adequately through the properties they possess and the laws they obey. Over and above the specific nature there is only individuation by matter, so that knowledge of one instance of a species is knowledge of any instance. What is true of species in general is also true of the human species, of the one faith coming through Jesus Christ, of the one charity given through the gift of the Holy Spirit. It follows that the diversities of peoples, cultures, social arrangements can involve only a difference in the dress in which church doctrines are expressed, but cannot involve any diversity in church doctrine itself.

Now later we shall have to investigate the permanence of doctrines called dogmas. But at once we have to take issue with classicist assumptions regarding species. First, it would seem that species evolve. Secondly, human individuals differ from one another, not only through individuation by matter, but also by their mentalities, their characters, their ways of life. For human concepts and courses of action are products and expressions of human understanding, human understanding develops over time, and it develops differently under the different human and environmental conditions of different places and times. Possible courses of action are the discoveries of human intelligence. At times they may be guided remotely by abstract principles and laws, but in their concreteness they are grasped by insight into concrete situations. By further insight the probable results of possible courses of action are estimated. Before action occurs there is required a free and hopefully responsible decision. When action has occurred, the situation has changed in some respect, and further insight alone can guide further fruitful action.

Spontaneously there occur in the individuals of a group processes of imitating, of teaching and learning, of watching, trying to do the same oneself, failing and watching again and trying again till practice makes perfect. The result is an accumulation of insights that enable one to deal successfully with the recurrent situations that have been dealt with successfully in the past and, as well, the alertness that notices what is novel in a new situation and proceeds to deal tentatively with that. It is common sense that guides us in all practical affairs and in all human (non-professional) relationships.

Such is human historicity. It is the fact that human living is informed by meanings, that meanings are the product of ine intelligence, that human intelligence develops cumulatively, that such cumulative development differs in different histories, and that the living, knowing, and doing of each man is marked by the historical conditions of his time and place.

Classicism itself was one very notable and, indeed, very noble instance of such cumulative development. It is not mistaken in its assumption that there is something substantial and common to human nature and to human activity. Its oversight is its failure to grasp that that something substantial and common also is something quite open. It may be expressed in the four transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But the situations to which men attend are an almost endless manifold. There vary enormously the ~~The~~ type and the degree of intellectual and moral development brought to deal with the situations. The standard for both for human reasonableness and for human responsibility can be satisfied only by a life-long devotion to human authenticity.

Such objections to classicism are theoretical. But the factual objections are far more massive. They are to be found

Fifthly, there is the emergence of the static system as in Greek logic, mathematics, science, philosophy. It is concerned to set up an explanatory account of the universe and its various regions and contents. It defines its terms, explicitly states their mutual relations,

Fifthly, there is the discovery of systematic thinking and of the system, logic, that guides it. Its effect is to reveal the universe as mediated by systematic meaning

Fifthly, there is the emergence of systematic meaning. Common sense knows the meaning of the general terms it employs, not because it possesses definitions that hold omni et soli, but as the analysts would contend because it understands how these terms are used correctly. ~~The fact, accordingly, that~~ So it was no paradox that neither Socrates nor his interlocutors could define ~~their~~ very familiar terms. On the contrary, the search for definitions was the beginning of a search for a single, ordered view of man and his world. Fourth-century Greece saw the emergence of systems in various fields. They tended in part to correct common sense and in part to confine it to its proper realm. They criticized earlier religion and earlier literature

Fifthly, there is the emergence of systematic meaning. Common sense knows the meaning of the words it employs, not because it possesses definitions that hold omni et soli but, as an analyst would contend, because it understands how to use the words appropriately. So it was no paradox that neither Socrates nor his interlocutors could define terms they constantly employed. Rather it was the beginning of systematic meaning which develops technical terms, assigns them their interrelations, constructs models, and adjustments them until there is reached some well-ordered and explanatory view that accounts for this or that realm of experience. As systematic thinking flourishes there emerges a world quite different from the world mediated by commonsense meaning. The new world is the world mediated by systematic meaning. Aristotle distinguished the two as what is prior for us and what is prior in itself. Eddington ~~did by distinguished them be by speaking of his two tables. now is the time for all good men~~ distinguished them by speaking of his two tables: one brown, solid, heavy; the other mostly empty space with and there an unimaginable wavicle.

