

values may promote cognitional activity. Eagerness for satisfactions may impede it. Cognitional activity itself, quite apart from ^{its link with} motivations, is relentlessly contextual. The process of learning is not a mere addition to what we already know but rather an organic growth out of previous knowing. So too ~~our~~ our intentions, our statements, our deeds all occur within a context and it is to that context we appeal when we outline the reasons for our goals, clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or explain our deeds.

Such very generally is the diversity of horizons, and the purpose of this chapter will be to pursue the matter further. Just as physicists relate variables and constants in extremely general equations and place these equations at the basis of all investigations in whole areas, so too we wish to proceed from the basic notions of transcendental method and develop the ~~concepts~~ connected set of concepts that can be affirmed in one measure or another or denied outright but, in each case, will serve to characterize some possible horizon of human knowledge, human values, human action. Needless to say, this procedure goes no further than inserting other horizons within a given determinate horizon. ^{Still it} ~~But this~~ is a necessary first step. Later in a discussion of dialectic we shall raise the question of the insertion of other horizons in a series of different determinate horizons. For the moment we beg the reader to be content with a single approach that attempts to clarify in its own way self-transcendence and ~~the~~ the notion of value, various aspects of the human good, progress and decline, religious values and expression, judgements of value and beliefs, and the development, transformation, and breakdown of horizons.

values may promote cognitional activity. Eagerness for satisfactions may impede it. Cognitional ~~area~~ activity itself, quite apart from its link with motivations, is relentlessly contextual. For the process of learning is not a mere addition to what we already know but rather an organic growth of previous knowing. So too our intentions, our statements, our deeds all occur within a context and it is to that context we appeal when we explain our deeds, clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or outline ~~our~~ reasons for our goals.

From the little that has been said, it is perhaps apparent how relevant is the notion of horizon to most of the tasks of theology. We have described the foundations of theology as the objectification of the horizon of the convert. But obviously the contextual aspect of horizon is fundamental to a hermeneutics, the genetic to ~~maintain~~ an account of history and historians, oppositions between horizons to dialectic, the contents to doctrines and systematics, and the very fact of horizons to communications. It seems, then, very much to our purpose to ~~be~~ obtain as profound and as accurate a notion of horizon as we can.

Self-transcendence

One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up within oneself. A first **is the sensitivity we seem to** step in this liberation ~~is~~ share with the higher animals. But while they are confined to a habitat, we live within a universe because, beyond sensitivity, we question and our questioning is unrestricted. **First there are** ~~Our first level~~ questions ~~are~~ for intelligence; we ask what and why and how and how often; and our answers unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize. From the narrow strip of space-time

of fact about particular individuals or groups. That is the work of historians and field-workers. Ours is the prior methodological concern. It proceeds from the basis of our transcendental method, from man's intentional consciousness. It aims at evolving a set of coherent and interrelated notions that will enable historians or field-workers to ask well-defined and interrelated questions now is the time questions whose meaning will have at least the clarity here attained

As adaptations to ever more objects occur, what is going forward is, at once, an increasing differentiation of operations and an ever greater multiplication of combinations of differentiated operations. This process, however, tends to a plateau named the group. It is characterized by the fact that the operator can perform with ease and satisfaction any combination of operations in the group. But it also implies that every combination is matched by an opposite combination so that the operator may always, if he pleases, work his way back to his starting-point. By the readiness of performance one is reminded of Aristotle's ~~best~~ acquired habit. But it is the matching of opposed combinations that enabled ~~the~~ Piaget to define stages of development and to devise tests that would reveal ~~when~~ whether a given subject had or had not yet reached that stage. Such groups may be illustrated first by the infant developing oral skills, visual skills, manual skills. ~~First there are minor groups of oral skills, visual skills, manual skills.~~ Then there is the grouping of groups when the foregoing are brought together by new combinations and differentiations, and the baby reaches for what he sees, and puts in his ~~hand~~ mouth what he grabs. Finally, there are the higher stages of development, in which first mediating operations are introduced and later the mediating operations themselves are mediated.

Operations are immediate when their objects are present. Seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched. But by imagination and by language we come to operate with respect to what is absent, past, future, merely possible or ideal or normative. So as the child learns to speak, he moves out of the world of his immediate surroundings towards the far larger world

As adaptations to ever more objects occur, what is going forward is, at once, an increasing differentiation of operations and an ever greater multiplication of combinations of differentiated operations. So the infant develops oral, visual, manual, bodily skills, to combine operations of one type with those ~~as~~ of another; ~~by~~ the baby reaches for what he sees, and puts in his mouth what he grasps. But where an Aristotelian is content to speak of acquired habits, Piaget adds the notion of group and, indeed, integration of the ~~grouping~~ ^{integration} of groups into higher groups. The principal characteristic of the group ~~is that~~ of operations is that every operation in the group is matched by an opposite operation and every combination of operations is matched by an opposite combination. Hence it is always possible for the operator to return to his starting point and, when in fact he ^{always} can do so unhesitatingly, he has reached mastery at some level of development. ^{It was this} ~~the~~ notion of group and of ~~the~~ higher group ^{that enabled} Piaget ~~was able~~ ^{both} to define successive stages of development, ~~and~~ to devise tests that would reveal whether a given boy or girl had reached a given stage, and to have his results confirmed by independent investigators ^{with quite different backgrounds.} ~~in various countries.~~

Finally, there are the higher stages of development, in which, first, mediating operations are introduced and, later, the mediating operations themselves are mediated. Operations are said to be immediate when their objects are present. Seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched. But by imagination and by language we operate in a compound manner: immediately with respect to ~~what~~ a representation or sign; mediately with respect to what is represented or signified. In this fashion we come

to operate not only with respect to the present and actual but also with respect to the absent, the past, the future, the merely possible or ideal or normative or fantastic. As the child learns to speak, ~~then~~ he moves out of the world of his immediate surroundings towards the far larger world revealed through the memories of other men, through the common sense of community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.

