

distance; yet the hand is seen by the eye. Such is transcendence: vision goes beyond itself to the other; it sees what is <sup>neither</sup> ~~not~~ vision nor eye but a manifestly distant hand. Finally, image, feeling, and insight mediate an apprehension of values. Dreadful as it would be for either Jack or Jill to be blind, how much worse off they would be, if they were to subscribe to subjectivism, or phenomenism, or Kantianism, or idealism! They then would know nothing but their own thoughts. How priceless is realism, for it safeguards our knowledge of the really real.

Now such a symbolic apprehension of the value of realism is beyond reproach. The world is full of men and women, whose education does not enable them to enjoy more than a symbolic apprehension of the "-isms." There is no reason to refuse them their one access to what others are talking about.

However, from symbol to myth the step is short and easy. In general, it is the intervention of the irrational. In the present case, the irrational consists in an identification of symbol and symbolized. Ocular vision ceases to be merely the symbol of transcendence; it acquires the very essence of transcendence, so that any cognitional activity that is not a looking, an intuiting, a seeing, must of necessity be merely immanent. Realism ceases to be a doctrine that relates true judgements to reality; it becomes a doctrine that asserts an identity of the real with the ~~possible~~ object of possible seeing, intuiting, beholding.

~~On the heels of myth follows ideology. Ocular vision is neither intelligent nor rational. On the one hand, then, there are intuitive activities, and their object is transcendent and real. On the other hand, there are the activities of~~

Intellectual Intuition as Foundation

If intellectual intuition is the foundation of realism, then it is the sufficient (if X, then Y) and the necessary (if Y, then X) ground of realism. On that supposition the very possibility of transcendent knowledge of reality will lie in intellectual intuition, so that (1) if our intellects intuit reality, then they possess transcendent knowledge of reality, and (2) if our intellects do not intuit reality, then they do not possess transcendent knowledge of reality.

On this view realism and idealism are alternatives, and the issue between them is settled by a simple appeal to matters of fact. Do our intellects intuit reality, or do they not? Scotus, Ockham, and their followers say that intellectual intuitions exist. Kant and his followers say that intellectual intuitions do not exist.