

[By liberalism is to be understood the
effective negation of the control of religion
as liberalism.]

The significance of the quarrel between church and state is not to be confined to the period extending from the middle ages to the successful and complete emergence of liberalism. For however successful liberalism may be considered inasmuch as it holds power, there can be no doubt that this fact of power is at the root of the distempers of the present day. A philosopher cannot be content to ask of history, Who holds the power? He must ask whether this incidence of power is for human progress or for human extinction. There is much in the present world-situation to confirm the view that liberalism in power is for the destruction of civilisation.

But the philosopher need not confine himself to this single question. To analyse liberalism fundamentally leads to the discovery that there are two aspects to human life: every act of the person is an internal act of will and an external activity; the internal act of the will has been the concern of the church and its opposition to liberalism; the external activity, merely as an external activity, is a motion for an end in its own order and it has been the control over this order that the liberal states have been vindicating as their right.

Plainly, we put the question in its full philosophic generality when we ask what is the end of external human action as such. For if there is an end to individual external acts, and to sets of such external acts, so there must be an end common to all external acts. If we determine this end and determine the laws by which it is attained and under which ~~human~~ action to the end evolves, we arrive at what is called a philosophy of history.

We define the philosophy of history as the pure theory of external human action. We premise that human action is in its material cause a flow of change - sensible in consciousness, physical in the subconscious and the external world - that it is in its formal cause the emergence of intellectual forms with respect to this flow of change, that it is

in its effective control the act of free will, which in itself is an act of love for the intelligible form (appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus), which in its implicit effect is an approbation or an inhibition of what is happening in the flow of ^{physico-sensitive} change. Thus, in the action of the individual there are three things: the physico-sensitive flow of change; the intellectual forms with respect to the phantasmal flux; the power of imposing the intellectual forms upon the flow of change, thus transforming behaviour into rational conduct and ^{speech} ~~language~~ into rational discourse. These three causes merge to constitute a single action: for what is caused by a material, a formal and an efficient cause is one and not three. Further, it is to be noticed ^{one} that the basis of the human flow of action lies in the material-physical-sensible order; what takes place in this order is pre-moved and (prescinding from the immanent control) predetermined by what takes place outside the individual; on the other hand, the immanent control of intellect and will is no more than a control; it is not a power of initiation but only a power of approval or inhibition. What you can think about depends upon external experience. What you think about it depends upon the mentality you have imbibed from an environment of home, school, university, and the general influences of others. The man with original thoughts from the view-point of history is merely an exception to the general rule; he is an instrument of social change and he is taken into account only in the theory of change and not in the theory of the regular event. Finally, the end of the individual as an individual is to accept the intellectual forms (effective assent to the true, consent to the good); by this means he attains the ^{teleology} ~~evolution~~ of his personality; on the other hand, inasmuch as he fails to accept the intelligible dictate and make it effective, he is merely predetermined by the physical flow; also, he sins for sin is the failure to obey reason. But on top of this, ^{immanent} ~~end of individuals as individuals~~ there is ~~the end of the~~ ^{flow of} external action, which is reasonable or unreasonable according to the goodness of the individuals, which none the less is something in itself.

Now we must grasp the intimate connection between the internal and immanent action of man and his external and transient action. This connection is the intelligible unity and the material distinctness of men.

Men are one in possessing one nature. A nature is the intelligible form explaining why a thing is ^{of the kind} ~~is~~ it is.

Men are many by matter. I am I and not somebody else, not for any assignable or conceivable reason but purely and simply as a matter of fact. Matter is the sensible antecedent to thought in its irreducible form; it is what can never be abstracted from phantasm and so never can be explained; and it can never be abstracted and never explained because there is no explanation, because it is pure matter of fact, the ultimate empirical.

Finally, men are one in their ~~external~~ action. Quidquid movetur ab alio movebur. This is easily demonstrated. For if anything changed without reference to something else, then it would be from every point of view the sole sufficient reason of its change. If it were the sole sufficient reason of its change, then there would be no change now but the thing would always have been what it now is becoming. This is a contradiction in terms. To deny the principle of the extrinsic mover is to suppose that a sufficient reason for change is not sufficient for the change at any time and, besides, that it was not sufficient but became sufficient without any sufficient reason for the becoming.

Hence, everything that a man does or thinks is pre-moved by the action of other things. Further, this pre-motion extends into the intellectual field and constitutes the pre-motion of the will. In response to this release of pre-motion the will need not act: but if it does act then it acts according to the pre-determined intellectual form; if it does not act, then it sins in failing to follow the dictate of reason, while what takes place in action is pre-determined by the sensitive mobiles, the previous intellectual pattern, habits, etc., all of which are predetermined.

Thus, besides the unity of human nature there is the unity of human action. Human action is always pre-determined to either of two alternatives: one rational the other irrational. Which is elected is not ultimately predetermined, though it may be proximately by the person's character or habit of will. ^{and None the less} ~~these~~ ^{these} human elections ^{are} are strictly subordinate to a statistical law. Men turn out in ever much the same proportion of good, indifferent and bad. What differentiates one social epoch from another does not lie in the individual wills of the time but in the upper and lower limits set these wills by the previous age. No man can be better than he knows how and no man can be worse than his temptations and opportunities. Thus the heritage of intellectual vacuity and social chaos given ^{the} the nineteenth century to the twentieth is the real reason why the twentieth is such a mess.

Now, considering that all that takes place outside the human order in this world is predetermined, considering that all of human action follows the pre-motions of the material world and previous human action according to a statistical law, we arrive at the conception of history as the flow of human acts proceeding from one human nature, materially individuated in space-time, and all united according to the principle of pre-motion.

Hence, nature explains why man is of the kind of being that he is.

History explains why men are doing what they are doing.

Matter is the principle which makes the one human nature into a successive manifold of individuals operating the earlier upon the later according to the law of a pre-determined bracket of influence and a statistical uniformity within that bracket.

Now, plainly it is impossible to influence human wills to do good without exerting an influence upon the external action that pre-moves and statistically predetermines wills. This is the claim of the church, of spiritual authority. On the other hand, the flow of human action considered merely as an external flow is for definite ends ^{yet} ~~and~~ entirely under the control of the wills. This is the basis of the continuous

rebellions of the state from mediaeval times to the present day.

We put the problem on its true philosophic basis by asking the meaning of history, the purpose of the external flow as such.

Now, despite the cries of obscurantists to the contrary there is as a matter of fact such a thing as progress. It is further manifest that progress is the fundamental concept in any theory of the external flow, the effective solidarity of mankind. For what is important in any flow is its differential. What flowed in the dim and distant past is of no earthly interest to us. But the differentials of what has flowed since integrate into the reality of the present, and that is of supreme concern to us. Further, the differentials of flow are something beyond the elements, the individuals in the flow. The nineteenth century was a century prating of Truth, Beauty, and Goddness. It had no concern for the differentials of flow in virtue of an asinine confidence in political economists. It has landed the twentieth century in an earthly hell. All the good intentions in the world are compatible with all the blunders conceivable. The nineteenth century was a century of good wills and bad intellects. The combination is fatal. Men being reasonable according to their individual lights of reason ~~the~~^{it} no guarantee that they are reasonable. Nor is any effort of the epoch to stabilise intellect, to make all think alike whether by newspapers, government education, official ~~philosophies~~^{prejudices} and histories and all the rest, any guarantee that the total and the differential of the total wisdom of the epoch is truly intelligent and reasonable. What is needed is a metaphysic of history, a differential calculus of progress.

