Intersubjectivity appears not only in spontaneous mutual aid but also in some of the ways in which feelings are communicated. Here we shall be reporting Max Scheler who distinguished community of feeling, fellow-feeling, psychic contagion, and emotional identification.

See Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburgh and Louvain 1965, pp. 56-66.

Both community of feeling and fellow-feeling are intentional responses that presuppose the apprehension of objects that arouse the feeling. In community of feeling two or more persons respond in parallel fashion to the same object. In fellow-feeling a first person responds to an object, and a second responds to the manifested feeling of the first. So community of feeling would be illustrated by the sorrow felt by both parents for their dead child, but fellow-feeling would be felt by a third party moved by their sorrow. Again, in community worship there is community of feeling inasmuch as worshippers are similarly concerned with God, but there is fellow-feeling inasmuch as some are moved to devotion by the prayerful attitude of others.

In contrast psychic contagion and emotional identification have a vital rather than an intentional basis. Psychic contagion is a matter of sharing another's emotion without adverting to the object of the emotion. One grins when others are laughing although one does not know what they find funny. One becomes sorrowful when others are weeping although one does not know the cause of their grief. An on-looker, without undergoing another's ills, is caught up in the feeling of extreme pain expressed on the face of the sufferer. Such contagion seems to be the mechanism of

of mass-excitement in panics, revolutions, revolts, demonstrations, strikes, where in general there is a disappearance of personal responsibility, a domination of drives over thinking, a decrease of the intelligence level, and a readiness for submission to a leader. Needless to say, such contagion can be deliberately provoked, built up, exploited by political activists, by the entertainment industry, by religious and especially pseudo-religious leaders.

In emotional identification either personal differentiation is as yet undeveloped or else there is a retreat from personal differentiation to vital unity. Undeveloped differentiation has its basic illustration in the emotional identification of mother and infant. But it also appears in the identifications of primitive mentality and, again, in the earnestness of a little girl's play with her doll; she identifies herself with her mother and at the same time projects herself into the doll. Retreat from differentiation is illustrated by Scheler in various ways. It is his account of hypnosis. It occurs in sexual intercourse when both partners undergo a suspension of individuality and fall back into a single stream of life. In the group mind members identify with their leader and spectators with their team; in both cases the group coalesces in a single stream of instinct and feeling. In the ancient mysteries the mystic becomes divine in a state of ecstasy; and in the writings of later mystics experiences with a pantheist implication are not infrequently described.

2. Intersubjective Meaning

Besides the intersubjectivity of action and of feeling, there also are intersubjective communications of meaning. This I propose to illustrate by borrowing a phenomenology of a smile largely from Suzanne Langer's Feeling and Form.

S. K. Langer, Feeling and Form, New York 1953.

First, then, a smile does have a meaning. It is not just a certain combination of movements of lips, facial muscles, eyes. It is a combination with a meaning. Because that meaning is different from the meaning of a frown, a scowl, a stare, a glare, a snicker, a laugh, it is named a smile. Because we all know that meaning exists, we do not go about the streets smiling at everyone we meet. We know we should be misunderstood.

Next, a smile is highly perceptible. For our perceiving is not just a function of the impressions made on our senses. It has an orientation of its own and it selects, out of a myriad of others, just those impressions that can be constructed into a pattern with a meaning. So one can converse with a friend on a noisy street, disregarding the meaningless surrounding tumult, and picking out the band of sound waves that has a meaning. So too a smile, because of its meaning, is easily perceived. Smiles occur in an enormous range of variations of facial movements, of lighting, of angle of vision. But even an incipient, suppressed smile is not missed, for the smile is a Gestalt, a patterned meaning, and it is recognized as a whole.

Both the meaning of the smile and the act of smiling are natural and spontaneous. We do not learn to smile as we learn to walk, to talk,

to swim, to skate. Commonly we do not think of smiling and then do it. We just do it. Again, we do not learn the meaning of smiling as we learn the meaning of words. The meaning of the smile is a discovery we make on our own, and that meaning does not seem to vary from culture to culture, as does the meaning of gestures.

