Notes from an Introductory Lecture on the Philosophy of History by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (These notes were taken from a tape-recording of a lecture given by Lonergan on September 23, 1960; they have not been corrected by Lonergan.)

The subject I have tonight is on the one hand enormous and complex and on the other hand one in which one very easily gets one's feet off the ground and in which it is particularly difficult to say anything much in an introductory lecture. I don't know whether I shall be able to present basic questions but I shall try to do something about basic notions, and I have divided what I have to say into three topics: first of all, history; secondly, philosophy of; and thirdly, philosophy of history.

By history two quite different things can be meant: the history that is written, and the history that is written about. My first point is history that is written -- history as a subject, as a specialized field of inquiry, investigation, research; marked by the product of procedures and by accumulative results (later historians use the work of earlier ones); as a process of proposition, publication, criticism, and use, doing the same thing over and over again. This is a field of knowledge that is developed and sustained by the academic process of libraries, teachers, pupils, classes, and degrees. Now history in that sense (history of Canada, history of England, history of Europe) history that is history of can be divided perhaps into three types, and the division, as we will see later, already takes us into the question of the philosophy of history. This is because the methodology of history is not quite historic (while the history of the methodology of history would be an historical question, the methodology of history itself is not historic). I will speak first of occasional history (very briefly on that); second, of technical history, which is the more solid of the work being done; thirdly, of explanatory history, which tries to get off the ground.

Occasional History. Herodotus wrote his nine books on why the Persians fought the Greeks. Thucydides wrote to say what the Peloponnesian War was. He is supposed to have been influenced by the biological, the medical concepts of his time; he was doing a report on the diagnosis. Livy wrote on what was the virtue and glory of Rome. Gibbon wrote on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. All of these are historical works bearing on particular issues.

Technical History. History as a scientific subject had its principal development in the 19th century, say, since Ranke; and I will try to suggest the notion of technical history. History begins as belief -- the historian is not at all places at all times. He does not see and hear everything; he needs the reports of other people; and he takes the word of others for what happened elsewhere and at other times. There can arise conflicting testimonies; and in a conflict between what the witnesses say and what he the historian believes could really happen, there will arise a critique of witnesses, what they could know, how accurate their knowledge is likely to be, how truthful they are, or whether they have ulterior motives, and so forth. However, as Collingwood points out in a fable in his The Idea of History, the

historian need not be simply a believer. He composed a detective story in which all the witnesses were lying, and all the clues were planted, and yet the detective could figure what really happened. He wasn't believing any of the witnesses, he wasn't trusting any of the clues, yet he could determine just what happened, who was the criminal, etc. And with that point reached, history turns over from a collection of beliefs to something analogous to an empirical science. It is concerned not with testimonies, but, if I may use the word of Professor Renier, with "traces". Everything that exists in the present and had its origins in the past constitutes a trace of the past. It may be a document, it may be anything else in the way of ruins, buildings, coins, descriptions, folkways, traditions, and so forth. All that comes from the past into the present is so much raw material. To the historian, it is data, it constitutes data, and as a datum it is valid. It is irrelevant as yet whether it is going to be classified as something truthful or a lie, a genuine moment of the past or a fake. That will depend upon how we classify it, what period it will be attributed to, what value will be placed upon it. All of that will depend upon the judgment of the historian. Just as the physicist considers all the colors he sees in the spectroscope, and all the measurements obtained, and so on, as so much data in which he seeks an understanding and as the start of the hypothetical-deductive process; so, in a somewhat similar fashion, the historian is not simply a believer of what other people have told him, a shrewd believer sizing things up, accepting some, discounting others; but something like a scientist seeking an understanding of all the traces of the past that are existing into the present.

That understanding reached by the historian is a thing that develops as do the empirical sciences. If one historian interprets the data a certain way, another, by pointing to data that have been overlooked or misinterpreted, can challenge his conclusions and set up a new view on the subject which can be a progressively improving interpretation of what happened in the past. However, it differs from the empirical sciences in two ways. First of all, historical understanding is not of general laws; it is of the particular and the concrete. Consequently, following upon this first difference, it is not possible for the historian to check his understanding of this case by appealing directly to other cases. If the physicist says that the ratio between the angle of incidence and the angle of refraction of a ray of light is some constant in this particular case, then he can appeal to all similar cases to check his interpretation, his account of the phenomena. The historian is interpreting just this particular case; other cases may all differ; he has not got that type of a check as the empirical scientist does. On the other hand, he does have something similar insofar as the historical interpretation of a period, of all the particular cases in a given section of space-time, have to present something of a coherent picture (an interpretation of one set of events has to be able to fit in with another closely related set of events); so there is a fair analogy between the understanding the historian seeks of the traces of the past, and, on the other hand, the procedure of the empirical scientist. That type of historical work I venture to call technical history. It differs from the earlier history that was largely a matter of sizing up of

witnesses (I don't want to simplify too much what the earlier people did, but history in the 19th century became largely a systematic use of methods somewhat of that type; the full consciousness of methodology is not possible to develop now, and I am giving you a schematic view only. To go through the historians of the 19th century and say what each one did and what the strong point of each one was would require a whole course). But I think it hits off fairly well what took place and I want to insist that that is a fundamental element in historical work and something of real value. It has its limitations (we'll go into that later) but I want you to get the point that there is an interlocking of the traces of the past that yields an understanding, and that understanding is going to be independent of the philosophic, the religious, the national, and all the other limitations of the individual who happens to be the historian. I shall illustrate it not from general history but from the history of doctrine, by a case of work of my own.

