

V A L U E S

More than any other discipline theology is ~~involved~~ concerned with values and involved in questions concerning them. For many this fact implies that theology cannot be considered an academic discipline and so cannot be allowed a place in a university curriculum. Whatever may be the views entertained by theologians on such issues, at least it is necessary for them to clarify their notions of value ~~and, if not settle in detail, and to some extent~~ and, in some measure, relate judgements of value to judgements of fact.

There are, then, four aspects to the good and they are revealed respectively on the four levels of human consciousness. There is the experiential good: it satisfies. There is the good of order; initially and basically it is the product of cosmic process but it is completed by the inventiveness of human intelligence, which devises ways and means to make an ever greater variety of instances of the experiential good regularly recurrent and generally available. Thirdly, there is disclosed by judgement the good that actually exists and the good that is proximately or remotely potential. Fourthly, there is the good as value; it is the truly good as opposed to the merely apparent good; it is what objectively is worth while; it is the possible object of benevolent ~~and beneficent~~ choice and beneficent action.

~~Value itself has different aspects. There are originated values~~

Value itself has different aspects. There is the originating value of the subject who by his attentiveness, his intelligence, his reasonableness, his ~~responsibility~~ responsibility is a fount of good things. There are the originated values brought about by his deliberations, evaluations, choices, actions. But prior to these and more fundamental is a transcendental notion of value. It is a somewhat elusive entity but, unless one takes the trouble to uncover it, one ~~finds~~ remains unable to give ~~one~~ oneself a satisfactory account of what one does in fact mean by value. On the other hand, once this hurdle is cleared, one can work one's way without too much difficulty through accounts of originated and originating values.

The Transcendental Notion

Questions have a ^{puzzling} ~~puzzling~~ feature. They would be pointless, if we already knew the answers. Yet they ask for the answers and, indeed, for ^{the} correct answers. But if we do not know the correct answers now, how will be able to recognize them when we get them? Indeed how are we able to advert to them, think about them, ask about them, when we do not know them?

This puzzle is anything but insoluble. It turns upon an apparent disjunction between ignorance and knowledge. But there is a third possibility, and it is cognitional process. It is not yet knowledge but ~~an~~ only movement towards knowledge. It is no longer mere ignorance, for it supposes

~~an~~ an awareness of ignorance and an efficacious desire to move from it towards knowledge.

Such process is not ~~being~~ blind but conscious. It goes beyond whatever it has attained to intend something further that as yet is not attained and not even known.

Such intending is what is expressed in questions. ~~So~~

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Questions for intelligence go beyond the data to ask, not for further data, but for ~~intelligible~~ intelligible unities and correlations. They ask what and why, how and how often and, when answers are reached, then a new type of question supervenes. It is the question for reflection that goes beyond both data and understanding to ask about truth and reality. It considers the intelligibility reached by understanding to be mere hypothesis. It wants to know whether what we intelligently think is what really is so. But men not only know but also act. So answers to questions for reflection are followed by questions for deliberation. When we know what is so, we ask what is to be done about it, what would be worth while, what ought I do, what shall I do.

Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation are three, distinct, successive, related ways in which we express and intend what as yet we do not know. Questions for intelligence intend the intelligible; they intend what ~~that~~ will be known when one understands; they express the dynamism of human intelligence striving for an understanding it does not yet possess. Questions for reflection, because they are reflective, intend a double object: the true and the real; they express the dynamism of human reasonableness striving to reach a true judgement and thereby to know what really is so. Questions for

deliberation intend the good as value, as what is worth while, as what is not apparently but truly good. They intend that. They do not know it. It is only through the answer that what is already intended later will be revealed. So it is that meanfully we can ~~§~~ speak of intelligibility and not yet understand, speak of truth and reality and not yet know, speak of value and not yet determine what is and what is not valuable. ~~In such cases we are employing, not concepts, much less abstract concepts, but transcendental notions,~~ valuable.

