# On the Method of Theology

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## Hermeneutics

1. Hermeneutics and exegesis are concerned with the meaning of texts. Hermeneutics is concerned with general principles, exegesis is concerned with their application to particular cases.

2. Hermeneutics is not a primary field of inquiry.
Per se (essentially) the meaning of texts is plain and stands in no need of any exegesis. Per accidens (in a secondary way) as a result of any of a number of blocks that may arise, the work of the interpreter becomes necessary.
The point can be demonstrated. If every text needed an exegesis, then the exegesis would need an exegesis, and so on into infinity. Similarly, the general theory, hermeneutics, would itself need an exegesis, and the need would be recurrent.

3. The primary field of inquiry is cognitional theory. It deals with knowing in all cases. One of these cases is knowing what an author meant in writing a given sentence, paragraph, chapter, book.
Hence, within the framework of a satisfactory theory of knowledge, hermeneutics is not a matter of special difficulty or interest. Such has been classical hermeneutics expounded by Aristotle and refined down the centuries.
Contemporary hermeneutics, on the other hand, is a matter of considerable difficulty and interest, mainly for four reasons.

First, the issues have been placed within the context of historical consciousness. The classicist view that "plus ça change, plus c'est la même" ('the more something changed, the more it remains the same'), has given way to an attention to detail, to differences in detail, to an understanding of man and meaning that rises from the detailed differences to be noted in the course of human development.

Secondly, in the Geisteswissenschaften ('sciences of the spirit') -- as distinct from behavioral science -- the basic category is meaning, and so hermeneutics, which deals with meaning, has a key role.

Thirdly, the lack of a commonly accepted cognitional theory has resulted:
(a) in the            application of mistaken cognitional theories to the problem of hermeneutics;
(b) in efforts to employ hermeneutical problems as the springboard towards the solution of the philosophic issues;
(c) in the attitude of the "plain" man who brushes aside such theoretical considerations, proceeds by what he names simple and honest common sense, and is usually guided by the more superficial and absurd catch-phrases developed by applying mistaken cognitional theory to hermeneutical problems.

Fourthly, modern man has been busy creating a modern world, in freeing himself from reliance on tradition and authority, in working out his own world-view comparable in completeness to the Christian view that ruled in an earlier age. This has brought about a climate and an exigence for reinterpretation:

---of Greek and Latin classical authors, removed from the context of Christian humanism, and revealed as pagans;

---of the Scriptures, removed from the context of Christian doctrinal development, and restored to the pre-dogmatic context of the history of religions;

---of the Law, removed from the context of Christian philosophy and morality, and placed within the context of some contemporary philosophy or attitude toward life.

4. Accordingly, the problems of contemporary hermeneutics are to a great extent coincident with the problems of method in contemporary Catholic theology.

We do not propose to reject historical consciousness and human science because we reject "modernity". At the same time, we do not propose to slip into "modernity" because we wish to accept historical consciousness and human science.

We wish, then, an integration of dogmatic theology with historical consciousness and human science, but without the aberrations of the Enlightenment, the Romantic movement, Idealism, Historicism, Dilthey's relativist Lebensphilosophie (Philosophy of Life), and existentialist "Transzendenz innerhalb der Immanenz" ("Inner transcendence of immanence"), or the naturalist "Principle of the Empty Head," "Postulate of the Commonplace," and "Axiom of Familiarity."

Plainly, such an integration cannot be conceived, much less achieved, without facing squarely the issues involved in the science of cognitional theory that underlies hermeneutics.

5. There are three basic exegetical operations: (1) understanding the text, (2) judging how correct one's understanding of the text is, and (3) stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text.

Understanding the text has four main aspects:
(a) one understands the thing or object that the text refers to;
(b) one understands the words employed in the text;
(c) one understands the author who employed the words;
(d) it is not "one", "l'on", "das Man" that understands, but I do, as a result of a process of learning and at times as a result of a conversion.

Judging how correct one's understanding of the text is raises the problem of context, of the hermeneutical circle, of the relativity of the whole, of limiting considerations on the possible relevance of more remote inquiries, and of limitations placed upon the scope of one's interpretation.

Stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text raises the issue of absolute context, of "Existential" categories, of the use of human sciences in exegesis, and of the problems of concrete communication in their relativity to a given group of readers.

## 6. Understanding the thing or object.

The Urphenomenon (Primary phenomenon) is not intelligere verba (understanding the words) but intelligere rem per verba (understanding the thing through the words).

Exegesis, as a first level, presupposes knowledge of things, objects, and of the language that names them.

Because we already have the universal potential knowledge of the knowledge of the thing dealt with in the text, we find per se that the meaning of the text is plain, that it simply applies to a particular the universal and potential knowledge we already have of the particular.

It is true, of course, that my understanding of the thing or the true understanding of the thing may not be the author's. But the point to "understanding the thing" is not that it settles what the author means, but that without it there is no possibility of understanding the author.

A blind man is not going to understand a description of colors; a person that has never attended to his won acts of intelligence is not going to understand a description of intelligence; etc.

By understanding the thing or object is not meant understanding only the things or objects of the visible universe. The thing or object in question may be (a) in the visible universe, (b) in the world of theory, (c) in the world of interiority, or (d) in the world of the sacred, or religion.

The contention that the interpreter should have his own understanding of the object, know what that understanding is, and distinguish it from the author's understanding of the object, amounts to a rejection of what may be called the "Principle of the Empty Head."

The "Principle of the Empty Head" (PEH) contends that if one is to be objective, if one is not to drag in one's own notions, if one is not to settle in an a priori fashion what the text must mean no matter what it says, if one is not to "read into" the text what is not there, then one must drop all preconceptions of every kind, see just what is in the text and nothing more, let the author speak for himself, let the author interpret himself.

What I have named PEH, clearly enough, is a widespread view of correct interpreation.

PEH is a confusion of three distinct issues based upon an utterly in adequate account of presumption regarding the nature of human knowledge.

So far from tackling in series the three tasks of (a) understanding the thing, (b) understanding the author's meaning concerning the thing, and (c) judging whether one's understanding is correct, PEH rests upon a naive intuitionism that, so far from judging the correctness of its understanding, has no need to judge because it sees what's there, and so far from bothering about understanding the thing, has no need of understanding anything but just looks at what's there.

In fact, what is there? There are printed signs in a given order. That is all that is there. Anything over and above a re-issue of the same signs in the same order will be mediated by the experience, intelligence, and judgment of the interpreter.

To reject the PEH is to insist that the wider the interpreter's experience, the deeper and fuller his understanding, the profounder his judgment, then the better equipped he will be to approach the task of stating what the author means.

The basis for this contention is simple.

Interpretation is a matter of proceeding from habitual, potential, universal knowledge to a second act that regards the concrete and particular: what was meant by the author in this text.

The less that habitual knowledge, the less the likelihood that the interpreter will be able to think of what the author means. The greater that habitual knowledge, the greater the likelihood that the interpreter will be able to think of what the author means.

When a critic of an interpretation states: "I do not see how Aristotle, St. Paul, Aquinas, Kant, could have meant what the interpreter says he meant," then the literal meaning of the critic's words is that he does not possess the habitual knowledge that would enable him to see how the author could have meant what the interpreter says he meant.

While PEH is widespread in positivist and in Catholic circles, it is vigorously rejected elsewhere.

(H. G. Gadamer, *Warheit und Methode*, p. 254 ff. R. Bultmann, "Das Problem der Hermeneutic," *ZThK* 47, p. 64.)

7. Understanding the words.

Understanding the thing accounts for the per se plain meaning of the text. This plain meaning is obvious and ultimate when the author and the interpreter understand the same thing in the same way.
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However, in conversation, so in reading, the author may be speaking of X' and the interpreter may be thinking of X". In that case, sooner or later, there arises a difficulty. Not everything true of X' will be true of X'', so that the author will appear to the interpreter to be saying what is not true or even what is absurd.

At this point the controversialist has all he wants: on the basis of his mistaken assumption that the author is speaking of X'', he sets about demonstrating the author's errors and absurdities.

The interpreter, however, considers the possibility that he himself is at fault. He rereads. He reads further. Eventually he makes the discovery that the text makes some sense when X' is substituted for X''.

