

existence of an external world, etc., etc. Once, more, this is ignoratio elenchi. In asking for the foundation of realism, one is not asking whether some vague and unspecified type of realism is true, and one is not taking into consideration every possible argument that can be adduced for that truth. The question of foundations is a highly technical. Deliberately it restricts the whole issue to an extremely narrow, awkward, and difficult field by asking simply and solely for the prior, known, sufficient, and necessary ground of the correspondence of true judgements to reality. Its purpose is precisely to eliminate merely vague and general accounts of knowledge and of reality and, as well, the intrusion of mere guess-work that too often turns valid generalities into

the existence of an external world, etc., etc. Once more, we are confronted with an ignoratio elenchi. The question of foundations is highly technical. It does not ask whether some vague and unspecified type of realism is true. It does not consider every type of argument even for a very precisely conceived type of realism. It restricts its attention only to precisely formulated accounts both of knowledge and of reality and, with respect to each, it asks the most awkward and difficult questions that can be devised. Finally, its purpose is to determine what exactly is the truth of the matter.

Now, of course, there do exist many excellent people that do not see why one should bother about the exact truth, why one should not be content with a vague and unspecified realism, why one should distinguish different kinds of argument to attend to one kind and disregard others. Until they do see why, they had best not bother their heads about the question of foundations.

There exist further excellent people that will argue (1) that the question of foundations

First, then, it might be thought that the foundation of realism lies, not in the subject and his acts, but in the reality of things. But this is ignoratio elenchi. The reality of things is a necessary condition for a correspondence between things and true judgements about things. But the reality of things is not a sufficient ground for

existence of an external world, etc., etc. But, once more, this is ignoratio elenchi. One has only to revert to the account we have given of the notion of a foundation to observe that