But what is progress?

It is a matter of intellect. Intellect is understanding of sensible data. It is the guiding form, statistically effective, of human action transforming the sensible data of life. Finally, it is a fresh intellectual synthesis understanding the new situation created by the old intellectual form and providing a statistically effective form for the next cycle of human action that will bring forth in reality the incompleteness of the

^{like}
~~previous~~ act of intellect by setting it new problems.

This follows from the very nature of the human intellect. It is a potency. A potency does not leap to its perfect act but goes through a series of incomplete acts on its way to attaining the perfect act, which is, as St Thomas says, perfect science. Let us generalise. The angelic intellect is instantaneous. It understands all that is to be understood in its individual world simply by being that individuality; it is intellect in act. The human intellect is intellect in potency; it is gradual; it arrives at its perfect act through a series of interactions between objective situations giving rise to intellectual theories and intellectual theories changing objective situations. Finally, as the angelic intellect knows all its to-be-known in the single instant of its being (aevum) so the human intellect works through its stages of ~~its~~ development in the instant of its being which is all time. Thus, intellectual achievement is not the achievement of individual men for individual men are unintelligibly different; intellectual achievement is the achievement of the race, of the unity of human action; *the individual genius is but the instrument of the race in its expansion.*

However, there is such a thing as sound philosophy, that is, definitive knowledge with an immutable basis. Philosophy stands above ^{is} the shifting scene of time. Its basis ^{is} in the pure forms of knowledge. Sense knowledge, even in the perfect act of intellect, will be knowledge of an inexplicable multiplicity: ^{that is,} the difference of this point from that, and of this instant from that, and of this particular thing from that, with no possibility of their being any conceivable reason why each point, each instant, each particular thing is the particular that it is and not another. This gives the first element in metaphysical reality: the category of ~~xxx~~ matter. Next, consciousness will always necessarily be a consciousness of action, of something acting, of the self acting: this existing substantial action, this ens per se, is no more to be understood in itself as an existing ens per se that the difference between points can be explained in terms of more points. We are forced

to set up another metaphysical category, ^{which} that is the ultimate basis of their being anything to be conscious of, just as matter is the ultimate basis of their being anything to perceive; this category is contingency and contingency can no more be explained in terms of other contingent beings than matter can be explained in terms of more matter; contingency is the ultimate empirical in the order of consciousness just as matter is the ultimate empirical in the order of sense. Finally there is intellect and it has its form. This form is the truth of the intelligible. Whenever you understand, you go on to ask whether your understanding is true, for instance, whether the circle really is all that it is because ~~that~~ it is the locus of points equidistant from a centre. And when you understand that it is, then you know truth. Now truth is true not in virtue of your knowing it. It is true in itself and the change merely happens in you in virtue of the contingency of your being. Thus, ~~from~~ truth as an absolute, as something that is what it is in itself despite what you may happen to think and indifferent to what you happen to think, is the ultimate form of intellect. Perfect science will be true.

Naturally, I can only outline the basis of the immutability of philosophy, of the way it takes hold of elements that will necessarily be found in the ultimate and perfect science of the perfect act of the human intellect. How philosophy sets up a theory of life on the basis of the triple metaphysical category of matter, contingency, and intelligible truth, is a question for a different essay much more ^{elaborate} ~~comprehensive~~ than this one. The only point to be made clear at present is the possibility of philosophy, of an universal science that is the form of all science, because it rests on the forms, the outer edges, the frames, of all possible human knowledge.

Now the possibility of philosophy leads us to distinguish between two phases in human progress: the automatic stage in which there is a constant succession of brilliant flowerings and ultimate failures; the philosophic stage in which the historical expansion of humanity

has its ultimate control in a sound philosophy that not only is sound but also is able to guide the expansion effectively.

Next, the actual course of human events divides this division once more into two sections. Hence we have:

- A. The world prior to the discovery of philosophy, that is, up to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
- B. The failure of philosophy to fulfil its social mission, that is, from Plato to the Dark Age.
- C. The automatic cultural expansion following upon the Dark Age and continuing up to the present. It has had sound philosophy but not social consciousness of the social necessity of philosophy.
- D. The future.

We may say a few words of each in turn.

A. This period as a period is either pre-history or revealed truth. Since Catholics believe the Old Testament because they believe the New, we are following a logical order in postponing a consideration of revelation till the emergence of the New Covenant, the Mystery of Faith in the Blood of Christ. Hence we must turn to the pre-historians, and I continue myself fortunate to be able to draw upon Mr. Christopher Dawson's undoubtedly brilliant and, by the competent, highly praised Age of the Gods. Unfortunately, my memory must act as intermediary between that book and this essay, so I ~~must~~^{shall} in advance beg pardon for any inaccuracies.

Let us distinguish the primitive cultures of hunters, fruit-gatherers, fishers, ~~mammal~~ megalith devotees, etc., together with the merely marked by peasant culture, ~~and~~ painted pottery, from the higher culture of the Mesopotamian Temple States and the Egyptian Dynasties.

The theory of these last two is that the discovery of the ox and large-scale agriculture with its long-term investments necessitated a new idea of property - land that was not merely inviolable as hunting-ground but ~~land~~ not even to be walked on at will. This idea was made socially effective by the cult of the Mother Goddess who owned all the land and all its fruits, whose servants the agriculturalists were, from ~~what~~

each received the bounteous reward of his labours.

We must here notice first of all the effect of a new means of exploiting matter leads to a greater and more strictly enforced social solidarity. Second, that what differentiates the higher culture of the near East from the painted-pottery culture generally is this stricter social bond.

For it was in virtue of the socialistic theocracy that the Temple States^s acquired their capital, supported an expansion of agriculture into its subsidiary arts and crafts, led to richer religious rites with their initial literature of song and their initial ~~calendar~~ science of calendars, ~~and to them~~ formed the basis of a wider expansion through commerce, ultimately to culminate in the stupendous temples such as that of Carchemish and ⁱⁿ a caste of priests, the law-givers, the ~~direct~~ administrators of justice, the directors of it all.

Next to be noted is that the unity of the Nile valley quickly imposed a political unity or unities, ~~for~~ while the Temple States would long continue to flourish as distinct units. But this geographical difference in no way affected the ultimate result. The god or goddess that is tied down and sacred to only one spot is unequal to the task of imposing social order ~~between~~ beyond his frontier. The gods of the states made commercial treaties to quarrel again till finally the whole was swallowed up in a Babylon. *Prink killed to warrior kings.*

Finally must be observed the nature of empire, of bureaucratic rule. It is vigorous as long as it continues to expand, for ~~for~~ then it has a social purpose to which all else is subordinate. But expansion inevitably yields to space; decreasing returns are as much a phenomenon of empire as ^{of} business. Next, once the expansion is ended, there is no social purpose beyond preserving what has been achieved. A bureaucracy cannot integrate the individual differential forces that would make for change and advancement; it suppresses them; it rules by rule of thumb which, however excellent at the beginning of the rule, becomes more and more antiquated, more and more the understanding of a situation that

is anything but the existing situation. Hence, when there is no tendency to advance, a bureaucracy merely encases a mummy, though the mummies of Egypt have lasted longer than her dynasties. On the other hand, given a ^{fundamentally new idea} ~~tendency to advance~~, the bureaucracy passes away in a bath of blood.

