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#### Chapter I

### The New Context

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The old context cane out of Aristotle. The writings ascribed to him had treated poetry and rhettoric, physics and biology, psychology and logic, ethics and politics, metaphysics and natural theology. They did so with the power of informed, precise, coherent, all-embracing thought. Souther They range and the possessed the depth as well as the range that might integrate a whole culture. When, then, mediaeval theologians reinterpreted Aristotle and formulated their Christian faith on that basis, not merely were they using a philosophy to perfect a theology but, what is far more important, they were unifying a culture and placing their theology in a context that let it reach into all departments of life and thought.

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The strength and suppleness of that context are not to resides not in be overlooked. For a context dumment, some set of theorems that can be corre cted and revised but rather a power of mind that gives wat different disciplines a common & vocabulary and style, that moulds them by a common outlook, that knits them together in a coherent view of nature, man, and God. So it was that commentators variously interpreted the Aristotelian books, that the learned added corrections, that thinkers distinguished, adjusted, and reconciled, that innovators denied and rejected, and yet the context remained. It remained because the many and divergent activities rested on familiar assumptions, which had an Aristotelian source; because they proceeded according to rules, which Aristotle had formulated; because they pursued ideals, which Aristotle had set forth : above all, because they were fragmentary and aimed more at' partial change than at total transformation. For the fact

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Indeed, the fact of the matter seems to be that, once a potent context has been established in a culture, it can be expelled only by the enormous labour of constructing a new context.<sup>1</sup>

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1) The point has recently been made by Frofessor Butterfield in his <u>Origins of Modern Science</u>, <u>1300-1800</u>,

argued that, while He painted and that, new scientific discoveries were accumulating they from the beginning of the fourteenth century, but they could neither break out of the Aristotelian context by nor be satisfactorily formulated within it. Only in the final decades of the seventeenth century was modern science in a position to only construct its own context and it is from that time that there has existed what today is meant by modern science.

But whatever the vitality that Aristotelianism once exhibited, today it cannot be invoked as a principle of integration. The reason for this is not merely that so much more the now is known so much better than by the andcients. The decisive point lies in differences of style, method, outlook, approach. Symbolic logic contrasts with Aristotelian logic. Modern science does not conform to the demands of the <u>Posterior Analytics</u>. Modern history is a scientific discipline for which Aristotle made no provission. Modern philosophy, to deal with its problems, has as much need to go beyond Aristotelian methods as modern geometry has to go beyond the methods of Euclid. Not only does Aristotle no longer offer an encyclopediat of <u>learning</u>, but an up-to-data revision on the old model to a self-contradictory potion.

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learning, but there cannot be an up-to-date revision on the old model, for the old model itself is the out-of-date.

A new context, then, is needed. Manifestly it is needed if theology is not to remain in a ghetto isolated from the rest of modern culture. But it is needed even more if theology is to put its own house in order. There old and new are in conflict. Traditional teaching remains largely within an implicit Aristotelian context. But teaching rests on investigation, and all the basic areas of theological investigation have been penetrated, taken over, occupied by modern scholarship, modern methods in history, modern are notions of science. The new procedures off too widely employed and too generally accepted for them to be dislodged. At the same time, they cannot be fitted into the old Aristotelian context. So, if theological investigation and theological teaching are once more to go hand in hand, a new context must be developed.

Work towards the new context has already begun, as is witnessed for example by Karl Rahner's <u>Kleines theologisches</u> <u>Wörterbuch</u> (Freiburg 1961) and by Heinrich Fries' editing of a two-volume <u>Handbuch theologischer Grundbe griffe</u> (München <u>1962 and 1963</u>). But our present purpose 13 far lees detailed 1962 and 1963). But our concern is limited to method and, accordingly, the present chapter need only indicate the main directions involved in constructing the new context. We shall point, then, to transitions (1) from logic to method, (2) from the <u>Posterior Analytics</u> to the modern notion of science, (3) from human nature to human history, (4) from soul to subject, and (5) from phileGophy as handmaid to transcendental method. As will be observed from the foregoing list,

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attention is limited to changes in norms and procedures. Because centres on it is climited to changes, the new context will be presented in its relations to the old. Because the changes are in norms and procedures, they directly affect not the content of theorem theology but the method by which it is developed and the context in which it is expressed.

### 1. From Logic to Method

Distinguish (1) logical ideals, (2) formal logics, and (3) a applications of formal logic.

Logical ideals may be illustrated by clarity and rigour. RERGIOUS Clarity excludes ambiguous terms. Refous demands: Rigour Coherence excludes contradictions. Rigour demands that conclusions follow from premisses with necessity.

A formal logic embodies logical ideals in general descriptions, explanations, and rules. Such an embodiment, however, adds to the ideals and, as such additions may be made from different sources, there arises the possibility of different formal logics. So Aristotelian logic takes its peculiar shape and direction from its embodiment of logical ideals in grammatical and linguistic forms. In contrast, symbolic logic embodies similar ideals mathematically: parations between propositions are related through their denot thations; propositions are related through their denot thations; inferences are conducted by continuous enthymeme with, at most, an achknowledgement of the major premises in a marginal note.

not incidentally or partially but fully A formal logic is applied, when a doctrine is formalized, that is, when the whole doctrine is expressed in exact accord

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with the requirements of a formal logic. As a brief reflection will reveal, such a realization of the logical ideals demands of a doctrine the perfection of complete immobility. The ideal of clarity demands that all terms be unambiguous; for them to be unambiguous, their meaning must be fixed, defined, differentiated from every neighbouring meaning; it follows that would have to be arrested in their course to meanings still in process of development danket be admitted. Again, the ideal of coherence demands that opposed statements be assigned to distinct and non-communicating universes of discourse; they cannot be left standing side by side as contrary yet complementary expressions of a truth that is yet to be discovered. Rigour, finally, demands that conclusions follow necessarily from their premisses; but if they follow necessarily, they must also follow at once. If the premisses are true now, the conclusion pust now be true, if the conclusion is not true today but W11/00 true tomorrow, the presises cannot be true today formalized doctrine may be about changing objects, -ivseli dannot be in process of development

must now be true; if now the conclusion is false, thampon one So a at least of the premisses is now false. & formalized doctrine in the fixity of its terms, the strict coherence of its stateinstantaneousness ments, the immediacy of all its conclusions, conforms to a valid ideal of the human mind and sets a goal which scientific always expression may hope eventually to attain. But besides the goal, there is also the process of attainment and, when we turn to that process, we turn from logic to method.

In general, a method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each is related to the others, where the set of relations form a pattern, where the pattern

the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, and where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely.

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So in the natural sciences method inculcates a spirit of inquiry, and inquiries recur. It insists on accurate observation and decription: both observations and descriptions recur. Above all it praises discovery, and discoveries frecut recur. It demands the formulation of discoveries in hypotheses, and hypotheses recur. It requires the deduction of the implications of hypotheses, and deductions recur. It keeps urging that experiments be die devised and performed to check the implications of hypotheses against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur.

A<sup>Sanch</sup> distinct and recurrent operations are related. Inquiry transforms mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation. What is observed is pinned down by description. Contrasting observations or descriptions give rise to problems, and problems are solved by discoveries. What is discovered, is expressed in a hypothesis. From the hypothesis are deduced its implications, which suggest experiments to be performed. The operations are related; the relations form a pattern; and the pattern defines a right way of **Maxing** going about scientific investigation.

Nowever, our very general definition of method does not bring out the specific character of scientific method, which is both cumulative and progressive. The wheel of method always turns: the wheel of scientific method not only turns but also rolls along. To repeat the method of making a motor-car is to make another motor-car, but successive applications of scientific method add new results to old and,

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#### However, if scientific procedure satisfies a very general

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definition of method, it also has its own specific character, Unlike the assembly line, science does not keep repeating the same product; A RoyAit is cumulative and progressive. The experiments devised

> to test an hypothesis lead to new observations that may or may not confirm the hypothesis. In so far as they do, they reveal that the investigation is not entirely on the wrong track. In so far as they do not, they lead to a modification of the hypothesis and, in the limit, to new the discovery, new hypothesis, new deduction, and new experiments. The wheel of method not only turns but also get rolls along. The field of observed data keeps broadening. New discoveries are added to old. New hypotheses and theories express not only the new insights but also all that was valid in the old, to give method its cumulative churacter and to engender the conviction that, however remote the goal of complete explanation may still be, at least we are nearer to it now than we were.

> He have been engaged in a summary contrast of logic and method. Both are pormative: they lay down rules to guide our Intellectual activities. But logical norms regard contents assemblies of terms, relations, propositions. The norms of method regard operations. It is true, of course, that logic positing or may be said to deal with such operations as defining terms and postulating or deriving propositions; and this is Amportant tor such operations occur when prescribes description Very summarily we have been attempting to indicate the general gharacter of logic and of method. Logic is concerned o formulate an ideal. When the realization of the ideal envisaged strictly, it is seen at once to be a rare attain-It is possible, for the instance, to formalize Euclidean geometry, but to do so it is necessary to effect rather

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Such very summarily is method in the natural sciences. It would be premature for us to proceed at once to an account of methods in other disciplines. But at least we can metate say immediately that we do not conceive a method as a set of fully that will produce satisfactory results when followed by by anyone. A method states what occurs when a task is performed properly. In any developing science or discipline such proper performance includes discovery as its principal achievement. But the occurrence of discoveries follows statistical laws: they can be made more probable; they cannot be assured by a set of prescriptions.

