

### III. Horizons and Categories

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## Horizons and Categories

### 1. Meaning of Horizon

In its literal sense "horizon" denotes the line where apparently earth and sky meet. It is the boundary of one's field of vision and, as one moves about, this boundary recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for different standpoints, there are different horizons. Moreover, for each different standpoint and horizon, there are different divisions of the totality of visible objects. Beyond the horizon lie the objects that, for the moment, cannot be seen. Within the horizon lie the objects that can now be seen.

As our field of vision, so too the range of our interests and the scope of our knowledge are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the range of one's interests and the scope of one's knowledge vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or, perhaps, analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's interests and knowledge; and what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.

Differences in horizon may be complementary, genetic, or dialectical. Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests. They live, in a sense, in different worlds. Each is familiar with his own world; but each also knows about the others;

each

recognizes some need for the others; and none is prepared to take over the others' tasks. So their many horizons in some measure include one another and, for the rest, they complement one another. They are, then, complementary horizons because singly they are not self-sufficient and together they <sup>delimit</sup> constitute the motivations and knowledge needed for the functioning of a communal world.

Next, horizons may differ genetically. They are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages partly to include them and partly to transform them. Precisely because they are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or history.

Thirdly, horizons may be opposed dialectically. Each has some awareness of the other and so each, in a manner, includes the other. But inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness <sup>r</sup> of illusion, to backwardness <sup>r</sup> of immaturity, to to infidelity, bad will, or a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable may make one furious. But, again, rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling except perhaps a wan smile. Both genocide and astrology <sup>r</sup> may be beyond the pale but, while the former is execrated, the latter is ignored.

More important, perhaps, than differences of horizons is their inner structure and organization. The process of learning is not a mere addition to what we already know but

rather an organic growth out of previous knowing and doing. So our intentions, our statements, our deeds all occur within contexts, and it is to contexts we appeal when we explain our deeds, clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or outline the reasons for our goals. So for Edmund Husserl the account of even a single perception would be incomplete ~~wa~~ were there no mention of the comprehensive horizon of a world as its encompassing frame of reference. Finally, regulative of our knowing are our interests. We take the trouble to attend and learn in accord with the values we respect and the satisfactions we prize; and the measure of respect for values, the values that are respected, the satisfactions desired or preferred, can differ from age to age, group to group, man to man, and in the course of each one's life time.

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See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 161, 718.

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## 2. Method as Horizon

In our opening chapter we had occasion to contrast ~~three approaches to method now is the time for all good~~ the Aristotelian approach to method with the one we were to employ. We have now to note that this difference in approach involves a series of differences in ideals and anticipations, and that it is of some importance that these differences be acknowledged explicitly. For while it is true that a first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's thought is rather rare among theologians today, the long-standing connection between Aristotle and Catholic theology has profoundly marked the

Catholic mind, so that there is <sup>to it</sup> ~~about~~ a good deal of unconscious or surreptitious Aristotelianism in a neurosis-like conflict with contemporary theological practice.

First, then, there ~~There~~ is a crucial difference between the Aristotelian and the modern notion of science. On the Aristotelian notion science is concerned with <sup>the causal,</sup> ~~the~~ necessary, and <sup>the</sup> ~~an~~ immutable. On the modern notion necessity and immutability have no more than a marginal significance. Science is concerned with the intelligibility, not that must be, but that can be. Of itself, such ~~verification~~ intelligibility is hypothetical; ~~it~~ essentially it stands in need of the complement of verification; and any single ~~of~~ verification yields no more than a probable confirmation, while even cumulative, indirect verification does not preclude the possibility of revision.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b 10 ff.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was still common to speak of the necessary and immutable laws of nature and even of the iron laws of economics. This trend has been reversed by the refutation of the uniqueness of Euclidean geometry, by the successful use in physics of a non-Euclidean geometry, by the alternative probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and by the limitations placed on deductive systems by theorems of the Gödelian type (on these see J. Ladrière, Les limitations internes des formalismes, Louvain 1957). While contemporary mathematicians differ on the foundations of mathematics, none affirm that ~~the~~ mathematics is based on necessary and immutable principles, and most are content if their basic postulates are non-contradictory (see M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, New York, Harper, 1964, pp. 187-193)

Now the Aristotelian view has never been anything but an embarrassment to theology. God in himself is necessary. But he need not have created anything. He could ~~have~~ have created a ~~different~~ different universe with different laws. The economy of man's salvation need not have occurred and it could have occurred in a different fashion. Apart from God, all that is and occurs, certainly is highly intelligible,

stupendously so. But the intelligibility is the intelligibility, not of what cannot be otherwise, but of what could be otherwise. It is the type of intelligibility discerned in the natural and the human sciences. In those sciences it is highly prized. But in theology it is called convenientia, and commonly enough interest ~~in~~ in it is mistaken for mental weakness.

To accept method in theology is to drop Aristotle's mistake that science is about the necessary and immutable. For the most part science <sup>is</sup> about contingent reality or about necessary reality whose necessity we fail to grasp. For the most part the intelligibility of reality and the intelligibility we grasp is the type of intelligibility of reached in the natural and human sciences and in systematic theology. It is not necessity but hopefully verifiable possibility.

There are a few corollaries. Aristotle distinguished science and opinion: science is of the necessary; opinion is of the contingent. Modern science regards the contingent universe that exists, and so we speak of scientific opinion. Similarly, Aristotle <sup>distinguished</sup> ~~distinguished~~ theory and practice: theory regards the necessary; practice regards the contingent. So theory and practice are mutually exclusive; the theorist cannot change the necessary; all he can do is contemplate it. But a modern science is far more theoretical than anything dreamt of by the Greeks or the Scholastics; but it is about

the contingent, about things that can be otherwise; and so modern  
 ^ ~~more~~ theory is eminently ~~pr~~ practical. We see its fruits all about us. In the modern context, then, theory and practice are just two moments in man's operations with regard to the same objects. Finally, as theory and practice are continuous, so our wisdom and our prudence must also run together. To play one's part in history, for all its particularity and contingency, calls for wisdom as well as prudence.

