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Second part of sixth lecture, Monday, August 9, 1971

[Data and Facts]

We considered three handbooks and came to the problem of data and facts. Data are what is given. They may or may not be attended to, investigated, understood, the understanding formulated, the formulation checked, verified, affirmed. Those things may or may not accrue to data. In any case, they are data. On the other hand, a fact has three qualities. It has the givenness of a datum. Secondly, it has the precision of an object of understanding; it is a datum that is understood. And thirdly, as Newman said, facts are stubborn things – it has the stubbornness of what has been grasped as virtually unconditioned.

The historical fact is something that is arrived at through a process of understanding and, in critical history, through a double process of understanding. A first process that is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive, and judicial, in which you are arriving at an understanding of the people that are providing you with your sources. And a second process in which you move from the historical experience to which your sources attest to historical knowledge, which involves a process such as that from the clues that the detective gradually uncovers to who did it.

Now this existence of a double process means that there are two sets of data and two sets of facts. There is a set of data from which you proceed to an understanding of what kind of a people are providing you with your

information, how reliable they are, how far you can trust them, how you can use them best. And that process, insofar as you are going to rely on them, provides you with historical experience, elements of historical experience. But again you have to proceed through a process of understanding, from mere historical experience to historical knowledge. All of us, all day long, are having historical experience, but it isn't historical knowledge. The experience of individuals has to be put together into some intelligible whole before you start having historical knowledge.

[Three Historians]

Our third section, then, three historians. We started with three handbooks. Now we will take three historians: Carl Becker, an American; R.G. Collingwood, an Englishman; and Henri-Irenée Marrou, a Frenchman.

Becker is an extremely interesting person. He said he had been assured by his contemporaries, big people in the American Historical Society, that all the historian had to do was to ascertain the facts and let them speak for themselves. This idea of synthesis of the facts was just preposterous, it couldn't be anything but merely subjective, it couldn't be objective. The positivist influence on history in the second part of the nineteenth century. All you had to do was collect the facts and let them speak for themselves. Becker said that idea is preposterous. There is no possibility of ever setting forth all the facts. And even if you did, they wouldn't say anything. So far from speaking for themselves they would not say anything. Why? Well, my reason for that would be: it would be just historical experience, it wouldn't be historical knowledge yet. In the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1910, he gave a very intelligent account of the way the historian

proceeds from his case of notes in which he has the fruits of criticism: like, so and so says this, and it is reliable because of this and this and this, but watch out for that, i.e., annotated elements of information. Now permit me to read a quote from Carl Becker, from *Detachment and the Writing of History, Essays and Letters*, edited by Phil Snyder, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1958:

As he goes over his cards, some aspects of the reality recorded there interest him more, others less; some are retained, others forgotten; some have power to start a new train of thought; some appear to be causally connected; some logically connected; some are without perceptible connection of any sort. And the reason is simple; some facts strike the mind as interesting or suggestive, have a meaning of some sort, lead to some desirable end, because they associate themselves with ideas already in the mind; they fit in somehow to the ordered experience of the historian. This original synthesis – not to be confused with the making of a book for the printer, a very different matter – is only half deliberate. It is accomplished almost automatically. The mind *will* select and discriminate from the very beginning. It is the whole ‘apperceiving mass’ that does the business, seizing upon this or that new impression and building it up into its own growing content. As new facts are taken in, the old ideas and concepts, it is true, are modified, distinguished, destroyed even; but the modified ideas become new centers of attraction. And so the process is continued, for years it may be. The final synthesis is doubtless composed of facts unique, causally connected, revealing unique change; but the unique fact, selected because of its importance,

was in every case selected because of its importance for some idea already in possession of the field.

In other words, it is the historian's understanding that is developing. The data provoke such a development, but what the data provoke depends not merely on the data by themselves but upon the growing understanding of the historian. And it is that understanding that is going to be presented. In other words, a positivistic, an empiricist approach to historical knowledge is going to falsify the process entirely, because it overlooks the fact that knowledge is a product not merely of experience but of understanding and of judgment.

