

CHAPTER TEN

D I A L E C T I C

Dialectic, the fourth of our functional specialties, deals with conflicts. The conflicts may be overt or latent. They may lie in religious sources, in the religious tradition, in the pronouncements of authorities, or in the writings of theologians. They may regard contrary orientations of research, contrary interpretations, contrary histories, contrary styles of evaluation, contrary horizons, contrary doctrines, contrary systems, contrary policies.

Not all opposition is dialectical. There are differences that will be eliminated by uncovering fresh data. There are the differences we have named perspectival, and they merely witness to the complexity of historical reality. But beyond these there are fundamental conflicts stemming from an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, an ethical stance, a religious outlook. They profoundly modify one's mentality. They are to be overcome only through an intellectual, moral, religious conversion. The function of dialectic will be to bring such conflicts to light, and to provide a technique that objectifies subjective differences and promotes conversion.

1. Horizons

In its literal sense the word, horizon, denotes the bounding circle, the line at which earth and sky appear to meet.

This line is the limit of one's field of vision. As one moves about, it recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for different standpoints, there are different horizons. Moreover, for each different standpoint and horizon, there are different divisions of the totality of visible objects. Beyond the horizon lie the objects that, at least for the moment, cannot be seen. Within the horizon lie the objects that can now be seen.

As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the scope of one's knowledge and the range of one's interests vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.

Differences in horizon may be complementary, or genetic, or dialectical. Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests. They live in a sense in different worlds. Each is quite familiar with his own world. But each also knows about the others, and each recognizes the need for the others. So their many horizons in some measure include one another and, for the rest, they complement one another.

Singly they are not self-sufficient, and together they represent the motivations and the knowledge needed for the functioning of a communal world. Such horizons are complementary.

Next, horizons may differ genetically. They are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them, and partly to transform them. Precisely because the stages are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or of a single history.

Thirdly, horizons may be opposed dialectically. What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious. But again rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling, except perhaps a wan smile. Both astrology and genocide are beyond the pale, but the former is ridiculed, the latter is execrated.

Horizons, finally, are the structured resultant of

past achievement and, as well, both the condition and the limitation of further development. They are structured. All learning is, not a mere addition to previous learning, but rather an organic growth out of it. So all our intentions, statements, deeds stand within contexts. To such contexts we appeal when we outline the reasons for our goals, when we clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or when we explain our deeds. Within such contexts must be fitted each new item of knowledge and each new factor in our attitudes. What does not fit, will not be noticed or, if forced on our attention, it will seem irrelevant or unimportant. Horizons then are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained.

2. Conversions and Breakdowns

Joseph de Finance has drawn a distinction between a horizontal and vertical exercise of freedom. A horizontal exercise is a decision or choice that occurs within an established horizon. A vertical exercise is the set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon to another. Now there may be a sequence of such vertical exercises of freedom, and in each case the new horizon, though notably deeper and broader and richer, none the less is consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities. But it is also possible that the movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it

begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a conversion.

Conversion may be intellectual or moral or religious. While each of the three is connected with the other two, still each is a different type of event and has to be considered in itself before being related to the others.

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at. Now this myth overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy, say, the world of the infant and, on the other hand, the world mediated by meaning. The world of immediacy is the sum of what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelt, felt. It conforms well enough to the myth's view of reality, objectivity, knowledge. But it is but a tiny fragment of the world mediated by meaning. For the world mediated by meaning is a world known not by the sense experience of an individual but by the external and internal experience of a cultural community, and by the continuously checked and re-checked judgments of the community. Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing. The criteria of objectivity are not just the criteria of ocular vision; they are the compounded criteria of

experiencing, of understanding, of judging, and of believing. The reality known is not just looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief.

The consequences of the myth are various. The naive realist knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking. The empiricist restricts objective knowledge to sense experience; for him, understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are merely subjective activities. The idealist insists that human knowing always includes understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist's notion of reality, and so he thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real but ideal. Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world; and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence.

Now we are not discussing a merely technical point in philosophy. Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means. An empiricist may argue that quantum theory cannot be about physical reality; it cannot because it deals only with relations between phenomena. An idealist would concur and add that, of course, the same is true of all science and, indeed, of the whole of human knowing. The critical realist will disagree with both: a verified hypothesis

is probably true; and what probably is true refers to what in reality probably is so. To change the illustration, What are historical facts? For the empiricist they are what was out there and was capable of being looked at. For the idealist they are mental constructions carefully based on data recorded in documents. For the critical realist they are events in the world mediated by true acts of meaning. To take a third illustration, What is a myth? There are psychological, anthropological, historical, and philosophic answers to the question. But there also are reductionist answers: myth is a narrative about entities not to be found within an empiricist, an idealist, a historicist, an existentialist horizon.

Enough of illustrations. They can be multiplied indefinitely, for philosophic issues are universal in scope, and some form of naive realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to very many. As soon as they begin to speak of knowing, of objectivity, of reality, there crops up the assumption that all knowing must be something like looking. To be liberated from that blunder, to discover the self-transcendence proper to the human process of coming to know, is to break often long-ingrained habits of thought and speech. It is to acquire the mastery in one's own house that is to be had only when one knows precisely what one is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start. It opens the way to ever further clarifications and developments.

Moral conversion changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values. As children

or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered, compelled to do what is right. As our knowledge of human reality increases, as our responses to human values are strengthened and refined, our mentors more and more leave us to ourselves so that our freedom may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity. So we move to the existential moment when we discover for ourselves that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself. Then is the time for the exercise of vertical freedom and then moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict. Such conversion, of course, falls far short of moral perfection. Deciding is one thing, doing is another. One has yet to uncover and root out one's individual, group, and general bias.¹ One has to keep developing one's knowledge of human reality and potentiality as they are in the existing situation. One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and its elements of decline. One has to keep scrutinizing one's intentional responses to values and their implicit scales of preference. One has to listen to criticism and to protest. One has to remain ready to learn from others. For moral knowledge is the proper possession only of morally good men and, until one has merited that title, one has still to advance and to learn.

Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and

1) See Insight, pp. 218-242.

permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts. It is revealed in retrospect as an under-tow of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as perhaps an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer. It is interpreted differently in the context of different religious traditions. For Christians it is God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us. It is the gift of grace, and since the days of Augustine, a distinction has been drawn between operative and cooperative grace. Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human freedom. Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions.²

As intellectual and moral conversion, so also religious conversion is a modality of self-transcendence. Intellectual conversion is to truth attained by cognitional self-transcendence. Moral conversion is to values apprehended,

2) On grace as operative and cooperative in St. Thomas, see Theological Studies 2(1941), 289-324; 3(1942), 69-88; 375-402; 533-578. In book form, B. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom in Aquinas, London (Darton Longman & Todd) and New York (Herder & Herder) 1971.

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 affirmed, and realized by a ^{moral} ~~real~~ self-transcendence. Religious conversion is to a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realization of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal.

Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relations in terms of sublation. I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense³ rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

So moral conversion goes beyond the value, truth, to values generally. It promotes the subject from cognitional to ^{moral} ~~real~~ self-transcendence. It sets him on a new, existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value. But this in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. He still needs truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can deliberately respond to value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigences of rational consciousness. But now his

3) K. Rahner, Horor des Wortes, München (Kösel) 1963, p. 40.

pursuit of it is all the more secure because he has been armed against bias, and it is all the more meaningful and significant because it occurs within, and plays an essential role in, the far richer context of the pursuit of all values.

Similarly, religious conversion goes beyond moral. Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfilment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose and, as well, there now accrues to man the power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline.

It is not to be thought, however, that religious conversion means no more than a new and more efficacious ground for the pursuit of intellectual and moral ends. Religious loving is without conditions, qualifications, reservations; it is with all one's heart and all one's soul and all one's mind and all one's strength. This lack of limitation, though it corresponds to the unrestricted character of human questioning, does not pertain to this world. Holiness abounds in truth and moral goodness, but it has a distinct dimension of its own.

| It is other-worldly fulfilment, joy, peace, ^{bliss}. In Christian experience these are the fruits of being in love with a mysterious, uncomprehended God. Sinfulness similarly is distinct from moral evil; it is the privation of total loving; it is a radical dimension of lovelessness. That dimension can be hidden by sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers to challenge our resourcefulness, to relax our bodies, to distract our minds. But escape may not be permanent and then the absence of fulfilment reveals itself in unrest, the absence of joy in the pursuit of fun, the absence of peace in disgust — a depressive disgust with oneself or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind.

Though religious conversion sublates moral, and moral conversion sublates intellectual, one is not to infer that intellectual comes first and then moral and finally religious. On the contrary, from a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God's gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion. For the word, spoken and heard, proceeds from and penetrates to all four levels of intentional consciousness. Its content is not just a content of experience but a content of experience and understanding and judging and deciding. The analogy of sight yields the

cognitional myth. But fidelity to the word engages the whole man.

Besides conversions there are breakdowns. What has been built up so slowly and so laboriously by the individual, the society, the culture, can collapse. Cognitional self-transcendence is neither an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible datum of consciousness to be verified. Values have a certain esoteric imperiousness, but can they keep outweighing carnal pleasure, wealth, power? Religion undoubtedly had its day, but is not that day over? Is it not illusory comfort for weaker souls, an opium distributed by the rich to quieten the poor, a mythical projection of man's own excellence into the sky?

Initially not all but some religion is pronounced illusory, not all but some moral precept is rejected as ineffective and useless, not all truth but some type of metaphysics is dismissed as mere talk. The negations may be true, and then they represent an effort to offset decline. But also they may be false, and then they are the beginning of decline. In the latter case some part of cultural achievement is being destroyed. It will cease being a familiar component in cultural experience. It will recede into a forgotten past for historians, perhaps, to rediscover and reconstruct. Moreover, this elimination of a genuine part of the culture means that a previous whole has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to compensate. Further, such elimination, mutilation, distortion will, of course, be admired as the forward march of progress, while the evident

ills they bring forth are to be remedied, not by a return to a misguided past, but by more elimination, mutilation, distortion. Once a process of dissolution has begun, it is screened by self-deception and it is perpetuated by consistency. But that does not mean that it is confined to some single uniform course. Different nations, different classes of society, different age-groups can select different parts of past achievement for elimination, different mutilations to be effected, different distortions to be provoked. Increasing dissolution will then be matched by increasing division, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence. The body social is torn apart in many ways, and its cultural soul has been rendered incapable of reasonable convictions and responsible commitments.

For convictions and commitments rest on judgments of fact and judgments of value. Such judgments, in turn, rest largely on beliefs. Few, indeed, are the people that, pressed on almost any point, must not shortly have recourse to what they have believed. Now such recourse can be efficacious only when believers present a solid front, only when intellectual, moral, and religious skeptics are a small and, as yet, uninfluential minority. But their numbers can increase, their influence can mount, their voices can take over the book market, the educational system, the mass media. Then believing begins to work not for but against intellectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence. What had been an uphill but universally respected course collapses into the peculiarity of an outdated minority.

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3. Dialectic: The Issue

The issue to be confronted in dialectic is twofold, for our functional specialties, history, interpretation, and special research are deficient in two manners.

