Chapter I

The New Context

The old context was woven by Aristotle. The writings ascribed to him had treated poetry and rhetoric, physics and biology, psychology and logic, ethics and politics, metaphysics and natural theology. They did so with the power of informed, precise, coherent, all-embracing thought. They possessed the depth and the range that might integrate a whole culture. When, then, mediaeval theologians reinterpreted Aristotle and formulated their Christian faith on that basis, not merely were they using a philosophy to perfect a theology but, what is far more important, they were unifying a culture and placing their theology in a context that let it reach into all departments of life and thought.

The strength and suppleness of that context are not to be overlooked. For a context resides not in some set of theorems that can be corrected and revised but rather in a power of mind that gives different disciplines a common vocabulary and style, that moulds them by a common outlook, that knits them together in a coherent view of nature, man, and God. So it was that commentators variously interpreted the Aristotelian books, that the learned added corrections, that thinkers distinguished, adjusted, and reconciled, that innovators denied and rejected, and yet the context remained. It remained because the many and divergent activities rested on familiar assumptions, which had an Aristotelian source; because they proceeded according to rules, which Aristotle had formulated; because they pursued ideals, which Aristotle had set forth; above all, because they were fragmentary and aimed more at partial change than at total transformation. For the fact

~~Indeed, the fact~~ of the matter seems to be that, once a ~~context~~ context has been established in a culture, it can be expelled only by the enormous labour of constructing a new context.[1]

1) The point has recently been made by Professor Butterfield in his Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800, New York (Free Press Paperback) 1965. He argued that, while ~~pointed out that~~ new scientific discoveries were accumulating from the beginning of the fourteenth century, ~~but that~~ they could neither break out of the Aristotelian context ~~in~~ nor be satisfactorily formulated within it. Only in the final decades of the seventeenth century was modern science in a position to construct its own context and it is only from that time that there has existed what today is meant by modern science.

But whatever the vitality that Aristotelianism once exhibited, today it cannot be invoked as a principle of integration. The reason for this is not merely that so much more ~~it~~ now is known so much better than by the ancients. The decisive point lies in differences of style, method, outlook, approach. Symbolic Logic contrasts with Aristotelian logic. Modern science does not conform to the demands of the Posterior Analytics. Modern history is a scientific discipline for which Aristotle made no provision. Modern philosophy, to deal with its problems, has as much need to go beyond Aristotelian methods as modern geometry has to go beyond the methods of Euclid. Not only does Aristotle no longer offer an encyclopedia of ~~learning, but an up-to-date revision on the old model is a self-contradictory notion.~~

learning, but there cannot be an up-to-date revision on the old model, for the old model itself is ~~[illegible]~~ out-of-date.

A new context, then, is needed. Manifestly it is needed if theology is not to remain in a ghetto isolated from the rest of modern culture. But it is needed even more if theology is to put its own house in order. There old and new are in conflict. Traditional teaching remains largely within an implicit Aristotelian context. But teaching rests on investigation, and all the basic areas of theological investigation have been penetrated, taken over, occupied by modern scholarship, modern methods in history, modern notions of science. The new procedures are too widely employed and too generally accepted for them to be dislodged. At the same time, they cannot be fitted into the old Aristotelian context. So, if theological investigation and theological teaching are once more to go hand in hand, a new context must be developed.

Work towards the new context has already begun, as is witnessed for example by Karl Rahner's Kleines theologisches Wörterbuch (Freiburg 1961) and by Heinrich Fries' editing of a two-volume Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe (München ~~1962 and 1963). But our present purpose is far less detailed~~ 1962 and 1963). But our concern is limited to method and, accordingly, the present chapter need only indicate the main directions involved in constructing the new context. We shall point, then, to transitions (1) from logic to method, (2) from the Posterior Analytics to the modern notion of science, (3) from human nature to human history, (4) from soul to subject, and (5) from ~~philosophy as handmaid~~ to transcendental method. As will be observed from the foregoing list,

first principles

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attention centres on changes in norms and procedures. Because it centres on changes, the new context will be presented in its relations to the old. Because the changes are in norms and procedures, they directly affect not the content of theology but the method by which it is developed and the context in which it is expressed.

1. From Logic to Method

Distinguish (1) logical ideals, (2) formal logics, and (3) applications of a formal logic.

Logical ideals may be illustrated by clarity, coherence, and rigour. Clarity excludes ambiguous terms. Rigour demands that conclusions follow from premisses with necessity. Coherence excludes contradictions.

A formal logic embodies logical ideals in general descriptions, explanations, and rules. Such an embodiment, however, adds to the ideals and, as such additions may be made from different sources, there arises the possibility of different formal logics. So Aristotelian logic takes its peculiar shape and direction from its embodiment of logical ideals in grammatical and linguistic forms. In contrast, symbolic logic embodies similar ideals mathematically: terms are related through their denotations; propositions are related through a theory of combinations; inferences are conducted by continuous enthymeme with, at most, an acknowledgement of the major premiss in a marginal note.

A formal logic is applied not incidentally or partially but fully when a doctrine is formalized, that is, when the whole doctrine is expressed in exact accord

with the requirements of a formal logic. As a brief reflection will reveal, such a realization of the logical ideals demands of a doctrine the perfection of complete immobility. The ideal of clarity demands that all terms be unambiguous; for them to be unambiguous, their meaning must be fixed, defined, differentiated from every neighbouring meaning; it follows that meanings still in process of development would have to be arrested in their course to cannot be admitted. Again, the ideal of coherence demands that opposed statements be assigned to distinct and non-communicating universes of discourse; they cannot be left standing side by side as contrary yet complementary expressions of a truth that is yet to be discovered. Rigour, finally, demands that conclusions follow necessarily from their premisses; but if they follow necessarily, they must also follow at once. If the premisses are true now, the conclusion ~~must now be true; if the conclusion is not true today but will be true tomorrow, the premisses cannot be true today. So a formalized doctrine may be about changing objects, but it itself cannot be in process of development~~ must now be true; if now the conclusion is false, ~~mmmmpm~~ one at least of the premisses is now false. So a formalized doctrine in the fixity of its terms, the strict coherence of its statements, the instantaneousness immediacy of all its conclusions, conforms indeed to a valid ideal of the human mind and sets a goal which scientific expression may always hope ~~eventually~~ to attain. But besides the goal, there is also the process of attainment and, when we turn to that process, we turn from logic to method.

In general, a method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each is related to the others, where the set of relations form a pattern, where ~~the pattern~~

the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, and where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely.

So in the natural sciences method inculcates a spirit of inquiry, and inquiries recur. It insists on accurate observation and description: both observations and descriptions recur. Above all it praises discovery, and discoveries recur. It demands the formulation of discoveries in hypotheses, and hypotheses recur. It requires the deduction of the implications of hypotheses, and deductions recur. It keeps urging that experiments be devised and performed to check the implications of hypotheses against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur.

These distinct and recurrent operations are related. Inquiry transforms mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation. What is observed is pinned down by description. Contrasting observations or descriptions give rise to problems, and problems are solved by discoveries. What is discovered, is expressed in a hypothesis. From the hypothesis are deduced its implications, which suggest experiments to be performed. The operations are related; the relations form a pattern; and the pattern defines a right way of going about scientific investigation.

However, our very general definition of method does not bring out the specific character of scientific method, which is both cumulative and progressive. The wheel of method always turns; the wheel of scientific method not only turns but also rolls along. To repeat the method of making a motor-car is to make another motor-car, but successive applications of scientific method add new results to old and,

However, if scientific procedure satisfies a very general definition of method, it also has its own specific character. Unlike the assembly line, science does not keep repeating the same product; for it is cumulative and progressive. The experiments devised to test an hypothesis lead to new observations that may or may not confirm the hypothesis. In so far as they do, they reveal that the investigation is not entirely on the wrong track. In so far as they do not, they lead to a modification of the hypothesis and, in the limit, to new discovery, new hypothesis, new deduction, and new experiments. The wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along. The field of observed data keeps broadening. New discoveries are added to old. New hypotheses and theories express not only the new insights but also all that was valid in the old, to give method its cumulative character and to engender the conviction that, however remote the goal of complete explanation may still be, at least we are nearer to it now than we were.

