

## Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity.

I. The real is exhausted by the terms: existence, individuation, essence; i.e., everything that is exists as a particular of a certain kind.

II. Existence is either intelligible or empirical.

Intelligible existence is the existence "per se nota quoad se."

Empirical existence is the existence that is not "per se nota quoad se." Empirical existence does not exclude all intelligibility: it is not intelligible in itself; to be known it has to be known as a matter of fact, empirically; once it is so known, it may be understood, but not in terms of itself but only in terms of a purely intelligible existence.

Empirical existence is also called contingent.

Empirical existence is what is called the "suppositum", i.e., what is presupposed to exist by intellect in its pure discourse; pure discourse quoad se could treat of God, it could treat of human nature, it could treat of an n-dimensional space; the existence of the last two, however, has either to be presupposed or to be prescinded from by pure discourse; on the other hand, pure discourse quoad se includes the existence of God.

It is in the order of empirical existence that the axiom holds: quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se. Thus, this intellectual and this sensible are really one thing; they are really one thing, empirically, as a matter of fact, because they are both found in the one contingent being though either may be found separately in contingent beings (angels and animals). On the other hand, this principle has a strictly limited application in the order of purely intelligible existence, i.e. the Blessed Trinity.

III. Individuation is either intelligible or empirical.

Intelligible differentiation is in virtue of an intelligible difference: thus, the Father differs intelligibly from the Son according to the opposition of the relations; similarly one angel differs intelligibly from another.

Empirical differentiation is not in virtue of an ultimate intelligible difference; it is difference simply as a matter of fact. This is similar to that, but it is not the same as that; why not? It is simply a fact; there is not a reason.

Positively, empirical differentiation is in virtue of matter: matter is the unlimited passive potentiality of unintelligible difference; it explains why all the points in a line are each different from all the others. This is not quantity, for quantity adds continuity to this mere potentiality of difference: matter is the potentiality of difference as such.

IV. Reality is either pure or impure.

Pure Reality is the aspect of the divine essence that is imitated or participated; it is necessarily intelligible in itself, for it is an aspect of the absolutely intelligible.

Impure reality is what must be besides this aspect as such for there to be more than the divine essence; thus, if the participated aspect is to be real, it cannot be a pure participation for it necessarily is something that the Participated is not, viz., partial; similarly, for imitation: the imitation cannot be the real original, else it would not be merely an imitation.

Impure reality is termed passive potency and pure reality act; hence, *actus limitatur per potentiam*.

Further, in God there is no potency; in all creatures there is potency; therefore, in all creatures there is something that there is not in God. Finally, both contingency and materiality are in themselves unintelligible neither is found in God; both are found in all creatures in the world; therefore, contingency and materiality are impure reality; also, as the real is positively real by participation or imitation of the Absolute, it remains that essence is the pure participation.

V. We draw two ~~xxxxx~~ corellaries. ~~mmmmmmmmmm~~.

a. The reality of a thing is to be measured not by its existence nor by its particularity, if these are merely empirical, but by its measure of essence, of participation of the divine essence.

b. The lower grades of being are differentiated by affirmation and negation according to their measure of imitation: thus, existing but not living; living but not rational; rational but not immaterial.

This is the scope of differentiation by "esse absoluto".

The same is true, possibly, of the differentiation of the angels.

In the Trinity, differentiation cannot be by the "esse absolutum" since each person is God exhaustively; hence it is by "esse relativum" by the reality of opposed ~~mmmmmmmmmm~~ yet mutually implicit function.

#### VI. Pure reality is dynamic.

God, whence all pure reality has its foundation, is a dynamic eternity of unlimited and immutable intellect and will; from this proceed all the attributes as well as the Persons; the attributes, for Wisdom is infinite intellect with infinite will; Goodness is infinite will with infinite intellect; omnipotence is the illimitation of will; immensity is the spiritual character of omnipotent will; etc. etc.

Physical reality, apart from its being a particular something, is as the physicists tell us energy; and a clear conception of the calculus is a great help to understanding the processions of St Thomas.

Biological reality, apart from its being particular somethings, is reproductive, self-adaptive, life.

The dynamism of reality is either "motus" or "energeia".

Motus est actus entis in potentia in quantum huiusmodi.

Energeia est actus entis in actu in quantum huiusmodi. (procession).

The dynamism of reality is somewhat obscured (ungroundedly) by the distinction between essence and nature. Essence is quo quid est quod est. Nature is the principium intrinsecum actionis talis. These two really coincide. To say that the essence of man is "rational animal" is to think of man not in his absolute measure of reality but in his measure ~~as a~~ ~~mmmmmm~~ measure relative to that of animals. Man considered in himself is a particular conjunction of physical, organic, sensitive and intellectual active potencies; abstract from the particularity and the contingent suppositum of the conjunction and we have the pure essence, a set of potencies. Now the actuation of these potencies does not regard man as such but man as existing and particular; hence the essence is merely the set of active potencies. But a nature is also a set of active potencies. Therefore, essence, considered absolutely, coincides with ~~xx~~ nature.

#### VII. Individuation and Personality.

Individuation is not the same as personality. An infant is actually individual but only potentially a personality. Formally, a personality is a combination of a habit of intellect and a habit of will, a particular mentality and character. This personality is constituted either by the Light and Charity that come of the Holy Ghost, and this gives the ~~λογος~~ ~~λογος~~; or in relation to the True, Good, and Beautiful, and this gives the ~~λογος~~ ~~λογος~~; or finally in relation to the sensible lower self of desire, and this gives the ~~λογος~~ ~~λογος~~.

Hence it would seem that even among men personality is a relation; but it is a relation that arises from the spiritual potencies used well or abused and corresponds to the passive potency of individuation by matter which supplies its initial possibility; we outgrow our individuation by matter, but we need it to begin with; further, we see the ground of immaterial existence in the intellectual and moral development of man.

... oportet considerare, quod intellectus noster  
de potentia in actum procedit: omne autem, quod  
procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad  
actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam  
et actum, quam ad actum perfectum... actus autem  
incompletus est scientia IMPERFECTA, per quam  
sciuntur res INDISTINCTE sub quadam CONFUSIONE...

