

595BCDTE070

BC70-3A¹

3 Meaning

Meaning. First of all, the carriers of meaning. There are four carriers or embodiments of meaning: intersubjectivity, art, symbol, and language.

1 Intersubjectivity

There is a 'we' that is prior to the 'we' resulting from the mutual love of an 'I' and a 'thou.' It precedes the distinctions of subjects and survives the oblivion of that distinction. It is vital and functional. Just as one spontaneously raises one's arm to protect oneself against a blow or something falling, so too one will spontaneously put out one's arms to prevent someone else from falling. You don't think about it and then do it; you do it and notice, become conscious, know you are doing it while you are doing it.

There is a vital, functional unity that is not deliberate but spontaneous. It is as if 'we' were members of one another prior to our distinctions of each from the others. This intersubjectivity appears not only in mutual aid, spontaneous mutual aid, but also in feelings. See Manfred Frings, *Max Scheler*, Pittsburgh and Louvain, 1965. Scheler distinguishes community of feeling and fellow-feeling. There is community of feeling in the parents' mourning the death of their child. There is fellow-feeling when a third person comes along and shares the sorrow of the parents. He is moved to sorrow because of their sorrow. And again, to put it in the religious context, in church there are people with community of feeling insofar as their minds and hearts are raised to God in prayer, in worship. But there is fellow-feeling when someone comes into the church or into the

¹ June 16 1970, part 1; audio may be found at 59500A0E070. Lonergan begins by recommending his '*Existenz and Aggiornamento*' as useful reading for the next day's lecture on religion.

religious gathering and is moved to devotion because of the devotion of people who are praying.

Besides community of feeling and fellow-feeling Scheler distinguishes psychic contagion. Community of feeling and fellow-feeling have an intentional basis; there is an apprehension of some object giving rise to the feeling, or at least the feeling is directed to some object. Psychic contagion is apart from that intentional element. It shares another's emotion without adverting to the object of the emotion. When other people are laughing, one starts to grin even though one doesn't know what they are laughing at. And if there is a shriek you feel afraid, even though you don't know what is happening to the person shrieking. An onlooker, without undergoing another's ills, is caught up in the feeling of extreme pain expressed on the face of the sufferer.

Such psychic contagion is the mechanism, it seems, of panics, revolutions, demonstrations, strikes, where personal responsibility disappears, intelligence decreases, a domination of drives over thinking emerges, along with readiness to submit to a leader. Such psychic contagion, of course, can be exploited, stirred up by political activists, the entertainment industry, religious and especially pseudo-religious leaders.

Again, intersubjectivity appears in what Scheler calls emotional identification. This also has a vital rather than an intentional basis. It occurs either when personal differentiation has not yet been achieved, or when it has been achieved and goes into abeyance. It has not yet been achieved: the relation between mother and infant, the identifications of primitive mentalities. There is retreat from differentiation, Scheler's explanation of hypnosis. It occurs in sexual intercourse, or when the group mind, the members of the group mind, identify with their leader, when at a sport spectacle you identify with your team and everything the referee says against your team is taken to mean he is a crooked referee, and so on. The group members identify with their leaders, the spectators with their team. In both cases the group coalesces into a single stream of instinct and feeling. Again, in the ancient mysteries the mystics became divine in a state

of ecstasy; and frequently in mystical literature you have descriptions that suggest pantheism.

2 Intersubjective Meaning

Now, besides intersubjectivity in mutual aid and in feeling, there is intersubjective meaning. This is expressed by frowns and smiles and gestures, everything that a person does, or every aspect that his countenance may take on. We will take just one instance of intersubjective meaning: the smile.

First, then, a smile does have a meaning. You don't go about the street smiling at everyone; you would be misunderstood. And if you are misunderstood that shows that there is a meaning there, there is a meaning to the smile.

A smile is highly perceptible. Even though it is involuntary and you want to suppress it, you will be caught, it is a Gestalt. It isn't just such and such movements of facial muscles, and so on, but there is a meaning in that smile. It is the meaning that is apprehended, the Gestalt that is apprehended.