In such cases we are employing transcendental notions. If one defines ~~as~~ a concept as what is known when the meaning of a word is known then, of course, intelligibility, truth, reality, value also are concepts. But their origin lies, not in the ~~as~~ data of sense experience, ~~but~~ but in the dynamism of intentional consciousness. They are transcendental in the sense that they are the conditions of possibility of promoting consciousness from the level of experience to the level of intelligence, from that to the level of ~~that~~ reasonableness, and from that to the level of responsibility and freedom. Again, they are transcendental in the sense that they are the conditions of possibility of proceeding to the answers to the questions that they raise. The same intelligence that asks the question for intelligence is the measure that determines whether the answer is or is not sufficiently intelligent. The same reasonableness that asks the question for reflection is the measure that determines whether or not the answer is probably or certainly reasonable. The same responsibility that asks the question for deliberation is the measure whether or not the answer squares with the responsibility of one's ~~answer~~

developing moral being. Thirdly, they are transcendental in the sense that they are comprehensive; they intend not the abstract but the concrete; and because they intend the concrete, the dynamism of consciousness takes us beyond every partial answer by raising still further questions; and since in fact our knowledge never is complete, it is only by means of transcendental notions that we intend and mean the concrete.

Still one may ask just what is the criterion employed in making a judgement of value. But ^{first-hand} ~~positive~~ answers to this question must be sought by each reader for himself in a reflection on the process by which he arrives at his own moral ~~mentiments~~ judgements and decisions. All that a writer can attempt is what an indication of what one should try to uncover in oneself provided, of course, to discover in oneself inasmuch as one is developing morally. can attempt is to indicate to those that are developing morally what it is they are to discern in themselves as moral development. This, very briefly, is a process of self-transcendence.

In fact, the whole of intentional consciousness is such a process. Sense experience is the beginning of a confrontation with the other. Intelligence unifies, relates, generalizes and so pulls us out of our sensible habitat into the universe. Reasonableness completes an intentional self-transcendence: for judgements ~~may~~ reveal not what appears, not what we imagine, not what we think, not what we are inclined to say, but what is so; even when judgements explicitly are about appearances, images, thoughts, inclinations, still they tell us what the appearances, images, thoughts, inclinations really are, or else they are false. But when we deliberate,

we are moving from an intentional towards a real self-transcendence. For to ask what truly is good is the beginning of benevolent choice, ^{of} ~~beneficent~~ action and, when these become the rule, of love. To love is to swing loose from the spontaneous short-sightedness and ~~self-centered~~ self-centeredness of ~~man~~ child and boy and even man. It is to break away from the narrow ^{can infect} egoism, not merely ~~of~~ the individual but also ~~of~~ the family, ^{the class,} the tribe, ^{the nation.} It is to be interested in and to promote what truly is good ^{everywhere} wherever and whenever we can. Such loving is, of course, more an ideal than a reality. But in the measure that we strive to reach it and succeed in moving towards it, in the same measure we shall have little difficulty in grasping what is meant by the transcendental notion of the good.

So we reach a preliminary answer to the question from which we ~~part~~ began. May a science be concerned with values? The answer is that, if value is understood in the sense intended by the transcendental notion, then a science not merely may but must be concerned with the value that it aims at achieving. For accurate information, developing understanding, ~~accurate~~ ^{secure and tested methods} careful and cautious judgement ^{are} what is meant by science, ^{as will appear,} and manifestly ^{these} are values. If the scientist makes these his goal, then his every operation is orientated ^{toward} toward value. If he has a different goal, then he is ^{not a} ~~misguided as~~ a scientist.

On Max Weber's doctrine that science should be value-free Talcott Parsons has commented: "I believe he meant that the values of the intellectual disciplines must be differentiated from the other types of values constitutive of the culture. Only on such a basis can science and scholarship be institutionalized." Daedalus 94¹(1965), 59.