Summa 1a., q. 85, a.3, c.

P A N T Ō N      A N A K E P H A L A I Ō S I S

A Theory of Human Solidarity

A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St Paul

A Theology for the Social Order,

Catholic Action,

And the Kingship of Christ,

IN   INCIPIENT   OUTLINE.

i)

Note: I trust the reader will be more inclined to be satisfied with suggestive ideas than to be exigent in the matter of logical development, exhaustive citation, careful exposition. The former is to some extent within the range of possibility for a student; the latter is not. Especially is this the case in the subject of this essay: for to write on the Pauline conception of our Blessed Lord as the *anakephalaiôsis* of all things presupposes very definite views on all things, theological, philosophic, historical, social, political, even economic. Now plainly it is one thing to justify one's position in this multiple field of science and quite another to pluck as the fruit therefrom a synthetic view revealing the metaphysical convergence of all things on Christ Jesus, our Lord. On the other hand, the achievement of such synthesis constitutes of itself a manner of proof, proof that may be conceived in terms of Newman's integration of probabilities or, more simply, in terms of the neat French phrase: *la vérité s'impose*; on this ground, it will be seen, synthesis is to no slight extent independent of its presuppositions and the procedure of this essay has an intrinsic justification as well as the extrinsic excuse of a student's manifold limitations.

The fundamental assumption of the essay is that a metaphysic is the necessary key to St Paul, as its fundamental contention is that the Thomist synthesis (pushed, indeed, to a few ~~latest~~ conclusions which, if they seem new, may be regarded, I trust, as a legitimate development) that do not figure, at least prominently, in the current Thomist mentality) provides such a key. The cardinal points of the conception we present are such as the theologian commonly fights shy of on the ground that they are too speculative to be of use to theology, - a principle that would certainly have clipped the wings of St Thomas himself. Thus we make of capital importance the ~~alternative~~ alternative of material and intelligible (by specific difference) individuation; we regard as a minor reality all potency, for potency is not an imitation of the Divine Essence but a condition for such imitation

ii)

which is to be found in essence and act alone; we argue that personality, as it is known to us, is the emergence of an intelligible individuation for which material individuation is a prerequisite (*materia proper formam*); finally, we find this intelligible individuation in the actuation of intellect and will in human operation and we synthetise human operation in terms of the solidarity of human intellects and the statistical uniformity, as it were, of human wills. It is <sup>from</sup> ~~an~~ the basis of a metaphysical conception of man, one in nature and operation, working through a material to an intelligible plurality in a transient dynamism in which no man is more than an instrumental cause and no causation fails to affect all men, that we attempt to interpret St Paul. This metaphysical conception we find to square accurately with the conception of humanity as an organism: the purely instrumental causality of man and the way in which this causality affects all men is exactly parallel to the purely instrumental causality of the members of a body and the way in which the operation of the members affects the whole body. This gives the "*singuli autem alter alterius membra*" of Rom 12.5. But more; the principle of pre-motion ~~humanitas humana~~ makes these ~~human~~ instrumental causes into a solidary chain of causation in which each instrument transfers the motion received from those before, ~~and~~ transmitting it to those that follow; thus, a place of singular responsibility falls to the first mover among men, to the first and the second Adam. Adam corrupted the pre-motion and set up the reign of sin, a reign of disharmony and maladjustment in the corporate unity of man. Christ set up a new motion to harmonise, re-adjust, reintegrate a humanity that had reached the peak of disintegration and death described in the first chapter of Romans. This is the *anakephalaiôsis*. And it is in virtue of this new motion that men again live, live as though "alive from the dead", live "yielding their members" as instruments of justice unto God," live not indeed of themselves but only in virtue of the pre-motion according to the word: "I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me."

"Ita multi unum corpus sumus in Christo, singuli autem alter alterius membra." Thus, the material unity of man in Adam is replaced by the intelligible unity of man in Christ, the blind course of nature by the voluntary course of faith, the sinful course of the reign of a pre-motion from the serpent by the current of charity that has its formal cause in Christ as Wisdom and its efficient cause in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost as Love. Man is indeed made to the image and likeness of God when the actuation of his being is from the Father, the actuation of his adoptive Sonship is from the Son, the Light of the world, and the actuation of his effective unity is from the Holy Ghost.

In so vast a field of thought it is impossible to be complete; it may well be that I have defeated my purpose in attempting in so short a space so much; for the effort to include further aspects tends to give the impression more of audacious assertion than of sober speculation. However let me do something to counteract this influence by expressing ~~namque~~ my willingness to go on any point to the "ultimum cur." I append an outline of the argument.

- §1. p. 1., Liberty as a disjunctive determination.
- §2. p. 3., The historical determination of intellect.
- §3. p. 6., The unity of human operation.
- §4. p. 8., The synthesis of human operation.
- §5. p. 11, The unity of man in the ontological ground of his being.
- §6. p. 15, Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.

Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis - A Theory of Human Solidarity.

§1. The human will is an "appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus."

a) The form of intellect in question can be nothing but the dictate of reason, for the will is the faculty by which men not merely act but act reasonably; to follow the dictate of reason is to act well, not to follow it is to sin; the act of will is following this dictate; the non-act of will is the failure to follow this dictate; the non-act is sin.

b) It is natural to man to follow the dictate of reason; when he does follow it, he is simply failing to do violence to his nature; hence, when we do all that is commanded of us, we remain unprofitable servants. Plainly so, for to allow events to take their natural course, to permit one's faculties their natural operation and expansion, is not a title to merit but simply the absence of evil. Hence the Augustinian doctrine that sin is from man and everything else from God who gives both the rational motives to our will and gives us wills naturally appetitive of rational motives: the naturalness of this appetite may be seen in the spiritual malady of remorse which is the phenomenon of violence done the will.

c) The non-act of will is the failure of the will to inhibit a motion that is contrary to reason: since only the will is free, it is clear that when the will does not act then the event is determinate, i.e., determined exactly as any other physical event.

d) The act of will is the positive following of a dictate of reason: but what is reasonable under any given set of circumstances may be either objectively or subjectively reasonable. If objectively reasonable, then the human act of will is determinate in the order of pure reason. If only subjectively reasonable, then the human act is again determinate as a function of historical causation: for there will be a reason why this man does not know what is objectively right, and this reason why will lie in the field of history. This last point will become clearer later. As is plain, we may speak of objective reasonableness as equally due to historical causation.

e) Hence human freedom is simply a choice between different determinate orders of events: if the will does not act, there is physical determination; if the will does act, then there is historical determination. Both are equally determined even though we cannot perform the psychological analysis necessary to prove the determination in that fashion, just as the distribution of the stars has some determining cause even though astronomy may be ignorant of it.