I wrote a series of articles in Theological Studies (1941-42) on "operative Grace in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas" and can use it to illustrate the interlocking of data on this subject. First of all, there was a German by the name of Arthur Landgraf, later a bishop, who investigated the doctrine of grace throughout the 12th and early 13th centuries. The whole movement of thought is tabulated in a long series of articles by this Arthur Landgraf. There was another series of articles by Dom Lautin on the conceptions and the development of the notions of freedom from St. Anselm to St. Thomas. And that provided me with the set-up, what the situation was when St. Thomas started writing. Now there were three places in which St. Thomas explicitly discussed operative grace and he had three different views on the subject in the three places. Successively these were: the Sentences, of his youth; the De Veritate, a few years later; and the Summa, towards the end of his life. Three entirely different views, fundamentally different views on the subject! Concomitantly with this difference in his views on operative grace, there were changes in his view of what Pelagianism consisted in. The notion of Pelagianism is very closely related to the notion of grace. There were developments in his notions on operative grace and on God's operation on the will, developments in his notion of the will itself, and developments in his notion of liberty; and all these developments were not just single strands; they all tied together; you could almost see him think. Now that work does not give an absolutely certain conclusion about just where St. Thomas was when he finished writing on the subject, what exactly were his views, just what aspect tied them down. But the movement itself and the interlocking of the data provide an understanding of St. Thomas as thinking, as developing, as changing his opinions, that is extremely difficult to interpret in different ways. (I give that as an illustration of the meaning of what I conceive as technical history.)

On the other hand, technical history has its weakness. That type of interlocking of the data is not a thing that can be applied along the whole historical continuum. There are points at which that technique can be applied; but there are equally the lacunae, and the lacunae can occupy many more places than the points. Consequently,

there remains a permanent temptation for the historian to fill in the blanks, and there is a fundamental problem in historical method with regard to these periods in which there are some data, but not enough to give you the interlocking of a whole series of considerations that pins down the meaning of the event. Butterfield (I am not sure whether he says this in his book on Christianity and History) takes the stand that history is a limited undertaking. We do what we can, we don't undertake to answer all questions; and that is pretty much the common sense of the historian. He will integrate his various degrees of confidence in the exactitude of what he is saying, point out that he is not quite sure of that, and so forth. One does not hesitate to say one does not know, is not sure. A second view is relativism. Now this is an extremely large doctrine. I will just take a single and rather simple example of it, using one of the set of papers presented to Ernst Cassirer on his 60th birthday; the set of papers was entitled Philosophy and History, was edited by Dr. Klibansky and first published by the Clarendon Press in 1936, then republished by Harper Torchbooks in 1963. If I remember rightly, the first essay was by Huizinga ("A Definition of the Concept of History") and his definition was that history is a people interpreting to itself its past. But the people of today who do the interpreting are not the people who did the interpreting fifty years ago, and much less of a hundred years ago, and so on. There are several histories. This relativism can come out in many ways. You can have the English history of England, the French history of England, the German history of England, and they are not all three exactly the same. And similarly, you can have several other combinations, and the possibility of that arises insofar as history is not simply the strict technical history, insofar as it fills in the blanks or holes, or leans rather heavily on possibilities and probabilities that depend a good deal upon the subject who is writing the history.

Now a third attitude comes out in Rudolph Bultmann. He distinguishes between understanding and pre-understanding, Verständnis and Vorverständnis. The understanding, the Verständnis, is this interlocking of the data, although he expresses himself somewhat differently. But the pre-understanding, the Vorverständnis, is a philosophy, and his philosophy for interpreting the New Testament is Heidegger's. I think he has the better part of the argument against the less sophisticated New Testament scholars, insofar as they say that he is using a philosophy to interpret the New Testament. "But so are you," he says, "I know what my philosophy is; yours is just a set of unconscious assumptions. I am making it quite plain to people what I am presuming. You are unconsciously, perhaps deliberately, but then you are just trying to fool them, padding off your assumptions without letting them know." It is again a case of the interlocking of the data; give one, take one, so far, but the questions that are raised about history, and especially about a history such as the New Testament, are not easily settled in that manner. The historian's view of human nature, of human destiny, plays a fundamental role in the selection, first of all, of the field that he studies (Why is he interested in the New Testament?), in the way he goes about it, in the types of thought he appeals to to illuminate the New Testament, in the selection of topics, and so on. I suppose there is no element

in history that is studied with such intensity and such terrific flow of volumes during the past century as all that is concerned with the New Testament. It's an overworked field in many ways.)

