

unconscious but conscious; but one is conscious not as attended to but as attending; only the spectacle or music is attended to. But if one begins to introspect^{ing}, one begins to attend to oneself, one's watching, one's listening; one cannot cease entirely from watching or listening for then one would have nothing to introspect; one cannot be totally absorbed in watching or listening, for then one would not be attempting to introspect; one can, however, take advantage of the span of consciousness, of the fact that the psychological present is not a mathematical point; and one can take advantage of what might be called the elasticity of consciousness, of its capacity to combine the first-order operation of watching or listening with the second-order operation of introspecting

his own. It is not homogeneous. It has a luminous centre, selected by his needs, his interests, his tastes, and made familiar by the constant employment upon it of his conscious and intentional operations. It has a penumbra of further objects with which his acquaintance is short and ~~his~~ for which his interest is slight. It has, finally, an unmeasured surrounding sphere of darkness, the known unknown of all the questions that he might have raised or might still come to raise^A if only he ever came to care.

Since subjects and their worlds are correlative, so subjects and worlds may be distinguished by their horizons, by the ^{imaginary} surfaces that mark the transition from light to shadow and, again, from shadow to outer darkness. Inasmuch as men live together, share a common field of experience, learn from one another to understand things in similar ways, pass judgement on things and values in a traditional fashion, commit themselves by the love that founds families, by the ~~loyalty~~ loyalty that makes states, by the faith that inspires religions, they share a common world. The common field of experience keeps ~~the~~ them in touch; their common understanding precludes the mutual incomprehension that generates ^{fear,} suspicion, hostility, war; their common judgements make the collaboration of common living not only possible but also easy; their similar or common commitments bind^d them together in a fashion that triumphs over adversity and survives even disaster. Such is human community. It does not require a complete coincidence of individual horizons but, to continue the metaphor, an overlapping of the central spheres of light, an inconclusiveness within the shadow of the viewpoints and attitudes of others, a tolerance of excursions ^{oddly} made by ~~unholy~~ restless spirits ^{for} into realms that one does not care to fathom^A oneself.

~~But human communities are many, and their differences are both subtle and profound. Each has its genesis, development, borrowings, crises, breakdowns, its efforts at renewal, and ultimately perhaps its dissolution.~~

But human communities are many, and their differences are both ~~sub~~ subtle and profound. All are products of a common field of experience, a common measure of understanding, common judgements and commitments. But the fabric of common meaning in symbol and language here may endure unchanged for centuries and there be thrusting upwards and outwards towards a new plateau of human existence. Just as the operational structure of science yields discoveries to test them by experiment, so too the operational structure of community has its discoveries that, when implemented in the life of community, constitute the experiment of history; ~~and~~ as in science, so too in history the experimental process can lead from discovery to discovery; and as science begins by trial and error eventually to reach the reflective consciousness of method, so too history has occurred for ages yet only recently has brought forth historical consciousness.

It is on the scale of historical development -- which is not entirely coincident with chronology -- that we make a first approximation in distinguishing human horizons. The mind of the primitive, the character of the ancient high civilizations, the various manners in which individualism emerged, the classicist standardization of man, the ~~open~~ openness of current historical mindedness, function both as points of reference that mark off broad differences and, at the same time, as delimited fields of ^{an} investigation that here has just begun and there has long been under way.

~~A second approximation comes from the social arrangements and cultural achievements of a community. For if all society and culture may be conceived as the resultant of historical process, still that resultant is not predictable and, in any case, its influence is upon the community as a whole and only through the community upon the individual~~

A second approximation comes from the social arrangements and the cultural achievements of a community. These in their totality may be conceived as the products of historical process, but it is their current reality that directly stimulates contemporary living in one direction to block it in others. As it is from his mother's womb that emerges the individual's body, so it is from the womb of community that there comes the first and basic shaping of his mind and heart. ~~INDIVIDUAL~~ Individual development is a matter of doing more and more things for oneself, deciding more and more for oneself, finding out more and more for oneself. But the moment of existential crisis, when one finds out for oneself that one must decide for oneself what to make of oneself, is ~~preceding~~ preceded and its issue profoundly influenced by the long years in which one ~~has~~ was busy learning what was already known, deciding in the light of others' experience, ^{and} striving to do as well as they did. So the insights, judgements, values of a community, their realization in social arrangements, and their justification in language and literature, in art and religion, in science, philosophy, and history, are at once a challenge to the individual to rise to the level of his times, an opportunity to ~~rise~~ advance beyond them, and a barrier of endless complexity that only the stoutest resolution ~~resolution~~ and the timeliest proposals can break through.