§2. We now proceed to investigate the historical determination of the form or dictate presented by intellect to the will.

a) We first note that every act of intellect will be specified and so determined by a phantasm and that the phantasm has to be drawn from some historical situation. The historical situation gives the outer limits to what men can think about: what they actually will think about will be discovered by preceeding to the limit, casting up the sum of a man's momentum of interests, experience, mental development, and actual position

b) Second, it is to be noted that every act of intellect is an universal.

The consequence is of ~~a~~ importance in this inquiry, inasmuch as ~~xx~~ the universal act of intellect will be a premise to an indefinite number of acts of will. We are here at the root of the philosophy of history: the <sup>one</sup> act of intellect guides a man's <sup>many</sup> actions till it is replaced by a contradictory idea; it guides not only the actions of the originator but also all the actions of those to whom he has communicated the idea either directly or by a secular tradition: think of Buddha, Confucius. Further, the emergence of a contradictory idea is as much a determinate event as the emergence of the first idea, for it has to be based upon phantasm and phantasms come from historical situations.

c) Consequent to the relation between intellect and human act, one act of intellect being capable of informing an indefinite number of acts of will, is the following principle for the analysis of history: the flow of human operations are determined by a single set of ideas; a change in all the flow of operation follows from the emergence of one new idea; the form of a flow of changes follows from the form of the flow of new ideas, that is, from a purely logical dialectic. In mathematical terminology, abstract thought is the second differential of human operation, while concrete thought is the first differential.

d) We arrive at the third differential by considering the form of human thought as such. As St. Thomas remarked, it is a progress from potency to perfect act (perfect science from every view-point) through a series of incomplete acts. (ST 1 85 3 c).

e) It is to be noted that this progress from potency through incomplete act to perfect act is to be predicated not of the individual but of humanity. Perfect science does not exist yet; our science is an incomplete act of intellect. Further, it follows from the analogy of the angel  
(aevum)  
who in the instant of his being solves all the problems relative to his specific nature, that man in the instant (tempus) of his being should solve the problems of his specific nature. Finally, the point is evident from the solidarity of human thought: the achievements and the errors of the past live on into the present and form the basis of the guidance intellect gives to will; with regard to this basis of traditional thought there is by the mass of men the application of the traditional principles to concrete situations and by the very few the addition of a new idea, a development or a higher synthesis of the old.

f) Matter, the principle of individuation, isolates the individual from the unity of the species; but this isolation exists only for the sake of a higher unity, the unity of men by intellect. The exploitation of natural resources calls for a higher organisation of men than the natural unit of the family or tribe; the organisation gives rise to the need of political and juridical forms of society; the advance in the manner of satisfying physical needs at once exercises intellect, reveals its power, and gives the leisure necessary for the pursuit of culture, i.e., the development of the higher faculties of man.

g) The unity of man achieved by intellect has to be an unity in truth, if it is to be stable. Peace fundamentally is this unity in truth and only phenomenally is it "ordo cum tranquillitate". Opposed to peace is the atomisation of humanity, the Zersplitterung that follows from error and sin, and the false substitutes of national self-idolabry or the deification of emperors to secure what reason is powerless to secure.

h) There is in the natural order a three-fold dialectic in the historic progress of intellect.

First, the dialectic of fact. The objective situation gives a phantasm which specifies an idea. The idea is an incomplete act of intellect but

5

it is put into execution as though it were complete: the result is a false historic situation which reveals the incompleteness of the old idea and leads to the emergence of a compensating idea.

Second, this is the dialectic of sin. False situations may be created not only by following incomplete acts of intellect as though they were complete but also by not following intellect at all. Thus, the depraved polytheism of the ancients arose from habit which made sin seek an intellectual justification; similarly, the theory of liberalism is a consequent of the sixteenth century heresy with the consequent religious wars while the theory of communism is a consequent of the pharisaical religiosity of capitalist exploitation and oppression.

Third, there is the dialectic of thought. As a pure dialectic it is the development of the "philosophia perennis" as new phantasms make a greater distinctness and precision possible. As contaminated with the dialectic of sin, the pure dialectic gives us the actual course of abstract thought since the emergence of philosophy as a human science with Socrates.

1) The potential character of intellect results through ignorance in an internal and external disharmony called concupiscence. The low *energeia* of intellect leads men to believe that the sensible is the real, that is, the particular concrete object which if accepted without qualification as the real leaves William of Ockham the "doctor invincibilis". The fact that because of this potentiality men develop first as animals and very gradually come to the use of reason, when taken in conjunction with ignorance about reality, supplies the dynamic basis for concupiscence in the narrow sense; for it is under these circumstances that the subconscious development of nervous paths and patterns takes place in a way that later interferes with human autonomy over the flesh. Finally, the blunders and the sins of men create objective situations that should never exist and that easily become intolerable, whether we consider the microcosmic tragedies of passion and cruelty and suicide or the more terrible fruits of so-called economic and political forces.