Secondly, the vehicle of Aristotelian science was, naturally enough, the syllogism. Syllogisms express knowledge of causes inasmuch as the middle term names the end, the agent, the matter, or the form. They express necessary knowledge inasmuch as the premisses are per se predications in which essential attributes are attributed to commensurate subjects. Finally, besides the premisses that may be derived syllogistically, there are those that are true, first, underived, better known than their implications, and related to them as cause to effect. Obviously, the existence of Aristotelian science depends on the existence of these basic premisses ~~in~~ in each field. But, while Aristotle does describe how our knowledge of them ~~does~~ arise<sup>S</sup>, while his description fits quite accurately the manner in which scientific discoveries are made, still what scientists do discover are, not necessary causes and immutable effects, but hypotheses, theories, systems, and all of them are open to revision.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 11, 94a 20 ff.

Ibid., I, 6, 74b 5 ff.

Ibid., I, 2, 71b 19 ff.

Ibid., II, 19

To accept method in theology, then, is to drop the deductivist ideal with its presupposition of necessary first principles. It is to conceive theology as an on-going process in two phases each subdivided into four functional specialties. Nor need this conception of theology involve one in some radical skepticism or relativism. As has been explained already, transcendental method brings to light a secure base and, in its systematic function, ensures continuity without imposing rigidity. Such security and continuity are precisely what is wanted when not only theology but also dogma and even religion develop.

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See above, pp.

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Thirdly, truth is contextual, but it makes a vast difference whether the context is envisaged ~~and~~ as unique and fixed or as ever subject to development and aberration. Ideally, of course, the context of any true statement ~~exists~~ would consist of all other relevant true statements. Ideally, every term would be clear and precise; there would ~~be~~ not even be any apparent contradictions; and the logical interdependence of connected statements would be exhibited syllogistically.

~~Now Aristotle fostered this ideal context~~

Now if Aristotle's logic made possible this notion of an ideal context, the bulk of his writings consistently preach the doctrine that subject differs from subject and that one should not expect more accuracy, coherence, rigor than any given subject permits. It remains, however, that more than excellent example is needed if one is to formulate in some manner what <sup>is</sup> the real, as distinct from the ideal, ~~context of statements~~



context of statements, and one of the advantages of method is that it ~~it~~ offers some help in this direction.

Within the frame-work of method the function of logic is limited. It consolidates past achievement. It reveals defects and deficiencies still to be ~~over-~~ overcome. It gives expression to an ideal ~~for which~~ towards which science advances. But that ideal is not supposed to be already an accomplished fact. The demand is not for clarity but for increasing clarity: understanding is expected to increase and, as it increases, concepts will become fuller, more precise, richer in implications. There is a permanent demand for coherence, but it has to make peace with the need to retain opposed statements that have some justification and so may prove complementary aspects of a truth as yet unknown. Full respect is paid to logical rigor but, when appropriate, there also is full respect for other procedures that step by step unfold an ever richer and fuller understanding. In brief, the deductivist ideal leads to an over-insistence on syllogistic proof; method, on the contrary, patiently accumulates a mass of evidence that cannot be compressed and made available for haughty people in a hurry; they have to learn to learn.

Fourthly, ~~in~~ as long as the scientific ideal ~~was~~ is conceived in terms of self-evident principles and necessary conclusions, it is manifest that one's values and choices can have very little <sup>f</sup>influence on science. They would have to be extreme indeed to blind one to the self-evident; and even if ~~there~~ they were extreme, they could hardly hide fallacy where it existed ~~it~~ or find it where it did not.

In contrast, when the ~~intellectual~~ <sup>necessitarian</sup> ivory tower turns out to be a fiction and method takes over, values and choices

assume a fundamental role. At the root of all scientific work is the decision to do such work, and method is the program to be followed in doing it. Moreover, the more the several methods of the various sciences are brought back to their foundations, the more their precepts are found to be articulations of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. At the root, then, both of science and of method is the authenticity of the existential subject and, inversely, the intrinsic value of science lies in the fact that it is one of the ways in which human authenticity may ~~be~~ unfold and flourish and bear fruit.

Fifthly, while deductivist science encourages the view that a science is a habit tucked into an individual's mind, the modern sciences are <sup>proving</sup> ~~proving~~ so vast, so much beyond any individual's comprehension, that they have to be conceived as parcelled out among the scientific community. No one today knows all mathematics, or all physics, or all chemistry, or all biology. What is true of them, also is true of theology and related disciplines. There are no omniscient theologians. The <sup>best</sup> ~~most~~ that can be had <sup>are large</sup> ~~As~~ teams or panels of experts and, while they can produce handbooks and encyclopedias, still it is not individuals but only other teams that can comprehend their output. So the unity of theology becomes the dynamic unity of the interplay of functional specialties. The teaching of theology becomes an initiation into the general nature of method, into its concrete exercise in different areas, and into a selection of topics made in accord with the future work of each student.

### 3. Old and New

It will serve to define further the horizon of contemporary theology if we go back to its medieval origins. The seminal work was Peter Abelard's Sic et Non which listed arguments from scripture, <sup>from</sup> the <sup>from</sup> Fathers, and <sup>from</sup> reason for both the affirmative and negative side of about one hundred and fifty-eight propositions. This set the problem of coherence in traditional teaching and evoked the technique of the quaestio. This technique was to begin ~~the quaestio which began~~ with a list ~~of~~ of arguments on one ~~side~~ side (Videtur quod non...) and then with a list on the other (Sed contra est...). <sup>Then it</sup> ~~but~~ went on in a general response to lay down principles of a solution and in particular responses to apply the principles to the arguments pro and con that had raised the quaestio.