But there is very clearly in the New Testament, taken as an historical document, the problem of how far does our understanding of the text take us, and how much does that understanding of the text depend upon other factors. And finally, of course, there is the naive approach, unaware of the issue. People have their own minds, and that is good common sense. When the other fellow's assumptions begin to appear and reveal differences of interpretation, well, he's wrong. But they have not too much consciousness that they are doing the same sort of thing themselves. So much for technical history.

Explanatory History. Technical history, I said, had a clear assimilation to empirical science, but there is a very important and a very fundamental difference methodologically, and we have been heading to that difference in our discussion, for example, of Bultmann.

In empirical science the most conspicuous part is the work of observation, of measurement, of collecting measurements, putting them on a graph, curve fitting, finding a formula; but that is (shall I call them insights?) simply the lower blade of the method. The method is a pair of scissors, and it has not only a lower blade, but also an upper blade, and the two come together. Galileo proceeded from falling bodies, falling from the leaning tower of Pisa, and bodies sliding down inclined planes. He also had an upper blade: the understanding of nature was going to fit into Euclidean geometry. That general assumption was just as much a determinant of his results as the observations and measurements. Newton substitutes for Euclidean geometry a similar deductive science called mechanics. It was the matter of setting down definitions and axioms and deducing things like movement of bodies in central fields of force, discovering that bodies moved just as Kepler had found planets to move. Again, that mechanics was an upper blade that combined with the lower blades to give you empirical science. Later there came in the place of Newton's mechanics Einstein's relativity mechanics; and the quantum theory introduces notions of discontinuity and indeterminacy. But there is always operative an upper blade; and the same holds in the other empirical sciences. No, there is not just simply this matter of proceeding from the data; there is also always operative an upper blade, usually expressed in differential equations or something like that. Can the weakness of technical history, the problem of going beyond the sure points where the data interlock, of having a systematic type of bridgework between those strong points, those, as it were, piers, be achieved by the introduction of an upper blade into historical method?

Now, in particular fields that is not only possible, but achieved. If you think of such a subject as the history of mathematics, the history of physics, the history of chemistry, of astronomy, geology, biology, medicine, economics and so on, it is quite possible in such a limited field of history to write an explanatory history that goes beyond the interlocking points in the data and satisfies everyone.

And that is quite possible because there is a science of methematics, physics, chemistry, and so on, on which everyone agrees. You cannot write the history of mathematics unless you are a mathematician, you cannot write the history of medicine unless you are a medical doctor, and you also have to be a historian and know the techniques of the historian; but you have also to have this specialized knowledge and without it you would be lost. You would not be able to pick out what are relevant data to a history of the field unless you know the subject inside out. You would not be able to pick out what is significant, or when what is significant arose, or what section is fulfilling its promises immediately, and so on. A man who really understands his mathematics can write an extremely intelligible history of mathematics, and similarly for these other subjects. The whole thing can be put together as a whole, and you have operating in your method not only the lower blade that comes from the interlocking of the data but also the upper blade which is derived from the science at the present time. And that type of history, it too, is subject to revision. Insofar as mathematics or physics, and so on, will further develop, new points will become significant in the future that previously were not; and, similarly, insofar as new data come to light, you will have fuller data to connect your history. But it is a type of change; it isn't falling into a relativism of any sort, but rather it is the same sort of "subject to change" that is found in the empirical sciences themselves.

Now we go a little further into the complexity of the problem. We ask about the history of philosophy. A philosopher from the viewpoint of his philosophycan write an explanatory history of philosophy and he can fill in the lacunae. But another philosopher with a different philosophy can do the same thing, and you get different results because any philosophy will supply an upper blade if it is sufficiently developed, and it can take on a form of a philosophy of philosophies. Also, it can take on the task of fulfilling the function of an upper blade in the history of philosophy. The trouble is that there are many philosophies and the debate here obviously shifts. It is not to be settled so much by historical criteria as by the debate between the philosophies themselves.

A third type, one which contains the problem of relativism in reduced form, is illustrated by the problem of the history of philosophy, and a perfect complication arises when you come to the history of art, the history of a literature or literature, the history of religions. The further complication is not only that there are many types of religious belief, many types of literature, and so on (as there are many philosophies, the multiplicity of the philosophies is also reflected in the religions and the arts, cultures, and so on); but also because in this case there is a concreteness, a resistance to systematic conceptualization which is of the essence, as it were, of such subjects as mathematics, physics, and so on.

Now one comes to the final question on this point of explanatory history. There can be an upper blade for things like mathematics and medicine, and to get, as it were, unambiguous results -- you do not get the multiplicity of results -- you can write explanatory history;

you can complement techincal history with explanatory. Secondly, you can write explanatory history of philosophy and similar things,or of theology, but the trouble is that you get many histories because you have many different upper blades. History of art and culture introduces a further complexity in its concreteness. Can there be an upper blade for general history, history in the ordinary sense as contrasted with, say, a history of capitalism?