The process can occur any number of times with respect to any number of instances of X' and X''. It is the process of learning, the self-correcting process of learning. It is the manner in which we acquire and develop common sense. It heads towards a limit in which we possess a habitual core of insights that enables us to deal with any situation, any text of any group, by adding one or two more insights relevant to the situation or text in hand.

Such understanding of the text must not be confused either with judgment on the truth of that understanding or with statement on the meaning of the text in virtue of that understanding. One has to understand before one can pass judgment on that understanding; one has to have understanding before one can express it. Understanding the text is such a prior understanding.

Such understanding matches the hermeneutical circle.

The meaning of the text is an intentional entity; it is a single paragraph that unfolds itself through parts, sections, chapters, paragraphs, sentences, words. We can grasp the unity, the whole, only through the parts. Yet at the same time the parts are determined in their meaning by the whole which each partially reveals. It is by the self-correcting process of learning that we sprial into the meaning of the text, understanding the whole through the parts, and understanding parts in light of the whole.

Rules of hermeneutics or of exegesis list the points worth considering in one's efforts to arrive at an understanding of the text. Such are the analysis of the composition of the text, the determination of the author's purpose, of the people for whom he wrote, the characterization of the means he employed, linguistic, grammatical, stylistic, etc.

The point to be made here is that one does not understand the text because one has observed the rules, but that one observes the rules in order to arrive at an understanding of the text. Observing the rules can be mere pedantry that leads to an understanding of nothing of any moment, to missing the point entirely. The essential observance is advertence to what I do not understand and the sustained rereading, search, inventiveness, that eliminates my lack of understanding.

8.  Understanding the Author.

When the meaning of a text is plain, then with the author and by his words we understand the thing.

When a simple misunderstanding arises (e.g., the author is thinking of X' and the reader of X''), then its correction is a

relatively simple process of rereading and inventiveness.

But when there is need of the long and arduous use of the self-correcting process of learning, when a first reading yields a little understanding and a host of puzzles, then the problem is not so much understanding the thing or the words as understanding the author himself, his nation, language, time, culture, way of life, and cast of mind.

The self-correcting process of learning is not only the way we acquire common sense in the first instance, but also the way in which we acquire an understanding of other people's common sense. Even with our contemporaries of the same culture, language, and station in life, we not only understand things with them, but also understand things in our own way and, as well, their different way of understanding the same things. We can remark that a phrase or an action is "just like you": we mean that it fits into our understanding of the way you understand and so go about things. But just as we can come to an understanding of our fellows' understanding, a common sense grasp of the ways in which we understand not with them but them, so this process can be pushed to a full development when the self-correcting process of learning brings us to an understanding of the common sense of another place, time, culture, cast of mind.

The phrase "understanding one another's common sense" must not be misunderstood. Properly, it is not understanding what common sense is, a task of the cognitional theorist. Again, it is not making another's common sense one's own so that one would go about speaking and acting like an Athenian of the 5th century B.C. But just as common sense is understanding what is to be said and what is to be done in any of the situations that commonly arise, so understanding another's common sense is understanding what he would say and what he would do in any of the situations that arose in his place and time.

This understanding another's common sense is very similar to what in Romantic hermeneutics is named "Einfuhlen", "empathy".

Derived from Winckelmann and developed by Schliermacher and Dilthey to be attacked by contemporaries under the influence of Heidegger (Being and Time, sec. 72-77).

Romantic hermeneutics conceives the text as Ausdruck, the exegete's task as Einfuhlen, and the criterion of the exegete's task as Reproducieren, an ability to say just why the author in each phrase expressed himself in the precise manner in which he did.

It singles out a valid task of the interpreter and it gives an approximate account of the way in which the task is performed; but it is incomplete as well as approximate, and so it has been subjected to a good deal of criticism (Bultmann, Gadamer).

Conceiving the text as Ausdruck (expression, statement) correctly draws attention to the aesthetic, intersubjective, symbolic dimensions of meaning; but it overlooks or prescinds from or fails to insist on the aspect of linguistic meaning by which it is true or false, by which it pertains to an absolute domain, by which it can be transferred from one context to another.

