

Such conclusions are characteristic of an intuitive realism. By their affirmation of valid intellectual knowledge, they are essentially opposed to any materialism, empiricism, positivism. However, there is a notable weakness to the affirmation of valid intellectual knowledge. In the first place, this affirmation does not rest on any detailed scrutiny of intellectual activity: for no detailed scrutiny is needed to establish the truth of some unspecified type of realism; no detailed scrutiny is needed to accept the mythic view of the possibility of transcendent knowledge; and no detailed scrutiny is needed to deduce, quite rigorously, from these premises the necessary conclusion that intellectual intuitions exist. In the second place, the mythic view of the possibility of transcendence has an implication to which the intuitive realist commonly does not advert. Ocular vision is neither intelligent nor rational. Accordingly, to place the essence of transcendence within ocular vision is implicitly to affirm that intelligence as intelligence must be merely immanent and that rationality as rationality must be merely immanent. It is this implication of the mythic view of transcendence that the idealist exploits.

Such, in general, is a foundation. But the foundation we are seeking lies in the order of knowledge. Not only, then, must X be the necessary ground of Y, but also it must be true that because we know X, we know Y and, indeed, without knowing X we cannot know Y.

This defines our question. For our Y is the correspondence of true propositions to reality. Our X, accordingly, is (1) what we must know if we are to know the correspondence of true propositions to reality and (2) what, if unknown, precludes the possibility of our knowing the correspondence of true propositions to reality.

Further determinations may be added. First, the X we are concerned to determine lies within the field of natural knowledge, for we are concerned with the naturally known foundations of natural knowledge. Secondly, the question is not whether true propositions exist, or whether they correspond with reality; for the question is put within the limits of realism, and asks about the foundation of realism. We are not here concerned, then, to argue against universal scepticism, materialism, empiricism, phenomenism, Kantianism, idealism, relativism, existentialism, etc. We are concerned to settle what is true; we are concerned to settle, not what follows from the presupposition of realism, but what grounds realism not about the existence of reality, the existence of true propositions, the existence of the correspondence of true propositions to reality; no doubt, all those questions are to be put and to be answered; but they are not our present concern which asks about the foundation of the correspondence of true propositions to reality.

Because it merely conscious and because consciousness ~~ix~~ as such falls short of explicit formulation and affirmation, there can be known a necessary ground of the correspondence of true propositions to reality and yet we can inquire and dispute about that necessary ground.

This may seem difficult, so let us illustrate its meaning. For the intuitive realist we know truth because we see it. But that seeing occurs within consciousness. As such, it is known through consciousness. In so far as the intuitive realist affirms any proposition as true, he at least will be conscious of his seeing its truth