V. Meaning

Chapter Five

MEANING

Some general account of meaning has to precede not only
any discussion of ~~such~~ such functional specialties as inter-
pretation, history, systematics, and communications but also
any ~~account~~ explanation of the diversity of the expressions of
religious experience. Accordingly in this chapter we shall
endeavor to say something about the embodiment or carriers of
meaning, about its analysis, its clarification, its functions,
and its historical development.

1. Carriers of Meaning

Meaning is carried or embodied in human intersubjectivity,
in art, in symbols, and in language. This section, then,
divides into four parts. My treatment of the first two will
draw heavily on notes made years ago mainly from Suzanne Langer's
Feeling and Form.

~~The embodiment of meaning in human intersubjectivity~~
~~no more than   here~~
~~can only be illustrated from a single instance, the meaning of~~

Here we can attempt no more than an illustration of the
embodiment of meaning in human intersubjectivity, and ~~thhtm~~
the instance we have selected is the meaning of a smile.
First, then, a smile does have a meaning. It is not simply
a combination of movements of lips, facial muscles, eyes.
It is a combination that has a meaning and, precisely because
of the meaning, it is named a smile. So we do not go about the

streets smiling at every passer-by. We know that,if we did so,
we should be misunderstood.

Next, a smile is highly perceptible. We easily notice
even an incipient, supressed smile suppressed smile. And the
reason for this is the fact that a smile carries a meaning.
For our perceiving is not just a function of the impressions
made on our senses. It has an orientation of its own and it
selects those impressions that can be constructed into a pattern
with a meaning. So one can converse with a friend on a noisy
street and disregard the surrounding tumult to pick out the
band of sound waves that carries a meaning. ~~Moreover, this
grasp of meaning is immediate. It is not a conclusion reached
when there is so much movement in so many muscles. It is
seized at once by insight~~

Moreover, to grasp the meaning of a smile is not a
conclusion drawn when there is so much movement in so many muscles,
so that below that level there would be no smile, and beyond it
one infers that so- a so-and-so is smiling. A smile occurs
in an enormous range of variations of facial movements, of
lighting, and of angle of vision. It is a __Gestalt__ and it is
recognized as a whole. *Apperceived*

The meaning of the smile and the act of smiling are
natural and spontaneous. We do not learn to smile the way
we learn to walk, to talk, to swim, to skate. Commonly we do
                                          just
not think of smiling and then do it. We ∧~~just~~ do it. Again,
we do not learn the meaning of smiling as we learn the meaning
of words. The meaning of the smile is a discovery we make on
our own, and that meaning does not seem to vary from culture
to culture.

It is, finally, an original phenomenon. It cannot be
explained by causes outside meaning. ⁺t ~~cannot~~ cannot be
elucidated by other types of meaning. It cannot be reduced
to them. Some illustration of this may be had by comparing
the meaning of a smile with, ~~conceptual~~ linguistic meaning,~~and discursive~~

~~meaning.~~

~~Conceptual meaning tends to be univocal. Dictionaries~~
~~exhibit the many possible meanings of each word, but usage~~
~~endeavors to avoid the play on words and to employ them in~~
~~some one of their meanings~~

      Linguistic
~~ᴧ Conceptual~~ meaning tends to be univocal, but smiles
have a wide variety of meanings. They are smiles of recognition,
welcome, friendliness, friendship, delight, joy, love,
                              or
contentment, satisfaction,ᴧamusement. They are ironic,
                              or
sardonic, enigmatic, sad, weary,ᴧresigned.

      C/~~Discursive~~ meaning

Linguistic meaning may be not only true as opposed to
mendacious but also true as opposed to false. A smile may be
simulᴧated, and so it can be true as opposed to mendacious, but
it is not true as opposed to false.

Linguistic meaning contains distinctions between what
                                              K
we feel, what we desire, what we fear, what we thinᴧ, what we know,
what we wish, what we command, what we intend. The meaning
of a smile ~~reciprocal~~ is global; it expresses what one person
means to another; it is the meaning of a fact rather than the
meaning of a proposition.

Linguistic meaning is objective. It expresses what has
been objectified. But the meaning of a smile is intersubjective.
It supposes the interpersonal situation with its antecedents
in previous encounters. It is a recognition and acknowledgement

of that situation and, at the same time, a determinant in the
situation, a meaning with its significance in the context of
antecedent and consequent meanings. But that meaning is not
about some object. Rather it reveals, betrays, the subject,
and the revelation is immediate. ⁺t is not the basis of some
inference, but rather the incarnate subject is transparent
in the smile, and that transparency antedates all subsequent
analysis that speaks of body and soul, or signifier, sign, and
signified.

From smiles, one might go on to all the ~~feeling~~ facial or bodily movements
or pauses, all the variations of tone and pitch and volume,
by which we manifest our feelings or actors depict them.
But enough has been said to indicate the main points to be
considered, and so we end this first topic by listing Max
Scheler's four manners in which feelings are shared or
communicated: community of feeling, fellow-feeling, psychic
contagion, and emotional identification.

I am drawing on Manfred Frings, Max Scheler,Pittsburgh
and Louvain, 1965, pp. 56-66.

Both community of feeling and fellow-feeling are
intentional responses that presuppose the apprehension of
objects that arouse the feeling. In community of feeling
two or more persons respond in parallel fashion to the same
object. In fellow-feeling a first persons responds to the
object and a second responds to the manifested feeling of the
first. So community of feeling would be illustrated by the
sorrow felt by both parents for their dead child, but feel
fellow-feeling would be felt by a third party moved by their
sorrow. Again, in community worship there is community of

feeling inasmuch as worshippers are similarly concerned with
God, but there is fellow-feeling inasmuch as some are moved to
devotion by the prayerful attitude of others.