There is something irreducible to the smile. It cannot be explained by causes outside meaning. It cannot be elucidated by other types of meaning. Some illustration of this will be had by comparing the meaning of the smile with that of language.

Linguistic meaning tends to be univocal, but smiles have a wide variety of different meanings. There are smiles of recognition, of welcome, of friendliness, of friendship, of love, of joy, of delight, of contentment, of satisfaction, of amusement, of refusal, of contempt. Smiles may be ironic, sardonic, enigmatic, glad or sad, fresh or weary, eager or resigned.

Linguistic meaning may be true in two ways; true as opposed to mendacious and true as opposed to false. A smile may be simulated and so it may be true as opposed to mendacious, but it cannot be true as opposed to false.

Linguistic meaning contains distinctions between what we feel, what we desire, what we fear, what we think, what we know, what we wish, what we command, what we intend. The meaning of a smile is global; it expresses what one person means to another; it has the meaning of a fact and not the meaning of a proposition.

Linguistic meaning is objective. It expresses what has been objectified. But the meaning of the smile is intersubjective. It

supposes the interpersonal situation with its antecedents in previous encounters. It is a recognition and an acknowledgement of that situation and, at the same time, a determinant of the situation, an element in the situation as process, a meaning with its significance in the context of antecedent and subsequent meanings. Moreover, that meaning is not about some object. Rather it reveals or even betrays the subject, and the revelation is immediate. It is not the basis of some inference, but rather in the smile one incarnate subject is transparent or, again, hidden to another, and that transparency or hiddenness antedates all subsequent analysis that speaks of body and soul, or of sign and signified.

From smiles one might go on to all the facial or bodily movements or pauses, to all the variations of voice in tone, pitch, volume, and in silence, to all the ways in which our feelings are revealed or betrayed by ourselves or are depicted by actors on the stage. But our purpose is not to exhaust the topic but rather to point to the existence of a special carrier or embodiment of meaning, namely, human inter-subjectivity.

3. Art

Again I borrow from Suzanne Langer's Feeling and Form where art is defined as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern, and each term in this definition is carefully explained.

A pattern may be abstract or concrete. There is an abstract pattern in a musical score or in the indentations in the grooves of

a phonograph record. But there is concrete pattern in these colors, these tones, these volumes, these movements. The concrete pattern consists in the internal relations of colors, tones, volumes, movements. It does not consist in, say, the colors as unrelated and it does not consist in the colors as representative of something else.

Now the pattern of the perceived is also the pattern of the perceiving, and the pattern of the perceiving is an experiential pattern. But all perceiving is a selecting and organizing. Precisely because the perceived is patterned, it is easily perceived. So one can repeat a tune or melody but not a succession of street noises. So verse makes information memorable. Decoration makes a surface visible. Patterns achieve, perhaps, a special perceptibility by drawing on organic analogies. The movement is from root through trunk to branches, leaves, and flowers. It is repeated with varying variations. Complexity mounts and yet the multiplicity is organized into a whole.

A pattern is said to be pure inasmuch as it excludes alien patterns that instrumentalize experience. One's senses can become merely an apparatus for receiving and transmitting signals. At the red light the brake goes on and at the green the accelerator is pressed down. So there results the behavior of the ready-made subject in his ready-made world. Again, sense may function simply in the service of scientific intelligence. It submits to the alien pattern of conceptual genera and species, of theoretical schemes and models, of judgemental concern for evidence that confirms or opposes an opinion. Finally, sense may be reshaped by an a priori theory of experience. Instead of having its own proper life, sense is subordinated to some view drawn

from physics, physiology, or psychology. It is divided by an epistemology that thinks of impressions as objective and of their pattern as subjective. It is alienated by a utilitarianism that attends to objects just in the measure there is something in them for me to get out of them.