^{through the ancient empires could not produce such an idea as could the liberals in the French Revolution and the Bolsheviks.}
But, the human spirit ~~was~~ not eternally baulked. The empires of Egypt, Babylon, Crete, Assyria, the Hittites passed away and on their ruins though on the fringe of their frontiers were born the city states of Greece. Here we have the same phenomenon as the Temple States, the small social unit that is not primarily an unit of blood but of geographical position. But there is the difference that the Greeks did not owe their rise to sages who called themselves priests but to sages who were simply law-givers, the leaders of comrades who fought side by side in battle. Death, the great leveller, is at the root of democracy. And democracy was the social form that made philosophy possible.

Gotama would have been as great a dialectician as Socrates had he lived in Athens. But he lived where men had not the habit of demanding the reason why for everything, of listening to orators and appraising their arguments, of following the sophists to learn to be orators themselves. This social fact differentiated Socrates from all the wise and profound men who predated him. It was the birth of philosophy, of following reason like a breeze, blow where it will. It was the promise of the eternal search for the reasons for everything up to the ultimum cur.

But philosophy had other presuppositions. Not only had ^{to be dispelled} the herd instinct of being satisfied with what the wise man said without bothering for any "why" beyond the fact that he was wise; there was the need of a rich and precise language, of a literature to make men think of man in general terms, of science to reveal there was such a thing as science and so the possibility of a science of science.

B. Philosophy emerged with the assertion of its social significance. "Men and cities will not be happy till philosophers are kings" is the central position of Plato's Republic, and the Republic is the centre of the dialogues. To Plato, Pericles, the idol of Athenian aspirations, was an idiot; he built docks and brought the fruits of all lands to Athens and beautified the city and pursued a policy of ~~timor~~ anticipating enemies while they were still weak; but he neglected the one thing necessary, the true happiness of the citizens. For did not the dialectic reveal that no man without self-contradiction could deny that suffering injustice was better than doing injustice, that pain was compatible with happiness, that shame, the interior contradiction, the lie in the soul of a man to himself, was incompatible with happiness. And whom had Socrates ever met that he could not reduce to nonsense? To put the truth in any easier form, let me recall a sentence from one of Mr. Dawson's reflective essays: You can give men better homes and food and clothing; you can build them theatres and parks and recreation grounds; you can decrease their labour and increase their wages and multiply a thousandfold the products of industry and the earth; and still men will not be content: but you can lead them through pain and misery, through toil and privation, and they will be happy if only they have something to die for. The point is a common-place of history and literature; it is a fundamental element of human psychology; and it is none the less true because the nineteenth century liberals believed exactly the contrary.

The function, then, of the state is to teach virtue. But to teach virtue you must know it; only the philosopher can know it; none but the philosopher may be king, if the state is to attain its end, if men are to be happy.

We cannot but grant the truth of the Platonic position; its truth is quite a different matter from its practicability. But we must measure both the strength and weakness of Platonism. It was evident to anyone contemplating what made and unmade statesmen in Athens, what determined

the policies of the city states, what was the worth of the statesmen, the voters, the policies, what was the inevitable outcome, that there was an imperative need of a higher control. This was as evident to Plato then as it is evident to-day whether we cast our eyes within the frontiers of our ever so sovereign states or beyond into the chaos of international diplomacy, or close our eyes to the present, with the relief of waking from a nightmare, to meditate on the rise and decline of all cultures and political forms. They did not pass away because some stronger thing arose to crush them; they passed away because they first decomposed. The march of Alexander through the near East, like the march of the semi-barbarian legionaries through the Roman Empire ~~more than the conquests of the Huns and the Goths~~ was but the profanation of a corpse and the scattering of ^{the} ashes of what long since lay dead. But however great the need for a higher control, for the rule of reason socially dominant and freeing society from a cyclic karma, as the rule of reason frees an individual man from the ~~next~~ intermittent domination and ultimate collapse of his passions, what we have to consider was the possibility of Platonism meeting the need.

The achievement of Platonism lay in its power of criticism. The search for a definition of virtue in the earlier dialogues establishes that virtue is an irreducible something, the emergence of a new light upon experience that cannot be brought back and expressed in terms of experience. This discovery of the idea, of intelligible forms, gave not only the dialectic but also the means of social criticism. For it enabled men to express not by a symbol but by a concept the divine.

Primitive men could understand that there was a God but they could no more express this act of understanding that transcended experience than Einstein can make you a working model of space-time so that you will be able to understand the way he understands physical ~~namely~~ phenomena. They expressed symbolically this understanding; they tended to vary their symbols with the form of their society; the hunters had mystic animals; the peasants the Mother Goddess and her consort;

and the Egyptian cults offer an interesting example of a super-position of the latter on the former; then there were the sky-gods of the nomads familiar in Greek, Roman, and Teutonic mythology, while the cult of the dead, the sacredness of the family tie, the beauties of nature and its terrors provided a subsidiary host.

The supreme difficulty of substituting a concept for symbolism is borne in upon us by the ~~momentary~~ ^{constant} warnings of the Hebrew prophets which had their ground in the constant back-slidings of the Hebrew people. The same example shows us the dangers of symbolism, the ease with which it passed into idolatry and superstition and, finally, orgiastic lust whether in the sombre cruelty of Baal or the routs of Dionysos. Nor is the origin of such degradation hard to find. The security and wealth of the settled state where religion tends to be the symbolism of a concrete utility, social order, ~~and~~ provide quite a different psychological setting from the isolation and misery of primitive men; there is quite manifestly a temptation to think of the present good as the meaning of religion in the former case while only the transcendent can be good in the latter. Again, religion is the explanation of reality and reality offers a twofold aspect: good and evil. This gives rise to a polytheism which even Plato hardly dared oppose. He was content that the gods be good, that men did not seek to justify their passions by painting the gods as worse than such as enjoy a mohammedan paradise.

As the basis of social reform, Plato criticised the gods and goddesses of Greece and in this he sought to make education his ally by ~~man~~ purifying it of its manifest corruptions. But his positive work was weak. His guardians were trained in what can only be called a school of mysticism, yet mysticism is hardly an art to be acquired even in its natural, ~~forms~~ merely meta-psychic forms. His theory of marital communism was a failure, however excusable in Greece, to grasp the significance in social life of monogamy and the education of children, since parents love their children even as Plato loved his philosophy with a love equally ~~pure~~ disinterested and far more easily ~~achieved~~ attained. Finally, his crossing

out 'mine' and 'thine' from the dictionary was but ~~an unpractical stroke~~ using a bludgeon where is needed a rapier.

Plato's greatness lies in his fidelity to the social problem in its most acute form. His Republic, like Kant's ^{Kritik,} ~~Emantik~~, set a perfect question but utterly failed to answer it. But Plato stayed with his task. He tried to develop the dialectic in a series of dialogues that puzzle the modern student from their mixture of profound and simple problems that are all taken ~~in~~ with equal earnestness. He remained a teacher, never putting forth an idea that was not so refined and polished that a smart lad could not get the point from the other end of the dialectical game. But eventually he renounced his projected Philosophos and with it philosophy; he wrote the Laws in an attempt to play in his very modern times the glorious role of the sage and law-giver ~~of~~ days so long gone by. He passed his mantle on to Aristotle, but for Aristotle the one issue was science and the only science of Ethics that Aristotle would attempt was a practical ethics that neatly dodged the real questions about the ultimate of society.