A contender for the position is sociology. Sociology is the study of human society at a given time and place, but this sociology over time should provide history with an upper blade, should do for history what the science of mathematics does for the history of mathematics. Something along that line was attempted by a sociologist, a Russian emigre, Sorokin. In the thirties he published four large volumes of Social and Cultural Dynamics. It is largely artistic, but deals also with several other types of things that he was classifying. What he was proving was the existence of a cycle, and it was applied to Hellenistic and Western culture extended over two thousand five hundred years. All I know about this work is that, to do a thing like this, you have to introduce categories like a field, etc., and Sorokin's categories were not properly sociological; rather, they were philosophic. His fundamental division was of cultures: were they sensate, idealistic, or ideational? (And those were his words.) They roughly correspong to Kierkegaard's three spheres of existential subjectivity, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious; and again, they correspond to the three spheres you get from Insight according as your emphasis is on experience, understanding, or judgment. What Sorokin really was doing was using rather philosophical categories and not sociological categories. Sociological categories would be something much more precise and would find an application (say of a cycle, if it were defined sociologically) without going over tremendous amounts of time. And, of course, in the human science it is quite a leap from the merely descriptive type of science in which you talk about things being heavy, hot, and so on, to the explanatory science in which you talk about mass (which is something quite distinct from weight) or temperature (but something quite distinct from being hot). And that, perhaps, in sociology is coming out at the present time in the work of Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structures (which the people at the Gregorian in Rome who are teaching sociology speak of as "the bible for sociologists"). Robert Merton seems to be introducing explanatory categories. Insofar as he is successful there perhaps will be from sociology a tool that will supply an upper blade. We will discuss that further in this course, and many questions will be raised.

Another illustration or contender as an upper blade in explanatory history is provided by Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History. What is history about? Is it like the history of Canada, or the history of England, or the history of Czechoslovakia? History, says Toynbee, is history of civilizations. The unit of study is the civilization. He pins the subject down to one subject, what he calls the civilization; he defines the civilization as a field of interdependence. You cannot write the history of Canada and prescind from the history of France

and England. You cannot write the history of a European country and prescind from the history of the neighboring Europeans. But you can write the history of modern Europe (great parts of it, anyway) and allow for merely incidental contacts between it and, say, China. And consequently there is here a norm of what he means by civilization -- the functional concept of the civilization. He uses this to say that there are many civilizations, and he makes a guess at the number. Each has its origin, its development, its breakdowns, its decline, its decay. There are relations in space and time between different civilizations, and finally, in his last four volumes (as less apparent than what he deals with in the first six) the push, the moving thing behind the whole business, behind the whole of history, is religion. There you have, taken out of historical study, a set of explanatory categories and a set of principal questions for the historian to deal with. Is there a similarity between that, does that stand to explanatory history as differential equations stand to physical theory, physical explanation? That is the question. Of course, I am not supposed to answer them all!

Now that is not the whole of Toynbee. There is so,ething else besides that fundamental conceptualization of what history is about: it is about civilizations' distinctive developments. This is supplemented by a set of humanistic categories. I spoke a moment ago about terms like weight, something heavy or hot, and so on, and terms like mass, which can ultimately be defined only by relation to other masses, ultimately by the inverse square law of gravitation. And that is a step which is a purely theoretical type of conceptualization. Again, in Scholastic philosophy, your fundamental terms come out in pairs: potency and act, matter and form, substance and accident; and their meaning is contained in their relations to one another; you have a closed conceptual system. Now humanistic categories are not of that type. A large part of Toynbee's thinking is in categories drawn from the Greek tragedies, from Shakespeare's plays, and the bible, of course, and from Goethe. And it is a type of systematic conceptualization that has a meaning to the cultured westerner. But it is not a type of systematic conceptualization that you have in explanatory science. Another try along this line is Eric Voegelin. His Order and History has, so far, three volumes published -- after the mid-fifties -- by the Louisiana State University Press. He has since gone to Munich. Before that, in the early fifties, the University of Chicago Press published his New Science of Politics. In these works, the upper blade is a philosophy of man, a philosophy of man of the type that is not just tied down to Heidegger, but is very much in the movement in which you find Heidegger and historians of religion of the type of Mircea Eliade and Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), and so on.

Well, this discussion of history as a subject provides perhaps a step towards philosophy of history. I mentioned an occasional history, which we did not bother to analyze, to set up in opposition; technical history, which is very much down to earth, and very solid, but appeals to professors (it does not appeal so much to the pupil, and even less to the man on the street -- he wants meaningful answers to Questions). And, on the other hand, there is explanatory history,

which has a great appeal and is beset with very fundamental difficulties. The difficulty that has been most conspicuous is the problem of relativism. It becomes conspicuous in dated history -- 'was a fine historical work, but for 1850 or 1910; but it does not count any more' -- or national history, or history that is acceptable to people of certain philosophic convictions or of certain religious convictions -- Catholic history, Protestant history, Jewish history, history that will satisfy Arabs, an so on. That problem of relativism, and the possibility of surmounting it somewhat on the historical level, was raised in connection with the notion of explanatory history. I will now attempt briefly to handle my second topic, namely, philosophy of.

