

Hence, to resume our three points, in seeking the foundation of realism, we are seeking a set of definitions and affirmations, i. e., knowledge that resides not in actu exercito vut but in actu signato. Next, that knowledge will be true because it ^{natural and implicit} expresses universally the knowledge of the ground of realism that is to be found in every rational true judgement.

We have been using logic as an illustration of what was meant by speaking of the natural foundation of realism. We have ^{closer} now to attempt a closer clarification of the matter.

It might be thought that the foundation of realism lies in the real existence of material things, of tables and chairs, dogs and cats, wolves and bears, birds and fishes, men, women, and children. But this is ignoratio elenchi. The real existence of material things is a necessary condition of realism, for if there are (as there are) true propositions about wolves and bears, then wolves and bears really exist. However, the real existence of wolves and bears is not a sufficient ground for realism, for wolves and bears could exist without there being any true propositions signifying and corresponding to the wolves and ^rbeats.

Again, it might be thought that the foundation of realism was to be sought in causal analysis. For a cause is a ground, and the full list of causes alone will assign assign the sufficient and necessary ground for ~~kmx~~ human knowledge of the real. We must, accordingly, consider our cognitional apparatus; but we must also consider the objects that influence it; and we must consider the first cause that produces both the objects and our cognitional apparatus and the relations between them.

Now there is no doubt that causal analysis gives a far fuller answer than the one we are attempting. But there also is no doubt that such a fuller answer would presuppose a psychology, a ~~metaphysic~~ metaphysics, and a natural theology. Nor is there any doubt that these departments presuppose a realism. Our ~~xxx~~ concern, however, is not the knowledge that can be reached by presupposing realism but the knowledge that is presupposed by realism.

What then is meant by a foundation? We shall consider, first, the general notion of a foundation, secondly, foundations in the order of knowledge, and, thirdly, the precise kind of knowledge involved in knowing the foundation of realism.

In general, \underline{X} is the foundation of \underline{Y} , if and only if \underline{X} is the necessary ground of \underline{Y} . Hence, in the sense that \underline{X} is ground and \underline{Y} is consequent, it will be true that if \underline{X} , then \underline{Y} . Further, in the sense that \underline{X} is a necessary ground, so that there cannot be \underline{Y} without \underline{X} , it also will be true that if \underline{Y} then \underline{X} .

Next, the foundation we are seeking is in the order of knowledge. Hence, \underline{X} will be ~~xxx~~ the ground of \underline{Y} in the sense that we know \underline{Y} because we know \underline{X} ; further, \underline{X} will be the necessary ground of \underline{Y} , in the sense that, unless we know \underline{X} , we cannot know \underline{Y} .

Thirdly, the \underline{Y} of our question is the correspondence of true propositions to reality. The \underline{X} , then, will be the known necessary ground of the correspondence of true propositions to reality. Evidently, since from the ^{terms} nature of the question we cannot know \underline{Y} without knowing \underline{X} , our knowledge of \underline{X} cannot be consequent to our knowledge of reality through the medium of true propositions. Our knowledge of \underline{X} has to be prior to our knowledge of true propositions and of their correspondence to reality; otherwise, our knowledge of \underline{X} cannot be the known necessary ground of our knowledge of the correspondence.

~~What can such knowledge be? Plainly, it has to be placed in the conscious process qua conscious that terminates at true propositions. Because that process terminates at true propositions, it is always prior to them. Because it is conscious, it lies within our knowledge in some sense of the word, knowledge. Nor is there any other kind of knowledge we possess that is prior to the utterance of true propositions and so could contain the known necessary ground of the correspondence of true propositions.~~

that an appeal to the rationally conscious subject violates the priority of the ontological: the ~~is~~ rationally conscious subject is a concrete reality. If by the priority of the ontological is meant the priority of the department of knowledge called ontology, then a distinction has to be drawn: if the ontology is based on the rationally conscious subject, then it is not prior to the natural foundation of realism but simultaneous with it; if the ontology is based on an unspecified realism established by appealing to massive and elementary pieces of evidence, then the ontology will be made specific only by the addition of unfounded assumptions; and all such an ontology is prior to is a morass of disputed questions.