Now I think that Becker, in that passage, gives – Becker was not a man, and it has been shown that he was not a man, who could give a fully competent account of a theory of knowledge, and he hasn't got it. But he was a craftsman, and he knew what the job was, and he wasn't taken in by clichés. And he was able to say very intelligently just what the historian did.

As I have already mentioned, R.G. Collingwood maintained that, while history up to the time of Vico largely was a matter of 'scissors-and-paste,' of collecting testimonies, checking them for their credibility, and stringing them together, still, in his time, 1930, he didn't say that type of history had entirely disappeared, but he said that anyone who wrote history at the present time in that fashion was at least a hundred years out of date. He claimed that there had been a Copernican revolution in the writing of history, that history is not only critical but also constructive. Historians start out from statements found in sources, they move on to imaginative representation of the meaning of those statements, the *Sitz im Leben*, they put questions on the occasion of this imaginative representation,

and the questions give insights that lead to further statements in the sources. There emerges an imaginative reconstruction woven about fixed points supplied by statements in the sources. Yet these statements are fixed only relatively, that is, as fruits of earlier historical inquiry. History grows out of history. Thucydides has a meaning; it is not just a series of marks on paper because you have historical knowledge of the Greek alphabet, of the Attic dialect, of the meanings of words in the Attic dialect, that you have come to recognize that certain passages are authentic, that Thucydides knew what he was talking about and intended to tell the truth. And it is through historical knowledge on all those points that you have a historical source. While any given particular historical work will depend on other histories, still history as a whole rises from data, through understanding, to narrative. And that narrative is under a continuously growing critical process.

In Collingwood's book, *The Idea of History*, the last section, the *Epilegomena*, he has two chapters: one on 'The Historical Imagination,' and the other on 'Historical Evidence.' And both are really worth reading; they are really illuminating.

Henri-Irenée Marrou, a specialist in the Patristic field, or the late Graeco-Roman culture, was invited in 1953 to the Chair Cardinal Mercier at Louvain and he chose as his topic 'Historical Knowledge.' The book has been translated into English; it was published in a book form *De la connaissance historique* and there is an English translation published in Dublin and Baltimore by Helicon Press. And the title is *The Meaning of History*, but that is not what the book is about. It is not about the meaning of history, but it is about historical knowledge. Again, you will find in it an attack, an ongoing attack on – he said the positive masters of history under which he had studied as a student would turn in their graves if they read his

book. They insisted terrifically on criticism of the sources, doubting everything that was said, and that was highly relevant to political and ecclesiastical history of the Middle Ages because there there were all sorts of false charters and decretals and antedated lives of saints, and so on. There was a whole lot of documentary false evidence in the Middle Ages. But the real thing that was required is to understand your sources, understand the people you were using, understand just what they can be used for. And the interdependence, he insists upon the interdependence of the two phases of critical history. That as you get to know your sources better you can better figure out what was the course of events. And the more you know the events, the better appreciation you have of your sources. So those two phases are not just the second depending on the first but also the first depending on the second.

I have been talking to you about history in terms of insight. And this whole development of history, the center of it was in Germany, nineteenth century, and the keyword they used was *Verstehen*, understand. Even today, like Coreth's book on hermeneutics, but even in Coreth at the present time, *Verstehen* is used in a restricted sense. It hasn't got the breadth that insight has in my book, in which there is understanding of mathematics, understanding of physics, and also commonsense understanding. That word, *Verstehen*, in Germany is understanding human expressions, largely.