Psychic contagion and emotional identification have a vital
rather than an intentional basis. Besides the "we" that results
from the mutual love a of an "I" and a" "Thou", there is also
the prior "We "we" that precedes the distinction and survives
its obliteration. This prior "we" is vital and functional.
Just as one spontaneously raiseds one's arm to ward off a blow
aimed at one's head, so with the same spontaneity one reaches
out to save another from falling. Perception, feeling, and
bodily movement are involved, but thep performance is not
deliberate but spontaneous. One adverts to it not before it
occurs a but as it is occurring. The prior "we" is revealed
in the fact that the spontaneity is independent of the distinction
between the "I" and the "Thou."

Psychic contagion 9s is a matter of sharing another's
emotion without adverting to the object of the emotion. One
grins when others are laughing without knowing what they find
funn7y. One becomes sorrowful when others are weeping without
knowing the cause of their grief. An on-looker, without undergoing
another's ills, is caught up in the feeling of extreme pain
expressed on the face of the sufferer. Such contagion seems
to be the mechanism of mass-excitement in panics, revolutions,
revolts, demonstrations, strikes, where in general there is
a disappearance of personal responsibility, a domination of
drives over thinking, a decrease of intelligence level, and a
readiness for submission to a leader. Needless to day, such
contagion can be deliberately provoked, built up, exploited
by political activists, by the entertainment industry, by

where that fulfilment is lacking whether in the truly godless or
the obdurate sinner, there emerge the fanatically harsh pursuit
of limited goals, the trivialization of human life in debauchery,
the conviction that the world and man's life are absurd.

will be matched in the history of religions by their opposites.
I said that love is love of someone; but religious love is
focussed on myɐɫɐʀɣxɫɦxɐɳɐxɐɫɦɐ transcendent mystery; transcendent
mystery as transcendent is nothing in their this world; transcendent
mystery as mystery, as the not known, has been named

will be matched in the history of religions by their opposites. So being in love is loving someone, but there has long existed a religious experience that conceives itself as atheistic. It This conception arises nox in the context not of a Western philosophy of bi being but of an Eastern school of asceticism and prayer. It emphasizes not the personal aspect of love but the fact that religious love is focussed on tran͡scendent mystery. What is transcendent is nothing in this world; what is mystery is unknown.

Again, transcendence can be over-emphasized, to make God remote, irrelevant, forgotten. Inversely, immanence can be over-emphasized, and then the divine will be identified with the universe apprehended as a vi vast vital process of which the group's living and loving is a part. ̶T̶i̶n̶a̶i̶d̶a̶y̶ Then the loss of reference to the transcendent will rob symbol, ritual, recital of their proper meaning to leave them idol and magic and myth.

Be 120
He 139

Go82-91

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Ve55

is subordinated to a fuller goodness in oneself, then the
cult of a God that terrifies can slip over into the demonic,
to an exultant destructiveness of oneself and of others.

/e 57

6.   The Word

By the word is meant any expression of religious meaning
or value. Its carrier may be intersubjectivity, or art, or
symbol, or language, or the lives, deeds, achievements of
individuals or groups. But while other modes of expression
add depth or power, it is language that makes communication
specific and precise. Accordingly, since our immediate aim
is a clarification of the nature of religion, ~~wunxnwh~~
attention will center on the spoken or written word.

God. It is a meaning that has its context in the process of
internal communication in which it occurs and functions, and
it is to that context that an interpreter has to appeal if
he would explain it.

To explain the symbol, of course, is to go beyond the
symbol. It is to effect the transition from an elementary to
a linguistic meaning, and such linguistic meaning in the
present century stands within a context of social, cultural,
psychological, philosophic, and religious views   at the present
meaning, at the present time, stands within the context of
a linguistic meaning. While the linguistic meaning will
have attempted to reach back to the proper context of the
symbol itself, it also has its own context.

interpreter spontaneously will draw when he sets about
clarifying, explaining, justifying, defending, or expanding his
position. On the other hand, in the measure that the inter-
preter's horizon, the context of his views, turns out to have
been the victim of the fashions and fads of his time and place,
in that measure subsecuent thought will have the task of
working out a correction and revision.

God. It is a meaning that has its context in the process of
internal communication in which it occurs, and it is to that
context through associations, concomitant feelings, antecedents,
tendencies that an interpreter has to appeal if he would
explain the symbol.

To explain the symbol, of course, is to go beyond the
symbol. It is to effect the transition from an elemental
meaning in an image or percept to a linguistic meaning, in
and from the subjective context of the image or percept to
the objective context of the linguistic meaning. Such contexts
are various. There is the general study of symbols as such,
                                                    h
as in Gilbert Durand's Les structures antropologiques de
l'imaginaire, which brilliantly organizes and relates vast
masses of symbolic data. There are studies within the

The subtitle is: Introduction à l'archétypologie générale,
2nd ed., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.

context of this or that school of therapists, where the main
significance of the symbol is symptomatic, pointing to the
origin of the malady or heralding a cure.
                    psychological
There are studies concerned not with the ill but with
the very healthy constantly gor growing and developing.
                    y
the very health who throughout their lives continue to grow
and develop.

5. Linguistic Meaning

Linguistic meaning is meaning embodied in conventional signs. Precisely because its base is conventional, it admits indefinite extension, flexibility, and even reflexion on itself. So one can speak of anything with any degree of nuance and precision and, as we now are doing, one can speak of speaking too. Where intersubjective meaning is confined to the ~~immediacy~~ where immediacy of the interpersonal situation, esthetic meaning is confined to the patterns and rhythms of shapes and colors, solid forms and structures, pitch, tone, and volume of sounds, while symbolic meaning is the focus at which body, mind, and heart adjust as the existential subject confronts his world, linguistic meaning ranges over the universe.