We have been engaged in a summary contrast of logic and method. Both are normative: they lay down rules to guide our intellectual activities. But logical norms regard contents: assemblies of terms, relations, propositions. The norms of method regard operations. It is true, of course, that logic may be said to deal with such operations as defining terms positing or and postulating or deriving propositions; and this is important for such operations occur when prescribes description

Very summarily we have been attempting to indicate the general character of logic and of method. Logic is concerned to formulate an ideal. When the realization of the ideal is envisaged strictly, it is seen at once to be a rare attainment. It is possible, for instance, to formalize Euclidean geometry, but to do so it is necessary to effect a rather radical

Such very summarily is method in the natural sciences. It would be premature for us to proceed at once to an account of methods in other disciplines. But at least we can say immediately that we do not conceive a method as a set of rules that will produce satisfactory results when blindly followed by anyone. A method states what occurs when a task is performed properly. In any developing science or discipline such proper performance includes discovery as its principal achievement. But the occurrence of discoveries follows statistical laws: they can be made more probable; they cannot be assured by a set of prescriptions.

Again, we have spoken of a transition from logic to method. By this we do not mean that logic is supplanted and abolished. On the contrary, such operations as describing, defining problems, formulating hypotheses, deducing implications are fall under the directives of logic and, no less, essential parts of the pattern laid down by a method. A transition to method, then, does not mean the omission of logical operations but the explicit addition of other activities such as inquiry, observation, discovery, experimentation, verification. It means the acknowledgement not only of the ideal goal which logic can define but also of the less perfect process in which terms are still developing, propositions are inadequate, conclusions are more or less probable. It means the acceptance of the less perfect process ~~as the normal state of affairs for, in the sciences, the solution of one problem usually uncovers the existence of further problems, and the advance of theory only broadens the field of data that can be apprehended and investigated.~~

as the normal state of affairs for, in the sciences, results are not definitive, the solution of one problem reveals the existence of other problems, and the advance of theory only broadens the field of data to be apprehended and investigated. Above all, the transition to method means that the process of coming to know has its own proper norms, that it is idle to expect the process to conform to ideals that imply the perfection of immobility, that the process as process has its own perfection in its cumulative and progressive character.

2. From the Posterior Analytics to Modern Science

While modern science is a continuation and development of its ancient and mediaeval antecedents, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that the later differs from the earlier only in procedures, content, extent, efficacy. These differences are of course enormous. But behind them there are less palpable but more fundamental differences in the anticipations and criteria that explicitly or implicitly direct investigations to make them fruitful or sterile. It is with these underlying, directive, dynamic factors that we are here concerned, and we may begin our brief summary by noting Aristotle's contrast of epistêmê and doxa, of science and opinion.

For Aristotle, then, science was a matter of knowing the cause, knowing that it was the cause, and knowing that the effect could not be other than it was.[1] In brief, the object of science was causal, necessary, immutable. Opinion, in contrast, was true knowledge of matters of fact where, however, the fact was not necessary or, if it were, then its necessity was not apprehended.[2]

The vehicle of Aristotelian science was, naturally enough, the syllogism. Syllogisms express knowledge of causes inasmuch as the middle term names the end, agent, matter, or form.[3] They express necessary knowledge inasmuch as the premisses are per se predications in which essential attributes are assigned to commensurate subjects.[4] Finally, besides the premisses that may be derived syllogistically, there are those that are true, first, underived, better known than their implications and related to them as cause to effect.[5] Obviously the existence of Aristotelian science depends on the existence of these basic premisses in each field; but

1) Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b 10 ff.

2) Ibid., I, 33, 88b 32 ff.

3) Ibid., II, 11, 94a 20 ff.

4) Ibid., I, 6, 74b 5 ff. As the necessary and essential also is eternal, various difficulties and solutions arose. Aristotle remarked that the attributes of perishable things either cannot be demonstrated or else the relevant syllogism will be 'mixed' with one premiss necessary and the other contingent (Ibid., I, 8, 75b 21 ff.). Aquinas appealed to the immutability of the abstract: Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae et immobiles, quaedam contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse scientiae. In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4m. On the intricate problem of scientific prediction, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, pp. 649-652.

5) Post. Anal., I, 2, 71b 19 ff.

while Aristotle does describe how our knowledge of principles arises,[6] while his description fits quite accurately the manner in which scientific discoveries are made, still such discoveries do not yield the knowledge of necessary causes and immutable effects demanded by the Posterior Analytics.

What the scientist discovers is not a truth but an hypothesis, not a necessity but a possibility. For instance, a free fall is a constant acceleration. The matter has stood the test of centuries. But it has done so, not because bodies must fall that way, not because the free fall cannot be other than it is, but simply because out of many hypothetical possibilities the simplest verifiable formula is the constant acceleration. Moreover, what holds for the free fall, holds for all other natural laws and, no less, for the theories and systems that relate them to one another. All such laws, theories, systems are subject to revision; they have a claim on our assent, not because of any intrinsic necessity, but only because they happen to be verified; and the moment further data begin to tell against them, they become questionable.[7]

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6) Ibid., II, 19.

7) In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was still common to speak of the necessary and immutable laws of nature and even of the iron laws of economics. This trend has been reversed by the refutation of the uniqueness of Euclidean geometry, by the successful use in physics of non-Euclidean geometry, by the alternative probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and by the limitations placed on deductive systems by theorems of the Gödelian type. On these see J. Ladrière, Les limitations internes des formalismes, Louvain 1957. On mathematical principles, M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, London 1958

and 1962, pp. 187-193; B. Lonergan, Insight, London and New York 1957, pp. 304 ff.

We have been touching on the crucial difference between the Aristotelian and the modern notions of science. On the Aristotelian notion science is concerned with the necessary and immutable. On the modern notion necessity and immutability have no more than a marginal significance. Science is concerned with the intelligibility, not that must be, but that can be. Of itself, such intelligibility is hypothetical; essentially, it stands in need of the complement of verification; and any single verification yields no more than a probable confirmation.

From the crucial difference other differences follow. The already mentioned shift from logic to method is but part of the larger shift from the Posterior Analytics to the modern notion of science. Logic might suffice to deal with knowledge of necessity and immutability. But one has to move beyond a consideration of logical operations and take into account inquiry, observation, discovery, experimentation, verification, if one is to proceed in an orderly and effective fashion when possible hypotheses are legion and only cumulative verifications are significant.

Again, we mentioned above that Aristotle contrasted science and opinion. As science was of the necessary, so opinion regarded the contingent. But modern science, like Aristotle's opinion, is concerned with the contingent; and so on each issue we seek the best scientific opinion that is at the time available.

On similar grounds Aristotle contrasted theory and practice. Practice is concerned with the contingent, with things that can be other than they are. It follows that science cannot be practical, for science is concerned with the necessary, with what cannot be other than it is. Science accordingly must be simply contemplative and, in that sense, theoretical. Now in the modern context the term, theory, cannot properly be given any such connotation. For modern science deals with the contingent; it grounds endless practical applications; to make modern theory is continuous with practice. So far from being opposed to one another, theory and practice now are two stages in man's dealing with the same objects.