Now Droysen's notion of historical investigation was *forschend verstehen*, through research to understanding, we might translate it. Raymond Aron, a Frenchman, wrote two books in the course of this century, in the 30s, bringing into France the ideas of leading Germans on the nature of history, using in French as the corresponding word *comprehension*, comprehension. Now that word is – we have to advert to it because, while it

was empirical, it was never empiricist. It was empirical because it was associated with the German Historical School, and their charter was the rejection of Hegel's a priori imposition of meaning onto history. The Historical School said you understood the meaning of history through historical research, not through any a priori dialectic. So it was empirical. It was never empiricist because when Dilthey attempted to use this new type of historical knowledge as a datum for cognitional theory, he discovered that it wasn't simply historical knowledge, that it was full of ideas from the Enlightenment and even from Hegel.

The necessity of this *Verstehen* as something that didn't fit in with any merely conceptualist account of knowledge or empiricist account of knowledge was twofold. First of all, there was the hermeneutic circle. The meaning of a sentence depends on the words but the meaning of the words depends on the sentence. The meaning of the sentence depends on the paragraph but the meaning of the paragraph depends on the sentences. The meaning of the chapter depends on the paragraphs but the meaning of the paragraphs depends on the chapter they're in. There's a mutual interdependence right along the line, and there's no logical process that's going to smash that circle. It has to be by a self-correcting process of learning, by a gradual accumulation of insights that complement one another and correct, qualify one another, and it's through that growing assembly of insights that one spirals in on the meaning of the whole through the parts. Each successive part involves an addition, a new insight to be added to previous insights, to qualify them and if need be to correct them.

The second reason was that historical or exegetical work dealt largely with the work of geniuses, of artists, who were highly individual. They couldn't be subsumed under general rules. They were original, new

creations. They might give rise to imitations, set up new rules, but the new rules would also be carried out in an individualistic fashion. There's only one *Hamlet* written by Shakespeare. There's only one *Faust* in two parts written by Goethe. There's only one *Divina Commedia* written by Dante. It's not a matter of general rules or general principles. Interpretation and history has to be a work of understanding. And insight, *Verstehen*, regards the concrete, coming to an understanding of this particular work, this particular historical process. It's not a matter of general principles. We've had a lot of discussion at the present time of the question, In what sense does history explain? Well, it explains in the same way as common sense understands the concrete situation in which it finds itself and sizes up what can be done about it. It deals with causes, if by 'cause' you mean what you know when you say, 'It's because of this.' But it doesn't deal with causes in any technical sense of causality that is developed in the empirical sciences.

Now the scope of understanding and the range of its significance was gradually extended. To the grammatical interpretation of texts Schleiermacher added a psychological interpretation that aimed at understanding persons and especially at divining the basic moment in a creative writer's inspiration: to 'divine' what he was up to. August Boeckh extended the range of understanding to the whole range of the philological sciences. He wrote a methodology on the philological sciences. What Boeckh did for philology Droysen did for history. Droysen noticed that it's not only individuals that express themselves but also such groups as families, peoples, states, religions. They all have their self-expression. And just as *Verstehen* is relevant to understanding the individuals, so it's relevant to an understanding of the group, insofar as there is expression. Dilthey went on to work out the distinction between the *Naturwissenschaften* and the

Geisteswissenschaften. And while he didn't solve the problem of idealism versus empiricism, he did make considerable contribution to what this field of *Verstehen* and *Leben* – where Hegel had spoken of *Geist*, Dilthey spoke of *Leben* – *das Leben legt sich aus*, life interprets itself. It expresses itself and interprets itself in its self-expression. So he developed quite a theory of the possibility of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, of the possibility of the human sciences of self-understanding; and note the significance of those *Geisteswissenschaften*; it means that there are sciences that are quite distinct from the natural sciences, that have techniques of their own. What he represents is a break with positivism. And it's on Dilthey in particular that you have phenomenology as a further step in Husserl and hermeneutical phenomenology in Heidegger. That's that line there.