6

§3. What has been said of intellect reveals the unity of all human operation. The individual's intellectual pattern is determined by phantasms which come from objective situations containing both a tradition of past intellectual achievement and the data for future development. Any new idea is gestated by the situation of successive centuries, is brought to birth by some chance individual meeting the postulate of the situation, immediately becomes the property of all affected by the situation as though the individual were but the instrument for general development. Thus it is that a first year theologian to-day can solve the problem of baptism by heretics that left Cyprian and the early church utterly at a loss; and, on the other hand, it takes a Newman some fifteen years of very slow progress to arrive at the truth of Catholicism, so great is the all pervasive power of traditional mentality. This point may be to some extent obscured to the reader if he thinks of the great variety of opinion at the present day: the fact is that at the present time we have not a burst of originality but the decay of intellect, the Zersplitterung, that results from men being out of touch with a tradition and fancying their primitively incomplete acts of intellect to be valid for the time; really, intellect has ceased to be a principle of unity among men; instead we have the mass propaganda of national education, national newspapers, national morality, and the peace that comes of police, armaments, and forced military service. The nineteenth century's romantic liberalism ~~af~~ in the cult of shoddy "originality" might be tolerable if, as Bernard Shaw suggested, we went back to Mathusaleh and men lived a millenium instead of dying off, as now, at the age of eighty when they are but beginning to have a few glimmerings of sense. But the providential dispensation that compensated for the patriarch's lack of tradition by ~~human~~ longevity is merely fantastic as a solution to modern problems: modern men have to think in development of previous thought if they are to think at all.

The unity of intellect, that follows from its potential character and the need of specification by phantasm, results in an effective uniformity of will. Free will is but the choice between following the dictates of intellect and not attempting to control by reason the mere impulses of blind nature: it is a choice between two determinate orders. Moreover, there is an uniformity in this choosing. We speak of moral certitude with regard to the future free acts of men and we recognise heroic virtue and inhuman vice as exceptions to a settled constancy. Thus, though the will is not determined, it remains that there is a statistical uniformity to the operations of will. In consequence, we may regard mankind as a machine of low efficiency that receives from the objective situation specifications of intellect and pre-motions but turns out operations that only in a certain <sup>if</sup> percentage are according to intellect and the rest as there was no intellectual control whatever.

We may conclude this section by putting the thought in the form of an argument. Men either think as they are taught or they think for themselves; in the latter case they either bring forth ideas that are real advances in the field of intellect or they merely add to the atomisation of humanity by proposing as true what is merely incomplete and false. In all three cases their thought is the thought of what may be called an objective Geist, the common mind of man: the traditionalist is merely another who thinks the same way, a numerical addition; the true originator is but the instrument for the advance of the objective Geist; the false originator is equally an instrument, ~~but~~ not for advance but for destruction, the penalty of man's forgetting that he is but a member of a species and cannot do all the thinking of the species himself. Next, the good will that follows intellect ~~it~~ does nothing but make the actions of man an instrument for fulfilling the practical aims of the objective Geist; on the other hand, the evil will makes human operation an instrument for the sub-intellectual determinate order. In either case, man is simply an instrument.

§4. We may now attempt the synthesis of human operation. There is as the extrinsic basis of this operation the succession of non-human world events in the physical and biological orders. As intrinsic basis there is the succession of individuals being born, begetting others, dying. In relation to both of these and to one another is the succession of human acts. Finally, arising from these three, controlling them, and being modified by them as a result of this control, is the succession of human thoughts, the development of the objective Geist.

R.P.Portalié in his article on St Augustine in D.T.C. considers the fundamental point in the Augustinian explanation of grace to be the psychological fact that man has not the initiation of his thoughts.

To a Thomist, this truth is self-evident. Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur. Will has to be pre-moved by intellect; intellect has to be pre-moved by phantasm; phantasm has to be pre-moved by an objective situation and environment; finally, the objective situation and environment is partly the determinate work of nature, partly the accumulated work of mankind acting now according to its limited knowledge and now against this knowledge.

Clearly, to a scientist with some highly refined mathematical calculus able to contemplate not only the multitudinous data of the problem but also the response of free wills to the precise intellectual forms that would arise from this complex scene, the whole course of history would be as simple and intelligible as is the course of the earth round the sun to a modern astronomer. It would be evident to this scientist that the principal cause of every event was the Designer, Creator and First Mover of the universe. He made the potencies what they~~are~~ are; set them in their intrinsic relations to one another; gave them their initial positions and their initial premotion; foresaw and intended the modification of position and of motion that would result as this premotion was transferred from one potency to another. What can operate only as the result of a premotion and ~~is~~ only according to pre-established laws is simply an instrument, a machine; it does not

1  
cease to have a merely instrumental causality because of the freedom of selecting between the determinate order of an objective Geist and the determinate order of sub-intellectual operation; the <sup>omniscient</sup> sower who casts seed by the wayside, on stones, among thorns is not surprised when he reaps no harvest there! A printer who hires men ~~and~~ <sup>who</sup> uses hand-presses is as much the principal cause of what is printed as the printer who buys more elaborate machinery and hires fewer men.

It is to be noted, however, that the "Primum Agens" uses human instruments to transfer His premotion and His predetermination. If you read a discerning autobiography you see a human life presented in terms of a number of influences from accidents of time and place and from other persons; now the ~~the~~ lives of these influencing persons are similarly the product of previous influences; and so on till one gets back to the first man. Thus, while God is the principal cause of all operation in so far as He gave the initial premotion and predetermination and <sup>infallibly|deliberately</sup> knew and intended all that would follow therefrom, the human instruments that transfer this premotion and predetermination differ from the physical or merely biological transference and instrumentality; for men by sin can make the motion to be transferred weaker, they can muddy the ~~the~~ stream that descends to posterity; man makes man; man is his brother's keeper for human operation is one operation, one successive transference of one premotion and one predetermination; man is no more than an instrument but he may be an instrument of righteousness or of sin; he may pass on to others what he has received or he may pass on less; but he can do nothing else.

It is to be recalled that sin does not make man a principal cause of anything: sin is non-act, non-ens; it is not a motion or a causality but a failure to move and to cause; it is not a principal causality but an instrumental non-causality. On the other hand, when man does not sin, it is not because he is doing something of himself: the intellectual form was given him; the power of willing was given him; the premotion of will by intellect was given him; the act of will in response to the

premotion of intellect is simply the spontaneous activity of the will in virtue of its appetitus naturalis; man does not add anything to the appetitus naturalis to make it go into act; he simply allows nature to take its course, does all that is required of him and remains an unprofitable servant.

