

Chapter three: H O R I Z O N S

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### Horizons

Literally, the horizon is the line where apparently earth and sky meet. It is the boundary of one's field of vision and, as one moves about, this boundary recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for different standpoints, there are different horizons. Moreover, for each different standpoint and horizon, there are different divisions of the totality of visible objects. Beyond the horizon lie the objects that, at least for the moment, cannot be seen. Within the horizon lie the objects that can now be seen.

As our field of vision, so too the range of our interests and the scope of our knowledge <sup>are</sup> bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the range of one's interests and the scope of one's knowledge vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background, <sup>and milieu,</sup> one's education and personal development. So ~~it is that~~ there has arisen a metaphorical or analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this ~~analogous~~ sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's interests and knowledge; and what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.

Differences in horizon may be complementary, genetic, or dialectical. Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests. They live, in a sense, in different worlds and each is familiar with his own world. But each also knows about the others; each recognizes some need for the others; none is ready to take over the others' task. So their many horizons in some measure include one another and, for the rest,

complement~~s~~ one another. They are complementary horizons that together make up a single, communal world.

Next, horizons may differ genetically. They are related ~~in some process of~~ as successive stages in some process of development. ~~The~~ <sup>Each</sup> later stage presupposes ~~the~~ earlier stages partly to include ~~them~~ and partly to transform ~~it~~ <sup>them</sup>. But precisely because ~~they are~~ <sup>they are</sup> earlier and ~~the other~~ <sup>no</sup> later, ~~the~~ two are ~~not~~ simultaneous. They are parts, not a of single, communal world, but of a single <sup>biography or</sup> history.

Thirdly, horizons may be opposed dialectically. Each has some awareness of the other and so each, in a manner, includes the other. But inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, ~~to~~ to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, bad will, or a refusal of God's grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable may make one furious. But, again, rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace of passion or even any show of feeling except perhaps a wan smile. Both genocide and palmistry may be beyond the pale but, while the former is execrated, the latter is ignored.

There are further differences that regard, not <sup>so much</sup> extent and contents, but rather <sup>inner</sup> structure and organization. One may be more concerned with values than with satisfactions or, inversely, more with satisfactions than with values. Identical lists of values may be arranged in different hierarchies, and identical lists of satisfactions found in different scales of preferences. Again, ~~mainly~~ one's concern with

of fact about particular individuals or groups. That is the task of historians and field-workers. Ours is the prior methodological concern. What are the questions to be asked? What precisely do these questions mean? Are these questions <sup>related</sup> so ~~related~~ that the several answers, ~~will~~ whether positive or negative, will come together to form a single, coherent, interconnected ~~picture~~ picture?

The basis from which we derive our questions will be, of course, transcendental method. It appeals to our intentional consciousness as structure and content, as open, dynamic, normative. Considering it in itself and in human situations generally, one is led to the <sup>basic</sup> questions that occur to men and, as answered one way or another, determine their horizons.

### Self-transcendence

One can live in a world, have a horizon, just in the measure that one is not locked up within oneself. A first step in this liberation is the sensitivity we share with the higher animals. But while they are confined to a habitat, we live within a universe because, beyond sensitivity, we question and our questioning is unrestricted. First, there are questions for intelligence; we ask what and why and how and how often; and our answers unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize. From the narrow strip of space-time open to immediate experience we move towards the construction

~~of immediate experience, through imagination and belief~~

~~of immediate experience we move towards the construction~~

of a world-view and towards the exploration of what we

ourselves could be and do. On questions for intelligence follow  
 questions

~~are~~ for reflection; we move beyond imagination and guess-work,

idea and hypothesis, theory and system, to ask whether or

not this <sup>really</sup> is so or that <sup>really</sup> could be. Now self-transcendence

takes on a new meaning. It not merely goes beyond the

subject but also seeks what is independent of the subject.

For a judgement that this or that really is so reports,

not what appears to me, not what I imagine, not what I think,

not what I would be inclined to say, not what seems to be so,

but what is so. Still such self-transcendence is only

intentional; it is in the order not of doing but only of

knowing. <sup>final</sup> It is on the ~~third~~ level of questions for

deliberation that self-transcendence becomes real. For

when we ask whether this or that is worth while, whether

it is not just apparently but truly good, then we are

~~inquiring not into our desires how we feel about it, how~~

~~much we desire or want it, whether it pleases us or our~~

~~friends, what possible harm might come of it, but whether~~

~~or not it itself is good whether or not what her or not~~

inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort

or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, but about

objective ~~part~~ value. Because we can ask such questions,

and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect

in our living a real self-transcendence. That real

self-transcendence is the possibility of benevolence and

beneficence, of collaboration and true love, of swinging

completely out of the habitat of an animal and of becoming

a genuine person in a human society.

I have spoken of value and, indeed, of objective value. I have distinguished between what truly is good and, on the other hand, what only apparently is good. But the basic fact is the subjective fact of ~~man's~~ self-transcendence, and the basic distinction is between achieving self-transcendence and failing to do so. The true good, the objective value, is what is judged to be good by a person achieving self-transcendence, and the merely apparent good is ~~the~~ what is judged to be good by a person failing to transcend himself.

This may be thought to be a subjective rather than an objective view of value. But subjectivity and objectivity are themselves quite ambiguous terms, and the solution of the ambiguity once more ~~lies in~~ is to be found by reverting to the basic fact and the basic ~~of~~ distinction. There is a subjectivity to be blamed because it fails to transcend itself, and a subjectivity to be praised because it does transcend itself.

There is an objectivity to be repudiated, because it ~~was~~ is the objectivity of those that ~~pronounced objective by those that~~ fail in self-transcendence; and there is an objectivity to be <sup>accepted</sup> ~~accepted~~ and respected, and it is that achieved by the self-transcending subject.

— See Insight, chapter 13. Collection, pp. 227 ff.

Our position, then, parallels that of the existentialists, inasmuch as it can conceive man's mere existing as his capacity for existing authentically or unauthentically. But it differs inasmuch as it discerns in self-transcendence both genuine subjectivity and the principle of genuine objectivity. ~~In the authentic subject there are no conflicts between intelligibility, truth, reality, value, for each is the object of one and the~~

However,

But the objectivity it affirms is not the objectivity of positivists and pragmatists, which existentialists deplore, but ~~rejected by existentialists but~~ the objectivity of intentional self-transcendence, to which existentialists have failed to advert. Again, the subjectivity it affirms, so far from being opposed to genuine objectivity, is its prolongation, for it consists in moving on from intentional to real self-transcendence. Finally, the continuity of intentional and real self-transcendence is, in principle, the reconciliation of truth and value, and so of science as concern for truth with religion as concern for value.

#### Value as Transcendental Notion

I have conceived value as what truly is good, what really is worth while, and I have placed the ultimate criterion of these in the self-transcending subject. Clearly, however, the matter calls for further elucidation. If there is no difficulty in seeing that actions should accord with decisions, and decisions with judgements of value, there is no little obscurity about the emergence of judgements of value. But that ~~the~~ issue we are not yet prepared to tackle, but only a first step. Our present concern is with a prior step, with the elucidation of the transcendental notion of value.

I distinguish transcendental notions from concepts. Concepts are objectifications. They result from the self-expression of intelligence, just as judgements result from the self-expression of reasonableness. Transcendental notions are at the opposite pole. They are principles of objectifying. Where concepts are intended, they do the intending. While this intending itself may be objectified to yield concepts of the intelligible, the true, the real,

the good, still the mere concepts lack the dynamic properties of the transcendental notions and so may be misinterpreted as lacking their concreteness.

The transcendental notions are dynamic in various ways. They promote the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, from the experiential to the intellectual, from the intellectual to the rational, from the rational to the existential. Again, they are intentional. They are  $\S$  dynamic intermediaries between ignorance and knowledge. The transcendental notion of intelligibility is  $\S$  not knowledge of intelligibility but a striving for such knowledge. The transcendental notion of truth is not knowledge of truth but a striving for truth. The transcendental notion of value is not knowledge of value but a striving <sup>both</sup> for <sup>of value and for</sup> both knowledge and the accomplishment of value in oneself and in one's world. Finally, the transcendental notions not only promote the subject and direct him to his goals but also provide the criteria that reveal whether the goals have been reached. The drive to understand is satisfied when understanding is reached but dissatisfied by every incomplete  $\S$  attainment and so the source of ever further efforts. The drive to truth withholds assent when evidence is insufficient and compels rationality to assent when evidence is sufficient. The drive to value rewards <sup>success in</sup> self-transcendence with a happy conscience and <sup>saddens</sup> ~~pesters~~ failures ~~in self-transcendence~~ with an unhappy conscience.

~~As transcendental notions are dynamic, so too they are concrete. They are the foundt <sup>initial</sup> not only of questions but also of further questions, and further questions for a better understanding, further doubts to lead to a fuller truth, further criticisms to carry us on to a more comprehensive good~~



As transcendental notions are dynamic, so too they are concrete. For the concrete is the real ~~in~~ not under this or that aspect but under its every aspect. <sup>Now</sup> But the transcendental notions are the fount not only of initial questions but also of further questions. Though the further questions come only one at a time, still they keep coming. There are ever more <sup>further</sup> questions for intelligence pushing us towards a better understanding and ever more further doubts urging us towards a fuller truth. The only limit to the process is at the point where no further questions arise, and that point <sup>would be only</sup> is reached <sup>only</sup> when we correctly understand <sup>so</sup> everything about everything, <sup>only</sup> when we know reality in its every aspect.

~~Similarly, the transcendental notion of the good is our raising of questions for deliberation. It stops us with the disenchantment that asks whether <sup>what</sup> we are doing is worth while. It brings to light the limitations of every finite achievement, every flawed perfection, every every finite achievement, the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring aspiration and faltering ~~achie~~ execution. It introduces us to the height and depth and breadth of love but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short of its aim. So the dynamism of the transcendental notion of the good would reach its end only in the achievement or in the enoun encounter with a in the encounter with a goodness that is totally beyond criticism.~~

There is something similar to the transcendental notion of the good. As the notions of the intelligible, ~~the true,~~ <sup>truth,</sup> the real, head for complete intelligibility, all ~~truth,~~ <sup>truth,</sup> reality in its every aspect, so the transcendental notion of the good heads for a goodness that is beyond criticism. For the transcendental notion of the good is our raising of questions for deliberation. ~~More precisely,~~ <sup>More precisely,</sup> it is our being stopped with the disenchantment that asks whether what we are doing is worth while. That disenchantment brings to light the limitations in every finite achievement, the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of ~~our~~ soaring aspiration and faltering achievement. It ~~introduces us to~~ <sup>plunges us into</sup> the height and depth and breadth of love but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short of its aim. ~~So it is~~ <sup>So it is</sup> In brief, ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> the transcendental notion of the good so invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely beyond its powers of ~~penetrating~~ criticism.

The Human Good

The transcendental notion of the good is directive, selective, progressive. Of itself it is incomplete. It raises the question for deliberation but it has to presuppose the topics to be deliberated. These for men are primarily the human good, and so some sketch of the human good is our immediate concern.

Let us begin from a preliminary scheme that will provide a first approximation towards <sup>clarifying</sup> defining and relating some <sup>nineteen</sup> ~~eighteen~~ terms. In general, the terms are sufficiently <sup>1</sup> known

| Individual                 |                            | Social                  | Final           |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| capacity, need             | operation                  | cooperation             | particular good |
| plasticity, perfectibility | development, skill, virtue | institution, role, task | good of order   |
| liberty                    | orientation, convention    | personal relations      | terminal value  |

for explanation to be superfluous. But what is highly important is that they be grasped in their interconnections, since from these relations there accrues to them most of their significance.

Individuals, then, have capacities for operating. By operating they procure themselves instances of the particular good. By such an instance is meant a single entity, whether object or action, that ~~it~~ meets a need of a particular individual at a given place and time. Needs are to be understood in the broadest sense; ~~they are not to be restricted to necessities; they refer to whatever any individual happens to want wants~~ they are to be stretched beyond necessities to include wants of every kind.