A third approximation is psychological or, if you prefer, educational

A third approximation is psychological and educational. One's place in human history is mediated by the social and cultural community in which one is born or to which one migrates. It is achieved in the measure that one's living, the flow of one's conscious and intentional acts, are a functional part of the community's living

if we prescind from introspection on the formation of concepts, never brings to light the abstract conceptual content, causality. But it does reveal concrete processes and, ^{ever more} as we move from level to level the category of causality appears ^{can be} thin and poor. On the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous; it is intelligible only in the sense that it ^{an} is understood, and causality ^{is not} altogether inadequate conception of it. But with inquiry the intelligent subject comes into his own, and the succession of his operations ^{is} only in its conditions ^{is} spontaneous; in itself it is intelligent, not merely an intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative that seeks understanding, understands, and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term or an impasse, intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as critically reflective, the subject stands in a conscious relation to an absolute -- the absolute that makes ^{us} regard the positive content of the sciences as only probable. In the rational subject, knowing his world and himself and their potentialities, there emerges conscious freedom and conscientious ~~responsibility~~ responsibility.

As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon Hegel's insight that the full objectification of ~~the~~ the human ~~spirit~~ spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of ~~the~~ social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us the mirror in which we can behold, the ~~the~~ originating principle of human aspiration and human ~~achievement~~ attainment and failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is a prior need of method; if method is not to be a mere technique arrived at by trial and error, we must first know its grounds; and its grounds reside not in words or statements, not in concepts or judgements, not in experiences or acts of understanding, but ~~to what~~

non-mechanical
sense
1

in the ~~the~~ principles, at once generative, constitutive, and normative of the human spirit in act[^] in inquiry which promotes consciousness from the empirical to the intellectual level, in critical reflection ~~in~~ which ~~promotes~~ promotes consciousness from the intellectual to the~~r~~ rational level, in what Joseph de Finance has named the vertical liberty by which we ourselves mount to the level of responsible freedom.

So, I should say, man comes to understand, not everything about himself, but the dynamic basis of his conscious and intentional being. But, it will be ~~is~~ asked, can any such understanding of oneself, such self-appropriation, be certain? Must it not lie under the limitations of every psychologism? Must it not be just another hypothesis or theory or system that possesses a certain plausibility, enjoys acceptance for a time, but inevitably has to be discarded in the light of fuller knowledge and more adequate explanation?

The answer, as the argument shows, must be affirmative, if revision is possible. The answer must be negative, if revision is not possible, if every possible revision is going to presuppose the very structure that is in question. But ~~any~~ any possible ~~yes~~ revision will appeal to data, ^{further} ~~to the data~~ ^{whether} of sense or of consciousness, and so an empirical ~~level~~ level of operations has to be presupposed. Any possible revision will offer a better explanation of the data, and so an intellectual level of operations has to be presupposed. Any possible revision will claim that the better explanation is more probable, and such a judgement presupposes the rational level of operations. A revision, finally, is a fact and not a mere possibility only as the result of a judgement of value and a choice; one undertakes such a labor, with all its ~~risks~~ risks of failure and frustration, only because one holds, not merely in theory but also in practice, that it is worthwhile to ~~get~~ get things straight, to know with exactitude, to contribute to the advancement of science; and so at the

root of all revision, as at the root of all method, there has to be presupposed the responsible level of operations. Now what every revision presupposes, no revision can exclude. The basic structure, the dynamic pattern, of our conscious and intentional operations is self-authenticating. It is the rock on which method can be built.

~~Finally, what good is the rock? As long, then, as methods are determined solely by trial and error~~

Finally, what good is the rock? Let us rephrase the question. In the first instance, it ^{might} ~~will~~ seem, methods are discovered by reflection on successful performance. But that first instance is not good enough. As long as trial and error are the sole determinants of methods, our scientific disciplines are no more than techniques. One knows what to do in accord with the best contemporary practice; but one has no reasoned ground that explains why doing that is the correct thing to do. Until method itself becomes an object of reflection and study, until its foundations are laid and its practice justified, there cannot be any reasoned critique of existing methods, or any procedure, save more trial and error, for the discovery of improvements or the evaluation of new proposals. In particular, in Catholic theology, where techniques abound and, at present, traditional techniques clash with the techniques imported from the human ~~and~~ sciences, from history, and from recent trends in philosophy, it seems most ~~unlike~~ unlikely that by trial and error -- by hoping for another Aquinas and doing little to prepare his way -- any comprehensive solution of the problems of method will be found.