We Again, we have spoken of a transition from logic to method. By this we do not mean that logic is supplanted and abolished. On the contrary, such operations as describing, defining problems, formulating hypotheses, deducing implications aravammitarmwith fall under the directives of logic and, no less,  $_{\Lambda}$  essential parts of the pattern laid down by a method. A transition to method, then, does not mean the omission of logical operations explicit but the addition of other activities such as inquiry, observation, discoverv A experimentation, verification. It means the acknowledgement not only of the ideal goal which logic can define but also of the less perfect process in which terms are still developing, propositions are inadequate, conclusions are more or less probable. It means the acceptance of the less perfect process as the normal state of affairs for, in the sciences, the solution usually existence of one problem uselly ancovers the wistence of further problem's, and the advance of theory only proadens the field of data that can be apprehended and Investigated.

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as the normal state of affairs for, in the sciences, results are not definitive, the solution of one problem reveals the existence of other problems, and the advance of theory only broadens the field of data to be apprehended and investigated. Above all, the transition to method means that the process of coming to know has its own proper norms, that it is idle to expect the process to conform to ideals that imply the perfection of immobility, that the process as process has its own perfection in its cumulative and progressive character.

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## 2. From the <u>Posterior Analytics</u> to Modern Science

While modern science is a continuation and development of its ancient and medifieval antecedents, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that the later differs from the earlier only in procedures, contend, efficacy. These differences are of course enormous. But behind them there are less palpable but more fundamental differences in the anticipations and criteria that explicitly or implicitly direct investigations to make them fruitful or sterile. It is with these underlying, directive, dynamic factors that we are here concerned, and we may begin our brief summary by noting Aristotle's contrast of epistêmê and <u>doxa</u>, of science and opinion.

For Aristotle, then, science was a matter of knowing the cause, knowing that it was the cause, and knowing that the effect could not be other than it was.<sup>1</sup> In brief, the object of science was causal, necessary, immutable. Opinion, in contrast, was true knowledge of matters of fact where, however, the fact was not necessary or, if it were, then its necessity was not apprehended.<sup>2</sup>

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The vehicle of Aristotelian science was, naturally

enough, the syllogism. St Syllogisms express knowledge of causes inasmuch as the middle term names the end, agent, matter, or form.<sup>3</sup> They express necessary knowledge inasmuch as the premisses are <u>per se</u> predications in which & essential attributes are assigned to commensurate subjects.<sup>4</sup> Finally, besides the premisses that may be derived syllogistically, there are those that are true, first, under underived, better known than their implications and related to them as cause to effect.<sup>5</sup> Obviously the existence of Aristotelian on the existence science depends of these basic premisses in each field; but

- 1) & Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71b 10 ff.
- 2) <u>Ibid</u>., I, 33, 88b 32 ff.
- 3) <u>Ibid</u>., II, 11, 94a 20 ff.

4) Ibid., I, 6, 74b 5 ff. As the necessary and essential and solu liona also is eternal, various difficulties, arose. Aristotle remarked that the attributes of perishable things either cannot be demonstrated or else the relevant syllogiem will be 'mixed' with one premiss necessary and the other contingent (Ibid., I, 8, 75b 21 ff.). Aquinas appealed to the immutability of the abstract: Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae et immobiles, quaedam contingentes et mobiles, et et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse scientiae. In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4m. On the intriacate problem of scientific prediction, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, pp. 649-652.

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5) <u>Post. Anal.</u>, I, 2, 71b 19 ff.

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while Aristotle does describe how our knowledge of principles arises, while his description fits quite accurately the manner in which scientific discoveries are made, still such discoveries do not yield the knowledge of necessary causes and immutable effects demanded by the <u>Posterior Analytics</u>.

What the scientist discovers is not a truth but an hypothesis, not a necessity but a possibility. For instance, a free fall is a constant acceleration. If The matter has stood the test of centuries. But it has done so, not because bodies must fall that way, not because the free fall cannot be other than it is, but simply by because of out of many hypothetical possibilities the simplest verifiable formula is the constant acceleration. Moreover, what holds for the free fall, holds for all other natural laws and, no less, for the theories and systems that relate them to one another. All such laws, theories, systems are subject to revision; they have a claim on our assent, not because of any intrinsic necessity, but only because they happen to be verified; and the moment further data begin to tell against them, they become questionable.<sup>7</sup>

6) <u>Ibid</u>., II, 19.

7) In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was still common to speak of the necessary and immutable laws of nature and even of the iron laws of economics. This trend has been reversed by the refutation of the uniqueness of Euclidean geometry, by the successful use in physics of non-Euclidean geometry, by the alternative probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and by the limitations placed on deductive systems by theorems of the Gödelian type. On these see J. Ladrière, <u>Les</u> <u>limitations internes des formalismes</u>, Louvain 1957. On mathematical principles, M. Polanyi, <u>Personal Knowledge</u>, London 1958

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and 1962, pp. 187-193; B. Lonergan, <u>Insight</u>, London and New York 1957, pp. 304 ff.

We have been touching on the crucial difference between the Aristotelian and the modern notions of science. On the Aristotelian notion science is concerned with the necessary and immutable. On the modern notion necessity and immutability have no more than a marginal significance. Science is concerned with the intelligibility, not that must be, but that can be. Of itself, such intelligibility is hypothetical; essentially, it stands in need of the complement of verification; and any single verification yields no more than a probable confirmation.

From the crucial difference other differences follow. The already mentioned shift from logic to method is but part of the larger shift from the <u>Posterior Analytics</u> to the modern notion of science. Logic might suffice to deal with knowledge of necessity and immutability. But one has to move beyond a consideration of logical operations and take into account inquiry, observation, discovery, experimentation, verification, if one is to proceed in an orderly and effective fashion when possible hypotheses are legion and only cumulative verifications are significant.

Again, we mentioned above that Aristotle contrasted science and opinion. As science was of the necessary, so opinion regarded the contingent. But modern science, like Aristotle's opinion, is concerned with the contingent; and so on each issue we seek the best scientific opinion that is at the time available.

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On similar grounds Aristotle contrasted theory and practice. Fractice is concerned with the contingent, with things that can be other than they are. It follows that science cannot be practical, for science is concerned with the necessary, with what cannot be other than it is. Science accordingly must be simply contemplative and, in that sense, theoretical. Now in the modern context the term, theory, cannot properly be given any such connotation. For modern science deals with the contingent; it grounds endless practical applications; is modern theory is continuous with practice. So far from being opposed

to one another, theory and practice now are two stages in man's dealing with the same objects.

Further, to find necessity in a manifestly contingent the mediteval notion of science retreated world, Arasbotslian science.had to retreat to the universal and the abstract. In contrast, modern science aims at the complete explanation of all phenomena. Though it has to use adstract berms, still it also is extremely recourseful abstract terms and universal propositions, still it regards them as limitations and strives to surmount them. Though it cannot master the concrete in its all but unlimited complexity, still it constantly endeavours to come as close as possible to such mastery, and it is extremely resourceful in inventing conceptual tools and imaginative models forvious to advance ever further the understanding of concrete processes.

There follows an enormous difference in sheer bulk. An Aristotelian science could musicing be a habit tucked in purported to be an individual's mind and, as it, was, certain knowledge, it would be passed on includinged from generation to generation. But the positive content of a modern science is only probable; it is continuously in process of development; did data

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its extent is so i vast that it cannot be encompassed by any single mind; and its sustained development calls for the assembled resources is and far-flung collaboration of the world's scientific communities.

Finally, on the modern conception there is a science yielding where there is employed a method from the cumulative advancement of knowledge. Methods differ from subject to subject, but each is directed by its own proper method, and each is scientific by that fact and not by its approximate resemblance to something in contrast, else. A But the Aristotelian conception of necessary conclusions following rigorously from necessary principles was an ideal type: it was thought to be realized in arithmetic and geometry;<sup>8</sup>

8) See W. D. Ross, <u>Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics</u>, Oxford 1949, p. 14.

elsewhere it was approximated to a greater or less extent. farthest As Christian theology was at the Purtherest remove & from the necessitarian ideal, it received the least help and guidance theology from the Aristotelian conception. Today 12, has nothing to lose and much to gain by severing itself from the Aristotelian ideal type and conceiving itself on the basis of its own proper method. For that ideal is now an anachroniam: it is not entertained in natural and, hus mi siemed science; mathematicians commonly aim no higher than axions that are not contradictory; philosophers take their stand not on necessity but on matters of fact; in theology, finally, that ideal was never more than Athe embarrasement for, were it realized, the result would be a rationalism or a semi-rationalism. It is time for theology to work out its own method and be just itself.

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# 3. <u>Human Nature and Human History</u>

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The more remote his ancestors, the more modern man conceives himself to differ  $\frac{1}{r}$  from them. No doubt this fact owes much to evolutionary and progessist propaganda, but it also is founded in modern man's experience, in his study of other men, and in hism moral aspirations.

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For modern man has made his own modern world. It emerged from a feudal background with mediaeval beginnings of commerce and finance. It passed through periods of exploration, confiquest,

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colonization. It has build culminated in applied science, technology, industry, and a population explosion. It has witnessed the emergence of the European nations, their long and sustained political development, their economic interdependence, their alliances, their wars, their recent insertion within a larger, global context. It has been carried for gward from medikeval Latin through Renaissance classicism to the development of the modern languages and the creation of modern literatures and art forms. It has found its substance in the working out of modern mathematics, of modern natural and human science, of modern philosophies, of modern religious and historical thought. Where the world of the classicist was inherited, where life was somehow lived in emulation with the ancients, modern man in naming himself modern has consciously been going his own way and thereby inscribing deeply in his own experience the fact that the shape and texture of man's world is the product of man's own efforts, his lucky hits, his mistakes and blunders.