Again, empathy is the simplest description of the way in which we grasp intersubjective, aesthetic, or symbolic meanings. But it contains more that a suggestion of an extrinsicism that overlooks the development of the interpreter, his acquiring an understanding of another's mode of understanding, the widening of his horizon to include or fuse with the horizon of others. So far from raising and solving the problem of the transference of meaning from the context of an ancient writer to the context of the contemporary interpreters, it encourages a mythic elimination of the problem by suggesting that the interpreter feels his way into another's mind and heart, his thought and sensibility; and it leads to a falsification of issues inasmuch as it implies that there can be no legitimate transference from one context toanother, that either one thinks with the mind of Paul or else one has no "objective" knowledge of Paul's meaning whatever.

Finally, the criterion of reproducieren is excessive. It means that one not only understands the author but also can do what the author himself could not do, namely, explain why he wrote in just the way he did. Common sense understands what is to be said and what is to be done; but common sense does not understand itself and much less does it explain itself.

9. The Development of the Interpreter.

The major texts, the classics in religion, letters, philosophy, theology, not only are beyond the original horizon of their interpreters, but also demand an intellectual, moral, religious conversion of the interpreter over and above the broadening of his horizon.

In this case the reader's original knowledge of the thing is just adequate. He will come to know the thing only insofar as he pushes the self-correcting process of learning to a revolution of his own outlook. He can succeed in acquiring that habitual understanding of the author that spontaneously finds his wave-length and locks onto it only after he has effected a radical change in himself.

This is the existential dimension of the problem of hermeneutics. Its existence is at the root of the perennial divisions of mankind in their views on morality, on philosophy, on religion.
Moreover, insofar as the radical conversion is only the basic step, insofar as their remains the further task of thinking out everything from the new and profounder viewpoint, there results the characteristic of the classic: A classical writing must never be able to be understood completely; the person who would be fashioned by classical writings must be willing to learn ever more from then.

There follows another basic aspect of the task of hermeneutics from the existential dimension.
The classics ground a tradition, an Uberlieferung, a culture. They create the milieu in which they are studied and interpreted. They produce in the reader through the tradition the Vorverstandnis (pre-understanding) that he will need when he comes to read, study, interpret.

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Such a tradition may be genuine, authentic, a long accumulation of insights, adjustments, re-interpretations, that repeats the original message afresh for each age. In that case, the reader will exclaim as did the disciples on the way to Emmaus, "Did not our hearts burn within us when he spoke on the way and opened to us the Scriptures?"

On the other hand, the tradition may be inauthentic. It may consist in a watering-down of the original message, in recasting it into terms and meanings that fit into the assumptions and convictions of those that have dodged the issue of radical conversion. In that case, a genuine interpretation will be met with incredulity and ridicule, as was St. Paul preaching in Rome and quoting Isaias, "You shall indeed hear but never understand."

It is in this perspective that is to be understood Gadamer's attack on the Aufklarung (Enlightenment) and Historismus (Historicism) as involving a bias against bias in general.

Inasmuch as these movements were concerned with creating a new world for man, a new tradition, a new culture, they were astute in laying down a principle that excluded the possibility of a tradition.
But inasmuch as the destruction of tradition implies a continuous return to primitive barbarism -- which was not the aim of the Enlightenment or Historicism -- these movements were incoherent and shortsighted.
The ultimate issue here lies between Descartes' advocacy of a universal doubt and Newman's preference for universal belief.

10. Judging the Correctness of One's Understanding of the Text.

Such a judgment has the same criterion as any judgment on the correctness of common sense insight.
The decisive question is whether one's understanding of the text is invulnerable, whether it hits the bull's eye, whether it meets all relevant further questions.
Here the key word is "relevant". It implies a reference to a determinate prospective judgment. Without such a judgment in view, one has no criterion, no reference point, for determining which further questions are relevant.
It follows that judgment on the correctness of one's understanding of the text is, not a general judgment on that understanding in all its respects or aspects, but limited judgments with respect to determinate and restricted points. They will be of the type: at least the author means this, at least he does not mean that.