On the other hand, enough has already been said for it to appear that the self-authenticating many-levelled structure of our operations ~~immediately grounds a transcendental method. For we have spoken, not of restricted fields of objects, but of operations generally. But it will be by operations, conscious and intentional, that we attain any object we can~~

immediately grounds a transcendental method. It grounds a method, for the structure is normative: it contains preconceptually the precepts of proceeding intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, where the meaning of intelligence, reasonableness, ^{responsibility} ~~responsibility~~ is given by the generative and constitutive principles of our conscious and intentional operations.

a method that is not restricted to any particular class of objects; It grounds a transcendental method, for the structure is determined and defined by operations as conscious, and so it is left completely open in so far as operations are intentional, that is, in so far as they regard objects.

There immediately follows the distinction between transcendental and special methods. Transcendental method ^{explores the basic} ~~explores the~~ meaning and implications of being intelligent, being reasonable, being responsible, and applies its conclusions to the investigation of any objects whatever. Special methods add further determinations to these conclusions from the peculiar exigences of ~~exercising~~ exercising intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility in particular fields of inquiry. It is to be noted that this distinction between transcendental and special methods is no more than a division of results. It must not be taken as a precept governing investigations: all instances of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility, ~~arrangement~~ including those of special methods, are sources for ~~learn~~ learning transcendental method; and inversely what is true of intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility in every case, as revealed by transcendental method, must be true in each of the special methods. The development then of transcendental and special methods is interdependent.

In the next chapter, in working out the distinction between operations in theology and operations in the natural and human sciences, we shall have occasion to clarify ^{the} ~~that~~ nature of special methods. But some further remarks ^{on} ~~on~~ transcendental method seem to be in order here. ~~and, first of all, it must be noted that we are not conceiving transcendental~~

First, then, transcendental method is concerned with basic issues; its aim is to cope with the fact that discussions commonly run up against irreducible differences that render further discussion hopeless. It does not propose to eliminate such differences; ~~but~~ its purpose is to reveal their roots, to point to the existence of ~~a~~ a common ground behind them, and to indicate ^a ~~the~~ way in which they can be dealt with intelligently.

The common ground is the immanent and operative pattern or structure of man's conscious and intentional acts. It is not some universal apart from individual men. It is not some ideal towards which men should and, at times, do strive. It is as individual, as real, as concrete as the conscious and intentional operations of each ~~man~~ and every man. It exists in those operations as their prior, immanent, orientating, and constantly directing principle or ground. Finally, it is not this or any other talk about it; it is what is talked about; and it exists and functions whether or not it is talked about.

It can be talked about adequately only as a result of self-appropriation, ~~only through the introspection, the understanding of oneself,~~ only through the introspection that objectivifies its various elements and relations, through the understanding that grasps the whole in the parts and the parts in the whole, through the acknowledgement that, while such understanding can be developed vastly, still it does not ~~and~~ admit any radical revision.

Accordingly, we have to distinguish between two cases of the common ground: there is the spontaneous ground that is operative in us whether we know anything about it or not, whether what we think about it is true or false; there is the appropriated ground which is the common ground itself but with the modal difference that results from

self-appropriation. Hence to appeal to the common ground as spontaneous ^{proximate} does not imply any ability in the spontaneous subject to recognize the ground of his own operations; but to appeal to the common ground as appropriated does suppose that the operating subject has already effected self-appropriation and so will not be totally at a loss when asked about the mainspring of his own ~~operating~~ operations.

Further, we have to distinguish between spontaneous expression and reflective formulation of the common ground. Reflective formulation puts in concepts and words the fruits of self-appropriation. Such formulation is a variable; it will be depend upon the stage of the historical development of man, upon the socio-cultural conditions of a given time and place, upon the acumen of the individual thinker. On the other hand, spontaneous expression is any a expression; for all expression proceeds from our conscious and intentional operations; all such operations occur within the pattern that grounds, directs, and orders them; and so all expression is a manifestation of the common ground.