Besides making his own, modern man has investigated the 'worlds' of other places and times. For the classicist, ancient Greece and Nome were islands of light in a vast sea of darkness. But to modern man voyages of discovery brought back word of other lands, other peoples, other languages, cultures, religions. Archeology dug up ancient cities and deciphered ancient writings. Geology, biology, ethnology placed the a basic races of men in the evolutionary perspective that is constantly being completed by genetic studies of every aspect of human development. If the classicist proclaimed that human nature was always the same and if he attributed to his ideals a normative quality that accounted the rest of men barbarians, modern man

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finds in his rich acquaintance with human diversity and change only a confirmation of the view that, as he has made his own world, so other peoples however unwittingly have made theirs.

But freedom and responsibility are components int human living. In the measure that modern man is proud of his creation, the modern world, and no less in the measure that he is ashamed of it, he relates his freedom and his repognsibility not only to his personal any acts but also to the larger movements of community and history over which, he feels, man should somehow learn to exercise guidance and control. This conviction, it would seem, is the mainspring of modern humanism in its many forms. It accounts for the power of the old liberal idea of progress, of the Marxist's dialectical materialism, of the existentialist's tragic posture, of the resonance that amplifies and propagates the appeal of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. If for the classichist the past embodied ideals to be emulated and even perhaps at shifts times equalled, for modern man the past is an object of intense study not without the hp hope that one may roughly discern in its slow but relentless upthrust the greater ships shapes of the the future.

Bill one may Way ask what is this world that changes with changes of common meanings, that men bring about, that they would control with full freedom and responsibility Distinguish then, world and worlds. The world is the totality of objects; it is unique; it contains all that ever was or is on will be; we intend with our questions and heuristic concepts; but we do not know it. On the other hand, a world is a totality of objects to be reached from some determinate standpoint, and there are as many such worlds as their there are standpoints.

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Modern experience, then, modern study, and modern aspiration reveal an awareness of historicity. We have considered the fact and now we must go on to its possibility. If the classicist is correct in maintaining that human nature is always the same, how can modern man differ significantly from the men of other places and times? The answer involves a series of steps and it will set them clearly apart if we number them.

First, human nature is the same whether one is awake or asleep, but almost all that is significant in human living occurs inasmuch as men are awake, inasmuch as they are experiencing, inquiring, understanding, judging, deliberating, decideing, doing, inasmuch in brief as human living is informed by meaning.

Secondly, there is the point that human community is a matter of common meaning, that it exists, develops, intensifies in the measure that many share a common field of experience, i understand their experience in a similar or complementary fashion, agree in their judgements on things, persons, policies, courses of action, and make common commitments of fidelity to one another, of loyalty to their nation, state, or super-state, of i faith in the destiny of man and the providence of God. Inversely, as community intensifies in the measure that meaning is common, so it distant disintegrates as meaning ceases to be common. Remove the common field of experience and people get out of touch. Remove common ways of understanding and there arise misunderstanding, suspicion, distructst, mutual incomprehension. Let judgements diverge and too soon an easy tolerance gives way to surprise, to ridiculæ, to consternation, to anger. Loosen the bonds of fidelity, loyalty, faith, and community weakens to give ever freer kunny play to minimum individual and gnowy black to the bias of factions and the aimless drifting of the whole.

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Thirdly, as the biography of the individual sets forth the acts of his waking life, his acts informed by meaning, so the history of the community is an account of its meaningful performance. Such common meaning, embodied in human performance, may remain more or less fixed for centuries, as among primitives, or in stagnant civilizations, or because fixity is estenas esteemed some necessary consequent of truth and value as in classicism. But it is no less true that common meaning may be on the move. Older views are questioned, challenged, circumvented, supplanted. Change that begins sporadically in isolated pockets becomes more widespread and more frequent. A cult of modernity ceases to be a fad to become a watchword, a rule, a principle. Insensibly the fabric of 4dd institutions is changed, the meaning of roles is altered, scales of values are modified, the world is given a new aspect that fascinates the young and frightens the old.

So modern man has made his own modern world. It emerged from a feudal background with mediaeval beginnings of commerce and finance. It passed through periods of exploration, conquest,

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Fourthly, change in comon agains occur on three out aren't levels

Fourthly, the world that is changed by changes of meaning is of course the world mediacy but the world mediated by meaning. In the child, hearing and speech, when they first develop, are directed to present objects, and so proceed from initially meaning is contined to a world of immediacy, to a world no bigger than the nursery and, seemingly, no better known because it is not only experienced but also meant. But as the command and use of language increase, there comes about a reversal of roles. For words denote not only what is present but also what is absent, not only what is near but also what is far, not only the past but also the future, not only the experienced but also the merely imagined, not only the factual but also the possible, the ideal, the normative. So we come to live, not as the infant in a world of immediate experience, but in a far vaster world that is brought to us through the memories of other men, through the common sense of the community, through the pages of literature, through the labours of scholars, through the investigation of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.

This larger world, mediated through meaning, does not lie within anyone's immediate experience. It is not be even the sum or integral of the totality of all worlds of immediate experience. For meaning does not merely repeat but goes beyond experiencing. What is meant not only is sensed or felt but also somehow understood and, com only, also affirmed. This addition of understanding and judgement makes possible the larger world mediated by meaning, gives it its structure and unity, arranges it in an orderly whole of \$75 almost endless differences,

partly known and familiar, partly in a surroundining penumbra of things we know about but have never examined or explored, partly in an unmeasured region of what we do not know at all. To this larger world we refer when we speak of the real world, and in it we live out our lives -- insecurely, for we know that meaning is insecure it since besides truth there is error, besides fact there is fiction, besides honesty there is deceit, besides philosophy there is myth.

Fifthly, changes in the world Med mediated by meaning are of three quite different kinds. Nature is mediated but not modified by meaning. Physics, chemistry, biology are known through acts of meaning, but the incompleteness of these sciences and any errors they include do not affect nature.

However, besides the world we know about, there is also will the world that we make. This making, to a notable extend, is a matter of intending and meaning. We imagine, we plan, we investigate possibilities, we weigh pro's and con's, we decide, we enter into contracts, we have countless orders given and Wwebber executed. From the beginning to the end of the process, we are engaged in acts of meaning; and without them the process would not occur or its end achieved. So the pioneers on this continent found shore and heartland, mountains and plains, but they covered it with cities, laced it with roads, exploited it with industries, till the world man has made stands between us and a prior world of nature. Yet the whole of this added, man-made, artificial world is the cumulative wpont is product product now of coherent and now of chaotic acts of meaning.

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Man's making is not restricted to the transformation of nature. There is also the transformation of man himself. It is most conspicuous, perhaps, in the educational process, in the oblice difference between the child beginning kindergarten and the doctoral candidate writing his dissertation. But the difference produced by the education of individuals is only a recapitulation of the longer process of the education of mankind, of the evolution of social institutions and the development of cultures. Religions and art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, the writing of history, all had their rude beginnings, slowly developed, reached a peak, perhaps went into decline and later had a rebirth in another milieu. And what is true of cultural achievements also, though less conspicuously, is true of social institutions. The family, the state, the law, the economy, the technology are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. Moreover, such change is in its essence a change of meaning -- a change of idea or concept, a change of judgement or evalutation, a change of the request or the command. The state can be changed by re-writing its constitution. More subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by re-interpreting the constitution or, again, by working on men's minds and hearts to change the objects that command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty. What is true of the state is true of all community for, as we have said, community is a matter of a common field of experience, a common mode of biderstanding understainding, a common measure of judgement, and a common consent. Such community is the possibility, the source, the ground of common meaning; and it is this common meaning that is

Mit I

revealed in family and polity, in legal and economic systems, in language and literature, art and religion, morals and education, philosophy, science, and the writing of history.

Sixthly, there is a notable difference between the transformation of nature and the transformation of man. Both indeed are initiated by acts of meaning. Both involve an expenditure of material energy. But the transformation of nature is a palpable change that puts nature at man's disposal. The transformation of man, on the other hand, ends where it begins, in habits and acts of meaning. Energy is expended in the use of communication media. But the transformation itself, as it originates, so also it terminates in habits and acts of attending, understanding, judging, valuing, choosing, doing.

On the level, then, of personal, social, cultural development, meaning approximates to a closed system. Knowing men is knowing what they feel, think, know, choose, do. One's choices occur in a context of others' choices, to lead them, or to follow, or to defy and conflict. One's doing occurs in an institutional framework that men have conceived, chosen, executely, developed.

Because of this closed system, because acts of meaning are this viewpoint both origin and end, stimulus and response, subjective act and objective term, human development can be as enormous as the differences between primitive and contemporary man. At the same time, widespread short-term differences are apt to be slight. To be communicable a difference has to lie within the resources of expression of contemporary common meaning. To be understood it must not go beyond the average man's capacity for learning. To be accepted it has to fit in with current needs, desires, tastes, tendencies, structures.

