

4. Order as Efficiency

The good of order may be conceived as efficiency, as ~~man~~ keeping things going, getting things done, ~~From this viewpoint~~ and moving ahead. From this viewpoint it may be studied by borrowing a ~~few~~ few basic concepts from Piaget's celebrated analysis of child development. These are a biological concept of adaptation, a mathematical concept of group, and a philosophic concept of mediation. Taken together they will be found illuminating when applied to any on-going and flexible ^{human} process.

Development, then, is conceived as learning new operations, and an element in such learning is thought of as an adaptation to some new object or situation. Adaptation itself is conceived as a compound of assimilation and adjustment. Assimilation consists in~~ing~~ bringing into play the spontaneous or previously learned operations employed on somewhat similar objects or in somewhat similar situations. Adjustment, by a process of trial and error, gradually modifies and supplements previously learned operations.

As adaptations to ever more objects and situations occur, there goes ~~for~~ forward a twofold process. On the one hand, there is an increasing differentiation of operations: more and more different operations are performed. On the other hand, there is an ever greater multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations. So the infant develops oral, manual, visual, bodily skills, and masters an ever greater variety of combinations of operations.

Such mastery may be conceived more precisely by introducing the mathematical ~~mat~~ concept of group. The ~~pr~~ principal characteristic of a group of operations is that every operation

to be revealed through the memories of other men, through
 through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars,
 the common sense of community, through the investigations
 of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the
 meditations of philosophers and theologians.

Besides the world of immediacy, then, there is much ^{the}
 larger and far richer world mediated by meaning. This world
 is what we call the real world and, once we have been intro-
 duced into it, there we live out our lives. Still it is an
 insecure world, for meaning can go astray. So there have
 been invented and developed a whole series of reflexive
 techniques for the control of meaning. Alphabets replace vocal by visual signs, dictionaries
~~fix the~~ ^{control} ~~meanings of words, grammars~~ ^{promote} ~~their combinations, logics~~ ^{the}
 clarity, coherence, rigor of statements, hermeneutics investi-
 gates the varying relationships between meaning and meant,
 and philosophies explore the ^{more basic} differences between worlds of
 immediacy and worlds mediated by meaning.

Psychological development, then, is a vast, cumulative
 process from initial, rudimentary, undifferentiated, clumsy
 operations on immediate objects, through their differentiation,
 the combination of differentiated operations, the grouping
 of such combinations, and the grouping of ~~gr~~ such groups,
 still higher groups of
 to operations on signs of objects and, ultimately, to even more
 remote groups of signs of
 operations on the operations on signs.

differentiation of consciousness, when one learns to speak, and a second differentiation that begins when one moves on to the techniques that control meaning. This distinction can be applied both to the individuals within a given society and to the historical spectrum of societies. Completely undifferentiated consciousness would be represented not only actually by infants but also hypothetically by the homo faber of some anthropological speculation. The first differentiation would apply to those that speak but do not succeed in mastering the reflexive techniques, to primitive societies, ~~and~~ archaic civilizations and, when led by one of their own, modern masses.

Fourthly, Piaget's highest groups, in which mediating meaning is itself mediated and so controlled, indicate the locus where the greater epochs of human history may be distinguished in ^{an} ~~the~~ explanatory manner. For when reflexive control of meaning is undeveloped, one may expect such aberrations of meaning as myth and magic. The Greek miracle, the victory of logos over mythos, coincided with the development of rhetoric, poetics, logic, philosophy, ^{and a} ~~many~~ theory of science. The crisis in our own day, I have suggested elsewhere, may

B. Lonergan, Collection, New York 1967, pp. 252-67.

perhaps be conceived as the problem of replacing the classicist control of meaning by a new type of control that harmonizes with modern science.

Finally, however general and sketchy our account of Piaget's analysis has been, still it forces us to think, not just of horizon, but of a developing succession of horizons. Adaptation is at once the genesis of skills and the differentiation of operations. The more operations are differentiated, the greater the range of combinations into which they may enter. Complete ranges form groups, and lower groups integrate into higher groups. As the subject comes to function ever more adequately in his world, so too his world is enlarged, its contours are ^{finely,} apprehended more ~~finely,~~ its values are more fully appreciated.