Friedrich Meinecke has said that every historical work is concerned both with causal connections and with values but that most historians tend to be occupied principally either with causal connections or with values. Moreover, he claimed that history, as concerned with values, "... gives us the content, wisdom, and signposts of our lives."⁴ Carl Becker went even further. He wrote: "The value of history is ... not scientific but moral: by liberating the mind, by deepening the sympathies, by fortifying the will, it enables us to control, not society, but ourselves -- a much more important thing; it prepares us to live more humanely in the present and to meet rather than to foretell the future."⁵ But the functional specialty, history, as we conceived it, was concerned with movements, with what in fact was going forward. It specialized on the end of the third level of intentional consciousness, on what happened. It had nothing to say about history as primarily concerned with values, and rightly so, inasmuch as history as primarily concerned with values pertains to a specialization not on the third but on the fourth level of intentional consciousness.

4) F. Stern, The Varieties of History, New York (Meridian) 1956, p. 272.

5) Charlotte Smith, Carl Becker: On History and the Climate of Opinion, Ithaca, N.Y. (Cornell) 1956, p. 117.

Similarly, our account of interpretation was a matter of understanding the thing, the words, the author, and oneself, of passing judgment on the accuracy of one's understanding, of determining the manner of expressing what one has understood. But besides so intellectual a hermeneutics, there also is an evaluative hermeneutics. Besides potential, formal, and full acts of meaning, there are also constitutive and effective acts of meaning. Now the apprehension of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of intentional response. Such response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings. So evaluative interpretation pertains to a specialty, not on the end of the second level of intentional consciousness, but on the end of the fourth level.

Such, then, is a first task of dialectic. It has to add to the interpretation that understands a further interpretation that appreciates. It has to add to the history that grasps what was going forward a history that evaluates achievements, that discerns good and evil. It has to direct the special research needed for such interpretation and for such history.

There is, as well, a second task. For our account of critical history promised univocal results only if historians proceeded from the same standpoint. But standpoints are many, and the many are of different kinds. There is the coloring that arises from the individuality of the historian and results in perspectivism. There is the inadequacy that is revealed when further data are uncovered and a better understanding achieved. There are, finally, the gross differences due to the

fact that historians with opposed horizons are endeavoring to make intelligible to themselves the same sequence of events.

8 | With such gross differences dialectic is concerned. They are not merely perspectival, for perspectivism results from the individuality of the historian, but these gross differences occur between opposed and even hostile classes of historians. They are not ordinarily to be removed by uncovering further data, for the further data, in all probability, will be as susceptible of opposed interpretations ~~just~~ as the data at present available. The cause of the gross differences is a gross difference of horizon, and the proportionate remedy is nothing less than a conversion.

As history, so also interpretation does not promise univocal results. The interpreter may understand the thing, the words, the author, and himself. But if he undergoes conversion, he will have a different self to understand, and the new understanding of himself can modify his understanding of the thing, the words, and the author.

Special research, finally, is conducted with a view to particular exegetical or historical tasks. The horizons that guide the performance of the tasks also guide the performance of the research. One easily finds what fits into one's horizon. One has very little ability to notice what one has never understood or conceived. No less than interpretation and history, the preliminary special research can reveal differences of horizon.

In brief, the first phase of theology is incomplete,

if it is restricted to research, interpretation, and history. For as we have conceived these functional specialties, they approach but do not achieve an encounter with the past. They make the data available, they clarify what was meant, they narrate what occurred. Encounter is more. It is meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds. Moreover, such an encounter is not just an optional addition to interpretation and to history. Interpretation depends on one's self-understanding; the history one writes depends on one's horizon; and encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test.

4. Dialectic: The Problem

The presence or absence of intellectual, of moral, of religious conversion gives rise to dialectically opposed horizons. While complementary or genetic differences can be bridged, dialectical differences involve mutual repudiation. Each considers repudiation of its opposites the one and only intelligent, reasonable, and responsible stand and, when sufficient sophistication is attained, each seeks a philosophy or a method that will buttress what are considered appropriate views on the intelligent, the reasonable, the responsible.

There results a babel. All three types of conversion may be lacking; any one may be present, or any two, or all three. Even prescinding from differences in the thoroughness of the

conversion, there are eight radically differing types. Moreover, every investigation is conducted from within some horizon. This remains true even if one does not know one operates from within a horizon, or even if one assumes that one makes no assumptions. Whether they are explicitly acknowledged or not, dialectically opposed horizons lead to opposed value judgments, opposed accounts of historical movements, opposed interpretations of authors, and different selections of relevant data in special research.

To a great extent natural science escapes this trap. It limits itself to questions that can be settled through an appeal to observation and experiment. It draws its theoretical models from mathematics. It aims at an empirical knowledge in which value judgments have no constitutive role. Still these advantages do not give complete immunity. An account of scientific method stands to cognitional theory as the less to the more general, so that no firm barrier separates science, scientific method, and general cognitional theory. So mechanist determinism used to be part of science; now it is a discarded philosophic opinion. But in its place there is Niels Bohr's doctrine of complementarity, which includes philosophic views on human knowledge and on reality, and any departure from Bohr's position involves still more philosophy.⁶ Again, while physics, chemistry, biology do not make value judgments, still the transition from liberal to totalitarian regimes has made

6) P.A. Heelan, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, The Hague (Nijhoff) 1965, chapter three.

scientists reflect on the value of science and their rights as scientists, while military and other uses of scientific discoveries have made them advert to their duties.

In the human sciences the problems are far more acute. Reductionists extend the methods of natural science to the study of man. Their results, accordingly, are valid only in so far as a man resembles a robot or a rat and, while such resemblance does exist, exclusive attention to it gives a grossly mutilated and distorted view.⁷ General system theory rejects reductionism in all its forms, but it still is aware of its unsolved problems; for systems engineering involves a progressive mechanization that tends to reduce man's role in the system to that of a robot, while systems generally can be employed for destructive as well as constructive ends.⁸ Gibson Winter in his Elements for a Social Ethic⁹ has contrasted the diverging styles in sociology associated with the names of Talcott Parsons and C. Wright Mills. After noting that the difference in approach led to different judgments on existing society, he asked whether the opposition was

7) F.W. Matson, The Broken Image, Garden City, N.Y. (Doubleday) 1966, chapter two.