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Finally, there is the distinction between human nature and human history. To know human nature is to know the propositions that are think true of all men at all places and times. To advert to man's historicity is to advert to the fact that knowledge of man's known nature is a set of abstract generalities, that there is much more to be known that is true only of particular men, particular places, particular times, that were what is significant in human living is to be found only potentially in human nature, and that it resides actually in human history.

plato and Aristotle, in their effort affort to disengage. science from sere common cense, exaggerated the differ

Plato and Aristotle were quite right in desiring to distinguish science from common sense and to disengage and usual liberate the former from the omnicompetent claims of the latter. But they were unfortunate in their over-statement that science was concerned with the necessary, the universal, the eternal, for more than anything that opinion delayed the development and the acceptance of a historical view of man and the of the full flowering of historical studies.

Within the Aristotelian context man was apprehended in terms of human nature, of its constitutive components, and of the ends and especially the norms of human action. So man was a rational animal, composed of body and immortal scul, endowed with vital, sensitive, and intellectual powers, in need of habits and able to acquire them, subject to a natural law which, in accord with accidental changes of circumstance, was to be supplemented by positive laws enacted by duly constituted authority. This extremely summary outline could be filled in at considerable length in many different directions, and it would be difficult to withhold one's praise of the broad

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experience, acute observation, shrewd reflection, and same judgement that went into the construction of its many parts. It would remain, however, that within the Aristotelian context the study of man was more a past achievement than an on-going process, that it centred on the natural and the normative, that  $\bigwedge_{\Lambda}^{g_j}$  it regarded the historical as the field of contingency and accident where science, theory, wisdom had to yield place to opinion, practice, and prudence.

Modern studies, in contrast,  $\frac{1}{2}$  consider not man but men. They are specialized and so they are equipped to take into account all available data on all men of all times and places. They are empirical and so they seek to discover, not necessary connections, but verifiable possibilities. There are those, of course, that conceive human science on the analogy of natural science, and their investigations cannot get beyond knowledge of human nature. But there is no lack of practitioners and theorists aware of the component of meaning in human living and of the fact that all meaning has its origins, its development, its interconnections, in brief its history.

The extent, to which such studies have penetrated Catholic theology, is evident to anyone glancing through the bibliographies of <u>Biblica</u>, of Altaner's <u>Patrologie</u>, of the <u>Bulletin de théologie</u> <u>ancienne et médiévale</u>, and of <u>Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses</u>. But it is the fact that such studies lie outside the Aristotelian context that confronts contemporary theology with the Herculean task of developing a new context.

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# 4. From Soul to Subject

If Aristotelians down the centuries have had little to may about consciousness and the subject, they have been very competent about soul. The little treatise, <u>De anima</u>, expanded a basic metaphysical scheme (1) to define souls in general, (2) to distinguish different kinds of soul, and (3) to direct investigation of the different kinds. Common to the souls of plants, animals, and men, is the relation of form to matter; and so soul is defined as the first act of an organic body.<sup>1</sup> But one kind of soul differs from another. Such differences are rooted in themine essences but manifested in the difference of making potencies; and as essence is known through potencyk, so potency is known through act, and act is known through object.<sup>2</sup> Hence, psychological investigation is to begin from objects, proceed from objects to acts, from acts to potencies, and from potencies to the essence of the soul under scrutiny.

1) Aristotle, <u>De anima</u> II, 1, 412b 4 ff.

2) <u>Ibid</u>., II, 4, 415a 14-20.

Not for all its neatness this scheme is not without its incongruities. Aristotle did not anticipate the behaviourist's exclusion of the data of g consciousness. He cannot be said to make add have ignored them, completely: his account of human intelligence hits things off too wid accurately for that. Yet he has basically the same explicit method for studying plants and for studying men; and once one has embarked with him on the course of metaphysical analysis, one has to make a completely fresh start if one is to treat of the subject and make a conscious activities.

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That completely fresh start must be made and, to begin, let us attempt to define implicitly such terms as <u>conscious</u>, <u>intentional</u>, <u>awareness</u>, <u>presence</u>, <u>subject</u>, <u>object</u>, and <u>introspection</u>. Men, then, perform many operations that are both conscious and intentional. Such operations are said to be intentional inasmuch as they constitute an awareness of an boyest object. They are said to be conscious inasmuch as they render the subject aware of himself and his operation. Thus, seeing is intentional for it makes present to us what is seen; and the same seeing at the same moment is conscious because in seeing I and my seeing are present to me; and what is true of seeing, is true of a long list of other operations which in due course we shall mention.

But first we must note an ambaiguity for, as employed above, 'awareness' and 'presence' each mean to two different things. The awareness of intentionality makes the spectacle present to the spectator, the object to the subject. But the awareness of # consciousness makes the spectator and his looking present But if I have repeated the word, awareness, as to himself. I have repeated the word, present, still there is a vast difference between the two instances. What is present axax in the spectacle is part of the spectacle. But to be present to himself, the spectator does not have to be part of the spectacle. On the contrary, unless he is present to himself, nothing can be present to him; and his presence to himself as subject is, never what is gazed upon, attended to, intended, and always resides in him gazing, attending, intendring. So it is that he can be present to himself by the presence of a subject, yet at the same time giving his whole attention to the spectacle that is present as object.

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There remains introspection, and it is not it to be confused with consciousness. We are conscious unless we are in deep sleep or in a coma. Because we have been and are conscious we have the materials for introspective examination. But introspection itself is the examination that presupposes consciousness, that supervenes upon it, that consists in shifting attention away from objects to the subject and his operations. By such a shift the subject becomes present in two manners: as introspecting, he is present to himself as conscious and subject; as introspected, he is present to himself as object.

I have spoken of an ambiguity of 'awareness' and 'presence.' But 'intentionality' and 'consciousness' also denote quite different things. In our dream states intentionality and consciousness are commonly fragmentary and pohement incoherent. When we awake, they & take on a different hue to expand on four intaking successive, related, but qualitatively different levels. There is an empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, weigh the pro's and con's, pass judgement on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the responsible level on which we are bound concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.

All the operations on these four levels are intentional and conscious. Still, intentionality and consciousness differ

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from level to level, and within each level the many operations involve further differences. Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have experienced, experienced. A third dimension of rationality wond emerges when the content of aw act of understanding is regarded as of itself a mere bright idea and we endesvour to settle what really is so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgement on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.

As empirically conscious, we do not seem to differ from the higher animals. But in us empirical consciousness and intentionality are only a substratum for further & activities. The data of sense provoke inquiry, inquiry leads to understanding, understanding expresses itself in language. Without the data there would be nothing for us to inquire about and nothing to be understood. Yet what is sought by inquiry and reached by understanding is never a further datum but the idea or form, the intelligible unity or relatedness, of data. Conversely, the inquirer is not just a centre) of experiencing but an intelligent centre, and more actively aware of himself by his intelligence than be by his experiencing. Next, without our efforts to understand and their conflicting is a results, we would have no occasion to judge. But such occasions are recurrent, and then the intelligent centres of experiencing reveals his reflective and critical rationality. Once more there is a fuller self of which we become aware, and once more the awareness itself is different. As intelligent, the subject seeks insight and the

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thence the revelation of his intelligence in his behaviour, his speech, his grasp of situations, his mastery of theoretic domains. But as reflectively and critically conscious, he incarnates detachment and disinterestedness, gives himself over to criteria of truth and certitude, makes his sole concern the determination of what is or is not so; and now, as the self, so also the awareness of self resides in that incarnation, that self-surrender, that single-minded concern for truth. There is a still further

dimension to being human, and there we emerge as persons, meet one another in a common concern for values, seek to abolish the organization of human living on the basis of competing egoisms and to replace it by an organization on the basis of man's perceptiveness and intelligence, his reasonableness, and his responsible exercise of freedom.

As already noted, activities that are conscious are also intentional; and so the foregoing differences in the concrete and the subject meaning of consciousness, are matched by corresponding differences and the object. in the meaning of intentionality, As the subject shifts from empirical to intellectual consciousness, intentionality shifts from the data of experience to their description and explanation. So what is experienced as heavy or light, as hot or cold, is explained by mass or temperature. But mass and temperature are objects not of experience but of thought. So they differ in their very manner of being an object, for they are not given to sense but conceived by understanding. Still, just as the one subject is both empirically and intellectually conscious, so that his inquiry is about the data he experiences and his understanding is of the way data, so too the object of experience is explained by the object of thought; heavy or light is explained by mass; hot or cold is explained by temperature. Again, as

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the subject moves from intellectual to rational consciousness, intentionality moves from the object of thought to the question of fact. Descriptions and explanations, as products of understanding, are hypothetical; but hypotheses need to be verified; and it is the process of verification that moves us from what we merely think or suppose towards what in fact is so. Finally, as the subject is promoted from critical rationality to responsible freedom, so his intentionality shifts from the true and the real to the persons he loves and the good that he wills them.

We have been distinguishing different levels of consciousness and of intentionality, stressing the qualitative differences of the successive levels, indicating the transitions from one level to another. But there is in each of us just the one subject that consciously experiences, consciously inquires, consciously reflects, consciously deliberates, even though the quality of being conscious varies from level to level. In similar fashion, intentionality differs as it attends to data, conceives objects of thought, affirms truly what is or is not so, dente decides to pursue this or that course of action. But this qualitative difference in successive intentionalities and the corresponding difference in the immediately intended objects in no way biecut preclude an overarching intentionality that unites the many intentionalities into a single, compound activity and the many immediate objects into a single compound object. On the contrary, just as we are far more cone conscious of the one subject than of the several levels of his consciousness, so too are we far more familiar with the compound of knowing and doing than with its many parts, and far more familiar with the joys and sorrows of the real world than with the data, the concepts, minipartenmentations the truths, the values, that name the

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immediate objects of the successive stages in our coming to know and to do.