The stream of practical influence that proceeded from Socrates forget Plato and Aristotle to divide into Cynic and Cyrenaic, Stoic and Epicurean. The Epicurean simply renounces all attempt at higher control; the Stoic manfully seeks it but can succeed only for the individual, teaching all men, but ~~an~~ more popular in times of stress and general misfortune than in times of joy, and, when popular, not teaching men to achieve but only to die with dignity.

The gods and goddesses that Plato mildly rebuked remained as strong as ever, a pall of gibbering ghosts to dim the lustre of the decaying empire of Rome. The Stoics whether the victims of imperial arbitrariness or the rulers from the throne of the Caesars could not halt that decay. And though in the fourth century Christianity was an ever growing and manifest power, still Christ had not come to save the world.

C. The emergence of Christianity gave rise to a distinction hitherto unknown, the distinction of church and state, of the spiritual and the

C. This period is a continuous advance accompanied by a continuous retrogression. The initial situation are the infinitesimal unities that were later ~~and~~ integrated into the feudal hierarchy and, on the other hand, the Christian Church. From the church, ^{canonists} came the laws that were the basis of an economic expansion by commerce, just as previously from the monastic centres came the agriculture that was the foundation of commerce. The full flowering of these two may be represented by the gothic cathedrals and the monarchies not yet exalted by any absolutist doctrine of the divine right of kings. Again from the church came the universities and the scholastic science which put Christianity on a far higher natural basis than had been known in the early church. The scandal of the anti-popes was the turning point of the whole period. For when in Italy, more under Byzantine influence than under that of the Nordic culture which may be represented by a circle with its centre at Aix-la-Chapelle, ^(L. Deussen) the discovery of ancient literature, ^{not only} gave a new birth to modern literature but as well ~~gave~~ cast a glamour over ancient paganism, a section of the North was able to secede from the intellectual unity of Christendom: this secession had a double ^{cause} ~~reason~~, pagan corruption and the obscuration of papal authority. History now flows in two streams and the villain of the piece is the state. The state stabilised the heresies. The wars of religion between the states, in which religion was not the determining factor (Richelieu), gave birth to a new principle, Liberalism: this was the negation of the need of higher control; what Plato longed for, the liberal threw away. The liberal state considered itself an absolute sovereign, as much the Catholic as the Protestant, as much the kings as the later democracies. Meanwhile the positive progress continued; to law and scholastic philosophy and modern literature was added the deliriously brilliant achievement of mathematical science. Science combined with liberalism to make political economy and to transfer power from an aristocracy to a plutocracy. Liberalism is a fact not a theory: but it inevitably tends to either of two theories, modernism ~~and~~ of

Bolshevism, neither of which are autonomous theories but arise from the objective situation and represent two directions that may be adopted to make it a consistent unity. The modernist desires to leave the whole of history without any higher control: all thought that is not positive science has no justifiable application to the objective situation since such thought has only a subjective value; all thought that is positive science merely represents inevitable law, the truth of what is going to happen in any case. The Bolshevik on the contrary takes as his starting-point precisely the indifference of the modernist to the objective situation, argues that his religion is merely a sham, an opiate to soothe the misery of those oppressed by the modernist state. However, Bolshevism uses theory only as a starting-point: its intrinsic nature is the domination of the fait accompli. It is the science of propaganda, the strategy of revolution, the political creed of cowing men by brutality and terror, and the art of permanently winning their hearts by moral perversion. As Mme Kollontai put it: "Immorality is progressing favourably in the schools." Bolshevism is ludicrous with its initial assertion that man is no more than an animal; but Bolshevism is terrible in its power to prove its own truth by making man no more than an animal.

The present situation is on the one hand the Bolshevik assertion of the animal in man and on the other hand the Church's absolute assertion of the spiritual nature of man. Between these two historic forces lie the liberal sovereign states with their economic problems and their political hatreds and fears: these are the pawns in the game however solid they may appear with their devotion to whatever is merely because it is.

We now return to the general theory, which we left with the division of progress into automatic and philosophic. We observe that the initial automatic period led automatically to the emergence of philosophy. Intellect discovered the possibility of social organisation for the fuller exploitation of material goods; this took the form of a socialistic theocracy and gave rise to all the material achievement of man up to

the industrial revolution; it laid the basis for the enrichment of language into literature and the discovery of science; the postulate of higher control over commerce changed the rule of priests into a rule of warriors; on this followed decay because the warriors could do nothing more once they had an empire. Still out of the ancient culture and on the fringe of its influence arose the ^{no longer ancient} warrior and so the democratic city states of Greece; democracy made philosophy possible.

Next to be observed is the impotence of philosophy to fulfil its ~~duties~~ function of higher control. Men want symbols and philosophy postulates concepts.

Third to be observed is the fact that Christianity was at once a symbol and a trans-philosophic higher control. In consequence modern history as a progress is in ^{the} reverse order to ancient history. The moderns began with philosophy, went on to literature, developed science and then applied it. The ancients first learnt the practical arts, then literature, then science and finally philosophy. On the other hand, the reformation does not differ from polytheism and liberalism does not differ from the deprecation of polytheism: the reformation accepted the states instead of the church because there was something it did not understand; ~~the~~ liberalism denied higher control to bring ~~the~~ theory into accordance with objective fact.

Fourth to be observed is that while the ancient cycle was a dialectic ~~of~~ fact, the modern cycle was a dialectic of thought: these differ in that the dialectic of fact has its first motion in material needs (socialistic agriculture, empire, democracy, more empire) the dialectic of thought has its first motion from thought (canon law, monarchy, philosophy from theology, applied science from theoretical science).

Fifth to be observed is that the retrograde movement in the modern period arises from the super-position of the dialectic of fact upon the dialectic of thought. The reformation appealed to the councils above the anti-popes (not really so but apparently so, which is the point

of this dialectic); liberalism appealed to the religious wars as fought for nothing (true of the way they were fought but not true of ~~the~~ might have been what ~~was~~ fought for); modernism appealed to Kantian agnosticism (a problem not a philosophy); communism appealed to the indifference of religion to the social problem (true of some religion, namely, such as ~~daxam~~ does not vindicate its right to dictate to all consciences as consciences on all issues).

Sixth, comes the emergence of the pure dialectic of fact, the realisation of the materialist conception of history that Karl Marx supposed to be the true conception of history. Bolshevism deals only with facts: but it makes the facts it deals with.

Seventh, we prove our assertion that the state is the villain of the modern piece. ~~Distinguish from the state the function of internal economic order, the administration of justice and the development of law with its presupposition of a plan of social progress.~~ For, in so far as the state really could progress, it had to be subject to the higher control of intellect. The higher control of intellect we may ^{nor} honestly attribute neither to the general run of kings of parliaments. Yet as long as the state was subject to the higher intellectual control, it was in continuous rebellion; when it laid this control ^(Reformation Protestantism) aside, it surrendered itself hands bound to the domination of economic ^(Liberalism) law. In both cases it deliberately fostered the mere dialectic of fact in the form of nationalism - the stupid appeal to a common language and an united geographical position as something of real significance. In both cases it had to do this: in the former to have a weapon against spiritual authority; in the later to have a weapon against economic rivals.