The reader may be unsatisfied with this; the reason will be that he considers there must be some act making the difference between the act of will and the non-act of will, some choice prior to both that is the true act of will. This, I beg to suggest, is the fundamental blunder of the whole question. The non-act of will is "contra rationem"; when you try to explain what is contra rationem you try to make a contradiction intelligible; sin is the unintelligible, because it is contra rationem; and the explanation of the unintelligible is critical thought, the doubling back to the assertion that the explanation is the demonstration that explanation is intrinsically impossible. Do not confuse this with mystery: mystery is intelligible quoad se though not quoad nos; sin is intelligible neither quoad se nor quoad nos. Hence the good act is explained by the premotion from intellect and the appetitus naturalis; the evil act is unintelligible, intrinsically so, for it is the irrationality of an irrational creature and a rational potency; to look for the reason of irrationality is absurd; did it have a reason, it would not be irrational; if sin had a reason or a cause, it would not be sin.

Finally, it is to be observed that I speak of the exclusively natural order. If man is merely an instrument in the natural order, a fortiori he is merely an instrument in the supernatural. But I am not speaking of the supernatural order; I am speaking as a psychologist of the school of St Augustine and St Thomas.



§5. We now turn to consider the basis of the unity of human operation. Why are there economic forces, making it impossible for industrialists to pay workmen a wage and for workmen to raise a family? Why are there political forces holding the world in the unstable equilibrium of a balance of power secured by <sup>Realpolitik?</sup> ~~unscrupulous diplomacy~~? Why are there sins of the monarchs and anti-popes and reformers and enlighteners and Marxians visited upon the twentieth century in a measure so terrible that men refuse to face the plain facts of the ~~modern~~ situation? What is Adam to us that we should bear the penalty of original sin? What is the metaphysical principle of the Redemption? It is all one question and it would seem to merit an answer.

The answer is that man is not <sup>simply</sup> an individual; angels are individuals; man is never more than a member of a species; he is not in his operation as we have already demonstrated; he is not in the ontological ground of his being.

Philosophically, man is one universal nature quoad id quod est and man is many merely in virtue of the modality of his being, quoad modum quo est. Man is one in virtue of his form and he is many merely in virtue of matter, the principle of individuation of universal forms. The individual man really is an individual: individuum in se and divisum a quolibet alio; but that reality is not pure reality but a compound of pure reality (what is participated of the Divine Essence) and a twofold potency, contingency and materiality, neither of which are in the Divine Essence, nor imitations of the Divine Essence, nor participations of the Divine Essence, but conditions of their being any imitation or participation of the Divine Essence besides the full possession enjoyed by the Divine Persons. Man as these many particulars is contingency and materiality; man as an universal nature is an intelligible essence and a limited aspect of the Divine Essence. Now as potency is because of act, it follows that the laws of mankind, that what is right and just for mankind, should proceed from the universal nature and be in terms of the universal nature and be irrespective of material difference.

Theologically, we may arrive at the same conclusion. Man is made in the image and likeness of God; The Father generates the Son in a generation, strictly so called; the Father and Son are consubstantial; therefore, men are consubstantial, not indeed in the same way as the Father and Son but in the image and likeness of that consubstantiality. Men are not strictly consubstantial but analogically so; they are different substances not *ratione essentiae* but *ratione ~~materiae~~ materiae* quantitate signatae; but in so far as man fails to resemble the Divinity, in so far he falls short of reality; and so the difference between men ~~xx~~ is less real than the unity of men.

This is a hard pill ~~man~~ <sup>those tending to be</sup> to swallow for ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~immense~~ <sup>immense</sup> members of the "invicta schola nominalium"; but let us hear their arguments! Meanwhile, let us push further the analogy between the human and the divine.

First, we must distinguish between individuality and personality. I do not say between the individual and the person, since, *ratione suppositi*, these two are identical. I inure into the difference between the *rationes formales*, individuality and personality.

Now a person is an individual with intellect and will. What is a personality? We argue as follows: the individuality results from matter, the principle of individuation; but matter is for the sake of some higher form; therefore personality is the form that can be individuating brought forth in a material individuality by intellect and will. But what intellect and will bring forth in the way of an individuating form is a given, personal as we say, orientation in life. Therefore, actual personality is the ultimate difference of intellectual pattern and habit of will called character that results from the operation of intellect and will in <sup>a material</sup> ~~an~~ individual. On the other hand, potential personality is mere individuality with unactuated intellect and will. According to the measure of this actuation, we distinguish persons as majors and minors; on the analogy of an orientation of intellect and will in the individual, we speak of moral persons.

Second, we discover the reason for the continuous variety of the objective Geist, its differentiations in time as one idea is complemented by another, its differentiations in space as each individual arrives at a view-point that is the integral of the influences exerted upon him.

Third, we discover a moral personality emerging from the flux of birth and death and change, the moral personality of humanity, of the human race, the "one and many." For the personality arrived at by each individual is the product of previous personalities and the producer of future personalities: man makes man what he is, even though he does so as an instrumental cause that now acts and now fails to act. Thus, there is in all men a responsibility ~~at once~~ and a debt to all men; no person is self-determined; no person fails to make things better or worse for the emergence of future personalities. This orientation of all men to all men is a moral personality.

Fourth, we complete our analogy to the Blessed Trinity. As the Trinity of Persons are subsistent relations in the eternal and equilibrated dynamism of *energeia* of unlimited intellect and will, so upon the transient dynamism of physical and biological nature emerge the physical personalities that should be the adoptive sons of God and the moral personality that should be the spirit of love for all men. In fact, human personalities are of three kinds: the *anthropos sarkikos* who is orientated towards sensible satisfaction; the *anthropos psikhikos* ~~psikhikos~~ who is orientated towards the True, the Good and the Beautiful; the *anthropos pneumatikos* who is orientated towards God in His transcendence of the transcendentals and as he is known only by faith through revelation. Why are not all men in the last category? It is the fault of men. Why are graces sufficient but not efficacious? It is the fault of the human instruments whose duty it is to transfer to others the motion they receive. Why does God draw some and not others? Because he made man to his own image and likeness, one in nature and in operation, because he uses instruments to draw men according to the

law "quidquid movetur ab alio movetur"; because, finally, the instruments ~~manumotum~~ will not be even unprofitable servants, will not live <sup>will</sup> exclusively for His Truth, and so cannot love as does His Love, ~~cannot~~ love reason, the image of the Word, and so cannot love man as did the Word. But the Divine Plan of man in God's own image and likeness <sup>that</sup> remains: persons in an orientation of Filial subordination to our Father in heaven constitute a moral personality of love for all men that all may be orïentated to the Father of all.