This overarching intentionality is transcendental. It is the condition of the possibility of the unity of human consciousness, of the identity of multiply intended objects, and so of the isomorphism between human knowing and its proportionate known. For it unites the different levels of human consciousness by making them successive and ever fuller responses to a single, overarching intentionality. It refers to a single, ultimately intended object the successive, partial objects of experiencing, understanding, judging, willing; so what we experience is identical with what we understand, what we understand with what we judge, what we judge with what we approve or reject. Finally, the process that unites the different levels of consciousness is demandance by identity the process that unites the successive partial objects; and so the structure of our cognitional operations has to run parallel to the structure uniting partial objects into wholes.

Further, this overarching intentionality is <u>a priori</u>. Our knowing always contains an <u>a posteriori</u> element, but it is by intending that we come to know. It is by questioning, by intending what we do not know, that we have reachied whatever knowledge we have attained. Such intending is <u>a priori</u>. Its object never is the given, never the known, always the unknown. It ever carries us beyond whatever we have attained, directing attention to further data, making new additions to pur already enormous backlog of inquiries, raising new doubtds about what we think we know, drawing to our attention **bvels** evils that exist, and challenging our generosity to overcome them with good.

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This overarching, <u>a priori</u> intention is completely open. There are no data excluded from its attention, no intelligibilities it may not desire to understand, no solutions it may not call in doubt, no values beyond its deliberation. Moreover, as the Antid intention is completely open, so too the intended is unrestricted. To restrict the intended would be to destroy the complete openness of the intended would be to destroy the complete openness of the intending, and to destroy that openness would be a radical obscurantism. But if the intended is unrestricted, then the ultimate object of the overarching intention is the universe. Beyond that object or apart from it there is just nothing.

So we move from more recent to older meanings of the term transcendental. The <u>a priori</u> intention that unifies consciousness and its objects is dynamic; it consists in going beyond the given, the known, the attained. To restrict it is to to stop it, to offset the dynamic with the static. But to acknowledge that it of itself is unrestricted is to an unrestricted, objective field and so also acknowledge the validity of the Scholastic transcendentals, ens. unum, verum, bonum

acknowledge an unrestricted, objective field. Of it we know only part. Of it we can effectively know only part. But at least we do know that our knowing knowledge is ever partial. Again, since our intending even of the unrestricted field is a matter of intending the intelligible, the one, the true, the real, the good, we arrive at the traditional transcendentals, ens, unum, verum, bonum.

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### 5. Transcendental Method

Earlier we remarked that a method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. But our account of subject and object, consciousness and intentionality, has brought to light such a pattern. Spontaneously, then, before any method is developed and explicitly formulated to suit the needs of any specialized field of inquiry, there exists the normative pattern and so the method of our conscious and

intentional operations. Moreover, this spontaneous method conditions the unity of consciousness and the identity of its objects; it is a priori; it is completely open; its object is unrestricted; and so it

> may be appropriately named transcendental method. Finally, adaptations as will appear, all special methods are body modef scations and complications of the completely general pattern of transcendental method; and so it is to transcendental method that we shall have when we shall attempt to to turn is clarifying and grounding an account of method in theology.

Now it cannot be overemphasized that the source of all such clarification and foundation resides within each reader, that he himself has to become familiar with his own conscious and intentional operations, that no one else can do it for him, that reading this or any other book does not and cannot provide a substitute for the task that he himself in himself must perform for himself.

What, then, is the task? It is applying one's own operations as intentional to one's own operations as conscious. If, for brevity's sake, we denote the operations on the four levels as experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, then one applies one's operations as intentional to one's operations as conscious inasmuch as (1) one experiences one's own experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (2) one understands the unity and relatedness of one's

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experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (3) one affirms the fact of one's conscious and intentional operations in their unity and relatedness, and (4) one decides to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's conscious and intentional operations. Let us spell this out.

First, there exist conscious and intentional operations. No one, unless, his organs are deficient, is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing or of hearing, of smealing or touching or tasting, of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have any such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all his life long he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his x activity. No one will preface his lectures by repeating his conviction did he have the even a fleetting experience of intellectual curiosity, of inquiry, of striving and coming to understand, of expressing what he had grasped by understanding. No one will begin his contributions to periodical literature by reminding his readers that never in his life did he experience anything that might be called  $\frac{1}{2}$  criticial reflection, that he never paused in doubt about the truth or falsity of any statement, that if ever he seemed to exercise his rationality by passing judgement strictly in accord with the available evidence, then this must have been mere appearance for he is totally unaware of any such event or even tendency. No one is going to place at the beginning of his books the warning that he has no notion of what might be meant by responsibility and that never in his whole life did he have the experience of acting responsibly, least of all in composing the work he is now offering

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Next, as conscious operations exist, so too their pattern is conscious. We do not experience the operations in isolation and then, by a process of inquiry and discovery, arrive at the relations that link them together. On the contrary, the unity of consciousness is itself given; the pattern of the operations is part of the experience of the operations; and inquiry and discovery are needed, not to effect the synthesis of an unrelated manifold, but to analyse a functional and functioning unity. Without analysis, of course, we cannot discern and distinguish the several operations; and until the operations have been distinguished, we cannot formulate the relations between them. But the point to the statement that the pattern itself is conscious is that, once the relations are formulated, they are not found to express surprising novelties but simply prove to be objectifications of the routines of our conscious living and doing. Before introspection brings the pattern to light, before the methodologist issues his precepts, the pattern is already conscious and operative. Spontaneously we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; and the spontaneity is not unconscious or bling blind; on the contrary it is constitutive of our conscious intelligence, just as the absence of the effort to understand is constitutive of stupidity. Spontaneously we move from understanding and its manifold and , conflicting fruits to critical reflection; 👍 again, the spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it is constitutive of our conscious rationality, of the damand demand, for sufficient reason before the formulation of the principle of sufficient reason; and it is the neglect or absence of this demand that

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constitutes silliness. Spontaneously we move from judgements of fact and possibility to judgements of value and to the deliberateness of decision and commitment; and that spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it constitutes us as conscientious, as responsible persons, and its absence would leave us psychopaths. In various detailed manners method will bid us be perceptive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. The details of its prescriptions will be derived from the character of the work in hand and will vary with it. But the normative force of its imperatives will reside, not in its claims to authority, not in the boy probability that what succeeded in the past will succeed in the future, but in the native spontaneities and inevitabilities of our consciousness which assembles its own constituent parts and unites them in a rounded whole in a manner we cannot set aside without, as it were, amputating our own moral personality, our own reasonableness, our own intelligence, our own sensitivity.

But if one is to operate methodically with a full awareness of what one is doing and why, it is not enough to agree that there exist conscious and intentional operations and that the pattern of relations between these operations is itself conscious. One must immomspect carry out in detail the programme of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.

Now what is conscious, is given. But what is given to consciousness, is given in a quite different from manner from what is given to sense. The latter is object: it is the shape or colour that is seen, the sound that is heard, the odour that is smelt, the solid or liquid that is touched, the morsel that is tasted. But what is given to consciousness, is not

36

given as object. It is on the side not of the spectacle but of the spectator, not of the thought but of the thinker, not of the judgement but of the judge, not of the beloved but of the lover. If one is to proceed from what is given in consciousness and to arrive at an account of what is given, one must objectiffy. One must construct an object on the model of the subject. One must pass from operations as consciously performed to operations as introspected, as intelligently thought, as reasonally affirmed. In brief, one has to apply the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.

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In this application the first step is introspection. It is the shift by which we somehow slip from colours accessor to we see to the our experience of seeing, from the connections we understand to the experience of understanding, from the evidence by which we judge to the critical rationality of our judging, from motives and objects of choice to the responsible deliberateness with which we choose. Essentially such introspection consists in a shift of attention: from attending to objects we turn to attending to the operations with respect to objects. But this essence of introspection is not achieved in isolation. It occurs and recurs within a context, which within the unfolding of a method. To introspect one must evoke the appropriate state and produce the operation Wolde under investigation. If this preliminary is easily fulfilled when one is asking what it is to see or hear or imagine, not a little forethought and ingenuity are needed when one is asking about symbols, inquiry, insight, definition, thought, critical 444 reflection, weighing the evidence, judging, evaluating, deliberating, deciding. One's state and operation must be genuine. One must be content to begin

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not from what is more interesting but from what is simpler and more precise. One has to be as much concerned with the relations between operations as with the operations themselves. One must discover for oneself that shifting attention from the intended object to the conscious act what not yet the poject wantsh

is not a matter of concentrating attention on the act to let the object vanish and with it the act but, on the contrary, being occupied with a task of inquiry, discernment, distinction, identification, naming, that provides the context within which introspection is demanded and occurs. Above all, one must not hope to introspect vicariously. One has to do it for oneself. Otherwise one will never know what all the talk is about. Just as the man born blind knows colour, not by seeing it, but by some inadequate analogy HSP with which his misfortune forces him to be content, so too a reader, that does not introspect to discover and identify within himself the conscious, pr pattern of his own recurrent and related operations, will get no further than some vague association between his personal experience and the terms and relations employed to refer to it. He will not properly pierce theveil of language and attain the familiarity that enables him to pin down exactly the conscious event or process that is meant. At most, he can employ some elegant and exquisite manner of discussion and clarification that prepares indeed the way and lights the path of introspection but never opens the door, enters, and thereby passes beyond talk to what is talked about.