Further, to find necessity in a manifestly contingent world, the medieval notion of science retreated to the universal and the abstract. In contrast, modern science aims at the complete explanation of all phenomena. Though it has to use abstract terms, still it also is extremely resourceful in abstract terms and universal propositions, still it regards them as limitations and strives to surmount them. Though it cannot master the concrete in its all but unlimited complexity, still it constantly endeavours to come as close as possible to such mastery, and it is extremely resourceful in inventing conceptual tools and imaginative models to advance ever further the understanding of concrete processes.

There follows an enormous difference in sheer bulk. An Aristotelian science could be a habit tucked in an individual's mind and, as it purported to be certain knowledge, it would be passed on from generation to generation. But the positive content of a modern science is only probable; it is continuously in process of development;

its extent is so vast that it cannot be encompassed by any single mind; and its sustained development calls for the assembled resources and far-flung collaboration of the world's scientific communities.

Finally, on the modern conception there is a science where there is employed a method yielding from the cumulative advancement of knowledge. Methods differ from subject to subject, but each is directed by its own proper method, and each is scientific by that fact and not by its approximate resemblance to something else. In contrast, the Aristotelian conception of necessary conclusions following rigorously from necessary principles was an ideal type: it was thought to be realized in arithmetic and geometry;[8]

8) See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, p. 14.

elsewhere it was approximated to a greater or less extent. As Christian theology was at the farthest remove from the necessitarian ideal, it received the least help and guidance from the Aristotelian conception. Today theology has nothing to lose and much to gain by severing itself from the Aristotelian ideal type and conceiving itself on the basis of its own proper method. For that ideal is now an anachronism: it is not entertained in natural and human science; mathematicians commonly aim no higher than axioms that are not contradictory; philosophers take their stand not on necessity but on matters of fact; in theology, finally, that ideal was never more than an embarrassment for, were it realized, the result would be a rationalism or a semi-rationalism. It is time for theology to work out its own method and be just itself.

4. From Soul to Subject

If Aristotelians down the centuries have had little to say about consciousness and the subject, they have been very competent about soul. The little treatise, De anima, expanded a basic metaphysical scheme (1) to define souls in general, (2) to distinguish different kinds of soul, and (3) to direct investigation of the different kinds. Common to the souls of plants, animals, and men, is the relation of form to matter; and so soul is defined as the first act of an organic body.[1] But one kind of soul differs from another. Such differences are rooted in essences but manifested in the difference of potencies; and as essence is known through potency, so potency is known through act, and act is known through object.[2] Hence, psychological investigation is to begin from objects, proceed from objects to acts, from acts to potencies, and from potencies to the essence of the soul under scrutiny.

1) Aristotle, De anima II, 1, 412b 4 ff.

2) Ibid., II, 4, 415a 14-20.

But for all its neatness this scheme is not without its incongruities. Aristotle did not anticipate the behaviorist's exclusion of the data of consciousness. He cannot be said to have ignored such data completely: his account of human intelligence hits things off too accurately for that. Yet he has basically the same explicit method for studying plants and for studying men; and once one has embarked with him on the course of metaphysical analysis, one has to make a completely fresh start if one is to treat of the subject and of conscious activities.

define implicitly such terms as

That completely fresh start must be made and, to begin, let us attempt to define implicitly such terms as conscious, intentional, awareness, presence, subject, object, and introspection. Men, then, perform many operations that are both conscious and intentional. Such operations are said to be intentional inasmuch as they ~~reveal~~ constitute an awareness of an ~~object~~ object. They are said to be conscious inasmuch as they render the subject aware of himself and his operation. Thus, seeing is intentional for it makes present to us what is seen; ~~and~~ the same seeing at the same moment is conscious because in seeing I and my seeing are present to me; and what is true of seeing, is true of a long list of other operations which in due course we shall mention.

But first we must note an ambiguity for, as employed above, 'awareness' and 'presence' each mean ~~to~~ two different things. The awareness of intentionality makes the spectacle present to the spectator, the object to the subject. But the awareness of consciousness makes the spectator and his looking present to himself. ~~But~~ Yet if I have repeated the word, awareness, as I have repeated the word, present, still there is a vast difference between the two instances. What is present ~~as~~ in the spectacle is part of the spectacle. But to be present to himself, the spectator does not have to be part of the spectacle. On the contrary, unless he is present to himself, nothing can be present to him; and his presence to himself as subject is, never what is gazed upon, attended to, intended, and always resides in him gazing, attending, intending. So it is that he can be present to himself by the presence of a subject, yet at the same time giving his whole attention to the spectacle that is present as object.

There remains introspection, and it is not to be confused with consciousness. We are conscious unless we are in deep sleep or in a coma. Because we have been and are conscious, we have the materials for introspective examination. But introspection itself is the examination that presupposes consciousness, that supervenes upon it, that consists in shifting attention away from objects to the subject and his operations. By such a shift the subject becomes present in two manners: as introspecting, he is present to himself as conscious and subject; as introspected, he is present to himself as object.

I have spoken of an ambiguity of 'awareness' and 'presence.' But 'intentionality' and 'consciousness' also denote quite different things. In our dream states intentionality and consciousness are commonly fragmentary and ~~coherent~~ incoherent. When we awake, they take on a different hue to expand on four ~~related~~ successive, related, but qualitatively different levels. There is an empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, weigh the pro's and con's, pass judgement on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the responsible level on which we are ~~now~~ concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.

All the operations on these four levels are intentional and conscious. Still, intentionality and consciousness differ

from level to level, and within each level the many operations involve further differences. Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have ~~experienced~~ experienced. A third dimension of rationality ~~come~~ emerges when the content of *an act of* understanding is regarded as of itself a mere bright idea and we endeavour to settle what really is so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgement on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.

As empirically conscious, we do not seem to differ from the higher animals. But in us empirical consciousness and intentionality are only a substratum for further activities. The data of sense provoke inquiry, inquiry leads to understanding, understanding expresses itself in language. Without the data there would be nothing for us to inquire about and nothing to be understood. Yet what is sought by inquiry and reached by understanding is never a further datum but the idea or form, the intelligible unity or relatedness, of data. Conversely, the inquirer is not just a centre of experiencing but an intelligent centre, and more actively aware of himself by his intelligence than ~~be~~ by his experiencing. Next, without our efforts to understand ~~and~~ and their conflicting ~~bred~~ results, we would have no occasion to judge. But such occasions are recurrent, and then the intelligent centre of experiencing reveals his reflective and critical rationality. Once more there is a fuller self of which we become aware, and once more the awareness itself is different. As intelligent, the subject seeks insight and ~~the~~

thence the revelation of his intelligence in his behaviour, his speech, his grasp of situations, his mastery of theoretic domains. But as reflectively and critically conscious, he incarnates detachment and disinterestedness, gives himself over to criteria of truth and certitude, makes his sole concern the determination of what is or is not so; and now, as the self, so also the awareness of self resides in that incarnation, that self-surrender, that single-minded concern for truth. There is a still further dimension to being human, and there we emerge as persons, meet one another in a common concern for values, seek to abolish the organization of human living on the basis of competing egoisms and to replace it by an organization on the basis of man's perceptiveness and intelligence, his reasonableness, and his responsible exercise of freedom.

As already noted, activities that are conscious are also intentional; and so the foregoing differences in the concrete meaning of consciousness and the subject are matched by corresponding differences in the meaning of intentionality and the object. As the subject shifts from empirical to intellectual consciousness, intentionality shifts from the data of experience to their description and explanation. So what is experienced as heavy or light, as hot or cold, is explained by mass or temperature. But mass and temperature are objects not of experience but of thought. So they differ in their very manner of being an object, for they are not given to sense but conceived by understanding. Still, just as the one subject is both empirically and intellectually conscious, so that his inquiry is about the data he experiences and his understanding is of the data, so too the object of experience is explained by the object of thought; heavy or light is explained by mass; hot or cold is explained by temperature. Again, as

the subject moves from intellectual to rational consciousness, intentionality moves from the object of thought to the question of fact. Descriptions and explanations, as products of understanding, are hypothetical; but hypotheses need to be verified; and it is the process of verification that moves us from what we merely think or suppose towards what in fact is so. Finally, as the subject is promoted from critical rationality to responsible freedom, so his intentionality shifts from the true and the real to the persons he loves and the good that he wills them.