(no page 22 in this copy)

~~Commonsense~~

The commonsense development of human intelligence
yields not only common but also complementary results. Primitive
fruit gatherers differentiate into gardeners, hunters, and fishers.
New_∧ ends and tasks and tools call forth new words. The division
groups and
of labor continues and, with it, the specialization of language.
Eventually there arises a distinction between words in common
use that refer to what is generally known about particular
tasks and, on the other hand, the technical words employed by
            or   or
craftsmen,_∧experts,_∧specialists, when they speak among themselves.
                        much
This process is carried ~~still~~ further, when human intelligence
shifts from commonsense to theoretical development, when inquiry
is pursued for its own own sake, when logics and methods are
formulated, when a tradition of learning is established,
different branches are distinguished, and specialties multiply.

Literary language is a third genus. While ordinary
language is transient, literary is permanent: it is the vehicle
        work,
of a ~~~~ a poiema, to be learnt by heart or to be written
out. While ordinary language is elliptical, ~~drawing on~~
content to supplement the common understanding and common feeling
already guiding common living, literary language not only
aims at fuller statement but also attempts to make up for
the lack of mutual presence. It would have the listener or
reader not only understand but also feel. So where the
technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic
and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float
somewhere in between logic and symbol. When it is analysed
                                                  are
by a logical mind, it is found to be full of what_∧termed
¢ figures of speech. But it is only the intrusion of non-literary
criteria into the study of literature that makes figures of

speech ~~neither~~ smack of artifice. For the language of feeling
                                       ^expression
is symbolic and, if words owe a debt to logic, symbols follow
the laws of image and affect. With Giambattista Vico, then,
we hold for the priority of poetry. Literal meaning literally
expressed is a later ideal and only with enormous effort and
care can it be realized, as the tireless labors of linguistic
analysts ~~gustom show~~ seem to show.

6.   Elements of Meaning

        Distinguish (1) sources, (2) acts, and (3) terms of
meaning.

        Sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended
contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four
levels of waking consciousness. The principal division of
sources is into transcendental and categorial. The transcendental
are the very dynamism of intentional consciousness, its capacity
to attend, to inquire, to reflect, to deliberate, a capacity
        endlessly
that ∧both heads for and recognizes data, intelligibility,
truth, reality, and value. The categorial are the determinations
reached through experiencing, understanding, judging , deciding.
The transcendental notions put the questions. Answers come
in categorial determinations.

        Acts of meaning are (1) potential, (2) formal, (3) full,
(4) active, and (5) instrumental.
~~and (4) instrumental.~~ In the potential act meaning is elemental.
There has not yet been reached the distinction between meaning
and meant. Such is the meaning of the smile that acts simply
as an intersubjective determinant, the meaning of the work of

art prior to its interpretation by a critic, the meaning of
the symbol performing its office of internal communication
without help from the therapist. Again, acts of sensing and
of understanding of themselves h ve only potential meaning.
As Aristotle put it, the sensible in act and the sense in act
are one and the same; and the intelligible in act and intelligence
in act are one and the same. Thus, sounding and hearing are
an identity: without ears there can be longitudinal waves in
the atmosphere but there cannot be sound. Similarly, data
are potentially intelligible, but their intelligibility in
act coincides with an intelligence in act.

The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving,
thinking, considering, defining, supposing, formulating.
There has emerged the distinction between meaning and meant,
for the meant is what is conceived, thought, considered, defined,
supposed, formulated. However, the precise nature of this
distinction has not as yet been clarified. One is meaning
precisely what one is thinking about, but one has yet to determine
wht whether the object of one's thought is merely an object of
thought or something more than that.

The full act of meaning is an act of judging. One
affirms settles the status of the object of thought, that it
is merely an object of thought, or a met mathematical entity,
or a real thing lying in the world of human experience,
or a trasncednet transcendent reality beyond that world.
                    or performative
Aetive meaning comes with judgements of value, decisions,
actions. What one means, directs and guides what one is to do.

Active or performative meaning comes ~~up~~ with judgements of
value, decisions,
                        actions|. It is a topic to which we revert
when we treat, in a later section, the effective and constitutive
functions of meaning in the individual and the community.

Instrumental acts of meaning are expressions. They externalize
and exhibit for interpretation by others the potential, formal,
full, or active ~~meant~~ acts of meaning of the subject. As the
expression and the interpretation may be adequate or faulty,
instrumental acts of meaning provide the materials for a special
chapter on hermeneutics.

The analysts have studied performative meaning, notably
Donald Evans, The Logic of Self-involvement, London, SCM Press,1963

A term of meaning is what is meant. In potential acts
of meaning, meaning and meant are not yet sorted out. In formal
acts, the distinction has emerged but the exact status of the
term remains indeterminate. In full acts of meaning there
occurs the probable or certain determination of the status
of the term; one settles ~~whether~~ whether or not ~~it~~ A is, or
whether or not A is B. In performative acts of meaning one
settles one's attitude to A, what one will do for B, whether
one will endeavor to bring about C.

With regard to full terms of meaning one has to distinguish
different spheres or realms of being. We say that the moon
exists. We also say that there exists the logarithm of the
square root of minus one. In both cases we use the same verb,
exist. But we do not mean that the moon is just a conclusion
that can be deduced from suitable mathematical postulates,
and we do not mean that the logarithm in question can be
inspected sailing around the sky. A distinction, accordingly,

has to be drawn between a sphere of real being and other
restricted sphere spheres or realms such as the mathematical, the
hypothetical, the logical, and so on. While these spheres
differ enormously from one another, they are not simply disparate.
The contents of each sphere are rationally affirmed. The affirmation
is rational because it proceeds from an act of reflective
understanding in which is grasped the virtually unconditioned,
that is, a conditioned whose conditions are fulfilled.

On the virtually unconditioned, _Insight_, chapter ten.