The same point comes to light from the hermeneutical circle. One understands the whole only through the parts, and nonetheless the meaning of the parts is dependent on the whole. Insofar as this circle is merely logical, it is surmounted by understanding. But it has a further and more fundamental aspect, namely, the relativity of the whole. With respect to a sentence, the paragraph is the whole; with respect to a word, the sentence is the whole. With respect to a paragraph, the chapter is the whole; with respect to the chapter, the book is the whole. But the book itself stands in a fur-

ther, far more complex type of context that includes the _opera omnia_ of the author, his sources, his contemporaries, the state of the question in his day, the issues then predominant, the author's aim and scope, his prospective readers, etc. In brief, there is an ever broadening hermeneutic context that ultimately finds itself in an historical context. Not only is the historical context to be known through hermeneutic contexts, but also it does not possess the type of intelligibility to be found in an hermeneutic context; the latter is like the general's plan; the former is like the course of the battle.

Now it is true that this relativity of the whole does not imply a complete fluidity, a _panta rhei_ of meaning. The meaning of the parts is affected by the whole, but it is not affected in all respects. That Brutus killed Caesar can be placed in a context that praises Brutus and, equally well, in a context that damns him; but it does not fit into a context in which it is true that Caesar killed Brutus. The Gospel of St. John has been read in a Hellenistic context and now is being read in a Palestinian context brought to light by the discoveries at Qumran. The change in context involves a change in perspectives, a change in difficulties, a change in the questions that are raised and discussed. But still this change in context does not change much in a commentary that is based upon exact analyses of the text and that is content to make cautious and restricted judgments on meaning.

There is to be noted a relation between the two reasons given for the restricted judgments to be made by the exegete. Our understanding of the text is correct insofar as it enables us to meet all further relevant questions. But what are such questions? One can pin them down in two manners. One can assign the prospective judgment to which they would be relevant. One can assign the field from which relevant questions might come. Because the field has a measure of indeterminateness, one is driven to assigning the prospective judgment. Inasmuch as one assigns such judgment, one finds onself assigning determinate and restricted assertions.

The issue can be put in a third manner. The exegete begins from his Fragestellung, his own viewpoint, interests, concerns, that lead him to question the text. As he learns from the text, his Fragestellung becomes transformed; he discovers the questions the author was asking and attempting to meet; he understands the author in terms of the author's own questions and answers. Such an understanding of an author defines a context, settles all that is relevant to itself, and all that has no bearing on itself. If that understanding of the author is correct, then there are no further relevant questions. Still, to determine whether that understanding is correct is made difficult by the indeterminacy of the whole. And until that indeterminacy can be eliminated, the exegete has to have recourse to the device of making restricted and limited judgments instead of pronouncing just what is the sum and substance, the essence and the accidents, of all the meaning contained in the text.

11.   Statement of the Meaning of the Text.

In stating the meaning of the text the exegete employs concepts but there are notable differences of opinion on the type of concepts he should employ.

(a) Albert Descamps, "Reflexions sur la methode en theologie biblique," Sacra Pagina, I, 132-157.

Passage cited from pp. 142-143:

/This theology will be as diverse as there are, in the eyes of the alert exegete, numerous biblical authors; ultimately, there will be as many biblical theologies as there are inspired authors, for one will oblige himself above all to respect the originality of each of them.
/The inquirer will appear to take delight in slow approaches, and will often take the path of school children; his description will have the flavor of ancient things; it will provide the reader with an impression of being in a different country, of being foreign, of being archaic; the desire for authenticity will manifest itself in the choice of vocabulary as biblical as possible, in the desire to avoid hasty transposition into more modern expressions, even if they have been approved in the theological tradition. There is quite a problem of discretion in the choice of words in biblical theology.

/The whole exposition of the work will have to be constructed following the conclusions from the study of its chronology and from the literary history of the biblical writings; it will be a matter of proper arrangement. That is why the questions about dates and authenticity of inspired writings, apparently secondary in biblical theology, actually have a decisive importance.

/Moreover, these expositions of the work will remain particular enough; if they include the whole of the books of the bible, they will bear only upon a point of well delimited doctrine; if they have a complex object, they will only bear on one writing or a group of writings. As for the biblical theology that would like to embrace the whole or at least a vast portion of inspired literature, it can only do so by remaining interiorly very diverse, somewhat as, on a profane level, a "general history" of Europe or of the world must be.