We have been distinguishing different levels of consciousness and of intentionality, stressing the qualitative differences of the successive levels, indicating the transitions from one level to another. But there is in each of us just the one subject that consciously experiences, consciously inquires, consciously reflects, consciously deliberates, even though the quality of being conscious varies from level to level. In similar fashion, intentionality differs as it attends to data, conceives objects of thought, affirms truly what is or is not so, ~~deems~~ decides to pursue this or that course of action. But this qualitative difference in successive intentionalities and the corresponding difference in the immediately intended objects in no way ~~preclude~~ preclude an overarching intentionality that unites the many intentionalities into a single, compound activity and the many immediate objects into a single compound object. On the contrary, just as we are far more ~~conscious~~ conscious of the one subject than of the ~~level~~ several levels of his consciousness, so too are we far more familiar with the compound of knowing and doing than with its many parts, and far more familiar with the joys and sorrows of the real world than with the data, the concepts, ~~conjectures of thought~~, the truths, the values, that name the

immediate objects of the successive stages in our coming to know and to do.

This overarching intentionality is transcendental. It is the condition of the possibility of the unity of human consciousness, of the identity of multiply intended objects, and so of the isomorphism between human knowing and its proportionate known. For it unites the different levels of human consciousness by making them successive and ever fuller responses to a single, overarching intentionality. It refers to a single, ultimately intended object the ~~success~~ successive, partial objects of experiencing, understanding, judging, willing; so what we experience is identical with what we understand, what we understand with what we judge, what we judge with what we approve or reject. Finally, the process that unites the different levels of consciousness is ~~identical~~ by identity the process that unites the successive partial objects; and so the structure of our cognitional operations has to run parallel to the structure uniting partial objects into wholes.

Further, this overarching intentionality is <u>a priori</u>. Our knowing always contains an <u>a posteriori</u> element, but it is by intending that we come to know. It is by questioning, by intending what we do not know, that we have reached whatever knowledge we have attained. Such intending is <u>a priori</u>. Its object never is the given, never the known, always the unknown. It ever carries us beyond whatever we have attained, directing attention to further data, making new additions to our already enormous backlog of inquiries, raising new doubts about what we think we know, drawing to our attention ~~world~~ evils that exist, and challenging our generosity to overcome them with good.

This overarching, a priori intention is completely open. There are no data excluded from its attention, no intelligibilities it may not desire to understand, no solutions it may not call in doubt, no values beyond its deliberation. Moreover, as the ~~intnd~~ intention is completely open, so too the intended is unrestricted. To restrict the intended would be to destroy the complete openness of the intending, and to destroy that openness would be a radical obscurantism. But if the intended is unrestricted, then the ultimate object ~~is~~ of the overarching intention is the universe. Beyond that object or apart from it there is just nothing.

So we move from more recent to older meanings of the term, transcendental. The a priori intention that unifies consciousness and its objects is dynamic; it consists in going beyond the given, the known, the attained. To restrict it is to to stop it, to offset the dynamic with the static. But to acknowledge that it of itself is unrestricted is to ~~an unrestricted, objective field and so also acknowledge the validity of the Scholastic transcendentals, ens, unum, verum, bonum~~ acknowledge an unrestricted, objective field. Of it we know only part. Of it we can effectively know only part. But at least we do know that our ~~knowing~~ knowledge is ever partial. Again, since our intending even of the unrestricted field is a matter of intending the intelligible, the one, the true, the real, the good, we arrive at the traditional transcendentals, ens, unum, verum, bonum.

5. Transcendental Method

Earlier we remarked that a method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. But our account of subject and object, consciousness and intentionality, has brought to light such a pattern. Spontaneously, then, before any method is developed and explicitly formulated to suit the needs of any specialized field of inquiry, there exists the normative pattern and so the method of our conscious and intentional operations. Moreover, this spontaneous method conditions the unity of consciousness and the identity of its objects; it is a priori; it is completely open; its object is unrestricted; and so it may be appropriately named transcendental method. Finally, as will appear, all special methods are ~~mod~~ adaptations ~~modifications~~ and complications of the completely general pattern of transcendental method; and so it is to transcendental method that we shall have to turn ~~in~~ when we shall attempt to clarify ~~ing~~ and ground ~~ing~~ an account of method in theology.

Now it cannot be overemphasized that the source of all such clarification and foundation resides within each reader, that he himself has to become familiar with his own conscious and intentional operations, that no one else can do it for him, that reading this or any other book does not and cannot provide a substitute for the task that he himself in himself must perform for himself.

What, then, is the task? It is applying one's own operations as intentional to one's own operations as conscious. If, for brevity's sake, we denote the operations on the four levels as experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, then one applies one's operations as intentional to one's operations as conscious inasmuch as (1) one experiences one's own experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (2) one understands the unity and relatedness of one's

experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (3) one affirms the fact of one's conscious and intentional operations in their unity and relatedness, and (4) one decides to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's conscious and intentional operations. Let us spell this out.

First, there exist conscious and intentional operations. No one, unless some of his organs are deficient, is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing or of hearing, of smelling or touching or tasting, of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have any such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all his life long he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his activity. No one will preface his lectures by repeating his conviction that never did he have even a fleeting experience of intellectual curiosity, of inquiry, of striving and coming to understand, of expressing what he had grasped by understanding. No one will begin his contributions to periodical literature by reminding his readers that never in his life did he experience anything that might be called critical reflection, that he never paused in doubt about the truth or falsity of any statement, that if ever he seemed to exercise his rationality by passing judgement strictly in accord with the available evidence, then this must have been mere appearance for he is totally unaware of any such event or even tendency. No one is going to place at the beginning of his books the warning that he has no notion of what might be meant by responsibility and that never in his whole life did he have the experience of acting responsibly, least of all in composing the work he is now offering

to the public.

Next, as conscious operations exist, so too their pattern is conscious. We do not experience the operations in isolation and then, by a process of inquiry and discovery, arrive at the relations that link them together. On the contrary, the unity of consciousness is itself given; the pattern of the operations is part of the experience of the operations; and inquiry and discovery are needed, not to effect the synthesis of an unrelated manifold, but to analyse a functional and functioning unity. Without analysis, of course, we cannot discern and distinguish the several operations; and until the operations have been distinguished, we cannot formulate the relations between them. But the point to the statement that the pattern itself is conscious is that, once the relations are formulated, they are not found to express surprising novelties but simply prove to be objectifications of the routines of our conscious living and doing. Before introspection brings the pattern to light, before the methodologist issues his precepts, the pattern is already conscious and operative. Spontaneously we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; and the spontaneity is not unconscious or ~~blind~~ blind; on the contrary it is constitutive of our conscious intelligence, just as the absence of the effort to understand is constitutive of stupidity. Spontaneously we move from understanding and its manifold and conflicting fruits to critical reflection; ~~it~~ again, the spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it is constitutive of our conscious rationality, of the ~~demand~~ demand within us for sufficient reason, ~~before the~~ prior to any formulation of the principle of sufficient reason; and it is the neglect or absence of this demand that

constitutes silliness. Spontaneously we move from judgements of fact and possibility to judgements of value and to the deliberateness of decision and commitment; and that spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it constitutes us as conscientious, as responsible persons, and its absence would leave us psychopaths. In various detailed manners method will bid us be perceptive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. The details of its prescriptions will be derived from the character of the work in hand and will vary with it. But the normative force of its imperatives will reside, not in its claims to authority, not in the ~~low~~ probability that what succeeded in the past will succeed in the future, but in the native spontaneities and inevitabilities of our consciousness which assembles its own constituent parts and unites them in a rounded whole in a manner we cannot set aside without, as it were, amputating our own moral personality, our own reasonableness, our own intelligence, our own sensitivity.