Not only are alien patterns to be excluded but also the pattern must be purely experiential. It is of the colors that are visible and not of the stereotypes that are anticipated. It is of shapes as visible and so in perspective and not of shapes as really constructed, as known perhaps to touch but not to sight. So too it is of the sounds in their actual tone, pitch, and volume, their overtones, harmonies, dissonances. To them accrue their retinue of associations, affects, emotions, incipient tendencies. Out of them may rise a lesson, but into them a lesson may not be intruded in the manner of didacticism, moralism, or social realism. To them also there accrues the experiencing subject with his capacity for wonder, for awe and fascination, with his openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, majesty.

The required purity of the existential pattern aims not at impoverishment but at enrichment. It curtails what is alien to Let experiencing find its full complement of feeling. It lets experiencing fall into its own proper patterns and take its own line of expansion, development, organization, fulfilment. So experiencing becomes rhythmic, one movement necessitating another and the other in turn necessitating the first. Tensions are built up to be resolved: variations multiply and grow in complexity yet remain within an organic unity that eventually rounds itself off.

Meaning, when fully developed, intends something meant. But the meaning of an experiential pattern is elemental. It is the conscious performing of a transformed subject in his transformed world. That world may be regarded as illusion, but it also may be regarded as more true and more real. We are transported from the space in which we move to the space within the picture, from the time of sleeping and waking, working and resting, to the time of the music, from the pressures and determinisms of home and office, of economics and politics to the powers depicted in the dance, from conversational and media use of language to the vocal tools that focus, mould, grow with consciousness. As his world, so too the subject is transformed. He has been liberated from being a replaceable part adjusted to a ready-made world and integrated within it. He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom.

It is possible to set within the conceptual field this elemental meaning of the transformed subject in his transformed world. But this procedure reflects without reproducing the elemental meaning. Art criticism and art history are like the thermodynamic equations, which guide our control of heat but, of themselves, cannot make us feel warmer or cooler.

The proper expression of the elemental meaning is the work of art itself. That meaning lies within the consciousness of the artist but, at first, it is only implicit, folded up, veiled, unrevealed, unobjectified. Aware of it, the artist has yet to get hold of it;

he is impelled to behold, inspect, dissect, enjoy, repeat it; and this means objectifying, unfolding, making explicit, unveiling, revealing.

The process of objectifying involves psychic distance. Where the elemental meaning is just experiencing, its expression involves detachment, distinction, separation from experience. While the smile or frown expresses intersubjectively the feeling as it is felt, artistic composition recollects emotion in tranquillity. It is a matter of insight into the elemental meaning, a grasp of the commanding form that has to be expanded, worked out, developed, and the subsequent process of working out, adjusting, correcting, completing the initial insight. There results an idealization of the original experiential pattern. Art is not autobiography. It is not telling one's tale to the psychiatrist. It is grasping what is or seems significant, of moment, concern, import, to man. It is truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point. It is the central moment with its proper implications, and they unfold without the distortions, interferences, accidental intrusions of the original pattern.

As the proper expression of the elemental meaning is the work of art itself, so too the proper apprehension and appreciation of the work of art is not any conceptual clarification or judicial weighing of conceptualized evidence. The work of art is an invitation to participate, to try it, to see for oneself. As the mathematician withdraws from the sciences that verify to explore possibilities of organizing data, so the work of art invites one to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world.

Footnote to page 10

Again, let me stress that I am not attempting to be exhaustive. For an application of the above analysis to different art forms in drawing and painting, statuary and architecture, music and dance, epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry, the reader must go to S. K. Langer, Feeling and Form, New York, 1953. The point I am concerned to make is that there exist quite distinct carriers or embodiments of meaning.

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4. Symbols.

A symbol is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling.