I began with history as a subject, spoke of occasional history, technical history, explanatory history; now we will move to the second topic, philosophy of.

One is asked to think traditionally of philosophy absolutely; philosophy is something, it is not of something else; philosophy is logic or epistemology, or ontology, or psychology, or cosmology, or ethics, or natural theology, or preferably, all put together; but it is that and nothing more or less. What is this philosophy of? Philosophy of history is one member of a species or genus. There is philosophy of nature, philosophy of science, philosophy of spirit, philosophy of man, philosophy of law, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, philosophy of art, philosophy of history. What is this "philosophy of"? It is a question that can be given a general answer very easily in traditional terms. (Philosophy (it is one case of a very explicit and deliberate etymology) means love of wisdom. It is a modest reply to the assertiveness of the sophists who proposed to hand out wisdom, while the philosophers had a lot more but did not think that they had got there yet. Wisdom is the ordering of all. And because it is an apprehension of universal order, it is also a potentiality of ultimate judgment. A judgment on anything has to take into account everything that is relevant to that point; and consequently ultimate judgments have to take into account everything. And consequently, wisdom is not only a principle of universal order, but also of ultimate judgment. But while wisdom as such is concerned with universal order and ultimate judgment, still it will of its very nature have application to particular fields. Precisely because it is universal and ultimate, it will have its participation in such fields as science, nature, spirit, art, law, education, religion, history; and so you have this "philosophy of".

The general answer is one thing, and the technique of setting up a "philosophy of", a philosophy that is so conceived that it automatically becomes a "philosophy of", is quite another. Philosophy can be, I would say, misconceived as a dam that flows across the river of life and thought rather than the bed in which the river flows. And what seems to me to have provoked that view of philosophy arises from taking the easy way of conceiving one's ownintellect, one's own intelligence, pretty much in the same way as one comes to know God. You know the methodological procedure in natural theology of coming to the concept of God. It is to begin from the effects and proceed by a method of analogy, of affirmation, negation, and eminence to a con-

cept of God. Man can proceed in exactly the same way to knowledge of his intelligence. There are the effects of intelligence in the sciences -- sciences in the sense of written books of science -- and in the use of common names, in intelligent products. And from that, one goes on, proceeding on the analogy that just as with our eyes we see, so there is a spiritual eye. And if we use common names, the spiritual eye looks at universals. And, since we have general principles, the spiritual eye sees the connections between these universals. And when it sees that connection, you have a universal and necessary truth of which you are absolutely certain. And when particular people might not be certain about it, still per se, of itself, it is certain. And while these truths, since they are universal and necessary, hold for all possible worlds, still there may be very many qualifications to be added on. But still per se they are true, and their being true is not being truth, which is formaliter in judicio (formally in the judgment), something that is in the mind; rather, the truths are "out there" too. Finally, the notion of system as a deduction from a set of principles. What system? Well, something like Euclid's Elements. You lay down axioms as definitions and then you proceed to deduce. If philosophy is conceived in that manner, it is going to be extremely difficult to get the type of wisdom that finds its applications in particular fields.

Let me handle very briefly the notion of system. If anyone reads St. Thomas, one notices no similarity to Euclidean procedure. He does not start from a set of definitions and axioms, and he never treats any question by giving one proof and writing off quod erat demonstrandum (what must be proven). But rather, he sets up an ordered series of questions and in the Summa Theologica he subdivides the questions into articles. In a work like the Summa Contra Gentiles in his ordered set of topics, he brings to bear on each not just one argument, but approximately twenty and the twenty are all different; but when you move to the next question, it is pretty much the same twenty coming up again in a somewhat different application; and so on. Now St. Thomas is systematic. In what does system consist? It consists in a basic set of operations that can be combined and recombined in various ways, and the various combinations are able to handle all the questions that arise. To conceive a system, then, involves a concept, a notion of system that is something far less static and abstract than this Euclidean deduction. Moreover, it is a notion of system that can be applied to very concrete, very human developments. It is the fundamental notion of Piaget's about twenty volumes on child psychology. Now if you conceive system -- a man has a system, he is thinking systematically, he is reaching systematic knowledge insofar as he is possessing a basic set of related operations -- then because the relations are related, the terms, the products of the operations will be related. Because the operations are related to one another, the operations can be combined in various ways. You can have all sorts of terms, all sorts of problems; and you will know exactly what the meaning is in each term because you know exactly what the operations are and what are the relations between them. Moreover, one has, as it were, the mastery of a field to which this group of operators is more or less the principle and intelligibility. Now philosophy can be conceived as a basic group of operations; and as an insight into what

that basic group of operations might be, you can take experiencing, understanding, and judging. The understanding can be differentiated and you can get different kinds of combinations of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