Eighth, we observe that the state had a real problem. There was in the philosophy of the spiritual authority no systematic recognition and official encouragement of progress after the counter reformation

D. We turn to the philosophic estimate of the future.

The first point to be noted is that the antinomy of church and state is fundamental. The state is the social expression of the natural ambitions and desires of man; it is the home of literature with its universal ~~embrace~~ ^{outlook} from the mysticism of romanticism to the sober, humanistic beauty of classicism and naturally ordered human life; it is the support of scientific effort with its inward enthusiasms and outwardly manifest benefits; it is the common effort of a people whose mentality is moulded by a common language, common manners, common historical memories of triumphs and deep grievances, to carry on the work of human advancement till the dream of a democracy which is an aristocracy for all be realised. But not only does the state sum up the natural ambitions and desires of man at their best; it is the real power of modern times as in any time in the past. It deliberately exploits all that is excellent and much that is evil in the social mentality and in the desires of individuals to make its power an absolute and unquestionable power.

Against this stands the church with its foundation not in the outward flow of history but in the consciences of individuals. For the church to take advantage of state support is, indeed, in the reasonable order of things. But this support is in the last analysis no addition to the church's real foundation which is in the individual conscience; it is a support that will weather the squalls and the smaller storms of the historical process; it is not a support that will see the church through the incessant drag of the dialectic of fact. For this dialectic also has its hold on the conscience. The good men would do they do not do. This contradiction in the conscience itself ever tends to the rationalism of making wrong into right. Till wrong is openly asserted to be right, sin is but an incidental element in the historic flow; it is a constant that vanishes when one differentiates to find the forces. But when wrong sets itself up as a theory, then it becomes a force; then sin really enters into the world; then men are unconsciously

corrupted. This corruption is not merely moral; it is not merely the generalisation and universalisation of the defended sin; it is a continuous potentiality of further rationalism, for the false that is in men's minds seeks to be made consistent with the truth that they possess and in the process inevitably ends with the falsification of all that is true. Once error has found an entrance in the name of sin, it can hardly be exorcised. For to crush the error, the ~~first~~ must first be crushed; and ex hypothesi the sin could not be crushed even when men had the truth.

Against the rationalising dialectic of fact, the church has a double weapon: to remove the contradiction from the individual conscience, to make the sinner affirm that sin is sin and so preclude the possibility of his trying to make out that sin is not sin, there is the sacrament and the practice of auricular confession; to crush any incipient movement of rationalisation in the social field, there is the teaching magisterium of the church. Together, these two form a perfect bulwark. Hence the heretics of the sixteenth century had to precede the rationalists of the eighteenth, just as the rationalists of the eighteenth century had to precede the communists of our own. On the other hand, everything in the modern ~~mind~~ mentality outside the church - in so far as that mentality rests upon tradition set up since the reformation - is necessarily in opposition to the church. Only the mind that can sweep away the whole of the ~~marxist~~ outlook imposed upon it by its environment is capable of coming back to the church: the difficulty of the task may be estimated by the fact that it took Newman over fifteen years to do so. However highly we estimate the power of the church to attract souls, we must remember that those attracted must from the nature of the case be a select minority. The first three centuries of Christianity gave the conversion of only from ten to twenty per cent of the Roman Empire.

Liberalism is the supreme social doctrine of modern times, in Catholic countries as well as non-Catholic. Intrinsically, that is, as far as logic

goes, liberalism is simply a cypher: the assertion that logic has nothing to do with the control of social life, with history. It was on this ground that we asserted liberalism to ~~be~~ be the pawn between bolshevism and Catholicism. It may last for centuries, as did Egypt, Babylon, Rome. It cannot last forever. The political mechanism on which it rests is the ability of England to maintain the balance of power on the continent of Europe - a process that will last just so long as no power on the continent can snap its fingers at England. When that day comes we shall have an European empire; a beneficent despot or an utter tyrant according to circumstance and mood; absolute, for the modern means of warfare ~~namely~~ give a central government as great a power over ~~as~~ a greater area as did gun-powder to the monarchs; great or insignificant, according to the carnage and cost of the initial achievement; decadent, for the economic problem will remain *and a socialistic empire is not a solution.*

Meanwhile we note that the modern state has no claim to be a sovereign state, to make final and absolute decisions. First, because no modern state is a perfect society. A perfect society has the right of making final and absolute decisions because it holds under its control and responsibility all that is affected by the decisions. No modern state, generally speaking, is either economically or politically independent. The world is run by an oligarchy of Grossmächte and the justice of their decisions is as much open to question as the existence of their right to make decisions.

Thus, there is a triple reason for the liquidation of the present order of sovereign states. First, they ^{must be} ~~are~~ conducted on no intelligible principle; they ^{must} argue not from what ought to be but solely from what is; they ^{use the} ~~use~~ liberal ^{the hypothesis} ~~liberal~~. Second, sound social theory as theory can assign no basis to their pretended right to making absolute decisions; they are neither economically nor politically independent and therefore they are not sovereign. Third, their action is immoral and cannot but be immoral. It is immoral in the domination of the Great Powers: even were they wise and just, they have not the right to make the decisions that they do make.

Further
Second, it is immoral in the fomentation of nationalism by the perversion of ~~human~~ the newspaper, the school, and practically everything else: nationalism is the setting up of a tribal god not merely in the case of Germany - at whom the world smiles for its self-idolatry - but in every case; every nation foment nationalism according to its need; Germany's exaltation of the nation is only the index of a greater need; every country does so, because no country ^{in the present situation can be} ~~is~~ conducted on an intelligible principle and so it must be conducted on an asinine principle. ^{again} ~~That~~, the action of the sovereign states is necessarily immoral in the matter of armament manufacture: no country dare tell the private firms to close up shop, because no country knows when it will need them. ~~But~~ And not only in this matter but in every economic question the antiquated sovereignty of the state is the fundamental difficulty; this will sufficiently appear from our discussion of economics.

When we pass from liberalism to bolshevism we ~~again~~ descend ~~from~~ to a lower level in the dialectic of fact. The liberal argues from what is; the bolshevist argues from what the bolshevist by propaganda, revolution, terrorism, and ~~sexual perversion~~ sexual perversion will make of man. As the barbaric legionaries destroyed the decaying Roman Empire, bolshevism will do all it can to destroy the decaying liberal world. The bolshevik is ^{not} considered a power in the modern world much as Philip of Macedon was ^{not} considered a power in the Greek world. It is not impossible that all attempts to unite Europe will be as futile as Demonsthenes' Philippics. But it is manifest that the modern Philip has a hold upon the modern states not only in his power of arms but also in his power to win the allegiance of everyone in the liberal states who wishes justice but not Christ.

Before attempting the synthesis, we distinguish:

The absolute dialectic: revelation, prophecy, development of dogma.

The dialectic of fact:

- a) Mere fact: the ancient higher culture of the Near East.
- b) Sin: The corruption of ancient ^{culture} and ^{the history of the corruption of} modern culture.
- c) Revealed fact: the development of the Jews and of Christendom up to the end of the middle ages.