Individuals live in groups. To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It follows some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional ~~frame-work~~ frame-work. Such frame-works are the family and manners, society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church or sect. They constitute the commonly understood and already accepted basis and mode of cooperation. They tend to change only slowly, for change, <sup>as distinct from mere</sup> involves a new common understanding and a new common consent.

Besides the institutional basis of cooperation, there also is the concrete manner in which cooperation is working out. The same economic set-up is compatible with prosperity and with recession. The same constitutional and legal arrangements admit wide differences in political life and in the administration ~~of justice. Similar views on marriage and the family do not preclude wide enormous differences in the happiness or misery of family life. Let us not now quit quit quit~~ of justice. Similar principles for marriage and the family in one case generate domestic bliss and in another misery.

This concrete manner, in which cooperation is working out, I would name the good of order. It is distinct from instances of the particular good but it is not separate from them. It regards them, however, not singly and as related to the ~~individual~~ individual they satisfy, but all together and as recurrent. My dinner ~~is~~ today is for me a particular good. But dinner every day for everyone that earns it is part of the good of order. My education was for me a particular good. But education <sup>a</sup> for everyone ~~in the~~ country that wants it is another part of the good of order.

By the good of order, then, is meant a vast net-work of relationships that embrace (1) a sustained succession of recurring instances of types of the particular good, (2) the ordering up of operations so that they become cooperations and ensure the regularity of recurrence of all <sup>effectively</sup> desired instances of the particular good, and (3) the motives leading operators ~~to~~ each to perform in the appropriate manner.

It is to be insisted that the ~~good~~ good of order is not some design for utopia, some theoretic ideal, some set of ethical precepts, some ~~code~~ code of laws, or some ~~super~~ super-institution. It is quite concrete. It is the actually functioning or malfunctioning set of relationships guiding operators and coordinating operations. It is the ground whence recur or fail to recur whatever instances of the particular <sup>good</sup> are recurring or failing to recur. It has a basis in institutions but it is the product of much more, of all the skill and know-how, ~~on~~ all the industry and resourcefulness, ~~and~~ <sup>all</sup> the ambition and ~~felice~~ fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency to disorder.

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On the good of order, see Insight, p. 596. For further analysis, see the sections on emergent probability, pp. 115-128, on common sense, pp. 173-181, 207-216, and on belief, pp. 703-718.

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To undertake a role and perform his or her task in society, the individual must develop. At birth the human infant seems to have only one ability, to cry. But its need to learn everything reveals its unlimited plasticity, its capacity to acquire <sup>not only ordinary competence but</sup> the incredible variety of amazing <sup>athletes, artists, actors,</sup> skills attained by acrobats, ~~sportmen,~~ <sup>musicians,</sup> craftsmen,

actors, professional people, and so on.

Our understanding of development has been greatly increased by Jean Piaget's numerous and celebrated studies in genetic psychology. While I cannot reproduce or even indicate the wealth of detail set forth in <sup>the</sup> his reports of his investigations, I feel constrained to present, however summarily, three basic notions that he has put together, namely, a biological notion of adaptation, a mathematical notion of group, and a philosophic notion of mediation.

Development is conceived as learning new operations, and an element in such learning is thought of as an adaptation to some new object or situation. Adaptation itself is conceived as a compound of assimilation and adjustment. Assimilation brings into play the spontaneous or previously learned operations employed on somewhat similar objects or in somewhat similar situations. Adjustment, by a process of trial and error, gradually modifies and supplements previously learned operations.

As adaptations to ever more objects and situations occur, there goes forward a twofold process: an increasing differentiation of operations, so that more and more different operations are performed; and an ever greater multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations. So the baby develops oral, ~~with~~ visual, manual, bodily skills, and masters an ever greater variety of combinations of operations.

Such mastery is conceived precisely by invoking the mathematical ~~notion~~ notion of group. The principal characteristic of the group of operations is that every operation in the group is matched by an opposite operation and every combination of operations is matched by an opposite combination. Hence,

~~A group is mastered, it is always possible for~~

inasmuch as operations are grouped, the operator can always return to his starting point and, when he can do so unhesitatingly, he has reached mastery at some level of development<sup>1</sup>. So by distinguishing and defining different groups of operations Piaget was able to ~~distinguish~~ mark off successive stages in child development and to predict what operations school children of various ages would be able or unable to perform.

Finally, there is the notion of mediation. Operations are said to be immediate when their objects are present. Seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched. But by imagination, language, symbols, we operate in a compound manner: immediately with respect to the image, word, symbol; mediately with respect to what is represented or signified. In this fashion we come to operate not only with respect to the present and actual but also with respect to the absent, the past, the future, the merely possible or ideal or normative or fantastic. As the child learns to speak, he moves out of the world of his immediate surroundings towards the far larger world revealed through the memories of other men, through the common sense of community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.

I have set forth this incomplete and schematic account of Piaget's ideas, because I feel they do much to clarify the notion of horizon. First of all, there is the fact of horizon. There is no doubt about the differences and the limitations of individual development. It follows that there are

sets of operations an individual can perform and further sets that he cannot. It further follows that as our development differs from one man to the next, so too does horizon; and still more training, effort, study <sup>is</sup> that, the price of broadening one's horizon, of escaping from one's selective inattention, of coming to apprehend what ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> habitually one overlooks.

Secondly, the central role of the notions of combination, group, and the grouping of groups into higher groups draws attention to the inner structure of horizon, to its organization. It enables one to grasp genetically what Edmund Husserl put descriptively when he contended that an account of even a single perception would be incomplete if there were no mention of the comprehensive horizon of a world as its encompassing frame of reference.

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See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 161, 718.

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~~Thirdly, while Piaget's detailed stages of development are of considerable interest to pedagogues~~

~~Thirdly, the distinctions between immediate operations, mediating operations, and the more remote~~

Thirdly, the distinction between immediate and mediate operations has quite a broad relevance. It sets off the world of immediacy of the infant against the vastly larger world mediated by meaning. Further, it provides a basis for a distinction between primitive and higher cultures. The primitive culture regards a world mediated by meaning but it lacks controls over meaning and so easily lapses into myth and magic. The higher culture develops reflexive techniques that operate on mediate operations in an effort



to safeguard meaning. So alphabets replace vocal with visual signs, dictionaries fix the meanings of words, grammars control their inflexions and combinations, logics promote the clarity, coherence, and rigor of discourse, hermeneutics studies the varying relationships between meaning and meant, and philosophies explore the more basic differences of between worlds ~~now~~ mediated by meaning. Finally, modern culture with its new notions of science and philosophy seems to constitute a completely new genus of higher culture.

Corresponding to different degrees of development and different worlds mediated by meaning, there are also similar differences in the differentiation of consciousness. On Piaget's view it is <sup>only</sup> in the process of development that the subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction from his world. But as his apprehension of his world and his conduct in it develop, he begins to move through different patterns of experience. <sup>When children</sup> Children <sup>imitate</sup> and play, they know their performance differs from "real" life. When their elders shift from the world mediated by meaning to the reflexive techniques in which they operate on ~~operations~~ the mediating operations, they are moving from "real" life to a world of ~~theory~~ "theory" that, despite the rare atmosphere, has a mysterious relevance to successful performance in the "real" world. When they listen to music, gaze upon a tree or landscape, are stopped by <sup>beauty,</sup> ~~a work of art,~~ they are freeing their sensitivity from the routines imposed by development and allowing it to follow <sup>fresher and deeper</sup> ~~more native~~ rhythms of apprehension and feeling. When finally the mystic withdraws into the ultima solitudo, he drops the constructs of culture

and the whole complicated mass of mediating operations to return to a new, mediated immediacy of his subjectivity reaching for God.

— On patterns of experience, see Insight, pp. 181 ff.

On peak experiences, A. H. Maslow, Toward a <sup>P</sup>psychology of Being, Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962; A. Reza Aresteh, Final Integration in the Adult Personality, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965.

— Besides skills, there are virtues. Besides the operational development studied by Piaget, there ~~is an aesthetic~~ ~~and religious development~~ and what, not if you please is the development of feeling. Here I would follow Dietrich von Hildebrand and distinguish non-intentional states and trends from intentional responses. The ~~non-intentional~~ former may be illustrated by such states as fatigue, irritability, bad humor, anxiety and such trends or urges as hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort. The states have causes and the trends or urges have goals, but the relation to the cause or the goal is merely <sup>causal</sup> ~~causal~~ ~~factually~~. It ~~is~~ does not presuppose and arise out of a perception representing the cause or the goal. First one feels tired and, perhaps belatedly, one discovers that what one needs is a rest. First one feels hungry and then one diagnoses the trouble as a lack of food. Intentional responses, on the other hand, respond to what is intended, apprehended, represented. The feeling relates us, not to a cause or an end, but to an object. Such feeling gives our ~~consciousness~~

intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without our feelings, our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of our feelings, our desires and fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasms and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are orientated <sup>mainly, and</sup> dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel with them, and we feel for them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be ~~do~~ accomplished.

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A wealth of analysis of feelings is to be had in Dietrich von Hildebrand's Christian Ethics (New York, David McKay, 1953). See also Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press and Louvain, Nauwelaerts, 1965.

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Feelings as intentional response respond to two main classes of objects, on the one hand, to the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying, on the other hand, to values, to the ontic value of persons and to the qualitative value of beauty, <sup>of understanding, of truth,</sup> of noble deeds, of virtuous acts. In general, response to value both carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or which we transcend ourselves. In contrast, response to the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous. What is agreeable may very well be what also is a true good. But it also is true that the true good may be disagreeable. Unpleasant work, privations, pains have to be accepted gladly by most good men.

Not only do our feelings respond to values but also they do so in accord with some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in an ascending order. Vital values, such as health and strength, grace and vigor, normally are preferred to the work, the privations, the pains involved in acquiring, maintaining, restoring them. Social values, the ~~common~~ good of order that conditions the vital values of the whole community, are preferred by the community to the vital values of single individuals, not indeed in the sense that the community will sacrifice <sup>individuals</sup> them, but that the community will expect and demand them to be willing to sacrifice themselves. Cultural values do not exist without the underpinning of social and vital values, but none the less they rank higher. Not in bread alone doth man live. Men not only live and operate. They also have to find a meaning and a value in their living and operating, and it is the function of the culture to discover, correct, develop, express, validate, criticize, improve such meaning and value. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence, as loving and being loved, as originator of values in himself and his milieu, as an <sup>and invitation</sup> inspiration to others to do likewise. Religious values, finally, are at the heart of the meaning and value of man's living and man's world, but to this matter we return presently.

Besides the development of skills, analysed by Piaget, there also is the development of feelings. It is true, of course, that fundamentally feelings are spontaneous. They do not lie under the command of the will as do the motions of our hands. But, once they have arisen, by advertence and approval, or by disapproval and distraction, they may be

reinforced or curtailed. Such reinforcement and curtailment not only will encourage some feelings and discourage others but also will modify one's spontaneous scale of preferences. Again, feelings are enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of objects that arouse them, and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste, of discriminating praise and carefully worded disapproval, that will conspire with the pupil's or student's own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence.

I have been conceiving feelings as intentional ~~resp~~ responses but I must add that they are not merely transient, limited to the time that we are apprehending a value or its opposite, and vanishing the moment our attention shifts. There are, of course, feelings that easily are aroused and easily pass away. But there also are feelings so deep and so strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that *they* channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life. Here the supreme illustration is loving. A man or woman that falls in love is engaged in loving not only when attending to the beloved but at all times. Besides particular acts of loving there is a prior state of being in love, and that prior state is, <sup>as</sup> as it were, the fount of all one's actions. Mutual love is the intertwining of two lives. It transforms an "I" and "thou" into a "we" so intimate, so secure, so permanent that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both.

We have been engaged in sketching various components of the human good and, of our original list, <sup>of nineteen,</sup> there remain now only five, namely, liberty, orientation, conversion, personal relations, and

terminal values.