Originating Value

The transition from the transcendental notion to the determinate ~~val~~ value is effected in the process of deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting. Primarily this process is concerned with fully determinate instances of the good. One deliberates whether this is to be admired or condemned, ~~wha~~ whether that is to be done or not done. Secondly, however, there arises a more specialized
^ reflection on human conduct, destiny, fate; coherence is sought in moral appraisal and preference; and there are developed ideal types,
^ arts of counselling, proverbial wisdom, codes of law, ethical systems. ~~The~~ But while this secondary formation is of great importance, it remains that it is secondary. As Aristotle put it, virtuous acts are the acts judged virtuous by the virtuous man. Or, in other words, working out an ethical system is a moral act and, indeed, an objectification of moral consciousness indeed an objectification of moral virtuous man. As Kant put it, moral consciousness is legislative. As someone else might prefer to say, working out an ethical system is a moral act and it consists in objectifying moral consciousness. While ideals, proverbs, codes, systems may be employed in developing moral consciousness, still ~~the initial datum is the moral consciousness~~
the basic matter of fact is moral consciousness and from it are derived ideals, proverbs, codes, and systems.

This twofold responsibility readily leads to a distinction between the originating values in the existential subject and, on the other hand, the originated or terminal values realized in the human situation. ~~To these we shall return. But the basic For they determine For it is through them that we give a categorial content to a notion of value that is prior and transcendental~~ To these we shall return. But first we must consider and somehow grasp a prior and transcendental notion of value, to which originating and originated values give a categorial content.

All three of our types of question ~~are~~ — questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, questions for deliberation — are transcendental. Each goes beyond the previous level of consciousness. Each constitutes a distinct level. Each is the ~~and~~ constitutive condition of the possibility of the dynamic ~~process that goes forward on its proper level~~ consciously process of working out answers appropriate to the questions. Each finally tends to a transcendental objective that lies beyond categorization: the intelligible; the true~~d~~ and, through it, the real; and the good of value.

Further, while there are three quite distinct types of question, the three are not unrelated. Rather, as already we have suggested, the three constitute successive stages

Above, p.

in the unfolding of a single basic drive. By questions for intelligence we seek to understand. By questions for reflection we seek to understand correctly, not in the sense that prior efforts were indifferent to truth and falsity, but in the sense that now we check to make sure our prior efforts did not

go astray. Finally, from the first we have been operating, but with questions for deliberation our operations themselves come under question, and this question itself contains the transcendental norm which answers must satisfy. Just as answers to questions for intelligence ^{should} ~~must~~ meet the exigences and operative immanent ^{answers to} in human intelligence itself, just as ^{should} ~~must~~ questions for reflection ^{should} ~~must~~ meet the norms immanent and operative in human reasonableness, so too answers to questions for deliberation ^{should} ~~must~~ meet the norms immanent and operative in responsible freedom. Note that I say that the answers not must but should meet the norms. Though intelligent, we can be stupid. Though reasonable, we can be silly. Though responsible persons, we can act irresponsibly.

What then is the transcendental notion of the good? The answer I am attempting to convey appeals ultimately to each one's own personal experience. One knows the exigences of intelligence from one's own experience ^{of one's own intelligence} in the ~~proper~~ conduct of investigations. One knows the exigences of reasonableness in one's own ^{scrutiny of the evidence for} ~~determination of~~ the truth or falsity of assertions, doctrines, hypotheses, systems. One knows the exigences of responsible freedom in one's own exercise of responsible freedom. But besides this ultimate appeal to personal experience I also am suggesting analogy and continuity. As the ~~the~~ exigences ~~of~~ of intelligence are for the good of intelligence, as the exigences of ~~the~~ reasonableness are for the good ~~of truth~~ that is truth, so the exigences of responsible freedom are of the ~~same order~~ same spiritual quality but regard absolutely all operations. ~~To that quality we refer when we speak of good and evil, and to that objective universality we refer when we speak of~~

It is this spiritual quality that immanently controls our exercise of freedom and thereby reveals to us our responsibility. To that quality we refer when we distinguish good and evil. To the universality of its relevance we bear witness when we distinguish good and bad. Good as opposed to evil is the goodness of decision, choice, action. Good as opposed to bad is the goodness of what is decided, chosen, done. The former is originating value. The latter is originated or terminal value.

