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of fact about particular individuals or groups. That is
the task of historians and field-workers. Ours is the prior
methodological concern. What are the questions to be asked?
What precisely do these questions mean? Are these questions
related
so related that the several answers, when whether positive or
negative, will come together to form a single, coherent,
interconnected processes picture?

The basis from which we derive our questions will be, of course, transcendental method. It appeals to our intentional consciousness as structure and content, as open, dynamic, normative. Considering it in itself and in human situations basic generally, one is led to the ouestions that occur to men and, as answered one way or another, determine their horizons.

Self-transcendence

One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up within oneself. A first step in this liberation is the senstitivity we share with the higher animals. But while they are confined to a habitat, we live within a universe because, beyond sensitivity, we question and our questioning is unrestricted. First, there are questions for intelligence; we ask what and why and how and how often; and our answers unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize. From the narrow strip of space-time open to immediate experience we move towards the construction

of whited at experience we may towards the construction

of a world-view and towards the exploration of what we On questions for intelligence follow ourselves could be and do. On a second level questions questions for reflection; we move beyond imagination and guess-work, idea and hypothesis, theory and system, to ask whether or not this is so or that could be. Now self-transcentdence takes on a new meaning. It not merely goes beyond the subject but also seeks what is independent of the subject. For a judgement that this or that really is so reports, not what appears to me, not what I imagine, not what I think, not what I would be inclined to say, not what seems to be so, but what is so. Still such self-transcendence is only intentional; it is in the order not of doing but only of knowing. It is on the third level of questions for deliberation that self-transcendence becomes real. For when we ask whether this or that is worth while, whether it is not just apparently but truly good, then we are Meniring not into our desires how we feel about it; how huch we desire or want it, whether it pleases us or our what possible harm might come of it but whether not it itself is good whether or not what her or inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, but about objective value. Because we can ask such questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect in our living a real self-transcendence. That real self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of collaboration and true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming

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a genuine person in a human society.

I have spoken of value and, indeed, of objective value.

I have distinguished between what truly is good and, on the other hand, what only apparently is good. But the basic fact is the subjective fact of manhous self-transcendence, and the basic distinction is between achieving self-transcendence and failing to do so. The true good, the objective value, is what is judged to be good by a person achieving self-transcendence, and the merely apparent good is the what is judged to be good by a person failing to transcendence himself.

This may be thought to be a subjective rather than an objective view of value. But subjectivity and objectivity are themselves quite ambiguous terms, and the solution of the ambiguity once more the 44 is to be found by reverting to the basic fact and the basic distinction. There is a subjectivity to be blamed because it fails to transcend itself, and a subjectivity to be praised because it does transcend itself.

There is an objectivity to be repudiated, because it was is the objectivity of those that pronounced objective by those that fail in self-transcendence; accepted and there is an objectivity to be self-transcending subject.

See <u>Insight</u>, chapter 13. <u>Collection</u>, pp. 227 ff.

Our position, then, parallels that of the existentialists, inasmuch as it can conceive man's mere existing as his capacity for existing authentically or unauthentically. But it differs inasmuch as it discerns in self-transcendence both genuine subjectivity and the principle of genuine objectivity. Include authenticasubject there are no conflicts between intelligibility, which resulty, walve, for each is the object of one and the

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However,

But the objectivity it affirms is not the objectivity of

, which existentialists deplore, but
positivists and pragmatists projected by existentialists but

the objectivity of intentional self-transcendence, to which
existentialists have failed to advert. Again, the subjectivity
it affirms, so far from being opposed to genuine objectivity,
is its prolongation, for it consists in moving on from intentional
to real self-transcendence. Finally, the continuity of

, in principle,
intentional and real self-transcendence is the reconciliation
of truth and value, and so of science as concern for truth

with religion as concern for value.

Value as Transcendental Notion

I have conceived value as what truly is good, what really is worth while, and I have placed the ultimate criterion of these in the self-transcending subject. Clearly, however, the matter calls for further elucidation. If there is no difficulty in seeing that actions which should accord with decisions, and decisions with judgements of value, there is no little obscurity about the emergence of judgements of value. But that issue we are not yet prepared to tackle. Dutanly a first at the Our present concern is with a prior step.

I distinguish transcendental notions from concepts. Concepts are objectifications. They result from the self-expression of intelligence, just as judgements result from the self-expression of reasonableness. Transcendental notions are at the opposite pole. They are principles of objectifying. Where concepts are intended, they do the intending. While this intending itself may be objectivited to yield concepts of the intelligible, the true, the real,

with the elucidation of the transcendental notion of value.

the good, still the mere concepts lack the dynamic properties of the transcendental notions and so may be misinterpreted as lacking their concreteness.

The transcendental notions are dynamic in various ways. They promote the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, from the experiential to the intellectual, from the intellectual to the rational, from the rational to the existential. Again, they are intentional. They are & dynamic intermediaries between ignorance and knowledge. The transcendental notion of intelligibility is # not knowledge of intelligibility but a striving for such knowledge. The transcendental notion of truth is not knowledge of truth but a striving for truth. The transcendental notion of value is not knowledge of value of value and for but a striving for both knowledge, and the accomplishment of value in oneself and in one's world. Finally, the transcendental notions not only promote the subject and direct him to his goals but also provide the criteria that reveal whether the goals have been reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is reached but dissatisfied by every incomplete attainment and so the source of ever further efforts. The drive to truth withholds assent when evidence is insufficient and compels rationality to assent when evidence success in is sufficient. The drive to value rewards self-transcendence aaddana with a happy conscience and postere, failures incolf transcandened with an unhappy conscience.

As transcendental notlens are dynamic, so too they are initial concrete. They are the foundt not only of questions but also of further questions, and further questions for a better understanding, further doubts to lead to a fuller truth, further criticisms to carry us on to a more comprehensive good

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As transcendental notions are dynamic, so too they are concrete. For the concrete is the real annual not under this or that aspect but under its every aspect. But the transcendental notions are the fount not only of initial questions but also of further questions. Though the further questions come only one at a time, still they keep coming. There are ever more questions for intelligence pushing us towards a better understanding and ever more further doubts urging us towards a fuller truth. The only limit to the process is at the point where no further questions arise. would be only and that point is reached, when we correctly understand everything about everything, when we know reality in its every aspect.

Similarly, the transcendental notion of the good

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transcendental notion of the good would reach its end only
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in the seconder with a goodness that is totally beyond criticism.

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There is something similar to the transcendental notion of the good. As the notions of the intelligible, when the true. the real, head for complete intelligibility, all truth. reality in its every aspect, so the transcendental notion of the good heads for a goodness that is beyond criticism. For the transcendental notion of the good is our raising of questions for deliberation. More precisely it is our being stopped with the disenchantment that asks whether what we are doing is worth while. That disenchantment brings to light the limitations in every finite achievement, the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of man soaring aspiration plunges us into and faltering achievement. It introduces us the height and depth and breadth of love but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short of its aim. In brief. that, the transecent dental notion of the good so invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely beyond its powers of penetrating criticism.

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