As adaptations to various objects occur, what is going forward is both an increasing differentiation of operations and a multiplication of combinations and recombinations of differentiated operations. This process heads towards a plateau named the group. It consists in a range of combinations of differentiated operations, such that any combination can be performed readily, easily, instantly and, moreover, such that every combination has its opposite so that the operator ^{always} can, if he pleases, return to his starting-point.

Initially there develop distinct groups: oral, visual, manual, aural, vocal. Gradually higher groups are formed, so that the baby will try to grasp whatever he sees and, when he succeeds, he will try to put it in his mouth.

A full account of the complementary, genetic, and dialectical differences of horizons would be little less than the whole of human history. But if that is quite beyond our scope, a few general indications of further types of difference

Such, then, in rough outline are the complementary, genetic, and dialectical differences of horizons. Further clarifications of genetic differences may come from a consideration of psychological differences development, of complementary

Such, then, in rough outline are the complementary, genetic, and dialectical differences of horizons. For the sake of some further clarification let us add a few schemata on such topics as ~~the~~ psychological development, social structure, philosophic, religious, and historical oppositions.

Psychological Development

A development may be conceived as a differentiation of tasks, a specialization of operations, and an integration of specializations. It proceeds, then, from a previous stage, in which ~~many~~ many tasks were apprehended globally as a single, undifferentiated unit^{relatively}, in which operations were rudimentary, inefficient, uneconomical, in which a problem of integration had not yet emerged.

For Jean Piaget in his celebrated studies of ~~genetic~~ genetic psychology the key element in the process of development is the adaptation. In it he distinguished two parts: assimilation and adjustment. There is assimilation inasmuch as the operator finds some similarity between the present task (object to be dealt with) and previous tasks, and so brings ~~memories~~ into play the operations learnt on previous occasions. There is ~~adjustment~~ adjustment inasmuch as the operator slowly comes to ^{and supplement} modify previously learned operations and thereby to deal more efficiently with the new object.

As adaptations to various objects occur, what is going forward is, at once, an increasing differentiation of operations and a multiplication of combinations and recombinations of differentiated operations. Development, then, like the Aristotelian acquired habit, means that one can perform any with ease and satisfaction any combination

a genuine person in a human society.

I have spoken of value and, indeed, of objective value. I have distinguished between what truly is good and, on the other hand, what only apparently is good. But the basic fact is self-transcendence, and the basic distinction is between achieving self-transcendence and failing to do so. The true good is what is judged to be good by a person achieving self-transcendence, and the merely apparent good is what is judged to be good by the person that is failing in self-transcendence. Again, authentic existence is the existence that achieves self-transcendence, and unauthentic existence is the existence that does not. Further, today there are those that praise objectivity and blame ~~on~~ subjectivity, and there are others that on the contrary praise subjectivity and blame objectivity. Both are right and both are wrong. There is a subjectivity to be blamed, for it failing to transcend itself; and there is a subjectivity to be praised, for it achieves self-transcendence. Similarly, there is an objectivity to be ~~blamed~~ blamed, for it stops short with some part of objectivity, with the experiential objectivity of what is given, or with the normative objectivity of the ~~existential~~ ^{the} exigences of intelligence and reasonableness, but fails to reach intentional self-transcendence in which the real is revealed as being, as what in fact is so. Inversely, there is an objectivity that is to be praised, for it adds normative objectivity to experiential and by combining them reaches the unconditioned that intentionally is independent of the subject and so intentionally transcends him.

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Nor is there any obscurity about what I have named the basic fact. In general, men seek what truly is good, unless some further motive intervenes to lead them astray. Even then they try to be good and, unless malicious, are evil as it were against their wills.

Nor is there any obscurity about what I have named the basic fact. Moral climates differ, and societies may become corrupt and degenerate.

a person in human society.

