

added such terms as liberty, orientation, conversion, virtue; ~~and~~ this view of the individual has to be ^{given} placed in its social complement; and the resultant ^{has to be} integrated under a notion of the good.

Operation, then, and cooperation aim at the good, but that may mean quite different though related things. These I have named elsewhere the particular good, the good-of-

B. Lonergan, Insight (London & New York 1957) pp. 596 ff.

order, and the terminal value. By a particular good is meant a single entity, whether object or action, that meets a need or satisfies an appetite of a particular person at a specified place and time. In contrast, the good-of-order extends over space and time. It envisages in a single net-work (1) a sustained succession of recurring instances of ^{types of} the particular good, (2) the ordering of ~~the~~ operations into cooperations to ensure ^{regularity of} the ~~sustained regular~~ recurrence, and (3) the motives leading operators ~~to~~ to contribute each in the appropriate manner.

It is to be insisted that the good-of-order is not some design for utopia, some theoretic ideal, some set of ethical precepts, some code of laws. It is the concrete, actually functioning or malfunctioning set of relationships that coordinate operations and ^{guide} ~~control~~ operators. It is the ground whence recurs or fails to ~~recur~~ ^{recur} whatever in fact is recurring or failing to recur.

Again, the good-of-order is not to be confused with institutions. Such are the family, mores, society, education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church

or sect. Such institutions are the commonly understood and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They change only slowly, for change involves a new common understanding and a new common consent. However, the same type of family set-up is compatible with enormous variation in the consequent good-of-order of family living, the same constitutional and legal arrangements with wide differences in political life and the administration of justice, the same economic set-up with prosperity and with recession. Besides the institutional basis of cooperation, then, there is also the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out. This is the good-of-order, adapting to each change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against tendencies to disorder.

As individual development, so too social development may be conceived as an increasing differentiation of tasks, and a mounting specialization of performance, an ever more fully articulated and more efficient integration of partial contributions. Under such rubrics one may envisage ^{however schematically the vast} process of ~~the~~ ^{unspecialized} members of a transition from the relatively ~~undifferentiated~~ tribe or clan to the wide variety of tasks and roles in a modern society. ~~Moreover, as these tasks and roles are complementary parts in an integrated good-of-order, so too a somewhat similar complementarity~~

So we come to the complementarity of horizons. For the tasks an individual performs and the roles he fulfils mark off his field of special interest and knowledge. Towards such performance and fulfilment his personal development has taken place. ~~Towards~~ Towards better performance and a still richer fulfilment further development may be in process.

unspecialized

Individuals live in groups. To a notable extent their operations are cooperations. They follow some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional frame-work. Institutions are the family and manners, society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church or sect. They constitute the commonly and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They ^{tend to} change only slowly, for change involves a new common understanding and a new common consent.

Besides the int institutional basis of cooperation there is also the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out. This I would name the good of order working out. This in itself is a good, quite distinct from the particular good, and to it I refer with ^{the} name, the good of order.

Besides the institutional basis of cooperation there also is the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out. This in itself is a good, quite distinct from instances of the particular good, and to it I refer when I speak of the good of order. For human needs are recurrent. People want dinner not just once but every day, and economic systems provide dinners along with many other things. They want each successive generation educated, and educational systems provide class-rooms and teachers, books and libraries, laboratories and equipment.

Individuals are born into social groups and live out their lives within them. So to a notable extent their operations are cooperations

So task and role may be regarded as basic indications distinguishing the several worlds in which people are living. But such worlds, as long as some ~~good~~ good-of-order is functioning, partly overlap and partly complement one another. It follows that the horizons, in which the several worlds are apprehended, partly will overlap and ~~part~~ partly will complement one another. Further, it follows that, since tasks and roles and the manner of their integration are products of social development, so too the complementarity of horizons as well as the horizons themselves will be historical variables.

There remain more ultimate questions. Neither personal nor social development runs along some foreordained single track of determinist imagination. Possibilities are always a manifold and, ~~we~~ when ~~we~~ prefer one possible line of development, we do so to others, because we attribute to it a greater value. Just what value is, of course, meets with many answers. There are mythical, naturalist, rationalist, utilitarian, hedonistic, esthetic, intellectualist, moral, legal, historicist, and religious accounts of the matter. But, apart from the mythical, all seem to have one thing in common. They claim to set forth the criteria guiding the choices of a reasonable and an attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible person. On the basis of such criteria we are to decide between the good-of-order offered by Christian marriage or by serial monogamy, by democracy or by dictatorship, by capitalism or socialism, by this or that type of legal, educational, economic, or technological system. They have two things in common. On the one hand, they offer criteria to guide our choices between Christian marriage and serial monogamy, between capitalism and socialism, between democracy and dictatorship, between this and that type of legal, educational,