Finally, there is the gimmick, the crucial instance. Spontaneous expression can run counter to what one actually is saying. One may be contending that science is value-free yet, at the same time, manifest in a thousand ways ~~but~~ that one considers science, not ~~worthless-by~~ worthless, but a ~~is~~ supreme value. One can maintain that human reason is a mirage and adduce very ~~force~~ cogent ~~reasons~~ reasoning for one's view. One can deny human intelligence and so do so very intelligenly.

So we must distinguish positions and counter-positions. By positions are meant statements that are compatible with the common ground, ~~its~~ its spontaneous expression, and its reflective formulation. By counter-positions are meant statements that conflict with the common ground, its spontaneous expression, or its reflective formulation.

Secondly, besides the common ground that lies behind irreducible differences, there are the irreducible differences themselves. Their most conspicuous manifestation is the set of perennial philosophies that change their dress from age to age but in their substance give expression to ~~the~~ various types of incomplete or unbalanced human development. So one may speak of a perennial empiricism that stresses the empirical level of conscious and intentional operations but is less than just to the other levels; of a perennial idealism that stresses the intellectual level to the detriment of one or more of the others; of a perennial rationalism that insists on truth to the neglect of experience, or of developing intelligence, or of concrete responsibility; of a perennial moralism that belittles the prior levels it presupposes and places its emphasis upon human freedom and responsibility; of a perennial positivism that rejects all interest in foundations and rolls up its sleeves to set to work on more concrete tasks. I have been merely listing the more obvious forms of one-sidedness, but obviously they admit many variants ~~and combinations, as any history of philosophy will show~~ and combinations, as histories of philosophy reveal both in the multitude of thinkers whose views are recounted and in the many approaches adopted by the many historians.

To all such one-sidedness transcendental method is opposed, for it invites each and every subject to a total self-appropriation and thereby to finding within himself the grounds for correcting whatever one-sidedness he may have picked up from his cultural milieu or may have found unduly congenial because of the incompleteness of his own development.

In a first instance, then, transcendental method is a method of self-criticism. It is an invitation to the subject to discover his own weakness; it indicates where such weaknesses may lie; at the same time, it points out in the subject himself, in his own spontaneous modes of operating, the grounds for personal development.

Still, the discovery of one's own weaknesses is notoriously difficult. It is so much easier to spot the mote in another's eye than the beam in one's own. So, in a second instance, transcendental method offers a common basis for dialogue. There exists and functions the common ground in each of the participants; its functioning involves spontaneous expression; such spontaneous expression will be at variance with utterances that are counter-positions; and while the speaker will have difficulty in noticing and acknowledging this anomaly in his views, others with different blind-spots will immediately sense that something is wrong and eventually be able to put their finger on it with an exact formulation. So dialogue between open minds and friendly spirits tends to the elimination of counter-positions and to the acknowledgment of the common ground itself as the ultimate norm of discourse.

While one cannot carry on a dialogue with the past, ~~which~~ one can objectify and generalize its principle to reach dialectic. For in the past as in the present there existed and functioned the spontaneous common ground and there occurred its manifestation in spontaneous expression. No less in the past than in the present there were utterances that on ~~examination~~ examination prove to be counter-positions, which to a greater or less extent influenced the whole of a speaker's or writer's thought and so tended to bring it in line with one or another of the one-sided perennial philosophies ~~which~~ examination prove to be counter-positions. In the measure that thought is coherent, such counter-positions tend to exert a decisive influence on all of a thinker's ~~own~~ opinions and so to bring his views into line with one or another of the one-sided perennial philosophies. ~~Accordingly,~~ Accordingly, in transcendental method one possesses a ~~useful~~ tool for historical criticism: opinions and doctrines can be judged by their own immanent standards; they can be classified and related by their

from these standards; and so what at first sight appeals to be a mere Babel of conflicting opinions, turns out on analysis to proceed from a single common ground which, however, is distorted, now by one, now by another failure in self-appropriation.

In three manners, then, by self-criticism, by dialogue, and by dialectic, transcendental method points the way to an intelligent handling of the problem of irreducible differences in doctrines and opinions.

Thirdly, as transcendental method grounds a self-criticism of the subject, so it is critical with respect to objects. By the word, critical, of course, we do not mean something peculiar to Kant's critical idealism. We employ the term in the quite general sense of the precept, Do not affirm what you cannot know. And we understand the precept in the sense in which its violation involves self-contradiction. An affirmation is a claim to knowledge, and so affirming what one cannot know amounts to claiming to know what one cannot know.

