

experienced, imagined, understood, thought, reflected on, grasped as unconditioned, <sup>known</sup> finally becomes known.

We have been engaged in offering an example of what is meant by saying that human knowing is structured. Presently, we shall see that such structures are conceived differently in different theories of knowledge. But our immediate concern has been to make clear what is meant by cognitional structure. In brief, it is a matter of conceiving experience, wonder, insight, imagination, thought, reflection, reflective understanding, and the proper content of judgement as <sup>an internally closed set of</sup> partial and complementary functions within a whole that is human knowing.

### Objectivity

Earlier we asked what is valeur, whether it is univocal or analogous, whether it has two or three distinct applications, and ~~why~~ why some philosophers acknowledge some applications while they reject others. Our answers to these questions will be in terms of objectivity.

When one finds that another's or even perhaps one's own statements are not objective, one does so for one of three reasons. The first is an appeal to data. You say my hand is white. Look, ~~it's~~ it's pink. The second is an appeal to norms. You postulate that no valid proposition regards all classes. But your postulate ~~is~~ is a proposition and it regards all classes. Therefore, it implies its own invalidity; it is self-destructive, contradictory. The third is an appeal to transcendence, to the absolute named truth. You ~~say this is a bear. But you are not awake, you are just dreaming; or, though awake, you are suffering a hallucination; or, you~~

### Structure

Realists commonly use the notion but not the name, structure. They speak of whole and part, distinguish material and formal parts, compare two parts of one whole with corresponding parts of another to affirm proportion or analogy. The names, the distinctions, the comparisons go back to Aristotle, who complained that ~~the~~ Platonic subsistent ideas were incomplete, that ~~the~~ a material substance ( ) is a whole ( ), that it is compounded of matter and form. The argument was continued by Aquinas, who maintained that the hylemorphic compound of matter and form is, not a thing, but just an essence, and that a thing consists of such an essence and existence. New variations were introduced by those that maintained ~~a~~ living things to have a plurality of substantial forms and, in another context, by those that attempted to think through the ontology of the hypostatic union.

Not only are all such questions concerned with structure, but also they are relevant to cognitional theory no less than to ontology. Accordingly, we shall begin from what is most general, ~~from~~ from the notion of structure itself. ~~Next~~ Next, we shall show how the notion of structure may be employed in cognitional theory, how this employment brings to light different components in the notion of objectivity (valeur), and how incomplete

xx say that this is a wolf. But are you certain? Might it not be a dog?

Three types of objectivity, then, may be distinguished: experiential, normative, and absolute. But at once there arise further questions. Are the three types irreducible? Or are only two irreducible? In that case, which are the two, and how is the third reduced to it? Or, perhaps, there is but one irreducible type and, in that case, how are the other two reduced to it? Moreover, when more than one irreducible type of objectivity is acknowledged, is one to conclude that there is more than one kind of human knowing, or is one to say that human knowing is structured and that its different components have different kinds of objectivity? Mathematically, there are eleven alternatives. Some of them, no doubt, if expressed more concretely, would be x eliminated out of hand. But, then, it also is true that a more concrete consideration of the matter is apt to give g rise to further questions and further alternatives and, in fact, there do exist quite a number of different philosophies. Let us consider some of them.

We have spoken of data, but data may be deflated to mere phenomena, ~~mfxxk~~ or they may be inflated into intuitions.

~~In the former case, appearances appear, and esse est percipi.~~

~~In the latter case, things in their objective reality are intuited. Human knowing ~~xxx~~ does not have to wait for true judgement to become transcendent absolutely; it possesses such absolute transcendence from the start~~

~~In the latter case, things in their objective reality are intuited; in virtue of such intuitions, human knowing has no need to await true judgement to acquire absolute transcendence.~~

In the latter case, things in their objective reality are intuited; in virtue of such intuitions human knowing has no need to await true judgement to attain absolute transcendence; it is absolutely transcendent from the start. Indeed, it is absolutely transcendent before it is specifically human: even sensitive knowledge has "... sa valeur absolue de représentation d'un monde extérieur, sa valeur indépendante de l'esprit humain." On that foundation one can build an account of concepts which, so far from adding anything to what is intuited by sense, on the contrary abstracts from ~~its~~ <sup>the</sup> wealth <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ sense. There now occur intellectual intuitions: one intuits not only the concepts but also their relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and necessary connection; by the intio intuitions of necessary connections one knows principles and norms; by combining intuitions of concepts with intuitions of existence one knows matters of fact. Finally, true judgement is simply a matter of assenting to what one knows by sense, by intellectual intuitions of ~~facts and norms~~ principles, and by conjoined intuitions that are knowledge of matters of fact, and to the necessary conclusions that follow from principles and facts. Hence, the truth of true judgement is only a derived truth; basically, truth is the correspondence between the intuition and the thing, and without that truth there can be only immanent operations of the mind without any objectivity whatever.

activities that are given in consciousness, it is mistaken; when it has to postulate activities that are not given in consciousness, it is involved in systematic error. Further, when a mistaken theory of knowledge is presented, the presentation is the work not of a theory but of a knower; the theory expresses the subject as object, but the expressing is done by the subject as subject account an account of knowledge tells about the subject as object, but the tale is told by the subject as subject; when the account is mistaken, there arises a conflict; the subject as subject is using the mind God gave him, but

experienced, imagined, understood, thought, reflected on, grasped as unconditioned, now finally becomes known.