The dialectic of thought:

- a) Natural reason: Plato's attempt at a social philosophy.
- b) Rationalism: reformation, liberalism, bolshevism.
- c) Faith: scholastic social theory culminating in the encyclical's of His Holiness, Pius XI.

We observe an anomaly, the necessity of the supernatural and the fact that the supernatural does not eliminate a dialectic based upon sin as an irreflective action or ~~in~~ a datum for a theory of what is, even though sin is non-ens. The necessity of the supernatural appears in the failure of the ancients to produce a social philosophy and the fact that the modern ^{secular} dialectic of thought made sin a datum for its social theory to end with the cult of sin, bolshevism. The fact that the supernatural does not eliminate a dialectic based on sin appears both in the ultimate corruption of the Jews who crucified Christ (irreflective dialectic of sin) and in the scandal of the anti-popes, the reformation, and the subsequent dialectic of thought that had sin for its premise. We note in passing that the hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order: it must be guided by the faith for reason alone is inadequate as we see both in the failure of Plato's thought and in the impossibility of presenting pure philosophy as an *idée-force*; but though supernatural it must also be philosophic, for only a sound philosophy can establish the intellectual conviction necessary to ~~can~~ reassure men, ~~can~~ eliminate false theories in a purely natural sphere, can give positive guidance in what the Pope called in his encyclical "technical matters" lying outside the scope of his pastoral office.

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It will be useful to ask in what this necessity of the supernatural, as revealed by the dialectic, consists.

It is a necessity not of nature but of action.

Human action is one: a statistically predetermined flow; all the individual can do is accept or reject the intellectual forms supplied him for the guidance of his action by the environment; if he thinks of anything not supplied him by the environment, he is merely ~~an~~ incidental, ^{his} an instrument used by humanity to bring forth a new idea which will become part of some ^{existing} movement or the initiation of a new movement.

The necessity of ~~action for~~ ^{action} the supernatural does not prove that the supernatural is not supernatural. The supernatural ~~is~~ is what ~~is~~ transcends nature in its constituents, consequents, exigences. The need of the supernatural for action does not contradict this transcendence of nature. For the need of the supernatural for action has its sole premise in sin. But sin is not a constituent of nature; it is not a consequence of nature; nor does nature by sinning establish any exigence in the order of rights but only a petition to the Divine Mercy for the gratuitousness of grace.

But it would seem that sin establishes an exigence in the order of rights: the present generation suffers for the sins of the past; that the present should suffer for the past is unjust.

That the present should suffer for the past is not unjust, for humanity is not an aggregation of individuals. It is one reality in the order of the intelligible. It is a many in virtue of matter alone. Now any right and any exigence has its foundation only in the intelligible. Matter is not the basis of exigence but the basis of potentiality. The one intelligible reality, man, humanity, unfolds by means of matter into a material multiplicity of men, that the material multiplicity may rise, not from itself, ~~fr~~ but from the intelligible unity, to an intelligible multiplicity of personalities. Men become from man as grapes from the one vine; if the vine corrupts, so do the grapes; but the grapes suffer no injustice from the vine; they are but part of the vine.

As is plain, there is a peculiar relation between the earlier and the later in history. We put this relation in the limiting case when we think of the first man. For the first man sinned, leaving man, spoliatus gratuitis, vulneratus in naturalibus. Spoliatus gratuitis, for the unity of human nature lost its divine adoption. Vulneratus in naturalibus, for the course of history was reversed: man instead of developing from an initial knowledge of philosophy had to develop by the exploitation of matter in a social form. In addition to this was set up the awful tradition of sin. "... by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned." (Rom. 5.12) But there was a second Adam, to restore the divine adoption by a new creation, to set up as first mover a new tradition of grace. "For if by the offence of one, many died: much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was by one sin, so also is the gift. For judgement indeed was by one unto condemnation: but grace is of many offences unto justification. For if by one man's offence death reigned through one: much more they who receive abundance of grace and of the gift and of justice shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ. Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation: so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just." (Rom. 5. 15 - 19)

There is no need to argue that we have here an insistence upon the metaphysical and physical relations of the one and the many: the metaphysical in Adam's loss of grace and Christ's restoration of it in a "new creation"; the physical in the fact that sin set up the dialectic of fact to bring about the "many offences" and the general corruption of history. "For we have charged both Jews and Greeks that they are all under sin. As it is written: There is not any man just. There is none that understandeth: there is none that seeketh after God. All have turned out of the way: they are

become unprofitable together: there is none that doth good, there is not so much as one. Their throat is an open sepulchre: with their tongues they have dealt deceitfully. The venom of asps is under their lips. Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet swift to shed blood: destruction and misery in their ways: and the way of peace they have not known. There is no fear of God before their eyes." (Rom. 3. 9 - 18)

"And as they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, avarice, wickedness: full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity: whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute: without affection, without fidelity, without mercy. Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things, are worthy of death: and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." (Rom. 1. 28 -32). These are the many offences, the height of human corruption, arising from the refusal to have God in human knowledge, and brought about by a corporate responsibility of those who do evil and those that consent to evil-doers. Now ~~xx~~ Christ not only restores the divine adoption: he is also the first mover of a new order. But "not as it was by one sin, so also is the gift." The one sin proceeds from its unity to the many offences; but the gift proceeds from the many offences unto one justification in Christ Jesus. The many offences are brought under a higher control, are integrated into a new movement, "in the dispensation of the fulness of times, to re-establish (ανακεφαλαιωσαι, integrate) all things in Christ, that are in heaven and on earth, in him." (Eph. 1.10)

Let us study this movement of integration, of bringing the scattered elements of humanity no longer submissive to the law of reason back under the control of that law.

There is no difficulty in identifying the unity of human action

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that is consequent to the action of Christ as ~~unimpaired~~ a new prime mover in society, a second Adam, with what is called the mystical Body of Christ, that is, the "many" of his metaphysical "one" in the "new creation" of humanity. In this new creation there are the two aspects of nature and action: nature is elevated by sanctifying grace; action is made good by actual grace. As we deal with the theory of human action, we concentrate attention on the latter.

I would define actual grace as the pre-motion consequent to Christ. Its social form is the ~~κοινωνία~~, the sharing with Christ, the communion with Christ. In itself, this social form has a fourfold aspect. As a body that lives by the blood of Christ, ~~ministration of the riches of his grace and channels through which they flow,~~ eternal it is the priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech and the sacraments that apply the grace of Christ's sacrifice. As a body that is but an extension of the body of Christ, it ~~is~~ exercises a power of jurisdiction, admitting members into the body by baptism, excluding decayed cells from the organism by excommunication. As a body united to Christ as Head, it is of one mind and with the authority of a divinely constituted teacher; "we have the mind of Christ" (I Cor 2.16) and that mind is not only one but authoritative. Finally, as Christ's Body, it executes the will of the Head, of Him who exclaimed: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered together thy children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not!" It is in the Body of Christ that the Christian lives and moves, lives the life of a soul elevated to the supernatural order, moves ~~mundum~~ in obedience to the *idée-force*; the intelligible or rather trans-intelligible form which by revelation is the Christian's dictate of reason. Christ is the vine and we are the branches. By Him we are all that we are, for being is act and every act has its pre-motion while sin is non-act, non-ens, the failure of the will to perform its immanent act of love for the intelligible form which makes action rationali

