

Lecture Notes on Existentialism

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NOTES ON EXISTENTIALISM

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PART ONE: THE BASIC THEME OF EXISTENTIALISMI. GENERAL ORIENTATION

1. By "existentialism" we shall understand the types of method and doctrine exemplified by K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, Gabriel Marcel.

The name is admitted by Jaspers and Sartre; it was admitted for a while by Marcel who after Humani Generis and, perhaps, to disassociate himself from Sartre, rejected it; Heidegger says he is concerned with Ek-sistenz.

Jaspers is Kantian and Lutheran; Heidegger an apostate and agnostic; Sartre an atheist; Marcel a convert to Catholicism.

2. They are concerned with what it is to be a man, not in the sense of having a birth certificate, but in the sense employed by President Eisenhower last fall when, asked whether it was not risky to send the fleet into the Mediterranean during the Egyptian crisis, answered "We have to be men."

"Being a man" in the sense that results from a decision, is consequent to the use of one's freedom, makes one the sort of man one really is, involves risk (in the present instance, the risk of nuclear warfare and all that it implies).

3. It is anti-positivist: "being a man" is not any set of outer data to be observed, any set of properties to be inferred from the outer data, any course of action that can be predicted from the properties; it springs from an inner and "free" determination that is not scientifically observable.

It is anti-idealist: the various transcendental ego's are neither Greek nor barbarian, neither bound nor free, male nor female; they don't suffer, they don't die; we do.

Positivism and idealism have been major determinants in producing the contemporary world; in the measure that the contemporary world is found unsatisfactory or, frankly, disastrous, existentialism has a profound resonance.

Sein und Zeit quickly ran through five editions; Jaspers' Geistige Situation der Zeit was through five editions in about a year and has been translated into six languages including Japanese; Sartre was a cafe hero in Paris.

This contemporary resonance fits in with existentialist concern for time and for history.

Since "being a man" is not a fixed essence with which we are endowed from birth but the result of the use of our freedom, and further, since "being a man" is not a property that necessarily remains with us but is maintained by us precariously in the continuous use of freedom, "time" is an intrinsic and necessary component in "being a man". Hence, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Marcel's Homo Viator. However, concern with history on the grand scale appears only in Jaspers, e.g., Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte.

4. It is unconcerned with propositional truth and with what man's per se capacities for truth or anything else.

This unconcern arises in Heidegger, Sartre, from phenomenological concentration on the sources, grounds, whence spring concepts and judgments.

It arises in Jaspers from Kant who is believed to have shown that any objective statement deals only with appearance.

It arises in Marcel from his concern with being a good man as opposed to mere existence as a man, and the common attitude (buttressed by dissatisfaction with idealism) that technically correct propositions have little or nothing to do with what you really are.

In all, it arises from a turning away from the universal, necessary, abstract, per se, to the unique individual, the contingent, the concrete, the de facto.

Jaspers repeatedly insists that freedom is not definable; Sartre establishes the fact of freedom by asking whether you have been in the torture chamber with the Nazis and made the experiment of freedom by not giving you comrades away; none of them would dream of discussing "man" as what is common to mewling infants, people sound asleep, and the mature man facing a crisis in his life.

Gabriel Marcel: "Plus il s'agit de ce que je suis et non de ce que j'ai, plus questions et reponses perdent toute signification. Quand on me demande, ou quand je me demande, en quoi je crois, je ne puis me contenter d'énumérer un certain nombre de propositions auxquelles je souscris; ces formules, de toute évidence, traduisent une réalité plus profonde, plus intime: le fait d'être en circuit ouvert par rapport à la Réalité transcendante reconnue comme un Tu." Quoted by R. Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, II, 352.

5. This unconcern with propositional truth and this distaste for the per se is de facto connected with an incapacity to provide foundations for either propositional truth or the per se.

It is my firm conviction that, while there is much in existentialism on which we should practice the patristic maxim of despoiling the Egyptians, still we cannot simply take existentialism (even Marcel's) and incorporate it within scholasticism.

6. Existentialism is concerned with the human subject qua conscious emotionally involved, the ground of his own possibilities, the free realization of those possibilities, the radical orientation within which they emerge into consciousness and are selected, his relationship with civilization, other persons, history, God.

7. G. Marcel is not a systematic thinker; in his preface to R. Troisfontaines' De l'existence à l'être, he congratulates the author for having done for him what he could not do for himself.

G. Marcel is a penetrating thinker and an extremely effective writer; he can put a concrete idea, orientation, criticism of life, across with extraordinary brevity and skill.