So insensibly we proceed from the comprehensiveness of the transcendental to the determinateness of the categorial. To issue the precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible, is simply to express as imperatives the conditions of the possibility of the subject as originating value. But ~~the~~ possibility of appropriate response to the precepts manifestly increases with the development of the subject. Our capacity to focus attention precisely, to understand more comprehensively and more exactly, to judge more surely, to select what ultimately will prove to be the proper course of action -- all increase with the extent and variety of our experience, with the measure and quality of insight already attained, with our acquired stock of correct knowledge, and with ^{our virtue, a} ~~the~~ rectitude grown habitual ⁱⁿ ~~of~~ decision, choice, and action. So there follows the further precept, Develop, and it has two applications.

~~There is the development from infancy to maturity, and it takes place in the measure that the immature qua immature ^{at least} are willing to learn from the mature qua mature. So a revolt of youth is ambiguous: it may spring from the immaturity of their elders; ~~not~~ it may even be due to the immaturity of the rebels. But~~

There is the long-term development of mankind. There are the short-term developments in which individuals are educated up to the level of their times and the group endeavors to raise that level and thereby contribute to long-term development.

Not everything new, not every added complexity is a development. Regression has the air of novelty. Complexity can mount to collapse. ~~But~~ Short-term wisdom can prove to be long-term folly. Not only does development mean a direction opposite to break-down, progress a direction ~~opposite to decline, but when when development is deliberate,~~
~~It presupposes in the subject a fully conscious and deliberate orientation in life when development is deliberate~~
 opposite to decline, but when development is deliberate, when it is sustained, when it involves human cooperation, then it presupposes an orientation in living that is more or less adequately expressed and communicated.

~~Such expression is the mystery or myth, the Weltanschauung, the system of values. But the underlying orientation is a major determinant of horizon. It selects ends, draws up schedules of relative importance, channels interests, directs attention, preforms the perspectives in which data will be rise beyond the threshold of consciousness, insights will accumulate, judgement be develop. All this and full occurs spontaneously as the primary expression of orientation~~

Such expression is twofold. There is the primary objectification or manifestation of orientation. This occurs spontaneously in the selection of ends, in drawing up ~~the~~ schedules of relative importance, in channeling interests, in directing attention, in preforming the perspectives within which insights will accumulate and judgement develop.

In so far as orientation is expressed only in this fashion, it is communicated only by presenting an example that others follow. But there is a ~~secondary~~ secondary and usually simplified expression of orientation in mystery and myth, in a world-outlook or Weltanschauung, in a system of values, in a delineation of ideals. Such expression offers distinct advantages, for it opens the way to comparing orientations, complementing the deficient, correcting the aberrant, developing the incomplete. Obviously, since orientation is a major determinant of horizon, such possibilities are of the greatest significance. But it must be born in mind that expressions are objectifications. They are not originating but originated. The origination of value is twofold: it is the transcendental intention of the good of value; and it is responsible freedom deciding upon the generic, specific, individual act or course of action in which the transcendental intention is to issue. To the transcendental intention Plato ~~intended~~ attended when he spoke of the ^{Idea or} Form of the Good. To the originating role of responsible freedom Aristotle adverted when, with sound empiricism, he defined ^{as} virtuous the acts that virtuous men would approve. In other words, to work out a system of ethics is itself an ethical ^{act: it proceeds} ~~act~~ proceeding from the transcendental intention ^{in an exercise of} ~~and~~ responsible freedom but, ^{it does so} ~~doing~~ ^{so} on a reflexive level. Ethics is the self-mediation of ethical consciousness. It ~~can~~ is an objectification and so it can be taught. But such teaching is not necessarily efficacious, for it is one thing to win approval of an objective statement, and it is quite another to transform subjective reality. It is only by such transformation, by conversion, that a real change in orientation is brought about.