Now to the more difficult topic -- philosophy of history. To bring the two together is the problem. Let us take philosophy of history as reflection on history, philosophic reflection on history, a mutual illumination of philosophy and of history. And now history has to be understood in the twofold sense of the history that is written and the history that is written about: the history that is written about, historical process, the totality of human action or human actions; and again historicity, a rather difficult concept -- trying to translate the German geschichtlichkeit as a dimension of human reality. Insofar as one is concerned with the relations between philosophy and history that is written, our first topic was largely engaged in doing this. I was using my own philosophic categories to clarify notions of history as a science, its problems, and its possibilities. The indications of the distinctions among occasional, technical, and explanatory history came right out of notions of what the nature of human understanding is as developed in Insight. There is a further point insofar as, just as metaphysics is conceived in Insight as the integrating subject, just as the notion of being is conceived as the notion that underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond all other notions, so metaphysics is, as it were, the science of fundamental inquiry. This inquiry is broken up into the inquiries of the several sciences. It is an inquiry that also criticizes the inquiry of the several sciences. It is an inquiry that also ciriticizes the result of those inquiries and integrates them and goes beyond them. So too, there is, from that view of metaphysics, a connection with history. Insofar as the historian is operating in the light of a philosophy, he can deal with concepts and raise questions that men are interested in even though those concepts and questions do not pertain to a specialized notion of history (such notions as the good, what is right, what is wrong, etc.). Again, insofar as you conceive your "philosophy of" as the basic group of operations, experiencing, understanding, judging, what would be true about those operations and their products again will all be true of the operations conducted by the historian: qua experiencing the traces now existing from the past, his understanding them, and passing judgments. And that conception of "philosophy of" on the one hand involves no intrusion into the specific procedures, the autonomy of the historian qua historian; and at the same time, it faciliates either his or his critics' discussion of the fundamental notions involved, and the valuation of his mode of conceiving them and the relation of his work to other works. Again, that philosophic background makes it possible to relieve the historian of problems that really do not bother him. (The historians have been greatly troubled by the problem of relativism, and this has been rather pronounced since large numbers of them were expelled from Nazi Germany, and they could not say, "Well, one opinion is just as good as another; they are all just so many opinions." Experience was a little too deep for that. Particularly notable is Karl Mannheim who did his work especially on the sociology of knowledge.)

However, what I wish to communicate in the time that remains are certain fundamental notions that arise when reflection on history -- on the history that is written about -- occurs on the philosophic level. It is said, or Hegel said it himself, that he (Hegel) transferred philosophy from the substance to the subject; Spinoza wrote about the substance, he wrote about the subject. And the notion of the subject is a difficult notion to get hold of. One is not a subject, though one is a substance, when one is asleep and not dreaming. If one starts to dream, one becomes a subject, though a subject of an inferior type. But when one wakes up, one is much more of a subject; one is an empirical subject, a subject of acts of sense, seeing, hearing, and so on. If one inquires, understands, a new dimension emerges in consciousness; one is not only an empirical, but also an intelligent subject: If one questions one's understanding; proceeds to judge, one becomes, one takes on the further dimension of, the rational subject. When one comes to making a decision or choice, the choice involves not only the chosen, but the chooser; and one is in the final level of the human subject, the self-conscious subject. What is the subject? The subject is what is known in consciousness, it is a term that, as it were, involves a leap from such metaphysical terms as substance and subsistence which are defined and are verified independently of whether the subject is conscious or not. The subject is this substance inasmuch as he is known by consciousness; and not only is the subject known by consciousness, but it is constituted qua subject by consciousness. It is when one moves from the level of thinking to another level that there is a discontinuity, and I was talking about the notion of the subject to illustrate that discontinuity. We are always substances, but we are only subjects when we are awake, and we are subjects in different degrees according to what type of activity is going on inside us. Now just as man is subject known and constituted by consciousness, so also man is known and constituted in his humanity by historicity, by the historical dimension of his reality. That notion is the one that happens to be receiving all sorts of attention this century. From the thought of Martin Heidegger there has radiated -- often with decreasing degrees of dependence -- a whole series of illuminations and transformations in previous ways of thinking of things. The notion goes back much further than Heidegger, but an illustration of it is the application of Heidegger's existentialism to depth psychology; and I will try to use a paper by Ludwig Binswanger on (I think the title of it is The Dream) the dream and existence (cf. Traum und Existenz, 1930). He distinguishes two types of dreams: the dream of the night, which is more largely determined by somatic influences, and the dream of the morning, in which the existent is shaping himself and his world. Consciousness is such that there is always a subject conscious of something and the range of things the subject is conscious of is the horizon. Now the dream of the morning is a symbolic, incipient, positing of the subject and his world; and that world is not just a world of objects; it is a world in which the subject is acting; and because this human acting is determined, conditioned, by the historical developments of the past and a contribution to what the immediate future is to be, you also have its historicity in the very constitution of the subject. To try to get hold of this notion from a slightly different angle, or perhaps, to carry the point a step further, a person suffering from amnesia does not know who he