He reviews his intellectual history in "Regard en arrière," a paper added to the collection Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel, introduction by E. Gilson; contributors include De l'homme, Troisfontaines, et al. See J. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy.

His Journal Métaphysique, I, was published in 1927, the date of Sein und Zeit. His background is idealism (including Bradley) and Bergson; Kierkegaard is acknowledged to have influenced him indirectly

8. K. Jaspers began with abnormal psychology of which he became professor and wrote various technical articles; he has a profound respect for science and is a mordant critic of scientists; forty years ago he was ridiculing the mythology of the brain and the mythology of the unconscious in the psychologies of his time.

He is a Kantian with the Critique of Practical Reason brought to life by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

He is the most broadly cultivated of the existentialists and with the widest range of interests; he writes very intelligently, explains exactly what he means, strikes one as very balanced and sane.

In his Philosophie (1932), he explains that Existenz and Transcendenz correspond roughly to what are named the soul and God by mythical consciousness.

Since then, he has developed the notion of das Umgreifende (which corresponds roughly to the notion of being in Insight) and has come to place a great deal more emphasis and reliance on reason (more perhaps to disassociate himself from Sartre and similar tendencies that from assignable grounds) and to speak openly of God (as a necessary philosophic postulate).

9. M. Heidegger is perhaps the most profound and original of the lot; his immediate source is Husserl; from Heidegger by way of a strong dose of French clarity comes Sartre, who figures as the reductio ad absurdum of the movement.

II. ON BEING ONESELF: /GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE THEME/

1. Subject is subject of; a relative term; meaning varies with correlative.

Grammatical: function in sentence.

Logical: function in proposition

Metaphysical: recipient: matter, form; potency, act,...

Psychological: subject of stream of consciousness.

2. Consciousness streams in many patterns: dream, biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, practical, mystical.

Contrast: subject of stream as oriented on knowing, and subject of stream as oriented on choosing.

Of old: speculative and practical reason; now: concrete flow orientated on knowing and orientated on choosing.

3. Intellectual pattern is intellectual by its detachment, by non-intervention of alien "subjective" concerns; by concentration of attention, effort, on observing, understanding, judging.

Subject is involved, but as involved he is subordinated to dictates of method, to immanent concretion within himself of principles of logic, of scientific aspiration, of absolute criteria: commitment is to submission to norms.

Subject is headed towards object, universe; he himself enters into picture only within objective field, as a particular case in a broader totality; that data of his consciousness may be a source of information, but they are not relevant qua his.

Subject has a responsibility; his judgment is his, and "personne se plaint de son jugement"; still, it is a limited responsibility, for he can frame his conclusions as positive or negative, certain or probable, etc.; in brief, he is bound to say what he knows and no more than he knows, re object and re mode, but he is not committed to reaching definite results.

4. The practical pattern of experience demands the intervention of the subject.

He may choose A or B, A or not-A; or he may consent to drift, permit himself to be other-directed, where however the consenting and permitting are equivalent to choosing, though an inauthentic equivalent.

The choice, decision, drift, are determined neither externally, biologically, psychically, nor intellectually.

Even when one knows everything about everything, an operable cannot be demonstrated; it admits no more than rhetorical syllogisms. But in fact, I do not know everything about everything; I do not know everything that ultimately is relevant to the choices I have to make, and none the less I already am alive, thinking, acting, under a perpetual necessity of drifting or choosing, choosing A or not-A, B or not-B, ...

Hence, choosing is within an atmosphere of incertitude, and so it involves an acceptance of risk.

Choosing not only settles ends and objects; it gives rise to dispositions and habits; it makes me what I am to be; it makes it possible to estimate what I probably would do; it gives me a second nature, an essence that is mine in virtue of my choosing; still it does not give me an immutable essence; achievement is always precarious, and a radical new beginning is always possible.

In choosing, I become myself; what settles the issue is not external constraint nor inner determinism nor knowledge, but ut quo my will and ut quod; in the last analysis, the ultimate reason for my choice being what it is is myself; if left to mere balancing of motives, impulses, etc., then I consent to drift; I consent to being other-directed; I implicitly choose as myself the On, Man -- inauthenticity.

If not left to mere balancing of motives, impulses, then I intervene, I knowingly assume risk, responsibility.

In either case, what ultimately is operative is purely individual, unique.

In the drifter what results is another instance of the average man in a given milieu.

In the decisive person, what results is what he chooses to be.

In the drifter, individuality is blurred; his individuality is his consenting to be like everybody else.