I have spoken of value and, indeed, of objective value. No doubt, I shall be asked just what I mean. A first step towards an answer will be to distinguish between an ethics and, on the other hand, moral living. An ethics is a doctrine purporting to clarify, formulate, make coherent, illuminate, defend, and even promote moral living. But moral living itself is not a doctrine but a part of human reality, the reality on which ethical doctrine reflects and in which ethical doctrine finds its factual basis. In other words, talk about moral living has a ^{positive and} real meaning only in so far as moral living actually occurs. So it is that Aristotle was expressing his empiricism and not mere tautology when he wrote: "Actions are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who does them as just and temperate men do them."¹ Or, again: "Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i. e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it."²

1) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, 3, 4; 1105b 5 - 8.

2) Ibid., II, 6, 15; 1106b 36 f. Translation by W. D. Ross in R. McKeon's Basic Works of Aristotle.

Still if ethical doctrine proceeds from reflection, not on all human conduct, but on the conduct of good men, there arises the obvious question of the criterion for the distinction between good men and bad. In reply it may be urged that this distinction usually presents little difficulty. In general,

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a genuine person in human society.

I have spoken of value and, indeed, of objective value. Again, I have distinguished between what truly is good and, on the other hand, what only apparently is good. No doubt, I shall be asked what these terms mean. But an answer can have a meaning only for those that attend to their own experience of questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation. In those questions, not as formulated, but in the transcendental intention expressed by ^{the} formulations, are to be found at once the principle and the criterion of self-transcendence. The transcendental intention is the nîsus to know why and at the ^{time} ~~same~~ the criterion that discerns every insufficient answer and puts further questions. It is the nîsus to know what is so and what is not so and at the same time the criterion that discerns between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Finally, it is the principle of deliberation asking what is worth while and what is worthless and at the same time it is ~~the criterion that discerns let us start this over~~

same time the criterion that by further questions brings ^{answers} to light the insufficiency of questions. It is the principle to light the insufficiency of inadequate answers. It too is the principle asking whether this is so and that not so and at the same time the criterion compelling rationality to assent to sufficient evidence and to reject insufficient evidence. It ^{finally} is the principle that deliberates whether or not this or that is ~~worth~~ worth while and at the same time it is the happy conscience of good decisions, words, and deeds and, on the other hand, the unhappy conscience of wrong decisions, words, or deeds.

such knowledge and such achievement.

Thirdly, the transcendental notions not only promote the subject to higher levels of consciousness and there direct him to his goals but they also provide the criteria that reveal whether the goals have been reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is reached but dissatisfied by every ~~the~~ incomplete attainment and so the source of ever further questions. The drive to truth compels rationality to assent when evidence is sufficient but obliges us to doubt ~~when evidence~~ and investigate further when evidence is insufficient. The drive to value rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience but saddens failure with an unhappy conscience.

As transcendental notions are dynamic, so too they are comprehensive. For they are the fount not only of initial questions but also of further questions. Though the further questions come only one at a time, still they keep coming. There are ever more further questions for intelligence pushing us towards a better understanding and ever more further doubts urging us towards a fuller truth. The only limit to the process is at the point where no further questions arise, and that point would be reached only when we correctly understood everything about everything, only when we knew reality in its entirety and in its every aspect.

There is a similar comprehensiveness or rather perhaps intensity to the transcendental notion of value. For that ~~notion is our raising questions for deliberation, where~~ deliberation has not been cut down by hedonist or utilitarian reductionism, but asks about what objectively is good.

This principle and criterion is not neither ignorance nor knowledge but intention of the intelligible, the true, the real, the good. To ask why is not yet ~~knowledge of~~ knowing why

same concern. Only with the failure to reach both intentional and real self-transcendence do science, personalism, and philosophy move off into different and opposed camps. let us ditto and real self-transcendence do positivist science, existentialist subjectivism, and realist philosophy move off into different and opposed camps.