There remain personal relations. They are personal in two manners. First, inasmuch as they are determined by the person as existential, as originating value, as determining the kind of person he is to be as a result of his own choices and the orientation of his own development. Secondly, they are personal inasmuch as they are reciprocal. We do not develop in isolation. We do not live alone. ~~We~~ Single-handed, we achieve almost nothing. By praise and blame, by admiration ~~and ridicule, we by~~ ~~friendliness, cooperation, rivalry, enmity, opposition~~ we develop common standards, form groups, love, and ridicule, by ~~friendliness, cooperation, rivalry, enmity,~~ we develop common standards, form groups for common action, and divide into sub-groups with ^{different or} opposed aims. Finally, personal relations commonly are not simply personal. They have a basis in institutional structures and in the functioning

of the good-of-order. Our relations are with the members of our families, with fellow students and fellow workers, with those that share our cultural heritage, our national destiny, our interests, hopes, plans, labors, relaxation. Through such relationships the fabric of community is held together by human ties. In such relationships we discover the meaning and appreciate the value of such remote social mysteries as institutions and the good-of-order.

~~these sons and daughters, these brothers and sisters. The~~ good-of-order is presented by the happy home.

In personal relations originating and terminal values merge. The virtuous, prosperous, ~~happy community is at once~~ cause and effect, origin and term.

The primary and ¹ ordinary manifestation of ultimate concern is, of course, not any technically formulated question about God, not any transcendental analysis of ultimate concern, not any philosophic proof of God's existence, but the endless variety of the religions of mankind. That massive and, indeed, ambiguous fact, set forth in the history of religions, itself raises the question about God, and so we turn ¹ to a preliminary understanding of that fact in terms of ultimate concern.

By religion, then, we would mean not ultimate concern itself but rather the expression, manifestation, communication, sharing of ultimate concern. Such an approach fits in with contemporary science of religion, which follows an empirical method and so at least begins from the outward data. At the same time it grounds normative discussion of religion, for it implies that religion is authentic only ^{it is} if ultimate concern that is expressed, manifested, communicated, shared.

~~A first observation~~

~~A first point to be made is that religion religion may be a component an undifferentiated component in human living~~

A first distinction to be made would regard global and specific religious expression. Initially, ultimate and proximate concern, the sacred and the profane, are not distinguished, separated, specialized. Each penetrates the other. What we would call profane is ¹ sacralized. What we would call sacred is profaned. All activity expresses some concern, but the concern that is expressed is at once ~~ult~~ ultimate and proximate. Then religion is not specific but global. Moreover, even after differentiation is established in the community and in certain patterns of ~~exp~~ experience,

it happens perhaps commonly that individuals slip back to less specialized states of consciousness in which religion as lived, felt, expressed, once more is global.

Religion becomes specific in the measure that religious is differentiated from other activity, that it becomes specialized, that finally it is integrated with the rest of human living. The differentiation sets the object of ultimate concern apart from other objects. The one basic concern to attend, to understand, to judge truly, to decide responsibly, remains one and the same. But it expresses itself differently with respect to distinct objects. There are developed specialized activities with a religious significance and, inevitably, as meanings shift with the passage of time, all such activities are historically conditioned. To remain true to their original intention they have to learn and adopt the idiom of ~~their~~^a new day.

It is notorious, of course, that religious expression is apt to remain immobile for centuries and, in part, this is quite justifiable. Ultimate concern itself is not a historical variable but a historical invariant. It is not so much historically conditioned as a condition of history. Moreover, cultural differences do not affect the maturer forms of religious experience. In the most diverse traditions a life of holiness or prayer tends to a state that is named variously as the "presence of God" or, again, as "quiet," "emptiness," "void." The different names are, perhaps,^{not} contradictory. Ultimate concern is a real orientation towards God, and so an experience of ultimate concern may be said to make God present to me. At the same time a pure experience of ultimate ~~pure~~ concern would be an experience of the dynamism of human consciousness unsupported and undetermined by any image or concept. So

the "presence of ~~↓~~ God" coincides with ~~as~~ emptying out ~~as~~ from consciousness all the determinations derived from the socio-cultural process of history. The subject that left the infant's world of unmediated immediacy to venture forth into the vast, historically conditioned world mediated by meaning, would return from ~~the~~ that endlessly intricate world and its historical conditions to discover himself in a mediated immediacy. In that new immediacy his ultimate concern, his essential striving for intelligibility, truth, goodness, would remain conscious though the props of image and concept became intermittent or fell aside.