It is natural and spontaneous. Both the meaning of the smile and the act of smiling are natural. We do not learn to smile as we learn to walk, to talk, to swim, etc. Commonly we do not think of smiling and then do it. We just do it. Nor do we learn the meaning of smiling as we learn the meaning of words. We make the discovery on our own, and the meaning of a smile does not seem to vary from culture to culture, as does the meaning of gestures.

I remember my first morning in Rome and I knocked at the Rector's door and he said, venge, venge, venge, and I went out again. But that's the way of saying come in. The smile has something irreducible to it. It cannot be explained by causes outside of meaning. It cannot be elucidated by other types of meaning. This will be illustrated by comparing the meaning of the smile with the meaning of language.

Linguistic meaning tends to be univocal, but smiles have a wide variety of different meanings. There are smiles of recognition, welcome, friendliness, friendship, love, joy, delight, contentment, satisfaction, amusement, refusal, contempt. Smiles may be ironic, sardonic, enigmatic, glad or sad, fresh or weary, eager or resigned. It depends on the context what the smile means.

Linguistic meaning may be true in two ways: true as opposed to mendacious, and true as opposed to false. But a smile, while it can be mendacious – one can smile and smile and be a villain – there isn't the distinction between true and false as there is in linguistic meaning.

Linguistic meaning contains distinctions between what we feel, what we desire, fear, think, know, wish, command, intend. The meaning of a smile is global; it is an element, a determinant, in the interpersonal relations between the person smiling and the person he is smiling at.

Linguistic meaning is objective. It expresses what has been objectified. But the meaning of the smile is intersubjective. It supposes the interpersonal situation with its antecedents. It is a recognition of that situation and a determinant of it. It is an element in the situation as process, a meaning with its significance in the context of antecedent and subsequent meanings.

Finally, the meaning of a smile is not about some object. It is an immediate revelation or betrayal of the subject. It is not the basis of some inference, but rather in the smile one incarnate subject is transparent or, again, hidden to another in a way that antedates all subsequent analysis of body and soul, or of sign and signified.

From smiles one may go on to all the facial or bodily movements or pauses, to all the variations of voice in tone, pitch, volume, and silence, to all the ways in which our feelings are revealed or betrayed by ourselves or are depicted by actors on the stage. They are all cases of intersubjective meaning. But we just want to know that that style, that

form of expression of meaning, that carrying of meaning exists. We will go on to another one, the work of art.

Incidentally, if anyone finds out where my source was for this phenomenology on the smile I would be extremely grateful. I thought it was Susanne Langer but I can't find it in the book of hers that I studied carefully and I need to have a reference for it before I can publish it. I may have thought it out for myself, I don't know.

3 Art

This depends certainly on Susanne Langer's *Feeling and Form*. She defines art as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern.

A pattern may be abstract: a musical score, the indentations in the grooves of a phonograph record. Or it may be concrete: the pattern in these colors, these tones, these volumes, these movements. Concrete patterns consist in the internal relations of colors or tones or volumes or movements. It is not in colors as unrelated and it is not in colors as representative of something else. It is internal to whatever the materials of the art are.

Besides the pattern of what is perceived, there is the pattern of the perceiving, and this pattern of the perceiving is experiential. All perceiving is a selecting and organizing, and what is already patterned is easily perceived. So one can repeat a tune or a melody but not a succession of street noises, because the tune or melody has a pattern and a succession of street noises hasn't. Verse makes information memorable, decoration makes surface visible. Patterns are especially perceptible by drawing on organic analogies, repeated variations and movements. The movement is from root through trunk and branches to leaves and flowers. The complexity mounts, and yet the multiplicity is organized into a whole.

It is a pure pattern. A pattern is pure inasmuch as it excludes alien patterns that instrumentalize experience, where one's senses can become merely an apparatus for

receiving and transmitting signals. You have the ready-made subject in the ready-made world. The light changes and his foot goes on the brake, and it changes again and it goes on the accelerator. They are automatic signals; his sensitivity is not operating on itself, it is just part of a ready-made subject in a ready-made world.

Or you can have sense subordinated to intellectual interests. It is engaged simply in categorizing data presented by sense. Or when you have some a priori theory of experience such as 'what is sensed is objective and what is understood is subjective and projected upon the senses.' In all these cases, sense is alienated by a utilitarianism that attends to objects just in the measure there is something in them for me to get out of them or to learn about them, etc. A pure pattern, then, is one without these alien influences.