/Certain people, it is true, dream of a kind of condensed version, of an exposition of the general plan of God throughout history of the two Testaments; this would be the same thing as a form of privileged biblical theology, following the idea of several writers. Actually, it seems to us that a sketch of this over-all plan only belongs to biblical theology to the extent that the historian can recognize himself within it; the believer himself only reaches the divine plan throughout the many ideas and aims of the sacred writers./

The foregoing view may be named the "common sense communication of a common sense understanding of the text".
The exegete begins from contemporary common sense; he develops the

common sense of another time; he speaks to his pupils by beginning
from their common sense and leading them into the multiple nodes of
the common snese of the multiple scriptural authors; that goal is
vast, complex, endlessly nuanced.

In turn the pupils will be able to communicate their understanding
in the same manner, uttering what initially gives an impression of
depaysement (being in a foreign country), d'etrangete (strangeness),
d'archaisme (being archaic); but when they have reached understanding,
it will have become familiar to them.

(b)  Besides the foregoing "common snese communication of a common
sense understanding of the text," one may envisage a scientific com-
munication of a common sense understanding of the text.

Such scientific communication rises spontaneously from the fore-
going common sense communication, for the very effort to communicate
involves "die Wendung zur Idee"(the turning point for the idea).

This tendency and turn may be illustrated by the composition
of grammars and lexicons, which are based upon familiar understand-
ing of groups of texts, and summarize recurrent elements or features
to be found in texts.  Again, from the grammars and lexicons of dif-
ferent languages or dialects, there arise another tendency and turn
to the idea in the form of comparative grammars and comparative
language study.  To take a different instance, place  names in texts
lead to studies that collect the lot of them on a map; time refer-
ences in texts lead to studies that collect the lot of them in a
chronology; personal names in texts lead to genealogies, biographical
dictionaires, outlines of history, etc.

Now the exegete draws upon all such studies in his work of in-
terpreting particular texts.  From one viewpoint, his work is one of
applying the results of investigations in a large number of special-
ized fields.  But there is also another viewpoint that arises in the
measure that the application recurs over long series of texts.

For stating the meaning of the text is a totally new and dispar-
ate task only on the first occasion.  As the number of occasions mounts
on which one states the meaning of texts, one finds oneself stating
over and over again the same meanings or slightly different mean-
ings, and so one begins to compare and classify, to find basic recur-
rent categories, their differentiations, their frequencies.

Genetic processes next come to one's attention, and from the
fact one may proceed to the cause or form or the end of the genesis.

So A. Descamps casually mentions both categories and genetic
considerations in his reflections on the method of biblical theology.

So M. Peinador lays it down that everyone would consider biblical
theology to be a theology expressed in the very categories of the
biblical authors.

(c) In the third place one may ask about the foundations of a scientific communication of a common sense understanding of the text.

This question appears in Descamps' discussion, first, when he begins by ruling out H. I. Marrou's contentions expressed in "De la connaissance historique", and secondly, when he discusses Dumery's demand for a "critique radicale", pp. 133-36, 154-57.

It appears in Peinador's illustration of biblical categories by the "images" of the people of God and the Kingdom of God, and as well in his requirement that biblical theology presupposes definite dogmas.

But it also appears in the use of Hegelian thought as the spine of historical development (as in the Tubingen school of 19th century higher criticism) and in Bultmann's use of Heidegger's existentialism, particularly in his interpretation of St. Paul. Cf. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, London, SCH Press, 1955 & 1960. Finally, the same question appears in Insight, Chapter 17, section 3.

There are a number of factors that enter into this problem, and we must begin first from an enumeration and a description.

First, the effort to attain a scientific communication of a common sense understanding of texts takes the interpreter beyond the explicit context of the original authors. Comparisons, classifications, the listing of categories and their differentiations, the observation and explanation of genetic processes, begin from the context of the original authors but they thematize it, and by that very fact, go beyond it to ask and answer questions that the original authors did not undertake to discuss.

Implicit in the foregoing shift of context is the shift from hermeneutics to history. In hermeneutics the question is, What did the author mean insofar as his meaning is conveyed by his text? In history the question becomes, What was going forward? The battle plan of the general answers questions of the hermeneutic type, for that plan tells what the general meant to do. The actual course of the battle differs not a little from the victorious general's plan, and a great deal from the defeated general's plan. To ask about the actual course of the battle is to ask a historical question, and its answer is normally, not this or that man's intention or meaning, but what results from the interplay of numerous and conflicting intentions and meanings.