is. If I were to forget that I was a Jesuit, a priest, a professor of theology, and so on, my possible activities must be entirely out of conformity with what I am. My memory of myself is constitutive, a fundamental determinant of what I do. And if you generalize, if a people were to forget themselves as a people, if all Canadians were to have amnesia insofar as they are Canadians, then Canada would no longer exist, and the same is true of any other people. There is an existential memory, and that is constitutive of the people qua people, just as there is an existential memory constitutive of a personality qua personality. Again, the history of a people is an account, an interpretation of what the people were; but what the people were was their own self-interpretation. A man is not just a thing. He is what he does. What he says, what he works for, is all a function of his experience, his accumulated experience, understanding, judgment, his mentality, his way of thinking, what he approves of and what he disapproves of, what he wants and does not want. His mental activities are the main determinants of all his actions, and his mental activities include an interpretation, an idea of what he himself is and what he is for -- his nature and destiny. And as this is true of the individual, so also it is true of the group. The historian in writing the history of the people, in interpreting what the people were, is not the first to step into the field of interpretation. There is an understanding that was constitutive of the history that is written about, not only the understanding of the historian. And so history becomes an objectification of the existential memory of the people, of the self-interpretation. Just as drama is an objectification, a symbolization of human life in some aspect or some situations, so on a more fundamental level you could say that all living in a sense is drama, people dealing with people and things. And that more fundamental drama is the more fundamental objectification in civilization of what, more fundamentally, more originally, the person is. In that way, one has a comparison between drama and history -- as though drama, as it were, is a pre-historical, more simple type of history, of objectification, and criticism of the way that people live; while history is a fuller, more ample, more reflective drama. Now what I have been trying to do is to suggest this notion of historicity; but it is a very difficult notion to get hold of. On the other hand, it is a field of very fruitful reflections on the nature and significance of history.

I cannot carry this notion any further. I will go on to another notion that emerges on the level of philosophic reflection on history. The notion is dialectic. After the beginning of the decade, Joseph Morrow wrote a very small book on Idealism and Realism in Plato, and its final paragraph ended up with a statement from Blondel, De l'Action (1893), in which Blondel stated that a fully coherent idealism ends by eliminating all the differences that separate it from realism. It is the statement that one type of philosophy, if fully coherent, if worked out to the end, becomes another. And there you have a fundamental opposition between what I call positions and counter-positions. Positions express the dynamic structure of the subject qua intelligent and qua reasonable. Counter-positions contradict that structure. Whenever a person is explicitly affirming -- presenting or affirming -- a counter-position, he is involved in a queer type of contradiction. The contradiction is not between statements that he makes; the con-

tradiction is between the statements that he makes and the subject that he is. He is intelligent and reasonable and purports to be intelligent and reasonable, and he would not admit any fall from intelligence or reasonableness. Yet, the implications of the one, the real consequences, so to speak, of the one, and the implications of the other, which are in a conceptual field, or a judicial field of conceptions or judgments, are in conflict. Such a conflict tends to work its way out in one way or another. It sets up a tension and it is a principle of movement; and that, to my mind, is a fundamental instance of what is meant by dialectic. It is in the concrete, it involves tension and opposition, and it is a principle of change; and the change is not so much or not merely in the statements; it will also be in the subject who comes to a fuller realization, a fuller appropriation of what he himself really is. The effect of the dialectic is not merely a matter of straightening out the sentences and affirming the ones that are true and denying the ones that are false. A person can be affirming propositions that are true but misinterpreting them; and you cannot correct what is wrong with him by telling the right ones, because he is always going to bring in the misinterpretation. There is a more fundamental step: the development in the subject himself through the dialectic. Now that dialectic goes on, not merely within the individual. Platonic dialectic was dialogue. There was ruled out eristic, i.e., argument for argument's sake -- the man in the deserted village, though vanquished, could still argue; eristic dialectic -- that was eliminated. But let the argument have its run, let it have its free course, and things will come to light that we had not thought of before. The Platonic dialogue was a concrete, group use of dialectic in that individual sense. The individual will make his statements and another individual will state what his subject really is, in an implicit manner no doubt, but there is here another example of dialectic.

A third, what Aristotle called dialectic, was reviewing the opinions of all the people that discussed the question before him; and there you have the dialogue put out into time. But what goes on in the subject, what goes on in the dialogue, what goes on in the development of opinions on a single question, that also has relevance to the total field of human development; and that is history. Now that notion of development has come to notice today. It is a little hard to describe it; there has been both Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. Think of Hegel's account in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the master-slave relations. It is a beautiful piece of work. It describes the initial situation where you have a master who is really master and the slave who is really slave. But time goes on and the master becomes more and more dependent upon the slave and the roles become more reversed. And that is an illustration of the notion of development of situations working themselves out to their consequences. But that notion of dialectic has been plunged into the problem of the interpretation, the grand scale interpretation of history on the philosophic level; and that is very much a problem of our time. The Liberals -- the Enlightenment and then the Liberals -- had a doctrine, an interpretation of history in terms of progress. Things were getting better and better. The Marxists had an interpretation of history in terms of what they call the materialistic dialectic, i.e., of history, and which has