~~The successful emergence of system brings about a critique of earlier common sense, religion, literature. The critique, however, is apt to judge the earlier not by the standards it could have had by but by the standards of a later time~~

Sixthly, there is the emergence of humanism. The successful emergence of humanism system implies

was necessarily so. But in modern times the aim of the system is to express whatever understanding has now been attained and to prepare the way for another and better understanding that the future will express in a new and better system.

We have been presenting a thumbnail sketch of the ~~different~~ differentiations of human consciousness, and our purpose has been ~~to provide the basis the basis for an account now is the time for~~ to pave the way for an answer to the question, What is the possibility of the development of dogma? How can mortal man develop what he would not know if God had not revealed it?

To that question, not indeed the whole, but at least a notable part of the answer is that dogmas have meaning and relevance within contexts, that human consciousness differentiates to change the contexts within which dogmas are assimilated, that consequently the dogmas are recast to have meaning and relevance within their new contexts.

Thus, the Greek councils mark the beginning of a movement towards systematic meaning and technical terminology. ~~Thus,~~ For example, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, ~~defined at~~ affirmed at Nicea, is not some undefined speculation about the divine substance or essence. It means that all that is true of the Father, also is true of the Son, except that the Son ~~pap~~ is not the Father. As Athanasius put it: <u>eadem de Filio quae de Patre dicuntur, excepto Patris nomine</u>.[7] As the Trinitarian Preface to the Canon of the Mass put it: <u>Quod enim de tua gloria, revelante te, credimus, hoc de Filio tuo, hoc de Spiritu sancto sine differentia discretionis sentimus</u>.

7) Athanasius, Oratio III c. Arianos, 4; <u>MG</u> 26, 329 A.

Again, the council of Chalcedon, in the second paragraph of its decree, introduced the terms, person and nature. But what these terms refer to concretely was plain from the first paragraph which asserts ~~asserts~~ that it is one and the same Son our Lord Jesus Christ that is perfect in divinity and the same

perfect in humanity, truly God and the same truly man, consubstantial with the Father in his divinity and the same consubstantial with us in his humanity, born of the Father before the ages in his divinity and these last days the same... born of the Virgin Mary in his humanity.[8]

~~It may be wondered, since the meaning of the for~~

Since the meaning of the this first paragraph is so plain, it may be wondered why there later added such terms as person and nature. The answer, I feel, is the post-systematic literary context. It was aware of the question whether the divinity and the humanity were one and the same because the Son was one and the same. It wanted to suggest ~~remark~~ that the Son was one and the same person but the divinity and the humanity were two natures. But one moves out of the post-systematic literary context into the fully systematic context of Scholasticism if one goes on to raise the further question whether person and nature are just verbally or notionally or really distinct and, if really distinct, what is the nature of that real distinction.

Already in this chapter I have sketched the methodical, cumulative, ongoing efforts of the medieval schools to collect, classify, interpret the sources ~~sources~~ of its tradition and then to take the Aristotelian corpus ~~cou-verpus~~ as a substructure for building a systematic Christian world view.

perfect in humanity, truly God and the same truly man, consub-stantial with the Father in his divinity and the same consubstantial with us in his humanity, born of the Father before the ages in his divinity and these last days the same... born of the Virgin Many in his humanity.[8]

8) DS 301.

