

### 3. Human Nature and Human History

A new notion of science yields a new ~~notion~~ apprehension of man. Classically orientated science concentrated on the essential to ignore the accidental, on the universal to ignore the particular, on the necessary to ignore the contingent, on the normative to ignore mere matters of fact. Man was a rational ~~and~~ animal, composed of body and immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive, <sup>and</sup> and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with changing circumstances, ~~it~~ was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. This is far from exhausting the content of the classically orientated science of man, but enough has been said to indicate its style. It is so phrased as to hold for all men whether they are awake or asleep, infants or adults, morons or geniuses. It makes it abundantly clear that you cannot change human nature. For it the multiplicity and variety, the developments and achievements, the breakdowns and catastrophes of human living are accidental, contingent, particular, merely factual. They lie outside the field of scientific interest. History tells their story. Art points their lesson.

With its method, its resources, its organization, modern science is able to take a different view. All men of all times and places offer a four-dimensional totality of data, of phenomena to be completely explained. The goal will never be reached but, then, no modern science is an achievement for all time stored in a great book. A modern science is an ~~on-going process that no library, let alone any single mind~~

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Within the Aristotelian context man was a rational animal, composed of body and immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive, and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with changing circumstances, was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. In brief, man was apprehended in terms of human nature, its constitutive components, and the norms and doing. of proper human living. Much empirical investigation went into the formation of this view of man, but most of it had been done ages ago and, while new facts and ideas continually found their way into the structure, still these additions were incidental and even somehow surreptitious rather than methodically intended and systematically incorporated.

Within the new context the classical apprehension of man is being changed in three manners. First, its underlying philosophic techniques are regarded as outmoded and are being replaced, but to this we shall attend in the next section of this chapter. Secondly, on the analogy of the empirical sciences of nature, there have developed the empirical sciences of man: biology and medicine, ethnology and anthropology, psychology and sociology

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Within the Aristotelian context man was apprehended in terms of human nature, its constitutive components, and the ends and norms of human action. Very summarily, man was a rational animal, composed of body and immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive, and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with changing circumstances, was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. Much experience, much intelligent observation, much shrewd reflection had gone into the construction of that view of man. It was eminently sane, urbane, compact, transmissible. If most of it had been worked out ages ago, still new facts and ideas continually found their way into the structure, even though they did so only incidentally and almost surreptitiously.

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Man is a rational animal, composed of body and immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive, and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with changing circumstances, <sup>is</sup> was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. Such in a most summary fashion was the apprehension of man within the Aristotelian context. If I have failed to suggest the breadth of experience, the acuteness of observation, the shrewd reflection, the sane judgements that went into the construction of that view, ~~in~~ my many omissions have a single cause. I wish to draw attention ~~in~~ not to content but to form, not to doctrine but to style. I wish to point out that in the Aristotelian context man was apprehended in terms of human nature, of its constituent components, and of the ends especially the and norms of human action.

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Modern man considers himself to be different from his remote ancestors and from the inhabitants of less fortunate nations. The grounds for this view are, perhaps, that modern man has made his own modern world

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Man's self-apprehension is a constitutive part of human living. If that apprehension is predominantly universal and abstract, there will tend to arise a systematic oversight

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Within the Aristotelian context man was apprehended in terms of human nature, its constitutive components, and the ends and norms of human action. Thus, man was a rational animal, composed of body and immortal soul, endowed with vital, sensitive, and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with changing circumstances, was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. So summary an outline, of course, might be filled in at considerable length in many different directions, and much praise might well be bestowed on the broad experience, acute observation, shrewd reflection, and sane judgement that went into the ~~construction~~ construction of its many parts. But our purpose is contrast, and so we turn

Fact - Made modern world Historical (etc)  
 Possibilities - ① many Common Man - [Person Social Culture]  
                   ② Nature Absolute  
 Difference - These ① Nature - ontology  
                                   ② Norms  
                                   ③ empirical laws

on-going process that is measured, not by its attainment of an ideal limit, but by its complete openness, by its exclusion of every obscurantism, by its unrelenting diligence in applying ~~carrying out the precepts of a cumulative and progressive method~~ developing its method and intelligently executing its precepts.



deciding. One has to know the precise meaning of each of these words. One has to produce in oneself the corresponding operation. In producing it one must not concentrate exclusively on the object of the operation but must open oneself to the duality of consciousness and intentionality, so that one adverts to the conscious questioner as well as the question asked, to the understanding subject whenever something is understood, to the formulating thinker whenever something is formulated, to the critically reflective doubter whenever a doubt arises, to the surveyor of the marshalled evidence, to the subject's rational need to judge in accord with the evidence no less than the resultant judgement

that is the form and act that finds expression in family and polity, in the legal and economic system, in customary morals and educational ~~the~~ arrangements, in language and literature, art and religion, philosophy, science, and the writing of history.

In the world mediated by meaning we have been distinguishing three areas or sections. There is the world of nature which meaning mediates but does not modify. There is the world of artefacts which by meaning we do not only know but also produce. Finally, there is the world which meaning not only mediates but also constitutes. Just as meaning is intrinsic to language, for without meaning words are mere sounds, so also ~~the~~ meaning is intrinsic to personal, to ~~the~~ social, and to cultural development. For it is in the performance of conscious, ~~intentional~~ intentional acts, that persons develop; it is through communication and collaboration that societies exist and function; it is with the transmission, the development, the control, and the effectiveness of meaning that cultural activities are concerned.

So we come to historicity. Once man begins developing personally, socially, culturally, meaning becomes ~~his~~ intrinsic to his living. But such meaning is not a set of eternal Platonic forms. It is a historical variable. There is, then, a historical variable intrinsic to all but the most rudimentary human ~~the~~ living, and it is this fact that is meant by the historicity of man.

finds expression ~~in morals and education~~, in family and polity, in the legal and economic system, in language and literature, art and religion, morals and education, philosophy, science, and the writing of history.

Sixthly, just as meaning is constitutive of language so that words without meaning are not words but merely sounds, so also the meanings that order human living

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finds expression in family and polity, in the legal and economic system, in language and literature, <sup>art</sup> and religion, morals and education, philosophy, science, and the writing of history.

Sixthly, while the transformation of nature by meaning involves a proportionate expenditure of energy, the transformation of man reveals meaning to have become a closed system. Personal, social, cultural developments are ~~develops devols~~ developments in habits and acts of ~~meanig~~ meaning. Energy ~~to~~ must be expended to communicate them. But as they originate, so also they terminate in acts of understanding, judging, valuing, deciding.

Let us now note some conclusions.

~~First, because meaning is a closed system, the transformation of man can be as enormous as we know it to be~~

First, because meaning is a closed system, because meaning is employed to change meaning, <sup>long-term</sup> changes in the system can be as enormous as ~~wanknow~~ the differences between primitive and contemporary man.

~~Secondly, short-term changes have to be gradual. For social, cultural, and fully deliberate personal change have to be effected through current common meaning, and current common meaning has to be stretched to mean more than it commonly does.~~

Secondly, the profounder changes are, the more they must be gradual. For change in meaning has to be effected through current common meaning, and the profounder the change the more it is immanent in common meaning itself. So profound change is of common meaning by common meaning, and that can only be only a matter of stretching common