Feelings are related to objects, to one another, and to their subject. They are related to objects: one desires food, fears pain, enjoys a meal, regrets a friend's illness. They are related to one another through changes in the object: one desires the good that is absent, hopes for the good that is sought, enjoys the good that is present; one fears absent evil, becomes disheartened at its approach, sad in its presence. Again, feelings are related to one another through personal relationships: so love, gentleness, tenderness, intimacy, union go together; similarly, alienation, hatred, harshness, violence, cruelty form a group; so too there are such sequences as offence, contumacy, judgement, punishment and, again, offence, repentance, satisfaction, forgiveness. Further, feelings may conflict yet come together: one may desire despite fear, hope against hope, mix joy with sadness, love with hate, gentleness with harshness, tenderness with violence, intimacy with cruelty, union with alienation. Finally,

feelings are related to their subject: they are the mass and momentum and power of his conscious living, the actuation of his affective capacities, dispositions, habits, the effective orientation of his being.

The same objects need not evoke the same feelings in different subjects and, inversely, the same feelings need not evoke the same symbolic images. This difference in affective response may be accounted for by differences in age, sex, education, state of life, temperament, existential concern. But, more fundamentally, there is in the human being an affective development that may suffer aberrations. It is the history of that process that terminates in the person with a determinate orientation in life and with determinate affective capacities, dispositions, and habits. What such affective capacities, dispositions, habits are in a given individual can be specified by the symbols that awake determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols. Again, from assumptions about normality one can go on to conclude that the responses of a given individual are normal or not.

Symbols of the same affective orientation and disposition are affectively undifferentiated. Hence, they are interchangeable and they may be combined to increase their intensity and reduce their ambiguity. Such combination and organization reveal the difference between the esthetic and the symbolic; the monsters of mythology are just bizarre. Further, compound affects call for compound symbols, and each member of the compound may be a conglomeration of undifferentiated or only slightly differentiated symbols. So St. George and

the Dragon present at once all the values of ascensional symbolism and all the disvalues of its opposite. St. George is seated yet high on his horse; he is in the light and is free to use his arms; one hand guides the horse and the other manipulates the spear. But he could fall, be pressed down by the scaly monster, blinded by its smoke, burnt by its fire, crunched by its teeth, devoured in its maw.

Affective development, or aberration, involves a transvaluation and transformation of symbols. But what before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. So the symbols themselves change to express the new affective capacities and dispositions. So the conquest of terror can relegate the Dragon to insignificant fancy, but now it brings forth the meaning of Jonah's whale: a monster that swallowed a drowning man and three days later vomited him unharmed upon the shore. Inversely, symbols that do not submit to transvaluation and transformation seem to point to a block in development. It is one thing for a child, another for a man, to be afraid of the dark.

Symbols obey the laws not of logic but of image and feeling. For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the coincidentia oppositorum, of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level, but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns.

The symbol, then, has the power of recognizing and expressing what logical discourse abhors: the existence of internal tensions, incompatibilities, conflicts, struggles, destructions. A dialectical or methodical viewpoint can embrace, of course, what is concrete, contradictory, and dynamic. But the symbol did this before either logic or dialectic were conceived. It does this for those unfamiliar with logic and dialectic. Finally, it does it in a way that complements and fills out logic and dialectic, for it meets a need that these refinements cannot meet.

This need is for internal communication. Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche. Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate.

In that communication symbols have their proper meaning. It is an elemental meaning, not yet objectified, as the meaning of the smile prior to a phenomenology of the smile, or the meaning in the purely experiential pattern prior to its expression in a work of art. It is a meaning that fulfils its function in the imagining or perceiving subject as his conscious intentionality develops or goes astray or both, as he takes his stance to nature, with his fellow men , and before God. It is a meaning that has its proper context in the process of internal communication in which it occurs, and

it is to that context with its associated images and feelings, memories and tendencies that the interpreter has to appeal if he would explain the symbol.

To explain the symbol, of course, is to go beyond the symbol. It is to effect the transition from an elemental meaning in an image or precept to a linguistic meaning. Moreover, it is to use the context of the linguistic meaning as an arsenal of possible relations, clues, suggestions in the construction of the elemental context of the symbol. However, such interpretative contexts are many and, perhaps, this multiplicity only reflects the many ways in which human beings can develop and suffer deviation.

