finite understanding does not understand being. It follows that in a finite understanding a concept of being cannot be an expression of an understanding of being. But if we do not understand being, then how do we manage to conceive it?

It is only by answering this question that

A third defect of conceptualism has to do with the notion of being. Insight into sensible representations arises as a response to inquiry, to the deep-set wonder that promotes human consciousness from sensitive to intelligent living. Such promotion consists in intending what as yet is unknown. Like  $x$  and  $y$  in algebra, it is heuristic. It heads for an unknown that now is a to-be-known. Reflection, moreover, reveals this intending to be unrestricted: we inquire about everything and, in each case, we want to know all about it; questions never come to an end; answers only provide the basis for still further, deeper questions. Now an unrestricted intention, an intention intending everything about everything, is an intention of being. But it is an intention not of anything abstract but of the concrete

is represented by a single concept or by several connected concepts. So judgement is the step that makes the difference between merely thinking and knowing. Prior to judgement one may think of essence and one may think of existence. Only in judgement can one know either essence or existence