In art the pattern must be purely experiential. It is of colors that are visible and not of the stereotypes that are anticipated. In Rome, the German College students wore red cassocks but the red was of all shades, according to the age of the cassock and the number of times it was washed, and so on. But automatically you said that it was red every time. And then shapes, what you see is in perspective but the way you imagine it is the way it is built, it is straight up and down, and so on. So a pure pattern is of the colors, not the real colors, but the visible colors, what's there to be seen and the sounds, and so on.

What accrues to purely experienced colors, sounds, and so on, is their retinue of associations, affects, emotions, incipient tendencies. Out of them may arise a lesson but into them a lesson may not be intruded in the manner of didacticism, moralism, or social realism. To them also there accrues the experiencing subject with his capacity for wonder, for awe and fascination, with his openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, majesty.

The fact that it is a purely experiential pattern with those things that I already mentioned in the way of associations, with the capacities of the subject – that pure pattern is not impoverishment but enrichment. It curtails what is alien and alienating to let

experiencing find its full complement of feeling, its own proper pattern, and take its own line of expansion, development, organization, fulfilment. So experiencing becomes rhythmic, one movement necessitating another and the other in turn necessitating the first. Tensions build up to be resolved; variations multiply and grow in complexity yet remain within an organic unity that eventually rounds itself off.

The aesthetically transformed subject and his world. Artistic meaning when fully developed intends something meant. But the meaning of an experiential pattern is elemental. It is the conscious performing of a transformed subject in his transformed world. This world may be regarded as illusion, or again as more true and more real. We are transported from the space in which we move to the space within the picture, from the time of sleeping and waking, working and resting, to the time of the music, from the pressures and determinisms of home and office, of economics and politics, to the powers depicted in the dance,² [from conversational and media use of language to the vocal tools that focus, mold, grow with consciousness. As his world, so too the subject is transformed. He has been liberated from being a replaceable part adjusted to a ready-made world and integrated within it. He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom.

It is possible to set within the conceptual field this elemental meaning of the transformed subject in his transformed world. But this procedure reflects without reproducing the elemental meaning.]

The work of art reflects without reproducing the elemental meaning. Art criticism and art history go a step further. They are like the thermodynamic equations, which guide our control of heat but they don't make us feel warmer or cooler. Similarly, art criticism

² There is distortion on the recording at this point. The words are filled in from the text of *Method in Theology*.

is not the same thing as making the work of art or appreciating the work of art. It is a further conceptual performance.

The proper expression of the elemental meaning is the work of art itself. That meaning lies within the consciousness of the artist but, at first, it is only implicit, veiled, unrevealed, unobjectified. Aware of it, the artist has yet to get hold of it; he is impelled to behold, inspect, dissect, enjoy, repeat it; and this means objectifying, making explicit, unveiling, revealing. This unveiling, revealing, involves insight into the elemental meaning, a grasp of the commanding form that has to be expanded, worked out, developed, and the subsequent process of working it out, adjusting, correcting, completing the initial insight. The result is an idealization of the original experiential pattern. Art is not autobiography. It is not telling one's tale to the psychiatrist. It is grasping what is or seems significant, of moment, concern, import, to man. In a sense it is truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point. It is the central moment with its proper implications that unfold without the distortions, interferences of the original pattern.

The proper apprehension and appreciation of the work of art is not any conceptual clarification or judicial weighing of evidence. The work of art is an invitation to participate, to try it, to see for oneself. As the mathematician withdraws from the sciences that verify to explore mere possibilities of organizing data, so the work of art invites us to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world. And, again, if you want the details, the application of that general analysis of the work of art in drawing and painting, statuary and architecture, music and dance, epic, lyric and dramatic poetry, see Susanne Langer's *Feeling and Form*.

4 Symbols

Besides intersubjective meaning and artistic meaning, there is symbolic meaning. By a symbol I understand an affect-laden image, an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling. We shall discuss, first, feelings; second, objects and images; third, symbolic evocation; fourth, some attempts at explaining symbols.