8) L. v. Bertalanffy, General System Theory, New York (Braziller) 1968, pp. 10, 52.

9) New York (Macmillan) 1966, pb. 1968.

scientific or merely ideological -- a question, of course, that transported the discussion from the history of contemporary sociological thought into philosophy and ethics. Prof. Winter worked out a general account of social reality, distinguished physicalist, functionalist, voluntarist, and intentionalist styles in sociology, and assigned to each its sphere of relevance and effectiveness. Where Max Weber distinguished between social science and social policy, Prof. Winter distinguishes between philosophically grounded and graded styles in social science and, on the other hand, social policy grounded not only in social science but also in the value judgments of an ethics.

Both in the natural and in the human sciences, then, there obtrude issues that are not to be solved by empirical methods. These issues can be skirted or evaded with greater success in the natural sciences and less in the human sciences. But a theology can be methodical only if these issues are met head on. To meet them head on is the problem of our fourth functional specialty, dialectic.

5. Dialectic: The Structure

The structure of dialectic has two levels. On an upper level are the operators. On a lower level are assembled the materials to be operated on.

The operators are two precepts: develop positions; reverse counter-positions. Positions are statements compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion; they are developed by being integrated with fresh data and further dis-

covery. Counter-positions are statements incompatible with intellectual, or moral, or religious conversion; they are reversed when the incompatible elements are removed.

Before being operated on, the materials have to be assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, selected. Assembly includes the researches performed, the interpretations proposed, the histories written, and the events, statements, movements to which they refer. Completion adds evaluative interpretation and evaluative history; it picks out the one hundred and one "good things" and their opposites; it is history in the style of Burckhardt rather than Ranke.¹⁰ Comparison examines the completed assembly to seek out affinities and oppositions. Reduction finds the same affinity and the same opposition manifested in a number of different manners; from the many manifestations it moves to the underlying root. Classification determines which of these sources of affinity or opposition result from dialectically opposed horizons and which have other grounds. Selection, finally, picks out the affinities and oppositions grounded in dialectically opposed horizons and dismisses other affinities and oppositions.

10) On Burckhardt, E. Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, New Haven (Yale) 1950, chapter 16; G.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, London (Longmans) ²1952, pp. 529-533.

Now this work of assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, and selection will be performed by different investigators and they will be operating from within different horizons. The results, accordingly, will not be uniform. But the source of this lack of uniformity will be brought out into the open when each investigator proceeds to distinguish between positions, which are compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, on the other hand, counter-positions, which are incompatible either with intellectual, or with moral, or with religious conversion. A further objectification of horizon is obtained when each investigator operates on the materials by indicating the view that would result from developing what he has regarded as positions and by reversing what he has regarded as counter-positions. There is a final objectification of horizon when the results of the foregoing process are themselves regarded as materials, when they are assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, selected, when positions and counter-positions are distinguished, when positions are developed and counter-positions are reversed.

6. Dialectic as Method

There has been outlined the structure of a dialectic, and now there must be asked whether it satisfies the definition of method. Clearly enough, it presents a pattern related and recurrent operations. But it is yet to be seen whether the results will be progressive and cumulative. Accordingly, let

us see what happens, first, when the dialectic is implemented by a person that has undergone intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, secondly, when it is implemented by a person that has not yet undergone intellectual or moral or religious conversion.

In the first case, the investigator will know from personal experience just what intellectual, moral, and religious conversion is. He will have no great difficulty in distinguishing positions from counter-positions. When he develops positions and reverses counter-positions, he will be presenting an idealized version of the past, something better than was the reality. Moreover, all such investigators will tend to agree and, as well, they will be supported in part by other investigators that have been converted in one or two of the areas but not in all three.

In the second case, the investigator may have only what Newman would call a notional apprehension of conversion, and so he might complain that dialectic is a very foggy procedure. But at least he would recognize radically opposed statements. In the area or areas, however, in which he lacked conversion, he would be mistaking counter-positions for positions and positions for counter-positions. When he proceeded to develop what he thought were positions and to reverse what he thought were counter-positions, in reality he would be developing counter-positions and reversing positions. While the implementation of dialectic in the first case led to an idealized version of the past, its implementation in the second case does just the opposite; it presents the past as

worse than it really was. Finally, there are seven different ways in which this may be achieved, for the second case includes (1) those without any experience of conversion, (2) those with the experience of only intellectual or only moral or only religious conversion, and (3) those that lack only intellectual or only moral or only religious conversion.

Now let us make this contrast slightly more concrete. Our fourth functional specialty moves beyond the realm of ordinary empirical science. It meets persons. It acknowledges the values they represent. It deprecates their short-comings. It scrutinizes their intellectual, moral, and religious assumptions. It picks out significant figures, compares their basic views, discerns processes of development and aberration. As the investigation expands, there are brought to light origins and turning-points, the flowering and the decadence of religious philosophy, ethics, spirituality. Finally, while all viewpoints may not be represented, there is the theoretical possibility of the fourth functional specialty being carried out in eight quite different manners.