But the Christian and the social form of Christianity, the Church, is in the world. "I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from evil." (John 17.15)

The presence of Christianity in the world gives rise to a two-fold ^{part} movement each of which divides into a prior dialectic of fact and a subsequent dialectic of thought. There is the movement of Christianity assimilating the world to itself, the work of the leaven that leaveneth the whole mass. There is movement of the world, ~~convicted~~ ^{convicted} of sin yet refusing grace, in opposition to this intussusception of all things into the Body of Christ. Further the movement of Christianity may be a simple dialectic of fact, the spontaneous expansion through the zeal of apostles, the courage of martyrs (sanguis martyrum, semen ecclesiae), the moral beauty of Christian life. And similarly the rejection on the part of the world may be a spontaneous movement of hatred: such was the fury of the Roman persecutions (Tacitus: odio humani generis convicti sunt; Tertullian, Apol. 7: coepit veritas, simul atque apparuit, inimica esse) and the liberal doubts about ~~the~~ "odium fidei" as the basis of the persecutions not only have ~~x~~ no foundation in historical science but argue a singular superficiality in human psychology. Again, there ~~xx~~ is the long interplay of static action and reaction, in which the church learns the value of philosophy from the definition of the "homocousios" through the scholastic systematisation of dogma to the modern elevation of St Thomas. On the other hand, during this same period the world builds up its dialectic of thought to arrive at Bolshevism as the one logical position for its resistance to Truth. Finally, there is the new apostolate and the new persecution. These proceed from the conclusions of the dialectic of thought. The Church turns to scientific sociology and missiology. Sin turns to scientific propaganda, physical domination, moral perversion. Between these two contending forces, the *ἔνερ ἀνθρώπου* and the *ἔνερ τοῦ κόσμου* lies the liberal idea of merely natural man, the *ἔνερ φυσικός*, with no firmer foundation than actual fact and with no theory save a theory

We now advance to our final conclusion, first examining the logic of our analysis of history, second asking what is the meaning of history.

Our analysis is strictly philosophic. We lay down the theory of the intelligible unity and material difference of humanity; we divide the intelligible unity into an unity of nature and an unity of action; we demonstrate the unity of action from the principle of pre-motion; we explain the limitation of free will, by noticing that the act of free-will is either an acceptance of a rational dictate (and what reason dictates is predetermined) or the non-acceptance of the rational dictate (and what then happens is entirely predetermined). Perhaps, it will be necessary for our outline of a Summa Philosophica to be read for the full appreciation of these philosophic points, particularly in what concerns freedom and the rationalisation of sin. However, we legitimately assume here what we prove elsewhere.

Second we study change in itself. We divide change into three kinds, according to its historic significance. First is the mere change of ordinary action: man lives as his ancestors. Second is the change that follows from the emergence of new ideas. Third is the change that follows from the emergence of systems of ideas, of philosophies. The first kind of change is of no interest. The second kind of change falls into three classes: ideas that understand the objective world; ideas that are vitiated by the existence of sin in the objective world; ideas that are elevated by the influence of divine revelation. In the third section we again have these same three divisions: but there is an essential difference. The ideas of the second kind of change are ideas in the concrete while those of the third kind are ideas in the abstract. The logic of ~~the first kind of~~ ideas in the concrete is the logic of fact: it does not work out in pure thought but in the objective situation. Thus, the temple states of Mesopotamia and the city states of Greece had no unifying idea effective in the concrete: they were forced into an empire by the lack of such an idea, but this lack did

not work out as a syllogism but by wars. Similarly, the empires were logically bound to fail for the lack of an idea that would integrate the differentials ~~and~~ of change and progress in their far-flung territories: but Egypt, Babylon and Rome passed away not by force of logic but by inner decay. On the other hand, the function of the applied dialectic of thought is to anticipate the need of the objective situation. Thus, the communist anticipates the break-down of capitalism. The Church executes a plan for the social order. The liberal was confident that "laissez faire" was an infallible recipe for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The Church, the liberal, and the communist bring about objective social change not by ideas in the concrete but by ideas in the abstract.

It may be asked, especially of one who writes in English, what is the value of abstract ideas applied to the situation. Let us be practical! The answer is that the abstract ideas have, indeed, a greater possibility of being wrong than the concrete ideas. Also, they work out for good or evil far more rapidly. But, whether we like it or not, the world has got beyond the stage where concrete problems can be solved merely in the concrete. Economics supplies us with the most palpable example: you have to have some economic theory in conducting the state and changing from one to another with every change of government is neither intelligent, fair to the people, or fair to the wide world which has to have an universal solution to the problem of go to pieces. Politics supplies us with another example. The modern state does not think in terms of the past, of its merits or demerits in being what it is; it thinks in terms of the future and if it foresees that it is being put out of the running by those with more economic power and more diplomatic skill, then it simply ^{turns} ~~runs~~ berserk in the name of Odin, Thor, or what you please. The sum and substance of the whole issue is that ideas ~~and~~ in the concrete will build you a shanty but not a house and still less a skyscraper. The modern situation demands that questions be settled not in the concrete, not by the petty minds of politics who think of

grabbing all they can because they can and make a virtue of not doing what they know either to be unprofitable or ^{impossible} ~~impossible~~, but in terms of pure reason. Physical reality functions perfectly in blind obedience to intelligible law. Humanity must first discover its law and then apply it: to discover the law is a long process and to apply it a painful process but it has to be done. The alternative is extinction. And practical minds are orientated towards extinction just as much whether they realise the point or not.

To return to history. From the point of view of the seven dialectics, the absolute Geist of revelation which develops in its reaction to the world, the triple form of the dialectic of fact and the triple form of the dialectic of thought, we do not pretend that these do not super-pose and interact: on the contrary that is their very nature. On the other hand, we may distinguish ~~a~~ three distinct periods that view these dialectics from a different point of view. The first period was the development of mind by material need and social collaboration: it gave the world the idea of philosophy in Plato. The second period was the development of philosophy from Plato to the emergence of the idea of a social philosophy: this period continues till the need of philosophy as the prime mover in social life is recognised generally. The third period is the development of society under the control of a social philosophy: liberalism, the negation of any social philosophy, was the fact that makes a social philosophy a necessity of which men can be conscious; communism is wild-eyed attempt to give the world such a philosophy; Catholic social theory has existed since the middle ages but the degree to which Catholics were conscious of the importance of a social philosophy has been small almost up to the present time.

Again we digress to note the peculiarity of Catholic development.