Transcendental method is critical in the foregoing sense because it reveals to us the operations we can perform and, by implication, the operations we cannot perform. But the operations in question are intentional; they are correlative to objects and consist in an awareness of objects. Hence, to know the intentional operations we can perform is also to know what objects we can know; and similarly to know the intentional operations we cannot perform is also to know what objects we cannot know. It is true of course that the human mind and its methods develop and that there are modalities and combinations of operations that at once one time could not be performed and at a later time can be. But this introduction of the variable, time, does not affect the validity of a critical approach. At any given time there are the operations that can be performed then; such operations can be specified; to specify them is also to specify their objects, for intentional operations

are intentional by intending objects; and so whenever an object can be known, it also is possible to determine the operation or set of operations by which it is known.

It will be noted that transcendental method in its self-critical and its critical aspects amounts to knowing precisely what one is doing in performing conscious and intentional operations. Self-criticism is grounded in the fact that the operations in question are conscious; criticism in the fact that they are intentional.

Further, it will be observed that the critical function of transcendental method may be specialized into a method for determining the basic terms and relations of foundational inquiry. Just as intentional operations generally may be employed to determine ~~subjects~~ their corresponding objects, just as the relations between operations may be employed to determine the relations between their respective objects, so too basic operations and basic relations between objects may be employed to determine basic terms and basic relations between terms. The simplest example of this procedure is the isomorphism between experience, understanding, and judgement on the one hand and, on the other, potency, form, and act, so that form is related to potency as understanding to experience, ~~and~~ act is related to form as judgement to understanding, and, further, so that potency corresponds to experience, form to understanding, and act to judgement.

Fourthly, transcendental method is relevant to history. This we have already seen in our remarks on dialectic, but the point we wish to make now is more general. In the measure that one succeeds in the critical and self-critical performance of one's own conscious and intentional operations, in that measure one is in possession of the elements for a fundamental interpretation of operations performed in the past and for a critique of that performance. Moreover, since the

spontaneous common ground of operations is self-authenticating and excludes radical revision, it does not vary from man to man or from generation to generation and so provides a fixed base for historical investigations. On the other hand, this spontaneous common ground differs from both its spontaneous expression and its reflective formulation; these involve concepts and words, judgements and propositions; they vary with the degree of development of human understanding; they suffer distortion from one-sided developments. It follows that transcendental method provides for historical study the study of the history of ideas and doctrines a single fixed base from which one can proceed to ~~the~~ comparisons that are significant and to genetic and dialectical explanations of differences that occur.

It follows, further, that from the viewpoint of transcendental method there are three main epochs in ~~this~~ the history of human thought. There is transcendental method itself which consists in employing the immanent and ~~operative~~ normative structure of our operations to ground and direct conscious and intentional operations generally. There is the prior era of logic, in which elements in the normative structure were employed to lay down certain general rules regarding terms, propositions, and inferences. There is a still earlier era, in which the normative structure operated only in a spontaneous fashion, received no reflective formulation, and commonly proved incapable of eliminating from man's mind its tendencies to mythical thinking and magical practices.

~~Fifthly, it is to be noted that we do not consider transcendental method to be a philosophic method, where philosophy is taken in the traditional meaning of a discipline based upon human reason to the exclusion of faith in a revealed religion.~~

Fifthly, to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding, we must again draw attention to the primacy and the universality of transcendental method as it is here conceived. This primacy, of course, is not chronological. One does not begin by studying some class of operations called transcendental and thereby arrive at a transcendental method. One begins by studying the operations and procedures that occur in the natural sciences, in the human sciences, and in theology: in part these operations and procedures differ, and such differences provide the basis for the special methods; in part, however, these operations and procedures do not differ, and such identities provide the basis for foundational or transcendental ~~method~~ method. This a posteriori approach implies, of course, that it is not by method that one discovers method. At the same time, however, it implies that transcendental method, once it is reached, assumes a position of primacy and is universal in its import. It is not dependent on logic; on the contrary it includes logical operations among the operations that it grounds and governs. It is not dependent on any distinct cognitional theory, epistemology, or metaphysics; on the contrary it includes, along with much else, the working out of a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics. It is not philosophic in the older pre-existential and pre-historical sense, in which philosophy was a discipline distinct from and less than theology: it regards all operations including the operations of theologians; it includes all objects ^{regards} including the objects proper to theology; and it bases this inclusiveness on the fact that transcendental method provides the foundations for special methods and special methods govern the operations of the special disciplines.