In its root, then, and in its fuller development religion is apart from cultural change, and so there is a very serious ground for the immobilism of its manifestations. It remains, however, that expression, manifestation, communication are historically conditioned, that they change with the shifting currents of effective meaning, that the apt expression of the past is easily inept today. Further, the more religion is integrated with a culture, the more it vitally penetrates the whole of human living, the more thorough must be its transformation when the former culture is replaced by another. So Catholicism, precisely because of its full participation in the ~~the~~ middle ages and the ~~renaissance~~ renaissance, finds itself a ghetto in the modern world.

It remains that integration is not optional. Specialization breaks up an initial undifferentiated unity not to destroy the whole but only to perfect the parts. So when religion is not integrated with ~~life~~ ^{too easily} ordinary living, it becomes a dreary formality while ordinary living takes on the nervous superficiality of worldliness.

But if religion can have the function ~~of promoting progress~~
 not merely of promoting progress but also of undoing decline,
 a grave danger resides in
 still, the mere fact that religion is not ultimate concern
 itself but only its specialized expression, manifestation,
 communication, sharing. For the outwardness of religion,
 its embodiment in individuals, in institutions, in ritual
 in thought and culture,
 and language, in property and administration, ~~make religion~~
 expose religion to the danger of becoming not just a principle
 of progress but also a vehicle of decline. If the apostolic
 man is the salt of the ~~earth and~~ earth, still in him first of
 all must faith, hope, and the charity of the suffering servant
 undo all effects of decline. Otherwise the salt loses its
~~savor, and one attempts to remove the mote from~~
~~a brother's eye before removing the beam from one's own~~
 savor. Instead of removing the beam from one's own eye one
 fumbles with the mote in another's.

Opposed to religion is atheism. Religious feeling,
 thought, speech, action, ^{have their} ~~have the~~ ^{their} ~~its~~ ground and ~~its~~ meaning in
 God. Atheism is the denial of God's existence and so it
 repudiates as mistaken, illusory, harmful the whole run
 of religious attitudes and activities. In principle, then,
 the horizon of the religious man and the horizon of the
 atheist are dialectically opposed. In practice, however,
 the opposition decreases in the measure that either
 believer or atheist is less than consistent. ~~The believer~~
~~may fail to integrate his religion with his living~~
 When the believer does not live his religion, when ~~it~~
 he devotes to it no more attention ~~that~~ than to the other
 formalities of his life, and when the atheist retains ways

of thought and feeling, speech and action, that belong to an earlier, religious period of his ~~culture~~ inherited culture, then believer and atheist can get along quite well together. But they have ^{to} ~~not~~ remain inconsistent, and that is not easy when others find both pleasure and profit in a self-righteous denunciation of ~~where others defects~~ their neighbors' sins.

As religion differs from ultimate concern, so too does atheism. Ultimate concern resides in the originating elements of ~~one's~~ consciousness. But the affirmation and the ~~and~~ denial of God ~~are~~ are originated acts, and, since they are inferential, they proceed from still other originated acts.

Now if both religion and atheism differ from ultimate concern, can one also say that both express ultimate concern? An answer to this question is quite involved. If one holds, as I do, that there are valid proofs of God's existence, then the atheist can deny God's existence only through philosophic error. Moreover, this error will be grave, for it will consist in a conflict between one's account of cognitional operations and, on the other hand, the operations one actually does perform. Further, this basic ~~conflict~~ conflict

For an expansion of the statement, see Insight, chapter ~~four~~ ~~four~~ fourteen.

will be complicated by a further conflict. A profession of ~~atheism either trivializes or secularizes ultimate concern~~ of atheism, since it rejects the religious ~~meaning~~ interpretation of ultimate concern, can only trivialize it or secularize it. But to trivialize ultimate concern is to trivialize man. ~~To secularize it is to direct man's quest, delude man with the expectation of finding the infinite in the finite,~~

To secularize it is to delude men into replacing worship of the Absolute with fanaticism over the finite and the relative.