Now the original authors used categories, effected differentiations of categories, brought about developments, but they did not sit back and reflect on what they had done. It is precisely this that is done when the scientific communication of a common sense understanding of texts is attempted. It moves beyond the explicit context of any given author's meaning to construct a historical context that contains, analyses and relates successive explicit contexts.

Secondly, the common sense understanding of texts begins from a contemporary brand of common sense, that of the interpreter, and moves to an understanding of the common sense of another place and time. For the interpreter, his own original common sense is a Selbstver-standlichkeit (self-understanding); it is something too obvious to be explained, too certain to need justification, too closely correlated with dramatic-practical saying and doing to be submitted to analysis. Still, it is only one brand of common sense: each people, each culture, each language, each region, each generation, each social class has its own; and each finds the other's strange, something that in time one can come to understand, something that perhaps one will make one's own by socio-cultural migration, but not something that is one and the same all over.

Now the contemporary differentiation of common sense, while it does not imply a relativism, does imply a relativity. When the interpreter interprets for some one, he bears in mind that person's horizon. He will speak differently at a congress of his colleagues, in his university lectures, and in a public address. He will be able to bring things home effectively precisely in the measure that he understands the common sense of his audience, i.e., understands what they will understand immediately and fully.

It follows that just as there is a Wendung zur Idee that goes beyond the context of the texts to be interpreted, so also there is a Wendung zur Idee that goes beyond the common sense of the interpreters, that determines their categories and the genetic process of the development of their science or field.

Thirdly, there exist human sciences. They are concerned with the order of human living in family and society, morals and education, state and law, economics and technics. They are concerned with the meaning of human living in intersubjectivity and symbol, in art and language, history and religion, literature, science and philosophy.

Insofar as these fields of investigation get beyond the initial descriptive phase of observation, collection, comparison, classification, insofar as they attempt to explain, correlate, analyze process, they become systematic. Their ultimate categories and differentiation of categories are, or aim to be, not what happened to be the categories of this or that writer or group of writers, but what are demanded by the subject itself, what lie in the nature of man, what can fit all cases, what will bring out most effectively the nature and structure of each.

Now the results of such human science are an effective tool for the scientific communication of common sense understanding of texts. They are such a tool, not only when employed on original texts, but also when employed on the texts written by interpreters of the original texts. Just as the interpreter will not hesitate to employ

grammars and lexicons, geographies and histories, in his interpretation of texts, so too he will avail himself of the tools of analysis and communication provided by the human sciences.

Fourthly, there exist philosophies and theologies. Already we have spoken of understanding the text as a development in the interpreter and indeed of a conversion of the interpreter. But such conversion and its opposite are thematized and objectified in philosophical and theological positions. In those fields they find scientific statement, and such scientific statement is the statement of the foundations of basic orientations and attitudes.

Now such basic orientations and attitudes find their unfolding, expression, concrete realization (1) in the original texts, (2) in the interpreations placed upon the original texts, and (3) in the manner in which the human sciences are conceived, grounded, directed, developed. The basic orientations and attitudes are the basic meanings of all texts, whether of authors, of interpreters, or of human scientists.

(d) Basic Context.

Context is a reminder-concept; it denotes the rest that is relevant to the interpretation of the text.
Material context is the rest of the documents or monuments relevant to the interpretation of the text.
Formal context is hermeneutical or historical.
Hermeneutical formal context is the dynamic mental and psychic background from which the author spoke or wrote; it is the set of habits of sensibility and skill, of intellect and will, that come to a second act in the context.
Historical formal context is the genetic-dialectical unity of a series of hermeneutical formal contexts.

The distinction between hermeneutic and historical is illustrated by the difference between the general's plan of battle and the actual course of the battle. The former has the unity conferred on it by a single mind (matched against other minds). The latter corresponds neither to the victorious nor to the defeated general's plan; it is what is realized through conflicting plans and decisions and because of them; but it results not merely from plans and decisions but also from what they overlooked.