In the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas the technique of the quaestio ~~has~~ had become highly formalized. With a monotonous regularity articles began with three arguments on one side and one on the other. But if one wishes to see the same technique applied to a real problem, one should read De Veritate, q. 24, a. 12, where there are twenty-three arguments on one side and eleven <sup>e</sup> on the other. If the response is compared with In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, one finds that St. Thomas was changing his position on moral importance.

The responses, however, gave rise to a new problem of coherence. Answers to a series of questions had to be coherent themselves; thereby, there arose the need for a systematic mode of conception that would provide a broad basis for solving questions and at the same time, as it were, automatically secure coherence.

The desired basis was found in the writings of Aristotle, whose thought could be applied directly to what was termed the order of nature, and could be extended by analogy to ~~man~~ treat the economy of salvation and the mysteries of faith.

The result was the imposing edifice of medieval theology. Needless to say, the Aristotelian ideal of science, ~~by expounding~~ expounded in the Posterior Analytics, did nothing to remedy the real weakness in the technique of the quæstio. For that technique, while it immersed theologians in ~~the~~ ~~mass of scriptural, patristic, and canonical data~~ a mass of scriptural, patristic and, to a less extent, conciliar data, was content to arrive at a merely logical coherence. It in no way envisaged the possibility of historical development underlying the apparent antinomies in theological sources.

The defect was not easily remedied. The renaissance was anti-Scholastic, but its classicism was involved in a normative notion of culture. It admired and imitated ancient ways much more than it developed historical perspective and acknowledged irreducible differences. The reformation was anti-Scholastic, but it called forth the counter-reformation, to give traditional views the halo of orthodoxy. When non-Catholic scholars developed and refined historical methods, the resulting ~~the~~ ~~resulting~~ ~~their~~ liberal Protestantism only seemed to confirm the opinion that the new methods were misleading or mistaken.

It remains that historical studies have won the day, patristic, conciliar, first in ~~theology~~ and medieval studies and, more recently, in the biblical field. It is this victory that constitutes the contemporary problem of method in theology, and ~~it~~ it will be well to list the various trends that, as it were, constitute the materials that have to be brought together or represent the dangers that such an effort may face.

First, there was the Thomist school represented by Capreolus (ob. 1444), Cajetan (ob. 1534), Bañez (ob. 1604), John of St. Thomas (ob. 1644), the Salmanticenses (1637 to 1700), Gonet (ob. 1681), and Billuart (ob. 1757). Its procedure was the commentary on St. Thomas. Its notion of theology was deductivist. Its historical perspective rudimentary.

Secondly, Melchior Cano's De locis theologicis endeavored to enrich the Scholastic tradition with the humanistic studies of the Renaissance. He conceived theology as proving traditional Scholastic theses deductively from a series of sources (scripture, patristic writings, papal and conciliar documents, theologians, reason, etc.). Historical development was overlooked.

about 1680  
Cano died in 1560 but his influence crystallized into a movement ~~about 1680~~ that lasted into the present century. Its fruit is the manual of dogmatic theology. <sup>Such a manual</sup> ~~It~~ consists of a set of theses in each of which there are set forth: the meaning of the terms in the thesis, ~~the~~ old and new opinions on the topic, the measure in which Church teaching is involved in the thesis, arguments in favor of the thesis from ~~scripture and tradition~~ scripture, tradition, and reason, and finally corollaries. While this outline sets forth what essentially is a pedagogical device that could be

turned to any of a variety of ends, its basic weakness lies concealed in the fact that a single man was expected to write and teach such manuals. This, of course, was only possible on the mistaken assumption of semper idem, that if one knew and understood the faith of today, one was fully competent to interpret the old and the new testaments, the Greek and Latin Fathers, the medieval, renaissance, and modern theologians.

art. "Théologie,"  
 For more see Yves Congar, Dict. theol. cath., XV<sup>1</sup>(1946),  
 417-421.

Ibid., 421 f.

Ibid., 432 f.

Thirdly, with the development and acceptance of the historical studies dogmatic theology of the manuals first moved in the direction of a Catholic positivism and then of a Christian positivism. Catholic positivism tended to reduce theology to a history of Catholic doctrine with special emphasis on the official teachings of the Church. Christian positivism is the work of biblical experts offering a collection or a synthesis of scriptural doctrines.

Karl Rahner refers to these as dogmatischen Positivismus and Biblizismus in his paper, "Philosophie und Philosophieren in der Theologie," Schriften zur Theologie, Einsiedeln 1967, VIII, 69. The same paper is available in English in Theology Digest, February 1968, where the terms are translated "dogmatic positivism" and "biblical fundamentalism" respectively.

~~Thirdly, towards the end of the nineteenth century~~

Thirdly, in the latter part of the nineteenth century official sanction was given to a revival of Thomism. This, of course, was necessary if there was to be kept intact the medieval achievement with its extensive borrowings from Aristotle. But while the movement flourished between the two world wars, it collapsed after the second. In the middle ages the baptism of Aristotle had been the key step in integrating within the Christian West a cultural invasion from Greek and Arabic sources. But in the twentieth century Aristotelianism provided no <sup>adequate</sup> basis either for dialogue with the natural and human sciences or for the intusception within theology of historical studies and historical perspectives. In consequence either theology degenerated into <sup>the</sup> history of doctrines and ideas in the various areas of theological study, or else theologians decided that, since a Neo-Scholasticism was inadequate, they would have to be their own philosophers.

two aspects of  
Karl Rahner refers to <sup>two</sup> this tendency as "dogmatic positivism" and "biblical fundamentalism" (in the original, Biblizismus) in his paper, "Philosophy and philosophizing in theology," Theology Digest, February 1968, p. 19. Cf. Schriften zur Theologie, Einsiedeln 1967, VIII, 69.