Liberty means, of course, not indeterminism but self-determination. It has four main aspects. Subjectively, liberty is the fact that we may succeed or fail in self-transcendence, that our decisions may be motivated by the values at stake or by the calculus of the pleasures and pains involved. Objectively, liberty is the fact that any course of action is only a finite good and, because only finite, open to criticism. It has its alternatives, its limitations, its risks, its drawbacks. Accordingly, the process of deliberation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the self that terminates the process of deliberating by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it. Finally, in so far as that thrust of the self regularly opts, not for the merely apparent good, but for the true good, the self thereby is achieving self-transcendence; it is existing authentically; it is constituting itself as an originating value, and it is bringing about terminal values, namely, a good of order, <sup>that is truly good</sup> and instances of the particular good that are truly good.

~~Orientation of human living is twofold. There is a basic orientation from the transcendental notions that both enable us and require us to respond to values, to judge truthfully, to advance in understanding. But there also is a resultant orientation that comes out of all our past and heads us into the future.~~

Liberty is exercised within the cooperating community whose members by fulfilling roles and performing tasks bring about a good of order. Presently we shall have to speak of the orientation of the community as a whole in terms of progress and decline. But for the moment our concern is with the orientation of the individual within the orientated community. At its root this consists in the transcendental notions that both enable us and require us to advance in understanding, to judge truthfully, to respond to values. Still, this possibility ~~and exigence become effective only through development, through the acquisition of the skills that enable one to function as a human being in one's milieu and through growth in sensitivity and responsiveness to values~~ let us simplify this and exigence become effective only through development. One has to acquire the skills of a competent human being in some walk in life. One has to grow in sensitivity and responsiveness to values if one's humanity is to be effective authentic. But development is not inevitable, and so results vary. There are human failures. There are mediocrities. There are those that keep developing and growing throughout a long life-time, and their achievement varies with their initial background, with their opportunities, with their luck in avoiding pitfalls and setbacks, with the pace of their advance.

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On various aspects of growth, see A. H. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962.

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As orientation is, so to speak, the direction of development, so conversion is a change of direction and, indeed, a change for the better. One frees ~~one~~ oneself from the unauthentic. One grows in authenticity. Harmful, dangerous, misleading satisfactions are dropped. Fears of discomfort, pain, privation have less ~~power~~ power to deflect one from one's course. Values are apprehended where before they were overlooked. Scales of preference shift. Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and shatter to leave one open to ~~the~~ things as they are and to man as he should be.

~~In the cooperating community persons are bound together by their needs that are met by the functioning of the good, of order, by the commitments they have freely undertaken and the expectations to which the commitments give rise, by the roles they have assumed and the tasks that they perform.~~

In the cooperating community persons are bound together by their needs and by the common good of order that meets their needs. They are related by the commitments they have freely undertaken and by the <sup>c</sup>expectations to which the commitments give rise, by the roles they have assumed, and by the tasks that they meet to perform. These relationships are alive with feeling. Persons are aware of common feelings about qualitative values and scales of preference. They are aware of mutual feelings in which each responds to the other as <sup>an ontic</sup> a value or as just a source of satisfactions. They are joined by common ~~knowledge~~ experience, common or ~~comprehended~~ complementary understanding, similar judgements of fact and of value, parallel orientations in life. They are separated, estranged, rendered hostile, when they get out of touch, misunderstand one another, judge in opposed fashions, opt for contrary



orientations. So personal relations vary from intimacy to ignorance, from love to exploitation, from respect to contempt, from friendliness to enmity. They bind a community together or tear it apart.

Terminal values, finally, are correlative to originating values. The originating values are the authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices. Terminal values are the values that they choose, true instances of the particular good, ~~true & truly good~~ a true good of order, and a true scale of preferences regarding values. At one point, however, terminal and originating value coincide. For among values is the ontic value of the good person. When <sup>each</sup> member of the community <sup>both</sup> wills that value ~~both~~ in himself and promotes it, as best he can, in others, then the originating value <sup>s</sup> that chooses and the terminal value <sup>s</sup> that <sup>are</sup> chosen coincide.

I have been offering a rapid sketch of the human good, and the reader well may feel that the sketch has been far too rapid to be helpful. But perhaps it will be conceded that, at least, I have been somewhat fuller than the traditional definition that simply states bonum est id quod omnia appetunt. I have been endeavoring to overcome that simplification, to identify the human good with the concrete human situation, to attribute to it all the complexity of that situation, to provide an initial set of terms and relationships for an investigation of the human good as it is conceived or realized at any given place or time. The relevance of such categories to horizon need not be stressed, for horizon is largely determined by the values one prizes, the satisfactions one insists on, the dissatisfactions that one dreads.

### Progress and Decline

Our account of the human good was static. It did mention the development of the individual in skill and virtue, but in the main it was concerned with the terms, relations, structures relevant to an account of the human good at <sup>any</sup> a given place and time. So now we have to advert to change, to the cumulative change for the better named progress, and to the ~~de~~ <sup>c</sup>umulative change for the worse named decline.

Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, <sup>b</sup> Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. <sup>N</sup> Being attentive includes attention to human affairs. Being intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities. Being reasonable includes the rejection of what probably would not work but also the acknowledgement of what probably would. Being responsible includes basing one's decisions and choices on an unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to oneself, to one's group, to other groups.

Progress, of course, is not some single improvement but a continuous flow of them. But the transcendental precepts are permanent. Attention, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility are to be exercised not only with respect to the existing situation but also with respect to the subsequent, changed situation. It spots the inadequacies and repercussions of the previous venture to improve what is good and remedy what is defective. ~~It adverts to the new possibilities that emerge from the occurrence of past change more generally~~

what is defective. More generally, the simple fact of change of itself makes it likely that new possibilities will have arisen and old possibilities have advanced in probability. So change begets further change and the sustained observance of the transcendental precepts makes these cumulative changes an instance of progress.

But precepts may be violated. Evaluations may be biased by an egoistic disregard of others, by a loyalty to one's own group matched by hostility to other groups, by concentrating <sup>n</sup> of short-term benefits and overlooking long-term costs.

I have elaborated these points in Insight, pp. 218-242.

Moreover, such aberrations are easy to maintain and difficult to correct. Egoists do not turn into altruists overnight. Hostile groups do not easily forget their grievances, drop their resentments, overcome their fears and suspicions. Common sense commonly feels itself omniscient in practical affairs, commonly is blind to long-term ~~coned~~ consequences of policies and courses of action, commonly is unaware of the admixture of common nonsense in its more cherished convictions and slogans.

The extent of such aberration is, of course, a variable. But the greater it is, the more rapidly it will distort the process of cumulative change and bring to birth a host of social and cultural problems. Egoism is in conflict with the good of order. Up to a point it can be countered by the law, the police, the judiciary, the prisons. But there is a limit to the proportion of the population that can be kept in prison and, when egoism passes that limit, the agents of the law and ultimately the law itself have to become more

tolerant and indulgent. So the good of order deteriorates. Not only is it less efficient but also there is the difficulty of exercising even-handed justice in deciding which injustices are to be winked at. The practical question is apt to be whose social sins are to be forgiven and whose are to be punished, and then the law is compromised. It is no longer coincident with justice. In all likelihood it becomes to a greater or less extent the instrument of a class.

For besides the egoism of the individual there is the egoism of the group. While the individual egoist has to put up with the public censure of his ways, group egoism not merely ~~mere~~ directs development to its own aggrandizement but also provides a market for opinions, doctrines, theories that will justify its ways and, at the same time, reveal the misfortunes of other groups to be due to their depravity. Of course, as long as the successful group continues to succeed, ~~as this group is successful,~~ as long as it meets each new challenge with a creative response, it feels itself the child of destiny and it provokes more admiration and emulation than resentment and opposition. But development, guided by group egoism, is bound to be one-sided. It divides the body social not merely into those that have and those that have not but also makes the former the representatives of the cultural flower of the age to leave the latter mere apparent survivals from a forgotten era. Finally, in the measure that the group encouraged and accepted an ideology to rationalize its own behavior, in the same measure it will be blind to the real situation, and it will be bewildered by the emergence of a contrary ideology that will call to consciousness an opposed group egoism.

~~Besides the bias of the individual and of the group~~

Decline has a still deeper level. Not only does it compromise and distort progress. Not only do ~~inattention~~ inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility produce objectively  $\phi$  absurd situations. Not only do ideologies corrupt minds. But compromise and distortion discredit progress. Objectively absurd situations do not yield to treatment. Corrupt ~~the~~ minds have a flair for picking the mistaken solution and insisting that it ~~be adopted~~ alone is intelligent, reasonable, good. Decline ever generates worse decline. Nor is the corruption of mind limited to the immediate sphere of material advantage. It insists alone is intelligent, reasonable, good. Imperceptibly the corruption spreads from the harsh sphere of material advantage and power to the <sup>mass media,</sup> ~~the~~ stylish journals, the literary movements, the educational process, the reigning philosophies. A civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relentless consistency. It cannot be argued out of its self-destructive ways, for argument has a theoretical major premiss, theoretical premisses <sup>are asked</sup> ~~have~~ to conform to matters of fact, and the facts in the situations produced by decline more and more are the absurdities ~~that~~ proceed from inattention, oversight, unreasonableness, and irresponsibility.

The Question of God

The facts of progress and decline raise questions about the character of our universe. Such questions have been put in very many ways, and the answers given have been even more numerous. But behind this multiplicity there is a basic unity ~~in that, at root, the question of God has a trans-cultural meaning~~ that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method. We can inquire into the possibility of inquiry; we can reflect on the nature of our reflection; we can deliberate whether our deliberating is worth while. In each case there arises the question of God.

The possibility of inquiry, on the side of the subject, lies in his intelligence, in his drive to know what, why, how, and in his ability to require intellectually satisfying answers. But why should answers that satisfy the intelligence of the subject yield anything more than a subjective satisfaction? Why should they be supposed to possess any relevance to knowledge of the universe? Of course, we all ~~do~~ assume that they do. We all can claim that ~~our~~ experience justifies our assumption. We grant, then, that the universe is intelligible and, once that is granted, there arises the question whether the universe could be intelligible <sup>about God.</sup> without having an intelligent ground. But this is the question. <sup>Again, to</sup> ~~To~~ reflect on reflection is to ask just what happens when we marshal and weigh the evidence for pronouncing that this probably is so and that certainly not so. To what do these metaphors of marshalling and weighing refer? Elsewhere I have worked out an answer to this question and,

See Insight, chapters nine, <sup>ten</sup>, and eleven.

here, I can do no more than summarily repeat my conclusion. Judgement proceeds rationally from a grasp of a virtually unconditioned. In general, by an unconditioned is meant any  $x$  that has no conditions. By a virtually unconditioned is meant any  $x$  that has no unfulfilled conditions. In other words, a virtually unconditioned has conditions which, however, are all fulfilled. To marshal the evidence is to ascertain whether all conditions are fulfilled. To weigh the evidence is to ascertain whether the fulfilment of the conditions certainly or probably involves the existence or occurrence of the conditioned.

Now this account of judgement implicitly contains a further element. If we speak of the virtually unconditioned, we first must speak of the unconditioned.  
~~so too we can speak of the formally unconditioned.~~  
 The former has no unfulfilled conditions. The latter has no conditions whatever. The former is, in traditional terms, a contingent being. The latter is, in traditional terms, a necessary being. So once more we come to the question of God. Does a necessary being exist?

To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether it is worth while. We praise the developing subject ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, and responsibility. We praise progress and we pour forth our denunciations <sup>on</sup> every manifestation of decline. But is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools struggling to develop individually and <sup>collectively</sup> to snatch progress from the welter of decline? The questions arise and, clearly,

our attitudes and especially our resoluteness are profoundly affected by the answers. Does there or does there not necessarily exist an intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?

Such is the question of God. It is not any matter ~~or~~ of image or feeling or concept or judgement. They pertain to answers but it is a question, <sup>It</sup> that rises out of our conscious intentionality, out of the a priori, structured drive that promotes us from experiencing to the effort to understand, from understanding to the effort to judge truly, from judging to the effort to choose rightly. In the measure that we advert to our questioning and proceed to question it, there arises the question of God.