In the decisive person, there comes to light both his individuality and the total-otherness of other individuals; my choice is what it is because that's what I choose; yours is because that's what you choose; even when what is chosen is the same, still the sources are simply different.

Finally, there are limiting situations; the drifter can no longer just drift; and the decisive person is powerless to change things by deciding. In general, such situations are the historical period in which one lives, the social milieu of birth, opportunities, being male or female, old or young; in particular, there are death, suffering, struggle, guilt.

Confronted with limiting situations, the drifter may try to forget, but ultimately he cannot succeed; he is totally involved, all of him is involved, and he is totally unprepared. On the other hand, the decisive person can be as decisive as he pleases, but the limiting situation is not thereby removed.

5. Oneself is the irreducibly individual element whence spring the choices of the decisive person and the drifting, forgetting of the indecisive.

What springs from that source is free; for it, one is responsible.

What results from that source is not only the sequence of activities but also the character of the man, the second nature, quasi-essence, by which precariously one is what one is.

Nor does choosing wait upon learning, the acquisition of as much knowledge as might be relevant; it involves risk and incertitude.

Finally, in choosing is involved everything that concerns me.

6. Being oneself is being the subject of fine acts. It is existential existence. In the limit, ex-sistence implies the transcendent, the absolute.

Within a satisfactory synthesis, there is possible an alternation, a withdrawal and return, a mutual complementarity.

In the intellectual pattern of experience, I am choosing because I choose to submit entirely to the exigences of knowing in order to know, and without that knowing, there would be, not merely a residual incertitude and risk to choosing, but a total blindness that makes choice indistinguishable from mere force, instinct, passion.

In the practical pattern of experience, there is an ultimate moment of "being myself", of incertitude and risk, and nonetheless, total commitment; but it is a known ultimate moment, and it is within a context of knowing and with respect to a largely known.

III. ON BEING ONESELF; PHILOSOPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEME

1. It provides a ready rationalization for those who do not wish to endure the restraints of knowing. Let's drop philosophy, speculative theology, science.

Love of neighbor, zeal for souls, dialogue, disponibilit , prayer.

2. Breaks through positivist science of man.

It denies that there is any ready-made essence or nature with predictable properties.

L'homme se d finit par une exigence.

Eisenhower: "We have to be men." It implies that we might be less than men, that there is an exigence for us to be men, that the exigence is to be met by a decision.

3. Breaks through pragmatist science of man.

One learns from experience about things, about one's own potentialities.

But the issue is not one of knowing whether a priori or a posteriori; given all the knowledge possible, all the human experiments desirable, there still remains the whole issue of deciding, which, even then, would involve incertitude and risk.

And meanwhile one already is living, and one has only one life. The decision to risk nuclear warfare is not justifiable pragmatically.

4. Breaks through the idealist view of man.

The idealist's absolute or transcendental ego is neither Greek nor barbarian, neither male nor female, it neither dies nor suffers,

nor acknowledges guilt.

The idealist's world is a world that is pure intelligibility, rational throughout; it is not a world of free choices springing from individuals that are totally concerned in the once for all of the momentous moment.

5. Sets problems for contemporary scholasticism.

a. What meaning is possible for the fact that I become myself?

An ambiguity comes to light in the metaphysical theory of the person, i.e. subsistence. It rests on the issue: is metaphysics knowledge of things through their causes or through the decem genera entis? Is the thing just its substance or is the thing a whole that includes both substance and accidents?

b. Verum et falsum sunt in mente, bonum et malum sunt in rebus. But in the concrete, there are no abstractions, and so there is no abstract good. But there remains for each one to work out concretely what the good really is.

There remains an order of the universe, but it is not an order deducible from abstract essences and schematic hierarchies; it is a concrete unfolding in concrete situations; and the concrete situations are proximately the product of individual decisions about the concrete good.

There remains the natural law (situations do not change moral precepts); but there arises the significance of kairos, of my situation, my opportunity, my duty; and while these can be illuminated by moralists, by spiritual directors, the ultimate issue is whether or not I am to take a risk and assume a total responsibility and rise to the occasion.

There is to the order of the universe the emergence of good from evil, the heightening of evil to a maximum that sets the alternative of conversion or destruction, where the evil is to be met, not by being included as intelligibility within the order, but as a surd violating the order, as a demand, not for justice, but for self-sacrifice and charity.

