С

There has emerged the sufficient and necessary ground of the correspondence of true judgements to reality.

First, there is correspondence. For every judgement, properly so called, is rational; every rational judgement has a meaning; and to every meaning there corresponds a meant.

Secondly, what judgements mean is being. For every rational judgement intends to affirm of what is that it is and to deny of what is not that it is not. To instend that is to mean being both positively, in so far as it is, and negatively, in so far as it is not. Judgements, then, mean being.

Thirdly, the judgements, being meant by all judgements, true or false, and attained by true judgements, is unconditioned, has no outstanding conditions, enjoys a total independence, is transcendent. For the true judgement means the unconditioned, grasped by reflective understanding, employed as a criterion of the sufficiency of the evidence, used to motivate the absolute certitude of the judgement, and then posited and meant by the judgement. That unconditioned is without outstanding conditions, with a total independence, transcendent. Therefore the being meant and attained by true judgement is the unconditioned, without outstanding conditions, with a total independence, transcondent. On the other hand, the being meant by the faise judgement but not attained by it is, in like manner transcendent. On the other hand, in the false judgement there is the same fundamental intention of reaching the unconditioned and transcendent; but the judgement is flase false precisely because what it basically intends is the opposite of what it actually affirms or denies.

Ø

0

are prior to any affirmation of data; they are prior to any conception of them as data or as data of such and such a kind; in particular, data are prior to and quite distinct from any psychological theory

0

G

unconditioned. Once that is found, there has emerged the motive of judgement: an unconditionized rationally necessitates an unconditional assent, an absolutely certain **EXERT** judgement. But this motive of judgement is also the criterion of truth, <u>i. e.</u>, that by which we tell whether a given judgement is true: what is grasped by reflective understanding as unconditioned, is what is affirmed by judgement as true; in other words, to say that the content of a judgement, B, is unconditioned is **exactly** whet is that it is true?

This holds not only for truth in the sense of the criterion of kn truth but also for truth in the sense of the definition of truth. The former entails the latter. An unconditioned has no conditions that are not fulfilled. If it is unconditioned what I am thinking. that X is what I have dreamt, what I am imagining, what appears to me, what seems to km me, then absolutely X is the content of mere dreaming, mere imagining, mere thinking, mere appearance, mere seeming. If, on the other hand, it is unconditioned that X is, then absolutely X is. Now we make judgements of both kinds. Both are true in the sense of the criterion of truth, for both rest on an unconditioned. Both are true in the EXE sense of the definition of truth, for both refer mean and correspond to reality; in the first case, however, they refer to the real occurrence of dreaming, imagining, thinking, af appearing, seeming; in the latter, they refer to a real occurrence of being.

But, one will object, how can the set of occurrences satisfying the requirements of empirical, normative, and absolute objectivity justify is the leap from a mere criterion of truth to truth in the sense of the definition? Now some further light will be thrown on this matter by a consideration of the terms,

0

bear serious scrutiny. No doubt, if one proceeds unscientifically by mere deductions and analogy, one can arrive at such vague notions on congitional activity that it it will mix not necessarily and immediately be bo obvious that cognitional atomism is fits false. But even then there are very simple arguments that exclude atomism; to think of existence is not to know existence; to think of universal is not to know universals; to think of anything is not to know it thinking is not knowing

19

 \odot

С

Human Cognitional Activities

Basic human cognitional activities are (1) the activities of external sense such as seeing, hearing, etc., (2) inquiry, (3) intelligent imagining, (4) insight, (5) thinking, (6) reflection, (7) reflective understanding, (8) judgement, and (9) consciousness of the subject, of each of the foregoing acts, of the dynamic relations between these acts.

Because these activities and their dynamic relations are given in consciousness, they can be known immediately and properly. They can be known immediately, so there is no need to deduce them from their effects, such as words, sentences, formal inferences. They can be known properly, so there is no need to appeal to the analogy of other activities that partly are like and partly unlike them.