§6. We come to our final point, the pantôn anakephalaiôsis, the Pauline conception of the role of Christ in creation.

We have argued that since man's operation is necessarily an instrumental operation then there is a particular significance to leadership, to being the first agent in human history. We set forth the fundamental antitheses of the first and second Adam as follows.

a) Adam, premoved by Eve, premoved by the serpent, set up the reign of sin. Rom 5.12

Christ, conceived by the BVM at the annunciation of the angel Gabriel, set up the kingdom of God.

NB The function of the angels is of importance for the cosmic implications of the theory: we return to the point later.

b) Adam communicates human nature to his progeny; parents are quasi instruments in the communication of Adam's sin, for they communicate nature that no longer has something it would have had if Adam had not sinned.

Christ communicates the divine adoption by regeneration of water and the Holy Ghost; the church and parents are instrumental causes of this communication.

NB The difference between quasi instrumentality of communicating sin and true instrumentality in communicating grace lies in the difference between grace and sin: grace is something and sin is a privation of something; you do not communicate a privation of something, but communicate the something without communicating what is deprived.

c) Adam and his progeny die the death that is the penalty for sin.

Christ transmutes death into the rite of sacrifice, greater love than this no man hath, and makes of death the seed of resurrection, for he is "primogenitus ex mortuis" Col. 1.19.

d) Adam by his forfeiture of the gift of infused knowledge reversed the course of history and set up the tradition of concupiscence. He reversed the course of history, for man had to develop from the mere

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potency of intellect, had to progress under the leadership of phantasms specifying intellect as chance offered them, became unable to plan progress but had to proceed in a series of more or less blind leaps of incomplete acts of intellect. This constitutes fundamentally, we have already argued, the ignorance and difficulty called concupiscence.

Christ restored the harmony of man by the grace of dogma, an absolute Geist above the wandering objective Geist of humanity. This point needs some expansion.

First, the coming of Christ coincides with the break-down of philosophy ~~humanism~~ and its recognised impotence to solve the problem of intellectual unity. Philosophy had to be discovered before Christ, else the Christian dogmas could not be expressed: pre-philosophic symbolism led necessarily to idolatry; <sup>ed it</sup> and the Hebrews avoided ~~idolatry~~ only to some extent, by making the divinity inexpressible. Philosophy had to be bankrupt before Christ to make plain to man his impotence without Christ: even the philosopher emperors stooped to apotheosis.

Second, the supernatural revelation to which Christ was a witness is not only a content but <sup>promotes</sup> a living and developing mind: the mind of the mystical body; "we have the mind of Christ." (1 Cor 2.16) The patristic period only established the principle of despoiling the Egyptians: for instance, the bishops at Nice who in the name of traditional mentality objected to defining the consubstantiality of the Son were over-ruled. This principle received its full application in scholasticism, which did not fear to reason about anything and which so enriched ordinary catholic thought that the early church with its misty conceptions on many points seems strange to us. The purely scientific character of the appeal to reason as well as the definition of the limits of that appeal was more than emphasized by the audacity of St Thomas of Aquin who based his thought on Aristotle precisely because <sup>Aristotle's</sup> ~~it~~ was the most scientific. Finally, the bull, Aeterni Patris, was the official recognition of the social need of a philosophy, the necessity for human society that in some sense the philosopher has-

of Pauline Importance of the Law

N.B. The development of dogma is the developed Absolute Geist turning back upon the content of revelation and seeing more than there was seen before.

to be king, ~~he is to~~ have a dictatorship over lesser minds and the Zeitgeist.

Third, the development of the absolute Geist <sup>through</sup> ~~of~~ dogma cannot be a development of the dogma, the revelation as such: that is a contradiction in terms, for the pure dogma is above reason. However, we may see in this development what the development of man's intellect would have been, had Adam not sinned. The development <sup>through</sup> ~~of~~ dogma is not by the acceptance of incomplete acts of intellect and their factual refutation when put in practice (for example, economic science creating a world crisis); it is by the selection of what is true in the incomplete acts of intellect of the objective Geist; and this selection takes place in virtue of the light of the supernatural truth, in virtue of the illumination that proceeds from the Light of the world, the Verbum Divinum. What the progeny of Adam would have done through infused knowledge, we do through Christ our Lord.

Fourth, the intellectual benefit of the absolute Geist is something that man, fallen man with his fatal tendency to sensism and nominalism, easily overlooks. To those outside the church the endless intransigence of the church against heretics from the Gnostics to the modernists is incomprehensible; they prize moral goodness; they constantly forget that no man is better than he knows how; above all, they overlook the impotence of the traditional mentality (as opposed to the philosophic with its defined abstractions) to make issue with the expanding objective Geist of humanity; the break-up of protestantism and the insolvency of the Orientals who call <sup>a dead</sup> tradition orthodoxy demonstrate which view is right. But there is more than this to the intellectualist position of the Church: not only is reason and the Thomistic canon "bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse" the sole possibility of a catholicity that over-rides the petty differences of nationality and other tribal instincts and therefore the sole possibility of a practical human unity; there are two further points. In the first place, any reflection on modern history and its consequent "Crisis in the West" reveals unmistakeably the necessity of a Summa Sociologica. A metaphysic