The order of the universe is not a mechanistic plan flowing from essences; it may descend to that through sin, but it rises from it inasmuch as the order is a matrix, a network of personal relations. [In brief,] Situation, surd, kairos, charity.

c. There is the need of an ancilla that will supply theology with the categories necessary to assimilate the doctrine of the Bible.

The possibility of such an ancilla: can existential questions be handled by the Catholic philosopher?; do they not suppose knowledge of theology by their very nature?

d. Withdrawal and return: this is not simply a matter of the mutual dependence of willing to know and knowing to will. There is the problem of conversion (reorientation, reorganization of mind and life). Kierkegaard's spheres: aesthetic, ethical, religious A & B.

Upward change is not in virtue of knowledge on lower plane; it is not in virtue of will following knowledge on lower plane. There has to be the apparent irruption of a latent power, the possibility of a radical discovery where the discovered has been present all along, the fact of an obnubilation that prevented prior discovery. This sets the radical question in all philosophizing.

It is relevant for scholastics with their innumerable disputed questions, and no method of solution, not only in sight, but not even desired, sought, seriously believed in. In various measures it is the concern of the thinkers named existentialists.

Proposal: to face our existential question and through it to move towards some understanding of this question for others.

PART TWO: PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: GENERAL ACCOUNT

PHENOMENOLOGY: NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATIONS

I. NATURE

Phenomenology is an account, description, presentation of the data structured by insight.

1. Of data, what is given, what is manifest, what appears.
Not just external data, phenomena; but also inner; hence, opposition to mechanism, behaviorism.
Not exclusively inner data: the inner intentional act terminates at the outer datum; and the outer datum is just the term of an inner intentional act.
No exclusions; not primitive as opposed to derived, natural as opposed to cultural, sensitive as opposed to intellectual, cognitive as opposed to emotional, conative.

2. Data structured by insight (my way of putting it).
Selective; not exhaustive description of all and any data; significant; seeks basic universal structures; Eidetic, Wesensschau, Aristotle's "parts of the form," in Metaph., Z., i.e., Book Z.
Takes time, effort; not first bright idea, but calls for scrutiny, penetration, contrasts, tests; may have to overcome spontaneous tendentiousness, systematic oversight, common over-simplification, preconceptions arising from "scientific", "philosophic", or other sources.

3. Not insight as such
Extremely elusive
Would lead immediately to unity (viewpoints, higher viewpoints, theory of judgment)
There is no such tendency toward unity in Husserl (he is forever discovering new field to be explored), and similarly there is no such tendency in his successors.

4. The data as structured by insight and not the subsequent conceptualization, definition, theoretic statement of the data in their essential features.
Perpetual appeal to prepredicative manifestation
Basic distinction between what is given, manifest, appears and the thematic treatment of the given by the phenomenologist (phainomena legein).

II. SIGNIFICANCE

1. It provides a technique for the exploration and presentation of whole realms of matters of fact that are significant and have been neglected or treated superficially.
Bias in favor of outer data, in favor of measurable, countable; "Scientific" psychology, comparable in this respect to the opening of new vista and fields effected by Freud.
Traditional psychology: either rough and ready statement of what was presumed to be obvious, or, when effort for precision attempted, bogging down in account of "indefinable something".

Husserl on perception: Abschattung and Horizont
F.J.J. Buytendijk, Phénoménologie de la Rencontre (Desclée, 1952),
La Femme (Desclée, 1952 or earlier) perhaps, Wesen und Sinn des Spiels (Berlin, 1933).

S. Strasser, Das Gemut (Freiburg i. B., & Herder, 1956). Le Problème de l'Âme: Etudes sur l'objet respectif de la psychologie métaphysique et la psychologie empirique, French trans. by P. Wurtz, (Desclee). [Also in English, translated as The Problem of the Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, (Duquesne University Press)]

M. Merleau-Ponty, La Structure du Comportement, 1942; La Phénoménologie de la Perception, (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). [both trans. in English: SC, as The Structure of Behavior, tr. by Alden Fisher, Beacon Press, 1961; and PP, as Phenomenology of Perception, tr. by Colin Smith, 1963, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)] He is brilliant on the significance of one's own body in one's perceiving; sentient and sensible (spatio-temporal); neither purely pour-soi nor purely en-soi; not ghost in machine, but incarnate subject; neither subject nor body intelligible without the other.

2. It provides philosophical psychology and philosophy with a powerful instrument.

Husserl's quest: Logische Untersuchungen; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie; Formale und transzendente Logik; Erfahrung und Urteil.