However, at a time when philosophic error is widespread, when very few seem capable of refuting it, there probably are many that honestly will doubt that the affirmation of God's existence ~~can~~ can be proved or even that it is meaningful. But if in fact that affirmation can be proved and is meaningful, the honest atheist will not escape the uneasy conscience of his counter-position — that is, the conflict between his cognitional operations and what he thinks those operations are — nor will he evade the dilemma of either trivializing or secularizing ultimate concern and so falling into a still graver form of inauthenticity. It is true, of course, that ^{is likely to} he ~~will~~ find the representatives of religion to be less than saints, organized religion to be infected with some corruption, and genuine reformers ^{both} blocked by archaists, intent on living in a world that no longer exists, and ~~pushed~~ shouted down by futurists, set to leap into a utopia defined by catchphrases. The sorry spectacle of religion ~~has~~ will be matched by the sorrier spectacle of the world at large. But if these tend to confirm the honest atheist in his atheism, strangely it follows that atheism must be suspect. For the fruits of decline ~~is~~ are an objective surd, a cumulative ~~product~~ product of inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, and irresponsibility. Such a surd is a negation, an objective, factual negation, of meaningfulness in man's world. If the atheist claims to be revolted by it, his admirable feelings are quite at variance with his denial of ^{God and so of} ultimate meaning and value in the world both of man and of nature.

The Question of Value

Already we have had occasion to speak of the transcendental notion of value and of originating and originated values

A number of distinctions have already been made. We have spoken of instances of the particular good, of the good-of-order, and of value. Further, we distinguished a transcendental notion of value, originating value, and originated values

that as other values so ultimate values ~~ya~~ have their support, their incarnation, their convincing revelation in human feelings. Ultimate concern gives religious acts their orientation to what lies "beyond" this world; it gives religious ^{need} its conviction that it can be met by nothing in this world; but it is the resonance of ultimate concern with the whole of man's being that gives religious feeling its depth and power.

I have said that human feelings partly are spontaneous and partly the effect of education. But if appropriate influence develops and refines feeling, it does not seem that our feelings are simply at our disposal and that we can direct them into any channels we please. Contemporary secularism eliminates the practice of religion. But it does not eliminate either the under-cover activities of Jung's archetypes or the emotional violence of our literature of the absurd. Again, contemporary culture fails to set forth effectively a value system. But man needs some such system and is apt to prefer any, no matter how bad, to none at all. So A. H. Maslow would trace to adult uncertainty about values much of the disturbance in children and adolescents ignorant and confused that set up systems of their own.

C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Cleveland, Meridian Books, 1961, pp. 100-124. R. Hostie, Religion and the Psychology of Jung, New York, Sheed & Ward, 1957, pp. 48 ff., 109 ff.

A. H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1962, p. 192. See also the chapters on values. For a phenomenology of feelings and values, Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1965, pp. 53 ff., 114 ff., 156 ff.

But if values are revealed and, as it were, experienced in feelings, if they are known in the study and critique of human achievements and in the encounter with good persons, still their origin in each of us lies in our deliberating, evaluating, choosing, acting. That process, we have said, is one of real self-transcendence. By it we gradually develop from the instinctive life of the infant and the playfulness of the child ^{towards} ~~the~~ the fulness of a wise and all-embracing love. The actual occurrence of such development may at present be rare; A. H. Maslow thinks that self-actualizing people are certainly less than 1% of the ~~population~~ population. But the mere fact that there now are many psychologists engaged in a new course of constructive and, indeed, inspiring thinking enables one to hope for better things.

~~Op. cit.~~ Op. cit., p. 190.

The Question of Mind

We have been illustrating dialectically opposed horizons by contrasting progress and decline, religion and atheism, values as a principle of self-transcendence and man's ~~real~~ frequent failure to love. But in the measure that we reflect on these oppositions whether in general or in their concrete detail, we are using our minds.