Such divergence, however, is not confined to future investigators. Positions and counter-positions are not just contradictory abstractions. They are to be understood concretely as opposed moments in ongoing process. They are to be apprehended in their proper dialectical character. Human authenticity is not some pure quality, some serene freedom from all oversights, all misunderstanding, all mistakes, all sins. Rather it consists in a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and the withdrawal is never a permanent achievement. It is ever precarious,

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 ever to be achieved afresh, even in great part a matter of uncovering still more oversights, acknowledging still further failures to understand, correcting still more mistakes, repenting more and more deeply hidden sins. Human development, in brief, is largely through the resolution of conflicts and, within the realm of intentional consciousness, the basic conflicts are defined by the opposition of positions and counter-positions.

moral
 Now it is only through the movement towards cognitional and ~~real~~ self-transcendence, in which the theologian overcomes his own conflicts, that he can hope to discern the ambivalence at work in others and the measure in which they resolved their problems. Only through such discernment can he hope to appreciate all that has been intelligent, true, and good in the past even in the lives and the thought of opponents. Only through such discernment can he come to acknowledge all that was misinformed, misunderstood, mistaken, evil even in those with whom he is allied. Further, however, this action is reciprocal. Just as it is one's own self-transcendence that enables one to know others accurately and to judge them fairly, so inversely it is through knowledge and appreciation of others that we come to know ourselves and to fill out and refine our apprehension of values.

Inasmuch, then, as investigators assemble, complete, compare, reduce, classify, select, they bring to light the dialectical oppositions that existed in the past. Inasmuch as they pronounce one view a position and its opposite a

counter-position and then go on to develop the positions and reverse the counter-positions, they are providing one another with the evidence for a judgment on their personal achievement of self-transcendence. They reveal the selves that did the research, offered the interpretations, studied the history, passed the judgments of value.

Such an objectification of subjectivity is in the style of the crucial experiment. While it will not be automatically efficacious, it will provide the open-minded, the serious, the sincere with the occasion to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others but eventually, even about themselves. It will make conversion a topic and thereby promote it. Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of maturation. It is finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is to be intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to love. Dialectic contributes to that end by pointing out ultimate differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one's destiny.

7. The Dialectic of Methods: Part One

Already we have remarked that the presence and absence of intellectual, moral, or religious conversion not only give rise to opposed horizons but also, with the advent of sophistication, generate opposed philosophies, theologies, methods, to justify and defend the various horizons.

Now the task of dealing with these conflicts pertains, not to the methodologists, but to theologians occupied in the fourth functional specialty. Moreover, the theologian's strategy will be, not to prove his own position, not to refute counter-positions, but to exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its roots. In this manner he will be attractive to those that appreciate full human authenticity and he will convince those that attain it. Indeed, the basic idea of the method we are trying to develop takes its stand on discovering what human authenticity is and showing how to appeal to it. It is not an infallible method, for men easily are unauthentic, but it is a powerful method, for man's deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.

that It remains ~~is~~ the methodologist cannot totally ignore the conflict of philosophies or methods. Especially is this so when there are widely held views that imply that his own procedures are mistaken and even wrong-headed. Accordingly, I shall comment briefly, first, on certain contentions of linguistic analysis and, secondly, on certain conclusions that follow from idealist premisses.

In a valuable paper presented at the twenty-third annual convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America Prof. Edward MacKinnon explained:

Since the publication of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations there has been a growing consensus that the meaningfulness of language is essentially public and only derivatively private. Unless this were so language could

not serve as a vehicle for intersubjective communication. The meaning of a term accordingly, is explained chiefly by clarifying its use, or the family of usages associated with it. This requires an analysis both of the way terms function within language, or a study of syntax, and also of the extra-linguistic contexts in which its use is appropriate, or questions of semantics and pragmatics.

A consequence of this position... is that the meaning of a word is not explicable by reference or reduction to private mental acts. The usual scholastic doctrine is that words have meaning because they express concepts. Meanings are primarily in concepts, private mental acts or states, and then derivatively in language which expresses such a concept. Within this view of language, transcendence does not present too formidable a linguistic problem. A word, such as "God" can mean a transcendent being, if this is what one intends in using the word. Comforting as such a simple solution might be, it, unfortunately, will not work.¹¹

This I find a clear and helpful basis of discussion. I wish to clarify my own position by adding a few remarks.

First, I do not believe that mental acts occur without a sustaining flow of expression. The expression may not be linguistic. It may not be adequate. It may not be presented

11) Edward MacKinnon, "Linguistic Analysis and the Transcendence of God," Proceedings, Catholic Theological Society of America, 23 (1968) 30.

to the attention of others. But it occurs. Indeed, Ernst Cassirer has reported that students of aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia universally have found these disorders of speech, knowledge, and action to be interrelated.¹²

Secondly, I have no doubt that the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is essentially public and only derivatively private. For language is ordinary if it is in common use. It is in common use, not because some isolated individual happens to have decided what it is to mean, but because all the individuals of the relevant group understand what it means. Similarly, it is by performing expressed mental acts that children and foreigners come to learn a language. But they learn the language by learning how it ordinarily is used, so that their private knowledge of ordinary usage is derived from the common usage that essentially is public.

Thirdly, what is true of the ordinary meaningfulness of ordinary language is not true of the original meaningfulness of any language, ordinary, literary, or technical. For all language develops and, at any time, any language consists in the sedimentation of the developments that have occurred and have not become obsolete. Now developments consist in discovering new uses for existing words, in inventing new words, and in diffusing the discoveries and inventions. All three are

12) E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, New Haven (Yale) 1957, vol III, p. 220.

a matter of expressed mental acts. The discovery of a new usage is a mental act expressed by the new usage. The invention of a new word is a mental act expressed by the new word. The communication of the discoveries and inventions can be done technically by introducing definitions or spontaneously as when A utters his new verbal constellation, B responds, A grasps in B's response how successful he was in communicating his meaning and, in the measure he failed, he seeks and tries out further discoveries and inventions. Through a process of trial and error a new usage takes shape, and, if there occurs a sufficiently broad diffusion of the new usage, then a new ordinary usage is established. Unlike ordinary meaningfulness, then, unqualified meaningfulness originates in expressed mental acts, is communicated and perfected through expressed mental acts, and attains ordinariness when the perfected communication is extended to a large enough number of individuals.