But the spheres differ so vastly because the conditions to
be fulfilled differ. The fulfilling conditions for affirming
real being are appropriate data of sense or consciousness,
but the fulfilling condition for proposing an hypothesis
is a possible relevance to a correct understanding of data,
while the fulfilling conditions for correct mathematical statement
do not include even a possible relevance to data. Finally,
beyond restricted spheres and the real sphere there is the
transcendent sphere of being: transcendent being is the being
that, while known by us through grasping the virtually uncon-
ditioned, is itself without any conditions whatever; it is
formally will unconditioned, absolute.

The foregoing, of course, is the realist account of
full terms of meaning. To transpose to the empiricist position,
one disregards the virtually unconditioned and identifies the
real with what is exhibited in ostensive gestures. What is
a dog? Well, here you are, take a look. To move from empiricism
to idealism, one draws attention to the empiricist's failure to
note all the structuring elements that are not given to sense
yet are constitutive of human knowing; but one fails to challenge

the empiricist notion of the real and to discover that we come
to know the real when we grasp a certain type of virtually
unconditioned.

7. The Unity of Differentiated Consciousness

Differentiated consciousness achieves its unity ~~by~~ (1) by
keeping distinct the worlds of common sense, of theory, of
interiority, and of transcendence, (2) by understanding the
relations between them, and (3) by moving easily from living
in one to living in another.

Such unity is quite different from the unity of ~~undifferentiate~~
undifferentiated consciousness, for which the different worlds
or realms have not yet become distinct. Again, it differs
from the troubled consciousness, for which different worlds
are becoming distinct but the discovery has not yet been made
that, when these distinctions arise, the old unity of
undifferentiation will no longer be possible, and a new dynamic
unity of well understood transitions has to be achieved.
Towards such achievement let us consider the four ~~exist~~
exigences that give rise to the different realms or worlds,
namely, the systematic exigence, the critical exigence, ~~we~~
the methodical exigence, and the transcendental exigence.

The systematic exigence separates the world of common sense
and the world of theory. Both of these worlds have the same
contents which, however, are viewed from such different
standpoints that they can be related only by shifting from
one standpoint to the other. The world of common sense is
the world of persons and things in their relations to us.

It is the visible universe peopled by relatives, friends,
acquaintances, fellow citizens, and the rest of humanity. We
come to know it, not by applying some scientific method, but by
a self-correcting process of learning, in which insights gradually
accumulate, coalesce, qualify and correct one another, until a
point is reached where we are able to meet situations as they
arise, size them up by adding a few more insights to the acquired
store, and so deal with them in an appropriate fashion.   Of the
objects in this world we speak in everyday language, in which
words have the function, not of naming the intrinsic properties
of things, but of completing the focussing of intamx conscious
intentionality on the things, of crystallizing our attitudes,
expectations, intentions, of guiding our dealings with them.

    The intrusion of the systematic exigence into the world of
common sense is beautifully illustrated by Plato's early dialogues.
Socrates would ask for the definition of this or that virtue.
No one could afford to admit that he had no idea fo of what was
meant by courage or temperance or justice. No one could deny
that such common names must possess some common meaning found
in each instance of courage, or temperance, or justice. And no
one, not even Socrates, was able to pin down just what that that
common meaning was. If from Plato's dialogues one shifts to
Aristotle's <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>, one can find definitions
worked out both for virtue and vice in general and for a series
of virtues each flanked by two opposite vices, one sinning by
excess, and the other by defect. But these answers to Socrates'
questions have now ceased to be the single objective. The
systematic exigence not merely raises questions that common sense
cannot answer but also demands a context for its answers,
a context that common sense cannot supply or comprehend. This

context is theory, and the objects to which it refers are in the
world of theory. To these objects one can ascend from commonsense
starting-points, but they are properly known, not by this ascent,
but by their interrelations, their similarities and differences,
the functions they fulfil in their interactions. As one
may approach theoretical objects from a commonsense starting-point,
                too one
so one can invoke commonsense to correct theory. But the
correction will not be effected in commonsense language but in
theoretical language, and its implications will be the consequences,
not of the commonsense facts that were invoked, but of the
theoretical correction that was made.

My illustration was from Plato and Aristotle, but any number
of others could be added. Mass, temperature, the electromagnetic
field are not objects in the world of common sense. Mass is
neither weight nor momentum. A metal object will feel colder
than a wooden one, but both will be of the same temperature.
Maxwell's equations for the electromagnetic field field field
are magnificent in their abstruseness. If a biologist takes
his young son to the zoo and both pause to look at a giraffe,
the boy will wonder whether it bites or kicks, but the father
will see another manner in which skeletal, locomotive, digestive,
vascular, and v nervous systems combine and interlock.

There are then a world of common sense and a world of
theory. We use different languages to speak of them. The
difference in the languages involves social differences:
specialists can speak to their wives about many things but not
about their specialties. Finally, what gives rise to these
                methods of coming to know,
quite different standpoints, languages, communities, is the
systematic exigence.

To meet the systematic exigence only reinforces the
critical exigence. Is common sense just primitive ignorance
to be brushed i aside with an acclaim to science as the dawn
of intelligence and reason? Or is science ~~just~~ of merely
pragmatic value, teaching us how to control nature, but failing
to reveal what nature is? Or, for that matter, is there any
such thing as human knowing? So man is confronted with the
three basic questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why
is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? With these
questions one turns from the outer worlds of common sense and
theory to the appropriation of one's own interiority, one's
subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms,
their potentialities. Such appropriation, in its technical
expression, resembles theory. But in itself it is a heightening
of intentional consciousness, an attending not merely to objects
but also to the intending subject and his acts. And as this
heightened consciousness constitutes the evidence for one's
account of knowledge, such an account by the proximity of the
evidence differs from all other expression.

The withdrawal into interiority is not an end in itself.
From it one returns to the worlds of common sense and theory
with the ability to meet the methodical exigence. For self-
appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method,
and that grasp provides one with the tools not only for an
analysis of commonsense procedures but also for the differentiation
of the sciences and the construction of their methods.