Ibid, p. 19: '... the concerns, methods, and needs of theology itself pose so many questions to philosophy, and make so many demands upon philosophy for conceptual and systematic instruments that the traditional neo-scholastic philosophy, as it has been and still is up to the present time, is simply inadequate to these demands. Hence, there is no alternative but to "philosophize" within theology itself.' Cf. Schriften, VIII, 68 f.

Fourthly, as we noted above, medieval theology had recourse to Aristotle to provide itself with a Begrifflichkeit, with a systematic set of categories for ~~creating~~ speaking of the order of nature, the economy of salvation, and God. When, then, today there is urged the inadequacy of neo-scholasticism, when increasingly theologians turn to ~~be~~ personalist, phenomenological, existentialist, and historicist sources to find ways of expressing their thought, what is at issue is the need to drop the old dependence on Aristotle and to replace it by the categories that meet contemporary ~~modern~~ exigences and opportunities.

#### 4. Categories

Categories, which would meet contemporary exigences and opportunities, will have their basis in transcendental method. That method brings to light (1) attending to data and questioning for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, (2) the operations that follow upon attending and questioning, (3) the structure in which these operations occur, and (4) the objects correlative to the operations and structure and specified, not by their own qualities, but only by their correlativity. These four may be referred to more briefly as (1) the a priori or, with Karl Rahner, the Vorgriff as distinct from the Begriff, (2) the operations, (3) the structure, and (4) the objects.

Now in one sense these four are not transcultural but in another sense they are transcultural. They are not transcultural inasmuch as their explicit formulation and the subsequent developments of that formulation can occur only when a rather notable (at least, for the twentieth century) cultural development



has taken place. But they are transcultural, <sup>both</sup> inasmuch as the realities, to which the formulations refer, precede the formulation and are to be found in any instance of homo sapiens, and inasmuch as these realities originate ~~back~~ the emergence of culture, its continuity, and its changes.

Now the significance of deriving categories from transcendental method is, of course, that thereby categories have at least something of a transcultural basis. For it is only inasmuch as theology has at least one foot resting on a transcultural base that it can reflect on a religion that has developed for two millenia and that it can direct communications with all nations and all cultural levels in each nation.

There remains, of course, the question of the way in which categories can be derived from transcendental method. Here, a first distinction must be drawn between the actual, detailed derivation, which will be the work of theologians, and on the other hand general indications revealing the possibility of such derivation, which is the concern of the methodologist. To this first distinction there is to be added a second: there is a general derivation, which theologians will use ~~through~~ inasmuch as they speak of the material universe and of men; and there is a specifically theological derivation needed for specifically theological topics.

[Note to page 15]

Illustrative of this need is Karl Rahner's Kleines theologisches Wörterbuch, Freiburg (Herder) 1961, and Heinrich Fries, Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe, 2 vols., München (Kösel-Verlag) 1962 and 1963.

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5. General Derivation

There are five procedures for deriving categories from transcendental method. They consist in (1) complicating the basic structure, (2) turning to concrete instances of it, (3) filling it out, (4) differentiating it, and (5) setting it in motion.

In the preceding chapter on functional specialties there was effected a complication of the basic structure by applying it to two distinct phases and then specializing on the end of each of the four levels of conscious and intentional operations. Moreover, while our presentation was conceived with reference to theology, it could be adapted to any subject in which investigators were responding to past history and were to influence future history. Different modes of complication of the basic structure are to be found in my book, Insight, in its treatment of common sense, in its account of classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods, in its view of metaphysics as an integral heuristic structure.

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Insight, pp. 173-181, 289-299.

Ibid., pp. 33-69, 217-244, 451-487, 530-594.

Ibid., pp. 390-396.

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Secondly, one may ~~pro~~ proceed from the single subject of conscious and intentional operations to many such subjects, to their grouping in society, and to the historical succession of such groups.

Thirdly, one may advance from a very general to a more detailed account of the subject and his conscious and intentional

operations. This procedure is illustrated throughout Insight and will be further illustrated in our following chapters on feelings, values, beliefs, meaning. To this topic we return in a later section on the use to be made of the human sciences. But, for the moment, it will be enough to stress the importance of basing one's advance to a more detailed account on genuine personal experience and of expressing it in a manner that will serve to objectify not only one's own but also the experience of others.

Fourthly, the basic structure of conscious and intentional operations may be differentiated in various ways. So in Insight there were distinguished a biological, an esthetic, an intellectual, a dramatic, and a practical pattern of experience. Again, one can distinguish the authentic subject that is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, ~~respon~~ responsible, and the unauthentic subject that fails in ~~some~~ one or more respects. One can go on to determine the positions maintained by the ~~authentic~~ authentic subject and the counter-positions of the unauthentic. One can distinguish different worlds: the world of immediacy, of what is given to sense or to consciousness; the world of common sense; the world as explained by the natural and human sciences; the world of interiority with its transcendental relevance; the world of religious experience and theology. One can distinguish between differentiated ~~multifaceted~~ consciousness that shifts with ease from one pattern of experience to another and from one "world" to another, and undifferentiated consciousness for which the world

Insight, pp. 181-191, 207 ff.

Ibid., pp. 387 ff.

of theory and of interiority is alien.