Fourthly, behind this confusion of ordinary meaningfulness and original meaningfulness there seems to lurk another. For two quite different meanings may be given to the statement that all philosophic problems are linguistic problems. If one conceives language as the expression of mental acts, one will conclude that philosophic problems have their source not only in linguistic expression but also in mental acts, and it could happen that one would devote much more attention to the mental acts than to the linguistic expression. But one may feel that mental acts are just occult entities or, if they really exist, that philosophers are going to keep on floundering indefinitely

if they pay any attention to them or, at least, if they make them basic to their method. On a reductionist view, then, or on a stronger or weaker methodological option, one may decide to limit philosophic discourse or, at least, basic philosophic discourse to the usage of ordinary language illumined, perhaps, by the metalanguages of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

However, if one adopts this approach, one cannot account for the meaningfulness of language by appealing to its originating mental acts. That would be a simple solution. It would be a true solution. But it is not an admissible solution, for it puts mental acts at the basis of the meaningfulness of language and, thereby, it does precisely what the philosophic or the methodological decision prohibited. Moreover, within this horizon, it is not difficult to overlook the distinction between the meaningfulness of language that has become ordinary and the originating meaningfulness it possesses when it is becoming ordinary. On the basis of that oversight one can maintain that the meaningfulness of language is essentially public and only derivatively private.

8. The Dialectic of Methods: Part Two

We have been talking about mental acts and now we must note that such talk can occur in genetically distinct horizons. In any of these the talk may be correct or incorrect but, the more differentiated the horizon, the fuller, the more accurate, and the more explanatory will be the talk.

Of the genetically distinct horizons the principal

ones have been indicated already in the sections on Realms of Meaning and Stages of Meaning in our third chapter on Meaning. In fully differentiated consciousness there are four realms of meaning. There is the realm of common sense with its meanings expressed in everyday or ordinary language. There is the realm of theory where language is technical, simply objective in reference, and so refers to the subject and his operations only as objects. There is the realm of interiority where language speaks indeed of the subject and his operations as objects but, none the less, rests upon a self-appropriation that has verified in personal experience the operator, the operations, and the processes referred to in the basic terms and relations of the language employed. Finally, there is the realm of transcendence in which the subject is related to divinity in the language of prayer and of prayerful silence.

Fully differentiated consciousness is the fruit of an extremely prolonged development. In primitive undifferentiated consciousness the second and third realms do not exist, while the first and fourth interpenetrate. Language refers primarily to the spatial, the specific, the external, the human, and only by special techniques is it extended to the temporal, the generic, the internal, the divine. The advent of civilization means an increasing differentiation of roles to be fulfilled and of tasks to be performed, an ever more elaborate organization and regulation to ensure fulfilment and performance, an ever denser population, and greater and greater abundance. With each of these changes the communicative, cognitive, effective, and

constitutive functions of language expand while, as an added grace, literature develops and differentiates to celebrate human achievement and to deplore human evil, to exhort to high endeavor and to entertain man at leisure.

All this can go forward though thought and speech and action remain within the world of common sense, of persons and things as related to us, of ordinary language. But if man's practical bent is to be liberated from magic and turned towards the development of science, if his critical bent is to be liberated from myth and turned towards the development of philosophy, if his religious concern is to renounce aberrations and accept purification, then all three will be served by a differentiation of consciousness, a recognition of a world of theory. In such a world things are conceived and known, not in their relations to our sensory apparatus or to our needs and desires, but in the relations constituted by their uniform interactions with one another. To speak of things so conceived requires the development of a special technical language, a language quite distinct from that of common sense. No doubt, one has to begin from within the world of commonsense apprehension and speech. No doubt one frequently has to have recourse to this world. But also there is no doubt that these withdrawals and returns only ensure the gradual construction of a quite different mode of apprehension and of expression.

This differentiation of consciousness is illustrated by the Platonic contrast of the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds, of Aristotle's distinction and correlation of what is

first for us and what is first absolutely, of Aquinas' hymns and his systematic theology, of Galilei's secondary and primary qualities, of Eddington's two tables.

In this differentiation, which knows only two realms, technical science, technical philosophy, technical theology are all three located in the realms of theory. All three operate principally with concepts and judgments, with terms and relations, with some approximation to the logical ideal of clarity, coherence, and rigor. All three, finally, deal primarily with objects and, while they may advert to the subject and his operations, still any systematic treatment, as in Aristotle and in Aquinas, is of the subject and the operations as objectified and, indeed, conceived metaphysically in terms of matter and form, of potency, habit, and act, of efficient and final causes.¹³

However, as science develops, philosophy is impelled to migrate from the world of theory and to find its basis in the world of interiority. On the one hand, science gives up any claim to necessity and truth. It settles for verifiable possibilities that offer an ever better approximation to truth. But, on the other hand, its success lends color to totalitarian ambitions, and science conceives its goal as the full explanation of all phenomena.

In this situation philosophy is left with the problems of truth and relativism, of what is meant by reality, of the

13) See above, p.

grounds of theory and of common sense and of the relations between the two, of the grounds of specifically human sciences. It finds itself confronted with the fact that all human knowledge has a basis in the data of experience and, since science seems to have acquired at least squatters' rights to the data of sense, it will have to take its stand on the data of consciousness.