[Perspectivism]

The next point is perspectivism, and here I'll draw mainly on Karl Heussi, *Die Krisis des Historismus*, Tübingen 1932. The book opens with an account of about 18 meanings of the word *Historismus*, which might be and has been translated into English as historicism. It's a word that's highly ambiguous simply because the subject of history is so complicated. He picked as the sense in which *Historismus* was in crisis in the 1930s was history as understood and practiced about the year 1900. At that time history had four characteristics. First of all, it had a determinate but simple-minded stand on the nature of objectivity; the structures of the past were out there, and you could take a look at them almost; that was the objective structure, and there was great danger of subjectivism, and they were constantly struggling against subjective accounts of what really was the course of events;

secondly, they held the interconnectedness of all historical objects, all historical phenomena; all were interconnected, there was one intelligible field; thirdly, there was a universal process of development; and fourthly, historical concern was confined to this world, the world of experience.

According to Heussi, it was the first of these four which occasioned the crisis. About 1900, historians emphasized the dangers of subjective bias but assumed that the object of history was stably given and unequivocally structured. Heussi held that the structures existed only in the minds of historians, that similar structures were arrived at when an investigation was conducted from the same standpoint, but that historical reality was not unequivocally structured but rather it was an incentive to ever fresh historical interpretation. Now his statement has idealist implications. But he wasn't exaggerating them. He added that there are many constants in human living, and that unequivocal structures are not rare. The problem is the insertion of these smaller, nonequivocal structures into larger wholes. Where contexts are fewer and narrower it is less likely that subsequent developments will involve revision of earlier history. But where different worldviews and values are involved, you can have agreement on single incidents and complexes but disagreement on larger issues.

Heussi's main point – and this is where he's quite right – is that historical reality is far too complicated for a full description ever to take place. As he remarked, 'No one is ever going to tell us everything that happened in the battle of Leipzig between the sixteenth of October and the nineteenth of October in 1813. Inevitably the historian selects. The selection goes forward to some extent spontaneously, in virtue of some mysterious capacity that can determine what is to be expected, that groups and constructs, that possesses the tact to evaluate and refine, that proceeds as

though some governing and controlling law of perspective existed, so that granted the historian's standpoint and so on, there must result the structures and emphases and selection that do result. The result is not merely the rehandling of old materials. It is something new. By selecting what from a given standpoint is significant or important, it does purport to mean and to portray historical reality in some incomplete and approximate fashion. And that's the point to perspectivism. Any history is not a full account of everything that happened, but a selection of what is important, significant, from some standpoint, and consequently it's an incomplete and approximate portrayal of what went forward.

It's this incomplete and approximate character of historical narrative that explains why history is rewritten for each new generation. Historical experience is promoted to historical knowledge only if the historian is asking questions. Questions are asked only by introducing linguistic categories. Such categories carry with them their host of presuppositions and implications. They are colored by a retinue of concerns, and inevitably the historian operates under the influence of his language, his education, his milieu. And these change with time. Thus excellent historical books written at the end of the nineteenth century lost all appeal by the 1930s, even for people with exactly the same social, political, religious, and philosophic concerns.

The reason why the historian cannot escape his time and place is that the development of historical understanding does not admit objectification. The mathematician can formalize, so that's there's no possibility of his using insights that are not explicitly acknowledged. The natural sciences are a group operation in which the hypothesis is set forth with all possible precision, the process of verification is described in detail, all

presuppositions and implications are out in the open anyone can move in and say, 'You've made a mistake here or there.' And it's to everyone's advantage if he can point out mistakes and take for himself a little bit of the prestige of the discovery. You have an objectification of the whole process. This is still true to a less extent of the human sciences. They're concerned with general laws, general statements, that can be verified in any relevant case. And if they're not verified in a relevant case, then the hypothesis or the theory is revised or even replaced. But the historian has to depend on all his past development, and that cannot be objectified. All that goes to the making up of an individual's mentality and attitudes, and so on, you can give a rough description, an approximate portrayal from a certain standpoint, in a biography. And you can write the biography after the man is dead. But you cannot go back over your whole life and narrate objectively everything that you are, everything that influences your way of understanding, your approach, your interests, and all the rest of it. We have to let historians be human beings, let them have an education, let them be socialized and acculturated, and so on, and while this will lead to a certain amount of error and bias and so on, still we have to put up with it. A pluralist society lets people be what they are and lets them do what they can do. What we have to say, of course, is that historians have presuppositions, that their work is not *Voraussetzungslos*, that idea of nineteenth-century positivism. There always are assumptions, and the assumptions are, not personal judgments but the historicity of a person's cultural being.