But if one is to operate methodically with a full awareness of what one is doing and why, it is not enough to agree that there exist conscious and intentional operations and that the pattern of relations between these operations is itself conscious. One must ~~immmmspect~~ carry out in detail the programme of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.

Now what is conscious, is given. But what is given to consciousness, is given in a quite different ~~form~~ manner from what is given to sense. The latter is object: it is the shape or colour that is seen, the sound that is heard, the odour that is smelt, the solid or liquid that is touched, the morsel that is tasted. But what is given to consciousness, is not

given as object. It is on the side not of the spectacle but of the spectator, not of the thought but of the thinker, not of the judgement but of the judge, not of the beloved but of the lover. If one is to proceed from what is given in consciousness and to arrive at an account of what is given, one must objectify. One must construct an object on the model of the subject. One must pass from operations as consciously performed to operations as introspected, as intelligently thought, as reasonably affirmed. In brief, one has to apply the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.

In this application the first step is introspection. It is the shift by which we somehow slip from colours ~~to seen to~~ we see to the our experience of seeing, from the connections we understand to the experience of understanding, from the evidence by which we judge to the critical rationality of our judging, from motives and objects of choice to the responsible deliberateness with which we choose. Essentially such introspection consists in a shift of attention: from attending to objects we turn to attending to the operations with respect to objects. But this essence of introspection is not achieved in isolation. It occurs and recurs within a context, ~~which~~ within the unfolding of a method. To introspect one must evoke the appropriate state and produce the operation ~~to be~~ under investigation. If this preliminary is easily fulfilled when one is asking what it is to see or hear or imagine, not a little forethought and ingenuity are needed when one is asking about symbols, inquiry, insight, definition, thought, critical ~~and~~ reflection, weighing the evidence, judging, evaluating, deliberating, deciding. One's state and operation must be genuine. One must be content to begin

not from what is more interesting but from what is simpler and more precise. One has to be as much ~~concer~~ concerned with the relations between operations as with the operations themselves. One must discover for oneself that shifting attention from the intended object to the conscious act ~~but not yet the object vanish~~ is not a matter of concentrating attention on the act to let the object vanish and with it the act but, on the contrary, being occupied with a task of inquiry, discernment, distinction, identification, naming, that provides the context within which introspection is demanded and occurs. Above all, one must not hope to introspect vicariously. One has to do it for oneself. Otherwise one will never know what all the talk is about. Just as the man born blind knows colour, not by seeing it, but by some inadequate analogy with which his misfortune forces him to be content, so too a reader, that does not introspect to discover and identify within himself the conscious and normative pattern of his own recurrent and related operations, will get no further than some vague association between his personal experience and the terms and relations employed to refer to it. He will not properly pierce the veil of language and attain the familiarity that enables him to pin down exactly the conscious event or process that is meant. At most, he can employ some elegant and exquisite manner of discussion and clarification that prepares indeed the way and lights the path of introspection but never opens the door, enters, and thereby passes beyond talk to what is talked about.

Introspection objectifies not only conscious operations but also conscious processes. There is, accordingly, something quite exceptional about an inquiry into the nature of our own minds. Sensitive ~~perv~~ perception does not reveal intelligible relations; we perceive not causality but succession. In like manner introspection does not reveal between our acts the abstract conceptual content, causality. But it does reveal concrete process and, as we move from level to level, the conceptual content, causality, appears ever more thin and poor. On the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous sensitivity; it is intelligible only in the sense that it can be understood; and causality in some non-mechanical sense is not an altogether inadequate conception of it. But with inquiry the intelligent subject comes into his own, and then only in its conditions is the succession of his operations ~~spontaneous~~ merely causal; in itself it is intelligent, not merely an intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative of intelligibility, the intelligence that intelligently seeks understanding, understands, and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term or an impasse, ~~intell~~ intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as critically reflective, the subject stands in a conscious relation to an absolute -- the absolute that makes us regard the positive content of the sciences as only probable. Finally, the ~~The~~ rational subject, knowing himself, his world, and their potentialities, rationally gives way to conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility.

~~To objectify consciousness as process, then, is to objectify the attentiveness of our experiencing, the intelligence of our investigating, the reasonableness with which we judge, the~~

With the objectification of conscious processes we have moved from the level of experience to that of understanding. For understanding unites and relates. But not only our conscious acts are given but also their unity and their relatedness. Indeed, the relatedness of the acts is precisely the process within which they emerge, a process that is conscious and ~~with its different modalities on its successive levels~~ takes on different modalities on its successive levels. Hence, our understanding of our conscious acts is not confined to such generalities as functional unity and interdependence. It will speak of the attentiveness that directs our experiencing, the intelligence that controls our investigating, the reasonableness that grounds our judging, the responsible deliberateness from which spring our choices. Finally, if anyone asks what these terms mean, he will have to be told, alas, that he must find out the answers for himself, by being attentive and noting the fact, by investigating intelligently and noting just what happens, by judging reasonably and adverting to that, by choosing responsibly and finding out what that refers to.

Besides experience and understanding of our conscious and intentional activities there is also the question of fact. Are our activities such as we have described them? Is not the account we have offered just another probable hypothesis that is due sooner or later for revision and, when revised, sooner or later will be due for another revision, and so on indefinitely?

To answer this question, one must ask another. Under what conditions is revision possible? There are, I submit, four conditions. First, any possible revision will appeal to further data that the opinion under review either overlooked

or misapprehended, and so an empirical level of operations must be presupposed by any revision. Secondly, any possible revision will offer a better explanation of the data, and so an intellectual level of operations must be presupposed by any revision. Thirdly, any possible revision will claim that the better explanation is more probable, and such a judgement presupposes a rational level of operations. Fourthly, a revision is not a mere possibility but an accomplished fact only as the result of a judgement of value and a decision; one undertakes the labour with all its risks of failure and frustration only because one holds, not only in theory but also in practice, that it is worthwhile to get things straight, to know with exactitude, to contribute to the advancement of science; and so at the root of all revision, as at the root of all method, there has to be presupposed a level of operations on which we evaluate and choose responsibly.

It follows that there is a sense in which the normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations does not admit revision. The sense in question is that the activity of revising consists in such operations in accord with that pattern, so that a revision rejecting the pattern would be rejecting itself.

There is, then, a rock on which one can build. But let me repeat once more ~~that~~ the precise character of that rock. It is not any theory or description or account of our conscious and intentional activities, for any theory, description, account will be incomplete and inaccurate. The rock is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. The point to the task of introspection is to begin to learn what these are and that they are.

6. From First Principles to Transcendental Method

By a principle is meant a first in an ordered set.

By first principles commonly are understood first premisses. The relevant set, then, is a set of propositions. The order is deductivist. And the propositions that are premisses but not conclusions are first premisses or first principles.

Now the transition from logic to method does not eliminate logic but, on the contrary, embraces it within a larger whole that includes inquiry, investigation, discovery, verification, revision, development. So it is that our present topic, the transition from first principles to transcendental method, does not suggest that the logical ordering of propositions and the recognition of first premisses are to be abandoned. On the contrary, such ordering is to be retained but within the larger whole of method. Moreover, since method is dynamic, any given ordering is open to revision, adjustment, correction, development. While it will always be possible to assign the first premisses of formulated knowledge at its present stage, still any present stage is only a point of transition towards a more adequate future. In brief, first premisses remain, but they cannot be conceived as complete, definitively formulated, immutable first principles.