of history is not only imperative for the church to meet the attack of the Marxian materialist conception of history and its realisation in apostolic Bolshevism: it is imperative if man is to solve the modern politico-economic entanglement, if political and economic forces are to be subjected to the rule of reason, if cultural values and all the achievement of the past is to be saved both from the onslaughts <sup>of</sup> purblind statemen <sup>s</sup> and from the perfidious diplomacy of the merely destructive power of communism. But to establish the intellectual unity of men by appealing to reason is impossible; men refuse to be reasonable enough to take the League of Nations seriously, and that is too elementary a notion to be called a metaphysic. The only possible unity of men is dogma: the dogma of communism unites by terrorism to destroy; the dogma of race unites to protect but it is meaningless as a principle of advance and it is impotent as a principle of human unity; in plain language, it is not big enough an idea to meet the problem; it is a nostrum that increases the malady. There remains only the dogma of Christ. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Christ as King, King as the rallying point for all men of good will, King of the historic process. We have here the significance of Pope Pius XI's proclamation of Catholic Action, for Catholics are the leaven that leaveneth the whole mass. Finally, we have here the significance of Pope Pius XII's command that "all candidates for the sacred priesthood must be adequately prepared ... by intense study of social matters." (Quadragesimo anno, CTS, London, p. 67) This command has not yet been put into effect, nor can it be till there is a Summa Sociologica: without that we would only flounder in the blundering and false science that created the problem. The second benefit of the absolute Geist as an intellectualism is that this is the natural means for man to overcome the evils consequent upon the low energeia of intellect, ie, the internal and external disharmony called concupiscence. For, first, it would seem that the sacraments are not intended to exorcise the evil;

Had Hitler had something better than "Christians and  
democracy is the restoration of harmony, for instance?"



second, it would seem that concupiscence, being the extrinsic privation of an instrumental means to an end, can be overcome by Christ; third, it is evident that wise laws wisely administered and adapted do much to mitigate the external disharmony; fourth, it is evident that intellectual culture does much to blunt the crudity of passion; fifth, there is reason to believe that an intelligently ruled economic and the continued advance of science will give man much more leisure for the development of his higher faculties in the future than in the past; sixth, we are beginning to understand more of human physiology and of the subconscious activity of the soul on the organism so that a development of educational theory may enable man to solve problems he now views with all the scientific penetration of a Mongolian herdsman.

So much for the brief expansion we have permitted ourselves on the development of the mind of the mystical body and its <sup>expansion</sup> ~~passage~~ from the primitive tradition of dogma <sup>so as eventually to include</sup> ~~to~~ a conscious body of social science illuminated by supernatural Light.

~~Now,~~ It is in this sphere of the role of the absolute Geist that Christ most luminously appears as "pantôn anakephalaiôsis". By one man sin entered into the world and in virtue of that one entry sin reigned. Now the reign of sin is a progressive atomisation of humanity. Matter individuates man and then man to overcome matter unites economically, politically, culturally, religiously; in every case, the basis of the union of men is an idea, an act of intellect; in every case, man is better off for having followed the idea; in every case, sin destroys the progress so that men are left with only the idea and without its fruit and come to look with suspicion on everything intellectual as a vain delusion. But it is not the idea that is to blame but the sin, the refusal to follow reason in all things. The idea is the principle of unity but sin, acting contrary to reason, destroys the unity; the idea is a formal cause but it must be joined with the effective causality of will to give effective unity, to give unity in truth whose phenomenon

is the "ordo cum tranquillitate" called peace. Thus it is that the reign of sin culminates in that Zersplitterung of humanity described by St Paul: men "foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy." More could not be said.

Christ as the new head of humanity, as the reunification and redintegration of what is torn asunder by sin, is the originator of the absolute Geist of dogma, is the absolute of intellect ~~mantham~~ in which participates the Church, the koinônia, the communion. For it is the absolute Geist of dogma that progresses without ever falling back; it is the Light of the world that selects the pure element of truth in the incomplete acts of the objective Geist. Next, intellect is the principle of human operation in unity; it is the principle of peace. ~~But~~ Whether we read the Messianic prophecies, muse over the angel's hymn at Bethlehem, recall the discourse of the Last Supper, or turn to the texts in St Paul on the anakephalaiôsis, ~~in~~ we always find the work of Christ described as the work of peace, the peace of an universal king, the peace that comes to men of good will, the peace that the world of sin with its balance of power and its economic imperialism cannot give. Quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, et per eum reconciliare omnia in ipsum, pacificans per sanguinem crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in coelis sunt. (Col 1.20) Ut notum faceret nobis sacramentum voluntatis suae secundum beneplacitum eius quod proposuit in eo, in dispensatione plenitudinis temporum, instaurare omnia in Christo quae in coelis et quae in terra sunt in ipso. (Eph 1.10) It is, then, the mustêrion of the anakephalaiôsis that Christ is Plato's philosopher king. Plato saw the social necessity of philosophy and before he died he renounced philosophy to play the ancient sage that gave men <sup>wise</sup> laws. But what Plato dreamt of, Ch<sup>r</sup>ist would realise. The means are at his disposal. The church holds in check false speculation by anathemas; the church prevents the rationalisation of making out that <sup>what</sup> ~~is~~ sin is no sin by imposing the obligation of auricular confession; the church gives the human will the support of grace that flows through

the sacraments; the church teaches the distinctive doctrine of Christ, which is charity, the only means of overcoming the evil of error and sin, the only ~~xxxxx~~ alternative to the dialectic of sin which takes objective evil as a premise and elaborates false principles as laws for the greater misery of mankind.

Christ is the *anakephalaiôsis* of humanity as the Light of the world, the principle of human unity, the prince of peace. But the Verbum Divinum is not only a source of intellectual light but also for of the object ~~of~~ the love the will; for the will is "appetitus naturalis sequens formam intellectus." From Christ by the sending of the Holy Ghost proceeds the active spiration in the human image of the Trinity; and in response to this active influence is the passive supernatural love of man, the theological virtue of charity. "Who then, asks St Paul, shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress? Or famine? Or nakedness? Or danger? Or persecution? Or the sword? As it is written: For thy sake are we put to death all the day long. We are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. But in all these things we overcome, because of him that hath loved us. For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor might, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Saviour." (Rom 8.35ff) In this love Christ is the centre of the love which all men must have for all men in the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human operation. For to love one's neighbour and to love Christ is all one. "Lord, when did we see thee hungry and fed thee: thirsty and gave thee to drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and took thee in? Or naked and covered thee? Or when did we see thee sick or in prison and came to thee?" (Matth 25.27 ff).

