himself seeing. Moreover, this awareness or presence is quite different from the awareness or presence of objects; for the object is always what is gazed upon, attended to, intended; but consciousness is at the opposite pole, in the gazing, attending, intending. To be conscious the spectator does not enter the spectacle; on the contrary, the spectator is conscious even when he is devoting all his attention to the spectacle, and this can be so because consciousness resides in the attending, wha while wa what is attended to either is or is becomging an object.

Thirdly, there is the misleading word, introspection. It denotes the process of objectifiying the contents of consciousness. But it speaks of this process mythically, as though it consisted in some inward looking. Moreover, consciousness can be conceived mythically as some inward looking, and then introspection is confused with consciousness

But the intended results need not be confined categorially. Instead of envisaging and adapting to the exigences and opportunities proper to this or that particular subject, one is concerned with the exigences and opportunities proper to the human mind itself. Inasmuch as this concern brings to light a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results, there emerges a method relevant to any use of the human mind. Inasmuch as this method is not restricted categorially, it is a transcultural method, capable of providing a base from which the categorial differences in cultures can be investigated. Inasmuch as this method

METHOD

1. A Preliminary Notion

A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each is related to the others, where the set of relations form a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, and where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely.

So in the natural sciences method inculcates a spirit of inquiry, and inquiries recur. In insists on accurate observation and description: both observations and descriptions recur. Above all, it praises discovery, and discoveries recur. It demands the formulation of discoveries in hypotheses, and hypotheses recur. It requieres the deduction of the implications of hypotheses, and deductions recur. It keeps urging that experiments be devised and performed to check the implications of hypotheses against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur.

These distinct and recurrent operations are related. Inquiry transforms mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation. What is observed is pinned down by description. Contrasting descriptions give rise to problems, and problems are solved by discoveries. What is discovered is expressed in a hypothesis. From the hypothesis are deduced its implications, and these suggest experiments to be performed. So the many operations are related; the relations form a pattern; and the pattern defines the right way of going about a scientific investigation.

There is a futher feature to scientific method, and it was not included in our initial definition. That definition could be applied to the procedures of the assembly line but, where the assembly

line keeps turning out the same product over and over, scientific method is cumulative and progressive. The experiments devised to test a hypothesis lead to new observations that may or may not confirm the hypothesis. In so far as they do, they reveal that the investigation is not entirely on the wrong track. In so far as they do not, they lead to a modification of the hypothesis and, in the limit, to new discovery, new hypothesis, new deduction, and new experiments. The wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along. The field of observed data keeps broadening. New discoveries are added to old. New hypotheses and theories express not only the new insights but also all that remains valid in the old, to give method its cumulative character and to engender the conviction that, however remote may still be the goal of the complete explanation of all phenomena, at least we now are nearer to it than we were.

Such, very summarily, is method in the natural sciences. The account, no doubt, is not detailed enough to guide the natural scientist in his work. It is perhaps too specific to be transposed to other disciplines. But at least it provides a preliminary notion of method as <u>a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results</u>.

Two observations are in order. The first is that method is often conceived as a set of rules that will produce satisfactory results when followed blindly by anyone. Now this view is true enough for the assembly-line type of method that keeps turning out the same product, but it will not do if cumulative and progressive results are expected. Progressive results rest upon a sustained succession of discoveries. Cumulative results rest upon a sustained succession of syntheses