Now just as the world of theory is quite distinct from the world of common sense yet is constructed only through a manifold use of commonsense knowledge and ordinary language, so also the world of interiority is quite distinct from the worlds of theory and of common sense yet it is constructed only through a manifold use of mathematical, scientific, and commonsense knowledge and of both ordinary and technical language. As the world of common sense and its language provide the scaffolding for entering into the world of theory, so both the worlds of common sense and of theory and their languages provide the scaffolding for entering into the world of interiority. But while the transition from common sense to theory introduces us to entities that we do not directly experience, the transition from common sense and theory to interiority promotes us from consciousness of self to knowledge of self. Common sense and theory have mediated to us what is immediately given in consciousness. Through them we have advanced from merely given operations and processes and unities to a basic system of terms and relations that distinguish and relate and name the operations and processes and unities and enable us to speak clearly, accurately, and explanatorily about them.

Such speech, however, is found clear and accurate and explanatory only by those that have done their apprenticeship. It is not enough to have acquired common sense and to speak ordinary language. One has also to be familiar with theory and with technical language. One has to examine mathematics, and discover what is happening when one is learning it and, again, what was happening as it was being developed. From reflecting on mathematics one has to go on to reflecting on natural science, discern its procedures, the relations between successive steps, the diversity and relatedness of classical and statistical methods, the sort of world such methods would reveal -- all the while attending not merely to scientific objects but also attending, as well as one can, to the conscious operations by which one intends the objects. From the precision of mathematical understanding and thought and from the ongoing, cumulative advance of natural science, one has to turn to the procedures of common sense, grasp how it differs from mathematics and natural science, discern its proper procedures, the range of its relevance, the permanent risk it runs of merging with common nonsense. To say it all with the greatest brevity: one has not only to read Insight but also to discover oneself in oneself.

Let us now revert to the relations between language and mental acts. First, then, a language that refers to mental acts has to be developed. As we have noted, the Homeric hero is depicted, not as thinking, but as conversing with a god or goddess, with his horse or a river, with his heart or his temper. Bruno Snell's The Discovery of Mind recounts how the Greeks

gradually developed their apprehension of man and eventually confronted the problems of cognitional theory. In Aristotle there exists a systematic account of the soul, its potencies, habits, operations, and their objects. In some respects it is startlingly accurate, but it is incomplete, and throughout it presupposes a metaphysics. It is in the world not of common sense and not of interiority but of theory. It is to be complemented by the fuller theory of Aquinas.

However, once consciousness has been differentiated and systematic thought and speech about mental acts have been developed, the capacities of ordinary language are vastly enlarged. Augustine's penetrating reflections on knowledge and consciousness, Descartes' Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Pascal's Pensées, Newman's Grammar of Assent all remain within the world of commonsense apprehension and speech yet contribute enormously to our understanding of ourselves. Moreover, they reveal the possibility of coming to know the conscious subject and his conscious operations without presupposing a prior metaphysical structure. It is this possibility that is realized when a study of mathematical, scientific, and commonsense operations bears fruit in experiencing, understanding, and affirming the normative pattern of related and recurrent operations by which we advance in knowledge. Once such an account of knowledge is attained, one can move from the gnoseological question (What are we doing when we are knowing?) to the epistemological question (Why is doing that knowing?) and from both to the metaphysical question (What do we know when we do it?).

From within the world of interiority, then, mental acts as experienced and as systematically conceived are a logical first. From them one can proceed to epistemology and metaphysics. From all three one can proceed, as we attempted in chapter three, to give a systematic account of meaning in its carriers, its elements, its functions, its realms, and its stages.

Still this priority is only relative. Besides the priority that is reached when a new realm of meaning is set up, there also is the priority of what is needed if that process of setting up is to be undertaken. The Greeks needed an artistic, a rhetorical, an argumentative development of language before a Greek could set up a metaphysical account of mind. The Greek achievement was needed to expand the capacities of commonsense knowledge and language before Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman could make their commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge. The history of mathematics, natural science, and philosophy and, as well, one's own personal reflective engagement in all three are needed if both common sense and theory are to construct the scaffolding for an entry into the world of interiority.

The conditions, then, for using mental acts as a logical first are numerous. If one insists on remaining in the world of common sense and ordinary language or if one insists on not going beyond the worlds of common sense and of theory, one's decisions preclude the possibility of entering into the world of interiority. But such decisions on the part of any individual or group are hardly binding on the rest of mankind.

9. The Dialectic of Methods: Part Three

An a priori rejection of the present approach can stem from idealist tendencies no less than from linguistic analysis. Perhaps its clearest expression is to be found in the writings of Karl Jaspers who would contend that our self-appropriation is indeed an Existenzerhellung, a clarification of the subject's own reality, but it is not objective knowledge.

Now it is true, of course, that self-appropriation occurs through a heightening of consciousness and such a heightening reveals not the subject as object but the subject as subject. I should contend, however, that this heightening of consciousness proceeds to an objectification of the subject, to an intelligent and reasonable affirmation of the subject, and so to a transition from the subject as subject to the subject as object. Such a transition yields objective knowledge of the subject just as much as does any valid transition from the data of sense through inquiry and understanding, reflection and judgment. But while that is my view, it is not the view of the idealist tradition which Jaspers inherited.

To understand this tradition in its endless complexity is quite beyond our present concern. But some basic clarification must be attempted at least in terms of points already made. There are, then, two quite disparate meanings of the term, object. There is the object in the world mediated by meaning: it is what is intended by the question, and it is what becomes understood, affirmed, decided by the answer. To

this type of object we are related immediately by our questions and only mediately by the operations relevant to answers, for the answers refer to objects only because they are answers to questions.

But there is another quite different meaning of the term, object. For besides the world mediated by meaning there also is a world of immediacy. It is a world quite apart from questions and answers, a world in which we lived before we spoke and while we were learning to speak, a world into which we try to withdraw when we would forget the world mediated by meaning, when we relax, play, rest. In that world the object is neither named *no/not* or described. But in the world mediated by meaning one can recollect and reconstitute the object of the world of immediacy. It is already, out, there, now, real. It is already: it is given prior to any questions about it. It is out: for it is the object of extraverted consciousness. It is there: as sense organs, so too sensed objects are spatial. It is now: for the time of sensing runs along with the time of what is sensed. It is real: for it is bound up with one's living and acting and so must be just as real as they are.