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Introspection objectifies not only conscious operations but also conscious processes. There is, accordingly, something ouite exceptional about an inquiry into the nature of our own Sensitive perception does not reveal intelligible minda. relations: we perceive not causality but succession. In like manner introspection does not reveal between our acts the abstract conceptiual content, causality. But it does reveal concrete process and, as we move from level to level, the conceptual content, causality, appears ever more thin and poor. sensitivity; On the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous, it is intelligible only in the sense that it can be understood; and causality in some non-mechanical sense is not an altogether inadequate conception of it. But with inquiry the intelligent subject comes into his own, and only in its conditions is the merely causal; succession of his operations epochemeous, in itself it is intelligent, not merely an intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative of intelligibility, the intelligence that intelligently seeks understanding, understands, and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term or an impasse, intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as critically reflective, the subject stands in a conscious relation to an absolute -- the absolute that makes us regard the positive content of the sciences Finally, the as only probable. The rational subject, knowing himself, his world, and their potentialities, rationally gives # way to conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility.

It's objectify consciousness as process, then, is to object if the attentiveness of our experiencing, the intelligence of our works with which we judge, the

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With the objectification of conscious processes we have moved from the level of experience to that of understanding. For understanding unites and relates. But not only our conscious acts are given but also their unity and their relatedness. Indeed, the relatedness of the acts is precisely the process within which they emerge, a process that is conscious and Alth its different modalities of its encessive levels? takes on different modalities on its successive levels. Hence, our understanding of our conscious acts is not confined to such generalities as functional unity and interdepedence. It will speak of the attentiveness that directs our experiencing, the intelligence that controls our investigating, the reasonableness that grounds our judging, the responsible deliberateness from which spring our choices. Finally, if anyone asks what these terms mean, he will have to be told, alas, that he must find out the answers for himself, by being attengtive and noting the fact, by investigating intelligently and noting just what happens, by judging reasonably and adverting to that, by choosing responsibly and finding out what that refers to.

Besides experience and understanding of our conscious and intentional activities there is also the question of fact. Are our activities such as we have described them? Is not the account we have offered just another probable hypothesis that is due sooner or later for revision and, when revised, sooner or later will be due for another revision, and so on indefinitely?

To answer this question, one must ask another. Under what conditions is revision possible? There are, I submit, four conditions. First, any possible revision will appeal to further data that the opinion under review either overlooked

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or misapprehended, and so an empirical level of operations must be presupposed by any revision. Secondly, any possible revision will offer a better explanation of the data, and so an intellectual level of operations must be presupposed by any revision. Thirdly, any possible revision will claim that the better explanation is more probable, and such a judgement presupposes a rational level of operations. Fourthly, a revision is not a mere possibility but an accomplished fact only as the result of a judgement of value and a decision; one undertakes the labour with all its risks of failure and frustration only because one holds, not only in theory but also in practice, that it is worthwhile to get things straight, to know with exactitude, to contribute to the advancement of science; and so at the root of all revision, as at the root of all method, there has to be presupposed a level of operations on which we evaluate and choose responsibly.

It follows that there is a sense in which the normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations does not admit revision. The sense in cuestion is that the activity of revising consists in such operations in accord with that pattern, so that a revision rejecting the pattern would be rejecting itself.

There is, then, a rock on which one can build. But let me repeat once more there the precise character of that rock. It is not any theory or description or account of our conscious and intentional activities, for any theory, description, account will be incomplete and inaccurate. The rock is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. The point to the task begin to of introspection is to learn what these are and that they are.

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#### 5. From First Principles to Transcendental Method

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By a principle is meant a first in an ordered set.

By first principles commonly are understood first premisses. The relevant set, then, is a set of propositions. The order is deductivist. And the propositions that are premisses but not conclusions are first premisses or first principles.

Now the transition from logic to method does not eliminate logic but, on the contrary, embraces it within a larger whole, that includes inquiry, investigation, discovery, verification, revision, development. So it is that our present topic, the transition from first principles to transcendental method, does not suggest that the logical ordering of propositions and the recognition of first premisses is to be abandoned. On the contrary, such ordering is to be retained but with xin the larger whole of method. Moreover, since method is dynamic, any given ordering is open to revision, adjustment, correction, development. While it will always be possible to assign the first premisses of formulated knowledge at its present stage, still, the present stage is only a point of transition towards a hermoni more adequate future. In brief, first complete, definitively formulated, premisses remain, but they cannot be conceived as immutable first principles.

But if the foundations appropriate to deductivism are abandoned, it does not follow that there are to be no foundations at all. On the contrary, as there are firsts in the order of premisses, so too there is a first in the order of methods. That first is transcendental method, and its function is to provide foundations when one moves from the abstractness of

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logic and the <u>Posterior Analytics</u>, of human nature and the human soul, to the concreteness of individual human subjects in their historical milieux working at modern sciences in accord with their approphriate methods.

A full account of transacadental method would be a very large volume. My swn view of it may be found in my book, Inaight

Some account of transcendental method has already been given in the preceding section. More along the same lines may be found in my book, <u>Insight</u>, in which subjects are invited to seek first-hand knowledge of (1) what they are doing when they are knowing, (2) why is doing that knowing, and (3) what do they does one know when they do it. For the present, then, I may be content to draw attention to the functions and properties of transcendental method.

First, there is the normative function. All special methods consist in making specific the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are ever formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts have prior existence and reality in spontaneous, the structured b dynamism of human conscioueness. That dynamism is not necessarily effective, for a man need not be authentic. At any moment he can slip into inattention, stupidity, silliness, irresponsibility. But he does not do so without failing to realize his own proper essence.

Secondly, there is the critical function. The scandal still continues that men, while they tend to agree on scientific questions, tend to disagree in the most outrageous fashion of on brid basic philosophic issues. So they disagree about the nature of the activity named knowing, about the relation

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of that activity to reality, and about reality itself. But differences on the second and third can be reduced to prior differences on the first, and differences on the first can be resolved by bringing to light the contradiction between a mistaken cognitional theory and the actual performance of the mistaken theorist. To take the simplest instance, Hume thought the human mind to be a matter of impressions linked by custom. But Hume's own mind was quite original. Therefore, Hume's own mind was not what Hume considered the human mind to be.

44

Thirdly, there is the dialectical function. For the critical use of transcendental method can be applied to every mistaken cognitional theory explicit or implicit. The applications can be extended to concomitant views on epistemology and metaphysics. In this fashion one can determine the dialectical series of basic positions, which criticism confirms, and basic counter-positions, which criticism confounds.

Fourthly, there is the systematic function. For in the measure that transcendental method is objectified, there are determined a set of basic terms and relations, namely, the terms that refer to the operations of cognitional process, and the relations that link these operations to one another. the Such terms and relations are substance of cognitional theory. They reveal the ground for epistemology. They are found to be isomorphic with the terms and relations denoting the ontological structure of any reality proportionate to human Éognitional process.

Fifthly, the foregoing systematic function assures continuity without imposing rigidity. Continuity is assured by the source of the Xasic terms and relations, for that source is human cognitional process in its concrete reality.

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Rigidity is not imposed, for a fuller and more exact knowledge of human cognitional process is by no means excluded and, in the is measure it is attained, there are to be expected a fuller and more exact determination of basic terms and relations.

Finally, the mark exclusion of rigidity is not a menace to conditions of the continuity for, as we have seen, the very possibility of revision sets a limits to the possibility of revising cognitional limits be. theory; and the more elaborate the revision, the stricter will the

Sixthly, there is the heuristic function. Every inquiry aims at transforming some unknown into a known. Inquiry itself, then, is something between ignorance and knowledge. For it is less than knowledge, else there would be no need to inquire. But it is more than sheer ignorance, for it knows promet to inquire has discovered its ignorance and knows enough to inquire makes ignorance manifest and strives to replace it with knowledge. This intermediary between ignorance and knowledge is intending, and what is intended is  $\frac{1}{2}$  an unknown that is to be known.

Now fundamentally all method is the exploitation of such intending, for it outlines the steps to be taken if one is to proceed from the inital intending of the question to the eventual knowing of what has been intended all along. Moreover, within method itself there the use of heuristic devices is fundamental. They consist in designating and naming the intended unknown, in setting down at once all that can be affirmed about it, and of using this explicit knowledge as a guide, a criterion, or a premiss in the effort to arrive at fuller knowledge. Such is the function of unknown, X, the algebraist's X- in the solution of problems. Such is or generic the physicist's use of indeterminate functions or of classes

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of functions specified only by differential equations.

Now transcendental method has a heuristic function. For in the measure that the subject is known, there i comes to light the intending of inquiry, ind its correlative that though unknown at least is intended, and the gradual determination accumulation of determinations that changes the unknown into a known. Further, inasmuch as the systematic function has provided its sets of basic terms and relations, there also are provided basic determinations that dreated are to an object once whenever the unknown is a human subject or an object propositionate to human cognitional process.

Seventhly, there is the foundational function For special methods employ human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonablenecss, responsibility, in accord with the exist egences of some limited field. They observe the norms set forth in an objectification of transcendental method but, in addition, they observe further norms that arise from their proper subject-matter and have become known through the adcumulated experience for investivators in that Therd

Seventhly, there is the foundational function. Special methods, no doubt, derive their proper norms from the accumulated experience of investigators in their several, separate fields. But besides the proper norms, there are also common norms. Besides the tasks of each field there are interdisciplinary problems. Underneath the consent of men as scientists, there is their dissent on matters of ultimate significance and concern. It is in the measure that [the methods of the sp] special methods acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be attained for attacking inter-

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disciplinary problems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within a higher unity in which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the solution of philosophic problems.