Now in saying this I'm not saying that historians are locked up in their subjectivity. I'm not suggesting that they cannot overcome individual, group, or general bias, or that they cannot undergo intellectual, moral, or religious conversion. And I'm not retracting what I said about the ecstatic

character of the growing insights that pull the historian or the interpreter out of his own assumptions and lead him into an understanding of the assumptions of the person he's interpreting or studying. The point I'm endeavoring to make is what is called perspectivism. The relativist has lost all hope of truth. There's no truth. The perspectivist realizes that historical reality is so complex, so enormous, that any history is just going to be an approximate and partial account, and secondly, that historical work is done in such a concrete fashion; its assumptions are the whole previous development of the personal life of the historian, that even though historians do have this ecstatic moment in their study, though they overcome individual, group, and general bias, though they undergo intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, still, there are several historians. Even if they start out from the same standpoint, they may ask different questions. Even though they ask the same questions, the questions have different contexts. Though they come to similar conclusions, still they come at it from different angles, with different sets of further questions surrounding their conclusions, and so on. So that there are going to be individual differences in the histories that are written, and this is not something to get excited about. You don't expect historians to tell you the same story. It's part of the way of revealing the wealth that there is to human history by admitting that historians write in perspectives that, if they contradict one another, of course, then it isn't just perspectivism. But it's the fact that histories are going to be written from different viewpoints and this is not something to be found fault with.

There are, then, there can be different senses in which the word 'perspectivism' is used. It can be used in a broad sense to refer to any case in which different historians treat the same matter differently. But that's not properly the meaning of perspectivism. Its proper and specific meaning is

that it does not refer to differences that arise from human fallibility. It does not refer to differences arising from personal inadequacy. It does not refer to history as ongoing process that further data will correct. It means, first of all, that the historian is finite in his information, in his understanding, in his judgment. It's because he's finite that there has to be selection. If he had unbounded information, unlimited understanding, and so on, there would be just one history, and it would express the unequivocal objective structures of the past. But that's the sort of history that cannot be written. Secondly, because the historian is finite, he's bound to select. The process of selecting is a process in the commonsense type of understanding. It's not, as in the sciences, a type of understanding that can be objectified in a system and put under systematic control. And thirdly, this process of selecting will depend upon the concrete education and development and milieu of the historian. As those things change, the way in which the selection is performed will vary. So it's the necessity of selection and the source of the selection is the variable difference of one individual from another.

Many ask, then, is history not a science but an art? And Collingwood, in *The Idea of History*, points out three differences between historical narrative and fiction. First of all, historical narrative places its events in determinate – locates them in space and in time. While the novel will locate them in space and time, still the location will usually be fictitious. Secondly, all historical narratives must be compatible with one another, but novels do not have to be compatible. They can be quite contradictory. And thirdly, historical narrative is justified at every point by evidence, and fiction, if it does introduce any evidence, the evidence itself is part of the fiction. So there are three differences. On the other hand, history differs from natural science insofar as its object is partly constituted by meaning and value.

Further, while it has a method, while its method will give similar results if it's applied from similar standpoints, still it is not subject to the same type of control as natural or even human science. All discovery is an accumulation of insights, and the historian has that just as much as the scientist. But there are differences in the expression and the checking and the advance. The differences in the expression: the historical narrative is particular, the interpretation of a text is with regard to that particular text. It depends upon not a set of assumptions that are explicitly formulated, as in maths and science, but on the previous development of the historian. It can be checked by having another historian go over the same field, but it's not going to be refuted by a different fact in a different field. But you can have validation of the scientist's work by having a universal law checked in every instance.