Still if the foundations appropriate to deductivism are abandoned, it does not follow that there are to be no foundations at all. On the contrary, as there are firsts in the order of premisses, so too there is a first in the order of methods. That first is transcendental method, and its function is to provide foundations when one moves from the abstractness of

logic and the Posterior Analytics, of human nature and the human soul, to the concreteness of individual human subjects in their historical milieux working at modern sciences in accord with their appropriate methods.

~~A full account of transcendental method would be a very large volume. My own view of it may be found in my book, Insight~~

Some account of transcendental method has already been given in the preceding section. More along the same lines may be found in my book, Insight, in which subjects are invited to seek first-hand knowledge of (1) what they are doing when they are knowing, (2) why is doing that knowing, and (3) what do they know when they do it. For the present, then, I may be content to draw attention to the functions and properties of transcendental method.

First, there is the normative function. All special methods consist in making specific the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are ever formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts have prior existence and reality in the spontaneous, structured dynamism of human consciousness. That dynamism is not necessarily effective, for a man need not be authentic. At any moment he can slip into inattention, stupidity, silliness, irresponsibility. But he does not do so without failing to realize his own proper essence.

Secondly, there is the critical function. The scandal still continues that men, while they tend to agree on scientific questions, tend to disagree in the most outrageous fashion on basic philosophic issues. So they disagree about the nature of the activity named knowing, about the relation

of that activity to reality, and about reality itself. But differences on the second and third can be reduced to prior differences on the first, and differences on the first can be resolved by bringing to light the contradiction between a mistaken cognitional theory and the actual performance of the mistaken theorist. To take the simplest instance, Hume thought the human mind to be a matter of impressions linked by custom. But Hume's own mind was quite original. Therefore, Hume's own mind was not what Hume considered the human mind to be.

Thirdly, there is the dialectical function. For the critical use of transcendental method can be applied to every mistaken cognitional theory explicit or implicit. The applications can be extended to concomitant views on epistemology and metaphysics. In this fashion one can determine the dialectical series of basic positions, which criticism confirms, and basic counter-positions, which criticism confounds.

Fourthly, there is the systematic function. For in the measure that transcendental method is objectified, there are determined a set of basic terms and relations, namely, the terms that refer to the operations of cognitional process, and the relations that link these operations to one another. Such terms and relations are the substance of cognitional theory. They reveal the ground for epistemology. They are found to be isomorphic with the terms and relations denoting the ontological structure of any reality proportionate to human cognitional process.

Fifthly, the foregoing systematic function assures continuity without imposing rigidity. Continuity is assured by the source of the basic terms and relations, for that source is human cognitional process in its concrete reality.

Rigidity is not imposed, for a fuller and more exact knowledge of human cognitional process is by no means excluded and, in the measure it is attained, there is to be expected a fuller and more exact determination of basic terms and relations. Finally, the exclusion of rigidity is not a menace to continuity for, as we have seen, the conditions of the very possibility of revision set limits to the possibility of revising cognitional theory; and the more elaborate the revision, the stricter will the limits be.

Sixthly, there is the heuristic function. Every inquiry aims at transforming some unknown into a known. Inquiry itself, then, is something between ignorance and knowledge. For it is less than knowledge, else there would be no need to inquire. But it is more than sheer ignorance, for it ~~knows enough to inquire has discovered its ignorance and knows enough to inquire~~ makes ignorance manifest and strives to replace it with knowledge. This intermediary between ignorance and knowledge is intending, and what is intended is an unknown that is to be known.

Now fundamentally all method is the exploitation of such intending, for it outlines the steps to be taken if one is to proceed from the initial intending of the question to the eventual knowing of what has been intended all along. Moreover, within method itself the use of heuristic devices is fundamental. They consist in designating and naming the intended unknown, in setting down at once all that can be affirmed about it, and of using this explicit knowledge as a guide, a criterion, or a premiss in the effort to arrive at fuller knowledge. Such is the function of the algebraist's unknown, x, in the solution of problems. Such is the physicist's use of indeterminate or generic functions or of classes

of functions specified only by differential equations.

Now transcendental method has a heuristic function. For in the measure that the subject is known, there comes to light the intending of inquiry, and its correlative that though unknown at least is intended, and the gradual accumulation of determinations that changes the unknown into a known. Further, inasmuch as the systematic function has provided its sets of basic terms and relations, there also are provided basic determinations that may be set down at once whenever the unknown is a human subject or an object proportionate to human cognitional process.

Seventhly, there is the foundational function. For special methods employ human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, in accord with the existegences of some limited field. They observe the norms set forth in an objectification of transcendental method but, in addition, they observe further norms that arise from their proper subject-matter and have become known through the accumulated experience of investigators in that field.

Seventhly, there is the foundational function. Special methods, no doubt, derive their proper norms from the accumulated experience of investigators in their several, separate fields. But besides the proper norms there are also common norms. Besides the tasks of each field there are interdisciplinary problems. Underneath the consent of men as scientists, there is their dissent on matters of ultimate significance and concern. It is in the measure that special methods acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be attained for attacking inter-

disciplinary proolems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within a higher unity in which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the solution of philosophic problems.

Eighthly, transcendental method is relevant to theology. This relevance, of course, is mediated by the special method proper to theology and developed through the reflection of theologians on the successes and failures on their efforts past and present. Now this special method, while it has its own special classes and combinations of operations, none the less is the work of human minds performing the same basic operations in the same basic relations as are to be found in other special methods. In other words, transcendental method is a constituent part of the special method proper to theology, just as it is a constituent part in the special methods proper to the natural and to the human sciences. However true it is that one attends, understands, judges, decides differently in the natural sciences, in the human sciences, and in theology, still these differences in no way imply or suggest a transition from attention to inattention, from intelligence to stupidity, from reasonableness to silliness, from responsibility to irresponsibility.

Ninthly, might we once and for all remind the reader that once the new context is introduced, one may not revert to the old without confusion and fallacy. Philosophy and theology and their relations, as conceived in the old context, are one thing. Transcedental and special methods are quite another. It would be a blunder, if not mere ill will, to relate the methods of the new context in the manner appropriate to relating sciences in the old context.

Ninthly, the objects of theology do not lie outside the transcendental field. For that field is unrestricted, and so outside it there is simply nothing at all. It is, of course, true that what man can know is limited, and the precise nature of such limitations will have to be considered in due course. But the transcendental field is ~~not restricted~~ defined not by ~~to~~ what man can know but ~~to~~ by what man can ask about, and it is only because questions are unrestricted that we are aware of the limitations of our knowledge.

Tenthly, to assign transcendental method a foundational role in theology adds no new resource to theology but simply draws attention to a resource that always has been used. For transcendental method is the concrete and dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and that unfolding occurs whenever anyone uses his mind in an appropriate fashion. Hence, to introduce transcendental method introduces no new resource, ~~nothing new~~ into theology, for theologians always have had minds and always have used them. But while it adds no new resource, it does add considerable light and precision to the performance of theological tasks, and this, I trust, will become manifest in due course.

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In the eleventh place, transcendental method is the key to the needed new context. The immobility of Aristotelian science conflicts with developing natural science, developing human science, developing dogma, and developing theology. In harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind that operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each. Through the self-knowledge, ~~self-possession~~ self-appropriation,

self-possession that result from making explicit the basic normative pattern of the recurrent and related operations of human cognitional process, it becomes possible to envisage a future in which all ~~fields~~ workers in all fields can find in transcendental method common norms, common critical, dialectical, heuristic procedures, common foundations and systematics.