It is a question that will be manifested differently in the different stages of ~~the~~ man's historical development and in the many varieties of his culture. But such differences of manifestation and expression are secondary. They may introduce alien elements that overlay, obscure, distort the pure ~~question that consists in applying the transcendental notions~~ to the transcendental notions. None the less, the obscurity and the distortion presuppose the pure question that they obscure and distort and, in that sense, there is radically only one question that is the question ~~about~~ of God. Moreover, that question is universal, for every man is capable of asking how understanding can be knowledge, of how the satisfaction ~~of his understanding is knowledge of things,~~ how the satisfaction of his understanding is knowledge of things, of demanding not merely the virtually unconditioned, that yields



question, the question that questions questioning. None the less, the obscurity and the distortion presuppose what they obscure and distort. It follows that, however much religious (or irreligious) <sup>^</sup> ~~and irreligious~~ answers differ, however much there differ the questions they explicitly raise, still at their root there is the same transcendental tendency of the human spirit that questions, that questions without restriction, that questions its own questioning and so comes to the question of God.

The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon. <sup>Man's</sup> ~~His~~ <sup>^</sup> transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible, the unconditioned, the ~~xxx~~ good of value. The reach <sup>^</sup> not of his attainment but of his intention is unrestricted. There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored. The atheist may pronounce it empty. The agnostic may urge he sees nothing there. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation towards the divine.

### Religious Values

In our sketch of the human good we said something about vital, social, cultural, and ~~personal~~ personal values, but postponed any elucidation of religious ~~value~~ values. To these we now turn. For the positive answer to the question of God is not only a statement of ~~his nature and~~ his existence and his nature but also a personal response to his goodness. It is not only metaphysics but also ~~moral and religion~~

morals and religion. It goes beyond the human good to the originating value that is God and the terminal value that is the universe.

Elsewhere I have shown how one may proceed from the human good to a general ontology of the good on the ground that ~~both the good and the real are to be identified with~~ <sup>is to be identified with being and being with</sup> the intelligible. Also I have shown how one may adopt a contemporary scientific and philosophic outlook and still conclude from the things that are seen to the existence, <sup>freedom,</sup> omniscience, goodness, and omnipotence of God. These

Insight, pp. 604-607.

Ibid., chapter XIX.

expositions I shall not repeat here but presuppose. They pertain to a philosophical theology. They take one no further than an intentional self-transcendence, but our present concern is with religious values and so with a real self-transcendence.

The original feature of this real self-transcendence is that by it the existential subject is constituting himself ~~in~~ <sup>in relation,</sup> ~~with regard to~~ not just to the human good, but to God as originating value and the universe as terminal value. In other words the human good becomes absorbed within ~~a larger, universal~~ <sup>an all-encompassing</sup> good. Where before the only originating values were men, ~~now~~ <sup>now</sup> there is the supreme originating value, ~~at the~~ creator of cosmic and historical process. Where before only man's achievements could be named terminal values, now the whole created universe is a terminal value.

Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and God's world. The limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave. Men meet not only to be together and to settle human affairs but also to worship. Human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness.

To conceive God as originating value and the world as terminal value implies that God too is self-transcending and that the world is the fruit of his self-transcendence, the ~~manifestation~~ expression and manifestation of his benevolence and beneficence, his glory. This glory he wills, as Aquinas saw, not for his sake but for ours. ~~For~~ He

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St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. theol., II-II, q. 132, a. 1 ad lm.  
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has made us in his image, for our authenticity consists in being like him, in self-transcending, in being origins of values, in true love.

~~The radical being in love that is to our authentic~~  
existing is being in love with God. It is peace, the peace the world cannot give, the peace into which one enters in prayer. It is the total self-surrender that just waits without image or thought or care in what is experienced by some as the presence of God and by others as quiet or the void. Still withdrawal is for return. As divine love is a self-transcendence expressed in created process, so man's being in love with God is a self-transcendence unto God that expresses itself not only by resting in God but also by collaborating in the achievement of God's glory.

Already I have had occasion to distinguish between acts of loving and being in love. Being in love is a dynamic orientation whence proceeds all one's living. As love of one's neighbor, it unites one with him or her in a common achievement of the good. But as love of God, it refers us back and around and forward. It refers <sup>us</sup> back to God, the self-transcending source of all good, in adoration and repentance, in thanksgiving and praise, in trust and hope. It refers <sup>us</sup> around to all men, for all men are made in the image of God and it is through and with and in them that God's glory is to be achieved. It refers us forward to promote progress and to offset decline, not just for the sake of achievement, not only for the good of ~~mankind~~ but mankind but, at the deepest level, for the greater glory of God.

Our topic is religious values. Value is the true as opposed to the merely apparent good. Its source and its criterion are self-transcendence. Religious values are the values that arise in and from real self-transcendence in response to God. Such values heighten, integrate, unify all other values.

All love is a gift of oneself to another, and so all love involves self-surrender. But only the love of God can be a total self-surrender without any qualifications or conditions or ~~any~~ reserves, and so only the love of God is ~~total loving~~. Again, only God can be relied on utterly, and so it is only the love of God that gives us ~~the~~ the solid serenity, the peace that the world cannot give, the peace into which one enters when one prays to one's Father in secret.

total loving. Such total loving is full authenticity, a fount of inner, deep-set joy that only failures in loving can sadden. It is basic fulfilment, ~~and~~ and so it gives the solid <sup>s</sup> serenity, the peace ~~that~~ that the world cannot give, the peace of the Lord into which one may almost palpably enter when one prays to him in secret. Such love, such joy, such peace transform a man. They banish the emptiness, the unrest, the alienation, the flight from one's depths that trouble lives lived without God. Full love, joy, and peace enhance all one's virtues and press against one's defects. They make one a power for all good and zealous in achievement. Relating man to God, they also relate him to mankind and to the whole cosmic and historical process. On all persons and things, on all events and deeds, they shed a new dimension of meaning, significance, value.

Religion, then, and progress are bound together. They have a common root in man's intentional and real self-transcendence, so that to promote either is to promote the other indirectly. Again, religion places human efforts in a friendly universe, reveals ~~that~~ an ultimate significance in human achievement, strengthens new undertakings with confidence. Above all, religion can undertake the supreme task of undoing the work of decline.

Decline ~~corrupts~~ disrupts a culture with conflicting ideologies. It inflicts on individuals the social, economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinisms. It multiplies and heaps up the abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, violence. It is not propaganda or argument but religious faith that will liberate human reasonableness from its ideological

prisons. It is not the promises of men but religious hope that can enable men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. Finally, if passions are to quieten down, if wrongs are to be not merely ignored, not merely palliated, but removed, human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by religious charity, by the charity of the suffering by self-sacrificing love. servant, ^ Men are sinners. If progress is not to be ever distorted and destroyed by decline, men have to be reminded of their sinfulness; they have to acknowledge their real guilt and they have to amend their ways; they have to learn with humility that the task of repentance and conversion is life-long.

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Insight, chapter XX, treats at some length the function of faith, hope, and charity in dissolving the effects of decline.

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#### Religious Expression

I have been conceiving religion as simply ultimate concern, as authentic human existence with regard to God and God's world. But the primary and ordinary manifestation of ultimate concern is, of course, not any technically formulated question about God, not any transcendental analysis of ultimate concern, not any ontology of the good or any philosophic proof of God's existence, but the endless variety of the religions of mankind.

These religions are more than ultimate concern. In the measure they are authentic, they do express, ~~reveal~~ reveal, communicate, share ultimate concern. But by going beyond ~~ultimate~~ ultimate concern to its expression they risk inauthenticity. Moreover, the more primitive the religion, the less it is differentiated from the rest of the culture, and so the less is it capable of functioning independently and resisting socio-cultural decline. On the other hand, when religion develops into a separate entity within a culture, it can function ~~more independently~~ with some independence and initiative of its own. But this will not guarantee authenticity and there are <sup>now</sup> the added risks of religion resisting cultural advance to maintain its authenticity or, on the other hand, seeking integration within a culture and mistakenly joining with the forces of decline.

First, then, early religious expression is global. Ultimate and proximate concern, the sacred and the profane, are not distinguished, separated, specialized. Each penetrates the other. What we would term profane is sacralized. What we would term sacred seems to us profaned. All activity expresses some concern, but the concern that is expressed is at once ultimate and proximate. Then religious expression is not specifically and exclusively religious but included ~~globally~~ globally with other types of expression. Moreover, even after differentiation has been slowly and gradually established, one is not to suppose that individuals and groups will not slip back to the forms of expression and the patterns of experience

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On patterns of experience, see Insight, pp. 181-189.

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in which religion as lived, felt, revealed, once more is global.

Religious expression becomes specifically religious by development, that is, by differentiation, specialization, integration. Differentiation sets the object of ultimate concern apart from other objects. The one concern of human authenticity -- the concern to attend, to understand, to judge truly, to choose responsibly -- remains one and the same. But it expresses itself differently with ~~new~~ respect to different objects. There are developed specialized activities with a religious significance. There is introduced a division of labor in the performance of the activities. So religious expression becomes a distinct part of the cultural statement on the meaning and value of human life, while the ~~maintenance~~ propagation and development of that expression are entrusted to a social institution.

Precisely because it <sup>manifests</sup> ~~is the expression of~~ ultimate concern, religious expression differs from all other expressions. They refer to this world, to the set of objects of possible, immediate, human experience. Its reference is other-worldly. For the object of ultimate concern <sup>is</sup> ~~comes~~ to be known, not by questioning experience, but by questioning questioning itself. Still, this does not imply that the object of ultimate concern is "totally other." On the ~~contrary~~ <sup>t</sup>, it is the ground of intelligibility, truth, being, value in the whole universe, and these are ~~totally~~ affine to human concern whether proximate or ultimate. Again, it is that ground alone to whom man can surrender himself totally and thereby ~~achieve~~ achieve the love, joy, and peace of authentic fulfilment. Finally, religious expression has the character of a response. It is man's

See <sup>§</sup> Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburg and Louvain 1965, pp. 156 f., on the phenomenology of religious acts.



self-transcendence answering divine self-transcendence, a finite being-in-love answering divine love.

However, profound and powerful, however intimate and personal, that response to God must be expressed, or else it will be incomplete, unfinished, broken off. But now that we have moved to specific religious expression, we must distinguish between whole and part, if we are to avoid the confusions and pitfalls connected with secularization theology.

See Robert Richard, Secularization Theology, New York, Herder and Herder, 1967. Colin Williams, Faith in a Secular Age, New York Harper and Row, 1966.

The total expression of one's response to God imitates divine love. Just as that love expresses itself by creating the universe, so man's response to that love expresses itself in a love of God's creation now is the time to rub out a line the universe and ~~grow~~ by loving and providing for rational creatures, so too man's loving response to God finds its expression and outlet in loving God's creation. Affectively it ~~it loves all that God has done, is doing, will do~~ is a love that extends to all that God has done, is doing, or will do. Effectively it turns to the persons that here and now can be comforted and <sup>present</sup> helped and to the tasks of promoting the human good and offsetting decline.

~~Total response, then~~

Total expression, then, is religious in its source, for its source is loving God with one's whole and one's whole soul and all one's mind and all one's strength. But its term is the whole of creation. It is not confined to what

is specifically<sup>1</sup> religious, ecclesiastical, theological. It reaches out to the whole of this world and, in that sense, it may be said to be secular. But it is not to be confined to this life, for its measure is all that God brings about.

However, if total expression is in a sense secular, still it is not secularist. It does not exclude religion or church or theology. On the contrary, it includes them as parts within a larger whole, and it limits them to their functions within that whole. For the fact is that man does not just act. He pauses and reflects on the significance and the value of his acting. He criticizes it and seeks to improve it. Nor is this reflective pause an unworthy deviation from the primary business of acting. On the contrary, it is the source of all development, which proceeds from initial, global, undifferentiated operations through differentiation and specialization to new and more effective integrations. What happens in all other components of human living, also happens in the most basic of all. Man reflects on his love of God. He asks whom he is loving, and whether it is really love, and how it could be ~~strengthened~~ strengthened and refined, and in what ways it could be communicated and shared. Though he holds that love to be God's gift, he also knows that it must be cultivated by human effort. Though he holds that his neighbor is to be loved in every way, still he knows that the greatest benefit he could confer would be to share <sup>with him his</sup> ~~the~~ love of God. So once more we may conclude to the cultivation of the inner life by prayer and mortification, to the mutual support of communal worship, to the specialized functions fulfilled by various members in the social institution named the church. But though we reach that conclusion, we must also stress that such

specifically religious activities are only a functional part of the ~~one's~~ total expression of one's love of God.