Fifthly, since transcendental method ~~examines~~ regards a dynamic structure of operations, there are various ways in which models of change can be set up. Thus, a single heuristic structure can encapsulate a  $\dot{\phi}$  series of different answers. The question, What is fire?, has been answered by saying it is one <sup>of</sup> the four elements, that it is a phlogiston, that it is a process of oxidization. Again, developments can be analysed as processes from initial, global operations of low efficiency through differentiation and specialization towards the integration of the specialties. Theoretical developments of a high order can be related as a succession of higher viewpoints. A universe in which both classical and statistical laws are verified will be characterized by a process named emergent probability. Authenticity can be shown to generate progress, unauthenticity to bring about decline, while the problem of overcoming decline yields a heuristic structure that provides an introduction to religion. The problem of interpretation brings to light the possibility of a universal viewpoint that moves over different levels and sequences of expression.

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Insight, pp. 13-19.

Ibid., pp. 115-128, 259-262.

Ibid., pp. 207-244.

Ibid., pp. 688-703, 718-730.

Ibid., pp. 562-594.

## 6. Special Derivation

Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence.

One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up within oneself. A first step in <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ liberation is the sensitivity we share with the higher animals. But while they are confined to a habitat, we live ~~with~~ within a universe because, beyond ~~sensitiv~~ sensitivity, we question and <sup>our</sup> questioning is unrestricted.

First there are questions for intelligence; we ask what and why and how and what for; and our answers unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize. From the narrow strip of space-time accessible to immediate experience we move towards the construction of a world-view and ~~to~~ towards the exploration of what we ourselves could be and do.

On questions for intelligence follow questions for reflection. We move beyond imagination and guess-work, idea and hypothesis, theory and system, to ask whether or not this really is so or that really could be. Now self-transcendence takes on a new meaning. Not only does it go beyond the subject but also it seeks what is independent of the subject. For a judgement that this or that really is so reports, not what appears to me, not what I imagine, not what I think, ~~now~~ not what I would be inclined to say, not what seems to be so, but what is so.

Still, such self-transcendence is only cognitive. It is in the order not of doing but only of knowing. But on the final level of questions for deliberation self-transcendence becomes real. When we ask whether this or that is worth while, whether it is not just apparently good but truly good, then

we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual or group advantage, but about objective value. Because we can ask such questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect in our living a real self-transcendence. That real self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and beneficence, of honest collaboration and of true love, of swinging completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming a genuine person in a human society.

Now real self-transcendence becomes a reality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. ~~It~~ Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's ~~§~~ desires and fears, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and determined action.

Being-in-love is of different kinds. There is the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, with its fruit in the family. There is the love of one's fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of welfare. There is the love of God with one's whole heart and whole soul, with all one's mind and all one's strength (Mk 12, 30). ~~There~~<sup>It</sup> is the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given to us (Rom 5, 5). ~~It grounds~~<sup>There is</sup> the conviction of St. Paul that "there is nothing in life or death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths -- nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom 8, 38 f.).

As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that ~~the world cannot give. On the other hand, the absence of that~~ fulfilment in the godless and in the sinner reveals itself, now in the trivialization of human life, now in the fanatical ~~pursuit of limited goals. now is the time for all good men~~ the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in <sup>a</sup> love of one's neighbor that brings about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment whether in the truly godless or in the <sup>obdurate</sup> sinner reveals itself, now in the trivialization of human life, now in the fanatically harsh pursuit of limited goals.

A first theological category, then, is God as implicitly intended in all intending.

and third are

A second ~~is~~ the experience and the fruit of being in love with God.

Now ~~is~~ just as one has to labor to bring out in the open one's experience of one's conscious and intentional operations generally, so too one has to perform a similar labor to identify in one's own inner life <sup>and its more outward fruits</sup> what is meant by the words, being in love with God. Again, just as there is an intellectual and moral self-appropriation that grounds transcendental method, so too there is a religious and Christian self-appropriation that grounds the extension of transcendental method into theology. Finally, as our Christianity commonly is more in aspiration than achievement,

, its store of experience,  
 we have to have recourse to the Christian community and its  
 traditional wisdom to awaken what is latent in us, to stir  
 our feelings, even though our minds are only partly open,  
 though our wills are not yet ready.

Next, just as there are five procedures for deriving  
 general  
 categories from transcendental method, so too there are a  
 similar five for deriving special, theological categories  
 from Christian self-appropriation.

First, being in love with God is <sup>something</sup> exceedingly simple  
 and simplifying, but it also is something exceedingly rich  
 and enriching. There is room then for a theology of the  
 Christian subject. It will be a theology of grace and,  
 at the same time, an ascetical and mystical theology. It  
 may further  
 develop along the lines of the human sciences using  
 history and field-work, phenomenology and psychology, and any  
 other relevant techniques.

Secondly, from the subject one moves to subjects,  
 their togetherness in community, the history of the salvation  
 that consists in being in love with God, and the function of  
 this history in promoting the kingdom of God amongst men.

~~Thirdly, our being in love with God is God's gift to  
 us, his loving us. Theology is not merely about man but also  
 about God. It is all the <sup>more</sup> emphatically about God when  
 through transcendental method it breaks away from the hold  
 of the philosophies that teach <sup>that</sup> objective statements about  
 God are necessarily mythical. So theology has to make sense  
 of the Christian doctrine that distinguishes the Holy Spirit  
 given to us, the Son and Lord that redeemed us, the Father  
 that sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, to  
 whom we are destined to come and to know face to face.~~



Thirdly, our being in love with God is God's gift to us, his gift of himself to us, his loving us, and our being loved by him. The Christian tradition makes explicit our implicit intending of God in all our intending by speaking of the Spirit that is given to us, of the Son who redeemed us, of the Father who sent the Son and with the Son sends the Spirit, and of our future destiny when we shall know, not as in a glass darkly, but face to face.

Fourthly, just as one's humanity, so too one's Christianity may be authentic or unauthentic. ~~Worse~~ What is worse, to the unauthentic man or Christian it is the unauthentic that appears authentic. Here, then, is the root of division, opposition, controversy, denunciation, bitterness. Here, too, is the transcendental base for the fourth functional specialty, dialectic.