Strasser; Merleau-Ponty (Une philosophie de l'ambiguïté)

Heidegger: A man's understanding of himself as implicit in his projects is the intelligibility of that man, the de facto Sein of that Seiende; just as phenomenology has to bet beyond the obvious and superficial, so must each man; hence, inauthentic and authentic living, and priority of the inauthentic.

L. Binswanger, Traum und Existenz; dreams of night (somatic determinants) dreams of morning (the human subject begins the projection of a world; interpretation of dreams in terms of itself vs. interpretation as fragmented waking, conceptualization of dream symbols.

K. Bultmann, Pistis is christliche Seinsverständnis, the rest is myth (what is objective is science or myth, and Christianity is not science).

H.W. Bartsch, Kerigma und Mythos. I, II, III, IV, and V; and Beiheft to I, II. (Harburg: 1948-55).

R. Marle, Bultmann et l'Interpretation du Nouveau Testament, (Paris: Aubier, 1956. Théologie 33.)

II. LIMITATIONS

1. As phenomenology is essentially prepredicative, so also essentially it is preconceptual and prerational.

It provides the evidence in which the phenomenologist and his reader can grasp the virtually unconditioned; but, as far as I know, it has not penetrated to the analysis of that reflective rationality; and so it fails to give due weight to it in psychology and in the consequent philosophy.

Hence, its criterion of the true is the manifest, the evident; what becomes manifest, evident, when one lets phenomena appear, does not brush them aside, is not living the life of an escapist.

Per contra, as affirmation is based upon manifestness of what is, so negation is based on manifestness of what is not, of nothing,

In Heidegger and Sartre, the basic role given to be anxiety crisis as the manifestation of Nothing.

3. Hence, the possibility of Husserl's Epoche: withdraw from interest in, concern with the "really real"; concentrate on intending and intended.

Radical difference between direction and redirection of attention, and the als ob of suspension of judgment; the possibility of the Epoche is connected with this ambiguity.

4. Hence, the impossibility of return from the Epoche.

If by intentional acts I regard the given as just what appears, (and I can do so), then by what sleight of hand can another intentional act of affirming, or anything else, restore the "really real"? cf. H.J. Pos.

See Problèmes Actuels de la Phénoménologie: Colloque Internationale de Phénoménologie, (Bruxelles, 1951; and Dosclée, 1952), edited by H.L. Van Breda.

There is a real difference between

- a) natürliche Einstellung, Santayana's "animal faith",
- and b) reaching the absolute "is" through a grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

Hence, the incapacity of phenomenology for dealing with issues of speculative thought. E. Fink, loc. cit.:

"... das Seiende ist Phänomen und weiter nichts. Eine Prüfung dieser Urentscheidung liegt gar nicht im Bereich der phänomenologischen Methode, weil sie all und jede Prüfung grundsätzlich als Ausweisung dar selbstgegeben Phänomen versteht." (p. 72)

"Dass das Ausweisbare allein ist ... kann nicht wiederum durch Ausweisung dargetan werden. Das Erscheinen des Seiendes ist nicht etwas, was selbst erscheint." (p. 70)

5. Hence, Heidegger is bogged down in remote criteria of truth and untruth: "being in the truth" and "being in the untruth."

A. deWaelhens, Une Philosophie de l'Ambiguïté: L'Existentialisme de M. Merleau-Ponty, (Louvain: 1951).

M. Merleau-Ponty is preparing a book to be called L'Origine de la Vérité. M. M-P was still working on this at the time of his sudden death in 1961. At that time, he had finished about 1/3 of the manuscript and had extensive work notes for the remainder of the work. This was posthumously published under the editorship of his friend Claude Lefort, under the title Le Visible et l'Invisible, which would have been the title Merleau-Ponty would have used had he lived to complete it. A. de Waelhens, Phénoménologie et Vérité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953).

Das Seiendes: brute existence. Sein: its intelligibility which is in man and from man. Heidegger confined to art.

Lotz: Heidegger's method excludes the possibility of his proving the existence of God.

PART THREE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

I. HUSSERL: LATER PERIOD

1. Enormous literary remains, mostly in shorthand, preserved at Louvain and being classified and edited under H.L. Van Breda, O.F.M.; there is some parallel institute at Cologne.

[Our concern is with] Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie, edited by W. Biemel, and published at The Hague by M. Nijhoff, 1954.

This is Husserl's last work; about the first third was published in his lifetime, and the rest was put together from his remains; probably owes something to the stimulus of his most brilliant (and disowned) student, Heidegger.