existence of an external world, etc., etc. Once more, we are confronted with an ignoratio elenchi. The question of the truth of realism is one thing, the question of its foundation is another. To establish the truth of realism one quite correctly invokes every available valid argument, and then the more massive and the more elementary the evidence the better. Moreover, to obtain a maximum of efficaciousness, one wisely refrains from determining too precisely which type of realism one proposes to prove. It remains that ~~there~~ there is room for a further question that regards, not realism in general, but precisely formulated types of realism and, to put them to the test, ^{does not consider} ~~considers not~~ all the possible arguments that ^{each} ~~any~~ might adduce but restricts the issue to ~~the~~ the most awkward and difficult question that can be devised, the question of foundations. Finally, just as there are very useful books that treat of the truth of realism without entering into the subtle complexities of its foundations, so also is it quite legitimate to discuss the issue of foundations without repeating the contents of easily available, ^e elementary presentations.

Fourthly, it may be argued that the question of foundations is the Kantian question, that one cannot ask Kant's question without giving Kant's answer, and that therefore to raise the question of foundations is to open the door to critical idealism.

~~I find this argument silly. There is nothing specifically Kantian about the question of the known sufficient and necessary ground of realism and there is nothing particularly cogent to Kantian opinions. What is true is (1) that the question of the necessary and sufficient ground may be particularized in a Kantian manner, and (2) that the question of the necessary and sufficient ground is a question that certain thinkers find it more convenient not to raise.~~

By the natural foundation of realism, then, there is meant (1) the sufficient and necessary ground of realism (2) that is known in actu exercito by the mere fact that one makes proper use of the mind God gave one and (3) that is known in actu reflexo et signato when one reflexively gives an explicit account of that naturally known ground.

Positions and Counter-positions

Reflexively discovered and explicitly formulated accounts of the natural foundation may be true or false. When they are true, they are coherent with the proper use of the mind God gave one; and then they are named positions. When they are false, they are incoherent with the proper use of the mind God gave one; and then they are named counter-positions.

The significance of the distinction between positions and counter-positions

Counter-positions may be incoherent in either of two manners.

Counter-positions may be incoherent in any of three manners. For while now one has any mind to use except the mind God gave him, still he may use it (1) properly, (2) improperly, (3) sometimes properly and sometimes improperly.

What then is meant by a foundation? We shall ~~give~~ indicate, first, the general notion of a foundation, secondly, its application to the case where the foundation is known, thirdly, the different senses in which the foundation may be said to be known.

In general, then, X is the foundation of Y, if and only if X is the ^{sufficient and} necessary ground of Y. Hence, inasmuch as X is the ^{sufficient ground} ~~ground~~ of Y, it will be true that if X then Y; further, inasmuch as X is the necessary ground of Y, it will be true that if Y then X. To put the matter in slightly different terms, X is the foundation of Y, if and only if (1) X is prior to Y, (2) if X then Y, and (3) if Y then X.

Next, the foundation that is sought is in the order of knowledge. Our Y is the correspondence of true propositions to reality; it is that correspondence, not as existing but unknown, but as known and so existing. Similarly, the X, about which we ask, is in the order of knowledge; it is not an existing but unknown ^{sufficient and} necessary ground, but a known and so ^{sufficient and} existing ^{sufficient and} necessary ground.

Thirdly, the knowledge in question is of two kinds. Thus, there is a knowledge of logic that results from the study of logic; but there is also a knowledge of logic in the man that never has studied logic yet in fact thinks and reasons in accord with the rules of logic. The former is an acquired knowledge of logic; it is acquired by reflection ^x on cognitional operations and processes; and so it is said to be knowledge in actu reflexo. The latter is a natural knowledge of logic; it is had by the ¹ simple fact that a man uses the intelligence and rationality God gave him; it is immanent and operative in the very exercise of that intelligence and rationality; and so