[Horizons]

Sir Lewis Namier has described a historical sense as 'an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen.' He was referring, of course, to the case in which such intuitive understanding is the fruit of historical study, but our present concern with horizons directs our attention to the prior understanding that the historian derives not from historical study but from other sources.

On this topic Carl Becker wrote. His topic was Bernheim's rule that a fact can be established by the testimony of at least two independent witnesses not self-deceived. And his question was, Do historians consider witnesses to be self-deceived, not because they were emotionally excited or had poor memories or anything like that, but because the statements they made were impossible from the historian's point of view? In other words, do

historians have preconceptions that affect the history that they write? And Becker affirmed undoubtedly they do. Whatever historians are independent of, detached from, it is not the climate of opinion of their day; that is what they express.

This open acknowledgment that historians have preconceived ideas is in accord not only with Becker but also with what we have said about horizons and meaning. Each of us lives in a world mediated by meaning, and that world mediated by meaning involves basic options. The historian is engaged in extending his world mediated by meaning. His questions regard not only matters of detail but also principles, issues, options. Take, for example, the question, Can miracles happen? If for the historian miracles are impossible, what does he do with witnesses testifying to miracles as matters of fact? He must either reconstruct his world, reconstruct his basic options, or else say these people must have been deceived; they can't be giving him the facts. And reconstructing one's world mediated by meaning is a large operation; you don't do it overnight. And most of us handle the knife gingerly and clumsily. It is far easier to say that these people must have been self-deceived than to reorganize one's apprehension of the world. Becker in *Detachment and the Writing of History* urged that Hume's argument did not prove that no miracles had ever occurred. Its real thrust was that the historian cannot deal intelligently with the past when the past is permitted to be unintelligible to him. If certain things are going to be intelligible to him and other things unintelligible, well there is no room for people who testify to miracles in a world in which miracles are impossible. And, he said, what holds for questions of fact also hold for questions of interpretation. There is still religion in the twentieth century but it doesn't make medieval asceticism intelligible. It is much more convenient to speak of monasteries as places

where pilgrims were housed and marsh land was reclaimed than to go into the sort of life these people really did live, because that is more easily explained today in terms of pathology.

Becker's contention that historians operate in the light of preconceived ideas, and that they can't help it, implies a rejection of the Enlightenment and Romantic ideal of presuppositionless history. To say that the historian should operate without presuppositions is to assent to the principle of the empty head and to strip the historian of his historicity. He is a historical being, a product of a given place and time and environment, and if you want to eliminate that you bring him back to his infancy or you give him a lobotomy or something.

It was Newman who remarked, apropos of Descartes's methodic doubt, that it would be better to believe everything than to doubt everything. Universal doubt leaves us with no basis for advance. We must allow historians to be educated, socialized, even though this will involve them in error. They write in the light of all they know or think they know, or unconsciously take for granted. History written with such presuppositions may result in different notions of history, different methods of historical investigation, incompatible standpoints, irreconcilable histories. What are needed are methods such as we will attempt in dialectic and foundations to deal with these contradictory histories. But we cannot expect the technique of the functional specialty 'history' to eliminate these difficulties, because they do not arise on the level of doing history, they arise on the level of horizon, and they are solved by things like conversion.

[Heuristic Structures]

A final section on heuristic structures; it is a series of particular questions. Has the historian philosophic commitments? If you mean by philosophy every book that has been written on the subject and the historian trying to make his way through that labyrinth, certainly not. But if you understand by philosophy the set of real conditions of the possibility of historical inquiry: the human race, remains from its past, the community of historians, their intentional operations especially insofar as they occur in historical investigation, then the historian has involvement in a philosophy. He need not know it. You can speak good French without knowing you are speaking prose as Mr. Jourdain did. And similarly the historian can do good history without knowing what precisely his operations are. But, de facto, there is a relation to philosophy.