Eightly, transcendental method is relevant to theology. This relevance, of course, is mediated by the special method proper to theology and developed through the reflection of theologians on the successes and failures on their efforts past and present. Now this special method, while it has its own special classes and combinations of operations, none the less is the work of human minds performing the same basic operations in the same basic relations as are to be found in other special methods. And In other words, transcendental method is a constillent part of the special mt method proper to theology, just as it is a constituent part in the special methods proper to the natureal and to the human sciences. However true it is that one attends, understands, judges, dejcides differently in the natural sciences, in the human sciences, and in theology, still these differences in no way imply or suggest a transition from attention to inattention, from intelligence to stupidity, from reasonableness to silliness, from responsibility to irresponsibility.

Mintuly, might we once and for all remind the resder that once the new context is introduced, one may not revert to the old without confusion and fallacy. Philosophy and theology and their relations, as conceived in the old context, are one thing. Transcedental and special methods are quite another. It would be a blunder, if not mere ill will, to relate the methods of the new context in the menner appropriate to relating sciences in the old context.

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Ninthly, the objects of theology do not lie outside the transcendental field. For that field is unrestricted, and so outside it there is simply nothing at all. It is, of course, true that what man can know is limited, and the precise nature of such limitations will have to be considered defined not by in due course. But the transcendental field is not recordiated by the what man can know but to what man can ask about, and it is only because questions are unrestricted that we are aware of the limitations of our knowledge.

48

Tenthly, to assign transcendental method a foundational role in theology adds no new resource to theology but simply draws attention to a resource that always has been used. For transcendental method is the concrete and dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and that unfolding occurs whenever anyone uses his mind in an appropriate fashion. Hence, to introduce transcendental method no new resource introduces, potking new into theology, for theologians always have had minds and always have used them. But while it adds no new resource, it does add considerable light and precision to the performance of theological tasks, and this, I trust, will become manifest in due course.

In the eleventh place, transcendental method is the key to the needed new context. The immobility of Aristotelian science conflicts with developing natural science, developing human science, developing dogma, and developing theology. In harmony with all development is the human mind itself which effects the developments. In unity with all fields, however disparate, is again the human mind that operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each. Through the self-knowledge, helf-possesters? self-appropriation,

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normative pattern of the recurrent and related operations of human cognitional process, it becomes possible to envisage a future in which all <u>finite</u> workers in all fields can find in transcendental method common norms, common critical, diffectical, heuristic procedures, common foundations and systematics.

In the twelffth place, the introduction of transcendental method abrogates the old metaphor that describes philosophy as the handmaid of theology and replaces it by a very precise fact. To study transcendental method is not to study theology, or human science, or natural science. On the other hand, to study theology or human science or natural science is to use one's mind and, if one is the not merely to do so but also to know what one is doing, then one must-also-study-transcendentak method, to know bas'cally what others-are doing in other fields, to be able to communicate with them, then one must study & transcendental method.

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# 4. The New Theology

If a new context implies a new theology, that implication does little to gafine what the new theology is to be it does how settle questions that are properly theological. But it does throw considerable light on the structures theology is to build and the procedures it is to employ. With these, I fined am sure, theology will feel more at ease than with the awkward stance and ill-fitting garments imposed in the past.

First, then, theology includes inferences, but its over-all structure is not deductivist. Basically, though not exclusively, it is an empirical, interpretative, historical science. Its primary sources are scripture and tradition. Their exact content has to be ascertained. It has to be viewed in historical perspective. It has to be expressed in contemporary language. That, of course, is not the whole of theology, but it is an essential part. In one sense the fact has always been recognized; in another, it is of recent date, for the need of historical perspective was overlooked both by the mediaeval <u>summa</u> and by the <u>de locis</u> of Melchior Cano.

A <u>summa</u> aimed at answering coherenting some totality of <u>auaestiones</u>. The existence of each <u>auaestic</u> had to be established by quoting authorities or reasons both for a negative (<u>videtur</u> <u>audo noin</u>) and for an affirmative (<u>sed contra est</u>) answerm <u>membrane</u> reply. The immediate task in each <u>auaestic</u> was the elimination of <u>whet</u> apparent contradictions whether between authorities or, on the other hand, between authoritative doctrine and the mediaeval mind. But besides this immediate task there was the far larger and profounder problem of making all the replies in a <u>summa</u> coherent with one another, for

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this demanded that theologians make explicit, clarify, correlate their fundamental assumptions and that they adopt, adapt, suppleand apply ment some system of basic terms and relations. The mediaeval <u>summa</u>, then, was empirical in the sense that it proceeded from scripture and tradition and that it aimed at the coherent assimilation of apparently opposed authorities. But the coherence it sought was simply logical and systematic. There was practically no awareness of the development of doctrine and so ht practically no reconciliation of opposed texts through a  $\frac{1}{2}$  historically grounded interpretation.

The type of theology codified by Melchior Cano aimed at proving current Catholic doctrine by arguing from the scriptures, from pontifical statements, from the councils, from the Fathers, and from the theologians. Undeniably it was an empirical and positive theology. But it evinced little appreciation of historical investigation and of historical process.

Today historical investigation is so complex that the study of the scriptures, the Fathers, the theologians is divided and subdivided among specialists. Such refined specialization is necessitated by the fact of development. Even though terms and concepts are general, and so prescind from space and time, still the act of denoting or conceiving proceeds from an act of understanding. But understanding develops over time; it develops in one manner in this area manner and in another, when in that; and so the concepts and if terms, in which understanding is expressed, are differentiated by their time and place of origin. To reach an exact knowledge their time and place of origin. To reach an exact knowledge of these bitferences and to discover under them their torm invulty are tasks, not of the Rensissance under them their torm

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of these differences and, beyond them, to discover their underlying continuity are tasks, not for the Renaissance <u>upmo univer-</u> <u>sale</u>, but for successive generations of specialists united by a common method and directed by it towards a common goal.

Again, the process from the sources to later developed doctrines is not adequately conceived as a matter of proof or argument. A logical conclusion follows instantaneously from its premisses, but doctrines develop only over long periods of time. Moreover, most developments occur in different manners. They are to be understood in the main only torough a historical investigation of the problems that were being met, of the circumstances that made the problems urgent, of the means employed to reach a solution. Finally, just as development varies from instance to instance, so too does the legitimacy proper to each development. Indeed, it is by understanding just what happened that one comes to see why it should have happened.

To conclude this first point, Catholic theology has always been empirical in the sense that it took its stand upon scripture and tradition. But it is mainly within the present century that it has become historical in the sense proper to contemporary scholarship. It is, of course, this fact that, in part, has already brought about a new theology and, in jew part, has set up an exigence for a fundamental review of theological method.

Secondly, theology has to be liberated from the mistaken notion that it is a science on the analogy of Aristotle's <u>episteme</u>. The latter is deductivist, but we have just argued the that theology is not deductivist. The latter is about the necessary, the abstract, the certain; for theology such characteristics are a Procrustean bed.

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Theology is not about the necessary. It is about the Blessed Trinity and the economy of salvation. The Blessed has been conceived as we trinity in itself to necessary, but to say a apprehend that necessity is the semi-rationalism condemned in Vatican I. The economy of salvation is not necessary but the provide the semi-rationalism condemned in Vatican I. free, to gratuitous, and the opposite view is associated with the errors of Baius.

To deny necessity is not, of course, to deny intelligibility. For intelligibility is the genus, and necessity is only one of its species; the other is verifiable possibility.

Nor is there any obscurity about verifiable possibility. It is what is reached in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and no one today is completely ignorant of those sciences. What is obscure is the view that theology deals with something avaloyaud that is not necessary but analogous to necessity. Frecisely because that is obscure, the theologian has constantly to be explaining that the intelligibilities he is proposing are not necessities. Moreover, his hearers conclude that, since they are not necessities, they are not worth bothering about. So the intelligibility that theology can and does reach is tends to be unintelligent neglected; dogmatic truth becomes, reduced to the repetition risks becoming of formulae; and rebellion against this t abuse which to baapood a rebellion against dogma.

As theology is not about the necessary, so it is not about the abstract. It is about the concrete. The Blessed Trinity is concrete. The economy of salvation is concrete. It is true, of course, that theology does not know the Blessed Trinity in its concreteness or the economy of salvation in its concreteness, for mamb man does not know anything in its concreteness, since that is knowing all there is to be known

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Just as physics, chemistry, biology, and the human sciences, so too theology is concerned to know, not abstractions, but the concrete universe.

This statement does not imply that these sciences know the universe or part of it in its concreteness, for that is know all there is to be known about a thing. Again, it does not imply that these sciences do not employ general terms and principles; they do, but they are not confined to generalities; on the contrary, they make it their aim to surmount the limitations of the generality and to reach an understanding of concrete processes in nature and in history. When, then, we unge that theology is not about the abstract,

The persato to the statement is the correction of a

A mediaeval mistake that attempted to keep the object of science necessary by taking refuge in abstractions. Now it is true that the abstract as abstract is immobile and, in that sense, necessary. But it does not follow that the content that is abstracted is necessary. In fact, in a contingent universe, what is abstracted is found to be, not a necessity, but just a hypothetical possibility.

Finally, while the objects of faith are certain, the objects of theology have any one of a long series of notes ranging from <u>de fide diving et catholica</u> to <u>probabilior</u>. All are equally objects of theology. They are what theology is concerned with. To think of theology as science and of science  $\frac{1}{2}$  as certain has had the disastrous effect of persuading seminarians to confine their attention to matters of faith. Ind so to learn no theology at all and, in their later lives, we give no support to the abademic size of seminary training.