Catholic development is by reaction; ^{but reaction may be even opposition as it may be higher synthesis.} ~~on reaction has been by reaction~~

that much has been more opposition
Wahg,

was inevitable as long as Catholics did not grasp the significance of intellectual development and the necessary consequence of such intellectual development in social change: this failure of Catholics

has always been a failure on the part of individuals. There were bishops who objected to the term "homocousios" because it was not in Scripture; there were contemporaries to oppose St Thomas who followed Aristotle and took the trouble to talk about the Arabs and refute them; there are Thomists whose last thought is to imitate St Thomas in this matter of thinking in pace with the times. Similarly, what is called anti-clericalism is at root the antinomy between a merely traditional mentality and a mentality that is thinking in terms of the future and of problems of which the mere traditionalist has not the ghost of a notion, in fact, would flatly deny their existence, or, if they exist, that something should be done about it, or, if that is manifest, then that anything can be done about it. It is not indeed to be denied that the reactionary attitude has not a very firm foundation in fact, namely, in the very palpable fact that all the progressives are more or less in error, more or less perverse, more or less destructive. Nor is it to be denied that the reactionaries had any other course open to them in the past. You can protect the good either by simply sitting back or by advancing with the good; but to advance with the good you have to have a theory of progress and a will to progress; these were lacking. Thus it is in the theory of social order, in the re-establishment of all things in Christ, in the leadership of Christ, King of the historical process, Prime Mover of the new order, that Pope Pius XI has laid the foundations for a triumph ^{over} ~~of~~ an old, inevitable, and regrettable antinomy. For it is only in the philosophy of the church that can be attained the realisation of that conception which Plato could not realise. It was true when Plato penned his Republic but it is even more manifestly true to-day that "Men and cities can not have happiness unless philosophers are kings." To the world in its present plight of economic distress and political insecurity the Church offers not philosophers but philosophy, nay, $\eta \lambda \theta \iota \varsigma \Sigma \Theta \Phi \iota \alpha$, the Word made flesh, Truth consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, as eternal King, as ruler of the historic process now that history has entered on its final stage of realising abstract ideas.

We deduce the meaning of history from the ~~method~~ intention of God's creating man as one, one in nature and one in action.

Creation aims at the manifestation of subsistential Wisdom, the Word. The angelic intellect is to the Word as the contingent to the Absolute; human intellect is to the angelic as potency to act. The contingent and the potential intellect are ~~to absolute Wisdom as a partial intellectual form is to the will~~ ^{mere} participations of the absolute Wisdom but also are wisdoms in potency. To be wisdom in act they must meet with an act of love for the intelligible on the part of the will, appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus. But the will is free; you love because you love. ^{To transcend freedom.} ~~Thus~~, creation divides into two parts: ^{there is} the angelic creation of pure individuals, specifically different from one another, and in this creation the good manifest Wisdom while the evil are the prime movers of sin in a world where there are not pure individuals but merely individuation by matter. In ^{the material} ~~this~~ world, the manifestation of Wisdom lies in the triumph of good out of evil; because evil caused evil in the world, the world brings good out of this evil for a final vindication of good and a final triumph ~~of the~~ Sapientia manifestanda.

Because men are but one in nature and action, all the good in the world flows from the pre-motion of Wisdom and would not be were it not for that pre-motion. On the other hand, all the evil in the world proceeds from its arbitrary basis of refusing the dictate of reason, spreads by a dialectic of evil till evil is crushed by its own excess to give rise to a contrary and higher movement for still greater good. No flesh may glory in the sight of the Lord, for all good has its causation both physical and moral in the pre-motion of Christ. No evil can triumph for every evil is permitted merely that good may more fully abound.

The role of the individual in the historic flux is two-fold. Pre-motion offers him an intelligible dictate. He may accept, but his

acceptance is not an act of his but simply an act that takes place in him: for the will naturally follows the dictate of reason; that is its "inclinatio naturalis". He may not accept, but then he simply does nothing. For sin is non-ens, the failure of the will to act, something uncaused and inexplicable (because against reason), pure malice that is entirely his. This is regarding the individual ~~xxx~~ from the viewpoint of the antecedents to his act or non-act. But the individual's act is not only a bracketed product of the past: it is a pre-motion for the future. The motion of the Prime Mover is passed from one individual to the next. Now according as the individual acts according to reason or fails to do so, he decreases or increases the quantity of objective evil, of a disharmony between reason and objective fact in the world. Every individual is an instrument in the transmission of the pre-motion: but he may be an instrument for more sin or for less. He may be an instrument of sin or of Christ.

"Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin: but present yourselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead; and your members ~~as~~ as instruments of justice unto God." (Rom. 6. 12,13) cf. *ibid.* 6.19; 7.5,6.

The meaning then of history is plain. It is the ever fuller manifestation of Eternal Wisdom first in a dialectic of fact and then through revelation in a dialectic of thought. The significance of the individual, "endured with much patience as a vessel ~~animum~~ of wrath fitted for destruction ... or a vessel of mercy ... prepared unto glory" (Rom 9.22,23), is to be a transmitting unit of the pre-motion of Wisdom or to fail in doing so thus creating the growing evil of the world. The direction of the historic flow is an accelerating progress as man passes from the factual more and more into the reflective dialectic. The nature of progress is to reconquer through Christ the loss nature sustains through sin. For from original sin we derive a double evil: ignorance of the intelligible and difficulty in obeying the intelligible. The function of progress is

to increase leisure that men may have more time to learn, to conquer material evil in privation and sickness that men have less occasion to fear the merely factual and that they may have more confidence in the rule of intellect, to struggle against the inherited capital of which injustice ~~thus~~ creates such objective situations that men cannot be truly just unless first the objective situation is changed, and, finally, I am not certain I speak wildly, out of the very progress itself to produce a mildness of manners and temperament which will support and imitate and extend the mighty power of Christian charity. This then is the virtue of progress, the virtue of social justice, by which man directs his action so that it will be easier for his neighbours and his posterity to know and to do what is right and just. To this virtue are all men bound by the unity of human action, for the human act is twofold: an immanent rightness of will and an external transient rightness ~~and~~ in the transmission of pre-motion. No man's achievement is his own: he is no more than a product of the past whether in the goods of the body or the goods of the soul. No man's achievement is for himself: it is but a modification for good or evil of the pre-motion the world has from Adam and from the second Adam, Christ.

We sum up the significance of the external action of man in a citation: *divinorum operum omnium divinissimum Deo cooperari in salvatione animarum*. That is the significance of ^{all} our external acts. They are the activity of our members and our members are either instruments of sin for greater sin or instruments of justice unto the justification of others. Man is one in nature and in action.

We have mentioned the fact that the greatest evil in the world is the evil that is concretised ~~into~~ the historic flow, the capital of injustice that hangs like a pall over every brilliant thing, that makes men and nations groan over others' glory; that provokes anger and suicide and dire wars, that culminates in the dull mind and sluggish body ~~and~~

of the enslaved people or the decayed culture. The Christian counter-piece to this in the Christian's victory over sin is charity. For charity becomes not angry over wrongs, charity does not nourish hatred or threaten war, charity does not despair; charity is an eternal fire of optimism and of energy, dismayed at naught, rebuked by none, tireless, determined, deliberate; with deepest thought and unbounded spontaneity charity ever strives, struggles, labours, ~~pleas~~ exhorts, implores, prays for the betterment of the unit action of man, for the effective rule of sweetness and light, for a fuller manifestation of what charity loves, Wisdom Divine, the Word made Flesh.

The Sovereign Pontiff has proclaimed the Kingship of Christ. Do you know His Kingdom?

"In the last days the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be prepared on the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills: and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say: Come, and let us go up to the mountain ~~of~~ the Lord and to the house of the God of Jacob: and he will teach us his ways and we will walk in his paths. For the law shall come forth from Sion: and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge the Gentiles and rebuke many people: and they shall turn their swords into ploughshares and their spears into sickles. Nations shall not lift up sword against nation: neither shall they be exercised any more ^{to} ~~in~~ war." (Isaiah 2:2-4)

Is this to be taken literally or is it figure? It would be fair and fine, indeed, to think it no figure.