Basic context is a heuristic notion, partly determined and partly to be determined. It is what becomes determined in the totality of successful efforts at exegesis.

At a first approximation, the basic context is the pure desire to know, unfolding through experience, understanding, and judgment, and leading to the statements found in the texts of authors, interpreters and critics.

15

Secondly, it is the pure desire as a reality with a real unfolding leading to actual statements in each of the relevant authors, interpreters, and critics.

Thirdly, it is a reality that develops, that proceeds from the undifferentiated through differentiation to an articulated integration. Such development is both individual (from infancy to senility) and historical (from primitives to contemporary culture).

Fourthly, it is a reality that undergoes conversion, intellectual, moral, and religious, and that is subject to aberration.

It is to be noted that basic context is (1) real, (2) one and many, (3) the ground of genetic relationships, and (4) the ground of dialectical relationships.

Further, it is at once factual and normative: the pure desire is both a fact and a norm; and observance of the norm and non-observance are facts with a normative connotation.

Again, basic context is related to common sense and scientific statements of the common sense understanding of texts, as the upper blade of scientific method to the lower blade. They are mutually determining, and they result in a philosophically or theologically grounded scientific statement of the common sense understanding of the texts.

Cf. Insight, Chapter 17, section 3 on "The Truth of Interpretation"; Chapter 15, section 7 on Genetic Method; Chapters 2-5 on Empirical Method; the Epilogue on the addition of the dimension of faith to human development and dialectic.

(e) Logic of Basic Context.

Basic context is a context of contexts; it is not on the level of the author's understanding of what he means; it is not on the level of the interpreter's common sense statement of a common sense understanding of the author's meaning; it is not on the level of a scientific statement of a common sense understanding of the author's meaning; it is the level on which genetic and dialectical relationships are found between the scientific accounts of successive authors' meanings.

Compare (1) reference frames, (2) the group of transformation equations defining the geometry of the reference frames, (3) the series of groups of transformations defining the series of geometries.

Because basic context places a series of authors within a genetic-dialectical unity, it goes beyond the intentions of the authors. It is historical, and the historical brings to light what was going forward through the authors' intentions and deeds but not merely because of their intentions and deeds but also because of what they overlooked or failed to do.

E.g., Basic context relates the trinitarian doctrine of Tertullian, Origen, and Athanasius. But Tertullian did not do so; Origen did not do so; Athanasius did not do so.

This does not imply that basic context is only in the mind of the upper-blade historian. It is also in the minds of the authors, but there it is implicit, vecu, in the mode of verstehen, etc. The genetic is in them as their dynamic openness or their stagnation; the dialectical is in them as their good or uneasy conscience.

Basic context differs from the scientific statement of a common sense understanding of the text. Such scientific statement presupposes the common sense understanding of the text and employs in stating that understanding (1) the categories constructed from the text and (2) the categories constructed by human science. Basic context is concerned with the genesis and dialectical abberrations of categories.

Basic contexts differ from common sense understanding of the text; it is content to select in the light of its own principles (usually unknown to the author) significant if very brief points. E.g., prove Tertullian had two distinct modes of thinking about the divinity of the Son. Such selection is not understanding Tertullian. Indeed, not even a scientific statement of a common sense understanding of Tertullian does more than effect such selections, though it does so in a complete manner.

Conversely, the questions arising from scientific statement and from basic context contribute nothing to common sense understanding of the text or situation.

E.g., the Council of Ephesus defined our Lady's divine maternity. The definition is a corollary to the explication of the Christian tradition and its sources: one and the same is God and man. But the naive are prone to ask, Did our Lady know she was the mother of God? How did she know it? How did she conceive? How did she feel about it? How do you prove all this from Scripture? Does St. Luke write with your account of our Lady's thoughts and feelings in mind?

Such questions arise solely from a total incomprehension of the nature and possibility of serious exegesis, and serious history.

It is possible to arrive at a common sense understanding of the texts, at a scientific statement of that common sense understanding, at a basic context that relates in a genetic-dialectical series the scientific statements.

But this possibility does not amount to the possibility of giving reasonable answers to the imaginative curiosity. The answers have to be theological, and theological answers do not include an imaginative reconstruction of the past.

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