That use is a primary fact.

The significance of the fact is that it can be invoked against mistaken theories of knowledge, mistaken theories of objectivity, and mistaken accounts of the reality to which objectivity ~~relates~~ ^{relates} knowledge. ~~For in the measure~~

In the measure that cognitional theory is mistaken, there can be revealed to the conflict between what one says one does in knowing and what in fact one does do.

In the measure that the theory of objectivity is mistaken, there can be revealed the conflict between what one says there occurs when one ~~knows~~ knows objectively and what in fact occurs when one knows objectively.

In the measure that an account of reality is mistaken, there can be revealed the conflict between that account and, on the other hand, the ~~imp~~ ^{correct theories} implications of ~~the correct theory~~ of knowledge and of objectivity.

~~The issues that can be resolved in the above fashion commonly are named philosophic~~

The issues that can be ~~more~~ resolved in the above fashion are both numerous and fundamental. Commonly they are named philosophic, but they are not some private concern limited to philosophers. They are the concern of everyone that uses his mind and, most particularly, of everyone that uses his mind in the methodical pursuit of a scientific goal. Because of this general ~~and~~ concern they have to be ~~that~~ detached from other philosophic preoccupations, however important and laudable. They have to be treated together in the unity of what above we named transcendental method. And this method has to exercise its normative, critical, dialectical, heuristic, foundational, and systematic functions in theology as in other disciplines.

In fact, in contemporary theology errors in ~~the account~~ suppositions regarding knowledge, objectivity, and reality are both numerous and frequent. They affect profoundly conceptions, norms, and procedures in interpretation, historical

investigation, in theological thinking, doctrines, and communications. They account for deep divisions ~~and~~ among Christian theologians and even mutual incomprehension. They provide the shifting sands on which ever rise and shortly tumble the flimsy structures that are greeted as great achievements only to be brushed aside in a few decades as inadequate and obsolete.

Now the use of transcendental method will not put an end to this state of affairs. But it will make it more difficult ~~x~~ for the theologian to cover up basic mistakes with the disdainful remark that he is not a mere philosopher, for he will be open to the rejoinder that he is using his mind and should know at least the elements of how it works. Moreover, it will bring out in ~~proper~~ the open a whole range of sources of ~~theological differences~~ exegetical, historical~~m~~, and theological differences: instead of the current practice of acknowledging disagreement and expressing profound respect, it will ^{often} be possible for at least some theologians to put their finger on the precise ~~f~~ root of the disagreement.

with a privileged area. Its data are data on the very operations which effect revisions of previous views. Unless these operations are understood, it cannot be asserted rationally that

fourth level
revision - revision

Value
self-transformation

But if religion must be integrated with life, the integration must be critical. It must ever distinguish elements of progress from the seeds of decline. Ultimate concern arises out of the very attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, that give rise to progress. Ultimate concern, ~~it~~ no less than progress, is diametrically opposed to ~~it~~ the inattentiveness, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility that bring about decline.

Not only do religion and progress have a common ground, not only should each strengthen and purify the other, but religion can have the function of undoing the work of decline. Decline disrupts a culture with conflicting ideologies; it inflicts on individuals the ~~social and economic~~ social, economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinisms; it multiplies and heaps up abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, anger, hatred, violence. Religious faith ~~alone~~ can liberate reasonableness from its ideological prison. Religious hope ~~alone~~ can enable ~~man~~ ^{the} mass of men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. Religious charity, the charity of the suffering servant, is needed if wrongs are to be ~~ignored~~ not merely ignored, not merely palliated, but ~~lighted~~ removed, and ~~passions~~ ^{if} passions are to quieten down. Men are sinners. If progress is not to be ever distorted and destroyed by decline, men have to be reminded of their singfulness, they themselves ~~had~~ have to acknowledge their real guilt and amend their ways, and they have to know that the task of ~~it~~ repentance and conversion is life-long.

I have developed this point at some length in Insight, chapter 20.