We have been engaged in offering an example of what is meant by saying that human knowing is a structure (concrete sense of structure) or has a structure (abstract sense). We had explained that a structure (abstract sense) is ~~the~~ an internally closed ~~structure~~

The Problem of Subjectivity

If we have urged that the problem of objectivity arises on three distinct levels, it has not been ~~our~~ our contention that the validity of the distinctions will be evident to everyone. Behind the differences between the world of common sense and the world of scientific ~~and~~ or metaphysical theory, there are the differences between the structure of commonsense consciousness and the structure of theoretic consciousness. These differences lie in the subject as subject, in the concrete reality that consciously exists and knows. Besides the world of common sense and besides commonsense knowledge of that world, there is the man of common sense, the man whose consciousness has a specific structure that grants a certain primacy to knowledge but does so only within a larger functional unity that, as a whole, is directed not to a specialization in knowing but to human action in human situations. Similarly, besides the world of scientific or metaphysical theory, besides theoretic <sup>knowledge</sup> ~~knowledge~~ knowledge of that world, there is the theorist, the scientist, the metaphysician, whose consciousness has been transposed or ~~is~~ transformed to a quite different structure in which all human activity is orientated to purely intellectual ends. But while the theorist will also be a man of common sense, and so will be capable of moving easily from one ~~structure~~ <sup>the</sup> structure of consciousness to ~~another~~, from one mode of knowledge to the other, from one world to the other, the converse ~~propositions need not be true. There never has been any lack of men of common sense that were not theorists~~

propositions need not be true. The man of common sense need be neither scientist nor metaphysician and, because he is neither, the world of theory and theoretical knowledge lie beyond his horizon, beyond the range of vision, of comprehension, of agreement or disagreement of a consciousness structure, not for theoretical knowledge, but only for commonsense knowledge. He will ask the theorist to tell him about the world of theory, but he will stipulate that ordinary language be used. He will modestly ask for explanations, but he considers it out of the question that he should undertake the long and arduous process of learning. Since anything the theorist says will be of learning. If the theorist chances to say something that he manages to understand, he will attempt to insert it within the unity of a commonsense view of things, run into countless difficulties, and proceed to argue that this must be so and that cannot be so. Eventually the theorist will begin to talk about the weather, and the man of commonsense will conclude either presumptuously that theory is meaningless or modestly that theory is meaningless to him.



Horizon, Anticipation, Backwardness

Man cannot see around the curvature of the earth, and so his ocular vision is bounded by a horizon. But as man's seeing is limited by the approximately rectilinear propagation of light waves, so too there are limitations on his knowing. Nor is there only the natural limitation, commonly expressed by the distinction between the formal object of intellect, ens, and the proper object of human intellect in this life, quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens, but also there are further de facto limitations that correspond to stages in human development. Every man is a spontaneous subject, but only the successfully educated in philosophy and science will be theoretical subjects as well; nor are all theoretical subjects also critical subjects but only those that have advanced beyond both common sense and theory to a larger range of issues that are at once more fundamental, more comprehensive, and more concrete.

So it is that the realm of theory is beyond the horizon of the man of common sense, and the realm of critical philosophy is beyond the horizon of the theorist.

Let us illustrate the point. It happens that a man of common sense will find himself in the company of a theorist. Anxious to improve the occasion, he will beg him to impart to him some inkling of what the metaphysician or the scientist knows. At the same time

Presence to Self and Knowledge of Self

We have considered structure, a structure of cognitional activity, and a structure of objectivity. We have now to advance to a consideration of the subject and its structures, which may be ~~theoretic~~ spontaneous, theoretic, or reflexive.

they are not the norms that govern the effort to define and they are not the criteria that control the affirmation of what has been defined. Prior to all ~~the~~ rules of logic, prior to all canons of method, prior to all necessities exhibited in concepts and in judgements, are the intelligent subject qua intelligent and the rational subject qua rational. For the subject, if not intelligent but stupid, will understand neither the rules nor the canons nor the necessities; and the subject, if not rational but silly, will yield neither to the rules nor to the canons nor to the necessities. Nor is this all. When a man understands what a donkey is and rationally affirms a donkey to exist, there are to be distinguished two quite different types of rule, canon, law, necessity, inevitability: one type holds only for donkeys, and it corresponds to the nature of the donkey; the other type holds for the universe in its entirety and ~~in~~ in its every part and aspect; it is transcendental, and it expresses the nature of man, not qua man, not qua ~~rational and animal~~, but only qua intelligent and rational