However, when we turn to the second paragraph with its mention of person and natures, we must advert to the fact that interpreters may assume any one of three possible contexts. They may assume the post-systematic literary context and then the term, person, denotes the "one and the same" that is the subject of predication, while the term, nature, refers to the quite distinct "divine" and "human" that in various ways are predicated of the one person. They may assume the later increasingly systematic contexts in which the burning questions were whether person and nature were verbally or notionally or really distinct and, if really distinct, what was the nature of that real distinction. Finally, they may assume that all systematic meaning, at least in theology, is to be abominated, and on that ground demand that the decree of Chalcedon be repudiated.

Now in my opinion the first assumption is historically correct; it is on the level of the doctrine of a communicatio idiomatum. The second assumption accords, not with the context of Chalcedon, but with the later context in which the Byzantine theologians discussed enupostasia and anupostasia while the Scholastics developed a theory of major and minor real distinctions. The third assumption, finally, expresses the ongoing protest on behalf of undifferentiated consciousness; systematic meaning is beyond its comprehension; therefore whatever entails

systematic meaning is to be repudiated.

But before one can consider the protest, one has to know something about the criminal. In its fundamental intention and style Scholasticism was a thorough-going effort to attain a coherent and orderly assimilation of the Christian tradition. The enormous differences between two great men, Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas, result from a century and a half of unremitting labors to assemble and classify the data, to work towards an understanding of them in commentaries, to digest them by resolving questions, and to ensure the coherence of multitudinous solutions by using the Aristotelian corpus as a substructure.

Now the greater part of this work resembles the medieval anticipations of modern science. What has often been described as a transition from the implicit to the explicit, really was the transition of Christian consciousness from a lesser to a fuller differentiation. It had been differentiated by common sense, by religion, by artistic and literary culture, and by a slight dose of the systematic. It now acquired a strong dose of the systematic. Terms were defined. Problems were solved. What had been lived and spoken of in one way, now became the object of reflex thought that reorganized, correlated, explained. About the middle of the twelfth century Peter Lombard worked out an explanatory definition of an old but ambiguous term, sacrament, and on this definition there were found to be seven sacraments in the Christian church. On each of the seven traditional doctrines were collected, ordered, clarified, presented. Again, the middle ages inherited from Augustine his affirmation of both divine grace and human liberty. For a long time it was difficult to say

systematic meaning is to be repudiated.

Before one can consider that protest, however, one has to evaluate the involvement of medieval Scholasticism in systematic meaning. In its its fundamental intention and style Scholasticism was a thorough-going effort to attain a coherent and orderly assimilation of the Christian tradition. The enormous differences between two great men, Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas, are the fruit of a century and a half of unremitting labors to assemble and classify the data, to interpret them in commentaries, to digest them by resolving problems, and eventually to make solutions coherent by using the Aristotelian corpus as a substructure. Now the greater part of this program resembles medieval anticipations of modern science. But the use of Aristotle proved to be a trap. On the one hand, he was the best available source for a reasoned view of the universe. On the other hand, he represented only an early stage of human development -- the emergence of systematic meaning. He did not anticipate the later emergence of a method that envisaged an ongoing succession of systems, the later emergence of a Philologie that made it its aim to reconstruct the constructions of mankind, the later ideal of a philosophy both critical and historically-minded that would cut to the root of philosophic disputes and would embrace in a single view the differentiations of human consciousness and the epochs of human history. So it has been in the long run that Aristotle provided an ample and congenial habitation that too many people were too reluctant to abandon.

There is, I suppose, no doubt that the systematic thinking of medieval and later theologians influenced church doctrines. But the precise nature and extent of that influence is to be discerned only through a historical investigation of the emergence of each doctrine. General treatments of the matter would regard the history of opposed systems and of the ecclesiastical and theological censures. For the existence of opposed schools within the one church has kept clear the disinction between church doctrines and theological doctrines especially in the areas in which the opposition was sharp. Again, ecclesiastical and theological censures not only distinguish matters of faith from theological opinions but also envisage a series of intermediate positions.[9]

On ecclesiastical censures see Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum (Herder 1963), Index systematicus H 1d and H 1bb, pages 848 and 847.