In the twelfth place, the introduction of transcendental method abrogates the old metaphor that describes philosophy as the handmaid of theology and replaces it by a very precise fact. To study transcendental method is not to study theology, or human science, or natural science. On the other hand, to study theology or human science or natural science is to use one's mind and, if one is ~~to~~ not merely to do so but also to know what one is doing, ~~then one must also study transcendental method~~ to know basically what others are doing in other fields, to be able to communicate with them, then one must study transcendental method.

7. The New Theology

If a new context implies a new theology, that implication does little to ~~define what the new theology is to be. It does~~ not settle questions that are properly theological. But it does throw considerable light on the structures theology is to build and the procedures it is to employ. With these, I ~~[illegible]~~ am sure, theology will feel more at ease than with the awkward stance and ill-fitting garments imposed in the past.

First, then, theology includes inferences, but its over-all structure is not deductivist. Basically, though not exclusively, it is an empirical, interpretative, historical science. Its primary sources are scripture and tradition. Their exact content has to be ascertained. It has to be viewed in historical perspective. It has to be expressed in contemporary language. That, of course, is not the whole of theology, but it is an essential part. In one sense the fact has always been recognized; in another, it is of recent date, for the need of historical perspective was overlooked both by the mediaeval *summa* and by the *de locis* of Melchior Cano.

A *summa* aimed at answering coherently some totality of *quaestiones*. The existence of each *quaestio* had to be established by quoting authorities or reasons both for a negative (*videtur quod non*) and for an affirmative (*sed contra est*) ~~answering~~ reply. The immediate task in each *quaestio* was the elimination of ~~[illegible]~~ apparent contradictions whether between authorities or, on the other hand, between authoritative doctrine and the mediaeval mind. But besides this immediate task there was the far larger and profounder problem of making all the replies in a *summa* coherent with one another, for

this demanded that theologians make explicit, clarify, correlate their fundamental assumptions and that they adopt, adapt, supplement, and apply some system of basic terms and relations. The medieval summa, then, was empirical in the sense that it proceeded from scripture and tradition and that it aimed at the coherent assimilation of apparently opposed authorities. But the coherence it sought was simply logical and systematic. There was practically no awareness of the development of doctrine and so practically no reconciliation of opposed texts through a historically grounded interpretation.

The type of theology codified by Melchior Cano aimed at proving current Catholic doctrine by arguing from the scriptures, from pontifical statements, from the councils, from the Fathers, and from the theologians. Undeniably it was an empirical and positive theology. But it evinced little appreciation of historical investigation and of historical process.

Today historical investigation is so complex that the study of the scriptures, the Fathers, the theologians is divided and subdivided among specialists. Such refined specialization is necessitated by the fact of development. Even though terms and concepts are general, and so prescind from space and time, still the act of denoting or conceiving proceeds from an act of understanding. But understanding develops over time; it develops in one manner in this area and in another manner in that; and so the concepts and terms, in which understanding is expressed, are differentiated by their time and place of origin. To reach an exact knowledge of these differences and to discover under them their continuity are tasks, not of the Renaissance uomo Universale, but of successive teams of specialists led by a method to a goal.

of these differences and, beyond them, to discover their underlying continuity are tasks, not for the Renaissance uomo universale, but for successive generations of specialists united by a common method and directed by it towards a common goal.

Again, the process from the sources to later developed doctrines is not adequately conceived as a matter of proof or argument. A logical conclusion follows instantaneously from its premisses, but doctrines develop only over long periods of time. Moreover, most developments occur in different manners. They are to be understood in the main only through a historical investigation of the problems that were being met, of the circumstances that made the problems urgent, of the means employed to reach a solution. Finally, just as development varies from instance to instance, so too does the legitimacy proper to each development. Indeed, it is by understanding just what happened that one comes to see why it should have happened.

To conclude this first point, Catholic theology has always been empirical in the sense that it took its stand upon scripture and tradition. But it is mainly within the present century that it has become historical in the sense proper to contemporary scholarship. It is, of course, this fact that, in part, has already brought about a new theology and, in part, has set up an exigence for a fundamental review of theological method.

Secondly, theology has to be liberated from the mistaken notion that it is a science on the analogy of Aristotle's episteme. The latter is deductivist, but we have just argued the that theology is not deductivist. The latter is about the necessary, the abstract, the certain; for theology such characteristics are a Procrustean bed.

Theology is not about the necessary. It is about the Blessed Trinity and the economy of salvation. The Blessed Trinity in itself has been conceived as necessary, but to say we apprehend that necessity is the semi-rationalism condemned in Vatican I. The economy of salvation is not necessary but contingent, free, gratuitous, and the opposite view is associated with the errors of Baius.

To deny necessity is not, of course, to deny intelligibility. For intelligibility is the genus, and necessity is only one of its species; the other is verifiable possibility.

Nor is there any obscurity about verifiable possibility. It is what is reached in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and no one today is completely ignorant of those sciences. What is obscure is the view that theology deals with something that is not necessary but analogous to necessity. Precisely because that is obscure, the theologian has constantly to be explaining that the intelligibilities he is proposing are not necessities. Moreover, his hearers conclude that, since they are not necessities, they are not worth bothering about. So the intelligibility that theology can and does reach is neglected; dogmatic truth tends to be reduced to unintelligent repetition of formulae; and rebellion against this abuse risks becoming a rebellion against dogma.

As theology is not about the necessary, so it is not about the abstract. It is about the concrete. The Blessed Trinity is concrete. The economy of salvation is concrete. ~~It is true, of course, that theology does not know the Blessed Trinity in its concreteness or the economy of salvation in its concreteness, for man does not know anything in its concreteness, since that is knowing all there is to be known~~

Just as physics, chemistry, biology, and the human sciences, so too theology is concerned to know, not abstractions, but the concrete universe.

This statement does not imply that these sciences know the universe or part of it in its concreteness, for that is know all there is to be known about a thing. Again, it does not imply that these sciences do not employ general terms and principles; they do, but they are not confined to generalities; on the contrary, they make it their aim to surmount the limitations of ~~the~~ generality and to reach an understanding of concrete processes in nature and in history.

When, then, we urge that theology is not about the abstract, ~~The point to the statement is the correction of a~~ we aim to reject a medieval mistake that attempted to keep the object of science necessary by taking refuge in abstractions. Now it is true that the abstract as abstract is immobile and, in that sense, necessary. But it does not follow that the content that is abstracted is necessary. In fact, in a contingent universe, what is abstracted is found to be, not a necessity, but just a hypothetical possibility.

Finally, while the objects of faith are certain, the objects of theology have any one of a long series of notes ranging from de fide divina et catholica to probabilior. All are equally objects of theology. They are what theology is concerned with. To think of theology as science and of science as certain has had the disastrous effect of persuading seminarians to confine their attention to matters of faith, ~~and so to learn no theology at all, and, in their later lives, to give no support to the academic side of seminary training.~~

In their seminary years they are content with a minimal theology and in later life they use their influence and authority to weaken the academic side of seminary training.

Thirdly, theology is not to conceive itself in terms of the Aristotelian distinctions between science and opinion, theory and practice, wisdom and prudence. For these distinctions are mistaken and harmful.

They are mistaken. Science deals more with verifiable possibilities than with necessities. It is to be contrasted, not with opinion for there is scientific opinion, but with common sense. Moreover, since science is about the possible as well as the necessary, its activity is not confined to ~~the contemplation of~~ contemplative Aristotelian theory but, in fact, vastly enlarges the range and improves the effectiveness of man's ~~practical~~ efforts at being practical. Finally, where science deals with the contingent and, indeed, with the enormous complexity of human history, there is needed for its direction not wisdom alone nor prudence alone but a fusion of the two in some higher synthesis.