There is a further point to be made. Neither total nor specific expression are immutable constants. Total expression, as effective, is always the love of one's neighbor; but the human good progresses and declines, and so the good to be done and the ~~decline~~ decline to be undone vary with place and time. Similarly, specific expression is fixed in some respects and variable in others. The higher achievements of the inner life tend to transcend image and symbol, concept and system, and on that account have an independence of historical change. But manners of speech, modes of emotional communication, cultural and social forms are historical variables. As they change, specific religious expression has to keep ~~up~~ step, neither resisting progress, nor siding with decline.

This, of course, is a high and delicate task. For it is the lot of specifically religious expression that, while it can promote the development of ultimate concern, the unfolding of benevolence and beneficence, it also can be a carrier of decline. To admit specific expression is to admit cultural activities and social functions in which inattention, incomprehension, unreasonableness, and irresponsibility can find their way. Just as these distort other forms of progress, so too they distort religious development. Then the salt loses its savor. Then the religious man neglects the beam in his own eye to fumble with the mote in his brother's.

I have agreed with secularization theology, then, in so far as I have stressed that specifically religious expression is only a functional part and not the whole manifestation of one's love of God and, as well, in so far as I have granted that specific expression can be antiquated and can be a carrier of decline. But granting all this

does not lead to the conclusion that Christianity should outgrow specifically religious statements, activities, functions. It has to place love and the human good ahead <sup>of</sup> religion, the church, theology. It has to update its structures, functions, activities, statements. It has ever to watch and pray lest it fall into temptation and, when it fails, it has to repent and make amends. But I see no evidence that it has to exclude specific religious expression and thereby revert to primitivism. In fact, not even the advocates of secular Christianity ~~are~~ have given up technical writing and contented themselves with global religious expression.

Christian atheism is another facet of twentieth-century <sup>confusion -</sup> originality. It is Christian inasmuch as it experiences ultimate concern and gives it at least ~~to~~ its primary and essential expression. It ~~is~~ is atheist because <sup>on</sup> most up-to-date philosophies there is no way of coming to know about God. Finally, it is Christian and atheist because it deems it absurd to surrender ultimate concern merely because its philosophic abilities or interests are not equal to the task of coming to know about God <sup>or</sup> to believe in him.

I doubt the stability of this position, not merely because I hold that <sup>^</sup> ~~to~~ believe the philosophic issues can be handled, but also because, when God is not acknowledged, ultimate concern ceases to be other-worldly. It ceases to be ultimate. Either it is not a total self-surrender, or else it is ~~an~~ total dedication to some worldly end or cause. In the former case human living is trivialized. In the ~~late~~ latter it becomes fanatical. In the former case man is alienated from himself. In the latter he ~~is~~ spreads havoc by his passion and his folly.

Judgements of Value

Judgements of value are simple or comparative. They affirm or deny that some x is truly good or only apparently good. Or they compare distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better, or more important, or more urgent than the other.

Such judgements are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being. But the criterion is one thing and the meaning of the judgement is another. To say that <sup>an affirmative</sup> a judgement of value is true is to say what objectively is ~~is~~ or would be good or better. To say that <sup>an affirmative</sup> a judgement of value is false is to say what objectively is not or would not be good or better.

Judgements of value differ in content but not in structure from judgements of fact. They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove of what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only intentional in judgements of fact but is heading towards real self-transcendence in judgements of value. In both the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgements of fact state or ~~claim to~~ purport to state what is or is not so; judgements of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.

True judgements of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence without reaching the fullness of real self-transcendence. That fullness is not merely knowing but also doing, and man can know what is right without doing it. Still, if he knows and does not perform, either he must be humble enough to acknowledge himself to be a sinner, or else he will start destroying his moral being by rationalizing, by making out that what truly is good really is not good at all. The judgement of value, then, is itself a reality in the moral order. By it the subject moves beyond the purely intentional order of knowing. By it the subject is constituting himself as proximately capable of real self-transcendence, of benevolence and beneficence, of true loving.

Intermediate between judgements of fact and judgements of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions ~~are intentional responses, feelings with respect to objects~~ are given in feelings. The feelings in question are not the already described non-intentional states, trends, urges, that are related to efficient and final causes but not to objects. Again, they are not intentional responses to such objects as the agreeable or disagreeable, the pleasant or painful, the satisfying or dissatisfying. For, while these are objects, still they are ambiguous objects that may prove to be truly good or ~~only~~ bad or only apparently good or bad. Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response <sup>which greets either</sup> to the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers

constitutive of intentional self-transcendence<sup>c</sup>, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of real self-transcendence.

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On values, scales of ~~perhaps~~ preference, feelings and their development, see above pp. 17-20 and 32-36.

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In the judgement of value, then, three components ~~unite. First, there is knowledge of fact, or~~ unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there ~~is~~ are intentional <sup>on</sup> responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards real self-transcendence constituted by the judgement of value itself. The judgement of value presupposes knowledge of human life, of human possibilities proximate and remote, <sup>probable</sup> of the consequences of projected courses of action. When knowledge is deficient, then fine feelings are apt to be expressed in what is called moral idealism, i. e. lovely proposals that don't work out and often do more harm than good. But knowledge alone is not enough and, while everyone has some measure of moral feeling for, as the saying is, there is honor among thieves, still moral feelings have to be cultivated, enlightened, strengthened, refined, <sup>criticized,</sup> and pruned of oddities. Finally, the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling lead to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but ~~also~~ also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one. With that discovery there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility. One's

judgements of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfilment or to one's loss. Experience, especially repeated experience, of one's frailty or wickedness raises the question of one's salvation and, on a more fundamental level, there arises the question of God.

The fact of development and the possibility of failure imply that judgements of value occur in different contexts. There is the context of growth, in which one's knowledge of human living and operating is increasing in extent, precision, refinement, and in which one's responses are advancing from the agreeable to vital values, from vital to social, from social to cultural, from cultural to personal, from personal to religious. Then there prevails an openness to ever further achievement. Past gains are organized and consolidated but they are not rounded off into a closed system but remain incomplete and so open to still further discoveries and developments. The free thrust of the subject into new areas is recurrent and, as yet, there is no supreme value that entails all others. But at the

On growth, growth motivation, and neurotic needs, see A. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962.

summit of the ascent from the <sup>initial</sup> infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications there are to be found the ~~highest~~ deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor, of being in love with God. In the measure that that <sup>summit</sup> goal is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are ~~whatever one loves in virtue of one's love of God,~~ while evils are ~~whatever one hates in virtue of the same.~~



~~While evils are whatever is opposed to that love~~  
 are God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal. In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases, Ama Deum et fac quod vis. Then affectivity is of a single piece. Further developments only fill out previous achievement. Lapses from grace are rarer and more quickly amended.

But continuous growth seems to be rare. There are the

Prof. Maslow (op. cit., p. 190) finds self-actualization in less than 1% of the adult population.

There are the deviations occasioned by neurotic need. <sup>T</sup> ~~The~~ refusals to keep on taking ~~wake~~ the plunge from settled routines to an as yet unexperienced but richer mode of living. There are the mistaken endeavors to quieten an uneasy conscience by ignoring, belittling, denying, rejecting higher values. Preference scales become distorted. Feelings soured. Bias creeps into one's outlook, rationalizations into one's morals, ideology into one's thought. So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to ~~to~~ groups, to nations, to blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms <sup>to divide mankind and</sup> to menace civilization with destruction. Such is the ~~port~~ monster that has stood forth in our day.

On ressentiment and the distortion of preference scales, see Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburgh and Louvain, 1965, chapter five.

In his thorough and penetrating study of human action Joseph de Finance distinguished between horizontal and vertical liberty. Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty

J. de Finance, Essai sur l'agir humain, Rome, Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962, pp. 287 ff.

from within a determinate horizon and on the basis of a corresponding existential stance. Vertical liberty is the exercise of liberty that selects that stance and the corresponding horizon.

Such vertical liberty may be implicit: it occurs in responding to the motives that lead one to ever fuller authenticity,

or in ignoring such motives and drifting into an ever less authentic selfhood. But it also can be explicit.

Then, <sup>one is</sup> ~~we are~~ responding to the transcendental notion of value,

by determining what it would be worth while for <sup>one</sup> ~~me~~ to make oneself,

of myself, and what it would be worth while for <sup>one</sup> ~~me~~ to do one's

for my fellow men. <sup>One works</sup> ~~We work~~ out an ideal of human reality one dedicates oneself.

and achievement, and to that ideal <sup>one's</sup> ~~we dedicate~~ ~~out~~ ~~ourselves~~.

As <sup>one's</sup> ~~our~~ knowledge increases, as <sup>one's</sup> ~~our~~ experience is enriched,

as <sup>one's</sup> ~~our~~ reach is strengthened or weakened, <sup>one's</sup> ~~our~~ ideal may be revised and the revision may recur many times.

In such vertical liberty, whether implicit or explicit, are to be found the foundations of the judgements of value that occur. Such judgements are felt to be true or false in so far as they generate a peaceful or an uneasy conscience.

~~They are true or false in so far as the conscience is that~~ fully developed of the self-transcending subject or, as Aristotle would put it, of the virtuous man. True judgements of value are the

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, iii, 4, 1105b 5-8;

III, vi, 15, 1106b 36-ff.

But they attain their proper context, their clarity and refinement, only through man's historical development and the individual's personal appropriation of his social, cultural, and religious heritage. It is by the transcendental notion of value and its expression in a good and an uneasy conscience that man can develop morally. But a rounded moral judgement is ever the work of a fully developed self-transcending subject or, as ~~as~~ Aristotle would put it, of a virtuous man.

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While Aristotle spoke not of values but of virtues, still his account of virtue presupposes the existence of virtuous men, as my account of value presupposes the existence of self-transcending subjects. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, iii, 4; 1105b 5-8: "Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just and temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the ~~can~~ man who also does them as just and temperate men do them." Similarly, ibid., II, vi, 15; 1106b 36 ff.: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i. e. the ~~me~~ mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom <sup>g</sup> would determine it." Translation by W. D. Ross in R. McKeon's The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York, Random House, 1941, pp. 956, 959.

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Beliefs

To appropriate one's social, cultural, religious heritage is largely a matter of belief. There is, of course, ~~as~~ much that one finds out for oneself, that one knows simply in virtue of one's own inner and outer experience, one's own insights, one's own judgements of fact and of value. But such immanently generated knowledge is but a ~~of~~ small fraction of what any civilized man considers himself to know. His <sup>immediate</sup> experience is filled out by an enormous context constituted by reports of the experience of other men at other places and times. His understanding rests not only on his own but also on the experience of others, and its development owes little indeed to his personal originality, much to his repeating in himself the acts of understanding first made by others, and most of all to presuppositions that he has taken for granted because they commonly are assumed and, in any case, he has neither the time nor the inclination nor, perhaps, the ability to investigate ~~them~~ for himself. Finally, the judgements, by which he assents to truths of fact and of value, only rarely depend exclusively on his immanently generated knowledge, for such knowledge stands not by itself in some separate compartment but in symbiotic fusion with a far larger context of beliefs.

I have treated the topic of belief more fully in Insight, pp. 703-718.