Finally, there is the transcendent exigence. Man
There is to human inquiry an unrestricted demand for intelligibility.
There is to human judgement a demand for the unconditioned.
There is to human deliberation a criterion that criticizes every

finite good. So it is that man can reach fulfilment, peace,
~~joy, only by turning to God reaching beyond the sphere of~~
~~world of experience to the transcendent now is the time~~
joy, only by moving beyond the world of possible experience
into the world of religion where God is known and loved.
But to this topic we return in the next chapter.

Differentiated consciousness, to conclude, sharply
distinguishes the four worlds of common sense, of theory,
of interiority, and of religion. It does not seek to give
them the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness
but leaves them in their proper diversity. Nor is it thereby
divided, split up, into unrelated compar^t ments. On the contrary,
through self-understanding and self-knowledge it finds in itself
the grounds of ~~the~~ this diversity, and ~~the~~ it acquires the
flexibility and dexterity that enables it to shift with ease
from any one to any other and to find itself at home in all
of the four.

8.   Functions of Meaning

Meaning is formative, cognitive, communicative, effective,
constitutive. These several functions involve differences in
the meaning of meaning and, as the fulfilment of the functions
may be more or less developed, there will result notable
differences in the general pattern of meaning and so a history
of meaning.

Meaning is formative inasmuch as it forms or completes
one's ^human being and functioning. Intersubjective meanings relate
us to one another and keep the interpersonal situation in process.

9.   Stages of Meaning

The four realms of meaning have a dynamic aspect. They
are reached only through successive differentiations of
consciousness. Accordingly, they provide a basic scheme for
distinguishing different stages of meaning. In the first stage
the commonsense mode of operations will confront the subject
with a world of common sense. There will be no theory and no
world of theory

religion do not get beyond commonsense or theoretical apprehension.

    The third stage results from _{meeting} ~~meeting~~ the critical and
the methodical exigences, and the fourth adds an adequate
apprehension of the transcendent. The third and fourth stages
are those that would result inasmuch as transcendental method
and its application to natural science, human science, philosophy,
and theology become accepted

religion do not get beyond commonsense and theoretical modes
of apprehension.

The third stage results ~~is~~ from meeting the critical and
methodical exigences. Its characteristics have been, perhaps,
            indicated
sufficiently, ~~defined~~ in this and the foregoing chapters. The
nature of the fourth stage will be indicated in the next chapter.
It remains then that we attempt to fill out our accounts of
the first two stages, and it will be more convenient to begin
with the second.

The second stage has ~~~~ three phases, a philosophic
phase, a natural science phase, and a human science phase.

Thes second stage is characterized by the emergence of
theory. It divides into three phases. In the first phase
theory is basically philosophic and the sciences are conceived
as specialized departments of philosophy. In the second
phase science is in revolt against the dominant philosophy;
                                                        thinkers
first, it fashions philosophies of its own or supports ~~those~~
that develop 'scientific' philosophies; eventually, it claims
autonomy

Aristotle
sensitive, or intellectual acts. Finally, while ~~he~~ ʌacknow-
ledged the existence of immaterial substances and conceived them
as intelligences in act, still they were integral to his theory
of this world, its first movers and, in number, forty-seven
or fifty-five according to the astronomical hypothesis one
preferred.

While Thomas Aquinas effected a radical revision of
Aristotelian metaphysics, while he conceived God in an essentially
transcendent fashion, still this conception remained in the
world of ~~theory~~ theory as did his ~~own~~ psychology as well.
The radical challenge to philosophy as theory came when
natural science shifted from Aristotelian logic to mathematics
for its fundamental inspiration; and this movement, though for
a while it took its stand on the basis of _ad hoc_ philosophies,
eventually developed a method and pronounced it autonomous.
In similar fashion the human sciences have detached themselves
from any philosophic base, either modelling themselves on the
methods of natural science or else, as in the German _Geistes-_
wissenschaften, proceeding in accord with the methods developed
in literary and historical studies. Now this secession of the
natural and human sciences from philosophic roots implies
specialization without integration. Integration is not to
be achieved by way of any logically articulated theory: for
logic is static while the modern sciences are ever in process.
Such is the situation that invites
ʌ~~There only remains~~ ʌthe transcendental turn that conceives
philosophy, not as a theory about objects of some special
a method,
philosophic variety, but as ʌ an expression of the subject's
normative pattern of recurrent and related operations.

9.   <u>Stages of Meaning</u>

The stages in question are ideal constructs. They aim
at understanding and conceiving secular differences of horizons.
The basic differences are derived

9.   Stages of Meaning

The stages in question are ideal constructs. We have
distinguished carriers, elements, functions, and realms of
meaning. We now propose to indicate some of the ways in which
these various aspects may combine.

In the main, three stages are distinguished. In a first
stage conscious and intentional operations follow the mode of
common sense. In a second stage the mode of common sense is
supplemented by the mode of theory, where theory is controlled
by logic. In a third stage there again are the modes of
common sense and of theory, but now logic has been absorbed
within method. The account of the second and third stages
will have to be modified when one moves outside of the Western tradition.
Within each stage further distinctions are to be drawn.
But no matter how numerous such distinctions might be, no
matter how fully they might be illustrated, still they never
would amount to a history of meaning. History arises from
historical data. The analysis of meaning is just a preliminary
exercise that stands to history in some such fashion as
mathematics stands to physics.