Further, because these activities can be known immediately and properly, it is unscientific to restrict our knowledge of them to deductions and analogies. Indeed, the result of such a procedure is simply ignorance of what is essential. For human cognitional activity is both intelligent and rational; but the products of human cognitional activity are neither intelligent nor rational; it is true that they are intelligible and grounded, that from the intelligible one can deduce the intelligent and from the grounded one can deduce the rational but the products of human cognitional activity are not intelligent but only intelligible, not rational but only grounded; hence, strict deduction from the products of human cognitional activity will fail to bring to light

0

0

О

Θ

There has emerged the sufficient and necessary condition ground of true judgements corresponding to reality. For the transcendence

0

of human knowing is by identity the transcendence of what is known. The unconditioned, grasped by reflective understanding, motivating absolutely certain judgement, constitutive of the criterion of truth

0

 \mathbf{O}

О

There has emerged the sufficient and necessary ground of the correspondence of true judgements to reality. The ground of correspondence lies in the fact that judgements have a meaning: when I judge that John exists, there is not only the act of judging but also the meaning of that act, namely, John exists; and similarly in every judgement, besides the act, there is the meaning that relates the judgement to what it means. The ground of the correspondence to reality lies in the fact that what the judgement means is the unconditioned: for the unconditioned grasped by reflective understanding not only is constitutive of the criterion of truth, not only is the motive of absolutely certain judgement, but also is posited by judgement and meant by judgement. Because, then, what is meant by judgement is the unconditioned, because it has no outstanding conditions, because it is totally independent enjoys a total independent because it enjoys a total independence, betcause it is transcendent,

Ο

С

0

There has emerged the sufficient and necessary ground of the correspondence of true judgements to reality. For, in the first place, since every judgement is an act of meaning, it is correlative to a meant; at least, then, there is a correspondence

0

10

12221

にはない

Õ

The reader will note that the foregoing thesis fits in with the contention of <u>De Veritate</u>, q. 1, a. 9. Intellect knows the truth of its knowledge because it knows the nature of its active principle

C

The reader will note that the foregoing thesis partly coincides and partly goes beyond the principles laid down by Aquinas in <u>De Veritate</u>, q. 1, a. 9. It coincides inasmuch as it places the foundation of realism in knowledge of the nature of intellect. It adds, however, to the Thomist outline a distinction between two types of knowledge of the nature of human intellect: there is knowledge <u>in actu reflexo et signato</u> to be had by the rational psychologist and epistemologist; there also is knowledge <u>in actu exercito</u> that is had by everyone in every rational judgement inasmuch as **intellectually** and rationally conscious of its own activity every rational judgement inasmuch as (1) the nature of intellect

is an active principle and (2) that active principle is intellectuall and rationally conscious.

0

11 '

G

0

Human Cognitional Activities

Basic human cognitional activities are (1) external sense such as seeing, hearing, etc., (2) inquiry, (3) intelligent imagining, (4) insight, (5) thinking, (6) reflection, (7) reflective understanding, (8) judgement, and (9) consciousness of the subject, his acts, and of the relation between his acts with respect to the foregoing.

The argument will require that the foregoing activities are known to the reader not by analogy but properly, and not mediately but immediately. They are to be known not by analogy but properly, because analogy is partly like and partly unlike for analogous & knowledge is insufficient for the purpose in hand: analogous knowledge is essentially an imperfect and incomplete knowledge

O

0

Human Cognitional Activities

Basic human cognitional activities are (1) external sense such as seeing, heatring, etc., (2) inquiry, (3) intelligent imagining, (4) insight, (5) thinking, (6) reflection (not to be confused with reflexion), (7) reflective understanding, (8) judgement, **XMX** (9) in all of the foregoing consciousness of the subject, of his activity, and of the dynamic relations between his activities, (10) reflexion or introspection which proceeds from the data of consciousness through inquiry, symbolic imagining, insight, thinking, reflecting, reflective understanding, to judgement.

There has emerged the sufficient and necessary ground of the correspondence of true judgements to reality. For the unconditioned, grasped by reflective understanding, motivating certain absolutely certain judgement, constitutive of the criterion of truth, also is what is posited by true judgement and meant by true judgement. It is that unconditioned that has no outstanding conditions, that enjoys a total independence, that is transcendent.

0

25

0

Q