Thus, one knows the relative positions of the major cities in the United States. After all, one has examined maps and seen their names plainly printed beside small circles representing their positions. But is the map accurate? That one does not know but believes. Nor does the map-maker

known for, in all probability, his map was just a compilation of the many maps of much smaller areas made by surveyors that had been over the terrain. Knowledge, then, of the accuracy of the map is divided up; part is in the mind of each surveyor; ~~but knowledge of the accuracy of the whole is in no one's mind; it is entirely a matter of the surveyors believing one another~~ and but the accuracy of the whole is a matter not of knowledge but of belief, of the surveyors believing one another and the rest of us believing the ~~of~~ surveyors. It may be urged, however, that the accuracy of maps is verified in countless manners. It is on the basis of maps that planes fly and ships sail, that highways are built and cities are laid out, that people travel about and that property is bought and sold. Over and over in myriad ways transactions based on maps prove to be ~~sur-~~ successful. But only a minute  $\frac{1}{2}$  fraction of such verifications is a matter of <sup>one's own</sup> ~~of~~ immanently generated knowledge. It is only by belief that one can invoke to one's support the cloud of witnesses who also have found maps satisfactory. It is that belief, that dependence on countless others, that is the real basis of one's confidence in maps.

Science is often contrasted ~~by~~ with belief, but the fact of the matter is that belief plays as large a role in science as in most other areas of human activity. A scientist's original contributions to his subject are not belief but knowledge. Again, when he repeats another's observations and experiments, <sup>when he</sup> works out for himself the theorems needed to formulate the hypothesis, <sup>its</sup> presuppositions, and <sup>its</sup> implications, when he grasps the evidence for excluding alternative views, then he  $\frac{1}{2}$  does not believe but knows. But it would be a mistake to fancy that scientists spend their lives repeating one

another's work. They do not suffer from a pointless mania to attain immanently generated knowledge of their <sup>fields.</sup> ~~subjects.~~ On the contrary, the aim of the scientist is the advancement of science, and the attainment of that goal is by a division of ~~the~~ labor. New results, if not disputed, tend to be assumed in further work. If the further work prospers, they begin to be regarded with confidence. If the further work runs into difficulties, they will come under suspicion, <sup>be</sup> submitted to scrutiny, tested at this or that apparent weak point. Moreover, this indirect process of verification and falsification is far more important than the initial direct process. For the indirect process is continuous and cumulative. It regards the hypothesis in all its suppositions and consequences. It recurs every time any of these is ~~pre~~ presupposed. It constitutes an ever increasing body of evidence that the hypothesis is satisfactory. And, like the evidence for the accuracy of maps, it is operative only slightly as immanently generated knowledge but overwhelmingly as belief.

<sup>have been</sup>  
I ~~am~~ pointing to the social character of human knowledge and I now must ~~add~~ invite attention to its historical character. The division of labor is not only <sup>is</sup> ~~among~~ among those inquiring today but also ~~among~~ <sup>it</sup> extends down the ages. There is a progress in knowledge from primitives to moderns only because successive generations began where their predecessors left off. But successive generations could do so, only because they ~~wer~~ were ready to believe. Without belief, relying solely on their own individual experience, their own insights, their own judgement, they would have begun ~~afresh~~ <sup>afresh</sup>

either  
ever been beginning afresh, and the attainments of primitives  
would never be surpassed or, if they were, then the benefits  
would not be transmitted.

Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession  
but rather a common fund, from which each may draw by believing,  
to which each may contribute in the measure that he performs  
his cognitional operations properly and reports their results  
accurately. A man <sup>does not</sup> learn ~~not~~ without the use of his own senses,  
his own mind, his own heart, yet not exclusively by these.  
He learns from others, not solely by repeating the operations  
they have performed but for the most part by taking their  
word for the results. Through communication and belief  
there are generated common sense, common knowledge, common  
science, common values, a common climate of opinion.  
No doubt, this public fund may suffer from blindspots,  
oversights, errors, bias. But it <sup>is</sup> what we have ~~got~~ got,  
and the remedy for its short-comings is not the rejection  
of belief and so a return to primitivism, but the critical  
and selfless stance that in this as in other matters promotes  
progress and offsets decline.

~~Such a critical stance is not, of course, universal  
doubt. No one ever practised that successfully, for if he  
did, he would have become once more an infant. No one ever  
should attempt universal doubt: it throws out truth along with  
error, and it leaves one with no criteria by which truth  
might be recovered and error avoided.~~

One promotes progress by being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible not only in all one's cognitional operations but also in all one's speech and writing. One offsets decline by following through on one's discoveries. For when one makes a discovery, when one comes to know what one did not know before, ~~usually~~ often enough one is advancing not merely from ignorance to truth but from error to truth. To ~~follow~~ follow up on such discovery is to scrutinize the error, to ~~uncover its premisses, other views now is the time my dear~~ to uncover other connected views that in one way or another supported or confirmed it. These associates of the error may themselves be errors. They will bear examination. In the measure they come under suspicion and prove to be erroneous, one can move on to their associates, and so make the discovery of one error the occasion of a purge purging many. Finally, besides <sup>his</sup> false beliefs there is the false believer. ~~When one uncovers one's errors and purges one's mind of them~~ It is not enough, however, simply to reject ~~err~~ errors. Besides the false beliefs there is the false believer. One has to look into the manner in which one happened to have accepted erroneous beliefs and one has to try to discover and correct the carelessness, the credulity, the bias that led one to ~~take~~ mistake the false for the true. Finally, it is not enough to remove mistaken beliefs and to reform the mistaken believer. One has to replace as well as remove, to build up as well as tear down. Mere hunting for errors ~~or heresies~~ <sup>personal and</sup> can leave one a cultural wreck without convictions or commitments. By far the healthier procedure is primarily positive and constructive, so that what is true more and more fills out one's mind,



and what is false falls away without leaving a gap or scar.

Such, in general, is belief and now we must turn to an outline of the process of coming to believe. ~~man~~  
The process is possible because what is true of itself is not private but public, not something to be confined to the mind that grasps it, but something independent of that mind and so in a sense detachable and communicable. This independence is, as already we have emphasized, the intentional self-transcendence involved in the true judgement of fact and the real self-transcendence involved in the true judgement of value. I cannot give another my eyes for him to see with, but I can truly report what I see, and he can believe. I cannot give another my understanding, but I can truly report what I have come to understand to be so, and he can believe. I cannot transfer to another my powers of judgement, but I can report what I affirm and what I deny, and he can believe me. Such is the first step. It is taken, not by the person that <sup>believes</sup>, but by the person whom he believes.

The second step is a general judgement of value. It approves man's division of labor in the acquisition of knowledge both in its historical and in its social dimensions. The approval is not uncritical. It is fully aware of the fallibility of believing. But it finds it obvious that error would increase rather than diminish by a regression to primitivism. So it enters into man's collaboration in the development of knowledge, determined to promote truth and to combat error.

The third step is a particular judgement of value. It regards the trustworthiness of a witness, a source, a report, the competence of an expert, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

the soundness of judgement of a teacher, a counsellor, a leader, a statesman, an authority. The point at issue in each case is whether one's source was critical of his sources, whether ~~his~~ he reached intentional self-transcendence in his judgements of ~~fact~~ fact and real self-transcendence in his judgements of value, whether he was truthful and accurate in his statements. Commonly such questions cannot be answered by direct methods. ~~But there are many ways of coming to know the reputation of a source, the studies or training of an expert, the character of an authority and, from these, one can reach a presumption of trustworthiness, competence, soundness of judgement and, by repeated use of the same source, this presumption may be confirmed or demolished,~~

by direct methods and recourse must be had to indirect. Thus, there may be more than one source, expert, authority; they may be independent and yet concur. Again, the source, expert, authority may speak on several occasions; <sup>his or her</sup> ~~its~~ statements may be inherently probable, consistent with one another and with all one knows from other <sup>of</sup> sources, experts, authorities. Further, other ~~in~~ inquirers may have frequently appealed to the same source, expert, authority, and have concluded to the trustworthiness of the source, the competence of the expert, the sound judgement of the authority. Finally, when everything favors belief except the intrinsic probability of the statement to be believed, one can ask oneself whether the fault is not in oneself, whether it is not the limitation of one's own horizon that prevents one from grasping intrinsic probability.

The fourth step is the decision to believe. It is an act of will, a choice, that follows upon the general and the particular judgements of value. Already one has judged that critically controlled belief is essential to the human good; it has its risks but it is unquestionably better than regression to primitivism. Just now one has judged that such and such a statement is credible, that it can be believed by a reasonable and responsible person. The combination of the general and the particular judgement yields the conclusion that the statement ought to be believed for, if believing is a good thing, then what can be believed should be believed. Finally, what should be so, actually becomes so, through an act of will, a decision or choice.

The fifth step is the act of believing, the assent of that results from the decision of the will. intellect, I in my own mind judge to be true the communicated judgement of fact or of value. I do so, not because of my own immanently generated knowledge, for that I do not possess in the matter in question, but because of the immanently generated knowledge of others. Moreover, my knowledge of the immanently generated knowledge of ~~others~~ others, as is clear from the third step, is not exclusively a matter of my immanently generated knowledge; as ~~in~~ most human knowledge it too depends to a notable extent on further acts of belief.

Now analysis can be misleading. Without a concrete illustration it may arouse suspicion and even make people feel that they should never believe anything. Think, then, of the engineer that whips out his slide rule and in a few moments performs a long and difficult calculation. He knows precisely what he is doing. He can explain just why the movements of the slide yield the results. Still the results

are not exclusively the fruit of the ~~engineer's~~ immanent  
~~of~~ engineer's immanently generated knowledge. For the  
 markings on the rule represent logarithmic and ~~the~~ trigonometric  
 tables. The engineer never worked out for himself such a set  
 of tables. He does not know but believes that such tables  
 are correct. Again, the engineer never checked the markings  
 on his rule against a set of tables. He has no doubt about  
 their correspondence, but the absence of doubt is due not  
 to immanently generated knowledge but to ~~of~~ belief. Is he  
 acting unintelligently, unreasonably, irresponsibly? Is anyone  
 willing to defend the thesis that all engineers using slide-rules  
 should desist until each one for himself has acquired immanently  
 generated knowledge of the accuracy of logarithmic and ~~trigonometric~~  
 trigonometric tables and of the correspondence of ~~the~~  
 the markings on their rules with the tables they have worked out  
 each for himself?

The reader may ~~be surprised~~ find our account of belief  
 quite novel. He may be surprised both by the extent of  
 belief in human knowledge and by the value we attribute to it.  
 But if <sup>notwithstanding</sup> he agrees with our position, his agreement may mark  
 an advance not from ignorance but from error to ~~knowledge~~  
~~truth~~. In that case ~~he~~ he should follow up his discovery.  
~~His error, he may find, stems from Enlightenment propaganda~~  
~~that attacked belief for the purpose of destroying certain~~  
 hurrying the demise of certain social, cultural, and religious  
 traditions. The difficulty with such a strategy is that it  
 leads in the long run to the destruction of every tradition,  
 including the ~~new traditions that the Enlightenment sought~~  
 to establish.

truth. In that case he should ask whether the error was a mistaken belief, whether it was associated with other beliefs, whether they too were mistaken and, if they were, whether they were associated with still further mistaken beliefs. As the reader will observe, this critical procedure does not ~~attack belief or possibly mistaken belief now is the time~~ attack belief in general; it does not ask you to believe that your beliefs are mistaken; it takes its start from a belief you have discovered to be mistaken and it proceeds along the lines that link beliefs together to determine how far the contagion has spread.

#### Faiths

By a faith I understand a basic religious belief, and I distinguish positive and negative, philosophic, historic, and continuously historic faith.

The evils that afflict mankind can be so great that men despair. Nor can despair be warded off by empirical knowledge of ~~the~~ future blessings, for the future is not yet an object of experience. Only hope can defeat despair, and the basis of hope is faith in God, in his existence, his power, and his goodness.

Such faith is positive and philosophic. It is positive for it affirms the existence, power, and goodness of God. It is philosophic for it has its ground in an ~~already~~ mentioned ontology of the good and in a proof of God's

See Insight, pp. 604-607, and 634 ff.

Faith

Faith is the knowledge born of religious love.