In the first stage, then, there occurs the development
of language. Already we have distinguished sources, acts,
and terms of meaning and, among the acts, potential, formal,
active,
full, performative, and instrumental acts. The use of language
is among the instrumental acts. Now this must not be taken
to imply that the use of language is some optional
adjunct that may or may not accompany the other acts. On
the contrary, some sensible expression is intrinsic
to the pattern of our conscious and intentional operations.
Just as inquiry supposes sensible data, just as insight occurs

with respect to some schematic image, just as the reflective

act of understanding occurs with respect to a convincing

summation of the relevant evidence, so inversely the interior

                              of
acts conceiving, judging, deciding demand the sensible and

proportionate substrate we call expression. Indeed, so rigorous

is this demand that Ernst Cassirer has been able to put together

a pathology of symbolic consciousness: motor disturbances

that result in aphasia are accompanied with disturbances of

perception, thought, and action.

See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,

Volume three: The Phenomenology of Knowledge, New Haven 1957,

pp. 205-277.

In the development of proportionate expression there are

three key steps. The first is the discovery of signification.

and its generalization now is the time for all good men to

Say one tries to grasp but fails. Still even the failure at

least points. When pointing is understood, one is consistent

no longer tries to grasp; one just points. The second step

is generalization. Not only does insight rise on the basis

of a schematic image. It also can use the pattern discerned

in the image to guide bodily or vocal movements. So one can

imitate others, and one can embody a similar pattern in quite

different materials. When the discovery as of signification

is joined with such mimetic or analogical expression, then

            can
one express meaning not only indicatively by pointing but

also mimetically and analogically. The third step is the

development of language. ^{I}t is the work of the community

Already in communication intersubjectively and by sign language

with common insights into common needs and common tasks and,

of course, already in communication both intersubjectively,

indicatively, and by mimetic and analogical expression.

Just as they understand one another's frowns and smiles,

gestures, mimesis, and analogy, so too they can come to ~~employ~~

endow vocal sounds with signification.

—

See Ernst Cassirer, <u>The Philosophy of</u> <u>Symbolic Forms</u>,
Volume one: Language, New Haven 1953, pp. 181 f.

Ibid., pp. 186 ff.

—

The limitations of early language result from the nature
                                         perceptual
of insight. Insight is into ~~perceptual~~ presentations and

imaginative representations. So human intelligence has no

~~diff~~ difficulty in developing language with respect to all that

can be directly perceived or represented. But neither the

generic nor the temporal are directly perceived; subjective

experience is on the side not of the perceived but of the

perceiving; and the objects of religious concern are not

percepts but the objectives of the transcendental notions in

their ~~its~~ unrestricted and absolute aspects. It follows that

the generic, the temporal, the subjective, the divine either

remain unexpressed or else find expression inasmuch as they

are somehow represented in the direct field of perception or

representation. So various American Indian languages cannot

say that a man is sick without also retailing whether he is near

or far, whether or not he can be seen; and often the form of the

sentence will reveal the place, position, and posture of the
                                                         were
sick man. Similarly, in Homer there ~~were~~ words for such

specific activities as glancing, peering, staring, but no generic

Footnotes to page 43:

Aristotle, _Metaphysics_, Lambda 8, 1074a 10 ff.

On this movement see Ernst Cassirer, _Das Erkenntnisproblem_
in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. Three
volumes. Berlin 1906, 1907, 1920.

Let us now turn to the first stage of meaning. In it
there is but one mode of operation, that of common sense. It
follows that consciousness is undifferentiated. Feeling, knowing,
deciding, doing all occur, but they occur together. There is no
pure theory detached from feeling, from practical decisions, from
immediate purposeful action. Again, the four functions of
meaning, cognitive, efficient, constitutive, and communicative,
are fulfilled. But there is no theory to distinguish them,
to assign each its limits, to determine their criteria; and
so one would misunderstand and misjudge the first stage,
if one assumed that it intended to proceed in accord with our
distinctions, goals, criteria. As in later stages man lives
in a world mediated by meaning, but constitutive meaning
mingles with cognitive to give birth to myths. Again, to
deal with that world, man extends the efficient function of
meaning, and so enlarges his powers with magic.

To enter into mythic consciousness one has to reverse
one's own development. One has to associate once more one's notion of
space with one's experience of climbing and falling so that
it is self-evident that, unless the earth were flat, things
on the opposite side would fall off. Time must cease

to assign each its limits, to determine their respective criteria.

Even in the first stage man lives in a world mediated by meaning,

but then the inadequacy of his mastery over meaning lets the

constitutive function create myth and the efficient function

generate magic.

~~from organizing all events in a single continuum~~

on the opposite side would fall off. Nothing is more certain
than myth. Time too has to be reconceived: it is not the
organization of all events in the universe within a single
continuum; it is thought inasmuch as verbs have tenses
and the tenses express not just a kind or quality of action --
as is the case in older languages   -- but temporal relations.

The escape from the limitations of early language is,
of course, by linguistic feed-back. I Language then is developed
by insights, not into gestures, percepts, images, but into
verbal expressions. Once this process gets under way earlier
meanings can be transformed and, among such transformations,
the most important is the notion of distinction. Obviously
in the perceptual field everything is not the same, but seeing
that is one thing, and saying it is another. In the latter
case, A and B are distinct, if A is not B. Further, the A
and B in question may be just words; they may be the meanings
of words; or they may be the realities that are meant. So
there are three kinds of distinction, and the third is
extremely important.

However, to discover that importance is to think
metaphysically, and to do so involves a step beyond the first
stage of meaning. It follows, as Cassirer states, that
the first stage lacks any fixed dividing line between ~~"mere~~
~~representation"~~ mere "representation" and "real" perception,
between wish and fulfilment, between image and thing, between
name and thing, between the world of the dream and the world
of waking states.