Fifthly, as <sup>human</sup> authenticity promotes progress, and human unauthenticity generates decline, so ~~not~~ Christian authenticity, which is a love of others that does not shrink from self-sacrifice and suffering, is the sovereign means for overcoming evil. Christians then bring about the kingdom of God in the world not only by doing good but also by overcoming evil with good (Rom 12, 21). But not only is ~~there~~ there the progress of mankind, but also there is progress and development within Christianity itself; and as there is development, so too there is decline; and, finally, as there is decline, so too there is the problem of undoing it, of overcoming evil with good not only in the world but also in the church.

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On the social surd, see Insight, pp. 229-232, 628 f., 689 f. On redemptive love, ibid., 699 f.

## 7. Use of the Categories

I have been indicating the possibility of deriving ~~categories~~ general and special categories from a transcendental and so transcultural base. The general base is the authentic or unauthentic man; attentive or inattentive, intelligent or stupid, reasonable or silly, responsible or irresponsible, ~~the special base is the authentic man in the time for a goal~~ with the consequent positions and counter-positions. The special base is the authentic or unauthentic Christian, genuinely in love with God, or failing in that love, with a consequent Christian or unchristian outlook and style of living.

The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and as an a priori whence one can understand other men, their social relations, ~~and~~ their history, their religion, their rituals, their destiny.

The use of the categories and their development occur<sup>§</sup> within the determinate tasks already described as functional specialties. ~~It occurs then,~~ They occur, then, in research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, communications.

Further, the use and development of the categories occur in interaction with data. They receive further specification from the data. At the ~~the~~ same time, the data set up exigences for further clarification of the categories and for their correction and development.

In this fashion there is set up a scissors movement with an upper blade in the categories and a lower blade in

the data. Just as the principles and laws of physics are neither mathematics nor data but the fruit of an interaction between mathematics and data, so too a theology can be neither purely a priori nor purely a posteriori but only the fruit of an on-going process of interaction between categories and data.

Finally, as the theology is an on-going process, as religion and religious doctrine themselves develop, ~~to be~~ so the fundamental part of theology and, perhaps, the Fundamentaltheologie Karl Rahner desires, will be concerned with the origins, the genesis, the present state, the possible developments and adaptations of the categories in which Christians understand themselves, communicate with one another, ~~and~~ and announce the gospel to all nations.

#### 8. Theology and the Sciences

Karl Rahner has remarked that the theology of the future will be in dialogue more with the sciences than with philosophy.

When theology is conceived as an interlocking set of functional specialties

The development of positive studies in theology has given it a material resemblance to the human sciences. But with the conception of theology

### 8. Theologians and Scientists

By its Christian adaptation of Aristotle, medieval theology related itself not only to Aristotle's philosophy but also to the extensive group of scientific investigations included in the Aristotelian corpus. While these investigations were stamped not only with a mighty effort towards clarity, precision, and coherence but also with far-ranging inquiry and observation, their inheritors tended to think of them, not as just a ~~modest~~ modest beginning to be further developed, but rather as a treasure to be preserved intact for all time.

Such <sup>seem to be</sup> ~~are~~ the facts and attitudes that condition traditional views on the relations between theology and science. They are relations between well-ordered collections of static results. These relations are ruled by logic, which classifies collections ~~by their formal objects so that different disciplines~~ by their formal objects, demands of each discipline that it remain within its own territory, and since two statements cannot be both true and contradictory, requires all disciplines to be coherent not only internally but also externally.

But neither modern science nor modern theology are well-~~ordered~~ <sup>are on-going processes and they</sup> collections of static results. They are ruled not by logic alone but by methods that regard non-logical as well as logical operations. Their common ground, ideally, lies in transcendental method and, since that method takes its stand on the ~~structures~~ <sup>structures</sup> immanent and operative in subjects, it will relate theology and science by first relating theologians and scientists.

A first task <sup>will be</sup> ~~is~~ to overcome the birth trauma of modern science. For that science, if it originated in Aristotelian

~~from~~ soil, developed and took shape through its opposition  
 through  
 to Aristotelian thought and its conflicts with Aristotelians  
 who also happened to be theologians and even happened to be  
 connected with ecclesiastical power. There is, then, endemic  
 to modern science a fierce resentment against any interference  
 from a philosophic, theological, or ecclesiastical source.

Accordingly,  
~~Not this~~ it will be well to be clear about possible  
 differences between theologians and scientists. It may happen  
 that their views are merely disparate: they are on different  
 topics and, for that reason, are not opposed. On the other  
 hand, they may really conflict, and such conflict may arise  
 from one or more of six sources. ~~Either the~~ <sup>The</sup> theology or the  
~~science~~ <sup>The</sup> science may be insufficiently developed. ~~Either the~~ <sup>The</sup> theologian  
 or the scientist may lack human authenticity. ~~The~~ <sup>t</sup> theologian  
 or the scientist may lack Christian authenticity.

Now if the theology or the science is insufficiently  
 developed, the solution is ~~for~~ further development. Such  
 further development will not come by deducing scientific  
 conclusions from theological premisses or theological conclusions  
 from scientific premisses. It will come only from further  
 work in the appropriate field in accord with the methods of  
 that field. It is true, of course, that the further work  
 can be stimulated if the theologian or the scientist draws  
 the other's attention to the fact that it might be his  
 subject that is not yet adequate. But the more this occurs  
 in friendly dialogue and the less it has the air of a public  
 denunciation, the more likely is it to have the fruit that  
 is intended.

Next, if the theologian or scientist is lacking in Christian authenticity, the remedy lies in God's operative grace that plucks out the heart of stone and replaces it with a heart of flesh. Moreover, while God gives his grace to those he pleases, it remains that he pleases to give it to those that ask for it (Lk 11, 13).