become their interpretation of human reality in Russia and in China; and it seems to be accepted there in all seriousness as the correct view of this world and what its meaning is and what it is about. We have had others of these grand scale interpretations of history. Another example is Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century, which is the interpretation of history behind the Nazi movement. There is very definitely a problem here. Christopher Dawson in a recent book, The Historic Reality of Christian Culture (1958), speaks of these movements as going on and of the Christians as having very little influence because of the largely passive attitudes. And Eric Voegelin in his New Science of Politics suggests, perhaps does more than suggest, that the Christian view of this world, as awaiting for the second coming of Christ, left a vacuum of meaning in that merely day-to-day aspect of human living, which these modern philosophies of history are attempting to fill. When they fill it, they obtain the stupendous results, the stupendous influence over human life in all its aspects, that are illustrated by 19th century progressivism -- it goes on well into this century -- and the influence of Marx at the present time.

A third notion is of stages. Most of you are familiar from the study of the New Testament and the Old Testament with the difference between the Greek and Hebrew mentality. The difference is essentially that the Greek view of man and the Greek's apprehension of himself was more differentiated than that of the Hebrew. In the cultured Greek there was the difference between intellect and sense, between apprehension and appetition, between appetito and choice. These were differences that were very clear and explicit. The Hebrew thinks of man more compactly, as a whole. Anterior to both the Greek and the Hebrew is the emergence of individualism. A primitive tribe is not a group of individuals, each of whom thinks and judges and decides. The thinking, judging, and deciding is a community operation; and Karl Jaspers, in a very stimulating book on The Origin and Goal of History (about 1949), places this emergence of individualism, of individual responsibility and individual judgment, in the period between 800 and 200 B.C., in China, India, Persia, in Israel with the prophets, and in Greece with the sophists and the philosophers and the tragedians.

In order to do the historical work of extending history back into the relatively primitive, or to understand the differences of the earlier and later civilizations, there is needed some exact knowledge of that differentiation, that movement from the undifferentiated consciousness, the primitive, to the later and fuller differentiation of consciousness (and also with some understanding of the problem of the primitives in our own days; in our own mass societies, the public reversion to the primitives), and one has to draw upon philosophic concepts, the difference between the high civilizations of Babylon, Egypt, the Indus, the Mayas, the Incas . . . They possessed first of all large states; they carried on enormous engineering projects; and they knew mathematics, and so on. But there fundamental thinking had not broekn through the mythical type of consciousness, in which the simple, naive, the name of reality, the symbol, the exact conception, and so on, are all pretty much of a blur. The understanding of that primitive, and then in the times of troubles following those civilizations, this breaking forth of individualism is rather convincingly

put forth in that book by Jaspers. And this is, again, another aspect of that notion of historicity I was trying to communicate earlier, namely, if differentiated consciousness itself is a product of the historic process, it becomes evident in a particularly clear way that there is a dimension of human nature contained in historicity itself. (Think of Heidegger's famous title, Sein und Zeit; Being and Time.) Further illuminations, further types of questions, projected into history from philosophic reflections, regard the notion of the good and the problem of evil. In a rather celebrated fantasy satire, 1066 and All That, the history of England was recounted in terms of 108 good things. What is the good? The position of a developed philosophic notion of the good is extremely relevant to the questions the historians get asked, whether they want them or not; and that type of question, if you want to go into it -- what the philosophic notion of the good is -- well, it is considered in chapter 18 of Insight, and also how it ties in with the notion of history. It is the sort of thing that can be left for the discussions of the year, if anyone is interested in it; and similarly, the soteriological issue is raised in the twentieth chapter of Insight.

As I am a theologian, I should be probably asked, "But what about the theology of history?" My answer very briefly would be that theology, insofar as it is a science and is systematic, follows a basic group of operations; that the basic group of operations are again experiencing, understanding, and judging; but that judging here is of a different type, involving beliefs; that the understanding has a new type of inverse insight because of the mysteries; but that, just as there is a basic philosophic set of operations, so it can go on to a specialization into a basic set of theological operations; and then one proceeds as before to have a mutual illumination of philosophy, theology, and history, just as one has of philosophy and history.

My illustrations have been largely one way, the illumination of history by philosophy; but it is very important to realize that it is a two-way street. All contemporary subjects are. Not only is there history as a specialized subject, but also the development, the presentation of any science or any subject at the present time has an historical dimension -- we have become historicized. "Truth is eternal in an eternal mind," according to St. Thomas; and our minds are not eternal. What is defined, qua defined, is as beautiful as a Platonic idea. But definitions arise at a determinate time. And the advance of science, the development that goes on in any science, involves the seriation of the concepts and the truths attained at any time over periods of time. The presentation of a subject at the present time is, briefly, four dimensional; and philosophy is no exception. There is a terrific development within philosophy itself, and again, within theology concerned with the development of dogma and the development of theology from history. If I have not touched upon those points -- and it is not that I should in any way wish to slight them -- I hope I have said something that will be of some use to this course during the coming year; and I think that we have about reached our limitations in time.