This absence of effective distinction especially affects
the subject's control over his own inner operations. There
is an incapacity to sort out and separate doing, deciding,
feeling, knowing, to liberate apprehension and conception
from concomitant feelings, to begin the pursuit of knowledge
as a specific and separate goal. Further, while the different
functions of meaning will be in use, the cognitive function
will not be sharply distinguished from the constitutive and
from the efficient. The mingling of the cognitive with the

Magic will decline as technique advances to reveal
by contrast the inefficacy of magic and to turn human weakness
                to
to praying the gods. But to break myth man has to discover
mind. He has to sort out and somehow detach from one another
feeling and doing, knowing and deciding. He has to clarify
just what it is to know, and then keep apart the cognitive
function of meaning from its constitutive and efficient functions
and from its role in the communication of feeling.

How the Greeks discovered mind has been told by Bruno
Snell. Homeric simile drew on the characteristics of inanimate
nature, of plants and animals, to illuminate and objectify
the forces operative in the epic heroes. The lyric poets
set forth individual human feeling. The tragedians exhibited
decisions and their consequences. If em Empedocles reverted
to Homeric hexameter and simile, still his similes served
a quite new purpose, the elucidation of objective process.
So ".. the light of the sun is thrown back by the moon like an
echo; the moon revolves about the earth like the felloe of
a wheel about the axle...."

As technique advances, it reveals by contrast the
inefficacity of magic and turns man in his weakness from magical
incantation to religious supplication. But if myth is to be
broken, man must discover mind. He has to sort out and somehow
detach from one another feeling and doing, knowing and deciding.
He has to clarify just what it is to know and, in the light of
that clarification, keep the cognitive function of meaning
apart from its constitutive and efficient functions and from its
role in the communication of feeling.

How the Greeks discovered mind, has been told by Bruno
Snell. On a first level there was the literary revelation of
man to himself. Homeric simile drew on the characteristics
of inanimate nature and of an plants and animals to illuminate
and objectify and distinguish the varied springs of action
in the epic heroes. The lyric poets worked out an expression
of individual human feeling. The tragedians exhibited human
decisions, their conflicts and interplay, and their consequences.
Literary development was accompanied with reflections on
knowledge.   For Homer, knowledge is a matter of direct experience
or else of hearsay. Human knowledge is always restricted.
                                                        omnipresent,
But the experience of the Muses, who are ~~always present~~, is
complete; and it is they that enable the bard to sing as if
                          had
he had been present or heard the tale from an eyewitness.
                          are far less trustworthy; they may
For Hesiod the Muses teach either plausible falsehood or
                          and taught him,
truth. They singled him out not to repeat the folly and
lies of his predecessors, but to tell the truth about the
struggle in which man ekes out his livelihood. Xenophanes
rejected the multitude of antropomorphic gods; for him god
was unity, perfect in wisdom, operating without toil, merely
by the thought of his mind. In contrast, human wisdom was
                                        still
imperfect, caught in semblance, but the best of the virtues,

MlT V

As technique advances, it reveals by contrast the inefficacy
of magic, and turns man from incantation to supplication.
magical   religious
But to break myth man has to discover mind. He has to sort out
and somehow detach from one another feeling and doing, knowing
and deciding. He has to clarify just what it is to know, and
then keep apart the cognitive function of meaning from its
constitutive and efficient functions and from its role
in the communication of feeling.

How the Greeks discovered mind has been told by Bruno
Snell. First, was the literary revelation of man to
himself. Homeric simile drew on the characteristics of inanimate
nature and of plants and animals to illuminate and objectify
and distinguish the varied springs of action in the epic
heroes. The lyric poets set forth individual human feeling.
The tragedians exhibited human decisions, their interplay,
and their consequences. Through the poets man gained
in self-understanding and self-expression. Still the images
of the poets, like the figures of myth, ".. burst fully-shaped
upon the imagination...." They ".. speak with a living
tongue that which needs no interpretation." But there are
more laborious, more critical modes of thought. Where Homer
and Hesiod depicted their singing as proceeding from the
inspiration of the muses, Xenophanes attributes the
of k discovery of what is better to long seeking. Where
the Ionians had sought the unity of the universe in a material
principle, he placed it in a divine principle that was unique
and that was not to be conceived in the image of man's
attributes let alone his vices. For Hecataeus the stories of
the Greeks were numerous and foolish. Knowledge comes not
from the gods but from investigation based on a well-organized

and to be attained by long seeking. Man's independence ⚓
of the gods in coming to know was stressed by Hecamtaeus,
who considered the stories of the Greeks numerous and foolish,
judged the past by the measure of ordinary experience,
rationalistically explained away themx now it is the time

and to be attained by long seeking. Similarly, for Hecataeus,
the stories of the Greeks ~~numerous~~ were numerous and foolish.
Man's knowledge is not the gift of the gods; stories of the
past are to be judged by everyday experience; one advances in
knowledge by inquiry and search, and the search is not just
accidental, as it was in Odysseus, but deliberate and planned.
~~The same devotion to inquiry lived on in Herodotus~~
The same devotion to inquiry lived on in Herodotus, but a
new turn emerged with Heraclitus. He maintained that the mere
amassing of information did not make one grow int intelligence.
Where ~~be~~ his predecessors were opposed to ignorance, he ~~is~~ was
opposed to folly. He prized eyes and ears but thought them
bad witnesses for men with barbarian souls. There is an
intelligence, a <u>logos</u>, that steers through all things. It is
found in god and man and beast, the same in all though in
different degrees. To know it is wisdom. While Heraclitus
viewed the universe as essentially process, Parmenides denied
~~both multiplicity and motion. While his expression has a~~
~~mythical and now is the time for all good~~
both multiplicity and motion. Though his expression revived
the myths of revelation , at its heart his position was a set
                    In contemporary language he
of arguments. ~~he~~ used the principle of excluded middle to
deny the possibility of becoming as an intermediary between
being and nothing. And he used the principle of identity
to preclude distinction and so multiplicity within being.
His achievement was both a fallacy and a breakthrough. Logic
had emerged as an independent force that could brush aside the
evidence of the senses. His position was buttressed by Zeno's
                    lay   eloquence and
paradoxes. The way open for the scepticism of the Sophists,
for Socratic demand for definition, for Plato's distinction
between eristic and dialectic, and for the Aristotelian <u>Organon</u>.

the principle of identity to preclude distinction within

being and so to preclude any multiplicity of beings. His specific

achievement was a mistake; but it was the carrier for a

breakthrough. Language and logic had emerged as an independent
                              dare to challenge
force that could brush aside the evidence of the senses. The

distinction between mind and sense was established. The way

lay open for the eloquence and scepticism oft the Sophists,

for Socratic demand for definition, for Plato's disitinction

between eristic and dialectic, and for the Aristotelian <u>Organon</u>.