Not only are the Aristotelian distinctions mistaken. They also are harmful. Modern theory is far more abstruse, more complex, more difficult than anything dreamed of by the Greeks or the Scholastics. ~~But the relatively small role of theory in the theological tradition~~ But the inheritors of the Greeks and the Scholastics, so far from emulating the moderns in theoretical work, seem to be suffering from a loss of nerve. To a great extent, no doubt, this has been due to the unending controversies and now to the contemporary crisis in Catholic theology. But behind it there is also the widespread delusion, grounded in the Aristotelian distinctions, that theory is of no practical utility and merely

withdraws one from service in the Body of Christ and closets one in some irrelevant ivory tower.

~~Fourthly, the theologian is not to conceive himself in terms of the foregoing distinctions~~

Fourthly, the theologian is no longer to conceive himself as some *per se* or *de iure* subject contemplating necessary, abstract, certain truth. He is a concrete, existential subject within a historical movement. He is one of a group engaged in assimilating the past of that movement and carrying it forward to its future.

This change, of course, is simply in the theologian's conception of himself and his role. Theologians always have been concrete, existential subjects. They have always stood within a historical movement whose origins and traditions they studied, assimilated, ordered, and passed on. Their interest centred on concrete realities. They insisted that they did not apprehend the necessity of the mysteries even when such reality was necessary. They devoted enormous quantities of time and energy to opinions that they regarded as no more than probable. Their division into various schools and the unresolved disputed questions that have been accumulating since the Middle Ages made it manifest that theology was not limited to drawing inevitable conclusions from the truths of faith and from the self-evident principles of reason. ~~But while this is what theology has, in fact, been, still there the actual practice had no theoretical formulation of itself as science apart from the analogy of Aristotelian science; and though 'analogy' meant no more than partly the same and partly different. Such, then, is wht what theology~~ Such, then, is what theologians and theology in fact have been. But actual practice is one thing; its theoretical formulation is another. In the past an adequate theoretical

formulation of theological reality has been lacking, and our concern with method is a concoern to work out such a formulation.

Fifthly, method directs operations towards ends. So far from being indifferent to values (wertfrei), it is concerned with values, namely, the values proper to the science in question. Moreover, in directing operations towards ends, method does not prescind from the operators. On the contrary, it wants them trained and skilled in the operations required of them. It wants them committed to the ends towards which they operate. Indeed, in the principal case of transcendental method with its normative, critical, and dialectical functions, method aims at the intellectual conversion of the operator.

On conversion and its three forms -- intellectual, moral, and religious -- more will be said in due course. But at once I must recall that science as conceived in terms of method is quite different from science as conceived in the Posterior Analytics. On the latter view science is an inevitable contemplation of abstract necessities in a per se or de iure Analytics. On the latter view, not only is science about the per se, and so about the abstract and necessary, but also, since there is a science about science, science itself has to be thought of as per se, abstract, and necessary.

Such science has to be the work of some pure intellect, equally per se, abstract, and for that reason necessary. It must prescind from values, from will, from conversion. In contrast, method is concerned with movement, with operations and ends, with values and if need be with conversion. Whether or not we are to conceive theology as analogously or properly a science of the modern, methodical type, had best, I think, be discussed in another context. But at least it is evident that a theology, governed by its own proper method, will be much closer to the modern idea of science than it ever could be to the Aristotelian idea.

Sixthly, while the normative, critical, dialectical functions of transcendental method can be expected to contribute greatly to clearing away the thick underbrush of ~~disputed~~ perennially disputed questions that have afflicted theology for centuries, they also have a highly important relevance for the more recently developed aspects of theology. I have said that theology, among other things, is an empirical, interpretative, historical science. I must add that the issues that are raised in their general form by reflecting on transcendental method, also are raised in a concrete and far more complex form when one asks what precisely is empirical science, what precisely is hermeneutics, what precisely is history. The general questions raised by reflecting on transcendental method are (1) what is one doing when one is knowing, (2) why is doing that knowing, and (3) what does one know when one does it. All three recur and they demand more specific and detailed answers when one asks about ~~doing~~ doing empirical science, doing an interpretation, ~~hermeneutics~~, doing history. Moreover, it is only by answering these questions in a fundamental, adequate, and coherent manner that one can

hope to heal the breach between the older and the more recent achievements of theology. For one cannot have a clear and satisfactory connection and interdependence of the many parts of theology without taking the trouble to work out the precise functions of each of the parts.

Seventhly, contemporary theology already has the bulk of a modern science. It is not to be stored in the acquired habit of a single mind; a notable number of specialists are needed to represent its many parts and sections. It is not to be set forth in some great book; indeed, it is only sampled by a large and costly library.

It follows that in teaching theology the aim cannot be to communicate the whole of theology to each of the students. For in the future theology will reside not in the single mind but in a community of minds. The community will have to know the whole of theology, not indeed in the sense that each member knows the whole, but in the sense that each knows a part and that the sum of the parts is the whole.

Again, it follows that communications must be maintained, written in books and periodicals, oral in regional meetings and congresses. For without communications the theological community dissolves into a set of isolated individuals, and theology itself resolves into a manifold of unrelated parts.

Finally, for communications to be possible, the parts of theology must be functional parts that by their very nature are ordered to one another and dependent on one another. For without such a functional interrelationship each specialist knows perfectly well that his field or department is a little sovereign state, and that as he has nothing to teach others in their

fields so he has nothing to learn from them in his own. Under such circumstances the means of communication can be multiplied, but the publications and congresses will only reflect the isolation of the parts and their failure to come together and form a whole.

Eighthly, the methodical conception of theology as the concrete operations of concrete subjects with respect to concrete objects effectively excludes the extrinsicism that has at times afflicted theology in the past.

We have already had occasion to mention the extrinsicism of 'objective' concepts. It argues from the abstractness of concepts to their immutability, and from their immutability to the exclusion of change, development, devaluation. Now it is true that change occurs only in concrete realities, so that the concept qua abstract is immutable. Still, every concept is the term of a process of conceiving, that process is concrete, it proceeds from concrete acts of understanding, and over time understanding develops or declines.

Besides the extrinsecism of 'objective' concepts, there is also the extrinsicism of 'objective' truths. Despite the explicit doctrine of Aquinas that, since truth is in the mind, there can be eternal truth only in an eternal mind[1], there have been those for whom the objectivity of truth

1) Sum. theol., I, q. 16, a. 7 c.

implies a complete disregard of minds. Such was the assumption underlying the assertion of a fides scientifica on the ground that the mysteries were syllogistically demonstrable. For ~~from reason we know that God neither can deceive nor be deceived, from apologetics we know prior~~

~~in the praeambula fidei we establish that God has revealed the mysteries~~

from reason we know that what God has revealed is true; in the praeambula fidei we establish that God revealed the mysteries; therefore, we must conclude, the mysteries are true. But this argument ~~hold~~ holds only as long as one does not ask in whose mind the truth is asserted to exist. What God has revealed is true, in the divine mind, I grant, in the minds of believers, I grant, in the minds of non-believers, I deny. Therefore, the mysteries are true, in the divine mind, I grant, in the minds of believers, I grant, in the minds of ~~both~~ non-believers, I deny.

Ninthly, the transition from the per se subject to concrete subjects in need of conversion affects one's theological judgement on the possibility of a natural theology. For from a theological viewpoint all men are sinners, in need of divine grace, granted the grace they need, and either cooperating with grace or failing to do so. In the concrete, then, there is no purely natural subject. Man, qua sinner, is most likely either to fail to arrive at a natural theology or, if he succeeds, to do so for the wrong reasons to the detriment of theology and religion. Man, qua aided by grace, can undergo intellectual conversion and so bring about the theoretical achievement named natural theology. But that achievement will be accepted by others only if they, in turn, undergo intellectual conversion. In brief, because the theoretical achievement does exist, it is a mistake without qualification to deny the possibility of a natural theology; and because the per se subject is just an abstraction, it is a mistake without qualification to affirm the concrete existence of a natural theology.