A general idea of this work provides a good introduction to Heidegger and offers the advantage of not involving us in the complexities of the development of Husserl's ideas on Phenomenology, Reduktion, Epoche.

2. "It might seem paradoxical to speak of a crisis in modern science: its achievements are unmistakable; its labors in endless fields continue apace; and what unsolved problems there are will be solved either by the methods of the past or by the discovery of new methods to complement and perfect those of the past.

Still the need of new methods can be discovered only by a critical survey; and if the need exists at present, then the survey will not only discover the existence of the need but also provide a sign-post to point the way towards a solution.

Such a survey demands a criterion, and the criterion that can hardly be rejected is an act of recall in which we reenact within ourselves the original intentions of the scientific enterprise.

These intentions had two principal manifestations: fourth century Athens; and the Renaissance.

3. "The formulation of the aim of science in fourth century Athens consisted in an Undeutung (shift in meaning) of popular notions of sophia, aletheia, episteme; this shift took place through the Platonic contrast of episteme and doxa, of dialektike and eristike; it consisted in setting up an ideal of knowledge and truth that involved (1) a sustained effort; (2) a methodical procedure; (3) a rigor; (4) an attainment of evidence; (5) a solid immovable basis in certainty, all of which simply were not contained in the previous customary connotation of such terms as aletheia, episteme; finally, it unfolded in the works of Aristotle, Euclid, Archimedes, the historians, and the medical doctors.

4. "The Renaissance brought forth a far more grandiose proposal; it discovered in the ancients;

- (1) an ideal of knowledge and truth vs merely traditional opinion.
- (2) as a principle of transforming society vs merely traditional power.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are valid, Western man is the exemplar of mankind, the realization of the meaning of what it is to be a man.

In the measure that that ideal and that principle are not valid, man is just another anthropological classification; he is of concern to us, not because of any intrinsic value or significance, but merely because he is the type or species to which we belong.

5. "Hence, if we are to judge modern science by the criterion of its original intentions, we must ask what hope modern science offers:
(1) of the attainment of knowledge and truth,
(2) of a principle that frees man from merely traditional opinion and power, and enables him rationally and responsibly to place human society on a basis of truth and reason, freedom and responsibility.

6. "Judged by this criterion, modern science can be criticized:
(a) for its tendency to splinter into specialties: see any university catalogue; congresses; "Deus scientia Dominus".
(b) for the autonomy of the splinters: what counts effectly within each of the departments, sections, subsections, is what is recognized as "good" within that department, section, subsection.

Discussions of knowledge, science, truth, are just so many other specialties, and their relevance to other fields is a mere matter of opinion.

(c) for the drift to the criterion of technical competence.

Upon a background of traditional norms that are not questioned, (Selbstverständlichkeiten), the effective principle of change is technique: what counts ultimately is "getting results", and what counts proximately is the approved technique, how one goes about it, all the wrinkles of observation, experimentation, all the apparatus of bibliography and footnotes.

(d) for the position of the human sciences.

Scientific medicine is based upon scientific anatomy, physiology, pharmacy, chemistry, physics; folk medicine (recipes, cures) has disappeared; but for human society the only medicine remains folk medicine; endless nostrums are proposed and, scientifically, they are of no value; de facto, techniques are unified by totalitarian state and mass democracy: unifications of state and reason. (for the impossibility of a reorientation of the present basis.

A reorientation demand a general view, and no general view is possible; only a shifting set of best available opinions in more or less unrelated fields. A general view is the work of a mind, and no mind can master all the techniques, and so no mind can present a scientifically respectable general view. Bodenlosigkeit!

7. "If we have found that modern science does not fulfill its original inspiration, intention, aim, we can go further and ask if there has been some radical defect or oversight in its program. Husserl's diagnosis of the malady is that scientific clarity floats on popular obscurity, scientific evidence on popular Selbstverständlichkeit (Marcel: tout naturel); in brief, the real basis of science has not been explored, examined, evaluated.

(a) for there exist two truths and two worlds.

There is popular truth in the sense of telling the truth in the home, in business, in law-courts, in newspapers and periodicals, in autobiography.

There is also scientific truth in the sense of a validated set of propositions: logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, etc.

These two reflect the original duality and bifurcation of doxa and episteme, of setting up a scientific ideal within a context of popular notions (one might compare the Hebraic ideal of "man before God" within the unity of Hebraic tradition).

There is the popular world of poets and men of common sense, of everyday assumption, opinion, activity.

There is the quite different world of the scientist and the philosopher: mass instead of weight, temperature instead of heat, dimensions instead of size, elements instead of bodies.