Finally, if the theologian or the scientist is lacking in human authenticity, the remedy lies in transcendental method. This, of course, is a radical cure and it demands considerable effort on the part of an invalid unaware of his malady. Moreover, as the malady is ~~was~~ widespread among theologians and scientists, its broad distribution makes it appear normal rather than an abnormality.

Still there are grounds for some hope. Theologians are afflicted with a problem of method. Some are ~~looking forward even to a difficult solution: now is the time~~ ready to implement even a difficult solution. If they succeed, it can be expected that others will join them.

Moreover, ~~when~~ while the sciences flourish, the scientists are not totally complacent. The horror of nuclear weaponry has led many <sup>scientists</sup> to ask about the <sup>of their work</sup> function in human history. The pacificism of many young men is leading them away from a scientific vocation. The old mechanist determinism is out, and the new Copenhagen interpretation has its scientific opponents. Finally, the human sciences have their special problems, and many among the human scientists would welcome a line of solution.

In fact, they have long been confronted with a dilemma. If they model themselves strictly on the natural sciences, then relentlessly their apprehension of man is stripped of

of all specifically human content. If they try to set up independent foundations of their own, they find themselves involved in the chaotic disarray of the philosophies.

Obviously, neither alternative is acceptable to anyone both seriously scientific and authentically human, and, fortunately, the dilemma is not quite rigorous.

For transcendental method is not just another instance in the species, philosophies. Though it is relevant to issues traditionally considered philosophic, its inspiration is precisely to get beyond the many philosophies and, as it here is conceived, its procedure is parallel to the procedure of empirical science. Where they appeal to the data of sense to objectify them in an ever more comprehensive and probable fashion, transcendental method appeals to the data of consciousness to objectify them in an ever more comprehensive and probable fashion. But where empirical science will not reach definitive views until all data have been accounted for, transcendental method deals with a privileged area. Its data are data on the <sup>very</sup> operations which effect revisions of previous views. Once the process of revising is adequately understood, that understanding itself cannot be revised without presupposing and so confirming the very position it is attempting to revise. Finally, what transcendental method brings to light, cannot be considered as something simply extrinsic to science itself. For the scientist has a mind and, as a scientist, he uses it. It is not alien to his vocation for him to ascertain (1) what exactly he is doing when he is knowing, (2) what why doing that is knowing, and (3) what he knows when he does it. ~~Nor is it superfluous for him to know what are the antinomies that result not only in the chaotic disarray of the philosophies~~

which unendingly generate and revise scientific hypotheses, theories, systems. Unless these operations are understood, one has no motivated ground for asserting that scientific hypotheses, theories, systems are perpetually subject to revision. ~~if~~ On the other hand, if these operations are understood and the view of science as on-going process is grounded, then that ground itself cannot be revised without presupposing and so confirming the very position it is attempting to revise.

Moreover, what transcendental method brings to light, cannot be considered as simply extrinsic to science. The scientist has a mind and, as a scientist, he uses his mind. It is in no way alien to his vocation for him to ascertain, (1) ~~what happens when he is doing~~ when he investigates, (2) why doing that moves towards knowledge, and (3) what comes to does he know when he does it. Nor is it superfluous for him in this fashion to come to grips with the antinomies that result in the chaotic disarray of the philosophies. For these antinomies are not confined to philosophic minds. They just as rampant among scientists. Indeed, it would seem to be a traumatic ~~to~~ fear of them that makes so many scientists shout their protest, No metaphysics!, even though they have little idea of what metaphysics has been or could be. Again, it would seem to be the same fear that makes many human scientists model their performance on that of the natural scientists: to liberate himself from the cognitional myths that afflict the philosophies by ascertaining (1) what he does when he investigates, (2) why doing that leads to knowing, and (3) what does he come to know when he does it. Nor would <sup>it</sup> be contrary to his scientific integrity to acknowledge the fact that a method ~~is a selection~~



means a choice of means with respect to an end, that to accept and follow a method is a matter of deliberation, evaluation, decision, that accordingly the pursuit of science, so far from being value-free, is the deliberate effort to realize the value, science, and that deliberate effort, so far from being opposed to scientific integrity, is the condition of its very possibility.

In other words, just as the the modern theologian has to break loose from <sup>the</sup> Aristotelian scientific ideal in terms of objective necessity, so too the modern scientist has to break loose the Enlightenment scientific ideal in terms of objective necessity. Both have to reconcile themselves to the fact that all the operations of existential subjects occur within a horizon, and that horizons are determined by the values (including the value of knowledge) that the subject effectively acknowledges. Nor need this fact disturb them. There is no conflict between the value, knowledge, and other values. All are a matter of self-transcendence: knowledge is a cognitive self-transcendence; the acceptance of other values involves a real self-transcendence. All that occurs is the substitution of a fact for an illusion. Objectivity is a matter of cognitive self-transcendence; cognitive self-transcendence is not necessary; it is contingent; it occurs in the measure that the subject is authentically human, that is, <sup>consistently</sup> attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. The necessitarian ivory tower has had its day.

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A more detailed discussion of values occurs in chapters four and five.

This fact is especially significant for the human sciences. They not only are the product of existential subjects but also are about existential subjects. Contemporary human scientists frequently are quite aware of this fact. <sup>But in</sup> ~~in~~ the measure that they come to grasp transcendental method, they will come to grasp the a priori of their field, for transc<sup>C</sup>endental method is the existential subject ~~about~~ concerned with himself. Once that basis is reached, human science can cease imitating natural science and set up house for itself.