As there are two meanings of the word, object, so too there are two meanings of the word, objectivity. In the world of immediacy the necessary and sufficient conditions of objectivity is to be a successfully functioning animal. But in the world mediated by meaning objectivity has three components. There is the experiential objectivity constituted by the givenness of the data of sense and the data of consciousness.

There is the normative objectivity constituted by the exigences of intelligence and reasonableness. There is the absolute objectivity that results from combining the results of experiential and normative objectivity so that through experiential objectivity conditions are fulfilled while through normative objectivity conditions are linked to what they condition. The combination, then, yields a conditioned with its conditions fulfilled and that, in knowledge, is a fact and, in reality, it is a contingent being or event.

We have distinguished two worlds, two meanings of the word, object, two quite different criteria of objectivity. But when these distinctions are not drawn, there result a number of typical confusions. The naive realist knows the world mediated by meaning, but he fancies that he knows it by taking a good look at what is going on out there now. The naive idealist, Berkeley, concludes that esse est percipi. But esse is reality affirmed in the world mediated by meaning, while percipi is the givenness of an object in the world of immediacy. The rigorous empiricist, Hume, eliminates from the world mediated by meaning everything that is not given in the world of immediacy. The critical idealist, Kant, sees that a Copernican revolution is overdue. But, so far from drawing the needed distinctions, he only finds another more complicated manner of confusing things. He combines the operations of understanding and reason, not with the data of sense, but with sensitive intuitions of phenomena, where the phenomena are the appearing, if not of nothing, then of the things themselves

which, while unknowable, manage to get talked about through the device of the limiting concept. The absolute idealist, Hegel, brilliantly explores whole realms of meaning; he gives poor marks to naive realists; but he fails to advance to a critical realism, so that Kierkegaard can complain that what is logical also is static, that movement cannot be inserted into a logic, that Hegel's system has room not for existence (self-determining freedom) but only for the idea of existence.

Kierkegaard marks a trend. Where he was concerned with faith, Nietzsche was with power, Dilthey with concrete human living, Husserl with the constitution of our intending, Bergson with his élan vital, Blondel with action, American pragmatists with results, European existentialists with authentic subjectivity. While the mathematicians were discovering that their axioms were not self-evident truths, while the physicists were discovering that their laws were not inevitable necessities but verifiable possibilities, the philosophers ceased to think of themselves as the voice of pure reason and began to be the representatives of something far more concrete and human. Or if they still stressed objective evidence and necessity, as did Husserl, they also were performing reductions that bracketed reality out of the question and concentrated on essence to ignore contingency.

There has resulted not so much a clarification as a shift in the meanings of the terms, objective and subjective. There are areas in which investigators commonly agree, such as mathematics and science; in such fields objective knowledge

is obtainable. There are other areas, such as philosophy, ethics, religion, in which agreement commonly is lacking; such disagreement is explained by the subjectivity of philosophers, moralists, religious people. But whether subjectivity is always mistaken, wrong, evil, is a further question. Positivists, behaviorists, naturalists would tend to say that it is. Others, however, would insist on distinguishing between an authentic and an unauthentic subjectivity. What results from the former is neither mistaken nor wrong nor evil. It just is something quite different from the objective knowledge attainable in mathematics and in science.

In some such context as the foregoing one would have to agree with Jaspers' view that a clarification of subjectivity, however authentic, is not objective knowledge. Still that context survives only as long as there survive the ambiguities underlying naive realism, naive idealism, ^{empiricism,} critical idealism, absolute idealism. Once those ambiguities are removed, once an adequate self-appropriation is effected, once one distinguishes between object and objectivity in the world of immediacy and, on the other hand, object and objectivity in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, then a totally different context arises. For it is now apparent that in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility. Mathematics, science, philosophy, ethics, theology differ in many manners; but they have the common

feature that their objectivity is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.

10. A Supplementary Note

We have distinguished four realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence. We have had occasion to distinguish such differentiations of consciousness as the resolution of common sense into common sense and theory and the further resolution of common sense and theory into common sense, theory, and interiority. But our remarks on transcendence as a differentiated realm have been fragmentary.

What I have referred to as the gift of God's love, spontaneously reveals itself in love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control. In undifferentiated consciousness it will express its reference to the transcendent both through sacred objects, places, times, and actions, and through the sacred offices of the shaman, the prophet, the lawgiver, the apostle, the priest, the preacher, the monk, the teacher. As consciousness differentiates into the two realms of common sense and theory, it will give rise to special theoretical questions concerning divinity, the order of the universe, the destiny of mankind, and the lot of each individual. When these three realms of common sense, theory, and interiority are differentiated, the self-appropriation of the subject leads not only to the objectification of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, but also of religious experience.

Quite distinct from these objectifications of the gift of God's love in the realms of common sense and of theory and from the realm of interiority, is the emergence of the gift as itself a differentiated realm. It is this emergence that is cultivated by a life of prayer and self-denial and, when it occurs, it has the twofold effect, first, of withdrawing the subject from the realm of common sense, theory, and other interiority into a "cloud of unknowing" and then of intensifying, purifying, clarifying, the objectifications referring to the transcendent whether in the realm of common sense, or of theory, or of other interiority.

It is to be observed that, while for secular man of the twentieth century the most familiar differentiation of consciousness distinguishes and relates theory and common sense, still in the history of mankind both in the East and the Christian West the predominant differentiation of consciousness has set in opposition and in mutual enrichment the realms of common sense and of transcendence.