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sacra mens

segregational

define + commit

organize data

what finite thing did not exist gratuitously and, while there were attempts to reconcile the necessity of grace with human liberty, the solutions were not happy. But about the year 1230 discovered a key that released a series of developments over more than forty years. The key was the distinction between two entitatively disproportionate orders: in the first there was nature, reason, friendliness, and the good opinion of one's neighbors; in the other was grace, faith, charity, and merit before God. On this showing grace and freedom pertained to distinct orders; it became possible to write treatises on freedom as such; it further became possible to investigate what man could and could not do with and without grace.

There is, I suppose, no doubt that the systematic thinking of medieval and later theologians influenced church doctrines.

any finite thing
that anything existed that was not God's free gift

that there existed any finite thing that was not God's free gift and yet, though it was plain that not everything was properly a grace, still lists of graces properly so called not only differed from one another but also betrayed not a little arbitrariness. At the same time it was very difficult for a theologian to say what he meant by liberty. Philosophers could say it was immunity from necessity, but theologians could not agree that it was immunity from the necessity of grace; man needed God's grace to be truly free. But what tortured the twelfth century found its solution in the thirteenth. About the year 1230 Philip the Chancellor discovered the key that released a series of developments that continued for over forty years. The key was a distinction between two entitatively disproportionate orders: grace is above nature, faith above reason, charity above human friendliness, and merit before God above the good opinion of one's neighbors. The distinction made it possible to think out the nature of grace without discussing liberty, to think out the nature of liberty without discussing grace and, finally, to work out the relations between grace and liberty.[9]

9) See my Grace and Freedom, Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, London (Darton, Longman & Todd) and Notre Dame (Notre Dame University Press) 1971.

So much for what I consider the bright side of medieval theological development. But now I must express my reservations. I have no doubt that it was necessary for medieval thinkers to turn to some outside source to obtain a systematic substructure for their theology. I have no doubt that they could do no better than turn to Aristotle. But today it is very obvious that

Aristotle has been superseded. Magnificently he represented an early stage of human development -- the emergence of systematic meaning. But he did not anticipate the later emergence of a method that envisaged an ungoing succession of systems. He did not envisage the later emergence of a Philologie that made its aim the historical reconstruction of the constructions of mankind. He did not formulate the later ideal of a philosophy both critical and historically-minded that would cut to the root of philosophic disputes and would ground a unified view that embraced the differentiations of human consciousness and the epochs of human history.

Not only has Aristotle been superseded, but also certain defects have become manifest. His ideal of science in terms of necessity has been said aside not only by modern empirical science but also by modern mathematics. ~~{That ideal}~~ Again, there is to his thinking an insufficient attention to the difference between common names and scientific ~~{technical}~~ terms with the consequent tendency to a verbalism that attributes to common names the properties of scientific ~~{technical}~~ terms. Both of these defects reappear, vastly magnified, in ~~{later Scholasticism}~~ ~~{forth}~~ fourteenth and fifteenth century Scholasticism, where an excessively rigorous ideal bred first scepticism and then decadence, while there developed a verbalism later mocked, among others, by Erasmus and Molière.

~~Now the theological develop now is the time for all good~~

Now the development of theological doctrines, effected by Scholastic theologians, exerted no little influence on the formulation of church doctrines. However, one can never proceed from the systematic meaning entertained by a theologian to the conclusion that that meaning must be the meaning

The fully ~~medieval co~~ metaphysical context emerges

intended in the formulation of a church doctrine. There has ~~ale~~ always been a plurality of systems, considerable rivalry ~~mo~~ among their upholders and, while the Catholic church has had a predilection for the doctrine of Aquinas, it has never taught that the Thomist system is true and the others false. Further, there exist both in theological notes and in ~~ecclesiastica~~ ecclesiastical censures a long series of distinctions that not only set off the difference between truths of faith and theological opinions but also present a sh whole spectrum of intermediate differences.[10] Accordingly, just as we conceived

10) See E. J. Fortman, "Notes, Theological", NCE 10,523; also the systematic index in DS at H 1d and H 1bb, pp. 848 and 847.

patristic thought to be not systematic but rather post-systematic, so too Scholastic thought, while it may be genuinely systematic in any given theologian, can be expected to be no more than post-systematic when its influence appears in a church doctrine.