First of all, feelings are related to objects, to one another, and to their subject. They are related to objects: one desires food, fears pain, enjoys a meal, regrets a friend's illness. They are related to one another: one desires the good that is absent, hopes for the good that is sought, enjoys the good that is present, fears absent evil, becomes disheartened at its approach, sad in its presence.

Again, feelings are related to one another through personal relationships: so love, gentleness, tenderness, intimacy, union go together; similarly, alienation, hatred, harshness, violence, cruelty form a group; so too there are such sequences as offense, contumacy: I hurt you and I'm glad, contumacy-judgment-punishment and, again, offense-repentance-satisfaction-forgiveness.

Feelings may conflict yet come together: one may desire despite fear, hope against hope, mix joy with sadness, love with hate, and so on.

Finally, feelings are related to their subject: they are the mass and momentum and power of conscious living. We are concerned with a world mediated by meaning because of feelings. The mass and momentum of conscious living lies in feelings. Feelings are the actuation of affective capacities, dispositions, habits, and the effective orientation of one's being.

Secondly, objects and images. The same objects need not evoke the same feelings in different subjects, and, inversely, the same feelings need not evoke the same symbolic images. This difference in affective response may be accounted for by differences in age, sex, education, state of life, temperament, existential concern. More fundamentally, there is in the human being an affective development that may suffer aberrations. It is the

history of that process that terminates in the person with a determinate orientation in life and with determinate affective capacities, dispositions, and habits. What these latter are in any individual can be specified by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols.

Again, the same affect may be evoked by very different symbols. These many symbols are said to be affectively undifferentiated. They are a multitude, yet they result from the same affective orientation and disposition. They are interchangeable, and they may be combined to increase their intensity and reduce ambiguity.

Such combination and organization reveal the difference between the aesthetic and the symbolic; the monsters of mythology are just bizarre; they are not artistic, but they do represent an affective development. St George and the Dragon is ascensional symbolism. St George is on the horse; he is free to use his hands, he has a spear in hand; he has great mobility. The Dragon is on the ground breathing smoke and fire, it is scaly, it is in the mire. It has everything that a person with ascensional development recognizes; it is connected with the child learning to keep his balance, stand on his feet and keep his balance, and ascensional symbolism is connected with that and is represented by this mass of all the symbols that you associate with falling, which is bad; and standing on your feet, being free to use your hands, standing up and being free to move about. You have the multiplication of the things that are bad in the Dragon and the things that are good in St George, all the symbols; and they are massed together to make the thing all the more precise and effective.

Compound affects call for compound symbols, and each member of the compound may be a conglomeration of undifferentiated or only slightly differentiated symbols. Jonah and the Whale is the opposite one. The drowning man is swallowed by the monster, and three days later he is vomited up on shore, quite unharmed. Besides falling there is the going down and it is very, very good, and into the dark, and all the rest of it.

A transvaluation and transformation of symbols is involved in affective development or aberration. What before was moving no longer moves; what before did not move now is moving. The symbols change to express new affective capacities and dispositions. The conquest of terror replaces the Dragon, as insignificant fancy, with the meaning of Jonah's whale. Inversely, symbols that do not submit to transvaluation and transformation seem to point to a block in development. It means one thing for a child, another for a man to be afraid of the dark.

Thirdly, symbolic evocation. Symbols obey the laws of image and feeling, not of logic. Comparison of the logical and the symbolic. The logical: the class; the symbol: the representative figure. Logic wants terms to be univocal; the symbol is a wealth of multiple meanings, like the smile. Logic wants rigorous proofs; the symbol overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in a meaning opposed to the meaning that is rejected. Logic: the principle of excluded middle, and the symbolic: the *coincidentia oppositorum*. Logic negates, symbol rejects by overstatement. Logic is linear, and the symbol condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns.

The power of the symbol is to recognize and express what logical discourse abhors: the existence of internal tensions, incompatibilities, conflicts, struggles, destructions. A dialectical or methodological viewpoint can embrace what is concrete, contradictory, and dynamic. But the symbol does this spontaneously before either logic or dialectic were conceived and still does it for those unfamiliar with logic and dialectic. Finally, it does it in a way that is still needed even though you have arrived at logic and dialectic, namely, it meets the need for internal communication. Organic and psychic vitality must reveal themselves in intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche.