There are, then, the three original interpretative systems: the psychoanalysis of Freud, the individual psychology of Adler, the analytic psychology of Jung. But the initial rigidities and oppositions are less and less maintained by their successors. Charles Baudouin has introduced a psychagogy that considers Freud and Jung to be not opposed but complementary: he uses Freud in reverting to casual objects and Jung in attending to subjective development; and this complementarity would seem to be supported by Paul Ricoeur's long study that concludes Freudian thought to be an archeology of the subject that necessarily implies but does not explicitly acknowledge a forward-moving teleology. Again, there are marked tendencies among therapists to develop their own systems of

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Charles Baudouin, L'oeuvre de Jung, Paris, Payot, 1963.

Gilberte Aigrisse, "Efficacité du symbole en psychothérapie," Cahiers internationaux de symbolisme, no. 14, pp. 3-24.

interpretation or to treat interpretation as an art to be learnt. Finally, there are those that feel that therapeutic goals can be more effectively attained by pretty well withdrawing from the interpretation of symbols. So Carl Rogers makes it his aim to provide his client with an interpersonal situation in which the client can gradually come to self-discovery. At an opposite pole Frank Lake gets his theory from Pavlov and administers LSD 25 to clients thereby enabled to recall and confront traumata suffered in infancy.

Paul Ricoeur, De l'interprétation, Essai sur Freud, Paris, du Seuil, 1965.

Karen Horney's books exhibit a cumulative development. The Neurotic Personality of our Time, 1937; New Ways in Psychoanalysis, : Self-analysis, 1942 : Our Inner Conflicts, 1945: Neurosis and Human Growth, 1950. Published by W. W. Norton, New York.

Erich Fromm, The Forgotten Language, chapter six, The Art of Dream Interpretation, New York, Grove Press, 1957.

Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961.

Frank Lake, Clinical Theology, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966.

Concomitant with the foregoing movement there has been a parallel development outside the therapeutic context. Freud proposed not merely a method of therapy but also highly speculative accounts of man's inner structure and of the nature of civilization and of religion. But this extension of the therapeutic context over the whole of human concern has been met by the erection of non-therapeutic contexts in which symbols are studied and interpreted. Gilbert Durand has proceeded from a physiological basis in three dominant reflexes, maintaining one's balance, swallowing food, and mating, to organize vast masses of symbolic data, to balance the organization with a contrary organization, and to effect the synthesis by alternation of the two. In a great number of works Mircéa Eliade has collected, compared, integrated, explained the symbols of primitive religions. Northrop Frye has appealed to the cycles of day and night, the four seasons, and the course of an organism's growth and decline to construct a matrix from which might be derived the symbolic narratives of literature. Psychologists have turned from the sick to the well, indeed, to those that keep growing over a long lifetime, and there has even been raised the question whether mental illness really pertains to a merely medical context, whether the trouble is real guilt and not merely mistaken feelings of guilt. Finally, and most significant from a basic viewpoint, there is the existential approach that thinks of the dream, not as the twilight of life, but as its dawn, the beginning of the transition from impersonal existence to presence in the world, to constitution of oneself in one's world.

Notes to page 17

Varying viewpoints in Irwin G. Sarason, editor, Science and Theory in Psychoanalysis, Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand, 1965.

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Mircea Eliade, "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism," in Mircea Eliad and Joseph Kitagawa, editors, The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959, ^{2}1962.

Northrop Fyre, Fables of Identity, Studies in Poetic Mythology, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963.

There exists what is named a "Third Force" in psychology. It is described by A. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand, 1962, p. vi.

O. H. Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion, Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1961.

Ludwig Binswager, Le rêve et l'existence, Desclée 1954, Introduction (128 pp.) et notes de Michel Foucault. Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger, editors, Existence, A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, New York, Basic Books, 1958. Rollo May, editor, Existential Psychology, Random House, 1961. Rolly May, "The Significance of Symbols," in Symbolism in Religion and Literature, New York, ~~Knopf, 1955. Man's Search for Meaning, New York, Washington Square Press, 1959, 1963.~~ Braziller, 1961.