First, then, there is a knowledge born of love. Of it Pascal spoke when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason <sup>§</sup> does not know. Here by reason I would understand the compound of the activities of the first three levels of intentional consciousness, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of factual judging. By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values; and I would recall the two aspects of such responses, ~~the absolute aspect inasmuch as values are apprehended~~ the absolute aspect inasmuch as the feeling is a recognition of value and the relative aspect inasmuch as feelings express preference of some values over others. Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of ~~religious~~ intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being-in-love.

Then it

Such being-in-love may be total. ~~It~~ is without conditions, reserves, qualifications. It is other-worldly, for only <sup>of this world.</sup> idolatry would bestow it on anyone or anything ~~material.~~ It is a state reached through the exercise of vertical liberty, the liberty that chooses, not among objects within a horizon, but between different horizons. It is a state that, once reached, is distinct from, ~~not~~ prior to, and principle of subsequent judgements of value and acts of loving. It is the fulfilment of man's capacity for self-transcendence and, as fulfilment, it brings a deep-set joy and a profound peace. It radiates through the whole of one's living and acting, opening one's horizon to the full, purifying one's intentional

responses to values, rectifying one's scale of preferences, underpinning one's judgements of value, simplifying issues by moving them to a deeper level, and strengthening one to achieve the good in the face of evil.

Such being-in-love is religious. Of it St. Paul spoke when he ~~wrote~~ exclaimed that the love of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that has been given us. Of it Paul Tillich ~~wrote when~~ spoke when he conceived the religious man as one grasped by ultimate concern. But it

D. M. Brown, Ultimate Concern, Tillich in Dialogue, New York, Harper & Row, 1965.

is experienced in many ways. It can be the quiet under-tow of one's living that reveals itself only in a <sup>deep but obscure</sup> conviction that one cannot get out of <sup>trying to be holy.</sup> ~~doing what is right~~. It <sup>can be</sup> is nurtured <sup>transitorily</sup> by a life devoted to prayer and self-denial and can <sup>re-direct</sup> consciousness away from the world mediated by meaning. But however ~~personal~~ personal and intimate, it is not solitary. It can be given to many, and the many can recognize in one another a common orientation in their living and feeling, in their criteria and their goals. From a common communion with God there springs a religious community.

Community invites expression, and the expression may vary. It may be imperative, commanding love of God above all and love of one's neighbor as oneself. It may be narrative, the story of the  $\phi$  community's origins and development. It may be ascetic and mystical, teaching the way towards total other-worldly love and warning against the pitfalls on the journey. It may be theoretical, teaching the wisdom, the goodness, the power of God, and manifesting his intentions

and his purposes. It may be a compound of two or three or all four. The compound may fuse the components into a single balanced synthesis, or it may take some one as basic and use it to interpret and manifest the others. It may remain unchanged for ages, and it may periodically adapt and develop and adapt to different<sup>t</sup> social and cultural situations.

~~Communities endure, as new members~~

Communities endure. As new members replace old, expression becomes traditional. The religion becomes historical in the general sense that it exists over time. But there is a further sense in which a religion may be historical. For ~~that~~ the total loving of ultimate concern has the character of a response. It is an answer to a divine initiative, and the divine initiative may be not only the act of creation but also a personal entrance into human history and a communication of himself to his people. Such was the religion of Israel. Such has been Christianity.

~~Faith, then, is not only the power of total loving, to fulfill one's being and to reveal and accomplish all good. It not only~~

Faith, then, takes on a new dimension. It remains the power of total loving to reveal and uphold all that is good. It remains the bond that unites the religious community ~~if~~ in mutual recognition, that directs their common judgements of value, that purifies their beliefs. But it now becomes harkening to the word of Emmanuel, of God with us. The history of its origins and developments becomes doctrine as well as narrative. Faith is also belief. As the subject

Need I recall Karl Rahner's classic, Hörer des Wortes, 1941. 2nd revised edition, by J. B. Metz, München, Kösel-Verlag, 1963.



grasped by ultimate concern can discern others similarly grasped, so too it can discern God's expression of his total love.

I have been describing faith as the eye of other-worldly love and doctrinal faith as the recognition of God's own love. ~~Such~~ Such recognition is on the level of <sup>personal</sup> encounter. Its formula is Newman's device, Cor ad cor loquitur. It is true that God's word comes to us not immediately but only through the religious community, but the community, as a fellowship of love at the service of mankind, is the sign raised up among the nations, and its members speaking from the heart will speak effectively to those whose hearts the Spirit fills.

Faith, then, subsists and is propagated on a level quite beyond philosophy or history or human science. They are the work of Pascal's reason, of experience, understanding, and judgement. But faith is the eye of other-worldly love, and the love itself is God's gift. It is on the level of ~~values~~ feelings, values, beliefs, actions, personal encounters, community existence, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> action, <sup>and</sup> tradition.

However, to say that faith subsists and is propagated on a level beyond experience, understanding, and judgement in no way implies that faith is without experience, understanding, or judgement. The higher levels of man's intentional consciousness do not suppress but presuppose and complement the lower. Without experience there is nothing for us to understand, without understanding there is ~~nothing~~ nothing for us to judge, without judgement there is ~~nothing known to be valued, loved, achieved.~~

without judgement we do not know and so we have nothing to love, value, achieve. Inversely, on the positive side, the many operations come together and cumulatively regard a single identical object so that what is experienced is to be understood, what is understood is to be affirmed, what is affirmed is to be evaluated.

However, this continuity has been disregarded or denied in recent decades, and a few clarifications may be in order here, first, on the notion of object and, secondly, on intersubjectivity.

First, then, God is not an object among the objects acknowledged by positivists, empiricists, and the like; he is not an object of natural or of human science; he is not an object in the naive realist sense in which an object is what is "out there" and a subject is what is "in here." However he is an object for intentional and <sup>for</sup> real self-transcendence, inasmuch as people think of him, affirm his existence and attributes, fear, worship, love him, speak of him and praise him. For an object is simply the <sup>referred</sup> content of an intentional act and the enumerated acts are intentional and refer to God. Finally, the possibility of God being an object within our horizon ~~is~~ rests on the fact that our conscious intending is unrestricted; we can ask about anything whatever; to place God beyond our horizon would be to deny his existence and his goodness.

Secondly, besides intending subject and intended object, there is also the intersubjective relation ~~between~~ <sup>or more</sup> between two <sup>^</sup> intending subjects. So "I" and "Thou" constitute a "We" to make ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> "Our" plans, do "Our" work, develop "Ourselves."

This relationship is not subject-to-object but subject-to-subject. Now there is something similar in total and so other-worldly being-in-love. For it puts the existential subject in a personal relationship to God. It is not a relationship to God as object for it is prior to all ~~objective~~ objectification whether in judgements of value or beliefs or decisions or ~~deeds~~ words or deeds. It is not similar to human intersubjectivity for that is between persons within a <sup>common</sup> horizon, but this being-in-love determines the horizon of total self-transcendence by grounding the self and its self-transcendence in the divine lover whose love makes those he loves in love with him; <sup>so</sup> and with one another. Beyond human intersubjectivity, then, there is a subject-to-subject relationship that is unique and that differs from human intersubjectivity <sup>much</sup> more than it resembles it.

Thirdly, when I think of myself, when we speak of ourselves, then what we think and speak of is a referred content, an object. Still that content is the subject or subjects. It is named, accordingly, the subject as object or the subjects as object. In like manner when total loving thinks of God, affirms him, worships him, speaks of him, God is a referred content, an object. Still for total loving that object is the unique Subject. ~~We can name~~ So we may speak of the Subject as object. On the other hand, inasmuch as there is raised and discussed and perhaps answered the question of God, God is a referred content, an object. Moreover, such discussion ~~does not~~ need not presuppose total loving, and so of itself it regards God just as object. Now between these two cases there are manifest differences in the human subjects, for different levels of operation are involved, and the subject is more himself the

higher the level on which he is operating. Moreover, these differences in operation and level imply that God is  $\neq$  differently apprehended in the two cases. But it does not at once follow, as seems too often to be assumed, that the different apprehensions regard different Gods. On the contrary, that conclusion follows only when the two apprehensions, so far from being compatible, complementary, and mutually enriching, are so incompatible and contradictory that there is no  $\frac{1}{2}$  hope of their being brought together by a process of mutual clarification $\frac{1}{2}$  and correction.

I have attempted, then, to make clear the utterly singular aspects of religious faith. But, at the same time, I have argued against those that would so exploit the singularity of faith as to exclude all continuity in religious development and <sup>t</sup> go separate believers <sup>so much</sup> from other men as to force them into a cultural ghetto.

It is also true, of course, that my statements have been confined to the deeper<sup>t</sup> and so more general aspects of faith. But it is the task, not of the methodologist, but of the theologian, ~~to~~ to tackle the problem $\frac{1}{2}$  of determining just what believers are to believe. <sup>To</sup> In the performance of that task the present analysis ~~make-<sup>pr</sup>~~ may provide a preliminary basis and even its very generality may have the utility of indicating the possibility of a completely sincere <sup>and</sup> yet honestly ecumenical approach.

### Conversions and Breakdowns

Conversion may be intellectual, moral, or religious.

Intellectual conversion is a radical ~~conversion and~~ clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading set of myths about reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. It distinguishes the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning; the distinction, <sup>is made,</sup> ~~occurs,~~ it will be noted, by <sup>an act of</sup> ~~by~~ meaning. It acknowledges the reality and the priority of the world of immediacy; but the acknowledgement, of course, is effected by meaning. It grants that without the world of immediacy we would never arrive at a world mediated by meaning; and granting this is ~~that~~ an act of meaning. It goes on to point out that any questions one asks about the world of immediacy or any answers one gives only serve to make the world of immediacy one of the objects meant within the world mediated by meaning. ~~Finally, it adds that any notions one may form or any criteria one may assign concerning human knowing, its objectivity, and the reality to be known, all result from acts of meaning.~~ Finally, it adds that any account of human knowing, <sup>of</sup> its criteria of objectivity, and of the universe thereby known, must be an account not simply of the world of immediacy but of that world and of the <sup>intricate</sup> process from it to the world mediated by meaning.

~~This brings us to the three basic alternatives in philosophy: empiricism, idealism, and realism.~~

Now the cognitional myth, at least for visual Western man, is that the real is out there now, and that objectivity is a matter of taking <sup>ing</sup> a good look. But from what has been said,

it ~~doe~~ follows that among the ~~criteria~~ <sup>criteria</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>very</sup> objectivity there must be some <sup>immanent</sup> in the <sup>process</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~knowing~~ from the world of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. When those criteria are ignored or rejected as merely subjective, there arises an empiricism. When it is discovered that in fact human knowing is anything but ~~is~~ just taking a good look, there arises an idealism. Only when one ~~uno~~ uncovers the intentional self-transcendence of the process of coming to know, does a critical realism become possible.

The matter is not a mere technical ~~pr~~ point in philosophy. For empiricisms, idealisms, and realisms name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects. An idealist never means what an empiricist means, and a realist never means what either of them means. So an empiricist ~~concludes that quantum theory cannot be about any physical~~ reality; an idealist adds that that is what he has been saying all along; a critical realist disagrees with both, for quantum theory refers to reality as much as any other verified hypothesis. What affects natural science, more gravely affects human science. The basic problems of philosophy can be and have, mostly incompetently, been all repeated and rehashed within the more concrete and more complicated contexts of psychology, sociology, anthropology, hermeneutics, historiography, ethics, religious ~~and~~ studies, and theology. Nor is one lightly to suppose that this sort of thing will not continue. It took a vigorous and long-sustained campaign to eliminate the flat-earthers. It will take more to put an end to the ~~me~~ myth that objectivity is a matter of taking a good look.

will argue that quantum theory cannot be about physical reality; it cannot, because it deals not with objects as such but only with relations between phenomena. The idealist will concur and add that, of course, the same is true of all theories and <sup>of</sup> the whole of human knowing. The critical realist will disagree with both: any verified hypothesis probably is true, and what probably is true ~~probably~~ refers to what in reality <sup>probably</sup> is so. To change the illustration, what are historical facts? For the empiricist<sup>1</sup> they are what was out there and capable of being looked at. For the idealist they are mental constructions carefully based on data recorded in ~~to~~ documents. For the critical realist they are events in the world truly mediated by acts of meaning. To take a third illustration, what is a myth? There are psychological, anthropological, philosophic answers to the question. But besides these there are also reductionist answers: myth is a narrative about entities not to be found within an empiricist, an historicist, an existentialist horizon. Enough of illustrations. They can <sup>be</sup> multiplied indefinitely, for philosophic issues are universal in scope and some form of naive realism seems to appear utterly unquestionable to visual Western man. As soon as he begins to speak of knowing, of objectivity, of reality, there crops up the assumption that knowing is a sort of looking. To be ~~liberated~~ liberated from that blunder, to discover the intentional self-transcendence in the human process of coming to know, is to break <sup>often</sup> long-ingrained habits of thought and speech and to acquire the ~~the~~ mastery in one's own house that comes of knowing what one <sup>is</sup> is doing when one is knowing. It is a conversion, a new beginning, a fresh start.