Our apprehension of values occurs in intentional responses, in feelings: we have the need for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings.

It is through symbols that the mind and the body, the heart and the body, the mind and heart, communicate.

The proper meaning of the symbol is in this internal communication. 'Sleep knits up the raveled sleeve of care,' and it does so through the dream. And the dreams automatically produce their effects, it is something that occurs apart from psychiatry. This is the elementary meaning, not yet objectified: a smile prior to a phenomenology of a smile has its meaning, and the purely experiential pattern prior to the work of art has its meaning. It is a meaning that fulfils its function in the imagining or perceiving subject as his conscious intentionality develops or goes astray or both, as he takes his stance to nature, with his fellow men, and before God. It is a meaning that has its proper context in the process of internal communication in which it occurs, and it is to that context with its associated images and feelings, memories and tendencies that the interpreter has to appeal if he would explain the symbol. The meaning of the symbol is the meaning it has in this individual, in his associations, and so on.

The interpretation of the symbol goes beyond the symbol. It is the transition from an elemental meaning, in which there is no distinction between meaning and meant, to a linguistic meaning. The context of linguistic meaning involves possible relations, clues, suggestions in the construction of the elemental context of the symbol. Such interpretative contexts are many, and, in part, this multiplicity reflects the many ways in which human beings can develop and suffer deviation. There are therapeutic interpretative systems: originally, the psychoanalysis of Freud, the individual psychology of Adler, the analytic psychology of Jung. But the initial oppositions are diminishing. Antoine Vergote, professor of religious psychology at Louvain, has a book, *Psychologie religieuse*, published in Brussels. He is quite Freudian but he always able to draw the line when Freud inserts his 19th-century mechanism, but he is quite Freudian. But there are other people that tend to combine Freud and Jung, for example, Charles Baudouin. Ricoeur's account of Freud is that what is explicit in Freud is an archaeology, but at the

same time for an archaeology to be significant there is implicit a teleology that Freud never acknowledges. It is the teleology that Jung stresses. Carl Rogers doesn't bother too much about any of the mythologies; he just wants to be helpful to this person, let him find what his feelings are. There is Frank Lake; his theory is Pavlov and his technique is LSD 25 and he has his patients reliving birth traumata, and so on.

Besides the therapeutic interpretations of symbols there are the non-therapeutic. Gilbert Durand, *Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire*, proceeds from a physiological basis in three dominant reflexes, maintaining one's balance, swallowing – Jonah and the Whale – A dominant reflex is that if anything tends to interrupt it or interfere with it, it takes over. If you are starting to fall, your attention simply goes to maintaining one's balance. If anything happens to your swallowing your attention goes to that entirely. These dominant reflexes are the basis on which he organizes whole ranges of symbols. His three dominant reflexes are: maintaining balance, swallowing food, and mating.

Mircea Eliade collects, compares, integrates, explains primitive religious symbols. Northrop Frye, *Fables of Identity*, combines cycles of day and night, of the four seasons, and the course of an organism's growth and decline to construct a matrix from which the symbolic narratives of literature can be derived. Psychologists have turned from the sick to the well with their life-long growth, notably, Abraham Maslow, Binswanger, Rollo May, Frankl and his logotherapy. The most significant, from a basic viewpoint, are the existential people like Rollo May, Frankl, Binswanger.

So we have had three carriers of meaning: intersubjectivity, art, and symbol. Next there is linguistic meaning.

5 Linguistic Meaning

By its embodiment in language, in a set of conventional signs, meaning finds its greatest liberation. For conventional signs can be multiplied indefinitely. They can be used reflexively in the analysis and control of linguistic meaning itself. In contrast intersubjective and symbolic meanings seem restricted to the spontaneities of people living together, and whatever conventions art may develop are limited by the materials in which colors and shapes, solid forms and structures, sounds and movements are embodied. Language is a completely free development, you can keep on adding words indefinitely.