V. E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, New York, Knopf, 1955. Man's Search for Meaning, New York, Washington Square Press, 1959, 1963.

5. Linguistic Meaning

By its embodiment in language, in a set of conventional signs, meaning finds its greatest liberation. For conventional signs can be multiplied almost indefinitely. They can be differentiated and specialized to the utmost refinement. They can be used reflexively in the analysis and control of linguistic meaning itself. In contrast intersubjective and symbolic meaning seem restricted to the spontaneities of human living together and, while the visual and aural arts can develop conventions, still the conventions themselves are limited by the materials in which colors and shapes, ~~sounds, shapes and solid forms, now is the time for all good men to come shapes~~ solid forms and structures, sounds and movements are embodied.

The moment of language in human development is most strikingly illustrated by the story of Helen Keller's discovery that the ~~writing on her hand~~ successive touches made on her hand by her teacher conveyed names of objects. The moment when she first caught on was marked by the expression of profound emotion and, in turn, the emotion bore fruit in so powerful an interest that she signified her desire to learn and did learn the names of about twenty objects in a very short time. It was the beginning of an incredible career of learning.

In Helen Keller's emotion and interest one can surmise the reason why ancient civilizations prized names so highly. It was not, as sometimes is said, that for them the name was the essence of the thing named. Concern with essences is a later Socratic concern seeking universal definitions. Prizing names is prizing the human achievement

of bringing conscious intentionality into sharp focus and, thereby, setting about the double task of both ordering one's world and orientating oneself within it. Just as the dream may be said to be the beginning of the process from an impersonal existence to the presence of a person in his world, so listening and speaking are a major part in the achievement of that presence.

So it is that conscious intentionality develops in and is moulded by its mother tongue. It is not merely that we learn the names of what we see but also that we can attend to and talk about the things we can name. The available language, then, takes the lead. It picks out the aspects of things that are pushed into the foreground, the relations between things that are stressed, the movements and changes that demand attention. So different languages develop in different manners and the best of translations can express, not the exact meaning of the original, but the closest approximation possible in another tongue.

The action is reciprocal. Not only does language mould developing consciousness but also it structures the world about the subject. Spatial adverbs and adjectives relate places to the place of the speaker. The tenses of verbs relate times to his present. Moods correspond to his intention to wish, or exhort, or command, or declare. Voices make verbs now active and now passive and, at the same time, shift subjects to objects and objects to subjects. Grammar almost gives us Aristotle's categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, habit, while Aristotle's logic and theory of science are deeply rooted in the grammatical function of predication.

In mathematical logic predication yields place to propositional combination. Elsewhere I have argued that the form of inference is the "if - then" relation between propositions.

Collection. Papers by Bernard Lonergan. Edited by F. E. Crowe. London and New York 1967.

As language develops there emerges a distinction between ordinary, technical, and literary language. Ordinary language is the vehicle in which the human community conducts its collaboration in the day-to-day pursuit of the human good. It is the language of home and school, of industry and commerce, of enjoyment and misfortune, of the mass media and casual conversation. Such language is transient: it expresses the thought of the moment at the moment for the moment. It is elliptical. It knows that a wink is as good as a nod, that full statement is superfluous and would only irritate. Its basis is common sense, where by common sense is meant a nucleus of habitual insights such that the addition of one or two more will bring one to the understanding of any of an open series of concrete situations. By that understanding one will grasp how to behave, what to say, how to say it, what to do, how to do it, in the currently emerging situation. Such a nucleus of insights is centred in the subject; it regards his world as related to him, as the field of his behavior, influence, action, as colored by his desires, hopes, fears, joys, sorrows. When such a nucleus of insights is shared by a group, it is the common sense of the group; when it is just personal, it is thought odd; when it pertains to the common sense of a different group, it is considered strange.

On common sense, Insight, chapters six and seven.