Moral conversion changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values. As children or minors we are persuaded, cajoled, ordered, compelled to do what is right. As our knowledge of human reality increases, responses to as our <sup>perceptions</sup> ~~perceptions~~ of human values are strengthened and refined, more and more our mentors leave us to ourselves so that our liberty may exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity. So we move to the existential moment when we discover that our choosing affects ourselves more than the chosen objects, and that it is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make for himself. It is the time for the exercise of vertical liberty and, then, moral conversion ~~consists~~ consists in opting for the truly good, for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict. Such conversion, of course, falls far short of moral perfection. Not only is ~~being~~ willing less than doing. One has to overcome one's individual, ~~individual~~, group, or general bias. One has to keep developing

On this threefold bias, see Insight, pp. 218-242.

one's knowledge of human reality and potentiality in the <sup>decline.</sup> ~~decline~~  
 One has to keep distinct its elements of progress and ~~decline~~  
 existing historical situation. <sup>proper</sup> One has to keep scrutinizing  
 one's intentional responses to values and their implicit  
 scales of preferences. One has to listen to criticism  
 and protest. One must remain ready to learn from others,  
 for moral knowledge is the <sup>proper</sup> possession only of ~~moral~~  
 morally good men and, until one has ~~earned~~ merited that title,  
 one ~~is~~ has still to advance and to learn.



Religious conversion is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reserves. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state distinct from, prior to, <sup>and</sup> principle of subsequent acts. It is revealed <sup>in retrospect</sup> as an under-tow of existential consciousness, as a fated acceptance of a vocation to holiness, as an increasing passivity in prayer. It is interpreted differently in ~~different~~ the context of different religions. For Christians it is the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that has been given to us. It is the gift of grace, and the distinction is drawn between operative and cooperative grace. Operative grace is the replacement of the heart of stone by a heart of flesh, a replacement beyond the horizon of the heart of stone. Cooperative grace is the heart of flesh becoming effective in good works through human liberty. Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, its full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds.

— of operative grace may be found in my  
 A fuller treatment, ~~may be found in my "Gratia operans"~~  
~~"St. Thomas Aquinas," "now is the time for all good men"~~  
 "St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia operans," Theological Studies,  
 2(1941) 289-324; 3(1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-578.

~~As moral conversion goes beyond~~

As intellectual and moral conversion, so also religious conversion is a modality of self-transcendence. Intellectual conversion is to truth attained by intentional self-transcendence; ~~and~~ moral  $\nabla$  conversion is to values apprehended, affirmed, and realized by a real self-transcendence; ~~so~~ religious conversion is to a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence whether in the pursuit of truth or in the apprehension, affirmation, and realization ~~of values~~ <sup>of other</sup> of human values or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal.

Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with ~~self~~ self-transcendence, it is possible, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relationships in terms of sublation. This means that, if one takes moral conversion as higher than

~~The meaning~~ <sup>is</sup> Karl Rahner's rather than Hegel's. See K. Rahner, Hörer des Wortes, München, Kösel, 1963, p. 40.

intellectual, and religious conversion <sup>as</sup> higher than moral, then the higher goes beyond the lower, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis yet, so far from interfering with the lower or destroying it, <sup>needs it,</sup> includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context. So moral conversion goes beyond the value, truth, to values generally; it promotes the subject  $x$  to <sup>a new, existential</sup> the ~~new~~ level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value; but this in no way interferes with or  $\nabla$  weakens his devotion ~~to truth, for one has to know the reality~~

to truth. He still needs truth, for <sup>he</sup> ~~one~~ must apprehend reality <sup>and</sup> ~~or~~ real potentiality before <sup>he</sup> ~~one~~ can respond to its value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the ~~exist~~ exigences of rational consciousness. But now his pursuit of it is all the more meaningful and significant because it occurs within <sup>and plays an essential role in,</sup> the far richer context of the pursuit of all values. Similarly, ~~was~~ religious conversion goes beyond moral. Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfilment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into <sup>at</sup> ~~the~~ subject in love, <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so other-worldly love. There is then a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. In no way are the fruits of intellectual or moral conversion negated or diminished; on the contrary, all <sup>human</sup> pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a context and purpose and, as well, there now ~~cosmic process and now there~~ accrues to man the power of <sup>to enable him</sup> love to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline.

It is not to be thought, however, that religious conversion means no more than a new and more efficacious ground for the pursuit of intellectual and moral ends. Religious loving is without qualifications, reserves, conditions. ~~Its object must be other worldly, now is the time for all~~ This lack of limitation, though it corresponds to the unrestricted character of human questioning, does not ~~pertain to things of this world. It is at once terrible and strange, an opening out to absolute values, a response of~~

pertain to this world. Holiness abounds in moral goodness but it has a distinct dimension of its own. It is other-worldly fulfilment, joy, peace, bliss; in Christian experience these are the epiphenomena of a being-in-love that is the gift of a loving if mysterious and uncomprehended God. Sinfulness similarly is distinct from moral evil; it is the privation of total loving, a radical lovelessness. It can be hidden by ~~sustained superficiality, by absorption in the~~ by sustained superficiality, by evading ultimate questions, by absorption in all that the world offers to challenge our resourcefulness, and to relax our bodies, and to distract our resourcefulness, and to relax our bodies, and our minds. But escape may not be permanent. ~~It can be confronted,~~ and then instead of fulfilment there is unrest, instead of joy there is fun, instead of peace there is disgust, a depressive disgust with oneself and or a manic, hostile, even violent disgust with mankind.

~~Religious experience has to do with the alternation of sinfulness and holiness. Sin is not a descent but a fall, a defilement that leaves the sinner unclean, an object of loathing, separated from God, rejected, an outcast. His guilt calls for a mediator, inspired by love, that will show the way from death to resurrection, from estrangement to acceptance, from offence to reconciliation, that will make manifest the love that can change lovelessness to love.~~

~~Besides conversions there are breakdowns. Religion can be challenged as illusion: there is too much evil in the world for a good God to exist. Morality can be challenged as hypocrisy, pretentiousness, sentimentality, an ignorance of psychology, of sociology, of human engineering, of the world as it is, of the way things in fact have worked out in the past and, for all we know, will work out in the future. The world mediated by meaning can be brushed-~~

Religious conversion is from sinfulness to holiness, from radical lovelessness to other-worldly being-in-love, from captivity to the powers of darkness to redemption and liberation in the kingdom of God. It is the new beginning that looks back on sin with the eyes of ~~repentance~~ contrition. Sin is not just moral fault, but a detestable offence against the goodness of God. The fact that I have sinned calls forth both regret and sorrow for the past and the ~~the~~ firmest purpose not to sin in the future. But can such detestation, such sorrow, such purpose change anything? The Christian answer is the mediating death and resurrection of Christ, for "in Christ God was ~~is~~ reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor 5, 19).

Besides conversions there are breakdowns. What has been built up so slowly and ~~so~~ laboriously by the individual, the society, the culture, can ~~collapse~~ collapse. Intentional self-transcendence is ~~not~~ <sup>neither</sup> an easy notion to grasp nor a readily accessible <sup>datum</sup> fact of consciousness to be verified. That the real is what you feel, may be crude <sup>for most men</sup> but it is convincing. Values have a certain esoteric imperiousness, but <sup>can they outweigh</sup> ~~what~~ of carnal pleasure, of wealth, of power? Religion undoubtedly had its day, but is not that day over? Is it not an ~~illusion~~ illusory comfort for weaker souls, an opium distributed by the rich to quieten the poor, a mythical projection of man's own excellence into the sky? ~~So much of what we know is known, not by immanently generated knowledge, but by belief that such questions have only to be taken seriously for doubt to set in and answers to be awaited in vain.~~

Initially, not all but some religion is pronounced illusory, not all but some moral precept is rejected as ineffective and useless, not all truth but some type of metaphysics is condemned as mere talk. The negations may be true, ~~from~~ an effort to offset decline. They may be false, the beginning of decline. In the latter case some part of past cultural achievement is being destroyed. It will cease being a familiar component in cultural experience; it will recede into a forgotten past for historians, perhaps, to rediscover and reconstruct. Moreover, this elimination of a <sup>genuine</sup> part means that a previous whole has been mutilated, that some balance has been upset, that the remainder will become distorted in an effort to fill the vacuum, to take over the functions once performed by the part that has been dropped. Finally, such elimination, mutilation, distortion will have to be ardently admired as the forward march of progress; and while they may give rise to objective grounds for  $\downarrow$  further criticism, that can be met by still more progress by way of still more elimination, mutilation, distortion. Once a process of dissolution has begun, it tends to perpetuate itself. Nor is it confined to some single, uniform course. Different nations, different classes of society, different ~~age~~ age-groups can select different parts of past achievement for elimination, different mutilations to be effected, different distortions to be provoked. Increasing dissolution will then be matched by increasing divisions, incomprehension, suspicion, distrust, hostility, hatred, violence. The body social is torn apart in many ways, and its cultural soul has been rendered incapable of reasonable convictions and responsible commitments.

For convictions and commitments rest on judgements of fact and judgements of value. Such judgements, in turn, rest largely on beliefs. For few, indeed, are the people that, pressed on almost any point, must not shortly have recourse to what they have believed. But such recourse can be efficacious only when believers present a solid front, only when intellectual, moral, religious skeptics are a ~~fairly~~ small and, as yet, uninfluential minority. But their numbers can increase, their influence can mount, their voices can take over the book market, the educational system, the mass media. Then believing begins to work not for but against intellectual, moral, religious self-transcendence. What <sup>had been</sup> ~~was~~ an uphill but universally respected course ~~collapses~~ into the peculiarity of an outdated minority.

### Conclusion

Immediate to each of us is oneself as subject of intentional consciousness on its experiential, intellectual, rational, and existential levels. In the present chapter we have <sup>been</sup> appealing to that immediacy, either individually or in successive generations of groups, to clarify and interrelate <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ set of notions relevant to a characterization <sup>t</sup> of horizons, of their differences, of the changes they undergo. ~~Much could be added. But, as befits a book on theological method, my main inte effort has been to indicate a concrete context for inquiry into religion.~~ ~~Had I not written the book, Insight, a much fuller treatment~~

Much could be added. But all that would added from outer experience pertains, not to method, but to history or field-work. What would be added on the intellectual <sup>and rational levels,</sup> ~~levels~~ has been broadly sketched in my earlier work, Insight. So attention has concentrated on the existential level, on moral and religious questions, and their connection with the human good. In this I suppose there is nothing that ~~might not be improved in every way but, as well, there are~~ ~~no doubt points on which some, at least, would prefer something less definite while others would desire something more definite.~~ might not be improved in every way. ~~umhama~~ But such is the common lot. What may provoke more specific complaints lies in views I have expressed in the fields of ethics and religion. It may be objected that a methodologist should be less determinate and, from the opposite quarter, it may be objected that a Catholic theologian should be more so. Difficulties of this type had best, I think, be left to smoothing effects of ~~time~~ the passage of time. Successive teachers and writers will go over the ground repeatedly and the happy mean, missed on the first try, is sure to be found by the nth.