There remain the developments that in Catholic circles are going forward at the present time. There has been the acceptance, first in patristic and medieval studies, and more recently in the field of scripture, of sound historical method. There is going forward an ecumenical movement and this raises the question of the permanent validity of Scholastically ~~inspired church doctrines. Granted that the Scholastic theologians systematized what they found already existing in church teaching and practice, still of themselves systems are not definitive. Granted the necessity of a teaching authority in the church, still~~

about doctrinal change. The cultural change, I would argue, does entail a change in methodological doctrine. But does such cultural or methodological change involve change in theological or in church doctrines?

century Scholasticism. The excessively rigorous ideal of science provides some explanation for fa the emergence first of scepticism and then of decadence. The blurred distinction between common names and scientifically elaborated terms encouraged the blunder that common names referred to essences., a verbalism later mocked, among others, by Ers Erasmus and Molière.

Our next topic is the interaction between church doctrine and systematic theology. Systematic theology is an amplification of church doctrine, and church doctrine finds an arsenal in systematic theology. The precise relations between the two on any particular issue is expressed in a set of theological notes and ecclesiastical censures[12] that distinguish not only truths of faith and theological opinions but also a whole spectrum of intermediate positions. Further, in Catholic circles

12) See E. J. Fortman, "Notes, theological", NCE 10, 523; and the systematic index in DS at H 1d and H 1bb, pp. 848 and 847.

church doctrine is one, while systems are many, x with considerable rivalry among their upholders. While the Catholic church has had a predilection for Thomism and has recommended him to hem theologians, it has not taught that Thomism is true. On the contrary it would be a mistake

century Scholasticism. The excessively rigorous ideal of science provides some explanation for the emergence first of scepticism and then of decadence. The blurred distinction between common names and systematic terms has some responsibility for the verbalism for which Scholasticism has been so bitterly reproached.

Now as medieval theology became deeply involved in the use of systematic meaning, so too church doctrines from the middle ages right up to Vatican II have been involved in a meaning that is post-systematic. In general, one will not understand the church doctrine with any exactitude if one does not know one's theology. But it is also true that one will not understand it with any exactitude if one does not know what is called the stylus curiae. Still, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. The one way actually to understand the doctrine is to do the necessary research and exegesis.

In general, one does not expect to find church doctrine coincident with theological system. For the church is intending to teach the faithful what is true, while the theologian is attempting to communicate some understanding of church teaching. Again, in Catholic circles, church doctrine is one, but systems are many; the church stands apart from the many, and the many expect their right to remain Catholics to be respected. Finally, the precise relations between church doctrines and theological systems is a carefully mapped terrain. Theological notes and ecclesiastical censures distinguish not only truths of faith and theological opinions but also a whole spectrum of intermediate positions.[12]

12) See E. J. Fortman, "Notes, theological", NCE 10, 523; and the systematic index in DS at H 1d and H 1bb, pp. 848 and 847.

This interaction of systematic theology and church doctrine was attacked explosively at the Reformation and once more is under scrutiny in the contemporary ecumenical movement.

7. The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part Two

The first part of this section did not take us beyond a theology that had as its substructure the thought of Aristotle.

7. The Ongoing Discovery of Mind: Part Two

The discovery of mind in classical thought is only part of the story. There has been the discovery of method in modern science, the discovery of scholarship in modern exegesis and history, and the exigence for a philosophy at once critical and historically-minded. These more recent differentiations of consciousness have antiquated the former Aristotelian and classicist substructure, and they have set up an exigence for a new substructure