I have been discussing general types of possible conflict. The discussion has been, not in the old context that conceived a science as true and certain knowledge of things through their causes, but in the contemporary context in which sciences are on-going processes, their positive results at any time are no more than probable and, where mistaken, these results sooner or later will be corrected. Where the old context might lead logicians to the conclusions of the Inquisition, the new context calls for the patience recommended in the parable of the cockle (Mt 13, 24-30).

Besides possible conflicts, there is the positive matter of use, of theology by the scientists, and of science by theologians. The use of theology to scientists seems to be threefold. First, it enables the scientist to keep his religion on the cultural level of the rest of his mental activity or, inversely, it prevents his religion from appearing something outworn, antiquated, irrelevant, childish. Secondly, it ~~is~~ frees the scientist from totalitarian <sup>tendencies.</sup> Scientific knowledge tends to be thought to be omniscient when clear-headed and carefully controlled scientific knowledge floats loosely in a mass of extra-scientific opinions. On the other hand, in the measure

~~that enough is known about philosophy and theology~~  
 that one is able to recognize philosophic and theological questions, to sketch the procedures for their solution, to respect the controls they employ, it is no longer self-evident that the only sensible way to tackle any issue is the way of science. Thirdly, the more a scientist is acquainted with first-rate theology, the better is he equipped to join with theologians in team-work on the university campus, in special ~~research~~ <sup>research</sup> projects, or in the publication of interdisciplinary research projects, or in interdisciplinary publications.

The use of the sciences by theology is necessary if ~~its~~ it is to speak to contemporary man. Just as ~~categories are to be contemporary.~~ As the Fathers justified their borrowings from Hellenistic culture by recalling the fleeing Israelites despoiling ~~of~~ <sup>just</sup> the Egyptians, as medieval theology enriched itself by taking over the Aristotelian corpus, so a contemporary theology has to enrich itself with the surpassing wealth of modern science.

The use itself is manifold, varying with the two phases and the functional specialties in each phase. To such variations we shall attend ~~when~~ when the specialties come up for a more detailed consideration. But in general the sciences, especially the human sciences and, most of all, the science of religion can supply the theologian with information, with accounts of structures, with analyses of processes, with analogies that throw light on specifically theological topics. Next, in each case, the theologian has to draw on good scientific opinion on the status of the material he proposes to borrow and he has to be able to criticize it from the viewpoint of human and Christian authenticity. Finally, he has to employ it <sup>both to extend his data and</sup> to make his general and special categories more determinate.

### 9. Pluralism

Knowledge of man is knowledge of many races, peoples, states, cultures, religions, histories. Such knowledge is pluralist both in its subject and in its object. It is pluralist in its subject, for it is knowledge that can be had never by the individual but only by the scientific community. It is pluralist in its object for the objects are many and in motion; they are a set of on-going processes, developing, declining, recovering in different ways at different rates in greater or lesser degrees of interdependence.

Such knowledge of man is under the sign of method. ~~Its~~  
~~context is shaped, not by the logical ideals of clarity, coherence,~~  
~~and rigor with their implication of perfection and immobility~~  
 If it uses logic to consolidate gains and point up as yet unresolved ambiguities and inconsistencies, it does not mistake the shape of its context by projecting on it the logical ideals of clarity, coherence, and rigor with their implications of perfection and immobility. <sup>Still, though</sup> ~~though~~ both knowing subjects and known objects are many and on the move, the resulting knowledge is not a mere ~~in~~ many-sided multiplicity and diversity. <sup>the</sup>  
~~For each investigation is a striving of a subject to bring~~  
~~to fruition his authenticity by being attentive, intelligent,~~  
~~reasonable, responsible in implementing and gradually improving~~  
<sup>The</sup> the methods proper to his field. And the investigations are concerned with individuals and groups themselves bringing to fruition their authenticity, or failing to do so. The methods employed ensure ~~progressive and cumulative results~~

For results are communicated in ~~congresses~~ faculty seminars, congresses, periodicals, books. Methods ~~enur~~ ensure progressive and cumulative results. Each investigation is the striving of a subject to bring to fruition his authenticity by being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in implementing and gradually improving the methods proper to his field. Finally, the investigations are concerned with individuals and groups themselves in their multiform lives bringing to fruition their authenticity or failing to do so. The process that is knowledge of man, like the process that is man, while neither static nor monolithic, possesses a dynamic unity both in its originating source and in the progressive and cumulative character of the results it obtains.

Such pluralism is characteristically modern and in sharp contrast with its classicist predecessor. Classicist culture conceived itself normatively. Its ideals were eternal verities. Its classics were immortal works of art. Its philosophy was the philosophia perennis. Its religion was the one and ~~only true religion. In a sense it was universalist~~ only true religion. Finally, because it conceived itself normatively and because it conceived norms as universally valid, it was not just one culture among many but the one and only culture. Anyone could partake of it, of course, if only he was ready to mount to the level of its norms and enjoyed the leisure to learn its disciplines. But the conditions could not be satisfied by the many, and so they remained beyond the pale. At home they were ~~by~~ named the people, abroad the natives or the barbarians. Similarly, in religious matters the educated were contrasted with the simple faithful, and true believers with the heretics and the

heathen.

Pluralism, then, is broader in its interests, richer in its sympathies, more zealous in its efforts to understand.

~~It is has its basis and legitimacy in the fact that so much of~~  
~~so much of one's horizon now is the time for all good men~~

It has its basis and its legitimacy in the fact that human development occurs over time, in different manners, at different rates, that human horizons are determined largely by the values one appreciates and freely chooses to realize, that human unauthenticity ought not to be but in fact exists, and that its effects are only multiplied by violence, or only removed by self-sacrificing love. So we find the Church more authentically Christian now that it has formed its commissions on ecumenism and on non-Christian religions. So too we think theology has to enter into communication with the history of religions and cultural history. But just what this means and implies, had best be reserved for a later chapter.