"Without me you can do nothing." This is true not only of the supernatural order of attaining the beatific vision. It is equally true of the social order; all things must be restored in Christ or there can be

no restoration. For the twofold problem of intellectual unity and effective will is beyond the reach of man. Man is not willing to take himself as no more than an instrument. It is hard for him to see the truth of the alternative set him by St Paul: Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of iniquity unto sin: but present yourselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead; and your members as instruments of justice unto God." (Rom 6.12,13) Man can choose and only between the service of reason or passion, only between the service of God or of Sin, only between the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of Satan. Man can be no more than an instrument. Man has to live as one alive from the dead, in a perpetual rite of sacrifice. Sacrifice, the shedding of blood, that is the whole meaning of life; and in this eternal oblation Christ is the primum agens. Let me close this aspect of our question with a citation from Donoso Cortes: "Die Stadt Gottes und die Stadt der Welt stehen zueinander in schärfsten Gegensatz, nicht etwa weil man in der einen Blut vergiesst, in der andern nicht, sondern weil in der einen die Liebe das Blut vergiesst, in der andern der Hass." (cited by Erich Przywara in Stimmen der Zeit, p. 14, April 1935)

e) We now come to the final antithesis between the first and second Adam; this is at the same time the final synthesis of history, Christ as the formal cause and through the Holy Spirit the efficient cause of the end of all creation, the manifestation of Divine Wisdom in heaven as well as on earth.

First, we must ask why God did not create an universe in which there would be no sin, for obviously he could have created such ~~unumwelt~~ an universe and that irrespective of the liberty of creatures and the temptations they were subjected to. God has created those creatures that would sin. We ask why? The answer is well-known: the Divine Wisdom in its transcendence of mystery and grace is better revealed when there are some creatures that actually do sin; and it is not in the manifestation of Divine Justice by the punishment of sinners that this greater manifest-

ation arises, for any penalty is a privation and God does not reveal himself by negations, however terrible; the greater manifestation of Divine Wisdom lies in the need for grace that is created by sin. In the first place, there must be such a need: for God is intelligent and so cannot do things unnecessarily. In the second place, sin creates such a need. But this need is specifically different, as it were, in the sin of the angels and in the sin of man. The sin of the angels is in the case of each angel a purely individual sin, for each angel is strictly an individual with a specific difference from all the rest of creation: now one but himself is involved in the sin of each angel. The sin of man, on the other hand, is the sin of a potential individual that is not confined to the potential individual but, through the metaphysical unity that makes the many potential individuals one in nature and in operation, extends from the one potential individual to the nature and the operation of all the potential individuals. Thus the sin of Adam is, as it were, an anomaly: for in virtue of what man actually is (one nature potentially many individuals) reason requires that all sin in Adam; but in virtue of what man potentially is (many intelligibly distinct individuals proceeding from one nature) reason would require that not all sin in Adam. I say: "Reason would require it." The condition implied is that reason would require it, if the many potential individuals were not merely potential individuals; thus the condition is really an impossibility, a contradiction, for the many men can be intelligibly distinct only through their potentiality in the one human nature. It is on the basis of this quasi-anomaly that Divine Mercy finds an opportunity to intervene and bring forth the "new creation" through Christ Jesus, a creation that in its transcendence of mystery and grace reveals the Word by the Word in a way that no single creation could achieve: to reveal the infinite there must be an infinite to be made issue with; Infinite Wisdom conquers the infinity of sin.

24

Hence as matter is for form so, in some analogous way, the sin of the first Adam is for the mystery of faith in Christ Jesus. But <sup>is</sup> the Saviour not merely the supernatural pendent to Adam's infranatural sin: His significance is cosmic; He restores all things whether on earth or in heaven. Now this restoration of all things must be the final settling of accounts with sin. How is it such?

First we note the peculiarity of a creature that is "one and many." The unity of human nature and operation - a unity that unfolds through a material to an intelligible plurality - is the connatural instrument for a victory over sin: for in this one nature and ~~one~~ operation sin is not an isolated and instantaneous emergence of evil; it dilutes itself in time and spreads out into a reign of sin till sin culminates in monstrosity and topples over from its own enormity. Thus the antinomy of church and state, in modern times, through the dialectic of sin, became first the heresies, then the liberal states, and finally Bolshevik Russia where sin in its pure form is organised by error, rules by terrorism, and attains security by the perversion of youth: the Bolshevik is ridiculous in his premise that man is merely an animal but he is terrible in his power to make man merely an animal; and, if you blame the Bolshevik, you are blind: for Bolshevism is the social consequent of liberalism, and liberalism is the social consequent of heresy, and heresy is the social consequent of the opposition of church and state, and the opposition of church and state is inevitable as long as men are children of Adam - a predication that neither churchmen nor statesmen can avoid. (Is then the situation hopeless? Certainly, unless we settle down, face the facts, and think on the abstract level of modern history. But it is not in itself hopeless for to God all things are possible even when He uses human instruments.)

Second, we note the solidarity between the sin of the angels and the sin of man. On the principle of "quidquid movetur ab alio movetur" it would have been impossible for Adam to think of sinning unless the

serpent had intervened to tempt him through Eve. Adam was not as we are; he was not ignorant; he was not weak; he suffered no pre-motion contrary to his nature; the pre-motion to sin had to have an extrinsic origin. Thus the reign of sin on earth takes its origin in the father Adam by sin made of lies; ~~Adam has thus made himself~~ himself the instrument of Satan's pre-motion; the reign of sin is the reign of Satan and a terrestrial repercussion of the sin of the angels; therefore, the Kingdom of God, Christ, the Messianic King, the Prince of Peace, the Eternal High Priest and Victim, the Light of the world and the "Primum Agens" of the reillumination of man, through the plerôma of the achievement in his first advent, shall in his second advent finally settle all accounts with sin whether on heaven or on earth.

Et ipse est caput corporis ecclesiae, qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis, ut sit ipse in omnibus PRIMATUM TENENS. quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, et per eum reconciliare omnia in ipsum, PACIFICANS per SANGUINEM crucis eius sive quae in terris sive quae in coelis sunt. (Col 1.19,20)

Palazzo Braccio, Louisa in Albis, 1935

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