This principle and criterion is neither ignorance nor knowledge but conscious intentionality proceeding from ignorance to knowledge. To ask a question is to expect but not yet to know the answer. To be able to accept or reject answers is to possess a criterion for discerning between satisfactory and unsatisfactory answers. Our questions intend the intelligible, the true, the real, the good of value. But it is only in the measure that answers are reached that we know the intelligible, the true, the real, the good let us start again the true, the real. And it is only in the measure that by right evaluations, decisions, choices, actions the true, the real. And it is only in the measure that we ourselves become and do good and do good that there exist right evaluations, right choices, right actions

men are good and not evil unless some further motive intervenes to lead them astray. Even then they try to be good and, unless malicious, are evil as it were against their wills. Moreover, for the most part they hide their sins and pretend to be good and, when they can no longer keep up the pretense, they begin to rationalize and to maintain that what was thought evil really, after all, is good.

However, while these facts reveal human existence to be the possibility of moral living and its opposite, of authenticity ^{and} inauthenticity, they take us no further than an account of the ethical doctrine implicit in the moral living at some given time and place. What, it will be asked, are the criteria for approving or disapproving the the different ethical ~~many~~ doctrines of different times and places? Is there an evolution of morals in the history of the human race? Is there, in the individual, moral education, moral development, moral maturity, moral conversion, moral degeneracy? To answer these questions is to make moral judgements, judgements of value, and there still remains the question of the manner in which such judgements are made.

But the point I have been trying to make is that such judgements fall into two classes. There are the ^{primary} moral or value judgements that occur within the concrete process of moral living. There are the secondary moral or value judgements that reflect on the primary and are themselves moral or immoral inasmuch as they reinforce good or bad moral judgements. A writer in his writing is exercising his freedom and responsibility and so is ~~in~~ in the concrete process of moral living. But unless he is writing about the moral aspect of his writing, he is not exhibiting

notion

is our raising questions for deliberation. The deliberation envisaged must be authentic, not the simulacrum invented by hedonist or utilitarian reductionism, but the disenchantment that stops us and asks us whether what we are ~~doing~~ doing is worth while. If we can answer that what we are doing is as much worth while as any thing anything else we might be doing, there will come the further question whether anything we might do really would be worth while, whether indeed this whole cosmic and evolutionary ~~process~~ and historical process in which we are involved is worth while. To the transcendental notion of value there is a thrust to the absolute. It plunges us into the height and depth and breadth of being in love but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short of its aim. It assigns human achievement only a relative value, not value beyond question or criticism or complaint, but value within man's reach and that the best he can achieve.

3. The Particular Good and the Good of Order

The transcendental notion of value is directive, selective, progressive. But of itself it is incomplete. It raises questions for deliberation and it provides the touch-stone that tests the answers. But it has to presuppose the topics to be deliberated. These for men primarily are the human good and so some sketch of the human good is our immediate concern.

By a particular good is meant a single entity, whether object or action, ~~ex~~ that meets a need or want or aspiration of a particular individual at a given place or time. The particular good, then, is the good in particular instances as related to particular individuals that possess and/or enjoy it.

same concern. Only with the failure to achieve self-transcendence both intentionally and really do there arise the thickets of confusions reflected in the multiplicity and diversity of philosophic ope opinions.

same concern. Only with the failure to reach ~~both~~ self-transcendence
radical
both intentionally and really do there arise the inner conflicts
and outer oppositions

This principle and criterion is neither ~~ignorance~~ incomprehension nor understanding, neither ignorance nor knowledge, neither amoral nor moral living. It is conscious intentionality intending the intelligible and so proceeding from incomprehension to understanding, intending the true and thereby the real and so proceeding from ignorance to knowledge, intending the good of value and so proceeding from potential to actual moral living. By such intending we ask questions and we are able to discern appropriate answers, but we do not as yet know answers. Only in the measure that answers are reached do we come to know the intelligible, the true, the real, the good of value. Only in the measure that we live in accord with right evaluations is the good of value a reality within the field of human experience.

ca same concern. Only with the failure to reach both intentional and real self-transcendence do there arise the radical oppositions that separate positivist science and existentialism^t subjectivism.