This is illustrated by the story of Helen Keller's discovery of meaning in the shapes and signs that her teacher was putting on the palm of her hand. Her first discovery is water, and the description is stunning. That experience, as described in the life of Helen Keller, reveals why the ancients and primitives have such a great esteem for language. Cassirer, in the third volume of his *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, has about seventy pages on the pathology; if a person is unable to speak, aphasia, for any reason whatever, it is not only his speech that is impaired but his perceptions, his thought, and his action. Speech is an integral part of human knowledge. Just as you have to have the images to have the insights, and the data to have the judgment, so conceiving and judging need their substrate in an expression of some sort or other. If that expression is failing, then the whole process is lopsided.

Consequently, it is sometimes said that the ancients had a great esteem for the name because they compounded the name with the essence. But essence is a Socratic concern; and this esteem for the name is that it enables consciousness to focus precisely on this object, to construct its world, and to orientate itself within its world.

Conscious intentionality develops in and is molded by its mother tongue. We not only learn the names of what we see but can attend to and talk about the things we can name. Available language takes the lead. It picks out aspects of things that are pushed into the foreground, relations between things that are stressed, movements that demand

attention. So different languages develop in different manners, and the best of translations can express not the exact meaning of the original, but the closest approximation possible in another tongue.

Besides molding developing consciousness, language structures the world about the subject. Spatial adverbs and adjectives relate places to the place of the speaker. The tenses of verbs relate times to his present. Moods correspond to his intention to wish, or exhort, or command, or declare. Voices make verbs active and passive, shift subjects to objects and objects to subjects. Grammar on the one hand almost gives us Aristotle's categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, habit, and Aristotle's logic and theory of science on the other hand are deeply rooted in the grammatical function of predication.

As language develops there emerges a distinction between ordinary, technical, and literary language. Ordinary language is the vehicle in which the human community conducts its collaboration in the day-to-day pursuit of the human good. It is the language of home and school, of industry and commerce, of enjoyment and misfortune, of the mass media and casual conversation. Such language is transient; it expresses the thought of the moment at the moment for the moment. It is elliptical. It knows that a wink is as good as a nod, that full statement is superfluous and would only irritate. It is based in common sense, where by common sense (*Insight*, chapter 6, the beginning of it) is meant a nucleus of habitual insights such that the addition of one or two more will bring one to the understanding of any of an open series of concrete situations – e.g., how to behave, what to say, how to say it, what to do, how to do it, in the currently emerging situation. Ordinary language is centered in the subject: it regards the world as related to him, as the field of his behavior, influence, action, as colored by his desires, hopes, fears, joys, sorrows. As shared by a group, the nucleus of insights is the common sense of the group; when it is just personal, it is thought odd; when it pertains to the common sense of a different group, it is considered strange. Common sense is not one; there are as many

kinds of common sense as are there are villages; common sense in England is not common sense in the States, nor is it the same as in France, and so on.

Technical language. The commonsense development of human intelligence yields not only common but also complementary results. Primitive fruit gatherers differentiate into gardeners, hunters, and fishers. New groups and ends and tasks call forth new words. The continued division of labor fosters the specialization of language. A distinction emerges between words in common use that refer to what is generally known about particular tasks and, on the other hand, the technical words employed by craftsmen, or experts, or specialists, when they speak among themselves. Primitives have no technical language (so you know what people who object to technical language are). Eventually, human intelligence shifts from common sense to theoretical development, when inquiry is pursued for its own sake, when logics and methods are formulated, when a tradition of learning is established, different branches are distinguished, and specialties multiply. And then you have technical language in the very strong sense.

Literary language, finally, is the vehicle of a work, a *poiēma*, to be learnt by heart or to be written out. While ordinary language is content to supplement the common understanding and common feeling already guiding common living, literary language not only aims at a fuller statement but also attempts to make up for the lack of mutual presence. It would have the listener or reader not only understand but also feel. Where the technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float somewhere between logic and symbol. So it is not simply logic. It is also guided by the laws of image and affect that govern the symbol. The analysis of literary language by the logical mind involves an intrusion of non-literary criteria. The expression of feeling is symbolic, and if words owe a debt to logic, symbols follow the laws of image and feelings. Literal meaning literally expressed is a later ideal, and only with enormous effort and care can it be realized, as the tireless labors of linguistic analysts seem to show.

So much for carriers of meaning: intersubjectivity, art, symbols, and language in its ordinary, its technical, and its literary use. Now the elements of meaning.