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In their seminary years they are content with a minimal theology and in later life they use their influence and authority to weaken the academic side of seminary training.

Thirdly, theology is not to conceive itself in terms of the Aristotelian distinctions between science and opinion, theory and practice, wisdom and prudence. For these distinctions are mistaken and harmful.

They are mistaken. Science deals more with verifiable possibilities than with necessities. It is to be contrasted, not with opinion for there is scientific opinion, but with common sense. Moreover, since science is about the possible as well as the necessary, its activity is not confined to the contemplative popplatY04 contemplation of Aristotelian theory but, in fact, vastly enlarges the range and improves the effectiveness of man's france deals with the contingent and, indeed, with the enormous complexity of human history, there is needed for its direction not wisdom alone nor prudence alone but a fusion of the two in some higher synthesis.

Not only are the Aristotelian distinctions mistaken. They also are harmful. Modern theory is far more abstruse, more complex, more difficult than anything dreamed of by the Greeks or the Scholastics. But the relatively defined role of incory in the theologiest tradition. But the inheritors of the Greeks and the Scholastics, so far from emulating the moderns in theoretical work, seem to be suffering from a loss has been of nerve. To a great extent, no doubt, this is due to the unending controversies and now to the A contemporary crisis in Catholic theology. But behind it there is also the widespread delusion, grounded in the Aristotelian distinctions, that theory is of no practical utility and merely

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withdraws one from service in the Body of Christ and closets one in some irrelevant ivory tower.

Fourth IV, the the slogian is not so converse two biaself

to conceive himself as Fourthly, the theologian is no longer some per se or de <u>iure</u> subject contemplating necessary, abstract, certain truth. He is a concrete, existential subject within a historical movement. He is one of a group engaged in assimilating the past of that movement and carrying it forward to its future.

This change, of course, is simply in the theologian's conception of himself and his role. Theologians always have been concrete, existential subjects. They have always stood within a historical movement whose origins and traditions they studied, assimilated, ordered, and passed on. Their interest centred on concrete realities. They insisted that they did not of the mysteries apprehend, necessity, even when such reality was necessary. They devoted enormous quantities of time and energy to opinions that they regarded as no more than probable. Their division into various schools and the unresolved disputed questions that have been accumulating since the # Middle Ages made it manifest that theology was not limited to drawing inevitable conclusions from the truths of faith and from the self-evident principles pt reson. But while this is what the logy has, in fact, been still there the actual practice had no theoretical formulation of itself as science apart from the analogy of Aristotelian science; and though lanalogy' meant no more than partly the sene and partly olf-ferent Such, then, is with the theology of reason. Such, then, is what theologians and theology in fact have been. But actual practice is one thing; its theoretical formulation is another. In the past an adequate theoretical

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formulation of theological reality has been lacking, and our concern with method is a concoern to work out such a formulation.

Fifthly, method directs operations towards ends. So far from being indifferent to values (wertfrei), it is concerned with values, namely, the values proper to the science in question. Moreover, in directing operations towards ends, method does not prescind from the operators. On the contrary, it wants them trained and skilled in the operations required of them. It wants them committed to the ends towards which they operate. Indeed, in the principal case of transcendental method with its normative, critical, and dialectical functions, method aims at the intellectual conversion of the operator.

On conversion and its three forms intellectual, morel, and religious - more will be said in due course. But at once recall I must insist that (I) science as conceived in terms of method is suite different from science as conceived in the <u>Posterior</u> <u>Analytics</u> and (RM from this I must conclude that theology now will be a science, not by analogy, but properly, simply because it has its own proper method

On conversion and its three's forms -- intellectual, moral, and religious -- more will be said in due course. But at once I must recall that science as conceived in terms of method is quite different from science as conceived in the <u>Posterior</u> <u>reads to be conceived as</u> <u>healties</u> <u>On the latter view of ence is an inevitable</u> <u>de</u> <u>contemplation of abstract necessities in a terms or de inner <u>Analytics</u>. On the latter view, not only is science about the <u>per se</u>, manadam and so about the abstract and necessary, but s also, since there is a science about science, science itself has to be thought of as a <u>per se</u>, abstract, and necessary.</u>

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Such science has to be the work of some pure intellect, equally per se, abstract, and for that reason necessary. It must prescind from values, from will, from conversion. In contrast, method is concerned with movement, with operations and ends, with values and if need be with confiversion. Whether or not we are to conficeive theology as analogously or properly a science of the modern, methodical type, had best, I think, be discussed in another context. But at least it is evident that theology, governed by its own proper much method, will be cover to the modern idea of science than it ever could be to the Aristotelian idea.

58

Sixthly, while the normative, critical, dialectical functions of transcendental method can be expected to contribute greatly to clearing away the thick underbrush of disputed perennially disputed questions that have afflicted theology for centuries, they also have a highly important relevance for the more recently developed aspects of theology. I have said that theology, among other things, is an empirical, interpretative, historical science. I must add that the issues that are raised in their general form by reflecting on transcendental method, also are raised in a concrete and far more complex form when one asks what precisely is empirical science, what precisely is hermeneutics, what precisely is history. The general reflecting on Aquestions raised by transcendental method are (1) what is one doing when one is knowing, (2) why is doing that knowing, and

they demand more specific and detailed answers when one asks an interpretation, about date doing empirical science, doing hermaneutics, doing history. Moreover, it is only by answering these questions in a fundamental, adequate, and coherent manner that one can

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(3) what does one know when one does it. All three recor and

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hope to heal the breach between the older and the more recent achievements of theology. For one cannot have a g clear and satisfactory connection and interdependence of the many parts of theology without taking the trouble to work out the precise functions of each of the parts.

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Seventhly, contemporary theology is already has the bulk bulk of a modern science. It is not to stored in the acquired notable habit of a single mind; soveral special anumber of specialists are needed to represent its many parts and sections. It is not set forth to be evented in some great book; indeed, it is only sampled by a large and costly library.

It follows that in teaching theology the aim cannot be to communicate the whole of theology to each of the students. For in the future theology will reside not in the single mind but in a community of minds. The community will have to know the whole of theology, not indeed in the sense that each member knows the whole, but in the sense that each knows a part and that the sum of the parts is the whole.

Again, it follows that communications must be maintained, written in books and periodicals, oral in regional meetings and congresses. For without communications the theological community dissolves into a set of isolated individuals, and theology itself resolves into a manifold of unrelated parts.

Finally, for communications to be possible, the parts of theology must be functional parts that by their very nature are ordered to one another and dependent on one another. For without such a functional interrelationship each specialist knows perfectly well that his field or department is a little , and sovereign state, that as he has nothing to teach others in their

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fields so he has nothing to learn from them in his own. Under such circumstances the means of communication can be multiplied, but the publications and congresses will only reflect the isolation of the parts and their failure to come together and form a whole.

Eighthly, the methodical conception of theology as the concrete operations of concrete subjects with respect to concrete objects effectively excludes the extrinstacism that has at times afflicted theology in the past.

the we have already had occasion to mention the extrinspeciam of 'objective' concepts. It argues from the abstractness of concepts to their immutability, and from their immutability to the the exclusion of change, development, devaluation. Now it is true that change occurs only in concrete realities, so that the concept <u>qua</u> abstract is immutable. Still, every concept is the term of a process of conceiving, that process is concrete, it proceeds from concrete acts of understanding, and over time understanding develops or declines.

Besides the extrinsecism of 'objective' concepts, there is also the extrinsticism of 'objective' truths. Despite the explicit doctrine of Aquinas that, since truth is in the mind, there can be eternal truth only in an eternal wind simmantaneous mind<sup>1</sup>, there have been those for whom the objectivity of truth

1) <u>Sum. theol</u>., I, q. 16, a. 7 c.

implies a complete disregard of minds. Such was the assumption underlying the assertion of a <u>fides scientifics</u> on the ground that the mysteries were syllogistically demonstrable. For thom reason we know that Goo neither can deceive nor be deceived? from apologetics we know pritor it.

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in the pratambula <u>fidei</u> we establish that God has revealed

from reason we know that what God has revealed is true; in the <u>praeambula fidei</u> we establish that God revealed the mysteries; therefore, we must conclude, the mysteries are true. But this argument only as long as one does not ask in whose mind the truth is asserted to exist. What God has revealed is true, in the divine mind, I grant, in the minds of believers, I grant, in the minds of non-believers, I deny. Therefore, the mysteries are true, in the divine mind, I grant, in the minds of believers, I grant, in the minds of hord non-believers, I deny.

Ninthly, the transition from, per se subject to concrete subjects in need of conversion affects one's theological judgement on the possibility of a natureal theorigy. For from a theological viewpoint all men are sinners, ind need of divine grace, g ranted the grace they need, and either cooperating with grace or failing to do so. In the concrete, then, there is no purely natural subject. Man, qua sinner, is most likely either to fail to arrive at a natural theology or, if he succeeds, to do so for they wrong reasons to the detriment of theology and religion. Man, qua aided by grace, can undergo intellectual conversion and so bring about the theoretical achievement named natural theology. But that achievement will be accepted by others only if they, in turn, undergo intellectual conversion. In brief, because the theoretical achievement does exist, it without qualification is a mistake to deny, the possibility of a natural theology; and because the per se subject is just an abstraction, it is vithout qualification a mistake to affirm the concrete existence of a natural theology.

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