that mediate mediating operations. For this distinction can be transferred both to the development of consciousness and to the historical spectrum of societies. As intentional operations pass from immediate to singly or doubly mediated objects, consciousness itself becomes increasingly differentiated. The subject that at first lives only in a world of immediacy, adds on a world mediated by meaning. As society develops, subjects specialize, form complementary horizons, and favor different patterns of experience. As complexity advances, the problems of control become acute; there are invented the techniques of exegetes, literary critics, logicians, and philosophers. Finally, at all levels of culture there ^{may} ~~soon~~ ~~to~~ exist rich and influential ~~personalities~~ personalities ^{seem to} that derive their power from an ability to withdraw from the world of sense and from the whole complicated mass of mediating operations. Not only is the world mediated by the

Attention has recently been drawn to this fact by A. H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton N. J. 1962 and by A. Reza Arasteh, Final Integration in the Adult Personality, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965. Both works refer to many others.

subject but from the mediated world the subject returns to himself in a mediated immediacy.

that mediate mediating operations. For this distinction can be transferred both to the consciousness of individuals and to the historical spectrum of societies. The consciousness of the infant is undifferentiated in the sense that it is not involved in a distinction between a world of immediacy and a world mediated by meaning

moral judgements. For primary moral or value judgements the reader has to turn to his own experience of his own moral living. All a writer can do is offer some help towards secondary judgements that presuppose the primary.

To accept method in theology is to drop the deductivist ideal. It is to think of theology, not as a set of eternal truths, but as the developing expression of a deductive process resting on the immutable truths of faith,

But individuals live in groups. To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It follows some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional frame-work. ~~For~~ Such frame-works are the family and manners, society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church or sect. They constitute the commonly understood and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They tend to change only slowly, for change, as distinct from breakdown, involves a new common understanding and a new common consent.

Now, over and above the institutional basis of cooperation, there also is the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out. The same economic set-up is compatible with ~~prop~~ prosperity and with recession. The same constitutional and legal arrangements admit wide differences in political life and in the administration of justice. Similar principles for marriage and the family in one case generate domestic bliss and in another misery.

This concrete manner, in which cooperation is working out, I would name the good of order. It is distinct from instances of the particular good but it is not separate from them. It regards them, however, not singly and as related to the individual ^{as an ordered group} they satisfy, but ~~all together~~ and as recurrent over time. My dinner today is for me a particular good, but dinner ~~everyday~~ every day for everyone that earns it is part of the good of order. My education was for me a particular good. But an on-going process of educating ^reveryone that wants it is another part of the good of order.

that accrues to
Finally, we would note the dynamic aspect of the notion
of horizon when it is conceived in terms of ph psychological
development

Finally, when horizon is conceived in terms of psychological development, an abstract notion of horizon is replaced by a

Finally, a development is a process. Even though our brief notes on Piaget's analysis are extremely schematic, still they force us to turn our attention away from an abstract notion of horizon and concentrate on a succession of

By the good of order, then, is meant a vast net-work of relationships that embrace (1) a sustained succession of recurring instances of the particular good, (2) the ordering of operations so that they become cooperations and ensure the regularity of the recurrence of all effectively desired instances of the particular good, and (3) the motives that lead operators to perform in the appropriate manner.

It is to be insisted that the good of order is not some design for utopia, some theoretic ideal, some set of ethical principles, some code of laws, or some super-institution. ~~and~~ It is quite concrete. It is the actually functioning or malfunctioning set of interconnections guiding operators and coordinating operations. It is the manifold ground when recur or fail to recur whatever instances of the particular good are recurring or failing to recur. ^IIt has a basis in institutions but it is a product of much more, of all the training and education, all the skill and know-how, all the industry and resourcefulness, all the ambition and fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency to disorder.

On the good of order, see Insight, p. 596. For further analysis, see the sections on emergent probability, pp. 115-128, on common sense, pp. 173-181, 207-216, and on belief, pp. 703-718.