What had been going forward in the literary, philosophic,

and scientific development, was an ever increasing use of

linguistic feed-back. More and more men spoke

the principle of identity to preclude distinction and within being
and so any multiplicity of beings. His achievement was both
a mistake and a breakthrough. Logic had emerged as an independent
force that could brush aside the evidence of the senses.
The distinction between mind and sense was established. The
way lay open for the ~~who~~ eloquence and scepticism of the
Sophists, for Socratic demand for definition, for Plato's distinction
between eristic and dialectic, and for the Aristotelian Organon.
                                just
        We have moved beyond the first stage of meaning into the
second, and it will not be amiss to reflect on the process.
We have distinguished between a world of immediacy, of the
infant in the nursery, and a world mediated by meaning, by
intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic acts of meaning.
But now a further distinction must be added between early and
late earlier and later. now is the time for all good men to
middle and late. In the early phase language is princiaplly
principally a matter of percept and is insight. There does
occur linguistic feed-back

is the primitive to be expected to employ linguistic feed-back
in order to define a distinction, distinguish different classes
of distinction, and determine the ~~euera~~ exact sense in
which real distinctions are said ~~tot~~ to be real.

With these movements there insensibly is effected the

transition from the first stage of meaning to the second. The

systematic exigence is being met, and the world mediated by

meaning splits into a world of theory and a world of common sense.

These two realms may be related: Aristotle distinguished what

is prior to us but in itself posterior from what is prior in

itself but to us posterior; again, modern science links its

austere theory to industrial achievement through the intermediaries

of applied science, x engineering, technology, and practical
                                                realms
know-how. On the other hand, the two may be contrasted,
                                          realm
and the contrast may favor one world or the other. Plato

~~conceived true reality as to be his ideal Forms~~
                                                    realms
contrasted the intelligible and the sensible worlds to

consider the former truly real and the latter somehow unreal.

——
                              of Plato's position,
        For a careful expression∧see F. Copleston, op. cit.,

    chapter twenty.

——

Galileo distinguished primary and secondary qualities: the

primary, that admitted mathematization, were pronounced real;

the secondary, which did not, were pronounced merely subjective
                                                  the experience of
~~like tickling~~ elaborations of matter in motion, such as is ~~tickling~~
being tickled.
But the contrast may run the other way. Then the real world

is the realm of good, solid common sense, while the world of
                  ~~theory, merely~~ theory, merely
theory is just ~~theory merely~~ ∧academic, merely abstract, a

bloodless ballet of categories.

    In this second stage of meaning two phases may be

~~distinguished. In the second of these phases science has~~

~~become autonomous: it has developed its methods and keeps~~

~~its own house in order. In the first phase science is developing~~

~~Distinction~~

An immediate clarification of this distinction will, I think,
simplify matters. In the third stage, then, theory in the
sense of the second stage is replaced two new kinds of theory,
scientific and philosophic. Science has become on-going process;
it does not state with certainty the truth about the various
departments of reality; it regards truth as an ultimate goal
but its concern is an ever better and fuller understanding
of all ~~phenomena~~ sensible phenomena; and so what it offers
at any time is the best available opinion. Such science is
ruled by method, and the method in all its specific content
has been developed within the sciences themselves.

available explanatory account of the matter. It is regarded
not as certain but as only proba|ble, and by probability is
meant that a given theory expresses a better understanding of
all the relevant data than any other formulated theory.
As in the seconds stage the remote goal was the good and the
proximate was the true, so in the third stage the remote goals
are the good and the true while the proximate goal is developing
understanding. As the theory of the second stage was guided
by a logic, so the theory of the third stage is guided by a
xx method in which logics are just a part. As the second
stage made attending attending, understanding, and judging
a speciality, so the third stage makes attending and under-
standing introduces a new differentalation of consciousness
in which attending and understanding are the main ingredients.
Finally, as "theory" has quite different meaninsgs in the
second and in the third stages, so also the transitions from
the first staet stage to the second and from the second to
the third bring about mutations in the realms in which common
sense is considered competent.

Now what in the third stage are differentiated, specialized,
moving towards integration, in the second stage are more or less
undifferentiation. We have spoken of the world mediated by
meaning splitting into a world of common sense and a world of
theory. But in Plato this split appears as an opposition
between intelligible forms and sensible data. In Aristotle
the opposition is both acknowledged and reconciled: objects
of tho theory are prior in themselves but posterior for us;
objects of common sense are prior for us but prior in themselves.
There are not two sets of objects but there are two approaches
to one set. Again, where a modern theorist uses the technique
of implicit definition to set up a system of complete generality,
Aristotle employs beguilingly simple analogies. Potency is
to form, as eye is to sight; form is to operation, as sight
is to seeing. But to grasp the generality of this quasi-
definition, one must rephrase it: potency is to form, as
                                                act,
experience is to understanding; form is to ~~operation~~, as
understanding is to judgement; but any object proportionate
to our knowing is known by experiencing, understanding, and
judging; and so any such object will include potency, form,
and act.

While an entry into the world of theory needs an
introduction -- and this is the abiding achievement of Plato's
dialogues -- while competent operation in the world of theory
demands at least an a logic, common sense functions on its own.