Does the historian employ analogies? It's said that the historian has to understand the past in the light of the present. Collingwood remarked that the fact that the Ancient Greeks and Romans limited their population by exposing infants is not thrown in doubt because that lies outside the experience of the author of the *Cambridge Ancient History*. The past does not have to be similar to the present. You can do a certain amount of historical work in terms of the present and present experience, but you can learn from your history, from historical works, that the past was different and in what way it did differ. So if one says there must be similarity or there cannot be dissimilarity one is proceeding in terms of an assumption. But insofar as he is proceeding in the light of the evidence and the possibility of the ecstatic character of historical investigation, you can get into the past.

Do historians use ideal types? The idea of the ideal type or the model was introduced into sociology by Max Weber, I believe. But Marrou asks about it in history. And he says that it can be useful, and it must not be

mistaken for a description. And the tendency is that on the thousand lines that cross one another in the historical reality, it marks off one with a red pencil. So don't exaggerate its importance; it can be helpful, but it is not history; it can help you uncover evidence and so on, but it can become simply a machine for failing to see what's there.

Does the historian follow some theory of history? By a theory of history I understand a theory that goes beyond a scientific, philosophical, or theological basis to make statements about the actual course of human events. For instance the theory set forth by Bruce Mazlish in his discussion of the great speculators from Vico to Freud in *The Riddle of History*, New York, 1966. The historical theory present the values of grand-scale ideal types. They emphasize certain aspects of reality and overlook others. The function of the historian is to fill out the picture.

Does the historian explain? The 19th century had a distinction — I think from Dilthey — between *erklären* and *verstehen*. And the question is, What kind of a science is it that does not explain but merely understands? The sciences explain, the historian merely understands. It is a rather artificial distinction; it fits in with the narrower sense of understanding that you have in the German *verstehen*. In fact, both the historian and the scientist understand; both of them express their understanding in words, in concepts and words, but the scientific expression is systematic, in terms of universal principles and laws; the historical is a narrative of particular events about particular persons.

Does the historian determine laws, study causes? He doesn't determine laws because laws are universal; he investigates causes if by cause you understand a statement in which the word 'because' occurs, but not if you understand by cause some idea of cause developed within a science.

Is the historian devoted to social and cultural goals? Remotely, yes. Proximately, no. Insofar as he is in a functional specialty, he is out to ascertain what was going forward; that's his job. And insofar as some ulterior goal is guiding him the results are apt to be distorted.

Is history value free? It is value free insofar as the proper object of the functional specialty is *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, what really happened. And that is the important thing for the historian, as I am now considering him, to attain. The more adequate the encounter with the past, the more fruitful it can prove to be. It doesn't become more fruitful by the historian being concerned with values but by his giving us the facts and then we can go on the values. The task of passing judgments on the values offered us by the past pertains to the further specialties of dialectic and foundations. On the other hand, the historian does not refrain from making value judgments. Any one of the specialties involves the four elements of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The historian has to make decisions about his methods, about his procedures, and so on, and decisions presuppose values.

Do historians know, or do they believe? They do not believe in the sense in which precritical history is a matter of believing credible testimonies; history is not a matter of belief in that sense. As Collingwood quite rightly says, the historian is autonomous. While he will depend on other historians, still, history as a whole rises from the data in the light of criteria provided by the historian's own understanding of his job.

[Science and Scholarship]

Finally, to give a name to the type of work done by historians and interpreters and research for interpretation and history, I suggest we use the word 'scholarship' as distinct from the word 'science.' Let general truths be handled by the scientists; and the sort of particular knowledge that has not the same type of control and that we have been dealing with in these last lectures on interpretation and history, give it the name 'scholarship,' and you will avoid an awful lot of useless disputation that is going on. You will find all sorts of examples of it in Patrick Gardiner's *Theories of History*; it has a terrific bibliographies with all sorts of points of view represented; and you can cut through the difficulties there with the distinction between science and scholarship.