Besides a world of immediacy there is, then, a much larger and richer world mediated by meaning. This world, strangely, is what we mean by the real world and, once we have been introduced to it, there we live out our lives. Still it is an insecure world, for it is mediated by meaning, and meaning can go astray. Besides truth there is error. Besides honesty there is deceit. Besides philosophy and science there are myth and magic. So there have been invented and developed a whole series of reflexive techniques in which we operate on mediating operations in an effort to safeguard meaning. Alphabets replace vocal by visual signs, dictionaries fix the meanings of words, ^agramm^ars control their inflexions and combinations, logics promote the th clarity, coherence, and rigor of discourse, hermeneutics studies the varying relationships between meaning and meant, and philosophy explores the more basic differences between worlds of immediacy and worlds ~~per~~ mediated by meaning.

Though incomplete and quite schematic, the foregoing outline helps to clarify certain basic features of horizons. First of all, there is the very fact of horizon. We have no difficulty in acknowledging ^{the differences and} the limitations of individual development. It follows that each of us has a bounded horizon, that as our developments so our horizons differ, and that the price of broadening one's horizon, ^{of escaping from one's selective inattention,} of coming to apprehend what now one habitually overlooks, is further training, effort, study.

Secondly, Piaget's success with the notion of group points to the aspect of horizon as organization, and this links up with the way in which Edmund Husserl employed the term, Horizont. At first he used ^{it} in the sense of William James' "fringes," i. e., the marginal acts and contents ~~of~~ surrounding the thematic core of the field of intentional consciousness. But gradually "he came to see that even these horizons were not merely open areas of decreasing clarity, but parts of the comprehensive horizon of a world as their encompassing frame of reference, without which any account of even a single perception would be incomplete." There is reason, then,

Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 161, 718.

believe to ~~suspect~~ ^{believe} that any given interest or apprehension is a function not only of its object but also of the horizon within which it emerges ^{and functions.}

Thirdly, while Piaget's ^{detailed} stages of development are of interest mainly to pedagogues, ^{far more general interest attaches to} his distinction of immediate operations, mediating operations, and the more remote operations ~~that mediate mediating operations, is of far more general interest.~~ It grounds a distinction between a first

To accept method in theology, then, is to drop the deductivist ideal with its presupposition of necessary first principles. It is to conceive theology as an on-going process in two phases each subdivided into four functional specialties. nor need this conception of theology involve one is in some radical skepticism or relativism. As already explained, there is the rock, ^{brought to light} ~~provided~~, by transcendental method and, in its systematic function, it provides continuity without imposing rigidity. When religion, dogma, theology, all develop, what

See above, pp.

~~does not lie in~~
~~counts are not necessary and immutable propositions~~

counts is found to lie, not in necessary and immutable propositions, but in the invariant structure of operations that has to be presupposed for any revision to occur.

~~Thirdly, a logic contains two distinct elements. Its aim is the achievement of clarity, coherence, and rigor. Its means are the embodiment of these ideals in general descriptions, explanations, and ~~two~~ rules. Now such an embodiment adds to the ideals and, as the addition may come from different sources, there arises the possibility of different formal logics. Aristotelian logic takes its peculiar shape and direction from its embodiment of logical ideals in grammatical and linguistic forms~~

Thirdly, within the frame-work of method the function of logic is limited. It consolidates all that has been achieved. It reveals the defects and deficiencies that have yet to be overcome. But it does not exercise any absolute rule. On the contrary, its ideals of clarity, coherence, and rigor are still in a healthy tension with the exigences of a developing science.

To accept method in theology, then, is to drop the deductivist ideal with its presupposition of necessary first principles. It is to conceive theology as an on-going process in two phases each subdivided into four functional specialties. Nor need this conception of theology involve one in some radical skepticism or relativism. As has already been explained, transcendental method brings to light a secure base and, in its systematic function, ensures continuity without imposing rigidity. Such security and continuity are precisely what is wanted when not only theology but also dogma and even religion are capable of development.

—
See above pp.
—

Thirdly, truth is contextual. But it makes a vast difference whether that context is envisaged from a deductivist viewpoint or from the viewpoint of ~~the~~ method. The deductivist conceives the context in the exclusive light of the ~~idea~~ logical ideals of clarity, coherence, and rigor. Clarity means that for each aspect of each thing there is one right concept. Coherence means that of two contradictory statements one and only one is false. Rigor means that true statements resolve into premisses and conclusions and so, if you think your statement is true, either you consider it self-evident or else you can demonstrate it by deducing it from self-evident statements. ~~On the deductivist ideal, then, truth is ^{not} envisaged concretely as a vast interlocked set of fixed concepts, propositions, and inferences; and coming to know the truth is a matter of arriving at this ~~mosaic~~ mosaic of eternal truths.~~

The ideals, then, of clarity, coherence, and rigor imply that this there exists and at present is available a context definitive, logically perfect context within which statements are to be interpreted and evaluated

From the viewpoint of method

In contrast method has its own distinct ideals. It uses logic to consolidate achievement and to reveal defects and deficiencies still to be overcome. It respects

Method wants clarity, but it refuses to purchase it by sacrificing concepts still in process of development. Method wants coherence, but it has no intention of surrendering either of opposed statements that may turn out to be complementary aspects of a truth still to be discovered. Method wants rigor but it also wants flexibility and adaptability and openness.

But the Aristotelian ideal of science as necessary conclusions from necessary principles gives to logic an absolute sway