as well as

have a common basis, ~~and~~ common functions. A first function is to offer criteria guiding our decisions and choices concerning the maintenance, improvement, or ~~the~~ transformation of existing institutions and ^{of} the current ~~functioning of the~~ good-of-order. A second function is to obligate us to coherence: our choices regarding particular instances of the good have to accord with our choices concerning institutions and the good-of-order. Finally, whatever the basis is on which the criteria are founded, at least ^{they} ~~it~~ always claim^s to set forth the position of an attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible person. For instance, one is not a utilitarian simply because one in fact pursues the greatest ^{happiness} ~~happiness~~ of the greatest number; one becomes a utilitarian only if one considers that ~~pure~~ pursuit for a man to adopt the right one. Again, the pursuit of pleasure does not make one a hedonist, but only the judgement that the pursuit of pleasure is the proper occupation of man. In ~~be~~ brief, though ~~answers to the question of values are many, the question about~~ ^{itself} is univocal; it is the question that ~~values is one, and it arises on the fourth level of intentional consciousness, the level of rational self-consciousness, the level of the existential subject.~~

~~Three aspects of the question may be distinguished: the transcendental and the categorial; and the subdivision of the categorial into originating values and originated or terminal values.~~

The transcendental aspect of the question lies in the fact that it is constitutive or, if you prefer, the condition of possibility of a distinct level of intentional consciousness. We are promoted from empirical to intellectual consciousness by asking questions for intelligence, questions leading to insight, questions asking what? why? how often? We are

answers to questions about value are many and disparate, the question itself has a basic unity of meaning; for it is the question for deliberation, the question that arises to constitute the fourth level of intentional consciousness.

There are in human experience three such types of question. There is the question for intelligence. It asks what? why? how? It seeks insight, understanding, explanation. It ~~promote~~ arises upon empirical consciousness and promotes the subject to intellectual consciousness. Next, there is the question for reflection. It asks whether this exists or that is so. It seeks evidence, truth, a rational apprehension of reality. It arises upon empirical and intellectual consciousness and promotes the subject to rational conscious^{ness}. Thirdly, there is the question for deliberation. It asks what is to be done, what am I to do, what ought I do. It is met by ~~deliberation~~ taking counsel of oneself or others, by judgements of value, by decisions and choices, and by courses of action. It arises upon empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness to promote the subject to rational self-consciousness, to conscientiousness. Such is the subject to ^{whom} ~~which~~ there are ascribed freedom and responsibility, and the responsibility is twofold. There is responsibility for the effects of his actions in the human situation. There also is responsibility for the effect of his actions upon himself, for human choices affect not only the chosen objects but also the choosing subject; ~~when~~ they make him the kind of man ~~that~~ he is, bestow upon him not immutably but precariously his ^{character or} personal essence.

actors, professional people, and so on.

Our understanding of development has been greatly increased by Jean Piaget's numerous and celebrated studies in genetic psychology. While I cannot reproduce or even indicate the wealth of detail set forth in Piaget's reports of his investigations, I feel constrained to present, however summarily, three basic notions Piaget has put together, a biological notion of adaptation, a mathematical notion of group, and a philosophic notion of mediation.

An adaptation is conceived as a compound of assimilation and adjustment. Assimilation is the use of operations

An adaptation is with respect to some new object or situation. It is conceived as a compound of assimilation and adjustment. Assimilation is the use of operations that have already been employed on similar objects or in similar situations. Adjustment, by something like a process of trial and error, gradually modifies and supplements previously learned operations

actors, professional people, and so on.

To the obvious fact of development, however, one must add some understanding of its nature. To this end I shall offer a ^{very} summary account of the conclusions reached by Jean Piaget in his celebrated studies of genetic psychology.

For the wealth of detail set forth in Piaget's reports of his investigations I must refer the reader to Piaget's own writings

~~are operations each can~~

a set of operations an ~~individual~~ individual can perform and a further set he cannot. It further follows that each has a bounded horizon, that as our developments ^{so} and our horizons differ, and that the price of broadening one's horizon, of escaping from one's selective inattention, of coming to apprehend what habitually one overlooks, is further training, effort, study.

~~Secondly, Piaget's success with the notion of group points to the aspect of horizon as organization~~

Secondly, Piaget's success with the notion of combination, group, and the grouping of groups into higher groups, points to the aspect of horizon as organization. It puts in dynamic terms

reinforced or curtailed. Such reinforcement and curtailment
enrich and
can be employed to strengthen ~~and~~ our scale of preferences
and, thereby, bring about

that both enable us and require us to respond to values, to judge truthfully, to advance in understanding. But there also is a resultant orientation, the trend of one's living. One may be content with what one has made of oneself, or still striving to develop, or suffering a psychological, intellectual, moral, or religious break-down. One may be content with things as they are and seek only to fit into the niche society offers one. One may be a progressive engaged in improving what is good and remedying evils. One may be a revolutionary, ^{despairing of the current set-up,} ~~destroying what exists~~ existing structures and the people that want them, and proclaiming ~~with~~ the intention of starting afresh.